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-----PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND ·····X

DEPOSITION of NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION by NORMAN C. MOSELEY, held at the offices of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East-West Highway, Bethesda, Maryland, on the 25th day of July 1979, commencing at 9:30 a.m., before Irwin H. Benjamin, Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public of the State of New York.

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1 APPEARANCES:

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2	NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION:
3	MARK E. CHOPKO, ESQ.
4	Attorney, Office of General Counsel
5	United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
6	Washington, D.C. 20055
7	PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THREE MILE ISLAND
8	KEVIN P. KANE, ESQ.
9	Deputy Chief Counsel
10	ALSO PRESENT:
11	DWIGHT H. REILLY
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2	NORMAN C. MOSELEY, having
3	been first duly sworn by Mr. Kane, testified
4	as follows:
5	DIRECT EXAMINATION
6	BY MR. KANE:
7	Q State your full name for the record,
8	please.
9	A My name is Norman C. Moseley.
10	Q Did you bring a resume with you today,
11	Mr. Moseley, that briefly summarizes your employment
12	and educational history?
13	A Yes (handing).
14	Q And does this accurately state your
15	education and employment background?
16	A Yes, it does.
17	MR. KANE: Let's have this marked as
18	Exhibit 1 to today's deposition.
19	(Resume was marked as Moseley Exhibit 1
20	for identification.)
21	Q Mr. Moseley, what is your current
22	position with the NRC?
23	A I am the director of Division of Reactor
24	Operations Inspection.
25	Q And when did you become the director of

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1	Moseley 4
2	Division of Reactor Operations Inspection?
3	A 1978.
4	Q And what was your position prior to
5	that?
6	A Prior to that I was director of the Division
7	of Reactor Construction Inspection.
8	Q When in 1978 did you become director
9	of the Division of Reactor Operations?
10	A I don't recall exactly. It was in the late
11	spring or summer. That doesn't have the date,
12	specific date.
13	Q Would you briefly describe the function
14	of Division of Reactor Operations Inspection and your
15	duties as director.
16	A The Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
17	is responsible for developing the inspection program
18	for all reactors in operation.
19	In addition to that, we are responsible for
20	determining that the inspection program is being
21	implemented, and to assist the regional offices in
22	resolution of technical problems that come up during
23	inspection, and to provide a mechanism for feedback
24	to other program offices of problem areas that need
25	regulatory attention. And as the director, I am

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2 responsible to see that all these functions are 3 carried out.

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4 Q Would you explain to me how you go about 5 developing an inspection program.

6 Well, it has evolved. Our present inspection A 7 program has evolved over the years. The people that 8 were hired earlier on in the program were all 9 experienced in reactor operations in supervision of 10 the operation of reactors. So, using this knowledge 11 and experience, we developed a program that was 12 based on an audit of the licensees' activities using 13 the basic premise of our regulatory posture that the 14 licensee is principally responsible for the safety 15 of his operations.

Then we developed the audit program which then Then we developed the audit program which then was designed to determine that a licensee was meeting his obligations in running a safe plant and observing the regulatory requirements.

20 Q When was that audit program first 21 evolved?

A Whenever the first civilian plant came along,
 which would have been Dresdin, I guess, back in the
 sixties.

Q In connection with that audit of

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6 1 Moseley licensees' activities, is it necessary to extensively 2 examine Licensee Event Reports, for example? 3 That's one of the things, yes. 4 What other aspects of that audit exist 5 0 in terms of examining licensees' activities? 6 7 It is an audit of all those activities that A related to safe operation. For instance, we review 8 9 the procedures which are prepared by the licensee to direct and instruct operators on how things are to be 10 done. We don't review them all. We review a portion 11 of them, and the review is to determine whether or not 12 using these instructions, the person doing the job, 13 whatever it might be, in using those, whether he would 14 15 do the job safely, not necessarily the best way, but safely. We review the surveillance testing. Again, 16 17 procedures. We also observe these activities being 18 done.

We review log books and analyses of events that the licensee has. We review plant changes, modifications. In all these cases, when I say we review, you should read it or understand the audit. We don't do a hundred percent of all these things.

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Q In reviewing safety, for example, how

1	Moseley 7
2	do you determine which instructions to look at?
3	A Well, there are general guidelines in our
4	instruction manual. The blue books there (indicating)
5	are the LGE inspection manuals. So in there, there
6	are general guidelines, but they are very general
7	and so the inspector takes a sample of those
8	procedures that a licensee has and looks at them.
9	Q I see.
10	Is the focus in terms of selectively
11	looking at those, are those instructions that would
12	relate to safety related equipment?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Is there any focus at all on operating
15	instructions for non-safety related equipment?
16	A Not specifically for non-safety related, no.
17	Q Would that be the same with regard to
18	surveillance activities that are reviewed?
19	A Well, yes.
20	Q For safety
21	A All of the things that we do are directed
22	towards safety related things, and we ignore those
25	things that are not safety related.
24	Q Why don't we come to that. How do you
25	determine what is and what is not safety related

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2 equipment in a plant?

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3 A Well, we are guided, in part, by the Safety
4 Analyses Report that is prepared by the licensee
5 and is the basis of a review of the Office of Reactor
6 Regulation.

We are guided by the technical specifications,
and by our own knowledge and experience in reactor
operations.

