



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

JUL 5 1970

Those on Attached List

COMPUTER LISTINGS OF LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS SORTED BY FACILITY

The enclosed computer listing provides information concerning licensee event reports entered into the file during the month of June.

If you desire additional information or special searches, please do not hesitate to contact us.

William H. Kirk

I. A. Kirk, Chief
Automated Systems Branch
Division of Technical Support
Office of Management and
Program Analysis

Enclosure:
As stated

JUN 30, 1978

LER MONTHLY OUTPUT SORTED BY FACILITY
PROCESSED DURING JUNE FOR POWER REACTORS

PAGE 63

FACILITY/SYSTEM/COMPONENT/ COMPONENT SUBCODE/CAUSE CODE/ CAUSE SUBCODE/MANUFACTURER	DOCKET NO./ LER NO./ CONTROL NO.	EVENT DATE/ REPORT DATE/ REPORT TYPE	EVENT DESCRIPTION/ CAUSE DESCRIPTION
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THREE MILE ISLAND-2	05000320	042378
MAIN STEAM SYSTEMS + CONTROLS	78-033/01T-0	050878
VALVES	021273	2-WEEK
OTHER		
DESIGN/FABRICATION ERROR		
CONSTRUCTION/INSTALLATION		
ITEM NOT APPLICABLE		

IN MODE 1 REACTOR TRIPPED FROM 30% R.T.P. RCS RAPIDLY COOLED DOWN AND DEPRESSURIZED. DURING DEPRESSURIZATION, SAFETY INJECTION WAS INITIATED. RCS AND PRESSURIZER COOLDOWN RATES WERE EXCEEDED (T.S. 3.4.9.1 AND 3.4.9.2). PRESSURIZER VOL BELOW LIMITS OF T.S. 3.4.4). CALCULATIONS AND RADIOCHEMISTRY SHOW THAT CORE REMAINED COVERED AT ALL TIMES AND NO RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL RESULTED.

THREE MILE ISLAND-2	05000320	042478
MAIN STEAM SYSTEMS + CONTROLS	78-034/01T-0	050878
VALVES	021273	2-WEEK
OTHER		
DESIGN/FABRICATION ERROR		
DESIGN		
ITEM NOT APPLICABLE		

FOLLOWING RX TRIP, MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES DID NOT RESEAT AT CORRECT PRESSURE. FEEDWATER SYSTEM RESPONSE SLOW SINCE INITIAL INTEGRATED CONTROL SYSTEM TESTING STILL IN PROGRESS. COMBINATION OF RELIEF VALVES FAILING TO RESEAT AND CONTINUING TO FEED STEAM GENERATORS RESULTED IN RAPID DEPRESSURIZATION AND COOLDOWN. RVS WILL BE TESTED.

IN MODE 1 REACTOR TRIP CAUSED SEVERAL MAIN STEAM RELIEF VALVES TO LIFT. DUE TO INADEQUATE DESIGN, SEVERAL STEEL LINERS USED TO PROTECT THE BELLOWES IN THE DISCHARGE PIPING WERE EJECTED. BECAUSE THIS WAS ON SECONDARY SIDE OF THE PLANT, AND NO RADIATION WAS RELEASED, EVENT POSED NO THREAT TO THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.

THIS EVENT WAS CAUSED BY AN INADEQUATE DESIGN WHICH ALLOWED THE USE OF BELLOWES LINERS QUALIFIED FOR 180 F/SEC. STEAM VELOCITY IN A LOCATION WHERE VELOCITIES UP TO 950 F/SEC. COULD BE EXPERIENCED. THE UNDER-DESIGNED BELLOWES LINERS ARE BEING REPLACED BY LINERS OF AN APPROPRIATE DESIGN.

THREE MILE ISLAND-2	05000320	050378
SYSTEM CODE NOT APPLICABLE	78-035/01T-0	050978
COMPONENT CODE NOT APPLICABLE	021273	2-WEEK
SUBCOMPONENT NOT APPLICABLE		
OTHER		
NOT APPLICABLE		
ITEM NOT APPLICABLE		

IN MODE 5 BURNS & ROE NOTIFIED MET-ED THAT SINGLE AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER OPERATION WITHIN THE NORMAL OPERATING RANGE OF THE GRID WILL NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT VOLTAGE LEVELS FOR OPERATION OF THE 480 V MOTOR CONTROLLERS DURING PERIODS OF PEAK UNIT AUXILIARY DEMAND. UNIT HAS NOT OPERATED AT A POWER LEVEL REQUIRING MAXIMUM UNIT AUXILIARIES. NO POTENTIAL FOR ADVERSE EFFECT ON THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC.

