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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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IN THE MATTER OF:

THREE MILE ISLAND  
SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS

DEPOSITION OF RONALD NIMITZ

Place - Bethesda, Maryland

Date - Wednesday, November 21, 1979

Pages 1 - 30

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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THREE MILE ISLAND                   :  
SPECIAL INQUIRY DEPOSITIONS       :  
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6935 Arlington Boulevard  
4th Floor  
Bethesda, Maryland

Wednesday, November 21, 1979  
3:00 p.m.

BEFORE:

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:

DENNIS ALLISON, TMI/NRC Special Inquiry Group  
GEORGE FRAMPTON, ESQ., TMI/NRC Special Inquiry Group  
ROBERT BERNERO, TMI/NRC Special Inquiry Group

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C O N T E N T S

WITNESS:

EXAMINATION

Ronald Nimitz

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E X H I B I T S

NIMITZ EXHIBITS:

IDENTIFIED

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gshPL

1 MR. BERNERO: Ron, as you can see, I've been  
2 granted the authority of the commission to take your oath  
3 for this testimony.

4 Would you please raise your right hand?  
5 Whereupon,

6 RONALD NIMITZ  
7 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,  
8 was examined and testified as follows:

9 EXAMINATION

10 BY MR. BERNERO:

11 Q You received a letter from this inquiry from  
12 Mr. Mitchell Rogovin regarding your appearance here to give  
13 testimony today. You have a copy of that letter before you.

14 A I have a copy in my briefcase.

15 Q Okay. Well, I'll hold my copy out for you. In  
16 that letter, it indicated to you that you have the right to  
17 have an NRC attorney in attendance here with you if you so  
18 desired. And as I recall, I spoke to you over the phone  
19 about this.

20 I would note for the record that you don't have someone  
21 here. Is this satisfactory to you to proceed without an  
22 attorney?

23 A Right.

24 Q Okay. If at any time during the discussion or  
25 questions and answers here in this deposition, if you feel

gshPL 1 that you would be better off with an attorney representing  
2 you, don't hesitate to interrupt me and say so and we can  
3 take the appropriate steps.

4 Now I further asked in the letter which I prepared for  
5 Mr. Rogovin's signature for you to bring a copy of your  
6 resume.

7 Do you have that with you?

8 A Yes, I have a copy.

9 Q Okay. Thank you. I have here resume headed,  
10 "Ronald L. Nimitz."

11 MR. FRAMPTON: Let's just mark this Nimitz Exhibit  
12 1 of this date.

13 (A resume was marked as marked  
14 Nimitz Exhibit No. 1 for  
15 identification.)

16 BY MR. BERNERO:

17 Q Mr. Nimitz, you have just presented us with a  
18 series of handwritten notes, the first page of which is  
19 dated 3-29-79.

20 Are these the extent of the personal notes from the TMI  
21 accident that you have in your possession?

22 A No. I'm sorry. I thought I had -- I've got some  
23 more. I've got some more. I'm sorry. These here are some  
24 more of my scribblings from the 28th.

25 MR. FRAMPTON: Off the record.

gshPL

1 (Discussion off the record.)

2 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

3 Q Let's go back on the record again.

4 Mr. Nimitz, showing you the note pad notes which bear the  
5 date, 3-29-79 on the first page, these are your own  
6 handwritten notes, are they, from March 29 and after?

7 A Yes. These are all my notes.

8 MR. FRAMPTON: All right. I'd like to have these  
9 marked as Nimitz Exhibit 2 of this date, please.

10 (Handwritten notes were marked  
11 Nimitz Exhibit 2 for  
12 identification.)

13 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

14 Q You've also given us another group of handwritten  
15 notes, including some diagrams and calculations. And in the  
16 back of this sheaf, there are about 11 pages of lined paper  
17 with handwritten notes.

