LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK: []]] [] (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1	M IB R P 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
O 1	PREPORT L 6 0 5 0 - 1 0 1 5 5 0 0 5 10 9 8 10 8 0 5 12 3 8 0 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
0 2	A design review of two 24" ventilation isolation valves for the reactor
0 3	containment indicates that damage to the air operator mechanism might occur
0 4	during the pressure transient associated with the MCA described in the FHSR.
0 5	Mechanical stops were placed on the valves to limit the valve opening to
0 6	15° angle on 5/9/80, thus eliminating the defect. No hazard to the public
0 7	occurred. Item is reportable based on Technical Specification 6.9.2.a(9)
0 8	
0 9	SYSTEM CODE CODE SUBCODE SUBCO
	LERIRO EVENT YEAR 17 REPORT 8 0
	F (X () 1 () () () () () () () () (
10	The cause is due to inadequate specifications for the original valves
111	(CV4094 and CV4096) installed in 1962. This cause is similar to valve de-
1 2	fect identified in LER 79-28. Since containment ventilation flow is now
1 3	restricted, methods of providing temperature relief during warm weather
1 4	are being investigated.
1 5	ACCULITY OF THER STATUS 30 NETHOD 05 DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION 32 NA DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION
	LEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY 35
	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39)
1 7 8	0 0 0 3 Z 3 NA PERSONNEL INJURIES 13
1 8	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (1) O O O NA
1 9	OSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) Z (42) NA
# 9 ts	PUBLICITY SUED DESCRIPTION 45 NAC USE ONLY
7 0 6	NJ 40 NA

Attachment to LER 80-013-01T-0 Consumers Power Company Big Rock Point Plant Docket 50-155

On November 29, 1978, the NRC forwarded a request to evaluate the closure capability of the containment isolation ventilation valves during the transient pressure conditions of design basis LOCA.

We previously evaluated the two 24" butterfly valves, CV4095 and CV4097 which resulted in throttled operation (LER 78-28). Our evaluation of the 24 inch check valves CV4094 (in series with CV4095 in the outlet flow path) and CV4096 (in series with CV4097 in the inlet flow path) indicates that the valves would close properly under the worst case transient containment pressure condition, but might be rendered incapable of maintaining leak tightness or of providing vacuum relief capability following the Maximum Credible Accident described in the FHSR.

The check valves are provided with air cylinders (air to open the valve) operated at 90 psig which would be subjected to transient overpressure of 340 psig and possible failure during rapid valve disc closure. The vendor has recommended that these valves be throttled from the normal 450 open limit to a 150 open limit to eliminate the potential for failure. This was accomplished by installation of mechanical blocks on May 9, 1980.

Operation in this mode has reduced ventilation air flow in containment to a level which may hamper operation during warm weather and we are now investigating methods to provide relief.

Apparently this design deficiency was the result of inadequate specifications for the valves procured for original plant construction in 1962. The valves are identified as 24" check valves per Attwood Morrill drawing 5237-F.