



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

T.I.C.
8005090 044

April 17, 1980

Docket No. 50-305

Wisconsin Public Service
Corporation

ATTN: Mr. E. R. Mathews
Vice President
Power Supply and
Engineering

P. O. Box 1200
Green Bay, WI 54305

Gentlemen:

Thank you for your letter dated April 7, 1980, informing us of the steps you have taken to correct the noncompliance identified in our letter dated March 13, 1980. We will examine your corrective action during a future inspection.

In regard to your request in attachment B of your April 17, 1980, letter to withhold certain information in accordance with 10 CFR Part 2.790, we are in agreement this should be withheld from public disclosure. We have revised the subject page accordingly as shown on the enclosure.

Your cooperation with us is appreciated.

Sincerely,

R. F. Heishman, Chief
Reactor Operations and
Nuclear Support Branch

Enclosure: Pg 8 of IE
Inspection Report 50-305/
80-2

cc w/encl:
D. C. Hintz, Plant Manager
Central Files
Reproduction Unit NRC 20b
PDR
Local PDR
NSIC
TIC

Mr. John J. Duffy, Chief
Boiler Inspector Department
of Industry, Labor and
Human Relations

ENCLOSURE

- a. It is highly probable the 1B emergency diesel generator was inoperable without anyone knowing it from about 10:00 p.m. on January 17, 1980 until sometime in the afternoon of January 18, 1980. This apparently does not violate the letter of the Technical Specification, but is serious considering that only one of the two sources of offsite power was available during this time period.
- b. No procedure or instructions existed specifying where to add oil to the 1B diesel during operation or with the diesel shut-down. This resulted in addition of five barrels of oil to the air box of the diesel, apparently rendering it inoperable and subject to damage if started. Failing to add oil without following a procedure or instruction is contrary to Technical Specification 6.8.1 and Section 5.1.6.1 of ANSI 18.7, 1972.

Normally adding oil would be within the skills of maintenance personnel without a procedure; however, for adding oil to the diesel it is evident that a procedure or instruction was needed.

- c. There was an apparent breakdown in communication between plant personnel who were aware of the amount of oil added and management personnel who were aware of an oil consumption problem.
- d. NRC personnel who responded to the event were not informed by the licensee of any diesel generator problem.

4. Lessons Learned

From this event several important lessons were learned as described below.

- a. The licensee's internal communication system was not powered by the safeguards power supply and was lost for approximately four hours until power was restored to the non-safeguards bus. The licensee intends to connect the internal communications systems to safeguards power supplies.
- b. The plant should have a weeks supply of lubricating oil on site as well as diesel fuel for the emergency diesel generators to provide for long term operation. The licensee intends to have this much oil onsite as a minimum.
- * c.
- d. The air motor starting system for the diesel generators should have a speed interlock which shifts the starting air to the

* Proprietary information deleted.