18 One of these pages bears the date 3/28/79. And there  
19 appear then to be at least two pages of handwriting.

20 Are some of these notes notes that were taken by you on  
21 the 28th?

22 A If they're dated 3-28, I probably took those notes  
23 then.

24 MR. FRAMPTON: Okay. I'd like to have this entire  
25 sheaf marked as Nimitz Exhibit 3 of this date.

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(A sheaf of handwritten notes was marked Nimitz Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

BY MR. FRAMPTON:

Q Now, do the two sheafs of notes that we've marked Exhibits 2 and 3 comprise all of the handwritten notes that you still have that you took during the first couple of days of the accident at Three Mile Island?

A As far as I know, that's it.

MR. FRAMPTON: Okay.

BY MR. BERNERO:

Q I'd like to go now into some questions that go back to that period of time and ask you to answer them. In the first place, when you heard of the accident at Region 1 when you reported to work, who designated you to go to the TMI site on March 28th?

A From what I can recall, Hilbert Crocker, who was at the time my acting section chief, requested that I accompany the team.

Q Is that as a fuel cycle and materials safety section or something like that, isn't it?

Are you in that section?

A No, I'm in the radiation support section.

Q And he was acting section chief?

A He was acting chief.

gshPL

1 Q Now, what instructions did he give you, do you  
2 recall?

3 A Basically, collect information regarding Three  
4 Mile tech's inspection, FSARs, and what have you, and get my  
5 necessary travel orders and meet with the other people that  
6 have been assigned and go to the site.

7 Q Who was designated to be your supervisor while you  
8 were at the TMI site?

9 A I was told that Don Neely would be my acting  
10 supervisor.

11 Q Is Don Neely a person you knew? Had you worked  
12 with him?

13 A He's a senior inspector in the radiation support  
14 section.

15 Q He was known to you prior to the accident, so he  
16 was not a stranger that you would be working with?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Had you ever been to the TMI site before yourself?

19 A Yes. Myself and Karl Plumlee, who also  
20 accompanied me on the team. We had looked at some problems  
21 with respect to radioactive waste shipping at the site.

22 Q How long before and how many times had you been  
23 there?

24 A I think it was in 1977, approximately July of  
25 1977. I was there off and on for about a week.



gshPL 1 Q Is this when you were a co-op with the branch,  
2 with Region 1?  
3 A Yes.  
4 Q According to your resume, I see here from May of  
5 1977 till August of 1977, you worked in a cooperative status  
6 as a radiation specialist with the fuel facility in the  
7 material safety branch.  
8 That was Crocker's normal branch, wasn't it?  
9 A No. The fuel facility material safety branch  
10 encompasses approximately 4 or 5 sections. And the  
11 radiation support section is one section in the branch.  
12 Q Oh, I see. I'd like to clarify while we're on the  
13 subject of employment, then, you left the NRC in August of  
14 1977 to return to graduate school and returned in July of  
15 1978, where you have been an intern radiation specialist?  
16 A Yes.  
17 Q Since that time?  
18 A Yes.  
19 Q Are you on the two-year intern program?  
20 A Yes, right.  
21 Q So that your intern status will be finished in  
22 July of 1980, this coming July?  
23 A Yes.  
24 Q During the period between July of 1978 and the  
25 present when you've been radiation specialist intern, could

gshPL

1 you give me a general description of your activities, what  
2 sort of work you were doing?

3 A Basically, I was essentially acting in the --  
4 acting as a senior radiation specialist with the section. I  
5 was going out with senior inspectors, programming  
6 inspections, writing reports.

7 I had worked on several civil penalty packages and  
8 basically reviewing specialty areas such as respiratory  
9 protection, radioactive waste handling, radio-chemistry such  
10 as that.

11 I was essentially acting as a full inspector, but I had a  
12 senior specialist that sort of oversaw my work.

13 Q Do you believe that you did more than the usual  
14 level or higher level work than the usual intern might do  
15 because of your rather comprehensive background and  
16 experience?

17 A Right. From my understanding, the reason I was  
18 classed as an intern was because at the time, there wasn't a  
19 position available, a full-time position.

