LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

0 1 | C T M N S 1 (2) | 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 (3) | 4 1 1 1 1 (4) | | (5)

LICENSEE CODE (9–14) · LICENSE NUMBER (15–25) · LICENSE TYPE (26–30) · CAT (57–58)

CON'T 0 1 | REPORT SOURCE L (6) | 0 5 0 0 0 2 4 5 (7) | 0 2 1 4 7 9 (8) | | (9)

DOCKET NUMBER (61–68) · EVENT DATE (69–74) · REPORT DATE (75–80)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

0 2 On February 14, 1979, at 1110 hours, while returing to a normal valve lineup

0 3 following completion of routine Isolation Condenser Isolation surveillance the

0 4 Isolation Condenser Inboard Steam Supply Valve 1-IC-1 lost position indication

0 5 resulting in an inoperable Isolation Condenser.

0 6

0 7

0 8

	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
0 9	C E (11)	E (12)	X (13)	V A L V 0 P (14)	A (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	7 9	—	0 0 8	/	0 3	X	—	1

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
A (18)	F (19)	A (20)	A (21)	0 0 5 6	Y (23)	Y (24)	N (25)	C 6 6 5 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

1 0 Investigation revealed that the gear casing on the valve operator had fractured.

1 1 The operator was removed, rebuilt, reinstalled and tested. Vendor analysis attributed

1 2 the failure to excessive torque and thrust loading. An alternate valve operator motor

1 3 and motor gearing will be installed during the 1980 Refuel Outage, pending availabil-

1 4 ity. See attachment.

	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
1 5	E (28)	1 0 0 (29)	NA	B (31)	Routine Iso. Cond. Surv.

	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
1 6	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7	0 1 5 (37)	E (38)	15 Maintenance Personnel - 5 man-rem total exp.

PERSONNEL INJURIES

	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
1 8	0 0 0 (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
1 9	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
2 0	Z (44)	NA 8005300411	

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 79-08/3X-1
(UPDATE REPORT)
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Operation in a degraded mode permitted by a limiting condition for operation occurred when a primary containment isolation valve failed to travel to the mode corresponding to the normal operating condition and resulted in an inoperable Isolation Condenser System.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

Prior to the occurrence the plant was operating at 100 percent steady state power.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On February 14, 1979, while returning to a normal valve lineup following completion of routine Isolation Condenser Isolation Instrumentation Functional and Calibration Test, the Isolation Condenser Inboard Steam Supply Valve, 1-IC-1 lost position indication. All other isolation valves in the system did travel to their proper position. The 1-IC-1 valve was declared inoperable and the surveillance required, when a primary containment isolation valve is inoperable, was performed. In doing so, the Isolation Condenser System was declared inoperable and the surveillance required when the Isolation Condenser System is inoperable, was performed.

On February 21, 1979, at 2100 hours a planned shutdown was commenced for the repair of 1-IC-1.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE

On February 22, 1979, after unit shutdown and cooldown, a drywell entry was made to determine the problem with the 1-IC-1 valve. Investigation revealed the fact that the gear casing on the valve operator had fractured. This allowed the gear operator to separate from the valve. Vendor analysis attributes this occurrence to failure of the yoke sleeve flange due to repeated excessive thrust loads, most likely resulting from excessive torque being applied to the valve yoke sleeve.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

Failure of the Isolation Condenser Inboard Steam Supply Valve 1-IC-1, to operate did not create a condition which had not been previously analyzed.

The Isolation Condenser Outboard Steam Supply Valve, 1-IC-2, did operate properly and would have been sufficient to maintain the required integrity. All surveillances that are required to be performed, when a primary containment isolation valve is inoperable and when the Isolation Condenser System is removed from service, were performed.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The subject valve operator was removed, rebuilt, reinstalled and tested. The motor operator is a Model T-40, manufactured by Crane Teledyne.

An alternate valve operator motor and motor gearing that will insure against excessive torque and thrust loads has been investigated, based on vendor analysis and recommendations. Plans have been made for installation during the 1980 Refuel Outage, pending availability of material.

Similar occurrences were described in RO-76-42/3L and RO-76-28/3L.