A/E SHOWED THAT WITHIN NORMAL RANGE (232 TO 238KV) ONE TRANSFORMER CAN'T PROVIDE ADEQUATE VOLTAGE LEVELS TO SUPPORT OPERATION OF ENGINEERING SAFETY FEATURES AND BALANCE OF PLANT AUXILIARIES. THREE POSSIBLE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS EXIST.

TROJAN-1	05000344	032578
RESIDUAL HEAT REMOV SYS + CONT	78-011/03L-0	042478
INSTRUMENTATION + CONTROLS	021177	30-DAY
INDICATOR		
PERSONNEL ERROR		
LICENSED & SENIOR OPERATORS		
BARTON INSTRU CO., DIV OF IIT		

WHILE IN COLD SHUTDOWN WITH THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM PARTIALLY DRAINED, FLOW WAS BEING SUPPLIED BY ONE RESIDUAL HEAT REMOVAL (RHR) PUMP. ON TWO OCCASIONS (MARCH 25, 1978 AND APRIL 17, 1978) REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM FLOW WAS LOST WHEN REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL INADVERTENTLY DROPPED BELOW THE POINT WHERE THE RHR PUMP TAKES ITS SUCTION.

THE CAUSE OF THESE EVENTS IS ATTRIBUTED TO INSTRUMENT ERROR. IN THE MARCH 25 EVENT A PRESSURE GAUGE WAS OUT OF CALIBRATION WHICH RESULTED IN AN ERRONEOUS LEVEL INDICATION. IN THE APRIL 17 EVENT THE LEVEL IN THE REFERENCE LEG OF THE LEVEL INSTRUMENT WAS LOW CAUSING IT TO READ INCORRECTLY.