20 So they brought me in as a intern.

21 Q But your resume indicates that your actual  
22 physical experience as a radiation technician or radiation  
23 specialist goes back to 1972?

24 A Yes, sir.

25 Q Now, you arrived at the site shortly after 10:00

gshPL 1 a.m. on the 28th in the original group of five.

2 A Right.

3 Q In the station wagon?

4 A Yes.

5 Q Were you in the group, then, when it was briefed  
6 by Jim Seelinger of Met Ed?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Okay. Now, did anyone call the region as soon as  
9 that team got to the Unit 1 control room?

10 A From what I can recall, Mr. Seelinger briefed us  
11 and at approximately 11:00, quarter till 11:00, 11:00, we,  
12 myself and C. Gallina, established a phone hook-up with the  
13 region.

14 Okay. So --

15 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

16 Q Let me go back for a minute. I think you said  
17 that you got to the site around what time?

18 A We got to the site approximately 10 after 10:00.  
19 Ten o'clock.

20 Q And there were five of you?

21 A Right.

22 Q Okay. How many people went on to the island?

23 A All five of us went on.

24 Q And you all went to the unit 1 control room to be  
25 briefed?

1           A        Yes.

2           Q        And you were briefed by Mr. Seelinger. Is that  
3 right?

4           A        Right.

5           Q        How long did that take? Was that a long time?

6           A        No. It was -- he basically gave us a brief  
7 rundown of what the status was, some radiation readings.  
8 Higgins, who was a reactor inspector, operations type  
9 inspector, received the information for the operational  
10 status. And the whole briefing, from what I can recall, was  
11 not that long.

12          Q        After the briefing, did anyone leave the island?

13          A        No, no one left the island.

14          Q        Okay. The five of you stayed in the Unit 1  
15 control room?

16          A        No. After we were briefed, myself and C. Gallina  
17 set up a command.

18          Q        When you say C. Gallina, you mean --

19          A        Charles Gallina. Charles Gallina, one of the  
20 members of the team. We set up a command post at Unit 1  
21 shift supervisor's office and Don Neely and Jim Higgins went  
22 to Unit 2 control room to essentially work at the -- I guess  
23 it was called the emergency center.

24          Q        Okay. That's 4 of you. What about the fifth  
25 person?

gshPL

1 MR. BERNERO: Plumlee.

2 THE WITNESS: Oh, Plumless, because of the -- we  
3 were interested in the nature of the off-site doses and what  
4 have you. Karl was delegated to go outside the plant and  
5 basically check the radiation levels on the perimeter of the  
6 island and parking lots and things like that.

7 But to the best of my knowledge, he didn't leave the  
8 island.

9 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

10 Q Do you know whether he came back into the plant  
11 during the day?

12 A He came back in off and on. Virtually anytime  
13 anyone got any additional information, be it dose rates,  
14 reactor status, anything of that nature was virtually  
15 immediately transmitted back to the region.

16 Q Well, now, the question I asked you was whether  
17 Mr. Plumlee came back into the plant into Unit 1 control  
18 room.

19 A Yes, he did.

20 Q So you would see him coming in and out?

21 A Right.

22 Q Do you know whether he was in the Unit 2 control  
23 room at all during the day?

24 A Not that I know of.

25 Q All right. So now we're to the point where you're

gshPL 1 setting up the command center with Mr. Gallina in the Unit 1  
2 control room.

3 A Yes.

4 Q That's at about 11:00, 11:30?

5 A Approximately 11:00.

6 BY MR. BERNERO:

7 Q Okay. Gallina then placed the call to Unit 1. Is  
8 that it? In order to set up this link with Unit 1?

9 A Oh, no.

10 Q I mean to set up the link from Unit 1 to the  
11 regional headquarters?

12 A Yes.

13 Q In King of Prussia.

14 A We maintained an open line.

15 Q So, Gallina literally called the home office?

16 A Right.

17 Q And now, this is from the shift supervisor's  
18 office, which is separate from the control room. Right?

19 A Yes.

20 Q Okay. Now once you got that set up, did Gallina  
21 stay on the phone and rely on you to go into the Unit 1  
22 control room or wherever you had to go to pass information  
23 or questions?

