3/4:2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS .

3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.1. All AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATES (APLHGR's) for each type of fuel as a function of AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE shall not exceed the limits shown in Figures 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, 3.2.1-5, or 3.2.1-6.

<u>APPLICABILITY</u>: CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER $\geq 25\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With an APLHGR exceeding the limits of Figure 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2-1-3, 3.2.1-4, 3.2.1-5, or 3.2.1-6, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and continue corrective action so that APLHGR is within the limit within 4 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.1 All APLHGR's shall be verified to be equal to or less than the applicable limit determined from Figure 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, 3.2.1-5, or 3.2.1-6:

- a. At least once per 24 hours,
- b. Whenever THERMAL POWER has been increased by at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER and steady state operating conditions have been established, and
- c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for APLHGR.





MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

BRUNSWICK-UNIT NO. 1





PLANAR AVERAGE EXPOSURE (MWd/t) FUEL TYPE P8DRB285 (P8x8R) MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS AVERAGE PLANAR EXPOSURE

FIGURE 3.2.1-5

3/4 2-5a



MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE



PLANAR AVERAGE EXPOSURE (MWd/t) FUEL TYPE P8DRB265H (P8x8R) MAXIMUM AVERAGE PLANAR I NEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE (MAPLHGR) VERSUS AVERAGE PL.MAR EXPOSURE

FIGURE 3.2.1-6

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.2 The flow biased APRM scram trip setpoint (S) and rod block trip setpoint (S_{op}) shall be established according to the following relationships:

 $S \leq (0.66W + 54\%) T$ $S_{DB} \leq (0.66W + 42\%) T$

where: S and S_{RB} are in percent of RATED THERMAL POWER, W = Loop recirculation flow in percent of rated flow,

T = Lowest value of the racio of design TPF divided by the MTPF obtained for any class of fuel in the core $(T \le 1.0)$, and

Design TPF for 8x8 fuel = 2.45. Design TPF for 8x8R fuel = 2.48. Design TPF for P8x8R fuel = 2.48.

<u>APPLICABILITY</u>: CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER $\geq 25\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER.

ACTION:

With S or S_{RB} exceeding the allowable value, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and continue corrective action so that S and S_{PB} are within the required limits within 4 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER to less than 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.2 The MTPF for each class of fuel shall be determined, the value of T calculated, and the flow biased APRM trip setpoint adjusted, as required:

- a. At least once per 24 hours,
- b. Whenever THERMAL POWER has been increased by at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER and steady state operating conditions have been established, and
- c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for MTPF.

BRUNSWICK-UNIT 1

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.2.3 The MINIMUM CRITICAL POWER RATIO (MCPR), as a function of core flow, shall be equal to or greater than MCPR \mathbf{x} the K_f shown in Figure 3.2.3-1 where MCPR values are:

| | BOC3* to EOC3** - 2000 MWD/t | EOC3-2000 MWD/t to EOC3 | |
|--------------|---------------------------------|----------------------------|--|
| (8x8 fuel) | 1.24 | 1.30 | |
| (8x8R fuel) | 1.24 | 1.30 | |
| (P8x8R fuel) | 1.30 | 1.32 | |

APPLICABILITY: CONDITION 1, when THERMAL POWER > 25% RATED THERMAL POWER

ACTION:

With MCPR less than the applicable limit determined from Figure 3.2.3-1, initiate corrective action within 15 minutes and continue corrective action so that MCPR is equal to or greater than the applicable limit within 4 hours or reduce THERMAL POWER TO LESS THAN 25% of RATED THERMAL POWER within the next 4 hours.

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.2.3 MCPR shall be determined to be equal to or greater than the applicable limit determined from Figure 3.2.3-1:

- a. At least once per 24 hours,
- b. Whenever THERMAL POWER has been increased by at least 15% of RATED THERMAL POWER and sleady state operating conditions have been established, and
- c. Initially and at least once per 12 hours when the reactor is Operating with a LIMITING CONTROL ROD PATTERN for MCPR.

*Beginning of Cycle 3 **End of Cycle 3

BRUNSWICK - UNIT 1

TABLE 3.3.4-2

CONTROL ROD WITHDRAWAL BLOCK INSTRUMENTATION SETPOINTS

| TRIP 1 | FUNCTION AND INSTRUMENT NUMBER | TRIP SETPOINT | ALLOHABLE VALUE | | |
|--------|---|---|---|--|--|
| 1. į | APRM (C51-APRM-CH.A,B,C,D,E,F) | | | | |
| | a. Upscale (Flow Biased) | $< (0.66 \text{ W} + 42\%) \frac{T*}{\text{MTPF}}$ | < (0.66 W + 42%) <u>T*</u> NA MTPF | | |
| | c. Downscale d. Upscale (Fixed) | > 3/125 of full scale $\leq 12\%$ of RATED THERMAL POWER | \geq 3/125 of full scale \leq 12% of RATED THERMAL POWER | | |
| 2. [| ROD BLOCK MONITOR (C51-RBM-CH.A,B) | | | | |
| | a. Upscale b. Inoperative c. Downscale | < (0.66W + 41%) <u>T*</u> NA MTPF <u>></u> 3/125 of full scale | <pre>< (0.66 W + 41%) <u>T*</u> NA MTPF > 3/125 of full scale</pre> | | |
| 3. | OURCE RANGE MONITORS (C51-SRM-K600A, B, C, D) | | | | |
| | a. Detector not full in b. Upscale c. Inoperative d. Downscale | $NA \le 1 \times 10^5 \text{ cps}$ $NA \ge 3 \text{ cps}$ | NA ≤ 1 x 10 ⁵ cps NA ≥ 3 cps | | |
| 4. | INTERMEDIATE RANGE MONITORS (C51-IRM-K601A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) | | | | |
| | a. Detector not full in b. Upscale c. Inoperative d. Downscale | NA \leq 108/125 of full scale \overline{NA} \geq 3/125 of full scale | NA < 108/125 of full scale NA ≥ 3/125 of full scale | | |
| 100.0 | 15 5 2-2 51 | | | | |

T=2.45 for 8x8 fuel.

