

MEETING WITH SCHULTZ -- 10-25-79

The issue -- growing from allegations

Our approach -- 3 questions:

- a) Were there incentives
- b) Were adjustments in the schedule made so as to be in a position to obtain incentives (inference of communication)
- c) Did those adjustments compromise the safety of the unit?

Summary of conclusions

(see exec summary in draft outline)

Why a consultant:

1. To advise us even before serious writing has begun as to whether we have overlooked possible incentives, indicia of rush or other data
2. If so, to advise us where to gather necessary data
3. If not (and time is short) to assist us in technical review of 2 major indicia of rush:
 - a) Replacement of Lonergan M.S. Relief valves on c*path
 - b) Adjustments made to power ascension test program (self-imposed tests, initial warranty run deleted)
4. To also provide experience based on other nuclear units
5. Ultimately -- perhaps not until draft report is written and fully thought-out -- would want advise on whether conclusions, implications and recommendations are well reasoned and supported by investigation.

Specific areas/questions:

1. What is experience on other units re: financial incentives and pace of construction/completion?
2. What importance is attached to unit acceptance test / initial warranty run? Do all vendors have such a contractual test?
3. Is it common for nuclear utilities to include tests beyond FSAR or NRC-mandated tests? Common to delete?
4. What of C*path planning for Lonergan valves? What of superiority of design (double porting)?
5. What of pool pressures? Dieckamp has dismissed but wouldn't \$23, "w be significant?
6. Based on experience with util execs, how far does knowledge of financial incentives sink?
7. Is there a reason to be concerned about economic impact on safety?
- x. Please be sure to raise questions concerns, etc. at any time. Define your relationship to us as you perceive need, so long as proper contract is broad enough.

8. Test sequence vs. schedule.

8002180061

P