24 A Yes. The control room was set up so that you  
25 could essentially look from the shift supervisor's office

gshPL 1 through a large window into the Unit 1 control room. And I  
2 myself acted, at least for the first couple hours, as an  
3 intermediary.

4 Mr. Gallina remained on the phones while I basically went  
5 back and forth from the emergency control station to the  
6 phones to relay information.

7 Q Okay.

8 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

9 Q When you talk about the emergency control station,  
10 where was that located?

11 A Unit 1. They had isopleths set up and had walkie  
12 talkies to determine what the off-site doses were, off-site  
13 radiation levels were, et cetera.

14 Q So that was out in the control room some place?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Or off to the site?

17 A It was directly out in the control room.

18 BY MR. BERNERO:

19 Q On the shift supervisor's desk?

20 A Basically.

21 Q So it was your understanding, then, that the Met  
22 Ed plan had plant emergency control for the damaged plant in  
23 Unit 2 and off-site emergency control coming out of Unit 1?

24 A That's basically what my understanding was.

25 Q Now in the early briefings or in the first moments

gshPL

1 perhaps an hour that you were there with Met Ed, did they  
2 mention to you an early prediction of an off-site dose as  
3 high 10 R per hour?

4 A I heard no numbers such as that.

5 Q A prediction of a dose in Goldsboro of 10 R per  
6 hour dose rate, I should say?

7 A I can't recall that. There was some numbers going  
8 around like that. There was some excessive dose rates in  
9 Goldsboro, but I can't recall what the numbers were.

10 Q Well, if you heard a prediction of 10 R per hour  
11 as a dose rate across the river in Goldsboro, would you --  
12 you would consider that a rather dramatic situation,  
13 wouldn't you?

14 A I would consider that essentially a breach of  
15 containment. It was very high.

16 Q So do you think you would be likely to have  
17 remembered it if you heard -- you would have reacted  
18 vigorously if you heard such a prediction?

19 A Oh, absolutely.

20 Q Now during the daylight hours, you stayed -- let  
21 me go back for a moment.

22 As we understand it from the record of your interviews  
23 with the IE investigation, you worked through the daylight  
24 hours and then through the night of the 28th and 29th;  
25 namely, Wednesday night, Thursday morning.



gshPL 1 Now, first of all, I'd like to ask you some questions  
2 about what you were doing during the daylight hours.

3 You were working with Chic Callina out of the Unit 1  
4 shift supervisor's office and going to the Unit 1 control  
5 room.

6 Did you, during those daylight hours, go to the Unit 2  
7 control room or elsewhere in the plant as well?

8 A Originally, in our briefing, I had been requested  
9 to determine the status of the Unit 1 auxiliary buildings.  
10 And basically what the radiation dose rates and air  
11 activities were in Unit 1.

12 But from what I can recall, Unit 1 had been essentially  
13 sealed off. And there were no access permitted to Unit 1.  
14 As a result, I stayed in the area of Unit 1 to try and  
15 determine any information from the shift supervisor's  
16 emergency station personnel.

17 Q But did you not go to Unit 2 on occasion, to the  
18 Unit 2 control room?

19 A From what I can recall, Unit 2 had gone on  
20 respirators. Apparently, there were some high airborne  
21 activity and they were having problems that there wasn't  
22 enough respirators.

23 And as a result, that was one of the reasons why Neely  
24 and Higgins had gone to Unit 2 because of the shortage of  
25 respirators.

ashPL

1 As I can recall, I managed to locate a respirator and had  
2 gone over once or twice to brief Neely as to what the status  
3 was in Unit 1 and if he had any further directives for me.