FACILITY/SYSTEM/COMPONENT/ COMPONENT SUBCODE/CAUSE CODE/ CAUSE SUBCODE/MANUFACTURER	DOCKET NO./ LER NO./ CONTROL NO.	EVENT DATE/ REPORT DATE/ REPORT TYPE	EVENT DESCRIPTION/ CAUSE DESCRIPTION
<p>TROJAN-1 REACTOR TRIP SYSTEMS INSTRUMENTATION + CONTROLS TRANSMITTER OTHER NOT APPLICABLE BARTON INSTRU CO., DIV OF IIT</p>	<p>05000344 78-012/03L-0 021312</p>	<p>040578 050278 30-DAY</p>	<p>DURING ROUTINE CALIBRATION FOUR OF TWELVE STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL INSTRUMENTS WERE FOUND TO BE OUT OF CALIBRATION. THE SHIFT IN CALIBRATION WAS SUCH THAT THE REACTOR TRIP SETPOINTS ASSOCIATED WITH STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL WERE BELOW THE MINIMUM VALUES PERMITTED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 2.2.1.</p> <p>THE CAUSE OF THIS OCCURRENCE IS ATTRIBUTED TO NORMAL INSTRUMENT DRIFT. THE CALIBRATIONS WERE PERFORMED WHEN THE STEAM GENERATORS WERE COLD AND DEPRESSURIZED. THESE CONDITIONS ARE THOUGHT TO HAVE AFFECTED THE CALIBRATION OF THE INSTRUMENTS.</p>
<p>TROJAN-1 SYSTEM CODE NOT APPLICABLE COMPONENT CODE NOT APPLICABLE SUBCOMPONENT NOT APPLICABLE PERSONNEL ERROR CAUSE SUBCODE NOT PROVIDED ITEM NOT APPLICABLE</p>	<p>05000344 78-001/01L-0 021341</p>	<p>040578 050278 30-DAY</p>	<p>TWO TECHNICIANS WERE EXPOSED TO RADIATION LEVELS FROM A SPENT FUEL ASSEMBLY AS IT WAS BEING TRANSFERRED FROM THE REFUELING CAVITY TO THE SPENT FUEL POOL. INDIVIDUALS RECEIVED DOSES OF 27.3 REM AND 17.1 REM. SEE SPECIAL REPORT SUBMITTED BY LICENSEE DATED 5-2-78;</p> <p>CAUSE WAS FAILURE OF THE TECHNICIANS TO ADEQUATELY ASSESS THE RADIOLOGICAL HAZARDS ASSOCIATED WITH OBTAINING DOSE RATE INFORMATION AROUND THE FUEL TRANSFER TUBE.</p>
<p>TROJAN-1 FIRE PROTECTION SYS + CONT PENETRATIONS, PRIMARY CONTAINMENT OTHER DESIGN/FABRICATION ERROR CONSTRUCTION/INSTALLATION ITEM NOT APPLICABLE</p>	<p>05000344 78-014/02L-0 021200</p>	<p>041578 051578 30-DAY</p>	<p>ALL FIRE PROTECTION SEALS WERE BEING INSPECTED AS TO THEIR COMPLIANCE TO FIRE PROTECTION REGULATIONS. THEN PENETRATIONS WERE INSUFFICIENTLY SEALED FOR FIRE PROTECTION. TWO WERE FOUND INSUFFICIENTLY SEALED FOR A FLOOD WATER BARRIER. ONE WAS FOUND INSUFFICIENTLY SEALED FOR BOTH A FIRE AND FLOOD WATER BARRIER.</p> <p>THE PENETRATIONS WERE NOT CORRECTLY SEALED PER DESIGN DRAWINGS AT THE TIME OF CONSTRUCTION.</p>
<p>TROJAN-1 SYSTEM CODE NOT APPLICABLE COMPONENT CODE NOT APPLICABLE SUBCOMPONENT NOT APPLICABLE DESIGN/FABRICATION ERROR DESIGN ITEM NOT APPLICABLE</p>	<p>05000344 78-013/01T-0 021311</p>	<p>042078 050578 2-WEEK</p>	<p>CONTROL BUILDING WALLS DO NOT FULLY MEET STRUCTURAL CRITERIA OF FSAR. DURING INVESTIGATION OF FEASIBILITY TO INSTALL SECURITY WINDOW IN CONTROL BUILDING WALL, MISAPPLICATION OF STRUCTURAL CRITERIA FOR BUILDING WAS DISCOVERED. THIS OCCURRENCE DOES NOT AFFECT THE HEALTH AND SAFETY OF THE PUBLIC. NO TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS VIOLATED. REPORTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS 6.9.1.8.A.</p> <p>FORMULA USED FOR CALCULATING CONCRETE SHEAR STRENGTH AND REINFORCING STEEL REQUIRED AREA WERE INAPPROPRIATE FOR INTENDED APPLICATION. AS-BUILT WALL REINFORCING IS NOT IN ALL CASES CONTINUOUS THROUGH SUPPORTING STEEL FRAME. STRUCTURAL EXTENSION TO BE PROVIDED TO CONTROL BUILDING TO RESTORE TO FULL ORIGINAL CAPACITY OF 0.15G.</p>



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION I
631 PARK AVENUE
KING OF PRUSSIA, PENNSYLVANIA 19151

Reference 31

SEP 21 1978

Docket No. 50-320

Metropolitan Edison Company
ATTN: Mr. J. G. Herbein
Vice President - Generation
P. O. Box 542
Reading, Pennsylvania 19603

Gentlemen:

Subject: Inspection 50-320/78-28

This refers to the inspection conducted by Mr. D. Haverkamp of this office on September 5-7, 1978 at Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2, Middletown, Pennsylvania, of activities authorized by NRC License No. DPR-73 and to the discussions of our findings held by Mr. Haverkamp with Mr. J. Seelinger and other member of your staff at the conclusion of the inspection.

Areas examined during this inspection are described in the Office of Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Report which is enclosed with this letter. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with personnel, and observations by the inspector.

Within the scope of this inspection, no items of noncompliance were observed.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the NRC's Public Document Room. If this report contains any information that you (or your contractor) believe to be proprietary, it is necessary that you make a written application within 20 days to this office to withhold such information from public disclosure. Any such application must be accompanied by an affidavit executed by the owner of the information, which identifies the document or part sought to be withheld, and which contains a statement of reasons which addresses with specificity the items which will be considered by the Commission as listed in subparagraph (b)(4) of Section 2.790. The information sought to be withheld shall be incorporated as far as possible into a separate part of the affidavit. If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified period, the report will be placed in the Public Document Room.

