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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

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Docket No. 70-820

Group 1

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Licensee: United Nuclear Corporation

Fuel Recovery Operation

Wood River Junction, Rhode Island

Facility Name: United Nuclear Corporation - FRO

Investigation at: Wood River Junction, Rhode Island

Investigation conducted: September 20-21 and 26-29, 1978; October 2-6, 19-20, 26-27 and 31, 1978; and November 1-3 and 21, 1978.

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Investigation Summary:

Investigation on September 20-21, 26-29; October 2-6, 19-20, 26-27, 31; November 1-3 and 21, 1978 (Investigation Report No. 70-820/78-22)

Areas Investigated: The investigation covered several allegations relating to the security program at the UNC-FRO site. The allegations were made by members of the security guard force on September 8, 20, 21 and 26, 1978. The allegations related to isolation zones, qualification examinations, alarm records, arms qualifications, training records, guard qualification, searches, key control, uncleared guards, guard performance, escort procedures and "dry-firing" of weapons. This investigation involved 429 man-hours on site by three NRC inspectors and two NRC investigators.

Results: Because of the extent and multiplicity of the allegations, all areas of the Physical Protection Program were reviewed which resulted in eleven (11) items of noncompliance: (1. infraction - failure to monitor isolation zone, Paragraph D.1; 2. infraction - failure to meet guard training requirements, Paragraphs D.2, D.4 and D.7; 3. infraction - failure to record SAS alarms, Paragraph D.3; 4. infraction - failure to maintain training records, Paragraph D.3; 5. infraction - failure to perform exit searches, Paragraph D.8; 6. infraction - failure to maintain PCAS locked, Paragraph D.10; 7. infraction - failure to provide escort in protected area, Paragraph D.13; 8. infraction - failure to make proper entries into MAA, Paragraph E.1; 9. infraction - failure to maintain required guard strength, Paragraph E.2; 10. infraction - failure to maintain adequate weapons, Paragraph E.3; 11. infraction - failure to perform employee searches prior to protected area entry; Paragraph E.4).

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* contains material exempt from public disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(d)

I BACKGROUND

A. Reason for Investigation

On September 8, 1978, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Inspection and Enforcement - Region I, received a telephone call from an individual providing various allegations related to the Physical Security Program of the United Nuclear Corporation (UNC) facility located at Wood River Junction, Rhode Island (United Nuclear Corporation - Fuel Recovery Operation, Docket No. 70-820). The basic allegations submitted at this time were that (a) firearms qualification records had been falsified; (b) training records may have been falsified; and (c) guards were not always posted when the protected area intrusion detection system was not operating.

Two NRC-Region I representatives contacted the above referenced individual on September 20, 1978 in order to obtain further details with respect to the allegations noted. During this meeting, the alleged named three other individuals whom he believed could provide further information relative to the allegations. The other individuals were contacted by NRC investigators on September 21 and 26, 1978. A signed statement by the original alleged is attached as Exhibit A of this report. A signed statement made by the individual interviewed on September 20, 1978 is attached as Exhibit B of this report.

Subsequent to a review of the information received up to that time, an investigation of the allegations obtained from the interviews was initiated by NRC-Region I at the UNC site on September 27, 1978.

B. Identification of Involved Organizations

1. United Nuclear Corporation (UNC)
Fuel Recovery Operation
Wood River Junction, Rhode Island 02894

A corporation licensed by the NRC to conduct activities associated with the fuel recovery operation.

2. The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC)
1247 Main Street
East Hartford, Connecticut 06108

This firm, under contract to UNC, provides the guard force for the physical protection of the fuel recovery operation.

II SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

A. Allegations and Investigation Findings

This investigation involves allegations that were introduced by (a) a telephone contact on September 8, 1978, and (b) statements made during interviews with various members of the UNC security guard force which occurred on September 20, 21 and 26, 1978. Subsequent review by the NRC established fourteen (14) allegations concerning separate but related problems with the Physical Security Program at the UNC facility at Wood River Junction in Rhode Island. These allegations are described and numbered 1 through 14 below.

During the review of the above referenced allegations, additional problem areas were identified, some of which developed into items of noncompliance. These additional findings are described and numbered 15 through 19 below.

SPECIAL NOTE: Insofar as possible and in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 2.790(d), details identifying UNC's procedures for safeguarding licensed special nuclear material or detailed security measures for the physical protection of the UNC facility have been detailed in Section F of this report. Section F is to be withheld from public disclosure.

Allegations

1. Alarms were placed in the "access" mode without appropriate compensatory actions being taken. In order to cover these actions, guards were told not to log various alarms and/or guards were only "posted on paper".

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be supported and resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the UNC's failure to monitor the isolation zone in order to prevent the potential penetration of the protected area as required by 10 CFR /3.50B(4). (Details, Paragraphs D.1 and F.1)

2. Individuals were provided answers to post qualification examinations in an effort to facilitate qualification.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be supported and contributed to an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC's failure to assure that guard training was completed prior to assignment to guard duties as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(4) and UNC License Condition 9.3.35 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details, Paragraphs D.2 and F.2)

3. Post B alarms were not being recorded in accordance with UNC procedures. Records were fabricated in order to cover these actions.

The NRC investigation found the allegation to be supported and resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC's failure to have the Post B guard record all alarms annunciating in Post B and reconciling the actions of the Post A guard as required by UNC License Condition 9.3.11 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details, Paragraphs D.3 and F.3)

4. Arms qualification records were falsified in order to qualify guards.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be supported and contributed to an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC's failure to maintain accurate records of each guards training status as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(4) and UNC License Condition 9.3.35 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment. (Details, Paragraphs D.4 and F.2)

5. Arms qualification procedures were not followed in order to facilitate qualification.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated and resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC's failure to follow Section IV of the Firearms Qualification Procedures which are part of the UNC training program as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(3). (Details, Paragraphs D.5 and F.4)

6. Training qualification records may have been falsified.

The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to substantiate this allegation (Details, Paragraph D.6)

7. Unqualified guards are operating posts without required supervision.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated and contributed to an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC's failure to properly supervise unqualified guards working various post assignments as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(4) and UNC License Condition 9.3.35 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details Paragraphs D.7 and F.2)

8. Required searches of guards are not being performed upon egress from MAA areas.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be supported and resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC's failure to perform required exit searches from the MAA as required by 10 CFR 73.60(b) and UNC License Condition 9.2.23 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details, Paragraphs D.8 and F.5)

9. Key control is not being maintained with respect to the Post A door.

The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to substantiate this allegation (Details, Paragraph D.9)

10. The door to Post A (PCAS) has been left open during off shifts.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be substantiated and resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC's failure to maintain the Post A door in a locked condition when not in use as required by the UNC Security Plan and UNC License Condition 9.3.10 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details, Paragraphs D.10 and F.6)

11. Uncleared guards are observing classified operations.

The NRC investigation found no evidence and/or information to substantiate this allegation. (Details, Paragraph D.11)

12. Guards are sleeping on duty.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be supported and although not resulting in a specific item of non-compliance, was an indication of a weakening of the overall security posture at the UNC site. (Details, Paragraph D.12)

13. Uncleared contractor personnel are being allowed unescorted access within the protected area.

The NRC investigation found this allegation to be supported and resulted in an infraction level item of noncompliance with to UNC's failure to escort an uncleared individual within the protected area as required by 10 CFR 73.50(c)(5) and related UNC procedures. (Details, Paragraphs D.13 and F.11)

14. "Dry-firing" was encouraged on post causing guards to be unarmed on post and may have led to an incident whereupon a weapon was accidentally discharged in Post A.

The NRC investigation found that

- a) with respect to the weapons discharge incident, there was inadequate evidence and/or information to determine the true cause of the incident and,
- b) with respect to "dry-firing" on post, the allegation was supported and although not resulting in a specific item of noncompliance, was an indication not only of a weakening of the overall security posture at the UNC site but also a practice that was hazardous to the personnel involved. (Details, Paragraph D.14)

Additional Findings

15. The NRC investigation found that improper entries had been made by security guards into the material access areas and that this constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to 10 CFR 73.60(a)(7) and UNC License Condition 9.3.56 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details, Paragraphs E.1 and F.9)
16. The NRC investigation found that on various occasions, the number of guards assigned official security protection duty was insufficient to meet the licensee's onsite guard strength requirement, and that this shortage of guards constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to UNC License Condition 9.3.34, Appendix A of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details, Paragraphs E.2 and F.7)
17. The NRC investigation found that on September 28, 1978, one of the required shotguns in the cafeteria was missing and that this shortage of weapons constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to 10 CFR 73.50(a)(3) and UNC Procedures for armed response individuals. (Details, Paragraphs E.3 and F.8)
18. The NRC investigation found that employee searches were not being performed as required and that this failure to perform required searches constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to 10 CFR 73.50(c)(i) and UNC License Condition 9.3.1 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2. (Details, Paragraphs E.4 and F.10)
19. The NRC investigation found that foreign material had been found in various firearms at the UNC site. NRC could not find any evidence and/or information which would have indicated deliberate sabotage of the weapons. (Details, Paragraph E.5)

B. Management Meeting

A management meeting was held at the NRC-Region I office on Tuesday, November 21, 1978. The following individuals were in attendance:

NRC-REGION I

B. H. Grier, Director
 J. M. Allan, Deputy Director
 W. G. Martin, Chief, Safeguards Branch
 H. W. Crocker, Chief, Fuel Facility Projects Section
 J. W. Devlin, Chief, Security and Investigation Section
 J. H. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Material Control Support Section
 C. O. Gallina, Investigation Specialist
 R. J. Bailey, Physical Security Inspector
 J. Roth, Fuel Facility Inspector

NRC-Headquarters

E. M. Howard, Director, Division of Safeguards Inspection

UNC

C. F. Bowers, General Manager (UNC, FRO)
 T. Collopy, Manager, Nuclear Material Control (UNC, NPD)
 D. M. Schultz, Manager, Compliance (UNC, FRO)
 R. Gigliotti, Manager, Security (UNC, FRO)

This meeting was held at the request of the NRC to discuss the findings and conclusions of the NRC security investigation at the UNC site, as well as other areas concerning the procedures controlling the shipment of empty containers and analytical samples. These additional areas are covered in detail in NRC Inspection Report No. 70-820/78-23.