4 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

5 Q Do you recall how many times or for how long you  
6 would have been in the Unit 2 control room?

7 A Just enough to go over and appraise the other  
8 members of the team of what basically was happening in Unit  
9 1. And because I had been assigned to Unit 1, to return to  
10 Unit 1.

11 Q Was it difficult to talk with Neely or Higgins on  
12 the telephone from Unit 1 to Unit 2?

13 A There were some -- we were having trouble with the  
14 phones and also trying to talk through a respirator over a  
15 phone was difficult.

16 Q So you were going over to report to them, rather  
17 than to get information to bring back, or was it both?

18 A Oh, no. There was a line also finally established  
19 between Unit 1 and Unit 2 so that we had an open line from  
20 Unit 1 to Unit 2 and also, from what I can recall, Unit 2  
21 also established an open line to Region 1.

22 So from what I can recall, Unit 1 and Unit 2 had an open  
23 line to either the region or headquarters.

24 I'm not sure.

25 Q Okay. Now, you recall going over to the Unit 2

gshPL 1 control room several times during what, the afternoon?

2 A Yes.

3 Q Do you remember whether people were in respirators  
4 in the Unit 2 control room during any of the occasions in  
5 which you were there?

6 A I can recall once going over and people were in  
7 respirators.

8 Q Did that mean you had to wear a respirator on the  
9 way over, or did you walk through those passageways, and so  
10 forth, without one?

11 A No. Because of Unit 1's ventilation, I  
12 essentially donned a respirator out in the hall from Unit 1  
13 control room and went over that way.

14 Q But you can also remember going over and then  
15 being able to take it off once you got to Unit 2?

16 A No, no, no. Just essentially talked through the  
17 respirator. You're able to talk. There's enough space that  
18 people can hear you.

19 Q I understand that. But my question is whether  
20 you remember what the situation was in Unit 2 on the  
21 various times when you got there.

22 Were there times when you got there when people were not  
23 in respirators?

24 A Yes. I'm not sure if it was the first day or the  
25 second day. But people were told that they didn't need the

gshPL

1 masks any more.

2 So I can recall going over at least once when they  
3 weren't on respirators.

4 Q Now, do you remember on the first afternoon being  
5 in the shift supervisor's office in Unit 2, meeting  
6 Mr. Neely or talking to him in the shift supervisor's  
7 office?

8 A Not that I can recall. I probably talked to him  
9 somewhere, but I can't recall where.

10 Q Do you remember what you were wearing? Were you  
11 wearing a hard hat, white hard hat?

12 A Yes, because we made it a point to bring our hard  
13 hats on the --

14 BY MR. BERNERO:

15 Q That's an NRC hard hat?

16 A Yes.

17 Q With symbols on it?

18 A Yes.

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1 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

2 Q What do you recall about being in Unit 2 control  
3 room, you know, on the first afternoon? Is there anything  
4 that stands out?

5 What do you recall about what you may have talked about  
6 when you were there, what you did or what the situation was?

7 A Basically, the only thing I can remember is that  
8 there were quite a few people in the control room. I can't  
9 recall exact numbers, but there was quite a few in there.

10 Q Do you remember -- you said you remember going  
11 over and talking to Mr. Neely a few times. Do you remember  
12 observing what was going on or talking to anybody else in the  
13 Unit 2 control room about plant status or things that were  
14 happening there during the occasions when you were in the  
15 control room?

16 A I can recall that the second day, going over and  
17 talking to -- when we were off the masks, talking to some of  
18 the health physics people, the site health physics people  
19 about some problems identified that they might not have been  
20 aware of.

21 And to perhaps institute some corrective actions.

22 Q Do you remember any conversations of any kind on  
23 the first day?

24 A No.

25 Q Do you recall any occasion when you were in the

gshPL

1 Unit 2 control room when there was an emergency systems  
2 actuation, things were happening and people were trying to  
3 figure out what had happened?

4 Does that ring a bell at all?

5 A No. Basically, the people in the control room  
6 were looking more toward the operational end with Jim  
7 Higgins, the reactor inspector, looking at that area.