Dupe of

7844990284

SEP 21 1978

No reply to this letter is required; however, if you should have any questions concerning this inspection, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,



Eldon J. Brunner, Chief
Reactor Operations and Nuclear
Support Branch

Enclosure: Office of Inspection and Enforcement Inspection Report
Number 50-320/78-28

cc w/encl:

T. Broughton, Safety and Licensing Manager
J. J. Barton, Project Manager
R. C. Arnold, Vice President - Generation
L. L. Lawyer, Manager - Generation Operations - Nuclear
G. P. Miller, Superintendent
J. L. Seelinger, Unit 2 Superintendent - Technical Support
I. R. Finfrock, Jr.
Mr. R. Conrad
G. F. Trowbridge, Esquire
Miss Mary V. Southard, Chairman, Citizens for a Safe Environment
(Without Report)

bcc w/encl:

IE Mail & Files (For Appropriate Distribution)
Central Files
Public Document Room (PDR)
Local Public Document Room (LPDR)
Nuclear Safety Information Center (NSIC)
Technical Information Center (TIC)
REG:I Reading Room
Region Directors (III, IV) (Report Only)
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania
Miss Mary V. Southard, Chairman, Citizens for a
Safe Environment

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

Region I

NOTICE

Report No. 50-320/78-28

AS OF 21 SEP 1978
REGION I HAS NOT OBTAINED PROPRIETARY
CLEARANCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH 10 CFR 2790

Docket No. 50-320

License No. DPR-73

Priority --

Category B2

Licensee: Metropolitan Edison Company

P.O. Box 542

Reading, Pennsylvania 19603

Facility Name: Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 2

Inspection at: Middletown, Pennsylvania

Inspection conducted: September 5-7, 1978

Inspectors: *D. R. Haverkamp*
D. R. Haverkamp, Reactor Inspector

9/18/78
date signed

date signed

date signed

Approved by: *R. R. Kaminig*
R. R. Kaminig, Chief, Reactor Projects
Section No. 1, R&IS Branch

9/19/78
date signed

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on September 5-7, 1978 (Report No. 50-320/78-28)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection by a regional based inspector of SIS reset feature; licensee followup actions concerning selected previous inspection findings, licensee events and IE Bulletins and Circulars; and selected licensee special reports. The inspection involved 22 inspector-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.

Results: No items of noncompliance were identified.

DUPLICATE DOCUMENT
Entire document previously
entered into system under:
ANO 7811090290
No. of pages: _____

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Metropolitan Edison Company

Mr. R. Bensel, Unit 2 Lead Electrical Engineer
*Mr. M. Bezilla, Unit 2 PORC Secretary
*Mr. J. Floyd, Unit 2 Supervisor of Operations
Mr. J. Hilbish, Station Lead Nuclear Engineer
Mr. B. Mehler, Shift Supervisor
Mr. I. Porter, Unit 2 Lead Instrumentation and Controls Engineer
*Mr. J. Seelinger, Unit 2 Superintendent-Technical Support
Mr. R. Warren, Unit 2 Lead Mechanical Engineer

General Public Utilities Service Corporation

Mr. W. Gunn, Site Project Manager
Mr. R. Toole, Test Superintendent
Mr. J. Wright, QA Manager

The inspector also interviewed several other licensee and contractor employees during the inspection. They included control room operators, technical and engineering staff personnel and general office personnel.

* denotes those present at the exit interview on September 7, 1978.

2. Licensee Action on Previous Inspection Findings

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/77-29-02: Fuel component and material certifications. A licensee representative stated that these records remain stored at the GPU offices in Parsippany, New Jersey. The inspector acknowledged the availability of the records for future NRC review and had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Noncompliance 320/77-47-09: Installation of pipe supports in variance with detail drawings. The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to Region I, serial GQL 0433, dated March 16, 1978. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-12-01: Welding of anchor plate studs without an approved welding procedure. The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to Region I, serial GQL 0811, dated May 1, 1978. (Reference: NRC Inspection Report 50-320/78-15, paragraph 2.) The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-20-01: Failure to verify equipment hatch closed and sealed. The licensee's corrective actions were completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978. The inspector reviewed Surveillance Procedure 2301-M8, "Containment Integrity Verification," Revision 5, dated June 12, 1978. The revised procedure includes requirements to verify that the equipment hatch is closed and sealed. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-02: LLRT procedure items. The inspector reviewed SP 2313-R7, "Reactor Building Local Leak Rate Testing," Revision 1, dated July 19, 1978. The revised procedure includes appropriate changes/provisions for (1) quantifying test boundary valve leakage vice CIV leakage, (2) taking flowmeter readings after both pressure and flow stabilization, (3) ensuring instrumentation is traceable to NBS standards, (4) operating the test rotameter and LLRT test stand and associated valves, (5) deleting references to superseded items (steps 5.2 and 7.3) and (6) specifying applicable minimum sensitivity values. In addition, TCN's have been initiated for SP 2313-R7, SP 2311-5, and SP 2303-SA2 to ensure that all applicable test results are included in the total combined leakage rate of penetrations and valves subject to Type B and C tests.

