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United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JOHN W. YAGO, JR., STAFF DIRECTOR
BAILEY GUARD, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

February 5, 1980

The Honorable John F. Ahearne
Acting Chairman
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As part of our investigation into the accident at Three Mile Island, we are looking at certain events which in some way may have foreshadowed the March 28, 1979, accident. These events include the September 24, 1977, transient at Davis Besse, the June 13, 1975, transient at Oconee Unit 3, and the four previous transients at Three Mile Island Unit 2 in which the high pressure injection system was automatically actuated.

With regard to these events, it is currently our understanding that, following these events, your agency did not notify other appropriate utilities of the incidents or advise them of the corrective actions to be taken in such an event. Please let us know:

First, if our understanding is correct.

Second, if this understanding is correct, why you chose to take no such action.

Third, if this is incorrect, what notification and advice was given and to whom.

Fourth, what follow-up work was done with respect to each of these events. Please include a description of any analysis that was performed and your conclusions regarding the severity of the event.

Fifth, with regard specifically to the activation of HPI at TMI-2, whether you contemplated any actions that would reduce the number of actuations of HPI under non-loss-of-coolant accident conditions.

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In addition, TMI-2 experienced chronic problems with the condensate polishing system, beginning with an incident on October 19, 1977 (which appears similar to the problems on March 28, 1979) and continuing until the accident. With regard to these problems:

First, was the NRC informed?


Second, if so, what follow-up actions were taken? Please include documentation.

Third, if the NRC was not informed, could you explain the circumstances surrounding the failure to inform.


So that we may have this information for our investigation report, which is now in the final stages of preparation, we would appreciate your providing a written reply to these questions as soon as possible. We hope to have our first draft by February 22.

Thank you very much for your prompt attention to this matter.

Sincerely,



Alan K. Simpson
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Nuclear
Regulation



Gary Hart
Chairman
Subcommittee on Nuclear
Regulation