8 And I primarily tried to look at health physics and  
9 things of that nature.

10 Q Do you remember whether Mr. Gallina would have  
11 been in the Unit 2 control room at any time during the first  
12 day?

13 A I can't recall.

14 Q Do you remember any other inspectors, NRC  
15 inspectors who were in the Unit 2 control room during March  
16 28th, really the afternoon of March 28th, other than  
17 yourself and Mr. Neely and Mr. Higgins?

18 A Of the 28th?

19 Q Yes.

20 A No.

21 Q We've had a couple of Met Ed people, utility  
22 people, say that they recall one occasion on which the  
23 sodium hydroxide building spray came on and there was an NRC  
24 inspector who was in the shift supervisor's office who  
25 followed some other people out into the control room to find

gshPL

1 out what was going on.

2 And there was some discussion about this.

3 Does that ring a bell? Would that have been you or do  
4 you recall that happening with somebody else who was there?

5 A I can recall someone mentioning or being told at a  
6 later date that they had sodium hydroxide sprayed. But to  
7 the best of my recollection, no one actually came up and  
8 told me, hey, we just had sodium hydroxide go on.

9 Q Are you familiar with that system? Do you know  
10 what it's designed to do, how it triggers, and so forth?

11 A Yes.

12 Q Do you recall the first day being in the control  
13 room when there was some discussion about the fact that taht  
14 had actuated, they were trying to figure out why. Aside from  
15 whether someone came up and said something to you, do you  
16 remember something about that in your presence or that you  
17 overheard?

18 A Not that I can recall the first, second, or third  
19 day. I can recall that perhaps at a later time someone  
20 mentioning it. But not the first several days.

21 Q Do you remember either while you were in the Unit  
22 2 control room or in Unit 1 on the first day, learning that  
23 they had had this pressure spike, pressure excursion  
24 indicated on the building pressure instrument?

25 Is that something that you can remember?

gshPL 1 A Not the first couple days. As I say, I had been  
2 there for approximately two weeks after, a week, two weeks  
3 after the incident. So I might have learned about this at a  
4 later date.

5 And I associated that with the sprays coming on. But  
6 during the time that I was in the control room, I don't  
7 recall anyone mentioning a pressure spike.

8 Q Okay. That's something that people generally, it  
9 appears, became aware of on Friday, March 30, and put this  
10 together with the hydrogen explosion.

11 But it appears that people in the control room observed  
12 it on Wednesday and the question is who knew about it or  
13 overheard discussions about what other people were saying  
14 about it?

15 Do you remember anything about either the spray or the  
16 pressure spike being mentioned, or your overhearing it on  
17 Wednesday, when you happened to be passing through the Unit  
18 2 control room?

19 A Not on Wednesday.

20 Q Other than Mr. Higgins and Mr. Neely, do you know  
21 of anybody else from the NRC who might have been in the  
22 control room or overheard something or learned something on  
23 Wednesday in the Unit 2 control room about that subject?

24 Are there any other possibilities, in other words?

25 A The only other inspector that I can recall being



gshPL

1 in Unit 2 is -- might have been Walt Baunack, but I'm not  
2 sure. I can recall seeing his face in there, but I'm not  
3 sure what day.

4 And it may have been late Wednesday or it might have been  
5 Thursday.

6 Q I think he was there late Wednesday.

7 BY MR. BERNERO:

8 Q Yes. Our record indicates that he was there late  
9 in the afternoon. The time of interest is in mid-afternoon,  
10 early afternoon, 2:00, thereabouts.

11 Let me ask a speculative question. You have experience  
12 as a radiation specialist at a variety of power plants and  
13 fuels fabrication facility in North Carolina and a graduate  
14 school facility.

15 Would you consider it noteworthy if you were told that  
16 the reactor building spray system had gone on, noteworthy to  
17 your own work as a radiation specialist?