III DETAILS

A. Reason for Investigation

This investigation was initiated as a result of the NRC-Region I being contacted by an individual on September 8, 1978, who alleged certain improprieties in the licensee's physical security program.

B. Scope of Investigation

This investigation included an examination of pertinent documents and records at the UNC site and at the NRC Regional office; interviews and contacts with individuals; and observations by the investigators.

C. Persons Directly Interviewed and/or Contacted During the NRC Investigation

1. United Nuclear Corporation (UNC)

C. E. Bowers, Manager
R. H. Brown, Security Management Representative
N. J. Cogan, Security Management Representative
T. Collopy, Manager, Nuclear Material Control
D. G. Himsey, Security Management Representative
D. M. Schultz, Manager, Compliance
D. F. Varrecchione, Security Management Representative
F. Cronin, Manager, Nuclear and Industrial Safety
D. Daigler, Quality Assurance Engineer
R. Gigliotti, Manager, Security
R. Gustafson, Corporate Security Director
J. Murphy, Process Supervisor
C. Pavelski, Process Operator
D. Reynolds, Process Operator

2. The Wackenhut Corporation (TWC)

D. W. Richards, Manager
D. R. LaChappelle, Captain

Several other employees of the Wackenhut Corporation who were either present or former members of the guard force assigned to the UNC site at Wood River Junction, Rhode Island.

D. NRC Findings and Conclusions Related to Allegations

Note 1: Excluding UNC management personnel, eighteen (18) present security guards, five (5) former guards, one (1) security guard Captain and four (4) UNC Security Management Representatives (SMR) were interviewed during the course of this investigation. With the exceptions noted as specific statements listed below with respect to individual allegations, individuals not listed stated that they either (a) had no knowledge of the activities described or (b) had not participated in the activities described.

With respect to the UNC Security Management Representatives, referred to as UNC Supervisors, and the Wackenhut Guard Captain, allegations were discussed in more detail inasmuch as they were reviewed after the interviews with the regular guard force and within the framework of statements made by members of the guard force. Again, with the exceptions noted as specific statements listed below, these individuals denied having knowledge of, or participating in any wrongdoing with respect to the allegations presented. Specific denials and/or refutations of statements are noted as they occur with respect to allegations discussed below.

Note 2: In order to protect the identity of those individuals interviewed during the course of this investigation, alphabetic symbols have been assigned to each individual noted within the context of this report. This alphabetic designation is consistent throughout the report, whether the individual noted is making a statement or mentioned by name within the statement of another.

1. Allegation No. 1

a. Allegation

Alarms were placed in the "access" mode without appropriate compensatory actions being taken. In order to cover these actions, guards were told not to log various alarms and/or guards were only "posted on paper".

b. NRC Findings

Six (6) present guards, two (2) former guards and two (2) UNC Supervisors provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. The statements included the following:

Individual A

- stated that many times the alarms had been put on access without being logged.
- stated that he was told by a UNC Supervisor not to write down the alarm because it might come back in a few minutes, however, he recalled that a month ago, the alarm on the southwest fence was down (in "access" mode) for hours without being logged.
- stated, "If we logged it (the alarm) and it didn't reset, we can't put in a 'secured time'. Then they (UNC Supervisors) would have to call a guard in and they didn't want to do that for a couple of hours."
- stated that guards were not posted on the southwest fence but performed their surveillance duties from the cafeteria.
- stated that several times assignments were given to guards without the guards being out there on their assigned post.
- stated that several times guards were not posted for periods of at least a half an hour between shift changes.
- stated that, "A fence section could be down for a whole shift and the SMR (UNC Supervisor) would say 'Why call in a guard for one half hour?'"
- stated that he heard a UNC Supervisor stating to a guard, "If anyone asks you, you were out there."

Individual F

- stated that in early spring (1978), while working a weekend shift in either April or May, he was informed by an a UNC Supervisor, "If anybody asks, you were sitting on the South IR section." Individual F stated that he knew it was unusual because he knew the IR was down and that he was the roving backup guard and had just finished sitting four hours in Post B.

-stated that it could not have been a misunderstanding (i.e., whether or not they should go on post) because when guards were told to take a post, they would actually go on the post.

Individual N

-stated "There was no security once the fog moved in because the fog caused the IR alarms to go off and they cannot be reset."

-stated that the guards were told not to log the alarm because if they (the guards) do log it, a guard has to be posted for that area. Individual N stated that the records were then falsified to show that a guard was posted, when in fact, they were not.

-stated that he was told not to post a guard on a fence section when the alarm went down.

-stated that Dale Schultz (UNC Manager of Compliance) knew about it and condoned it because he had several thousand dollars of new equipment in the warehouse and couldn't see bringing in a guard for a few hours."

-stated that alarms were placed on access without guards being posted and without the alarm being recorded.

-stated that when coming on duty for the third shift, he was informed by UNC Supervisors and also informed by the Captain that the IR alarms were down. He stated further that he was informed that it had not been logged and told not to log it by the UNC Supervisor. Individual N stated that he checked with the Post A guard who stated that he (Post A guard) had been told to put the alarms on "access" but not to log it.

Note: The NRC investigators reinterviewed the Post A guard in question (Individual B). Individual B stated that he could not remember such an incident specifically but that "it might have been the Southeast fence".

-stated that on shifts where there were 5 guards working, guards would be told that they had been assigned to a post but that they need not go to that post to perform their guard duty. On shifts where there were only three guards posted, it was general knowledge that the UNC Supervisors were told to put "Guard Posted" in their journal, without listing any names. Individual N stated that he had been told "Let the NRC figure out who the 'guard posted' was." Individual N stated that this was part of the philosophy imparted to him by UNC and the Captain that they should "dazzle the NRC with paperwork."

Note: The NRC investigators review of SMR Journals (SMR=Security Management Representative=UNC Supervisor) indicated several "guard posted" entries without specific guard name designated, especially on the shift where only three guards were required.

-stated that he had been told by a UNC Supervisor "In my journal I posted a guard because we had an IR down, but I can't see a guard coming in for two or three hours, so no guard is actually being posted."

-stated that he heard guards being told "If anyone asks you where you've been for the past few hours, you were on the fence."

Individual P

-stated that when IR alarms were down guards were not always on post. Sometimes the south fence was monitored from the cafeteria.

-stated that if the IR's were going down, the guards were usually instructed not to log these events in the log book. Individual BB told him not to log the

alarm. No one was on the fence, especially during July when the process area was shut down. If the IR's would go out, no one would be sent out, and in certain periods for up to two hours, no one would be out near the fence areas, except for outside patrols, once or twice during that time period.

Note: The NRC investigation noted that during the July shutdown, records indicated instances of inadequate guards on site. This area is discussed in detail in Paragraph E.2 of this report.

Individual Q

- stated that on October 4, 1978, he was instructed not to record alarms going off in the truck well. It was Individual Q's belief that the sensitivity of these alarms (IR), as well as the new microwave alarms had been turned up due to the presence of the NRC. Consequently, the rain had caused several false alarms.
- stated that guards were only posted on paper on several occasions.
- stated that he had been told at one time that if anybody asked him, that he was on the north fence.
- stated that he was getting his gear together when "they told me that they were keeping me over as a holdover, but that they were not going to post me on the fence." Individual Q stated that he was told he was being kept over because the IR was down.

Individual T

- stated that when on post he had been told that during fog and rain he was not to bother to log every alarm and on one occasion was told to log every fifth alarm.

-stated that a great deal of "paper posting" was done especially on the southwest fence. When guards were actually put on the southwest fence, they would watch it from the cafeteria or Post B, rather than actually patrolling the fence itself.

-stated when asked about the allegation regarding telling guards not to go on post, "The allegation is absolutely true because I've done it." The SMR told him that he was on post, but not to actually go to it.

