

CERTIFIED

10/21/79

ACRS-1664 A

ISSUE DATE: 10/15/79

MINUTES OF THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS (SALEM) SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING
JULY 27, 1979
WASHINGTON, DC

A meeting of the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island 2 Accident Implications was held in Room 1046, 1717 H Street, Washington, DC on July 27, 1979. The purpose of the meeting was to develop information that will assist the full ACRS in reaching a decision on what requirements from the TMI accident will be applied to plants in the near-term license stage, specifically a Westinghouse-type reactor, Salem 2. The meeting was noticed in the Federal Register dated July 12 and 20, 1979, which are included as Attachment A. The schedule of the meeting and the attendee list are included in Attachment B and C, respectively. Handouts at the meeting are included as Attachment D. No request to make a statement at the meeting from the public was received. The meeting was held in open session.

EXECUTIVE SESSION

Dr. Siess opened the meeting by stating that the ACRS at the June meeting had reached a position on how it plans to handle plants with near-term OLs. He then read the pertinent portion of the letter that was transmitted to the Staff, as follows: "The Committee expects that the NRC Staff will keep it informed regarding the additional requirements arising from consideration of the TMI-2 accident being imposed on those plants in which the ACRS has already reported to the Commission on OL applications but for which the OL has not yet been issued. The information supplied to the ACRS may be provided either case-by-case or in generic form, as appropriate. The ACRS expects to review this information and any actions proposed by the Staff and to report thereon to the Commission when considered appropriate by the Committee, or as requested by the Commission."

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THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS
POOR QUALITY PAGES

8002210

The Staff had chosen to present this information in generic form as NUREG-0578, "TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force Status Report, Short-Term Recommendations." This report includes recommendations relating to all operating reactors and to all pending operating licenses.

Dr. Siess suggested that the scope for today's meeting should be limited to those things which affect the near-term OLS.

Additional recommendations will be forthcoming from the Bulletins and Orders Task Force for the six near-term OLS of the highest priority interest, the Westinghouse plants. These additional recommendations will be in a Westinghouse generic report being written by the Bulletins and Orders Task Force. There will also be other recommendations in the near-term associated with operator training and licensing.

The Staff stated that the 23 recommendations in NUREG-0578 have been transmitted to Mr. Denton for action. The Staff feels that all 23 recommendations will be approved with only minor changes.

BULLETINS AND ORDERS - S. Israel, NRC Staff

Mr. Israel discussed the requirements that the Bulletins and Orders system group will be applying to the PWR plants.

Since there is an overlap in some of the recommendations with the Lessons Learned Task Force, only those not in the Lessons Learned Task Force were discussed by Mr. Israel.

In the area of the auxiliary feedwater system, the following items were discussed:

- single suction valve
- alternate water source
- condensate storage tank low level alarm
- pump endurance test

- water hammer flow
- valve position on loss of air
- actuation on loss of all AC
- technical specifications

In the area of instrumentation, core exit thermocouples that will be monitored in the control room was discussed.

In the procedures area, small LOCA, extended loss of feedwater, and steam generator dump valve operation were discussed.

The program discussed above will be implemented before the near-term OLS are issued.

EMERGENCY PLANNING - J. Miller

Mr. Miller represented a group that reviewed emergency planning for all sites including the near-term OLS. He stated that the charter of the group is to implement Regulatory Guide 1.101 to assure the implementation of the Lessons Learned Task Force on operating reactors and near-term OLS, and to assure that the relationship between licensees, and state and local agencies concerning the emergency plans is firmed up. He further stated that emergency planning will be applied to a distance of 10 miles from the plant, and that test exercises of emergency plans involving both state and local levels, including the licensee, will be required. Implementation schedule is July 1, 1980.

TRAINING - R. Bursey

Mr. Bursey discussed new training requirements for operators to be licensed in new plants. The training requirements are listed in a Commission paper which will be submitted for consideration at a later date. Some of the requirements of the oral and written examinations include all of the TMI-related material, response to the Bulletins and Orders, and expansion of the material on heat transfer, fluid flow, and thermodynamics. In addition, all Unit 1 personnel of a multi-unit facility of the near-term OLS will be evaluated on the basis

of grades achieved during the last annual requalification examination. If an individual received a grade less than 80 percent (formerly 70 percent) overall, he will be required to take a regular examination; if he is an SRO, he will have to take the regular RO and SRO examinations.

