

MEMORANDUM FOR: William P. Gammill

FROM: Harley Silver

From: J. Creswell  
(49-28019)

SUBJECT: PRELIMINARY RESPONSE TO 2/5/80 LETTER FROM SENATORS HART & SIMPSON

My comments regarding TMI-2 events in response to the letter of Senators Hart and Simpson of February 5, 1980 are as follows. I understand that I&E has the prime responsibility for responding to that letter. Since I am leaving this evening for a two-day trip and a response is desired by Thursday, the following is mostly from memory. I will be happy to discuss these items further on Friday.

In response to the first, second, and third inquiries regarding HPI actuation events at TMI-2, DPM did not notify other utilities of these incidents or advise them of appropriate corrective action. The lead responsibility in each case rested with I&E at the time. NRR position was to respond to any I&E requests for assistance. (None were made to my knowledge.) The appropriate vehicle for such notification would have been I&E bulletins, but I am not aware that any were issued for any of these events. LER summaries briefly describing these events were published and available to all utilities.

With regard to the 4/23/78 event, I specifically offered NRR assistance verbally to the I&E inspector if it was felt necessary, but no such request for assistance was made. Nevertheless, on July 5, 1978, when I received a copy of what was then apparently an internal Med Ed report on the incident, I forwarded it to the Reactor Systems Branch of DSS, asking, "If you feel we should do more, please let me know." The report was returned without comment. Essentially the same report, modified slightly in form, was submitted formally by Met Ed letter to I&E dated 7/24/78 and was distributed widely within NRR, and I assume I&E. I am not aware of any resultant action.

The fourth request deals with follow-up work with respect to these events. Item 1 of Amendment 4 to the TMI-2 license covers avoidance of injection of NaOH into the RCS during inadvertent actuations of the ECCS, such as the events in question. Amendment 6 addresses changing the RCS pressure-low trip setpoint to increase the margin to HPI so that a rapid depressurization will not unnecessarily cause HPI as frequently as would otherwise be the case.

With regard to the fifth question, other than Amendment 6 noted above, I do not recall much emphasis within NRR (or I&E, for that matter) on reducing the number of inadvertent HPI actuations.

To respond to the questions about the condensate polishing system, I subscribe to the draft response prepared by Jerry Mazetis in RSB on February 11, 1980.

Harley Silver

*with Met Ed, I&E, and NRR*

In fact, the dominant concern appeared to be injection of chlorides with the NaOH into the RCS, per discussions between myself and Dan Struberg of Region I.

DPM memo after the first two events (dated 5/1/78) reflected this concern. MTEB regarded that chlorides-NaOH was not a problem. RSB responded verbally they were not involved in this problem. I have no record of responses from other addressees.