

Interview #177 - Training

p 8 - Both
(previously
unit 1
shift
foreman)

Electromagnetic valve was leaking prior to accident. had to make up over 1000 gallons each shift to hold the make tank level within the operating limits so that at the start of the incident they would have had higher than what you would call normal relief valve discharge temperature

Beers Under these conditions it is difficult to determine what is a high temperature on the downstream side of the electromagnetic relief

p 9 Both response to alarm procedure for drain tank pressure high - out of sight from console - back where level and pressure indicators are for the drain tank

Based on training - abnormal indicators of pressure and level in the drain tank would be able to allow operators to distinguish source of water - but not INSTANTANEOUSLY.

p 10 Both saturation - in basic thermo taught for AO's + ~~to~~ CRO's in - transfer characteristics
not 7 or PVT? → talks DNBR ^{1.3} ~~Let what is~~ variable low pressure trip -

p 12 Both no requirement for steam tables in control room.
✓ U-1 in shift foreman's desk - not readily available to an operator at the console

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Boltz P18 procedure 2202-2.5 rev 6 9/22/78
station blackout - That maximum
maintain pressurizer level ensuring core
core

Brown P19 No current events or operating history info
on Davis Bessie
50p report on D-B LER rec'd 5/2/79
info not significant

Zechman P21 important info
1 - communication - info's dept B+W / pm
2 - appears on simulator
3 - Operator licensing exam (NRC)
vs Lind
how simulator course
gets planned

Brown P21 Nothing about D-B came out in B+W users
meeting / users memo system

Boltz P21 D-B - boiling - didn't come through in NRC
tech specs.

Brown P22 LER's don't detail operator error
indicator vs operator

P25, 26 training to bypass SFAS actuation Bees
following depressurization - DESIGN PROBLE

P29 Boltz procedure 2203-1.4 rev 3 5/4/78
abnormal
conditions requiring securing an
reactor coolant pump.
§ covered in Training - CRO & Regual.

P37 Brown Bypass Polishes on Unit 1

P37 Boltz Unit 1 no ~~low~~ low pressure trip
on feedwater pump

P39 Boltz 2 containment isolation valves on R/Bldg sump
§ interlock U-1 but not on U-2

P13 Brown Relationship between hot leg or core exit temp. & saturation temp. - "The only place that it is addressed where they could have somewhat access to it, limited access is in the station blackout procedure - when the discussion goes into natural circulation cooling but the situations at hand, they were not in a station blackout, they didn't lose all the power so they wouldn't have been keyed to look in there, and there was enough other things going on that personally I don't feel they would have thought about looking in there to see where they were in relationship to those temperatures.

P13 Boltz procedure 2202-1.5 leaking electromechanical relief valve.

P14 Boltz B+W limits precautions, a statement that says - They shall not go solid at any time in the pressurizer except for hydrostatic testing
get document

P15 Boltz Based on the training and the materials and the operating procedure to meet Ed to the training department by B+W, he ^{operator} would have reacted to the high pressurizer level, again trying to avoid going solid and overpressurization of the system...

P16 Brown following trip maintain pressurizer level to prevent steam bubble into the hot leg.

P17 Boltz you've got positive identification that the core is covered if you have pressurizer level indication