The Staff is attempting to requalify current operators of operating plants. The problem, in part, stems from the unavailability of training slots at a simulator. In the meantime, the operators of the near-term OLS will be more thoroughly trained than the operators of operating plants.

NUREG-0578, LESSONS LEARNED

Dr. Siess then went through, item by item, the 23 short-term recommendations delineated in NUREG-0578. These recommendations are deemed by the Task Force to provide substantial additional protection for the public health and safety. Some of the items of particular interest to the Subcommittee are listed as follows:

- Post-Accident Hydrogen Control Systems
- Instrumentation to Follow the Course of an Accident
- Shift Technical Advisor
- Revised Limiting Conditions for Operations

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The Chairman asked if Salem had any problems in meeting the requirements in NUREG-0578. The Applicants stated that, in general, no problems exist in implementing the recommendations in NUREG-0578, but they may have space problem for the on-site technical support center. The Staff stated that it should not be a problem because proximity was meant by the Staff to mean that people could be sent to and from the plant conveniently. The center can be "a block" away from the plant.

The Subcommittee is still concerned that some plants still require AC power for the auxiliary feedwater system to operate. The Staff stated that this concern is now being addressed by a dedicated task force.

Ice condenser and BWR plants were not covered at this meeting, but were scheduled to be addressed at future meetings.

The Subcommittee then agreed to present the Salem 2 matter at the full ACRS meeting scheduled for August.

NOTE: For additional details, a complete transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St., NW, Washington, DC 20555 or from Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc., 444 North Capitol St., NW, Washington, DC.

evaluate incidents involving ionizing radiation. The Agency continues to prepare for such response by providing the following:

- (1) trained staff for advisement required to meet any given situation;
- (2) trained and equipped staff for emergency field activities;
- (3) transportation by automobile to site of incident;
- (4) established liaison with appropriate NRC and DOE Operations Offices; and
- (5) training to key personnel of other state/local agencies.

Radiological assistance in the form of monitoring, liaison with appropriate authorities, and recommendations for area security and cleanup are provided by the Agency. The contamination guides used by the Agency are in Table III of the Protective Action Guides contained in Appendix XI. All Agency personnel will be maintained at an operation-ready level of training. Part of this training will be provided through cooperation of the NRC in Las Vegas, Nevada.

The Annex C Nuclear Accident or Incident Control Plan presently being revised by the State Civil Defense Preparedness Agency (DCPA) is included in Appendix XI. This plan addresses both transportation accidents and off-site releases from fixed facilities. It requires that the State Police first notify DCPA, which in turn notifies the Radiation Control Agency. It is the responsibility of the Agency to advise the DCPA the extent of the hazard to the public health and safety and recommend protective actions as necessary. All licensees will be given copies of the plan and instructed in proper reporting of incidents which occur outside of their facility.

FR Doc. 79-2006 Filed 6-25-79 3:43 am
BILLING CODE 7530-01-0

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island, Unit 2, Accident Implications Re Nuclear Power Plant Design; Addition to Agenda

The agenda of the July 26-27, 1979 meeting of the ACRS Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident—Implications Re Nuclear Power Plant Design, will include the following:

Friday, July 27, 1979

The subcommittee will address the topic of further ACRS review of pending applications for operating licenses as a result of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident, and, specifically, the Salem Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 review.

Background information regarding the Salem Nuclear Power Station, Unit 2 can be found in documents on file and available for public inspection at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H St., N.W., Washington, DC 20555, and at the Salem Free Public Library, 112 West Broadway, Salem, NJ 08079.

All other items regarding this meeting remain the same as announced in the Federal Register on July 12, 1979 (44 FR 40739).

Further information can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the Designated Federal Employee for this meeting, Mr. Richard K. Major, (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EDT.

Dated July 16, 1979.

John C. Hoyle,

Advisory Committee, Management Officer.

FR Doc. 79-22408 Filed 7-19-79 8:45 am
BILLING CODE 7530-01-0

[Docket No. 50-133]

Pacific Gas & Electric Co.; Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has issued Amendment No. 18 to Facility Operating License No. DPR-7, issued to Pacific Gas and Electric Company (the licensee), which revised Technical Specifications for operation of the Humboldt Bay Power Plant, Unit No. 3 (the facility) located near Eureka, California. The amendment is effective as of the date of its issuance.