10 Q Are you also guided by 10-C, Part 50,
11 I believe, Part B of --

12 A Appendix to Part 50 is a regulation which 13 applies to quality assurance, and it says that this 14 applies to safety related equipment, but it does not 15 define what safety related equipment is.

16 Q But is that then a source for guidance 17 for I&E as to what it determines to be safety related 18 equipment?

A Yes. It is guidance as to how -- what things
apply to safety related equipment. It is not guidance
for what is safety related equipment.

22 Q And then you also look at the SER, the 23 Safety Evaluation Report.

24 A Safety Analysis Report, yes, SAR.

O And the SER?

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BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 9
2	A Yes.
3	Q Anything else?
4	A Well, the technical specifications. The
5	specification 10-CFR's you mentioned is one
6	specific part of one specific regulation, but all
7	of the 10-CFR's that apply to reactor operations,
8	which would be 50 and 20, principally.
9	Q How often are these audits of licensee
10	activities conducted?
11	A There isn't a specified frequency. On the
12	average, I believe that we do something on the
13	order of about 25 to 30 inspections per year at each
14	reactor.
15	[Continued on next page]
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10 1 Moseley TL/slc tp2 Are those inspections conducted primarily 2 0 by regional offices outside the Bethesda Area? 3 4 A Yes. C How many inspectors do you have nation-5 Q 6 wide? I really don't know offhand. There are 7 A 8 several hundred. What kind of qualifications are the 9 0 inspectors required to have? 10 They are required to have the equivalent of 11 A a Bachelor's Degree in an engineering dicipline, plus 12 experience related to reactor operations. 13 The equivalent of a Bachelor's Degree? 14 0 Yes. It's not necessary to have a Bachelor's 15 A 16 Degree. 17 What would be an equivalent? 0 An equivalent would be working experience 18 A which would be comparable to the knowledge that 19 one would gain during the course work for obtaining 20 21 this. What kind of work experience? 22 0 Well, it would be operating a reactor. It 23 A would include people from the Nuclear Navy Program, 24 people from the Army Program. Mose of the people --25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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we have very few who do not have degrees, but 2 the people who we do have who don't have degrees 3 in general came from the Navy Program or the Army 4 5 Program. But you have very few who do not, in 6 Q fact, have a formal Bachelor's Degree? 7 8 That is correct. A What else is required besides a 9 0 Bachelor's Degree or equivalent? 10 Knowledge and/or experience.in reactor 11 A operations or related to reactor operations. A 12 person could have had experience in designing or 13 engineering in support of reactor operations. 14 Where do your people customarily 15 0 16 acquire that experience? In the programs that I have already mentioned, 17 A plus the National Laboratories, the facilities that 18 are run by the Department of Energy, and operating 19 power plants, or research reactors, in some cases. 20 How many of your inspectors in fact 21 0 22 have been RO's or SO's? 23 Licensed? A 24 Yes. 0

A I don't have a number for you. There are some.

The majority of our people came from one of the military programs or the National Laboratories, and neither of these have formal license requirements; that is, issued by the NRC. They have requirements of their own.

Q . In the military or the National 7 Laboratories. What kind of experience do these 8 people have in the military or National Laboratories 9 that enables them to understand how a control room 10 in a commercial nuclear reactor is laid out? 11 Well, the control room for a nuclear power 12 A plant is rather complex, whether it has a power 13 plant, an electrical generating station, hooked to 14 it or not. I am not sure I answered your question. 15 16 Maybe you should rephrase it.

Q What I am attempting to focus on, it is my understanding that there could well be substantial differences between military nuclear facilities and commercial nuclear power facilities. Let me ask you that first. Is that true?

22 A Yes.

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23 Q What kind of experience would you get 24 in National Laboratories that would relate to doing 25 inspections at a nuclear power plant?

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

A Well, the reactors are similar, and reactor operations are very similar. The differences, to the extent they exist, are in various feedback mechanisms that are associated with the power plant itself. We have training courses that we send our

7 people to.

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8 Q So that is in addition to the basic
9 course?

10 A Yes. I was talking about the hiring qualifica11 tions. We have in depth technical training courses
12 in reactor theory and reactor operations including,
13 as I said, simulator training.

Let's come to that, then. The hiring 14 0 qualifications are what you just tal ed about, a 15 Bachelor's Degree or equivalent or the background 16 in the military programs. Once an inspector is 17 hired, what kind of training does he go through? 18 He goes through what we call basic technology 19 A training and then an advanced course that is related 20 to the specific type of reactor that he is going to 21 inspect and the simulator. And there is retraining 22 on a periodic interval in these areas. 23

24 Q Let's take the basic technology. What 25 is that?

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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I would really rather you talked to the people 2 A who are associated with the training program if you 3 really want to understand, because they can give you 4 a much better picture of what all the contents of this 5 particular "ourse is. I think you will get a better 6 7 feedback. We will be talking to Don Skovholt this 8 0 9 afternoon. Talk to Jack Ledoux. I direct you to him. He 10 A is the guy who is in charge of the training program, 11

and he can give you a very good handle on just what it is we train people on, what each of the courses 13 14 contains and so on.

15 L-e-d-o-u-x? 0

16 That's right. A

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Beyond that, I would like to know your 17 0 understanding of what the basic technology course 18 is, how long it is, and what it is composed of. 19 Well, it's about three weeks in length, and 20 A it's the traditional reactor technology, what are 21 the basic components of a power plant, how radio-22 activity is controlled, what the transients of con-23 cern are, how the plant is designed to handle these 24 25 transients, these kinds of things.