18 A Well, that, and also, I've got a nuclear  
19 engineering background with some operation experience. And  
20 that would be noteworthy, yes.

21 Q So, you feel that you would react to such  
22 information?

23 A Oh, yes. Absolutely.

24 Q Okay. Now, that day, we understand about 8:00  
25 p.m. of that day, sometime in the evening -- it's not vital

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1 whether it's 8:00 exactly -- that there was some sort of an  
2 NRC shift change where they didn't let you go to bed. They  
3 just sent you off-site to work for the off-site surveys.

4 Is that correct?

5 A From what I can recall, approximately 6:00, 7:00  
6 that Wednesday, I left the site from what I can recall, to  
7 help a fellow by the name of Dick Kottan, one of our  
8 emergency planning people or independent measurements  
9 people, attempt to do some off-site measurements with our  
10 mobile laboratory.

11 Q You would have left when the van arrived, in other  
12 words, from Millstone?

13 A No.

14 Q Or did you leave before he got there?

15 A No. I left after he got there because there was a  
16 time that I was operating the van, assisting in the  
17 operation of the van.

18 It was later, approximately 8:00, 9:00 that essentially,  
19 our acting chief or chief at that time, Phil Stohr,  
20 requested us to actually take the mobile lab out and do  
21 surveys, our own surveys in various areas.

22 Q Okay. Let me clarify that, please. You were in  
23 the Unit 1 and mobile lab, drive and parked near the  
24 observation center on the mainland?

25 A Right.

gshPL

1 Q You went over to the parking lot of the  
2 observation center and worked in the van for a time?

3 A Yes.

4 Q And then, after some period of operations there,  
5 Phil Stohr asked you to take the van, physically take the  
6 whole van and drive it?

7 A Yes, the reason being because of the amount of  
8 equipment it had, such as the computer and the jelly systems  
9 to do exact measurements.

10 We could essentially get on-the-stop identification  
11 wherever we were at.

12 Q So you would have gone to the off-site survey with  
13 that vehicle?

14 A Yes.

15 Q But there were mechanical problems with that  
16 vehicle?

17 A We tried to take it, but because they had come in  
18 at such a -- apparently, a hurried pace from Millstone or  
19 wherever, one of the tires was completely flat, or  
20 something, and the other one was bald.

21 And we couldn't chance it taking the van out, taking it  
22 away from the site and having it break down.

23 Q So, you left the van there and went out in a Met  
24 Ed car, did you not?

25 A Yes. I reported to Phil Stohr what our problem

gshPL 1 was and he suggested that I get with some Met Ed people.  
2 The reason being is that we wanted to go out and basically  
3 see how the licensee was doing the off-site surveys.

4 And there had been some reports and some erroneous  
5 readings, and what have you. And they wanted someone out  
6 there with the people to see what they were doing.

7 So Phil Stohr suggested I go out with some of the survey  
8 teams to see how they draw their samples and see how they  
9 take their readings and what have you.

10 Q Did you feel that there was a deficiency in the  
11 NRC vehicles at the site? You have the van obviously  
12 deficient. There was still a station wagon there and a  
13 couple of automobiles.

14 A Our biggest deficiency is we had A/C equipment.  
15 And there was no way that we could run our equipment  
16 remotely. We didn't have an A/C converter or D/C  
17 converter. And we didn't have, from what I can recall, we  
18 didn't have a portable generator.

19 Q We understood that you tried to use a Met Ed  
20 converter, D/C, A/C converter.

21 A I don't understand it, but apparently, their unit  
22 couldn't handle the load that -- we had new equipment,  
23 Radeco-type air samplers that we used. And their  
24 converter couldn't handle the load that the unit draws.

25 Okay, that --

gshPL

1 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

2 Q Maybe you can tell us a little bit about what your  
3 impression was of the situation in the Unit 2 control room  
4 during the times that you were in there. You said there  
5 were a lot of people.