The amendment revises the Technical Specifications to extend on a one-time basis the interval for containment integrated leak rate testing until immediately prior to returning the facility to power operation. The amendment also includes the following administrative changes to the Technical Specifications:

1. Expression of an allowable tolerance for performing surveillance intervals.
2. Addition of a member to the Plant Staff Review Committee.
3. Correction of a typographical error, and
4. Clarification of General Office Nuclear Power Plant Review and Audit Committee responsibilities.

The application for the amendment complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations. The Commission has made appropriate findings as required by the Act and the Commission's rules and regulations in 10 CFR Chapter I, which are set forth in the license amendment. Prior public notice of this amendment was not required since the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration.

The Commission has determined that the issuance of this amendment will not

result in any significant environmental impact and that pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) an environmental impact statement, or negative impact declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with issuance of this amendment.

For further details with respect to this action, see (1) the application for amendment dated October 20, 1978, as supplemented January 24, 1979, (2) Amendment No. 18 to License No. DPR-7, and (3) the Commission's related Safety Evaluation. All of these items are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, D.C. and at the Humboldt County Library, 636 F Street, Eureka, California. A copy of items (2) and (3) may be obtained upon request addressed to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, Attention: Director, Division of Operating Reactors.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 15th day of July 1979.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Thomas A. Ippolito,

Chief, Operating Reactors Branch No. 3
Division of Operating Reactors

FR Doc. 79-22472 Filed 7-19-79 8:45 am
BILLING CODE 7530-01-0

[Docket No. 50-275]

Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1); Order Extending Construction Completion Date

Pacific Gas and Electric Company is the holder of Construction Permit Nos. CPPR-39 and CPPR-89 issued by the Atomic Energy Commission* on April 23, 1968 and December 9, 1970, respectively, for construction of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2, presently under construction at the Company's site in San Luis Obispo County, California.

On May 24, 1979, Pacific Gas and Electric Company filed a request for extension of the completion date for Unit 1.

On November 15, 1978, the Commission's staff published Supplement No. 8 to the Safety Evaluation Report for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant documenting the need to make certain modifications. Consequently, additional time will be required to complete the

*Effective January 30, 1975, the Atomic Energy Commission became the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Permits in effect on that day were continued under the authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Attachment A

Endowment for the Arts, Washington, D.C. 20506, or call: (202) 634-6070.

John H. Clark,

Director, Office of Council and Panel Operations, National Endowment for the Arts.

(FR Doc. 79-21485 Filed 7-11-79 8:45 AM)

BILLING CODE 7537-01-00

Federal Graphics Improvement Advisory Panel, Meeting

Pursuant to section 10(a) (2) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (Public Law 92-463) notice is hereby given that a meeting of the Federal Graphics Improvement Advisory Panel to the National Endowment for the Arts will be held on July 19, 1979, from 9:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. in room 1125, Columbia Plaza Office Building, 2401 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

This meeting will be open to the public on a space available basis. Accommodations are limited. Interested persons may submit written statements to the panel.

The agenda for this meeting will include a discussion of the Graphic material of the Consumer Product Safety Commission.

Further information with reference to this meeting can be obtained from Mr. Lance Jay Brown, Coordinator of Federal Graphics, National Endowment for the Arts, Washington, D.C. 20506, or call (202) 634-4286.

Dated: July 9, 1979

John H. Clark,

Director, Office of Council and Panel Operations, National Endowment for the Arts.

(FR Doc. 79-21515 Filed 7-11-79 8:46 AM)

BILLING CODE 7537-01-00

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident, Implications Re Nuclear Power Plant Design; Meeting

The ACRS Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident—Implications Re Nuclear Power Plant Design, will hold a meeting on July 26-27, 1979 in Room 1167, 1717 H St., N.W., Washington, DC 20555.

In accordance with the procedures outlined in the Federal Register on October 4, 1978 (43 FR 45926), oral or written statements may be presented by members of the public, recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its

consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the Designated Federal Employee as far in advance as practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made to allow the necessary time during the meeting for such statements.

The agenda for subject meeting shall be as follows:

Thursday, July 26 and Friday, July 27, 1979, 8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of business each day.

The Subcommittee may meet in Executive Session, with any of its consultants who may be present, to explore and exchange their preliminary opinions regarding matters which should be considered during the meeting and to formulate a report and recommendation to the full Committee.

