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**DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE**

*La Crosse, Wisconsin*

54601

February 28, 1980

In reply, please  
refer to LAC-6804

DOCKET NO. 50-409

Mr. James G. Keppler  
Regional Director  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Directorate of Regulatory Operations  
Region III  
799 Roosevelt Road  
Glen Ellyn, Illinois 60137

SUBJECT: DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE  
LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)  
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45  
IE BULLETIN NO. 79-27 - LOSS OF NON-CLASS 1-E  
INSTRUMENT AND CONTROL POWER SYSTEM BUS  
DURING OPERATION

Reference: (1) NRC Letter, Keppler to Linder,  
dated November 30, 1979, Enclosing  
IE Bulletin No. 79-27.  
(2) NRC Letter, Keppler to Linder,  
dated January 11, 1979, Enclosing  
IE Bulletin No. 79-02.

Dear Mr. Keppler:

In the LACBWR design there are a total of five (5) Class 1-E and non-Class 1-E buses supplying power to the safety and non-safety related instrumentation and control systems. These are:

- 1) 1A Inverter Bus
- 2) 1B Inverter Bus
- 3) 1C Inverter Bus
- 4) Turbine Building Bus
- 5) Turbine Building Regulated Bus

We have identified and reviewed the Control Room alarms associated with these buses which would alert the operator to the loss of power to the bus.

Evaluation of the affects of loss of power to these instrument and control system loads indicated that loss of power to individual buses would not affect the ability to achieve a cold shutdown condition.

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Mr. James G. Keppler, Reg. Dir.  
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

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During our review and evaluation, we have found that the inverter bus 1C did not have a Control Room annunciator associated with loss of power to its bus. We propose to install a Control Room annunciator which will alert the operator to the loss of power to this bus. This proposed modification will be installed during our next refueling shutdown scheduled for March 11, 1980.

We have again reviewed Circular No. 79-02 in regard to failure of 120-volt vital AC power supplies. Based on the review and operating experience, we do not propose any design modifications.

The emergency procedures and operating procedures, relating to loss of power to electrical buses and those relating to achieving a cold shutdown condition have been reviewed. Procedures are provided for loss of power to the electrical buses, including loss of power to buses and failure of emergency power sources.

There are no postulated failures of electrical power to buses that would prevent the plant from achieving a cold shutdown condition. To reduce the rate of cooldown there are procedures for achieving a controlled cold shutdown condition even with a complete loss of electrical power by utilizing mechanical local indicators and throttling of manual valves. A procedure will be prepared for the proposed Control Room annunciator, at the time of its installation.

If you have any questions regarding this response, please let us know.

Very truly yours,

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE



Frank Linder, General Manager

FL:WPN:GSB:af

cc: U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Office of Inspection and Enforcement  
Division of Reactor Operations Inspection  
Washington, D. C. 20555