1	Moseley 15
2	Q That is given for three weeks? Where
3	is that course given?
4	A Here.
5	Q In Bethesda?
6	A Yes.
7	Q Then you mentioned the advanced course.
8	Is that required after the basic technology course?
9	A Yes. I believe that is two weeks. These
10	times may be wrong. I may have them switched.
11	There is another course that is about two weeks,
12	which would be more advanced and would be more
13	related to a specific, like Westinghouse plant.
14	- Q At that point, the inspector begins
15	to specialize?
16	A He begins to specialize. Let me back up and
17	say, I think those courses are specialized in PWR's
18	and BWR's.
19	Q Does each inspector get training in
20	both, or does he choose?
21	A He may not make the choice. A choice is
22	made, and he goes to one or the other, and many
23	of the people have been to both.
24	Q You are saying many people have been
25	to both?

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1	Moseley 16
2	A Yes.
3	Q They have come back and redone the cours,
4	or taken both at the same time?
5	A They have been to both PWR and BWR training.
6	Q Simultaneously?
7	A No, they are different courses. The full-time
8	is eight hours a day, plus for the period of time
9	that you are there, so they have been at different
10	times to the PWR course and the BWR course.
11	Q That is a 2-week course and, again, that
12	focuses basically on how the PWR or BWR works?
13	A It's more specific to these types of
14	reactors, that's right.
15	Q Then you mentioned a simulator training
16	as well?
17	A I believe that's about seven days, and it is
18	located I believe the PWR simulator that we go
19	to is in Illinois, that we rent time from. I'm not
20	sure whether it's GE or what. We also go down to
2	Chattanooga. We rent time from TVA.
2:	Q For PWR simulator?
23	A Yes.
2	Q What takes place during the simulator
25	training?

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2 Well, it's a specialized course that is set A 3 up for our inspectors that goes through the normal 4 operation sequence startup, as well as observing 5 and participating in handling transients. 6 Startup and observing? 0 7 Well, in the simulator, every student doesn't A 8 do every evolution. Some of the stuff is done by 9 the instructor doing some evolution and scopping it 10 and explaining to the student what is happening and 11 starting it again, and that kind of thing. Then, 12 in addition -- that's part of every simulator. Then 13 the student is put on the board. He's the operator 14 and the instructor causes the simulator to do 15 certain things and requires the operator, the trainee, 16 to respond, to manipulate the controls to counter-17 act whatever it is that the instructor has put in. 18 Is each student required to sit at the . 19 board and --20 I don't know that detail. A 21 You mentioned retraining. There is a 0 22 periodic retraining for inspectors? 23 A Yes. 24 Why is there the necessity for retraining Q 25 of inspectors?

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1 It's necessary to retrain in most any field. 2 A People need to be refreshed, and so we have a 3 4 program that does that. On the other hand, these inspectors 5 0 are out in the field from the time they finish the 6 training doing inspections, aren't they? 7 Yes. 8 A That is on a fairly constant basis, so 9 0 one would assume they are staying proficient? 10 I would presume so. 11 A Q There is still the need for retraining? 12 13 Yes. A Q Is the retraining simply covering things 14 15 previously covered in these basic courses and 16 simulator training? It's basically the same kind of thining, but 17 A the value of retraining is that there are a lot of 18 things you do not see in a period of time and, 19 therefore, to have these things refreshed in your 20 21 mind is useful. In other words, to remind the inspectors 22 0 of things they may not have encountered on the field? 23 24 A Yes. Q How long is the retraining conducted? 25

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 19
2	A I believe it's about every two to three years.
3	Again, Jack Ledoux can fill you in on that much
4	better.
5	Q How long is the retraining course?
6	A About a week.
7	Q Where is that done?
8	A The classroom-type stuff would be done here.
9	The simulator stuff would be done at the same place
10	as I mentioned.
11	Q How is it determined whether or not the
12	person should go for retraining on the BWR simulator
13	or PWR?
14	A It depends on what his current job assignment
15	is. If he is inspecting BWR's, he would go to BWR.
16	Q So, from what you said before, some
17	inspectors in fact wind up working on BWR's for a
18	while and then are transferred?
19	A That's a possibility.
20	Q Does it also appear that inspectors
21	wind up doing both at the same time?
22	A I can't say that it doesn't. It's not
23	normally done.
24	Normally, an inspector is either
25	working on PWR's or BWR's?

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1	Moseley 20
2	A That's correct.
3	Q Is there any specialization as to types
4	of plants, Westinghouse, B&W?
5	A I'm not sure how much the current training
6	program specializes in those. I would refer you to
7	Jack Ledoux.
8	Q Are you aware that there is any specializa-
9	tion at all?
10	A I really don't know.
11	Q It is my recollection from glancing
12	over your resume, that at one time you were a
13	reactor inspector.
14	A 'Yes.
15	Q At that time, were reactor inspectors
16	assigned to particular kinds of plants?
17	A At that time, when I first started in reactor
18	inspection, the reactor inspectors inspected any
19	type at any time in their history. In other words,
20	the same guy would inspect construction as well as
21	operation inspection.
22	Q So there was no particular differentiation
23	between kinds of plants?
24	A There was none.
25	Q Do you have any reason to think that
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 situation has changed since then?

