



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

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APR 20 1980


Docket No. 50-483  
Docket No. 50-486

Union Electric Company  
ATTN: Mr. John K. Bryan  
Vice President - Nuclear  
P. O. Box 149  
St. Louis, MO 63166

Gentlemen:

The enclosed IE Circular No. 80-09 is forwarded to you for information.  
No written response is required; however, should you have any questions  
regarding the Circular or its recommendations, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

  
James G. Keppler  
Director

Enclosure: IE Circular  
No. 80-09

cc w/encl:  
Mr. W. H. Weber, Manager,  
Nuclear Construction  
Central Files  
Director, NRR/DPM  
Director, NRR/DOR  
PDR  
Local PDR  
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Mr. Ronald Fluegge, Utility  
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UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

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DUPLICATE

April 28, 1980

IE Circular No. 80-09

PROBLEMS WITH PLANT INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS

Description of Circumstances at the Kewaunee Power Plant:

On January 17, 1980, the Kewaunee Nuclear Power Plant lost offsite power to its 4160V non-safeguards buses. Since the system used for internal communications, paging and evacuation alarm purposes (Gai-tronics) was powered from a non-safeguards bus, plant communications were degraded during the outage. This degraded condition persisted until power was restored to the affected bus thru an emergency safeguards bus. While in the degraded mode, the licensee used two-way portable radios for internal communications. The radios performed satisfactorily, per se; however, when transmitting in the vicinity of certain electronic equipment, they induced false signals into the electronic equipment.

Description of Circumstances at the Davis-Besse Power Station:

On October 15, 1979, the Davis-Besse Power Station lost all offsite power. During the period when offsite power was not available, the licensee noted that the internal three digit telephones (GTE) would not function. In addition, the NRC "Red Phone" was subsequently reported to have been out of service. Other licensee phone systems (Gai-tronics and the outside four digit Ohio Bell phones) did work.

Following this event, the licensee provided emergency power to its phones and the NRC took action through AT&T to provide emergency power to all Red Phones. (Note: Although the communications system at Davis-Besse was not designed to meet the single failure criterion, its FSAR states that the main internal communications system is supplied by two redundant power feeders from the uninterruptable instrumentation distribution panels.)

RECOMMENDED ACTION FOR LICENSEES AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS

All licensees of nuclear power reactors and holders of construction permits should be aware of the potential problems described above. Because of the generic implications of the above problems, it is recommended that the following actions be considered:

1. Determine the source of power for plant internal communications systems;
2. Upgrade the internal communications systems to assure operability during the loss of offsite power or other foreseeable events;

3. Determine whether any plant electronic equipment may be adversely affected by portable radio transmissions. This determination should include, but not be limited to, the computer system, electro-hydraulic system, and nuclear instrumentation system; and
4. Instruct employees on the use of radios in areas susceptible to electromagnetic interference.

No written response to this Circular is required; however, if additional information regarding these matters is required, contact the Director of the appropriate NRC Regional Office.

IE Circular No. 80-09  
April 28, 1980

Enclosure

RECENTLY ISSUED  
IE CIRCULARS

Circular No.	Subject	Date of Issue	Issued to
80-08	BWR Technical Specification Inconsistency - RPS Response Time	4/18/80	All General Electric BWR's holding a power reactor OL
80-07	Problems with HPCI Turbine Oil System	4/3/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-06	Control and Accountability Systems for Implant Therapy Sources	4/14/80	Medical licensees in Categories G and G1
80-05	Emergency Diesel-Generator Lubricating Oil Addition and Onsite Supply	4/1/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-04	Securing of Threaded Locking Devices on Safety-Related Equipment	3/14/80	All holders of a power reactor OL or CP
80-03	Protection from Toxic Gas Hazards	3/6/80	All holders of a power reactor OL
80-02	Nuclear Power Plant Staff Work Hours	2/1/80	All holders of Reactor OLs, including research and test reactors, and CPs
80-01	Service Advice for GE Induction Disc Relays	1/17/80	All licensees of nuclear power reactor operating facilities and holders of nuclear power reactor CPs
79-25	Shock Arrestor Strut Assembly Interference	12/20/79	All licensees and holders of power reactor CPs
79-24	Proper Installation and Calibration of Core Spray Pipe Break Detection Equipment on BWRs.	11/26/79	All Holders of a Power Reactor OL or CP