(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-20-03: Improper air lock door seal test. The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978. The inspector reviewed SP 2311-5, "Containment Integrity", Revision 3, dated June 12, 1978. The revised procedure requires testing of the air lock door seals using a rotameter type flowmeter, which is consistent with recently revised Technical Specifications for conducting this test. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-20-04: Failure to implement surveillance procedures for air lock door seal testing. The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978. The inspector reviewed completed surveillance procedures SP 2311-5, "Containment Integrity," Revisions 3 and 4, performed during June 15-August 31, 1978. Required data were correctly entered in these procedures. Additionally, the licensee's method of identifying TCN's in the body of the control room file and working copies of procedures has been satisfactorily implemented. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Noncompliance 320/78-20-05: Failure of employees to monitor themselves when leaving a controlled area. The licensee's corrective measures were completed as described in MEC letter to NRC Region I, serial GQL 1108, dated June 20, 1978. All operators have reviewed the requirements of HPP 1612 and SP 2311-5. The inspector interviewed selected operators and determined that they were knowledgeable of the proper procedure for gaining access to the air lock door seals for surveillance testing. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-06: Isolation of pressure source by a single root valve during pressure decay tests. The licensee's method of measuring air lock seal leakage has been changed from a pressure decay test to a rotameter type flow test. Additionally, when pressure decay is used as a measurement of other leakage rates, the pressure source is disconnected. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-07: Guidance on sequence of seal leak test and door closure. The inspector reviewed SP 2311-5, "Containment Integrity," Revision 4, dated July 12, 1978. The revised procedure requires testing the inner door seal and then the outer door seal of both air locks. These tests are accomplished without opening any door after the test. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-20-08: Bypass leakage during air lock test. The inspector reviewed SP 2303-SA2, "RB Hatch Leak Rate and Interlock Test," Revision 1, dated July 26, 1978, and TCN 2-78-580. The TCN requires use of a modified test pressurization rig which isolates and vents the flowmeter bypass line during air lock leak testing.

(Closed) Inspector Followup Item 320/78-23-01: Pipe restraint deficiencies. The loose steel support plate near mechanical snubber 863 and the excessive attachment angle of mechanical snubber 411 were corrected by Catalytic work authorization #809. While performing this work, snubber 411 was found to be bound up and was replaced with snubber 2459. The inspector observed the completed maintenance and had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-24-02: Heat treating procedure (draft) heating and cooling rates were greater than allowed by code requirements. The inspector reviewed the approved main steam piping post weld heat treatment procedure for FCR 2520.1, "Heat Treating Procedure," (Original) dated July 18, 1978. The procedure included appropriate heating and cooling rates above 600°F, in conformance with requirements of the USAS B31.7 Code. Additionally, the inspector reviewed selected QC inspection reports of actual heat treatment and determined that identified deviations were satisfactorily resolved. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-24-03: EDG low lube oil day tank level alarm operability. The apparently out of service annunciator alarm was due to a burned out light bulb, which was replaced. The inspector verified the alarm operability and had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-24-04: Corrective measures for LER's 78-33/LT and 78-34/LT. The inspector reviewed the results of main steam safety valve testing. Each valve was checked for proper lift setting using a hydroset lift rig. Valve adjustments and additional tests were performed until satisfactory lift setpoints were attained. Selected valves were lift tested by slowly raising steam pressure, and the lift setpoints closely correlated with the hydroset test results. Appropriate blowdown ring positions were determined during the steam pressure lifts, and each valve was subsequently adjusted. The inspector verified that final test results were acceptable and had no further questions concerning this item.