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A Well, yes, I'm aware that in general, the regions: attempt to assign people by type, but smaller regions where there may not be enough reactors of a particular type, there may be some crossover. In larger regions, it's my understanding that in general, a person will specialize in a type by assignment.

Q When you say "by assignment," do you
 mean you might have an assignment of Westinghouse
 for one week and B&W the next?

13 No. I'm talking about the -- we have got to A 14 become a little more specific. The things that I 15 have talked about were related to the principal 16 inspector being the person who has the overall 17 coordination for all of the inspections at a plant 18 and the specific assignment for certain parts of the 19 inspection. We have also people who are called specialists or are specialists, and they may inspect 20 21 their area in a number of different kinds of 22 transients. If an individual is specializing in 23 electrical instrumentation inspections, he may do 24 that at all types of reactors.

25

Q Westinghouse, B&W?

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22 1 Moseley 2 A That's correct. 3 There are significant differences between 0 4 the plants as to electrical instrumentation? 5 The basic instrument theory that is used is A the same. A pressure transmitter is a pressure 6 7 transmitter. A temperature indicator is the same 8 thing. So the basic instrumentation technology is 9 the same. The application may be different. 10 You said you had principal inspectors? 0 11 Yes, the principal inspector is, as I said, A 12 the guy who is responsible for doing a portion of 13 the inspection himself. He is also responsible to 14 coordinate schedules and see that inspections are 15 done in all the other areas in accordance with our 16 required inspecting program. 17 So he is both a supervisor --0 18 He is not a supervisor. He is a coordinator. A 19 So he coordinates inspections by other 0 20 inspectors? 21 That's right. A 22 Who report to him? 0 23 No, he is not a supervisor. They report to A 24 their own supervisor. What he does is -- the 25 schedule says, "During the next two months, the

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2 following inspection modules need to be done." 3 He notifies either his supervisor or the supervisor 4 of the people that do that inspection so they can 5 schedule this during that time frame to be done, and 6 he is aware of when they go. At times he goes with 7 them. He is aware of their findings, he will be 8 responsible for continuing pursuit with the licensee 9 management of any problems that are identified as a 10 result of those inspections. 11 Do principal inspectors specialize as to Q 12 type of plants? 13 Yes, in general, but not in every specific A 14 instance. 15 Then you mentioned another type of 0 16 inspector, something between specialist and principal 17 inspector, the people who are coordinated by the 18 principal inspectors? 19 No, those are specialists. There are basically A 20 two types. 21 Principal inspectors and specialist 0 22 inspectors? 23 A Yes. 24 Q The specialist inspectors do not, by 25 and large, specialize as to type of plant?

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2 Well, they may. It depends on what their A 3 specialty is. The one that I chose was the 4 instrumentation type, electrical instrumentation 5 type. In another case, a guy may be a specialist in 6 preoperational testing for PWR's. He may then do 7 a preoperational inspection of the procedures in 8 observed tests, and so on, for those plants. 9 Would he also specialize in preoperational 0 10 testing for a Westinghouse plant as opposed to B&W? 11 I don't think you will find that kind of 12 specialty, because we do not have that many plants 13 starting up in any one region in any one period of 14 time. 15 Would specialist inspectors, however, 0 16 in some instances, at least, specialize as to type 17 of plant: that is, as to manufacture, Westinghouse, 18 B&W, as opposed to simply specializing in PWR's 19 versus BWR's? 20 I think most of the specialty will be in A 21 PWR versus BWR. 22 In the case of principal specialists, 0 23 they do not specialize in manufacture? 24 In general, but not specific. A 25

SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 25
2	Q In the larger regions, they tend to
3	do that?
4	A Yes.
5	Q Does that pose any problems for the
6	inspection process, to have two or three different
7	kinds of plants in operation?
8	A What do you mean by "problems"?
9	Q Well, I mean in terms of the fact that
10	you have to have people who know one kind of plant
11	as opposed to another. If you have a shortage of
12	people in one, you have to transfer them over. If
13	somebody changes his job location or his job
14	description, he has to learn new things about plants
15	that he has not been previously familiar with.
16	A In that regard, yes.
17	Q It makes the job more complicated, doesn't
18	it?
19	A Yes.
20	Q Does it also lead to a situation where
21	some plants will have more advanced safety features.
22	than others?
23	A I don't believe Your question is, does
24	the fact that there are several different types
25	of plants lead to plants having a more advanced