At the conclusion of the Executive Session, the Subcommittee will discuss with representatives of the NRC Staff, the nuclear industry, various utilities, and their consultants, state and local officials, and other interested persons, the implications of the Three Mile Island, Unit 2 Accident.

In addition, it may be necessary for the Subcommittee to hold one or more closed sessions for the purpose of exploring matters involving proprietary information. I have determined, in accordance with Subsection 10(d) of Public Law 92-463, that, should such sessions be required, it is necessary to close these sessions to protect proprietary information (5 U.S.C. 552b(c)(4)).

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the Designated Federal Employee for this meeting, Mr. Richard K. Major, (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., EDT.

Background information concerning this nuclear station can be found in documents on file and available for public inspection at the NRC Public Documents Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20555 and at the Government Publications Section, State Library of Pennsylvania, Education Building, Commonwealth and Walnut Street, Harrisburg, PA 17126.

Date: July 10, 1979.

John C. Hoyle,

Advisory Committee Management Officer.

(FR Doc. 79-21761 Filed 7-11-79 10:30 AM)

BILLING CODE 7590-01-00

[Docket Nos. 50-522 and 50-523]

Puget Sound Power & Light Co., et al. (Skagit Nuclear Power Project Units 1 and 2); Order for Evidentiary Hearing and Related Matters

1. Pursuant to agreement among the parties at a conference in Seattle, Washington, on April 24, 1979, the evidentiary hearing is scheduled to resume at 9:30 a.m., Tuesday, July 17, 1979. The location of the resumed hearing will be at Room 3038, New Federal Building, 915 Second Avenue, Seattle, Washington.

2. At the beginning of the hearing, limited appearances pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 2.715 will be permitted. Paragraph (a) thereof is pertinent.

(a) A person who is not a party may, in the discretion of the presiding officer, be permitted to make a limited appearance by making oral or written statement of his position on the issues at any session of the hearing or prehearing conference within such limits and on such conditions as may be fixed by the presiding officer, but he may not otherwise participate in the proceeding.

3. Persons wishing to make a limited appearance at the hearing scheduled to begin on July 17, 1979, are requested to give advance notification to the Secretary, United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555. Those planning to make a limited appearance at the hearing beginning on July 17 are directed to check with the Board's clerk at 9:00 a.m. that day at the hearing room.

Done this 5th day of July 1979 at Washington, D.C.

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board,
Valentine B. Deale,

Chairman.

(FR Doc. 79-21475 Filed 7-11-79 8:45 AM)

BILLING CODE 7590-01-00

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

[N-AR 79-28]

Annual Report to Congress, Accident Reports, Safety Recommendations, and Responses; Availability

Annual Report to Congress.—The National Transportation Safety Board released its report on June 29 and copies are now available to the public. Single

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE
ACRS AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON THE TMI-2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS
1717 H STREET, NW, WASHINGTON, DC, ROOM 1046
JULY 26 & 27, 1979

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ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION ON JULY 26, 1979 - (8:30 am - 7:00 pm)

1. What should be the design basis for hydrogen build-up for LWRs? Why?
2. Examine events having the potential for overflowing the secondary side of steam generators (e.g., the March 20, 1978 Rancho Seco event).
3. Examine events involving debris arising from structural failure of pieces within process lines.
4. How to resolve the question of the adequacy of the single failure criterion.
5. How to examine the influence of control systems on safety.
6. How to evaluate the merit of possible design changes for future LWRs:
 - a. More RHR loops?
 - b. Full pressure RHR?
 - c. Containment modifications?
 - d. Others
7. How to review BWRs for TMI Implications.
8. Generic Implications of Recent LERs:
 - a. Loss of pressurizer level indication at Oconee - 3/6/79
 - b. Maintenance at Fitzpatrick
 - c. Others
9. Auxiliary feedwater system Requirements:
 - a. What should be the quantitative reliability requirements? Why?
 - b. Others
10. NRR's use of probabilistic techniques in the licensing process.
11. Control Room Computer Systems for Data Processing. What is the state-of-affairs in other plants? What information is being given to operators? Inexpensive off-the-shelf type equipment is now an order of magnitude improvement over the TMI-2 systems. What is being asked of utilities in this area?