Individual U

-stated, "I did not have enough people during heavy fog when these IR's were down on the southwest and northeast. Guards on the perimeter were walking back and forth covering the areas as best they could in the heavy fog. On the first night that this happened, I had two guards on the perimeter and had to take one guard away for patrol rounds."

Individual X

-stated that sergeants were responsible for seeing that guards are posted.

Individual W

-stated, "I have seen Journals where it says 'guard posted' and it does not say who the guard was. This does leave a question in my mind."

Individual Y

-stated that he had observed instances when due to various conditions (e.g., birds, fog, etc.), the IR alarms could not be secured or reset and no guards were posted, especially the north section, alarms were put in "access mode."

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force and UNC Supervisor, the NRC concludes that this allegation has been supported and constitutes an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the failure on the part of the licensee to monitor the isolation zone in order to prevent the potential penetration of the protected area as required by 10 CFR 73.50B(4).

2. Allegation No. 2a. Allegation

Individuals were provided answers to post qualification examinations in an effort to facilitate qualification.

b. NRC Findings

Four (4) present guards and one (1) former guard provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. The statements included the following:

Individual A

-stated that Individual W and Individual R were going around giving clues to the questions in such a manner as to almost give the answer to the question.

-stated that "I've seen people take a book or 'crib sheet' into the exam with them or another guard would give them the answers."

Individual F

-stated that with respect to qualification examinations for Post A and Post B, that he observed both exams being given as an open book examination.

Note: The NRC investigators noted that an open book examination had been given to security guards in August 1978, by the Wackenhut Corporation and determined that it was not the examination referred to in the above statement.

-stated that the Sergeant read the questions in such a manner as to almost give the answers out.

Individual N

-stated that he had been told by Individual W to tell guards coming on post the answers to the Post B examination.

-stated that he gave the post examinations and deliberately gave the participants the answers to the examination.

-stated that the UNC Supervisors were aware of these actions. "(Individual U) and I actually sat down and went through the books with (Individual F) (guard) trying to find the correct answers."

Individual P

-stated that he took his post examination with Individual BB and Individual W present in the classroom. Individual P stated that these individuals put a paper with the answers on the table and then walked out of the room. In other instances, answers were given for the sake of "clarity."

-stated that he took his Post B test on the second shift proctored by Individual N. Individual P stated that the answers were given during the examination.

Individual Q

-stated that assistance was given during examinations.

-stated that when a guard grabbed a book to get the answers during an examination, the Sergeant replied, "I don't care what you have to do to pass it (the exam)," upon which time the sergeant left the room leaving the guards with the open book.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force including the specific admission that answers were provided during a post qualification examination, the NRC concludes that the allegation has been supported and contributed to an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the failure on the part of the licensee to assure that guard training was completed prior to assignment to guard duties as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(4) and UNC License Condition 9.3.35(c) of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

3. Allegation No. 3a. Allegation

Post B alarms were not being recorded in accordance with UNC procedures. Records were fabricated in order to cover these actions.

b. NRC Findings

Eight (8) present guards, one (1) former guard and three (3) UNC Supervisors provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. The statements include the following:

Individual A

-stated that guards do not call Post A right away to reconcile alarm action.

-stated that new guards are told what is supposed to be done in this regard and then the way it is actually done.

-stated that the Post B alarm records are brought up to date periodically, not when the alarms actually occur.

-stated that when completed alarm sheets were brought to him for his initials after the fact, he would refuse to sign them.

Individual F

- stated that he would sit in Post B for two hours without logging any alarms, but before leaving the post, would call Post A and get a two hour update.
- stated that the (Post B) logs do not come anywhere near matching when the records were actually done and that he realized that this was not the proper way to do the logging.
- stated that the relief guards would fill in the alarm logs but not initial them. Then they would call him (Individual F) over to initial it after the fact.
- stated that usually a UNC Supervisor or Duty Sergeant would find out that the alarm records had not been recorded properly and ask the guards to do the "post-logging." (i.e., logging after the fact).

Individual M

- stated that when on Post B he would coordinate the alarm annunciation time with Post A, so that the records would agree.

Individual N

- stated that he had observed a UNC Supervisor (Individual U) recopy an entire document (Post B alarm log) from Post A records. Individual N stated that different pens and writing styles were used and that Supervisor even used "white-out" to make the record more authentic. Everything down to the initials were forged.

Note: When interviewed by NRC investigators, Individual U denied making anything other than "minor corrections" in Post B alarm records.

- stated "at the end of my post, I will call Post A and get all the alarms at one time."
- stated that related to the above incident, he was allowed to see how the UNC Supervisors "reconciled the records."

Individual P

-stated that he generally waited thirty minutes without logging alarms received and then completely logged the Post B alarms by telephone using Post A records. I knew there was a correct way, but Individual N and Individual BB told me to do it their way.

Individual Q

-stated that alarms are not recorded in the Post B alarm log as they occurred, but rather are updated periodically by calling Post A to get the exact times and the response actions performed.

Individual S

-stated that he knew that the alarms are supposed to be logged as they go off, but there was so much difference in the logs that guards were given instructions to make the Post A and Post B logs the same. Individual S stated, "Now we make out the logs for Post B from the Post A logs."

-stated that once he didn't fill out the Post B alarm sheet because when he called Post A, they told him they were too busy to give him the information. Later when alarm sheet was filled out for him by Post A and brought to him for his initials, he refused to initial it.

Individual T

-stated that Post B alarm records are updated periodically from Post A records. In some cases, he stated that the Post A guards would actually fill out an entire Post B alarm sheet and then go to Post B for their (Post B guards) initials. Individual T stated that he did not believe that this was the way it should be done.

stated that on one occasion, he visually observed individual C taking different color pens and fabricating an entire Post B alarm record from the Post A alarm sheet. He stated that this happened about a month ago and that Individual Q and Individual G were involved.

Note: The NRC investigators determined that this incident of alleged falsification was separate and distinct from the one mentioned earlier by Individual N. When questioned about the incident, Individual C denied fabricating the records.

-stated that "Individual U told us how to do it (get copied records to agree)."

Individual W

-stated that, "Yes, the records of Post B have been found not to be completed. I have asked that they be corrected for items such as initials or other data that is not filled out. When I see these, (errors and/or omissions) I will have the individual fill it out and if he is not available on that shift, I will catch him the next day."

-stated that, "I have also had to have people use 'white-out' because the Post B log did not match the Post A log. I have been instructed by the NRC inspector that the two logs have to be identical. As an example, if you say it is 1901 in the Post A log, then it better be 1901 in the Post B log."

Individual R

-stated that, "Yes, I have found Post B alarms not completed and it's too late to have it corrected. I have left this with the next SMR (UNC Supervisor) coming on duty for them to have the corrections made."

Individual U

- stated that, "I found records that were not completed when I first started. Now the sergeants look at the logs and I hope they let me know if they are incomplete. I am not looking at all of the logs directly."
- stated that, "Since June, I have noticed that the logs are filled out at the end of the shift."
- stated that, "They (guards) aren't doing it the way they should be doing it. We are currently managing by exception."
- stated, "I have known of Individual N copying the Post B alarm records from the Post A records."

Note: The NRC investigation determined that this incident of alleged falsification was separate and distinct from the incidents mentioned earlier by Individual N and Individual T. This incident would constitute the third alleged incidence of record falsification. Individual N denied fabricating records of Post B alarms.

Individual V

- stated that the guard in Post B, in order to reconcile the log must call Post A to see what is recorded in the Post A log.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by the members of the security guard force and UNC Supervisors, and confirmed by a record evaluation which indicated that portions of the Post B alarm logs were missing, the NRC concludes that this allegation has been supported and constitutes an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the failure on the part of the licensee to have the Secondary Alarm Station (SAS) attendant record all alarms annunciating in the station (SAS), and reconciling the actions of the Primary Central Alarm Station attendant as required by UNC License Condition 9.3.11 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

4. Allegation No. 4a. Allegation

Arms qualification records were falsified in order to qualify guards.

b. NRC Findings

Seven (7) present guards and one (1) former guard provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. The statements included the following:

Individual A

-stated that with respect to the form which indicated that the qualifications score was correct, Individual BB told him not to worry about it and sign the form even though he wasn't sure he had qualified.

-stated that Individual BB had done it (hole punching), and that he had observed both Individual BB and Individual W punching holes in targets, although he could not be sure if it was in connection with the specific qualification of any individual.

Individual F

-stated that he had observed holes being punched in the targets of guards being qualified.

-stated that he could not remember the exact date, but that it was in 1978 and that he was in charge of taping the targets.

-stated that Individual W was the scorer and Individual BB was the verifier.

-stated that, "I would follow along as Individual W punched holes with a pen. He would say, 'We have so many of these, so many of these, but not enough of these,' whereupon he would punch several holes in the target with his pen."

- stated that some of the guards would not have qualified had Individual W not punched the holes.
- stated that a UNC Supervisor was there but that he did not know if the Supervisor was aware of the pen punching.

Individual N

- stated that he had observed pen-punching of targets by Individual W on firearms qualifications of the other guards.
- stated that he had observed Individual BB adding scores to the firearms qualifications fired by other new guards.