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1	Moseley 25	a.
2	safety feature?	
3	Q In some than in others?	
4	A I think that the more important factor is age	
5	of the plant. I think that the more recent plants	
6	almost always have more advanced equipment, whatever	
7	type, whoever.	
8	[Continued on next page.]	
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	3	difference between respective NSSS suppliers
r	4	for plants as to sophistication on safety equipment?
(5	A I don't perceive that to be a principal
	6	difference between the plants, no.
	7	Q Let us take an example. A position
	8	indicator for PORV's that has come up several times
	9	in the last few months, as a result of the TMI-2
	10	incident on March 28, 1979. How many plants around
	11	the country have a position indicator for the PORV?
	12	A I really don't know.
	13	Q Do you know if anyone does besides TMI-2?
	14	A - Of my personal knowledge, I don't know. I
	15	presume, and I am positive that there are others that
	16	do, but I don't have personal knowledge.
	17	Q Do you know if TMI-1 has a position
	18	indicator on the PORV?
	19	A I don't know.
	20	Q Do you know if Davis-Besse 1 has a
,	21	position indicator on the PORV?
C	22	A I don't know.
	23	Q If I told you that Davis-Besse 1 has an
	24	actual position indicator on the PORV, and as you know
	25	TMI-2 has a command signal indicator on the PORV,
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 27
2	would that suggest to you that there are some
3	incongruous differences between the instrumentation
4	of the plants?
5	A It would suggest to me there are differences,
6	which I certainly am well aware there are differences.
7	I don't take from your example, I can't draw from
8	that, the larger conclusion that, therefore, that
9	this plant is safer than that plant. I can't make
10	that conclusion.
11	Q Have you examined the Lessons Learned
12	interim report that has now been issued?
13	A Yes.
14	Q Do you recall in there that it is now
15	recommended that there be an actual indicator
16	A I support that.
17	Q Do you support that on the basis of
18	safety?
19	A Yes.
20	Q Does it then indicate to you that a
21	plant that does not have an actual position indicator
22	and only has a command signal indicator on the PORV,
23	that it is less safe than one that has an actual
24	position indicator?
25	A That's too simple a piece to make the big

1	Moseley 28
2	thing that you are attempting to lead to. There are
3	a lot of things that affect safety.
4	Q Yes. I understand that.
5	A Yet, that's the right thing to do, and I think
6	it should be done.
7	Q Let us return back for a minute. I read
8	Lessons Learned, and the reason that the recommenda-
9	tion was being made for installing an actual position
10	indicator is that it is more safe; is that correct?
11	A Yes.
12	Q And that lesson was learned from TMI-2
13	that we need that kind of thing?
14	A - Yes.
15	Q Therefore, I simply ask you, if a plant
16	has an actual position indicator for its PORV, is
17	that plant safer than a plant that has a command
18	signal indicator only for the PORV?
19	A Yes, but it may be safer by that much [indicat-
20	ing] out of so [indicating], a very large amount.
21	I can't quantitize that.
22	Q I don't want you to quantitize it, I
23	, we want ,
24	
25	there wouldn't be any recommendation to make this.

2 Q And, in fact, that's the basis for the 3 recommendation in Lessons Learned?

Moseley

4 A Yes.

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Q I guess I forgot to indicate at the beginning of the deposition, Mr. Moseley, that the reporter can't take down both of us at the same time, so please allow me to finish my questions before you respond, even if you know what the question is going to be. The only reason for that, so we can have a very clear record here.

Let me also remind you, as I did at the 12 beginning, although we are sitting here in the 13 relative informality of your office, the testimony 14 you are giving here does have the same force and 15 solomnity as if you are testifying in a court of law. 16 The reporter is taking down my questions and your 17 answers, and that will be reduced to booklet form 18 19 later on. You will be given an opportunity to make changes. However, it is very important to avoid 20 the necessity for changes, as much as we can, and, 21 for that reason, if at any time you are confused 22 about a question and you don't understand it, ad 23 you need some clarification, please feel free to 24 25 stop me and ask at that point.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 A Okay.

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Q Are there any other safety differences that you are aware of between different types of plants around the country? We are talking about PORV indicators, for example. Are there other differences between plants that relate to safety of which you are aware?

9 A There are obviously other differences in
10 plants. There literally are no plants that are
11 exactly alike.

12 Q I understand that. That's what I 13 perceive to be something of a problem for the 14 inspection and enforcement function, isn't it? 15 A Yes.

16 Q Because it makes the job, as you said, 17 very complicated.

18 A It makes it more difficult, yes.

Q What I was talking about is what
differences there are that relate to safety.
A Well, I can certainly say that there are
things. If you're next going to ask me to list
them, I can't do it.

24 Q Please don't try to anticipate my 25 next question. The first question is, are there

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

31 Moseley 1 differences between plants that relate to safety? 2 I have answered that. Obviously, there are. 3 A Okay. What differences? 4 0 I can't --5 A I don't want you to list them, but tell 6 0 me what differences you have in mind. 1 I don't know how to answer the question that 8 A 9 you asked. Maybe I can rephrase it. There are 10 0 differences in plants that relate to safety, differences 11 in, I take it, equipment of various kinds. 12 Yes. 13 A What differences in equipment do exist 14 0 that can relate to safety from one plant to another, 15 based on your experience? 16 I simply can't enumerate these things. 17 A There are lists of items that are under review. 18 The generic issues are examples of things that 19 represent questions where there are differences. 20 There are questions that have been raised as to 21 whether or not this is good enough, or whether or 22 not other things ought to be changed, but --23 I don't know that I was talking about 24 0 generic issues. If I understand it, the generic 25

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1	Moseley 32
2	issue is an issue of safety that applies to more
3	than one plant, is that right?
4	A Yes.
5	Q As a matter of fact, it usually applies
6	to a large number of plants?
7	A More than one would suffice.
8	Q More than one?
9	A Yes:
10	Q What I was trying to focus on, was
11	differences between plants that relate to safety.
12	One plant would be safer than another. That may or
13	may not relate to a generic issue of safety as well,
14	but the point is, in your experience, are there
15	differences, for example, between B&W plants and
16	Westinghouse plands that you relate to safety?
17	A Well, I think I can answer that specific
18	question if I say that our approach really is not
19	to try to determine what is the absolute safest in
20	terms of how something is done, but rather is in
21	terms of is it adequately safe. Then I think that
22	will context where we actually operate on a day-to-
23	day basis as opposed to a review which will be to
24	say, well, if you did this much more, you will be
25	this much safer. We simply don't operate in that

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2 realm.

