

**PGE**



Portland General Electric Company  
Trojan Nuclear Plant  
P.O. Box 439  
Rainier, Oregon 97048  
(503) 556-3713

May 30, 1980  
CPY-522-80

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V  
1990 North California Blvd.  
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appendix A, US NRC Technical Specifications, Paragraph 3.9.4 B and C, attached is Licensee Event Report No. 80-08, concerning a situation where containment integrity was not maintained while moving fuel in the reactor.

An immediate report has already been made regarding this event (letter CPY-497-80 to R. H. Engelken, dated May 19, 1980).

Sincerely,

C. F. Yundt  
General Manager

*JCP*  
CPY/JCP:na  
Attachments

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

1. Report No.: 80-08
2. a. Report Date: May 30, 1980  
b. Occurrence Date: May 16, 1980
3. Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PØ Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048

4. Identification of Occurrence:

During refueling, containment integrity was not maintained as required.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was conducting refueling operations (Mode 6), transferring fuel from the spent fuel pool to the reactor vessel. RCS temperature was 70°F with one RHR pump in operation.

6. Description of Occurrence:

During refueling of the reactor, containment integrity is required. Maintenance activities were also being conducted on a steam generator and the main steam isolation valves. This resulted in a direct pathway from the containment atmosphere to the outside via an open steam generator secondary manway and a disassembled main steam isolation valve. It is not known exactly how long the pathway actually existed while fuel was being handled, but it can be assumed that it was for at least several hours and maybe as long as several days.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence is personnel error. Existing procedures established to control containment integrity were not followed. Both of the maintenance activities were treated as separate activities having no impact on containment integrity.

8. Analysis of Occurrence:

This event had minimal effect on plant or public safety. The containment is maintained at a negative pressure during refueling so that any fission products that would have been released to the containment following a fuel handling accident would have stayed inside containment.

9. Corrective Action:

This occurrence was discussed with all appropriate supervisors and personnel and the plant Planner/Scheduler was directed to follow plant procedures controlling the establishment and maintenance of containment integrity.