Individual P

- stated that he saw holes punched in targets by Individual R, but mostly by Individual W, in an effort to qualify various individuals, especially the older guards.

Note: The NRC investigators noted that Individuals W, R and BB denied any knowledge of "hole-punching" of targets.

Individual Q*

- stated that in July of 1978, he (Individual Q) and Individual K added some points to the qualification scores of the class being qualified and that during the last phase of firing with the .38 caliber weapon, the class was moved up from a distance of approximately 25 yards from the target to a distance of approximately 15 yards. Individual K, the assistant range officer, also participated in the score alteration and that both of them were under the direction of the UNC Supervisor (Individual R).

* A signed statement was provided by Individual Q and has been attached to this report as Exhibit C.

Note: The NRC investigators questioned Individual K the assistant Range officer, and Individual R, the UNC Supervisor present at the time of the qualification in question. When asked if he had any direct knowledge of points being added to the scores of individuals qualifying for firearms during July of 1978, Individual K stated "to my knowledge it has never happened". When questioned by the NRC as to whether the same individuals were allowed to fire the third phase of the "short course" at a distance of less than 25 yards, Individual K stated that they had been moved to 15 yards from the target to give them confidence, but that they were then moved back to 25 yards in order to qualify. When asked if Individual R (UNC Supervisor) could have been involved or have had knowledge of any falsification of firearms qualifications, Individual K stated that Individual R never gave any hint of being involved in such activity.

Individual R was then questioned by NRC Investigators regarding the firearms qualification of July 1978. Individual R stated that he was not aware of any falsification. He did state, however, that he was not directly supervising this particular phase of the qualification, but rather was attending to the familiarization requirements with respect to rifle and shotgun. Individual R stated that to the best of his knowledge, the two range officers, Individual Q and Individual K, had moved the guards up to a shorter distance only for the purpose of giving confidence to the guards and that they would be returned to 25 yards for qualification. Individual R stated that if anything else were done with respect to firearms qualification, it was done without his knowledge. The NRC investigators selected at random two of the guards who participated in the firearms qualification of July 1978. The two guards selected (Individual D and Individual O) confirmed their presence at the above qualification. Individual D was asked if he was aware that the range officers at the time of this qualification, Individual Q and Individual K had deliberately added points to the

scores of the first two phases of the "short course" required for qualification. Individual D stated that he was unaware of anyone adding points to his qualification score, although he did not know what his score was at the time. Individual D was then asked which of the above named range officers was responsible for his particular qualification to which he answered, Individual K.

Individual D was then asked if the third course of fire for the "short course" firearms qualification was fired at a distance of less than 25 yards. Individual D stated "Yes, we were moved up closer to the targets". The NRC investigators asked Individual D if this movement of target to firing distance was done as a practice maneuver or was it done for actual qualification. Individual D stated that to the best of his knowledge, the group was moved up to a distance closer to the target for actual qualification and that they never returned to the original distance to fire any further rounds.

The NRC investigators asked Individual D if Individual R was present and if Individual R was aware that they had been moved closer to the targets for qualification. Individual D stated that Individual R was present but that to the best of his knowledge Individual R was not directly aware that they had been moved forward for qualification.

Individual O was asked who was in charge of the firearms qualification in question, to which he answered that the group was divided equally between Individual Q and Individual K. Individual O said that his particular group was under the control of Individual Q, the Range Officer. The NRC investigators asked Individual O if he was aware that points had been added to his score in order to facilitate his qualification. Individual O stated that he was unaware that any points had been added to his score although he was somewhat apprehensive about his ability to qualify prior to that date. Individual O

stated that he was present at the target when the score was recorded but that they (Individual Q and Individual K) were adding up the totals and he could not tell whether additional points had been given to him without his knowledge. Individual O was then shown a typed copy of the two courses of fire used at the UNC site, the "short course" and the police "combat course". He was asked to identify the course which he fired in July. Individual O identified the "short course" as the one which he had fired. Individual O was shown the fact that all three phases of the .38 calibre qualification had to be fired at 25 yards and he was asked whether to the best of his knowledge any of the phases had been fired at distances of less than 25 yards. Individual O stated "Yes, the third phase of fire was done closer to the targets". Individual O stated that Individual Q had ordered them to get closer to the target before firing the shots. The NRC investigators questioned Individual O as to whether this particular firing was for practice only, to which he answered that "No, these were the shots used for our qualification".

The NRC investigators asked Individual O if to the best of his knowledge Individual R (UNC Supervisor) had any knowledge of the fact that they had been moved up for this third round of fire. Individual O stated that Individual R was in charge of the shotgun qualifications and was not present during the time when the guards were moved closer to the target. Individual O stated that to the best of his knowledge he could not tell if Individual R was involved. Individual O stated that at the time the guards did not know what the qualifications were therefore did not think that anything irregular had occurred when they were moved closer to the targets.

The NRC investigators attempted to review the records of the firearms qualifications for July of 1978, specifically the scorecards used at the firing range. The NRC investigators noted that although

these scorecards were available for every other firearms qualification conducted in 1978, they were conspicuously absent for the July 1978 qualification. UNC management was informed and after a further search of the records and files by UNC personnel, the NRC investigators were notified that the scorecards in question could not be located.

Individual Q

-stated "In March of 1978 when I was qualifying with the shotgun, I fired only 7 rounds of 12 gauge slug ammunition, thereby making my maximum possible score 70. (Individual W) added several points making my score, to the best of my knowledge, 93 out of 100."

Note: The NRC investigators reviewed the firearms scorecards for Individual Q and confirmed that in March of 1978, Individual Q was qualified on the shotgun with a score of 93. A copy of the record sheet is attached as Exhibit D. The investigators also noted that on this particular record, 35 rounds had been fired instead of the maximum 30 rounds in order to achieve the noted qualification score. Similar results were found on the March 1978 firearm qualification of Individual J (34 rounds fired) and Individual W (31 rounds) fired. These records are attached as Exhibits E and F respectively. It was also noted that the firearms record of Individual W for March of 1978 (Exhibit F) was not signed by either the firer or the instructor.

Note: The NRC investigators were informed during the course of the investigation that one guard was allegedly qualified on the shotgun when in fact, the shotgun jammed, rendering qualification impossible. The investigators, after having reviewed the situation and associated records in detail, noted that on May 2, 1978, the guard in question failed to qualify with respect to the .38 calibre weapon and rifle, but did qualify with the shotgun. Approximately a week to ten days later, after qualifying with respect

to the .38 calibre weapon and rifle, the shotgun jammed. Consequently the guard did not requalify with the shotgun as this had been accomplished earlier in May of 1978.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force, supported by records or lack thereof, the NRC concludes that this allegation has been supported and that the absence of firearms qualification records contributed to an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the failure on the part of the licensee to maintain accurate records of each guards training status as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(4) and UNC License Condition 9.3.35(a) of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

5. Allegation No. 5

a. Allegation

Arms qualification procedures were not followed in order to facilitate qualification.

b. NRC Findings

Twelve (12) present guards, one (1) former guard and one (1) UNC Supervisor provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. The statements included the following:

Individual A

-stated that he fired for rifle qualification on the old range, meaning that the firing could not have taken place from the required distance of 50 yards.

Individual E

-stated that the entire course (handgun, rifle and shotgun) was fired at 25 yards.

-stated that he performed no hip firing with the shotgun.

Individual D

-stated that for shotgun familiarization, he fired 5 rounds of "00" buck shot, each round containing 9 pellets.

Note: UNC procedures require 9 rounds with 8 pellets per round.

Individual F

-stated that in May of 1978, he never fired the rifle at the required 50 yards.

-stated that there were no hip firing positions for the shotgun and only 5 shots were fired, each round containing only 9 pellets.

Individual G

-stated that in January of 1978, he could not recall any hip firing being performed with the shotgun and that the shotgun rounds contained only 9 pellets per round which he believed to be different from the UNC procedures.

Individual M

-stated that all firing in May 1978 qualification (including shotgun and rifle) was performed at 25 yards.

Individual N

-stated that none of the targets used in May were of the silhouette type.

-stated that because of the lack of silhouette targets, any round to hit the target was considered a "7". Individual N stated that he knew that this was a clear violation of UNC procedures and gave a much higher score than would have been received if the required target had been used.

-stated that he had never fired a carbine or shotgun from the required 50 yards from the target.

-stated that on the old course, the maximum distance was approximately 25 or 30 yards, and to shoot from 50 yards, you would have to be shooting at the target from the woods.

-stated that he had never qualified with the M-14 carbine at 50 yards.

Individual O

-stated that all shotgun rounds were fired from the shoulder.

Individual P

-stated that the shotgun was fired using the old range (meaning at a distance of less than 50 yards) and just from the shoulder (no hip firing).

Individual Q

-stated that in May of 1978, the only target fired at with his rifle was a tin can.

-stated that the M-14 was not used, only 20 rounds with an M-1 carbine and only at 25 yards.

-stated that distances were not accurate as they were only paced off.

-stated that no hip firing was performed with the shotgun.

Individual S

-stated, "I fired the rifle at the same distance that I fired my handgun."

