UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

MAR 21 1980

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Report Nos. 50-324/80-07 and 50-325/80-07

Licensee: Carolina Power & Light Company
411 Fayetteville Street
Raleigh, NC 27602

Facility Name: Brunswick Steam Electric Plant

Docket Nos. 50-324 and 50-325

License Nos. DPR-62 and DPR-71

Inspection at Brunswick site near Southport, NC

Inspector: J. Blake — 3/21/80
J. Blake — Date Signed

Accompanying Personnel: L. Zajac

Approved by: A. R. Herdt — 3/21/80
A. R. Herdt, Section Chief, RCES Branch — Date Signed

SUMMARY

Inspection on March 4-7, 1980

Areas Inspected

This routine, unannounced inspection involved 48 inspector-hours on site in the areas of Special Ultrasonic Examination of Recirculation System Inlet Nozzles, (Unit 2); Inservice Inspection of Class 1 Piping, (Unit 2) Preparations for Mark I Torus Modifications, (Units 1 & 2).

Results

Of the three areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Licensee Employees

A. C. Tollison, Jr., Plant Manager
*W. M. Tucker, T&A Manager
*J. A. Padgett, Director Nuclear Safety
*R. M. Poulk, NRC Coordinator
W. Pearce, Recirculation Nozzle Project Coordinator
J. Hewett, Inservice Inspection Coordinator
R. White, QA Technician
R. Labaw, Torus Modification Project Engineer
F. R. Coburn, Construction QA Supervisor
D. Watkins, Construction QA
D. N. Allen, Operations QA Supervisor

Other licensee employees contacted included QA technicians, security force members, and office personnel.

Other Organizations

Lambert, MacGill, Thomas, Inc. (LMT)
T. Lambert, Technical Manager

NRC Resident Inspector

*M. Davis, Resident Inspector
J. Outz, Sr. Resident Inspector

*Attended exit interview

2. Exit Interview

The inspection scope and findings were summarized on March 7, 1980 with those persons indicated in Paragraph 1 above. The inspector reviewed the new inspector follow-up and unresolved items in detail.

3. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

Not inspected.

4. Unresolved Items

Unresolved items are matters about which more information is required to determine whether they are acceptable or may involve noncompliance or deviations. A new unresolved item identified during this inspection is discussed in paragraph 6.

5. Inservice Inspection (Unit 2)

The inspector reviewed the Southwest Research Institute Program and procedures for the 1980 outage of Brunswick 2. This program references the ASME B&PV Code 1974 through S75 Section XI and Section V requirements for these inspections.

The inspector observed partial examinations on the following Class 1 welds:

a. 3-inch control rod drive return nozzle to vessel weld.

b. 24-inch primary steam, Loop D transition piece to pipe weld (weld no. 2).

c. 24-inch primary steam, Loop B pipe to elbow weld (weld no. 3).

After observing the weld inspections the inspector asked to see the data sheets for the Loop B, weld 3, Primary Steam weld. As the project plan required the inspection of weld 2 rather than weld 3 the inspector was informed that the UT Examiner had realized his mistake prior to the completion of the weld no. 3 and had done weld no. 2 as required. The inspector informed the licensee that reportable UT indications had been observed during the part of the weld 3 inspection witness by RII which would have to be dispositioned. In that the licensee committed to a follow-up inspection of weld 3 later in the outage; this will be tracked as inspector follow-up item No. 50-324/80-07-01, "Disposition of Primary Steam Loop B, weld 3, UT indications".

There were no items of noncompliance or deviations in this area of inspection.

6. Recirculation System Inlet Safe-End Inspection (Unit 2)

The recirculation system inlet nozzle safe-end internal attachment weld area was being inspected by LMT in accordance with the licensee's commitments to NRC. The inspector observed preparations for the inspection, training of the inspection crew and the inspection of nozzle 2C.

During discussion with Plant QA personnel the inspector noted that an LMT inspection program for Brunswick Unit 2, 1980 outage, with a plant specific procedure cover sheet was in concurrence routing at the time the inspections were being conducted. This specific procedure had not been signed by anyone in the concurrence route at the time of the exit interview and personnel contacted were unclear as to the status of the program. The inspector informed the licensee that the situation of an unsigned procedure would be an unresolved item Item No. 50-324/80-07-02, "Approval of Procedure for Safe-End Inspection".

(On Monday, March 10, 1980, the licensee's site coordinator for the safe-end inspection called RII to report no change detected during this examination and to discuss the unresolved item. The explanation offered for the unsigned

site procedure was that while the LMT program and procedures were fully approved for use, the site specific procedure number was assigned to provide separate filing and retention of data obtained this outage.)

This appeared to be a logical explanation and the item will be reviewed in that light during a follow-up inspection.

There were no items of noncompliance or deviations in this area of inspection.

7. Mark I Torus Modifications (Units 1 & 2)

The licensee was starting the work on the long term fix for the Unit 2 Torus and continuing preparations for the Unit 1 Torus modifications. The modifications include addition of deflectors to the vent headers, separation of the SRV discharge lines, replacing the rams heads with T-Quenchers and modifying the RHR return lines.

The inspector reviewed the plant modification traveler, Mod. No. 79-188, for the unit 2 work, and the associated drawings for fabrication and inspection requirements. The traveler states that the structrual design shall be in accordance with 1977 ASME B&PV Code Section III through summer 1977 addenda.

These requirements were discussed with the licensee's construction QA personnel who stated that the fabrication and inspection would be handled with existing administrative and technical welding and NDE procedures, but they were still waiting for the final weld map drawings from engineering. The inspectors also viewed the full-scale mock-up of one segment of vent header which was being used to check out the modification program.

There were no items of noncompliance or deviations in this area of inspection.