AVERAGE DAILY UNIT POWER LEVEL

DOCKET NO. 50-346
UNIT Davis-Besse Unit 1
DATE June 9, 1980
COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000, Ext. 251

MONTH May, 1980

DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)	DAY	AVERAGE DAILY POWER LEVEL (MWe-Net)
1	0	17	0
2	0	18	0
3	0	19	0
4	0	20	0
5	0	21	0
6	0	22	0
7	0	23	0
8	0	24	0
9	0	25	0
10	0	26	0
11	0	27	0
12	0	28	0
13	0	29	0
14	0	30	0
15	0	31	0
16	0		

INSTRUCTIONS

On this format, list the average daily unit power level in MWe-Net for each day in the reporting month. Compute to the nearest whole megawatt.

(9/77)

8006130 275

OPERATING DATA REPORT

DOCKET NO. 50-346
DATE June 9, 1980
COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000
Ext. 251

OPERATING STATUS

1. Unit Name: Davis-Besse Unit 1
2. Reporting Period: May, 1980
3. Licensed Thermal Power (MWt): 2772
4. Nameplate Rating (Gross MWe): 925
5. Design Electrical Rating (Net MWe): 906
6. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Gross MWe): 934
7. Maximum Dependable Capacity (Net MWe): 890

Notes

8. If Changes Occur in Capacity Ratings (Items Number 3 Through 7) Since Last Report, Give Reasons:

9. Power Level To Which Restricted, If Any (Net MWe):
10. Reasons For Restrictions, If Any:

	This Month	Yr.-to-Date	Cumulative
11. Hours In Reporting Period	744	3,647	24,172
12. Number Of Hours Reactor Was Critical	0	2,078	13,042
13. Reactor Reserve Shutdown Hours	0	0	28,758
14. Hours Generator On-Line	0	2,008.7	11,883.0
15. Unit Reserve Shutdown Hours	0	0	1,728
16. Gross Thermal Energy Generated (MWH)	0	4,687,305	24,886,812
17. Gross Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	0	1,583,559	8,307,070
18. Net Electrical Energy Generated (MWH)	0	1,483,787	7,654,365
19. Unit Service Factor	0	55.1	50.4
20. Unit Availability Factor	0	55.1	58.2
21. Unit Capacity Factor (Using MDC Net)	0	45.7	38.3
22. Unit Capacity Factor (Using DER Net)	0	44.9	37.6
23. Unit Forced Outage Rate	0	14.3	25.6

24. Shutdowns Scheduled Over Next 6 Months (Type, Date, and Duration of Each):

25. If Shut Down At End Of Report Period, Estimated Date of Startup: August 1, 1980
26. Units In Test Status (Prior to Commercial Operation):

	Forecast	Achieved
INITIAL CRITICALITY		
INITIAL ELECTRICITY		
COMMERCIAL OPERATION		

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UNIT SHUTDOWNS AND POWER REDUCTIONS

REPORT MONTH May, 1980

DOCKET NO. 50-346
UNIT NAME Davis-Besse Unit 1
DATE June 9, 1980
COMPLETED BY Bilal Sarsour
TELEPHONE (419) 259-5000 Ext. 251

No.	Date	Type[1]	Duration (Hours)	Reason[2]	Method of Shutting Down Reactor[3]	Licensee Event Report #	System Code[4]	Component Code[5]	Cause & Corrective Action to Prevent Recurrence
4	80 04 7	S	744	C	4	NA	NA	NA	Unit outage which began on April 7, 1980 was still in progress through the end of May, 1980. (See operational summary for further details).

1
F: Forced
S: Scheduled

2
Reason:
A-Equipment Failure (Explain)
B-Maintenance or Test
C-Refueling
D-Regulatory Restriction
E-Operator Training & License Examination
F-Administrative
G-Operational Error (Explain)
H-Other (Explain)

3
Method:
1-Manual
2-Manual Scram.
3-Automatic Scram.
4-Continuation
5-Reduction
9-Other

4
Exhibit G - Instructions for Preparation of Data Entry Sheets for Licensee Event Report (LER) File (NUREG-0161)

5
Exhibit I - Same Source

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OPERATIONAL SUMMARY
MAY, 1980

5/1/80 - 5/31/80 The unit outage which began on April 7, 1980, was still in progress through the end of May, 1980.

The following are the more significant outage activities performed during the month of May:

1. Replacement of reactor coolant pump seals for Reactor Coolant Pumps 1-1 and 2-2.

2. Overhaul of many station pumps and valves.

3. Performance of electrical preventive maintenance.

4. The turbine work is approximately 75% completed. The high pressure turbine and main feed pump turbine 1-1 are reassembled, and the low pressure turbine is being reassembled.

5. The modifications to the moisture separator reheater are 70% completed.

6. The majority of the circulating water canal work is completed.

7. The modifications to the fuel transfer system were completed. Fuel shuffle was commenced and was completed 95 hours later.

8. A holddown spring on assembly C-3 was discovered to be broken. The subsequent video investigation of fuel assemblies in the core and spent fuel pool revealed definite spring problems.

   Irradiated springs have been sent to Babcock and Wilcox Lynchburg Research Center for analyses.

REFUELING INFORMATION

DATE: May, 1980

1. Name of facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Unit 1

2. Scheduled date for next refueling shutdown: April, 1980

3. Scheduled date for restart following refueling: August, 1980

4. Will refueling or resumption of operation thereafter require a technical specification change or other license amendment? If answer is yes, what, in general, will these be? If answer is no, has the reload fuel design and core configuration been reviewed by your Plant Safety Review Committee to determine whether any unreviewed safety questions are associated with the core reload (Ref. 10 CFR Section 50.59)?

