



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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April 24, 1980

Dockets Nos. 50-368
and 50-313

MEMORANDUM FOR: Carl Berlinger, Group Leader
Operating Experience Evaluation Group

FROM: Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

SUBJECT: ANO-1/2 RESPONSE TO LOSS OF OFFSITE POWER OF APRIL 7, 1980


On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One, Units Nos. 1 and 2 automatically shutdown on loss of load. Both units were at 100% power at the time. The plant experienced a total loss of offsite power and offsite power was not restored for approximately 25 minutes. The electrical load was picked up by emergency diesel generators.

The attached AP&L Transient Reports provide the details of the event and how the operators in the plants responded to the event.

The response of Unit No. 1 is of primary concern. You will note that the high pressure injection was manually initiated within 6 minutes after the reactor trip and continued to operate for approximately 54 minutes. The operators apparently initiated HPI to increase pressure in the RCS because of a decrease of pressure due to a sudden cooling as a result of an emergency feedwater pump operation. Also the PORV was manually opened to help control RCS pressure. Although the report did not indicate it, the block valve for the PORV also was manually opened. This block valve was closed during operation because of the action initiated to preclude an event similar to the Crystal River loss of NNI event.

Our concern is focused on the operation of HPI, a safety system, and the manual operation of the PORV to control an operational transient. The question is why should a safety system be necessary to control an operational transient? Also, considering the effort that went into reducing the number of times the PORV is operated as a result of the TMI-2 accident, is it acceptable to use the PORV to control an operational transient?

Please review the event and determine if this is an acceptable mode of operation and if it is not acceptable, recommend a course of action for ANO-1. Also determine the generic implications for other plants and recommend a course of action. The TAC for this item is 13146. Please provide the evaluation and the recommendations in writing by May 30, 1980.


Robert W. Reid, Chief
Operating Reactors Branch #4
Division of Operating Reactors

Attachment: AP&L Transient Report
ccw/attachment: See next page

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
POOR QUALITY PAGES

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