(Closed) Unresolved Item 320/78-24-05: Update report for LER 78-44/3L. The licensee submitted Update LER 78-44/3L, dated August 24, 1978, which contained adequate narrative descriptions of the event and the cause. The licensee's corrective measures were satisfactorily completed, as described in Paragraphs 5 and 6 of this report. The inspector had no further questions concerning this item.

3. SIS Reset Feature Review

The inspector reviewed the design capability for resetting a safety injection signal following a LOCA. The control system designs at certain other PWR facilities include a SIS reset feature that, if actuated, would prevent proper ESF sequencing operation after a loss of offsite power following a LOCA. The emergency safeguards design at TMI-1 includes a bypass function of each ESF actuation circuit. The ESF bypass functions and their effects are similar, but not identical, to the SIS reset function at other facilities.

The inspector reviewed the following Unit 2 emergency procedures.

- EP 1202-6, "Loss of Reactor Coolant/Reactor Coolant Pressure," Revision 7.
- EP 1202-2 & 2A, "Station Blackout and Station Blackout with Loss of Both Diesel Generators," Revision 9.

These procedures adequately control the insertion and removal of ESF bypass functions.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4. IE Bulletin and Circular Followup

The inspector reviewed the licensee's followup actions regarding the IE Bulletin and Circular listed below.

- IE3 78-10, "Bergen-Patterson Hydraulic Shock Suppressor Accumulator Spring Coils," dated June 27, 1978.
- IEC 78-09, "Arcing of General Electric Company NEMA Size 2 Contactors," dated June 8, 1978.

This review included discussions with licensee personnel, review of selected facility records, and observation of selected facility equipment and components.

With respect to the above Bulletin, the inspector verified that licensee management forwarded copies of the bulletin response to appropriate onsite management representatives, that information and corrective action discussed in the reply was accurate and effected as described, and that the reply was submitted within the time period described in the bulletin.

With respect to the above Circular, the inspector verified that the circular was received by appropriate licensee management, a review for applicability was performed, and that action taken or planned is appropriate.

Acceptance criteria for the above review included inspector judgement and requirements of applicable Technical Specifications and facility procedures.

Licensee followup to the above Bulletin and Circular was acceptable.

5. In-Office Review of Licensee Event Reports (LER's)

The LER's listed below were reviewed in the Region I office promptly following receipt to verify that details of the event were clearly reported including the accuracy of the description of cause and the adequacy of corrective action. The LER's were also reviewed to determine whether further information was required from the licensee, whether generic implications were involved, whether the event should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence, and whether the event warranted onsite followup.

The following LER's were reviewed.

- *-- Update LER 78-33/IT, dated July 31, 1978; Reactor trip followed by RCS depressurization and sodium hydroxide injection, due to steam generator safety valves not properly reseating.
- Update LER 78-34/IT, dated July 31, 1978; Degradation of main steam safety valve discharge piping.
- *-- Update LER 78-44/3L, dated August 24, 1978; Manual output breaker G2-IE2 for the "A" diesel generator was not closed when the unit was placed in emergency standby, due to a procedure inadequacy.
- *-- LER 78-45/IT, dated July 19, 1978; Nonconservative calculational errors resulted in incorrect Technical Specification limits for variable pressure temperature trip and positive imbalances.
- LER 78-48/3L, dated August 22, 1978; A wall penetration in the "A" Emergency Diesel Generator Building switchgear room was discovered to be lacking a fire barrier seal, due to an oversight on the part of the contractor.

The above LER's were closed based on satisfactory review in the Region I office, except those LER's selected for onsite followup.

* denotes those LER's selected for onsite followup.

6. Onsite Licensee Event Followup

For those LER's selected for onsite followup (denoted in Paragraph 5), the inspector verified that the reporting requirements of Technical Specifications and GP 4703 (Original) had been met, that appropriate corrective action had been taken, that the event was reviewed by the licensee as required by Technical Specifications, and that continued operation of the facility was conducted in conformance with Technical Specification limits.

The inspector's findings regarding these licensee events were acceptable.

7. In-Office Review of Special Reports

The special reports listed below were reviewed in the Region I office to verify that the report included information required to be reported and that test results and/or supporting information discussed in the report were consistent with design predictions and performance specifications, as applicable. The reports were also reviewed to ascertain whether planned corrective action was adequate for resolution of identified problems, where applicable, and to determine whether any information contained in the report should be classified as an Abnormal Occurrence.