Individual T

- stated that the new range was not used in May of 1978 (limits distance to 25 yards).
- stated that he did not fire any rounds with the M-14 in May of 1978. All rifle shots were performed at a distance less than 50 yards.
- stated that he never qualified with the assigned .38 calibre weapon, but rather with his own personal weapon.

Note: The NRC investigator confirmed that in March of 1978, the firearms qualification record for individual T indicated that the individual's personal weapon had been used. The referenced qualification record is attached as Exhibit G. The investigator also noted that the firer (Individual T) had not signed the form where indicated.

Individual W

- stated, "In May, I believe that some slugs and a little of everything else was fired with shotguns. We only had so much ammunition since the double "00" buck shot had been ordered but instead of buck shot, some skeet shot was received instead.
- stated that, "In May, during the firing, we received word over the radio from Post A that we should change the order of fire to fire only five rounds of buck shot. I don't know the source of the order and do not remember who it came from in Post A. I passed this information on to the range officer and issued only five rounds. I discussed this change with Roger Brown (UNC Supervisor) and also mentioned it to the the Manager of Compliance."
- stated that during May, individuals fired five shotgun slugs and five shots of buck shot.

-stated that the smaller range was used in May which had a maximum distance of approximately 30 yards.

Individual R

-stated that firearms qualifications in January and March of 1978 were performed on the older course. Therefore, the familiarization was done at a distance of less than 50 yards . (This would have included the May requalification). The course was extended between the second and third class which would have meant that the June and July qualifications were performed with the 50 yard distance available.

-stated that hip firing was eliminated with respect to the shotgun in May of 1978, due to the shortage of ammunition.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force a UNC Supervisor, and supported by records* of firearms qualification which indicate changes in the prescribed course of fire, the NRC concludes that this allegation is substantiated and constitutes an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the licensee's failure to follow Sections VI C and D of the Firearms Qualification procedures which are part of the UNC training program as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(3).

6. Allegation No. 6

a. Allegation

Training qualification records may have been falsified.

b. NRC Findings

The NRC investigators noted that this allegation was based primarily on the statements of a single individual. Due to the nature of these statements, the letter designation assigned this individual will not be used with respect to

* A sampling of these records are attached as Exhibit H.

this allegation due to the fact that the details presented within the context of the statements are specific enough to identify the individual. The letter designation is not being used so as not to compromise the individual's identity with respect to statements made relative to the other allegations covered in this report.

The alleged in question stated that he was a sergeant at the UNC facility and that in August of 1978, a directive was issued by the UNC Manager of Compliance through the Wackenhut Guard Captain to have all guards properly qualified for various posts by August 31, 1978. The alleged stated that the Manager of Compliance knew that the NRC inspector would be at UNC in September and didn't want to get in trouble for having unqualified guards operating various posts. All sergeants were responsible for getting their own people trained. According to the alleged, there were some guards whom he could not get trained due to vacation or other absence and informed the Guard Captain of this fact. According to the alleged, the Captain stated, "Guys you can't get, just sign their forms anyway." "We can get them later and Schultz (UNC Manager of Compliance) will never know the difference." The alleged stated that he wasn't about to sign any document because he knew he could get in trouble. The alleged stated that the Captain was mad at him for not signing the forms. The alleged also stated that he had been informed by another sergeant that other guards had also not qualified, but he (the alleged) didn't know if the other sergeants had signed the forms improperly. The alleged stated that he discussed this matter with the Manager of Compliance and then disassociated himself from training new guards. According to the alleged, on September 1, 1978, approximately two days after giving up his training duties, he was asked by the Wackenhut Company to give up his sergeant's stripes. The alleged stated that UNC informed him that he had been demoted because they (UNC) were not pleased with his work, but informed other guards that he (the alleged) had given up his stripes. The alleged also stated that he was also requested to take two weeks vacation without pay. The alleged stated that he didn't know why UNC had taken the action unless it was because the NRC was due and they (UNC) didn't want him to be on site to mention anything about the incident.

The allegor also provided the NRC investigators the names of the individuals whose forms he was allegedly requested to falsify. A check of the training records for these individuals indicated that they were not qualified as of the time of the investigation, a matter which is discussed in more detail under Paragraph D.7 of this report.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the review of statements made with respect to this allegation, including a review of associated records, the NRC found no evidence and/or information to substantiate this allegation.

7. Allegation No. 7

a. Allegation

Unqualified guards are operating posts without required supervision.

b. NRC Findings

Seven (7) present guards and two (2) UNC Supervisors provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. The statements included the following:

Individual A

-stated that people are operating the posts alone who have not taken the qualification examination for that post.

Individual B

-stated that he had not as yet finished the required on-the-job training for post examinations, but that he was still on the post alone, though not qualified.

-stated that there was never the constant presence of a supervisor.

Individual H

-stated that he had not taken any of the qualification examinations for the various posts but that on September 29, 1978, manned Post B alone.

Individual I

-stated that he had worked Post B alone but had not officially qualified by taking the written examination for that post.

Individual M

-stated that he was getting his qualification on-the-job training on the post by himself for most of the 40 hours prior to taking the post qualification examination.

Individual N

-stated that at least four guards had worked the lobby without 40 hours of on-the-job training.

-stated that UNC process workers who are used for armed response, have no real security training at all.

Individual W

-stated that, "Yes, I have witnessed guards on post that were not qualified after approximately 10 hours of on-the-job training. The individual is left alone if the sergeant and SMR feel that he is able to work the post alone.

-stated that the qualification of guards for these posts is a problem because the attrition rate is about 50% or about 15 guards every six months.

Individual R

-stated that an individual can work the post alone after a period of time (30 min. to 2 1/2 hrs.) when in the judgement of the sergeants, the individual is able to do so. During this time, this individual may be working the post alone without the sergeant or SMR actually being physically present.

Individual U

-stated that, "Yes (relative to unqualified guards) because of the shortage of guards with the large turnover that we have, guards have been posted unsupervised and without being qualified by passing the written examination."

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force and UNC Supervisors, and supported by post assignment records, the NRC concluded that the allegation is substantiated and contributed to an infraction level of noncompliance with respect to the licensee's failure to properly supervise unqualified guards working various post assignments as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(4) and UNC License Condition 9.3.35(d) of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

8. Allegation No. 8a. Allegation

Required searches of guards are not being performed upon egress from MAA areas.

b. NRC Findings

Seven (7) present guards and one (1) former guard provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. The statements included the following:

Individual A

-stated that with respect to MAA-2, pat-down searches were not performed as they exited this area. "We see them while they are in there, so why search them? What could they take out?"

Individual B

-stated that searches were usually performed but that when rushed, the pat-down search upon egress from the MAA areas was not performed.

Individual F

-stated that on occasion, required pat-down searches were not performed leaving the MAA area.

-stated that not doing searches was just between the other guard and himself and that toward the end of the shift, guards would usually go right out without being searched.

-stated that as far as the gamma scan was concerned, it was used strictly on the NRC inspectors for show.

Individual N

-stated that metal scans upon egress from MAA-1 areas are routinely omitted on the third shift.

-stated that pat-down searches upon leaving MAA-2 are only done for show when the NRC is there.

-stated that UNC kept good MAA records, but that is about where it stopped.

Individual P

-stated that approximately 30% to 40% of the workers leaving MAA areas are not scanned properly.

-stated that when the "golden arch" (SNM detector) goes down, guards didn't always scan with portable instruments.

Individual Q

-stated that "Most of the time I entered MAA-2 with a cleared guard but no pat-down searches were performed when we left."

Individual S

-stated that pat-down searches upon egress from MAA-2 were not always performed.

Individual T

-stated, "If I'm on that post (Post C), I will do the door checks by myself. Nobody will be there to check me when I leave MAA-1."

-stated that there was a very limited check on pat-down searches, especially upon leaving the MAA-2 area.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force, including the specific admission that required searches were not being performed, the NRC concluded that the allegation is supported and constitutes an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the licensee's failure to follow UNC procedures relative to required exit searches from the MAA as required by 10 CFR 73.60(b) and UNC License Condition 9.2.23 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

Note: On October 25, 1978, the NRC was notified by the licensee that on or about October 17, 1978 a discreet item of SNM was inadvertently shipped from the UNC in a container believed to be "empty". The NRC determined that the inadvertent shipment was due in part to the failure of the security guard to perform the required search of the container. Details of this occurrence are provided in NRC Inspection Report 70-820/78-23.

9. Allegation No. 9a. Allegation

Key control is not being maintained with respect to the Post A door.

b. NRC Findings

Three (3) present guards provided information relative to and/or supporting this allegation. These statements included the following:

Individual F

-stated that a guard was conducting a Post A guard change when the door swung shut. The door was not opened with the key from Post B because he (Individual F) was in Post B at the time and the glass on the spare key box was not broken.

Individual Q

-stated, "I know that (Individual R, UNC Supervisor) has a spare key, but I've never seen him use it.

Individual T

-stated (Individual R) has a spare key to Post A. I've seen him use it twice and I'll swear to it. (Individual Z, Manager of Compliance) has a spare key in his safe."