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Q However, doesn't inspection and enforcement focus on margin of safety of plants? A It does in a sense. If we raise a question of is what we find, is that safe enough, I guess that is a question of margin, but not in any specific terms of how much is the margin.

9 Q We were just talking about margins of 10 safety, and I gather from your response, what you 11 were suggesting is that there is a minimum line to 12 which I&E looks for purposes of safety.

Is it my understanding that ISE is not 13 concerned with how far over that line a particular 14 plant goes, as long as it meets that line? 15 In general, that is correct. The question of 16 A how safe is safe enough is obviously a very 17 difficult one to answer and we sometimes have to 18 resolve our differences by saying this is safe 19 20 enough.

21 Q I understand that. According to your 22 resume that you have produced, and that we have 23 marked as Exhibit 1, you have been with NRC since 24 1964, is that right?

25 A That's correct.

BENJALIN REPORTING SERVICE

Q Over the course of those years of experience, I see you had experience from '64 to '71 as a reactor inspector and a senior reactor inspector. Was it your observation that some plants do go further over that minimum line of safety than others?

8 A Yes.

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And what facets of the plants led you 9 0 to that observation, what things that you look at 10 that indicate to you that that was the case? 11 I think it is more a general perception than it 12 A is something that, because of this piece of equipment 13 or lack of that piece of equipment, it is more a 14 15 general perception.

Well, a general perception is usually 16 0 based on things that you have seen. What kind of 17 things. I'm not asking for an exhaustive list, but 18 how about something illustrative of what you have 19 seen that gives you that kind of general perception? 20 Well, I am not sure that I can answer that on 21 A the basis of my inspection experience. I certainly 22 note that -- let us take the BGW plants that have 23 the sealed loop, and the smaller pressurizer. 24 These things, I believe, tend to make this 25

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2 plant more sensitive to transients, and require, 3 or let us say, challenge the safety systems more frequently than plants of other design. 4 5 That's a specific that I can relate, perhaps. 6 You mentioned the sealed loop. Is that Q 7 the once through steam generator design? 8 No, it has to do with the piping arrangement A 9 between the steam generator and the reactor, and 10 also between the pressurizer and the reactor. 11 And it has been your observation that 0 12 that makes the plant more sensitive to transients? 13 A Yes. 14 0 How do you mean sensitive to transients? 15 Well. the B&W design philosophy has been, A 16 was in the past, do not have anticipatory SCRAMS 17 on problems in the secondary system, relying, rather, 18 on the resulting reaction of the primary system to 19 cause a SCRAM if the SCRAM was sought to be needed 20 at that period of time. 21 For instance, loss of feedwater did not 22 directly cause a SCRAM previously in B&W plants. 23 The result of loss of feedwater always gave a high pressure in the primary system. This, of 24 25 course, causes a SCRAM, which meant that a transient

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2	in the secondary system would perturbate the
3	primary system rather than directly scramming,
4	as the other B&W designs have done all along.
5	Q Is that the B&W philosophy as to its
6	plants today, do you know?
7	A The plants have been required to install the
8	anticipatory scram since Three Mile Island.
9	Q They have been required to install the
10	anticipatory scram?
11	A Yes.
12	Q In what sense?
13	A They now have a scram on feedwater loss
14	directly.
15	Q How is that accomplished?
16	A It is a matter of installing instrumentation
17	to sense it and feed a system, signal it into the
18	reactor scram.
19	Q Did that have anything to do with
20	the adjustments in the PORV?
21	A That was another facet of it. In response
22	to the bulletins and orders that were issued at
23	B&W plants, one of the things that they were
24	required to do was to increase the setting of the
25	PORV to make it closer to the code safety valve

1	Moseley 37
2	setting, and, at the same time, reduce the setting
3	on the high pressure reactor scram and thus reduc-
4	ing the number of times that the PORV would be
5	required to operate to terminate a pressure excursion.
6	Q You also mentioned the sealed loop
7	configuration. Has anything been done since TMI-2
8	and the
9	A No.
10	Q Are you familiar with the once through
11	
	system generator configuration used in B&W plants?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And you are also familiar with the re-
14	circulation steam generator configuration generator
15	used in Westinghouse plants?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Are there significant differences between
18	the two in the amount of reaction time that is
19	accorded to an operator in the event of a loss of
20	feedwater, for example?
21	A Yes. The once through steam generator, in
22	fact, produces super heated steam which means that
23	some of the tubes in the steam generator are dry
24	in normal operation, and the water level, the amount
25	of water inventory in the secondary system on the

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once through system generator is small in comparison to that in the other steam generators. So that wider fluctuations in primary coolant system temperature result from level changes in the once through steam generator.

7 Q Does that lead to a situation where the 8 once through steam generator will boil dry more 9 rapidly than a recirculation steam generator in the 10 event of a loss of feedwater?

A Yes. Because part of the steam generator is dry anyway, and in once through, yes, the smaller inventory in the steam generator will cause it to boil dry sooner.

15 Q That will then lead to a situation that 16 requires immediate operator reaction, will it not? 17 A Well, it requires some action. It is not 18 necessarily operator action. That's not the only way.

