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Docket No. 50-285

Mr. Alan H. Kirshen
Associate Professor of Law and
Chairman, Natural Resources
Committee
7000 West Center Road, Suite 200
Omaha, Nebraska 68106

Dear Mr. Kirshen:

Thank you for your letters of March 13, 1980 to Mr. Lobel and Mr. Erickson of the NRC. We agree with you, that public meetings, such as the January 16, 1980 meeting in Omaha, can result in a very useful interchange between local citizens, the NRC and a utility on significant issues involving nuclear power plants. I wish to thank you and your committee, also, for your efforts in establishing the January 16th meeting in Omaha.

Your petition for rule making to require informal public meetings/hearings for NRC licensing actions has been published in the Federal Register and is under active consideration by NRC. Our experience in the January 16, 1980 meeting in Omaha does support the establishment of more frequent public meetings near reactor sites.

You also suggested a safeguards procedure to bring a reactor to cold shutdown and block any restart until an NRC "key" (mechanical/electronic) was used. We have reviewed your suggestion, but our preliminary assessment is that any system which would automatically bring a reactor to cold shutdown and could not be bypassed would not be desirable since shutting down a nuclear power plant requires the judgment of a competent well-trained operator to assure that the equipment is performing as it should. If, for some reason, a piece of equipment is not available, only an operator could best put into operation the alternate piece of equipment to assure that cold shutdown of the reactor will be reached in a safe manner. Also, even after a reactor is shutdown much equipment must remain in operation to continue to cool the core. The block on reactor restart would, therefore, not prevent damage to the core if the heat removal systems were prevented from operating properly.

The only threat that is used to develop scenarios for power reactor sabotage is that which is outlined in 10 CFR 73.1a(1). Specifically, this threat was developed to provide protection with high assurance against successful industrial sabotage by both of the following:

- (1) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes, assistance and equipment: (i) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (ii) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information) an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or both, (iii)

suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (iv) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise destroying the reactor integrity, and

(2) An internal threat of an insider including an employee (in any position).

Protection against threats which exceed the above design basis threat are principally the responsibility of government protective forces and agencies (local, State and Federal).

Sincerely,

Original signed by
Robert W. Reid

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

*See Previous Yellow for Concurrences

ORB#4:DL <i>ORH</i>	C-ORB#4:DL <i>RR</i>	AD-OR:DL	C-ORB#3:DL	C-SSRB:DL	NMSS
PErickson/cb	RReid	TNovak*	RCClark*	JRMiller*	Chappell*
5/12/80	5/25/80	5/13/80	5/9/80	5/13/80	5/19/80

Mr. Alan H. Kirshen

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weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (iv) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or otherwise destroying the reactor integrity, and

(2) An internal threat of an insider including an employee (in any position). Protection against threats which exceed the above design basis threat are principally the responsibility of government protective forces and agencies (local, State and Federal).

Sincerely,

Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Licensing

Handwritten note in a circle:
This is a copy of the letter
to the [unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear]
Agree!

OFFICE	ORB#4:DL	C-ORB#1:DL	AD-ORR	C-ORB#3:DL		
SURNAME	Perickson/cb	RReid	Tovak	RClarke	JR Miller	MSS
DATE	5/15/80	5/14/80	5/13/80	5/9/80	5/13/80	5/19/80