-stated that, "The ironical part was that after (Individual R) opened the post door with the key on his belt, he then went over to Post B and broke the glass where the spare key is kept so that nobody would know he had a spare key.

Note: Individual R denied having an unauthorized key to Post A.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force, and after a detailed review of the licensee's key control program, the existence of an unauthorized key to Post B, and consequently the allegation relative to its existence, could not be substantiated.

10. Allegation No. 10a. Allegation

The door to Post A (PCAS) has been left open during off shifts.

b. NRC Findings

Seven (7) present guards, one (1) former guard and three (3) UNC Supervisors provided information relative to and/or supporting the allegation. These statements included the following:

Individual A

-stated that Post A is not locked most of the time, especially on the third shift.

-stated that he had seen it propped open on several occasions, especially when the air conditioner is inoperative.*

-stated that it was always closed when Mr. Schultz (UNC Manager of Compliance) was there.

Individual B

-stated that on hot days, the air conditioner would be turned off* and the Post A door would be left open to provide circulation and ventilation to Post A.

* Air conditioner exhausted into cafeteria and not the exterior of the building.

Individual F

-stated that the Post A door is permitted to be open in the presence of security guards and process workers in the cafeteria. Several times a chair was put in the door so that the guard can talk to other individuals in the cafeteria. The door is always open on weekends.

Individual P

-stated that on weekends or second shift, and especially during the July shutdown, the door to Post A was propped open approximately 80% of the time. Process people were free to walk in and out of Post A and traffic was not limited to security personnel.

Individual Q

-stated that Post A doors are open as a common occurrence. Individual Q stated that all the SMRs (UNC Supervisors) condone this action with the exception of Mr. Schultz (Manager of Compliance).

Individual S

-stated that he had observed the door to Post A propped open. It depended on who the sergeant and the SMR was.

Individual T

-stated that on the second shift, the Post A door was normally kept opened so getting locked out did not become a problem.

Individual W

-stated that he had found the Post A door open and had instructed the guards to close it.

Individual R

-stated that the Post A door was allowed to be open mostly in the summertime.

Individual V

-stated that he had seen the Post A door open, but only with guards in the cafeteria.

Individual U

-stated that it (Post A) has been opened a number of times and that during these times, there were also process workers present in the cafeteria.

Note: At approximately 5:20 a.m. on September 28, 1978, an NRC investigator noted that the door to Post A was open and the guard stationed therein was carrying on a conversation with, and passing food between himself and a UNC process worker sitting in the cafeteria.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on statements by members of the security guard force and UNC Supervisors, and supported by the direct observation of an NRC investigator, the NRC concluded that the allegation is substantiated and constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the licensee's failure to follow UNC security procedures with respect to maintaining the Post A door in a locked condition when not in use as required by the UNC Security Plan and UNC License Condition 9.3.10 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

11. Allegation No. 11a. Allegation

Uncleared guards are observing classified operations.

b. NRC Comments

The NRC investigators noted that the above allegation was made by a single guard who stated that although he did not possess a security clearance, he was assigned to perform a duty which allowed him to observe what he believed to be a classified operation. Specifically, the guard stated that he had been assigned to a rifle team on the plant roof, part of the overall security procedures associated with the transfer of special nuclear material. While assigned to this team, the guard observed the loading of the DOE-SST, a special transport vehicle utilized by the U. S. Department of Energy for these transfers.

c. NRC Findings

The NRC investigation determined that the loading and transfer operation were not classified in nature and consequently no breach of security was involved by having an uncleared guard observing the operation. The allegation was therefore unsubstantiated.

12. Allegation No. 12

a. Allegation

Guards are sleeping on duty.

b. NRC Findings

The NRC investigators noted that four (4) UNC Supervisors confirmed that guards had been caught sleeping on duty, but also stated that the guards in question were subsequently terminated. The employment terminations were confirmed by the investigators.

The NRC investigators noted, however, that two (2) currently employed guards had made statements which indicated that the action taken by UNC supervisory personnel as referenced above was not always consistent and/or that incidents in this regard may have occurred without the knowledge of UNC supervision.

Among the statements made, the NRC investigators noted that Individual Q, a security guard, stated that sleeping on duty was a common occurrence. The investigators noted that the high turnover rate with respect to security guards had caused a shortage of qualified guards and consequently, many qualified guards were required to work 16-hour shifts. Individual Q stated that these working conditions were exhausting and that he actually observed guards taking pillows from a couch and putting them behind the desks in the office area where they would go to sleep. Individual Q also stated that UNC Supervisors sometimes knew about it and allowed it to be done.

The NRC investigators noted that another guard (Individual T) confirmed the statements of Individual Q and openly admitted that he himself had slept while on post. Individual T stated that during inclement weather, when the fence alarms were inoperative, guards were sent outside of the protected area fence to monitor the fence area in their private vehicles. According to Individual T, once in his own car and out of the inclement weather, it was easy to fall asleep and Individual T stated that he had done so for hours at a time. Individual T stated that although he had a portable radio, no one would call to check on him or his condition until the alarms were back up and he was called to return inside the protected area. Individual T stated that he would be asleep for hours at a time. Individual T stated that guards would sleep on duty and that one guard was almost injured when he fell off the stool at Post C.

The NRC investigators reviewed these statements with the UNC Supervisors and one of the supervisors (Individual U) stated that he had observed guards sleeping on both Post B and Post C, but that he didn't consider it serious. Individual U explained that from a distance, the guards would appear to be dozing, but as the supervisor approached, they would straighten up and be awake. Individual U stated that the guards were never caught "asleep".

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on statements by members of the security guard force and a UNC Supervisor, including the direct admission by a member of the security guard force that he was asleep on post, the NRC concludes that the allegation is supported and although it does not constitute a direct item of noncompliance, it does indicate a weakening of the overall security posture at the UNC facility.

13. Allegation No. 13a. Allegation

Uncleared contractor personnel are being allowed unescorted access within the protected area.

b. NRC Comments

The NRC investigators noted that this allegation was made by a single security guard (Individual Q) and involved two incidents relative to unescorted access. During the first incident, the guard observed an electrical contractor working within the plant area without an escort. The NRC investigators reviewed this matter with UNC supervision who stated that uncleared personnel need not be escorted specifically by a security guard, but only by a "cleared" individual. Within the plant area, contractors are assigned to various "cleared" individuals depending on the circumstances. For instance, according to the Supervisor, the telephone repairman is not cleared, but may be assigned to be "escorted" by the secretary or other members of the office staff where the work is being performed. The majority of the office staff are "cleared" personnel.

The second incident described by Individual Q did not involve merely an observation of what was believed to be unescorted access, but the actual participation by the guard in leaving an individual unescorted within the protected area. According to the guard, in late August or early September of 1978, he was assigned to escort three (3) contractor individuals who were onsite to

install the stanchions for the new microwave alarm system. The guard stated that he accompanied the individuals to an area near the incinerator where the concrete was to be mixed for the job. The guard stated that it soon became evident that the two individuals who would be setting the stanchions would be leaving the remaining individual who was mixing the concrete. The guard, realizing that it would be impossible to keep all three persons under observation, radioed the sergeant for assistance. Upon reporting the situation to his sergeant, the guard was informed that there was a shortage of guards and that he should go with the individuals pouring the concrete and to leave the third individual mixing the concrete alone in the protected area without an escort. The sergeant involved had since terminated employment with UNC, but when contacted and questioned by the NRC investigators, would not comment on the incident.

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statement of the involved individual, including his admission that an uncleared contractor employee was left unescorted within the protected area, the NRC concludes that the allegation is supported and constitutes an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the failure on the part of the licensee to provide an escort to an uncleared individual not employed by the licensee as required by 10 CFR 73.50(c)(5) and UNC Procedures dated May 22, 1978, relative to protected area access.

14. Allegation No. 14

a. Allegation

"Dry firing" was encouraged on post causing guards to be unarmed on post and may have led to an incident whereupon a weapon was accidentally discharged in Post A.

b. NRC Comments

The NRC investigators reviewed the circumstances surrounding the accidental discharge of a service revolver in Post A. The investigators found that on August 16, 1978, at

approximately 6:45 a.m., a guard who stated that he was preparing to "dry fire" his weapon in accordance with a directive by Wackenhut and UNC supervision, allegedly dropped the weapon on the table in Post A with the hammer in a cocked position, upon which it discharged. Several guards, including the guard scheduled to relieve the guard in question were interviewed in this regard by the NRC investigators. The NRC investigators were unable to determine if the gun actually discharged while "dry firing" or if it discharged while the guard involved was attempting to "clear" his weapon prior to turning it in. The NRC investigators determined that the guard in question had just completed a 16 hour shift and due to his tired condition may have failed to completely empty his weapon prior to clearing it.

With respect to that part of the allegation related to "dry firing" on post in general, the NRC investigators noted that four (4) present guards, one (1) former guard and three (3) UNC supervisors made statements relative to and/or supporting the allegation. These statements included the following:

Individual A

- stated that a couple of months ago, Individual W had ordered the guards to practice "dry firing" of their weapons while on duty.
- stated that several times he had practiced "dry firing" with Individual BB inside of the cafeteria using his own weapon.
- stated that prior to the incident (accidental discharge of a weapon in Post A on August 16, 1978) that guards were "dry firing" their own weapons on Post, especially Post C. Subsequent to the incident, guards were told that they could only "dry fire" using another weapon (i.e., other than their own weapon) and only under the supervision of a sergeant.