19 Q Does it place upon the operator a burden 20 of responding more quickly in the event of a problem 21 with the once through steam generator as opposed to 22 the recirculation steam generator?

A Yes. If you presume that everything doesn't
work, he has less time to right those wrongs.
Q So if I understand it, then, this

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 39
2	recirculation steam generator, there is a wider
3	margin of protection against transients or reaction
4	requirements on the part of the operator?
5	A Well, I would state that there is more time
6	for actions to be taken.
7	Q Because there is more water?
8	A Because there is more inventory, therefore,
9	that gives you more time to take actions, whether
10	it be automatic or operator initiated.
11	[Continued on next page.]
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IHB/pw	1 Moseley 40
T4.1	2 Q When you say "inventory," you mean coolant,
	3 water?
	4 A Yes.
C	5 Q Had there been any suggestion that B&W
	6 changed that particular configuration within NRC?
	7 A Not to my knowledge.
	8 Q Do you think that might be a good idea?
	9 A I really haven't studied that, and I would not
	10 be in a position to render an opinion.
	11 Q What: is the reason for having a once-through
	12 steam generator?
	13 A Well, it is principally to provide the super
	14 heat by having a super-heated steam. By producing
	15 super-heated steam, you get more efficiency out of the
	16 total system.
	17 Q How much more efficiency?
	18 A It is a few percent, I can't give you exact
	19 numbers.
	20 Q One or two percent, something like that?
	21 A A few.
(22 Q Less than five?
	23 A On that order, yes.
	24 Q So less than 5 percent more efficiency,
	25 if I understand it then, B&W had elected to use the
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

once-through steam generator which calls upon them to move much more quickly in an event of loss of feedwater, for example, than would be the case with the Westinghouse recirculation --

6 A I don't know that's the only reason. That's7 the reason that is obvious to me.

Q Do you know of any other reasons?
A I don't know of other reasons, but I don't know
10 that other reasons do not exist, either.

11 Q Has NRC performed any evaluation on a 12 cost benefit basis, if you will, of balancing that kind 13 of efficiency against the problems that that kind of 14 configuration can create for operators?

15 A I don't know of any cost benefit analysis, but 16 there could have been, and I would not be knowledgeable 17 of that.

Q Inspection & Enforcement would -A That would be outside of our area of responsibility.
Q It would be the function of Inspection &
Enforcement to give greater attention to transients at
plants that have a once-through steam generator in order
to analyze how that system is performing and whether or
not it poses safety problems as opposed to other plants?
A It is not clear to me that there was a thorough

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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4.3 1 Moseley 42 2 appreciation for the sensitivity of the B&W plants 3 prior to the Three Mile Island event. Q You think that sensitivity does exist now? 4 C Yes. S A Q But, to your knowledge, there has been no 6 7 look at the once-through steam generator within NRC? I don't know whether it's been made or not. 8 A It is not covered, as I recall, in the 9 0 10 Lessons Learned Interim Report, at least. 11 A But there are other things going on, so I wouldn't 12 want to rule it out. I just don't know. 13 Q Is Oconee Unit 3 in South Carolina a B&W 14 plant? 15 A Yes, it is. Q Does it have a once-through steam generator? 16 17 A Yes. 18 Q In the interview that we had with you. 19 Mr. Moseley, some days ago, I did provide you with a 20 copy of a letter dated August 8, 1975, directed to you 21 at the time that you were working in Atlanta, Georgia. 22 I guess at that time you were with Region I? 23 A II. 24 Q I'm sorry, Region II, as a director of that 25 region, and this was a letter from Duke Power Plant, BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 43
2	signed by Mr. William O. Parker, and it describes a
3	transient which occurred at Oconee Unit 3 on June 13,
4	1975.
5	During the interview I asked you if you
6	could follow up to determine what response had been
7	made by you or someone from Region II to this letter.
8	Did you make that determination?
9	A I hadn't done that yet. I have asked my staff
10	to gather that information so I could look at it, and
11	I hadn't gotten it.
12	Q Do you recall this transient of June 13,
13	1975?
14	A I do not.
15	Q Do you recall it involved problems with th
16	PORV?
17	A I don't recall it at all.
18	Q It is also described in the Tedesco report
19	New Reg 0560?
20	A Yes.
21	Q Do you recall reading about it in there?

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22 A I have read the Tedesco report, but I don't have 23 any specific recollection of that particular event.

24 Q To your knowledge, did this transient raise 25 any generic safety issues which had to be addressed in

Moseley 44
connection with B&W plants?
A I really don't have any recollection of that
specific event.
You pointed out to me, I will look into it.
I just have had
Q Okay.
MR. KANE: Let us have this marked as
Exhibit 2.
Q If you could follow it up, Mr. Moseley,
and provide us with whatever documentation that was
prepared in response to this letter, we would certainly
be appreciative of that.
A I intend to do just that.
(The above-described document was marked
Moseley Exhibit 2 for identification, this date.)
Q Are you familiar with the transients which
occurred at Davis-Besse 1 in 1977 involving PORV and
pressurizer level aberrations?
A Yes, in some amount of detail.
Q They are also described in the Tedesco
report?
A Yes.
Q One of them occurred in September of 1977,
on September 24, 1977. Are you familiar with that
BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 transient?