6 Would you say that it was fairly well organized or was it  
7 your impression that things were pretty confused?

8 A My impression was that it was somewhat hectic.  
9 But as far as not being organized, I can't really say.  
10 There appeared to be a line of communication, line of  
11 organization in terms of operational aspects.

12 But one of the problems I noted was the -- the site  
13 health physics supervisor, RPM, appeared to be involved in  
14 the operational aspects of the plant and was not devoting  
15 enough time to the nitty gritty, so to speak.

16 BY MR. BERNERO:

17 Q Keeping good health physics practices?

18 A Right. And basically, putting that excessive  
19 workload on the foreman, the job foreman.

20 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

21 Q Were Mr. Higgins or Mr. Neely having any problems  
22 getting access to any information that they needed or wanted  
23 there as far as you observed, or they told you?

24 A Not that I can recall. I certainly didn't have  
25 any problems in terms of gathering information.

gshPL 1 I can recall being told by one individual that they were  
2 very busy with the operation of the plant. And I recall  
3 asking someone else the question.

4 But overall, in general, I didn't have any problems with  
5 information-gathering.

6 Q Your access to panels wasn't restricted in any way  
7 except insofar as you weren't supposed to step on other  
8 people's toes?

9 A Well, in terms of Unit 2, I was not involved in  
10 access to panels and this and that.

11 If the need be, and if I did go to look at the radiation  
12 monitors, I would have asked the control room operator or  
13 supervisor's permission to look at the instrumentation  
14 before I went back.

15 Q Do you recall doing that, in fact, on any  
16 occasion, the first day, let's say?

17 A Maybe once, but I can't be certain of that. Just  
18 to get an overall picture of what was happening.

19 BY MR. BERNERO:

20 Q Would you restrict that to radiation monitors,  
21 that you would look at the radiation control panel?

22 A Yes.

23 Q As against --

24 A I was basically there to look at the radiation,  
25 the overall radiation problems at the plant. And I would

gshPL

1 also perhaps take a look at the meteorology data, the wind  
2 speed and direction and such and such.

3 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

4 Q Did you have the impression on the afternoon of  
5 March 28th that the plant was unstable? I mean that they  
6 were trying to reassert control over the situation or did  
7 you not think it was quite that serious at that point from  
8 what you were told or heard or sensed from being in the  
9 control room of either unit?

10 A The only problem I can recall is the problem with  
11 the steam generators and a bubble in perhaps one of the  
12 loops.

13 That's the only thing that I can recall. And I'm not sure  
14 if that was the first day.

15 Q Well, I'm not sure then what your sense of the  
16 situation was. Was your sense of the situation insofar as  
17 you observed other people, people from the utility reacting  
18 to it, that it was not basically an unstable situation?

19 A Oh, no. The overall impression that I got is that  
20 they were trying to control the plant and they were having  
21 difficulty in terms of cooling the reactor down in terms of  
22 stabilizing the situation.

23 But as far as acting calmly, like there was nothing out  
24 of order, or what have you, I didn't get that impression.  
25 They seemed justly concerned about the problems.

gshPL

1 BY MR. BERNERO:

2 Q One loose end. When you left the Unit 1 shift  
3 supervisor's office to go out and start working with Kottan  
4 in the van there, who was left there in the Unit 1 office?

5 A We had -- from what I can recall, the initial team  
6 that went out was myself and four other people in the first  
7 car.

8 And later on, approximately an hour, maybe two hours  
9 behind us, several other inspectors came. And I can recall  
10 Ray Smith, investigations specialist from Region 1, coming  
11 in. And I'm not sure if he was placed in charge of the  
12 command center in terms of transmitting information or not.

13 But it was either Chic Gallina or Ray Smith at the center  
14 in the Unit 1 shift supervisor's office when I left.

15 There was always someone on the phone.

16 MR. BERNERO: That's it. Any other questions?

17 Well, forget the magic words for ending.

18 MR. FRAMPTON: Thank you very much. We appreciate  
19 your time and your cooperation. Okay

20 (Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the deposition  
21 adjourned.)

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23

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