BRUNSWICK-UNIT 1

3/4 3-42

T=2.48 for 8x8R fuel.

T=2.48 for P8x8R fuel.

3/4.2 POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

The specifications of this section assure that the peak cladding temperature following the postulated design basis loss-of-coolant accident will not exceed the 2200°F limit specified in the Final Acceptance Criteria (FAC) issued in June 1971 considering the postulated effects of fuel pellet densification.

3/4.2.1 AVERAGE PLANAR LINEAR HEAT GENERATION RATE

This specification assures that the peak cladding temperature following the postulated design basis loss-of-coolant accident will not exceed the limit specified in 10 CFR 50, Appendix K.

The peak cladding temperature (PCT) following a postulated lossof-coolant accident is primarily a function of the average heat generation rate of all the rods of a fuel assembly at any axial location and is dependent only secondarily on the rod to rod power distribution within a assembly. The peak clad temperature is calculated assuming a LHGR for the highest powered rod which is equal to or. less than the design LHGR corrected for densification. This LHGR times 1.02 is used in the heatup code along with the exposure dependent steady state gap conductance and rod-to-rod local peaking factor. The Technical Specification APHGR is this LHGR of the highest powered rod divided by its local peaking factor. The limiting value for APLHGR is shown in Figures 3.2.1-1, 3.2.1-2, 3.2.1-3, 3.2.1-4, 3.2.1-5, and 3.2.1-6.

The calculational procedure used to establish the APLHGR shown on Figure 3.2.1-1 thru 3.2.1-6 is based on a loss-of-coolant accident analysis.] The analysis was performed using General Electric (GE) calculational models which are consistent with the requirements of Appendix K to 10 CFR 50. A complete discussion of each code employed in the analysis is presented in Reference 1. Differences in this analysis compared to previous analyses performed with Reference 1 are: (1) The analyses assumes a fuel assembly planar power consistent with 102% of the MAPLHGR shown in Figures 3.2.1-1, and 3.2.1-2; (2) Fission product decay is computed assuming an energy release rate of 200 MEV/Fission; (3) Pool boiling is assumed after nucleate boiling is lost during the flow stagnation period; (4) The effects of core spray entrainment and countercurrent flow limitation as described in Reference 2, are included in the reflooding calculations.

A list of the significant plant input parameters to the loss-ofcoolant accident analysis is presented in Bases Table B 3.2.1-1.

BRUNSWICK-UNIT 1

B 3/4 2-1

POWER DISTRIBUTION LIMITS

BASES

3/4.2.2 APRM SETPOINTS

The fuel cladding integrity safety limits of Specification 2.1 were based on a TOTAL PEAKING FACTOR of 2.45 for 8x8 fuel and 2.48 for 8x8R and P8x8R fuel. The scram setting and rod block functions of the APRM instruments must be adjusted to ensure that the MCPR does not become less than 1.0 in the degraded situation. The scram settings and rod block settings are adjusted in accordance with the formula in this specification when the combination of THERMAL POWER and peak flux indicates a TOTAL PEAKING FACTOR greater than 2.45 for 8x8 fuel and 2.48 for 8x8R and P8x8R fuel. The method used to determine the design TPF shall be consistent with the method used to determine the MTPF.

3/4.2.3 MINIMUM CRIFICAL POWER RATIO

The required operating limit MCPR's at steady state operating conditions as specified in Specification 3.2.3 are derived from the established fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit MCPR of 1.07, and an analysis of abnormal operational transients 1. For any abnormal operating transient analysis evaluation with the initial condition of the reactor being at the steady state operating limit, it is required that the resulting MCPR does not decrease below the Safety Limit MCPR at any time during the transient assuming instrument trip setting as given in Specification 2.2.1.

To assure that the fuel cladding integrity Safety Limit is not exceeded during any anticipated abnormal operational transient, the most limiting transients have been analyzed to determine which result in the largest reduction in CRITICAL POWER RATIO (CPR). The type of transients evaluated were loss of flow, increase in pressure and power, positive reactivity insertion, and coolant temperature decrease.

The limiting transient which determines the required steady state MCPR limit is the turbine trip with failure of the turbine by pass. This transient yields the largest Δ MCPR. When added to the Safety Limit MCPR of 1.07 the required minimum operating limit MCPR of Specification 3.2.3 is obtained. Prior to the analysis of abnormal operational transients an initial fuel bundle MCPR was determined. This parameter is based on the bundle flow calculated by a GE multi-channel steady state flow distribution model as described in Section 4.4 of MEDO-20360⁽⁴⁾ and on core parameters shown in Reference 3, response to Items 2 and 9.

BRUNSWICK-UNIT 1