

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

LICENSEE CODE: 1 L Q A D 1; LICENSE NUMBER: 2 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 0 0; LICENSE TYPE: 3 4 1 1 1 1; CAT 58: 4 5

REPORT SOURCE: 0 1; DOCKET NUMBER: 6 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 4; EVENT DATE: 7 0 4 2 3 8 0; REPORT DATE: 8 0 5 1 6 8 0

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES

0 2 While performing the Loss of Electrohydraulic Control Fluid Pressure Scram surveillance, procedure QIS-39, pressure switch 1-5600-PS-3 was found to trip at 896 psig. This is 4 psig below the 900 psig setpoint requirement of TS Table 3.1-3. Since redundant switches were demonstrated to be within allowable limits, an EHC low fluid pressure condition would have been sensed at the proper setpoint and a reactor scram would have been initiated.

SYSTEM CODE: 1 1 A; CAUSE CODE: E; CAUSE SUBCODE: E; COMPONENT CODE: I N S T R U; COMP SUBCODE: S; VALVE SUBCODE: Z; LER/RO REPORT NUMBER: 17; EVENT YEAR: 8 0; SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.: 0 1 0; OCCURRENCE CODE: 0 3; REPORT TYPE: L; REVISION NO.: 0; ACTION TAKEN: E; FUTURE ACTION: Z; EFFECT ON PLANT: Z; SHUTDOWN METHOD: Z; HOURS: 0 0 0 0; ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED: Y; NPRD-4 FORM SUB.: Y; PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER: N; COMPONENT MANUFACTURER: B 0 7 0

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

1 0 The cause of this occurrence was instrument setpoint drift. The 1-5600-PS-3 pressure switch was adjusted and successfully functionally tested to demonstrate operability.

FACILITY STATUS: E; % POWER: 0 8 6; OTHER STATUS: NA; METHOD OF DISCOVERY: B; DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION: Routine Test; ACTIVITY CONTENT: Z; AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY: NA; LOCATION OF RELEASE: NA; PERSONNEL EXPOSURES: 0 0 0; PERSONNEL INJURIES: 0 0 0; LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY: Z; PUBLICITY: N

- I. LER NUMBER: LER/RO 80-10/03L-0
- II. LICENSEE NAME: Commonwealth Edison Company
Quad-Cities Nuclear Power Station
- III. FACILITY NAME: Unit One
- IV. DOCKET NUMBER: 050-254
- V. EVENT DESCRIPTION:

On April 23, 1980 while performing surveillance test procedure QIS-39, Loss of Electrohydraulic Control Fluid Pressure Scram, pressure switch 1-5600-PS-3 was found to trip at 896 psig. This is 4 psig below the 900 psig setpoint requirement of Technical Specification Table 3. 1-3. The other three EHC pressure switches were found to be within the Technical Specification limit. The switch was immediately recalibrated and functionally tested satisfactorily.

VI. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE:

The four pressure switches are arranged in a one-out-of-two-twice logic to initiate a reactor protection system function upon loss of EHC pressure. Since redundant switches were demonstrated to be within allowable limits an EHC low fluid pressure condition would have been sensed at the proper setpoint and a reactor scram would have been initiated. Safe operation of the reactor was not affected at any time.

VII. CAUSE:

The cause of this occurrence was instrument setpoint drift. The pressure switch is model C-9612-2, manufactured by Barksdale Co.

VIII. CORRECTIVE ACTION:

The immediate corrective action was to recalibrate the pressure switch setpoint. A functional test was then successfully performed to demonstrate the operability of the pressure switch.