Attachment B

12. How are decisions made regarding backfitting requirements?
13. Discussion of diffuser screens in the surge line entrance to the pressurizer.
 - postulating a break at the top of the pressurizer, will the pressurizer water dump?
14. Which operating procedures will be handled in the short-term? How will the adequacy of other operating procedures be determined? Examples:
 - (1) Operating Procedures for the SSE.
 - (2) Operating Procedures for a steam line break coupled with a small primary side break.
15. Others

Rev. 1

ITEMS FOR DISCUSSION ON JULY 27, 1979 - (8:30 am - close of business)

1. Discussion with the NRC Staff on how to apply the results of the Lessons Learned Task Force and the Bulletins and Orders Task Force to the near-term Westinghouse OL stage plants:
 - a. design changes
 - b. operator actions and operating procedures

The discussion should focus on the Salem 2 plant as the Westinghouse near-term prototype. The Subcommittee wishes to explore the procedures and requirements which will be placed on the near-term OLs by the Staff (e.g., how much of the review will be generic and how much plant specific?)

2. Discussion with PSE&G on how they intend to implement the Staff's requirements on the Salem 2 Station. The discussion is not intended to serve as a review of the Salem 2 Station, but rather to address Salem 2 as the prototype near-term W plant.
3. The other near-term Westinghouse OL stage plants are invited to attend the meeting. Formal presentations are not required, however, they may be able to respond to Subcommittee questions arising out of design differences between the plants.

Plants included are: Diablo Canyon, North Anna 2, Sequoyah, Farley 2, and McGuire.

ATTENDANCE LIST

ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON TMI-2 ACCIDENT IMPLICATIONS
JULY 26 & 27, 1979
WASHINGTON, DC

ACRS

D. Okrent, Chairman
C. Siess
J. C. Mark
H. Etherington
M. Plesset
I. Catton, ACRS Consultant
W. Lipinski, ACRS Consultant
C. Michelson, ACRS Consultant
R. Major, Designated Federal Employee
E. Igne, ACRS Staff

EPRI

R. Leyse

MCGRAW-HILL

B. Adamson
J. Frent

MORGAN, LEWIS & BOSKINS

E. Epner
M. Hartley

EPA

D. Rasch
D. Rasch

NORTHEAST UTILITIES

E. Foster

NUCLEAR PROJECTS INC.

J. Kelly, Jr.

PCOTMI

L. Jaffe

NRC STAFF

R. Tedesco
R. Mattson
R. Frahm
J. Milhoan
J. Olshinski
R. Cudlin
T. Telford
C. Long
P. Mathews
L. Beltracchi

PASNY

G. Rangarao

GENERAL ELECTRIC

N. Shirley

BABCOCK & WILCOX

R. Borsum

FRAMATOME

M. Lecomte
Y. Paternot

NUS CORP.

D. Jaffe

TEPCO

H. Harmader

KEPCO

K. Ota

PUBLIC SERVICE ELECTRIC & GAS

E. Liden
R. Mittl
R. Burricelli
H. Heller
J. Zupko, Jr.
C. Veprek
T. Taylor
L. Reiter
L. Leitz
J. Wroblewski
J. Gormly
R. Patterson
T. Martin
F. Schneider

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORP.

J. Scuss
W. Gangloff
R. Burch
J. Hord
D. Maire
K. Jordan

SOUTHERN COMPANY SERVICES INC.

O. Batum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

T. Knight
D. Lambert
J. Raulston
R. Hernandez
D. Wilson

BECHTEL POWER CORP.

W. House, II

VIRGINIA ELECTRIC & POWER CO.

J. East

Attachment C

OFFSHORE POWER SYSTEMS

D. Aabye

LEHIGH UNIVERSITY

J. Chen
R. Sundaram

DUKE POWER COMPANY

T. Heitman

PUBLIC

T. Manjikian, States News Service
J. Hebert, Associated Press
H. Yocom, Gilbert Associates
Richardson, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
D. Hoffman, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
J. Burns, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
A. Riley, Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.
K. Loryn, BRD



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

July 18, 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: Roger J. Mattson, Director
TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force

SUBJECT: TMI-2 LESSONS LEARNED TASK FORCE
REPORT (SHORT TERM) NUREG-0578

Enclosed is the first report of the TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force. It contains a set of short term recommendations to be implemented in two stages over the next 18 months on operating plants, plants under construction, and pending construction permit applications. There are 23 specific recommendations in 12 broad areas (nine in the area of design and analysis and three in the area of operations). The 23 recommendations would provide substantial, additional protection which is required for the public health and safety.