The following TMI 2 special reports were reviewed.

- 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, dated January 31, 1978; Reactor building emergency cooling booster pumps did not meet system design requirements.
- 10 CFR 50.55(e) report, dated January 11, 1978; Reactor building spray pumps had a higher required NPSH than the system available NPSH during runout conditions.
- Special Report 78-03, dated August 9, 1978; Fire Service air intake tunnel halon system actuated during a thunderstorm and remained inoperable for more than 14 days while the halon storage containers were being recharged and reinstalled.

The above reports were closed based on satisfactory review at the Region I office.

8. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on September 7, 1978. The inspector summarized the purpose and scope of the inspection and the findings.

REGULATORY INFORMATION DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM (RIDS)
DISTRIBUTION FOR INCOMING MATERIAL 50--320

TO: GRIER B H
NRC

ORG: HERBEIN J G
METROPOL EDISON

DOC DATE: 07/24/78
DATE RCVD: 08/04/78

OBJECT TYPE: LETTER NOTARIZED: NO
SUBJECT:

COPIES RECEIVED
LTR 1 ENCL 1

TRANSMITTAL OF A SPECIAL REPORT CONCERNING THE EMI-2 ECCS ACTUATION WHICH
OCCURRED ON 4/23/78.

PLANT NAME: THREE MILE ISLAND -- UNIT 2

REVIEWER INITIAL: XRS
DISTRIBUTOR INITIAL: *MC*

***** DISTRIBUTION OF THIS MATERIAL IS AS FOLLOWS *****

NOTES:

SEND AMENDMENTS ONLY TO WETMORE

PSAR/FSAR AMDTS AND RELATED CORRESPONDENCE
(DISTRIBUTION CODE B001)

FOR ACTION: ASST DIR VASSALLO**LTR ONLY
PROJ MGR H. SILVER**W/ENCL

BR CHIEF LWR#4 BC**LTR ONLY
LIC ASST LWR#4 LA**LTR ONLY

INTERNAL:

REG FILE**W/ENCL
I & E**W/2 ENCL
OPERATOR LIC BR**W/ENCL
QAB**W/ENCL
MIPC**LTR ONLY
MECH ENG BR**W/ENCL
MATERIAL ENG BR**W/2 ENCL
REACTOR SYSTEMS BR**W/ENCL
CORE PERFORMANCE BR**W/ENCL
AUXILIARY SYS BR**W/ENCL
I & C SYSTEMS BR**W/ENCL
AD FOR SITE TECH**W/5 ENCL
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS**W/ENCL
RAD ASSESSMENT BR**W/ENCL
GEOSCIENCES BR**W/ENCL

NRC PDR**W/ENCL
OELD**LTR ONLY
EMERGENCY PLAN BR**W/ENCL
DIRECTOR NRR**LTR ONLY
AD FOR ENG**LTR ONLY
STRUCTURAL ENG BR**W/ENCL
AD FOR REAC SFTY**LTR ONLY
ANALYSIS BR**W/ENCL
AD FOR PLANT SYSTEMS**LTR ON
CONTAINMENT SYSTEMS**W/ENCL
POWER SYS BR**W/ENCL
AD FOR SITE ANLYS**LTR ONLY
EFFLUENT TREAT SYS**W/ENCL
KIRKWOOD**W/ENCL

EXTERNAL:

LPDR'S
HARRISBURG, PA**W/ENCL
TERA**W/ENCL
NSIC**W/ENCL
ACRS CAT B**W/16 ENCL

DISTRIBUTION: LTR 58 ENCL 48
SIZE: 1P+4P

CONTROL NBR: 782160092

***** THE END *****

MEMO ROUTE SLIP Form 95 (Rev. May 14, 1947), AFM 0740		For Concurrence. For signature.	For Action. For information.
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS
T. Hovak			
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS
			See me about this. Date and return.
TO (Name and unit)	INITIALS	DATE	REMARKS
H.S. Silver		7/5/78	For concurrence in 7/5/78 attached in Aleted report on 4/23/78 reactor trip at T-111-2. If you feel we should decrease, please let me know. I.E. Keselmeind responsibility for this. Please return report.
PHONE NO.	DATE	OTHER SIDE FOR ADDITIONAL REMARKS	
	7/5/78		

GPO : 1968 O-394-818