



SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION
SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 34 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-61
CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY

HADDAM NECK PLANT

DOCKET NO. 50-213

1.0 Introduction

I&E Bulletin 79-06A, Revision 1, listed several areas of concern to be evaluated by licensees as a result of the Three Mile Island-2 accident including improvement of the reliability of auxiliary feedwater systems. By letter dated June 1, 1979, the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company (the licensee) proposed changes to Sections 3.8 and 4.8 of the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating License No. DPR-61 for the Haddam Neck Plant which would revise the limiting conditions for operation and the surveillance requirements for the auxiliary feedwater system, including pumps, piping, and water sources. The proposed changes are designed to further ensure the availability of the auxiliary feedwater system by providing more comprehensive and complete limiting conditions for operation and surveillance requirements.

2.0 Discussion and Evaluation

2.1 Section 3.8 - Turbine Cycle

The changes proposed for this section include provisions which would require that:

- (a) Both steam-driven auxiliary feedwater pumps be operable during power operation and capable of providing an adequate supply of feedwater to the steam generators to remove decay heat following reactor shutdown. The proposed change would also improve the probability that at least one pump would be available at all times.
- (b) If one auxiliary feedwater pump becomes inoperable, it must be restored to an operable status within 72 hours, or the plant must be placed in at least hot standby condition within the next 6 hours and in hot shutdown within the following 6 hours. By requiring that an inoperable auxiliary feedwater pump be restored to service quickly, the probability is increased that at least one pump would be available when needed.

- (c) If the level of water in the demineralized water storage tank (DWST) falls below 50,000 gallons, or if the DWST becomes otherwise inoperable, the DWST level must be restored and the DWST must be operable within 4 hours, or else the plant must be placed in the hot standby condition within the next 6 hours and in the hot shutdown condition within the following 6 hours. This requirement is intended to further ensure that an adequate supply of feedwater is available to remove reactor decay heat following a reactor shutdown.
- (d) If the level of water in the primary water storage tank (PWST) falls below 80,000 gallons, or if the PWST becomes otherwise inoperable, the PWST level must be restored and the PWST must be operable within 4 hours or an equivalent supply of water must be made available from an alternate source or else the plant must be placed in the hot standby condition within the next 6 hours and in the hot shutdown condition within the following 6 hours. The PWST is a backup water supply for the DWST, and this requirement is intended to ensure that an adequate backup supply of feedwater is available to remove reactor decay heat following a reactor shutdown.

2.2 Section 4.8 - Auxiliary Steam Generator Feedwater Pumps

The changes provided for this section would provide more detailed requirements to verify the operability of the auxiliary steam generator feedwater pumps and their ability to respond properly when required. The additional requirements include position checks of all non-automatic valves in the flow path and detailed minimum performance standards for the auxiliary feedwater pumps which must be tested monthly. The greater detail required by these checks improves the capability to detect inoperable equipment and, therefore, improves the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system.

All of the proposed changes are consistent with current licensing requirements set forth in the Standard Technical Specifications for Westinghouse reactors. Based on this and the above considerations, we find these changes acceptable for inclusion in the Haddam Neck Technical Specifications.

3.0 Environmental Consideration

We have determined that the amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that the amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact and, pursuant to 10 CFR §51.5(d)(4), that an environmental impact statement or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

4.0 Conclusion

We have concluded, based upon the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Date: April 14, 1980