All but one of the 23 recommendations have a majority concurrence by the Task Force. The exception is the recommended requirement to provide capability to install an external recombiner at each reactor plant for post-accident hydrogen control, if necessary following an accident. The majority of the Task Force recommends that this matter deserves further evaluation in conjunction with other hydrogen generation and control questions being reviewed by the Task Force for its final report.

Three of the recommendations appear to require changes in existing regulations for which the Task Force recommends immediately effective rulemaking. They are: 1) inerting of MK I and MK II BWR containments that are not already inerted; 2) provision of the capability to install an external recombiner for plants that do not already have recombiners (minority view); and, 3) revised limiting conditions of operation in operating licenses for total loss of safety system availability through human or operational error. The Office of Standards Development has agreed to develop the required Commission papers and carry through with these rulemaking actions.

The 23 recommended actions were discussed with the Regulatory Requirements Review Committee (June 22, 1979), the Commission (June 25, 1979), the TMI-2 Subcommittee of the ACRS (July 11, 1979), and the ACRS (July 12, 1979). In addition, meetings were held with various groups in the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation in the course of the last few weeks to discuss technical aspects of specific portions of the recommended actions and the implementation alternatives.

Attachment D
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The Task Force recommends that time not be taken to request and evaluate public comments on these short term requirements prior to their promulgation as licensing requirements or rules because they are safety significant matters that require prompt application to operating reactors and operating license applications in the late stages of review. Other TMI-2 accident review groups and the Lessons Learned Task Force are continuing to evaluate the longer term implications of the accident. Any public comments on the short term recommendations that are received after their issuance (just as in the case of the earlier IE Bulletins) can be factored into those continuing evaluations.

Having identified the 23 specific recommendations for short term action, the Lessons Learned Task Force will turn to the broader, more fundamental regulatory questions which should be addressed in the longer term (some of them likely to require evaluations that extend beyond the life span of the Task Force) before other regulatory actions are recommended. These longer term interests of the Task Force are described in Section Three of the report. The Task Force intends to develop its final recommendations and issue a final report in early September 1979. The topics to be addressed in the final report could affect the future structure and content of the licensing process to correct deficiencies identified by the TMI-2 accident and to further upgrade the level of safety in operating plants and plants under construction. The Task Force does not believe that allowing new plants to begin operation in the next few months will foreclose further design changes that may be shown to be desirable by its continuing review of the accident.

On July 11, I solicited the comments of the principal NRR line organizations on the final draft of the report and its central conclusion regarding the necessity and sufficiency of the short term recommendations for continued operations and licensing. General support for the conclusions of the Task Force report was expressed by all of the principal NRR line managers. We have reviewed and considered the detailed comments supplied by the various NRR organizations in the course of their review. Where appropriate, we made clarifying changes in the language of the report. The principal substantive change occurred in the form and schedules of the implementation section (Appendix B). Some of the comments addressed matters that the Task Force has deferred for consideration in its final report. There are significant differences of opinion within the staff on two of the Task Force recommendations, as follows: a) the need for recommendation 2.2.3 concerning rulemaking for revised limiting conditions for operation (some agree with the recommendation and others prefer more stringent enforcement actions using existing regulatory machinery) and b) the need for the minority Task Force recommendation 2.1.5.c concerning rulemaking for backfit of recombiner capability (some support the minority recommendation, others do not). Having considered these comments and made changes to the report where appropriate to reconcile them with the intent of the Task Force, I recommend that you:


- a. direct the immediate implementation by DPM, DOR or B&OTF, as appropriate, of all the short term recommendations, except the three rulemaking matters, through the issuance of licensing positions to operating plant licensees, plants under construction, and construction permit applicants.

Harold R. Denton

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b. request the formulation of immediately effective rules by the Office of Standards Development for action by the Commission on the three rulemaking matters.

Another matter that needs to be considered by you in deciding upon the additional requirements for near term CP and OL decisions and for operating reactors is improvements in licensee emergency preparedness.



Roger J. Mattson, Director
TMI-2 Lessons Learned Task Force

Enclosure: as stated

cc: Chairman Hendrie
Commissioner Gilinsky
Commissioner Kennedy
Commissioner Bradford
Commissioner Ahearne
ACRS (20)
Policy Evaluation
SECY
L. V. Gossick, EDO
S. Levine, RES
R. Minogue, SD
V. Stello, IE
M. Rogovin, Special Inquiry
J. Fouchard, PA (20)
C. Kammerer, CA (20)
NRC PDR

Per. sig
7/27-79

I

DEFINITIONS

PARTIAL EXAMINATION - EXAMINATIONS BOTH WRITTEN AND ORAL THAT WILL INCLUDE TMI-2 RELATED MATERIAL, IE BULLETINS 79-05, 79-05A, 79-06, 79-06A AND 79-06B RESPONSE WHERE APPLICABLE AND EXPANSION OF MATERIAL ON HEAT TRANSFER, FLUID FLOW, THERMODYNAMICS AND DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNITS 1 AND 2.