Individual M

-stated that they were encouraged to "dry fire" on post if they so desired.

Individual N

-stated that he had observed a guard on post without ammunition in his weapon due to "dry firing".

Individual S

-stated that guards had been told to "dry fire" on post with their own weapons "way back before the May (1978) training."

Individual Y

-stated that several guards had unloaded their own guns on post to practice "dry firing". "Almost everyone was doing it during July and August."

Individual X

-stated that the Wackenhut Corporation had encouraged dry firing prior to the incident.

Note: The NRC investigators determined that the Wackenhut organization itself never encouraged "dry-firing" as a policy and that the reference made in the statement referred to the Wackenhut Guard Captain.

Individual W

-stated that "dry firing" had been encouraged while the guards were on duty but not while on post.

Individual R

-stated that guards had been instructed and encouraged to "dry fire" and that this encouragement had occurred prior to May of 1978. It was never intended for the guards to unload their weapons while on duty in order to perform this "dry firing".

c. NRC Conclusion

Based on the statements by members of the security guard force and UNC Supervisors, the NRC concludes that:

- a) with respect to the weapons discharge incident of August 16, 1978, there is inadequate evidence and/or information to determine the true cause of the incident and,
- b) with respect to "dry-firing" on post, the allegation is supported and although it does not constitute an item of noncompliance, it does indicate not only a weakening of the overall security posture at the UNC facility but also a practice hazardous to the personnel involved.

E. Other Areas Reviewed

Note: During the course of this investigation, other areas of the licensee's security program were reviewed. These areas were identified from either (a) comments of security guard force personnel not directly related to the allegations, (b) evaluations of the licensee's records and (c) direct observations by the NRC investigation team. These items are discussed below.

1. Improper Entry into MAA areas

a. NRC Findings

During the course of the NRC interviews of security guard force personnel, it was brought to the investigators' attention that three individuals may have entered the MAA-1 area alone, a condition prohibited by NRC requirements and UNC License Condition. The statements made by these individuals are as follows.

Individual A

-stated that with respect to MAA-1, that he had gone into the area alone. Although he was told that someone was in the process area, Individual A stated that he never saw this other individual.

Individual N

-stated that he also had entered MAA-1 alone. Individual N stated that on one occasion he was told by a UNC process supervisor to "Get in and get out quick because I want to close up". Individual A stated that he was the only one in the MAA area and that the process supervisor did not follow him into the area or keep an eye on him while he made his routine door checks.

Individual T

-stated that he knew of a guard who was uncleared making a round inside of MAA-1 without a cleared escort and that he himself though cleared, went into the MAA unescorted. Individual T stated that "Someone was in there, but I never saw him".

b. NRC Conclusion

The NRC concluded that entry into the MAA areas alone and/or under conditions whereby the guard could not be, or was not observed by another individual constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the licensee's failure to meet both NRC requirements and UNC license condition relative to the presence of two individuals within a material access area as required by 10 CFR 73.60(a)(7) and UNC License Condition 9.3.56 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

2. Insufficient Guard Strengtha. NRC Findings

The NRC investigators noted that a detailed review of UNC's guard assignment records indicated that there were

days when the number of guards assigned official security protection duty was insufficient to meet this licensee's onsite guard strength requirement. The investigators also noted that records were not available to indicate when the guard captain was filling in for missing guards on certain occasions. No records were made available to the investigators to identify the UNC "armable employees" when they were designated as part of the armed guard force.

b. NRC Conclusion

The NRC concluded that the recorded shortage of guards, compounded by the absence of records relative to substitution personnel and "armable employees" constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance relative to the licensee's failure to maintain an adequate guard strength at the UNC site as required by UNC License Condition 9.3.34 Appendix A of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

3. Missing Weapons

a. NRC Findings

During the course of the investigation the NRC investigators noted that on September 28, 1978 at about 5:10 A.M., one of the shotguns in the cafeteria was missing. This shotgun is required as part of the contingency response program.

b. NRC Conclusion

The NRC concluded that the absence of the required weapon constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to the licensee's failure to provide weapons as required by 10 CFR 73.50(a)(3) and UNC Procedures for armed response individuals.

4. Employee Searches

a. NRC Findings

A review of UNC records and personal observations by NRC investigators indicated that employee searches were not being conducted as required, specifically, (a) random searches of UNC employees were not conducted each day, and (b) uncleared guards entering the protected area were not searched.

b. NRC Conclusion

The NRC concluded that the failure on the part of the licensee to provide required searches of employees, and uncleared guards constituted an infraction level item of noncompliance with respect to NRC requirements and UNC procedures relative to searches prior to entry into the protected area as required by 10 CFR 73.50(c)(1) and UNC License Condition 9.3.1 of Materials and Plant Protection Amendment MPP-2.

5. Weapons Maintenance

a. NRC Findings

The NRC investigators were informed during the course of their interviews with members of the security guard force that there had been instances when foreign material and debris (i.e., dirt, pebbles, etc.) had been found in some of the firearms at the UNC site, specifically, some rifles and shotguns. The NRC investigators noted that these instances had been properly logged in UNC Supervisor's Journals but further investigation by the licensee into the cause of and/or motives behind their occurrences could not be determined. The NRC investigators were also able to determine that no formal weapons maintenance program was in existence at the UNC site at the time of the investigation. Guards questioned in this regard stated that the guns were cleaned by the individual guards but only after their use, which heretofore was limited to firearms qualifications and associated activities on an infrequent basis.

b. NRC Conclusion

The NRC concluded that although the finding of foreign material and debris within firearms and the absence of any specific weapons maintenance program did not constitute a specific item of noncompliance, it did indicate a weakening of the licensee's overall security posture and presented a situation whereby the personal health and safety of individual members of the security guardforce may have been jeopardized. No specific evidence and/or information was obtained that would substantiate that the weapons had been deliberately sabotaged.

SECTION F

PAGES 47-59 INTENTIONALLY DELETED; THEY CONTAINED EITHER
CONFIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION OR 10 CFR 2.790(d)
INFORMATION

LIST OF EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT A SIGNED STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL N DATED SEPTEMBER 20, 1978

EXHIBIT B SIGNED STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL Y DATED SEPTEMBER 21, 1978

EXHIBIT C SIGNED STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL Q DATED OCTOBER 5, 1978

EXHIBIT D FIREARMS QUALIFICATION SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL Q
DATED MARCH 6, 1978

EXHIBIT E FIREARMS QUALIFICATION SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL J
DATED MARCH 6, 1978

EXHIBIT F FIREARMS QUALIFICATION SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL W
DATED MARCH 6, 1978

EXHIBIT G FIREARMS QUALIFICATION SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL T
DATED MARCH 6, 1978

EXHIBIT H (1-3) FIREARMS QUALIFICATION RECORDS OF THREE UNC SECURITY
GUARDS

EXHIBIT A

SIGNED STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL N

STATEMENT

I, _____ Security Specialist-Nuclear, Wackenhut Security employed by UNC at Wood River Junction, Rhode Island was contacted by Dr. Charles Gallina, Investigation Specialist and Edward Jones, Security Inspector on September 20, 1978 at approximately 6:00 P.M. at the Howard Johnson Motor Lodge in Mystic, Connecticut. I was advised of the nature of the inquiry and the provisions of Section (e)(3) of the Privacy Act. After being so advised, I voluntarily supplied the following information.

While employed as a security guard Sergeant at UNC the following items were either observed directly by me or brought to my attention relative to the UNC security program at the above referenced site.

1. Answers were provided to individuals by supervisory personnel during qualification examinations in an effort to facilitate qualification.
2. Individuals qualifying for .38 calibre weapons use were told they had passed when they knew that they had failed. Individuals were never shown the specific targets. At least two individuals believed that their records had been falsified.
3. I was requested by Wackenhut supervision to deliberately falsify training records of certain individuals.
4. On instances when the IR alarms would alarm continuously due to weather conditions, guards were instructed to put alarms on "access" without posting guards for the area.
5. Alarm annuciation records were deliberately falsified.

I, _____ have read the above statement of 2 pages and it is true and correct. Furthermore, I am aware that this statement may be used in subsequent NRC proceedings and reports I understand that this information will not be made public without my knowledge and/or approval. I also understand that as far as possible my identity will not be made known in any report or correspondence with UNC or Wackenhut.

(signed) _____

Witnessed by: Charles Gallina
Edward W. Jones, Jr.

EXHIBIT B

SIGNED STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL Y

STATEMENT

I, _____ former security guard at UNC, Wood River Junction, Rhode Island was contacted Dr. Charles Gallina, Investigator and Mr. Edward Jones, Security Inspector of the NRC on September 21, 1978 at approximately 10:15 A.M. at _____ Rhode Island. I was advised of the nature of the inquiry and the provisions of Section (e)(3) of the Privacy Act. After being so advised, I voluntarily supplied the following information.

