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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION I  
631 PARK AVENUE  
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19406

April 29, 1980


Docket No. 50-213

Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company  
ATTN: Mr. W. G. Council  
Vice President - Nuclear  
Engineering and Operations  
P. O. Box 270  
Hartford, Connecticut 06101

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Information Notice No. 80-16, "Shaft Seal Packing Causes Binding in Main Steam Swing Check and Isolation Valves" is forwarded to you for information. No written response is required. If you desire additional information regarding this matter, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

  
for Boyce H. Grier  
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Information Notice No. 80-16
  2. List of Recently Issued IE Information Notices No. 80-16
- CONTACT: W. Baunack  
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cc w/encls:

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Accession No.:  
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, DC 20555

IE Information Notice No. 80-16  
Date: April 29, 1980  
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SHAFT SEAL PACKING CAUSES BINDING IN MAIN STEAM SWING DISC CHECK AND ISOLATION VALVES

Description of Circumstances:

Recently two instances of binding of swing check valves have occurred. During disassembly of the main steam isolation valves at Indian Point 2, it was observed that all four reverse flow check valves were stuck at or near fully open. These 28" valves are manufactured by Atwood & Morrill Co.

Investigation revealed that this condition was apparently caused by excessively tight shaft packing which did not allow free movement of the valve disc.

This condition was reported on January 31, 1980. An evaluation determined that with the existence of the reported condition in event of a main steam line break upstream of a main steam isolation valve together with coincident single failure of a main steam isolation valve to close in another loop, the potential existed for blowdown of the contents of two steam generators.

Main steam line break analyses applicable to Indian Point 2 have been performed assuming blowdown of the contents of one steam generator and have not considered multiple steam generator blowdown. Therefore, it is possible that the reported condition could have contributed to the exceeding of a safety limit as defined in the Unit 2 Technical Specifications if a main steam line break had occurred.

The reported condition was corrected by adjusting the packing of these valves in all four loops and verifying that valve disc movement is not restricted.

During testing in the hot standby mode at the Trojan Nuclear Plant on April 15, 1980, three of the four main steam line isolation valves failed to close when manually actuated. The cause of the occurrence was binding in the shaft packing. The valve is air opened and is closed by gravity, steam flow and a small spring force; the valves were manufactured by Atwood & Morrill Co. The licensee believes that the valves would have closed during actual operations with steam flow in the line. The valves were repaired and tested satisfactorily. Modifications to the valves to install air operators to help close the valves are being investigated by the licensee.

This Information Notice is provided as notification of a possible significant matter. It is expected that the recipients will review the information for possible applicability to their facilities and appropriate corrective action taken.

No written response to this IE Information Notice is required.

ENCLOSURE 2

IE Information Notice No. 80-16  
Date: April 29, 1980  
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RECENTLY ISSUED IE INFORMATION NOTICES

Information Notice No.	Subject	Date Issued	Issued to
80-07	Pump Fatigue Cracking	2/29/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an Operating License (OL) or Construction Permit (CP) and applicants for a CP
80-08	The States Company Sliding Link Electrical Terminal Block	3/7/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-09	Possible Occupational Health Hazard Associated with Closed Cooling Systems for Operating Power Plants	3/7/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-10	Partial Loss of Non-Nuclear Instrument System Power Supply During Operation	3/7/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-11	Generic Problems With ASCO Valves in Nuclear Applications including Fire Protection Systems	3/14/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP, Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities
80-12	Instrument Failure Causes Opening of PORV and Block Valve	3/31/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-13	General Electric Type SBM Control Switches - Defective CAM Followers	4/2/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP
80-14	Safety Suggestions from Employees	4/2/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP, Fuel Fabrication and Processing Facilities and Materials Priority 1 Licensees
80-15	Axial (Longitudinal) Oriented Cracking in Piping	4/21/80	All Power Reactor Facilities with an OL or CP