REGULAR EXAMINATION - SEVEN CATEGORY RO, FIVE CATEGORY SRO AND ORAL OPERATING TEST. EXAMINATION WILL INCLUDE SUBJECT MATERIAL IN THE PARTIAL EXAMINATION.

II

SALEM II - NORTH ANNA II - FARLEY II

- ALL UNIT I LICENSED PERSONNEL SHALL RECEIVE TRAINING ON DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNITS I AND II, THI-2 RELATED MATERIAL, BULLETIN RESPONSE AND TO INCLUDE TRAINING ON A SIMULATOR.

- ALL UNIT I LICENSED PERSONNEL SHALL BE EVALUATED ON THE BASIS OF GRADES ACHIEVED DURING LAST ANNUAL REQUALIFICATION. IF AN INDIVIDUAL RECEIVED LESS THAN 80.0 PERCENT OVERALL HE SHALL BE REQUIRED TO TAKE A REGULAR EXAMINATION.

- NRC WILL ADMINISTER PARTIAL OR REGULAR EXAMINATION TO ALL UNIT I PERSONNEL AS APPLICABLE.

- FAILURE TO PASS EXAMINATIONS WILL RESULT IN:
 - (1) REMOVAL FROM LICENSED ACTIVITIES ON UNIT I
 - (2) RETRAINED
 - (3) REEXAMINED AND MUST PASS BEFORE RESUMING LICENSED ACTIVITIES ON UNIT I

III

SEQUOYAH

- ALL PERSONNEL WHO HAVE PASSED THEIR WRITTEN AND ORAL EXAMINATIONS BUT HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED LICENSES SHALL BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE ADDITIONAL TRAINING IN TMI-2 RELATED SUBJECTS.

- EXAMINATIONS ARE PLANNED FOR FOUR REACTOR OPERATORS AND EIGHT SENIOR REACTOR OPERATORS WHO MEET THE COLD ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS.

- BASED ON THE RESULTS OF THESE 12 EXAMINATIONS, OLB WILL DECIDE WHETHER OR NOT PARTIAL EXAMINATIONS ARE TO BE ADMINISTERED TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN EXAMINED BY OLB. A REVIEW WILL BE CONDUCTED OF THE TRAINING RECORDS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE ADDITIONAL TRAINING WAS COMPLETED SATISFACTORILY.

IV

DIABLIO CANYON

- ALL APPLICANTS HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED BOTH WRITTEN AND ORAL EXAMINATIONS ON TWO OCCASIONS. IN 1978 ALL APPLICANTS WERE REQUIRED TO RECEIVE TRAINING ON THE ZION SIMULATOR PRIOR TO ADMINISTERING THE SECOND SET OF EXAMINATIONS. OPERATOR LICENSES HAVE NOT BEEN ISSUED AT DIABLIO CANYON.

- ALL APPLICANTS SHALL RECEIVE TRAINING IN TMI-2 RELATED SUBJECTS TO INCLUDE TRAINING ON THE ZION SIMULATOR. AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE TRAINING AT ZION, NRC WILL ADMINISTER PARTIAL EXAMINATIONS TO ALL APPLICANTS.

- CANDIDATES WHO FAIL TO PASS THE EXAMINATION ARE TO BE RETRAINED AND REEXAMINED.

V

McGUIRE

- ALL APPLICANTS HAVE BEEN ADMINISTERED WRITTEN EXAMINATIONS. ORAL EXAMINATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ADMINISTERED.

- ALL APPLICANTS SHALL RECEIVE ADDITIONAL TRAINING IN TMI-2 AND RELATED SUBJECTS AND WILL BE ADMINISTERED ORAL EXAMINATIONS BOTH ON THE PLANT AND ON THE SIMULATOR.

- APPLICANTS WHO FAIL TO PASS THE EXAMINATIONS ARE TO BE RETRAINED AND REEXAMINED.