While employed by UNC in approximately July of 1978, all security personnel were told by Mr. D. LaChappelle to unload their weapons on duty and practice "dry firing". On August 16, 1978, approximately 6:45 A.M. while getting ready to "dry fire" my weapon, I dropped the weapon, hammer in cocked position, on the table in the CAS; upon which it discharged damaging the old (non activated) alarm panel. As a result of this action, I was suspended for 1 week, which was extended to 1 month, upon which time I was informed that I had been terminated.

While employed at UNC at the above location, I also observed instances when due to various conditions (eg. birds, fog; etc.) the IR alarms could not be secured or reset and no guards were posted, especially the North Section. Alarms were put in "access" mode. For a short period time, eg. 5 min. I was told not to enter it in the alarm log.

I, _____, have read the above statement of 1 page and it is true and correct. Futhermore I am aware that this statement may be used in subsequent proceedings and/or reports.

(signed) _____

Witness by: Charles Gallina
Edward W. Jones, Jr.

EXHIBIT C

SIGNED STATEMENT OF INDIVIDUAL Q

STATEMENT

I, _____ Security Guard with the Wackenhut Corporation, Hartford area office employed at the United Nuclear Corporation Recovery Operation Plant at Wood River Junction, Rhode Island on October 5, 1976 at 9:45 PM at the UNC site referenced above was contacted by Dr. Charles Gallina, Investigation Specialist, Mr. Raymond Smith, Investigation Specialist and Mr. Roland Bailey Physical Security Inspector, all of the NRC.

I was advised of the nature of the investigation and the Section (e)(3) of the Privacy Act. After being so advised, I voluntarily supplied the following information.

On or about July 19, 1978, I, _____ while acting in the capacity of range officer during the initial arms qualification for Messrs. Goncarvos, Hargreaves, Harrington, Kiggen, Stanton, Steere and Hudson, for the .38 calibre handgun, and firing the short course (as described in UNC procedures dated 2-28-78), altered the third phase of the firing order, under the direction of Mr. Roger Brown, UNC Supervisor, by moving the above named individuals from the 25 yard distance to a distance of approximately 15 yards from the target. This phase was altered because the above individuals after firing the first 2 phases, were having extreme difficulty in firing their weapons and hitting the target in a manner which would have allowed them to obtain a qualifying score with the remaining rounds. In addition, with the full knowledge of Mr. Brown, Cpl. Hampton and myself (Cpl. Hampton was my assisting qualifying officer) deliberately increased the scores of several individuals while scoring the first two phases of the qualification in order to insure that these individuals would receive a passing score.

This appeared to be a common practice for when I myself qualified in March of 1978, I personally observed Capt. LaChappelle punching holes in the target of individuals with whom I was qualifying in order to increase their scores and enable them to qualify. At the same time, when I was qualifying with the shotgun, I fired only seven rounds of 12 gauge slug ammunition thereby making my maximum possible score 70. Captain LaChappelle added several points making my score, to the best of my knowledge, 93 out of 100.

EXHIBIT C CONTINUED

Statement

2

I _____ have read the above statement of two pages and it is true and correct. Furthermore I am aware that this statement may be used in a judicial proceeding.

(signed) _____

witnessed by: Charles Gallina
Roland J. Bailey
Raymond H. Smith

EXHIBIT D

FIREARMS QUALIFICATION SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL

WACKENHUT

Handout
WAEC-13-8
March 28, 1975

FIREARMS TRAINING

SCORE CARD-SHORT COURSE
(Minimum Score 175)

Name: _____ Location: WOODRIVER JCT RI
(Last First MI) City State

Area/Branch Office _____ Client LIN/FRO

RANGE (YDS)	TYPE FIRE	TIME	NO SHOTS	NO STRINGS	TARGET	MAX HITS	10 RING	9 RING	8 RING	7 RING	MAX SCORE	SCORE
25	Slow	5 min	5	2	25 yd (SF)	10	1	2	3	1	100	59
25	Timed	20 sec	5	2	25 yd (TF)	10	1	1	8	4	100	111
25	Rapid	10 sec	5	2	Silhouette	10	3	5	4	2	100	121
Totals (Score)						30					300	291

Signatures: _____
(Firer)
[Signature]
(Instructor)

Date: MAR 6 1978
Month/Day/Year

Qualified Unqualified
(Check One)

↑
IN error
DMS
10-11-78
[Signature]

SHOTGUN - 93
M-1 CARBINE - 199

POOR ORIGINAL

EXHIBIT E

FIREARMS QUALIFICATIONS SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL J

WACKENHUT

Handout
WAEC-13-8
March 28, 1975

FIREARMS TRAINING

SCORE CARD-SHORT COURSE
(Minimum Score 175)

Name: _____ Location: Wood River Junction R.I.
(Last First MI) City State

Area/Branch Office _____ Client UNC

RANGE (YDS)	TYPE FIRE	TIME	NO SHOTS	NO STRINGS	TARGET	MAX HITS	10 RING	9 RING	8 RING	7 RING	MAX SCORE	SCORE
25	Slow	5 min	5	2	25 yd (SF)	10		3	4		100	59
25	Timed	20 sec	5	2	25 yd (TF)	10	2	6	5	5	100	149
25	Rapid	10 sec	5	2	Silhouette	10	1	3	2	3	100	74
Totals (Score)						30					300	282

Signatures: _____
(Firer)

Date: 3 16 78
Month/Day/Year

[Signature]
(Instructor)

Qualified Unqualified
(Check One)

Shotgun 95
M1 Carbine 190

FIREARMS QUALIFICATION SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL W

FIREARMS TRAINING

SCORE CARD-SHORT COURSE
 (Minimum Score 175)

9mm

Name: _____ Location: Wood River Pt RI
 (Last First MI) City State

Area/Branch Office Plant 4 Ford Client UNC

RANGE (YDS)	TYPE FIRE	TIME	NO SHOTS	NO STRINGS	TARGET	MAX HITS	10 RING	9 RING	8 RING	7 RING	MAX SCORE	SCORE
25	Slow	5 min	5	2	25 yd (SF)	10		3	4	3	100	80
25	Timed	20 sec	5	2	25 yd (TF)	10	1	6	2	2	100	94
25	Rapid	10 sec	5	2	Silhouette	10	1	1	4	4	100	79
Totals (Score)						30					300	253

Signatures: _____
 (Firer) *[Signature]*

Date: 3 16 78
 Month/Day/Year

 (Instructor)

Qualified Unqualified
 (Check One)

EXHIBIT G

FIREARMS QUALIFICATION SCORECARD OF INDIVIDUAL T

FIREARMS TRAINING

SCORE CARD-SHORT COURSE
(Minimum Score 175)

Name: _____ Location: Wood River Jct RD
(Last First MI) City State

Area/Branch Office Harland Client ENR

RANGE (YDS)	TYPE FIRE	TIME	NO SHOTS	NO STRINGS	TARGET	MAX HITS	10 RING	9 RING	8 RING	7 RING	MAX SCORE	SCORE
25	Slow	5 min	5	2	25 yd (SF)	10	1	4	3	2	100	84
25	Timed	20 sec	5	2	25 yd (TF)	10	1	4	5		100	82
25	Rapid	10 sec	5	2	Silhouette	10	1	4	5		100	86
Totals (Score)						30					300	256

Signatures: _____
(Firer)

Date: 3 16 78
Month/Day/Year

[Signature]
(Instructor)

Qualified Unqualified
(Check One)

.41 MAG
Personal Weapon

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION,
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

Report No. 70-820/78-23

Docket No. 70-820

License No. SNM-777 Priority 1 Safeguards Group 1
Category UR

Licensee: United Nuclear Corporation

Wood River Junction, Rhode Island 02894

Facility Name: Fuel Recovery Operation

Inspection at: Wood River Junction, Rhode Island and Uncasville,
Connecticut

Inspection conducted: October 27, 30, 31, - November 1-3 and 21, 1978

Inspectors: E. Woltner 12/7/78
E. Woltner, Safeguards Auditor date signed

Accompanying E. Quinn, NMSS
Headquarters J. Hockert, NMSS
Personnel: W. Ward, IE

Approved by: J. H. Joyner 12/14/78
J. H. Joyner, Chief, Nuclear Material Control date signed
Support Section, Safeguards Branch

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on October 27, 30, 31, November 1-3 and 21, 1978 (Report No. 70-820/78-23)

Areas Inspected: Special, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector and accompanying Headquarters personnel of nuclear material control and accounting in the areas of: shipment of a supposedly empty container which actually contained SNM; security search procedures; shipper/receiver differences; and licensee action to improve SNM control. The inspection involved forty-nine inspector-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.

Results: Of the five areas inspected, no apparent items of noncompliance were identified in three areas; three apparent items of noncompliance were identified in two areas (Infraction - failure to keep records regarding the disposal and transfer of SNM - Paragraph 3.i; Violation - failure to use SNM detectors on containers upon exit from MAA-1 - Paragraph 4.c; and Deficiency - failure to dispatch Form NRC-741 on same day material was shipped - Paragraph 3.i).