8005090171

S

Duquesne Light
435 Sixth Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pa.
15219

March 10, 1980

(412) 456-6000

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Attention: Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director

Subject: Beaver Valley Power Station - Unit No. 2
Interim Report - Cable Tray Potential Deficiency
Docket No. 50-412
Significant Deficiency Report No. 80-01

Gentlemen:

A breakdown in the T. J. Cope Co. Quality Control Inspection Program of Galvanized Cable Trays, as reported by Duquesne Light Company vendor surveillance, has determined that T. J. Cope failed to check for burrs on cable tray rungs. The problem was reported to Mr. Tony Cerni of your office on February 7, 1980, as a significant deficiency.

An investigation is currently underway to determine why the imperfections formed on safety related cable trays during the hot dipped galvanizing process were not identified by the vendor. Pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.55(e), a written interim report is herewith submitted, and it is presently anticipated that a final written report on this matter will be submitted to you on March 28, 1980.

DUQUESNE LIGHT COMPANY

By E. J. Woolever

E. J. Woolever
Vice President

cc: Messrs: V. Stello (15)
W. G. McDonald

INTERIM REPORT ON CABLE TRAY GALVANIZING DEFICIENCY AT BEAVER VALLEY POWER STATION - UNIT NO. 2

1. SUMMARY

A number of protrusions in the cable bearing area of hot dip galvanized safety related cable tray have been found. These protrusions are a result of runs and imperfections in the hot dip galvanizing which solidified to form spikes and sharp edges. The cable tray vendor did not adequately inspect and correct tray after galvanizing as required by the purchase specification.

2. IMMEDIATE ACTION TAKEN

All uninstalled tray on site are being inspected for galvanizing projections prior to installation. If projections are found, they are filed smooth. Tray remaining to be shipped is being thoroughly inspected by the Duquesne Light Company inspectors to ensure no projections exist. An audit of the quality control program is being performed to determine effectiveness. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission was informed that the tray galvanizing was potentially reportable under the provisions of 10CFR50.55 (e)(1)(i) on February 7, 1980 by Mr. H. A. Van Wassen of Duquesne Light Company.

3. DEFICIENCY

Duquesne Light Company inspectors had, over a period of time, found numerous rejectable pieces of tray which the cabl tray vendor had presented for final inspection. As a result, the inspectors issued a Nonconformance and Disposition Report identifying that the vendor was not adequately inspecting tray. Inspection of tray on site was performed and similar deficiencies were found.

4. ANALYSIS OF SAFETY IMPLICATIONS

Galvanizing deficiencies within the cable bearing area of the tray may have the potential to damage cable jacketing and insulation. This could occur from cable being either pulled over or sitting on a sharp projection. Safety related cable has either neoprene or hypalon jacketing and it is questionable as to whether jacketing could be damaged by the protrusions. To determine possible damage testing has been conducted in which cable was dragged over projections in a manner to create considerable downward force. No significant damage to jacketing was found. However, with these tests results alone we are not able to determine whether a safety implication exists. Additional analysis is required; a final report will be submitted on or before May 1, 1980.

5. CORRECTIVE ACTION TO REMEDY DEFICIENCY

Immediate action of inspecting tray before installation will be continued until all tray are installed. Duquesne inspectors will thoroughly inspect all tray until confidence in the vendor's inspection program has been developed. All installed safety related tray will be inspected and deficiencies will be corrected or tray replaced before cable is pulled, thus eliminating any safety hazard associated with this deficiency.