   Yes, see attached

5. Scheduled date(s) for submitting proposed licensing action and supporting information. February, 1980 (revision submittal expected)

6. Important licensing considerations associated with refueling, e.g., new or different fuel design or supplier, unreviewed design or performance analysis methods, significant changes in fuel design, new operating procedures.

7. The number of fuel assemblies (a) in the core and (b) in the spent fuel storage pool.

   (a) 177 (b) 44 - Spent Fuel Assemblies
   8 - New Fuel Assemblies

8. The present licensed spent fuel pool storage capacity and the size of any increase in licensed storage capacity that has been requested or is planned, in number of fuel assemblies.

   Present 735 Increase size by 0 (zero)

9. The projected date of the last refueling that can be discharged to the spent fuel pool assuming the present licensed capacity.

   Date 1989 (assuming ability to unload the entire core into the spent fuel pool is maintained and the unit goes to an 18 month refueling cycle)

4. The following Technical Specifications (Part A) will require revision:

2.1.1 & 2.1.2 - Reactor Core Safety Limits (and Bases)
2.2.1 - Reactor Protection System Instrumentation Setpoints (and Bases)
3.1.3.6 - Regulating Rod Insertion Limits
3.1.3.7 - Rod Program
3.2.1 - Axial Power Imbalance (and Bases)

The following Technical Specifications (Part A) may also require revision:

3.1.2.8 & 3.1.2.9 - Borated Water Sources (and Bases)
3.2.4 - Quadrant Power Tilt (and Bases)
3.2.5 - DNB Parameters (and Bases)

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUESTS

FCR NO. 78-315

SYSTEM: Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS)

COMPONENT: SFAS wiring for valve CC1407B

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: On April 26, 1980, FCR 78-315 was closed out. FCR 78-315 was written on June 26, 1978 to document work performed on SFAS Channels 2 and 4 on that date with the verbal approval of Toledo Edison Power Engineering. The modification involved making wiring changes in two SFAS cabinets such that the white wire on pin "K" of connectors J208 and J408 was moved to pin "C" of each connector which was a spare.

REASON FOR THE CHANGE: The wire running between the two cabinets via pin "K" in connectors J208 and J408 was broken which prevented actuation of valve CC1407B (component cooling water outlet isolation valve from containment). Substituting the spare conductor restored the ability of the SFAS to operate this valve. See Licensee Event Report NP-33-78-88 for further details.

SAFETY EVALUATION: This FCR provides for changing internal cabinet connection wires in channels 2 and 4 of the SFAS in connectors J208 and J408. Presently, these wires show a discontinuity which prevents actuation of valve CC1407B (component cooling outlet isolation valve from containment) on SFAS logic L422B/L424B.

The wires would be replaced by good wires which would enable actuation of the above valve as required by the SFAS.

Replacing of defective wires by good wires does not constitute an unreviewed safety question.

COMPLETED FACILITY CHANGE REQUEST

FCR NO. 78-511

SYSTEM: Solid Radwaste

COMPONENT: Radwaste Solidication System

CHANGE, TEST, OR EXPERIMENT: On April 10, 1980, the 10CFR50.59 review requested by FCR 78-511 was completed. The purpose of this review was to comply with the NRC requirement that such a review be undertaken when a utility utilizes a Chem-Nuclear Systems, INC., mobile radwaste solidification system. System Procedure SP 1104.28, "Solid Radioactive Waste Disposal", was modified to reflect the use of the Chem-Nuclear system.

REASON FOR THE CHANGE: The Chem-Nuclear system is being utilized because the plant's installed solidification system is inoperable.

SAFETY EVALUATION: Liquid radwaste at Davis-Besse is being solidified using a Chem-Nuclear mobile solidification system. The system is located in the fuel handling area of the auxiliary building on elevation 585', near the existing radwaste drumming station area. This evaluation is based on the skid and liners for the mobile solidification system remaining in their present location in the fuel handling area. The solidified product meets all current NRC and DOT requirements for shipping and burial. The procedures used to transfer radwaste to the liners and the procedures used for the solidication system (SP 1104.28) have been approved by the Station Review Board. Liquid radwaste (200 ft^3/liner is transferred to a 300 ft^3 liner in the fuel handling area where it will be solidified by a Chem-Nuclear operator utilizing their mobile solidification system. Once liquid has been placed in a liner, the liner is not moved until it has been solidified, thus eliminating the hazard of spilling due to mishandling. Should a liquid filled liner leak, or the waste supply line to the liner develop a leak, the liquid would flow into the drains in the fuel handling area or the radwaste drumming area drains which are all routed to a sump in the auxiliary building and then into the miscellaneous liquid radwaste system. The drains and the sumps are adequate to handle this material and contain it within the auxiliary building. Normal fuel handling ventilation filtration consists of prefilters and HPEA filters. On high radiation in the fuel handling area, the normal ventilation system is actuated for the area to ensure radiation limits at the site boundaries are well within the 10CFR Part 100 guidelines. Therefore, the ventilation systems are adequate to handle the solidification activities in the area. An unreviewed safety question is NOT involved with this activity for the following reasons:

1. The probability of occurrence or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety previously evaluated in the final safety analysis report is NOT increased.

2. A possibility for an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the final safety analysis report is NOT created.

3. The margin of safety as defined in the bases for any technical specification is NOT reduced.