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3 A Is that the one where the PORV stuck open?
4 Q That's correct, and there is also one
5 where the pressurizer level rose as a result of that
6 situation.

7 When did you first become familiar with 8 that particular transient?

9 A My first recollection of any attention to that 10 particular transient was in response to the Creswell 11 request. I believe that was a specific event that he 12 based his recommendation on.

Q When did you become aware of that?
A . It would have been sometime in the latter part
of last year or first of January, December of '78 or
January of '79, in that time period.

17 Q How did that come to your attention?
18 A It came to my attention as a result of a letter
19 which Jim Keppler addressed to Thornburg and myself.
20 That letter was dated January 19th.

Q Let me show you a document that has been marked as Exhibit 10 to the Foster deposition previously taken in connection with this Commission's investigation, and ask you if that's the letter you are referring to. It actually appears to be a memorandum.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Moseley 46
2	A It appears to be the same, yes. Wait a minute,
3	no, it isn't.
4	Q I note you are looking at something else
5	there.
6	A Yes.
7	Q Can I see what you have in front of you
8	there, I don't recognize that.
9	MR. CHOPKO: It is the same without
10	attachments.
11	THE WITNESS: The words look like they're
12	different. It looks like this was redrafted to
13	become this. That's my best guess.
14	MR. CHOPKO: I think just the top of the
15	page is cut off.
16	MR. KANE: It doesn't appear to be the same.
17	MR. CHOPKO: I think it is the same, just
18	the top of the page
19	MR. KANE: What is all this stuff at the
20	bottom?
21	THE WITNESS: This is from a file copy.
22	This stuff is on the file copy, and it is not on
23	the original. Maybe it is the same.
24	MR. KANE: Can we have this marked as an
25	exhibit, or is that your only copy?

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1	Moseley 47
2	MR. CHOPKO: I can get a copy for you.
3	I can give you this one.
4	MR. KANE: We can refer to this. The
5	reporter will need to take it with him. Can
6	we have that marked as Exhibit 3?
7	(The above-described document was marked
8	Moseley Exhibit 3 for identification, this date.)
9	Q This is a memorandum which you received
10	from Mr. Keppler of Region III. It is dated
11	January 19, 1978. You did say your recollection was
12	that this first came to your attention in late '78 or
13	early '79?
14	A Having seen this date, I would say that it was
15	in early '79.
. 16	Q That is towards the end of January '79?
17	A Yes.
18	Q Was that the first notice you had of any
19	concerns being raised about a transient at Davis-Besse
20	on September 24, 1977 and generic problems that might
21	be connected with that?
22	A To the best of my recollection, yes.
23	Q And this was a request or recommendation
24	for notification of Licensing Boards and a request
25	for technical assistance, is that right?
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 A It was a specific request from Creswell. The 3 specific request that Mr. Creswell made was for notifi-4 cation of the board.

5 In forwarding this, Mr. Keppler made recommenda-6 tions that other things other than notification of the 7 board might be more appropriate in this.

8 Q What were those recommendations? 9 A It would seem more effective and less premature 10 of handling this information and so on.

11 0 You were referring to Page 2 of this document, and at the top in the second sentence from the 12 top it says, "It would seem that a more effective and 13 less premature way of handling this information would 14 15 be for NRR to review and disposition the information 16 during the development of the SER and SER Supplement relating to OL issuance for the affected plants." 17 18 A Yes.

19 Q What is that procedure that he is talking 20 about there?

21 A Well, it is not a defined procedure, but what it 22 would amount to would be to refer this to the licensing 23 project manager to specifically address these issues in 24 the SER.

Q For what plant?

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2 A For the plants that an SER remains to be written 3 on. So it would be a plant where there is a licensing 4 action that is pending.

5 Q Not for any plants that have already been 6 licensed?

7 A A plant for which there was not an SER pending,
8 this was not appropriate.

9. Q How long would that mechanism take that
10 Mr. Keppler is suggesting would be a more effective and
11 less premature way of handling the information?
12 A Well, it would vary with the length of time before
13 the SER was issued for a specific plant. It might be
14 a month or two, or it might be many months.

15 Q Did you review this document at the time 16 you received it?

17 A Yes, I did.

18 Q Did you understand the nature of Mr. Creswell's
19 concerns at that time?

20 A Well, I understood or I thought I understood what 21 Mr. Creswell's concerns were, and specifically in rela-22 tion to the pressurizer, I took Mr. Creswell's concern 23 to be that he thought the pressurizer was too small, 24 and that he had some concern about the level instrumenta-25 tion associated with pressurizer.

Q You were referring to Page 2 of the memorandum which is attached to the cover letter, the memorandum being dated January 8, 1979, from Mr. Creswell to Mr. Streeter entitled "Conveying New Information to Licensing Boards," and the specific note being Item 3 on Page 2 of that memorandum, which does refer to a transient of November 29, 1977 at

9 Davis-Besse.

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Now, I want to come to that transient
with you, and it is my understanding, also, that this
portion that you have referred to, Paragraph 3 on Page 2
of the attached January 8, 1979 memorandum was, in fact,
quotes in I&E Fulletin 7905, which was issued right
after the TMI 2 accident, is that correct?
A That's correct.

Q I do, as I say, want to come to that transient with you, but I was attempting to focus first upon a transient which occurred on September 24, 1977 at Davis-Besse. So let us jump back for a moment and let me ask you if you know anything about that transient on September 24, 1977.

23 A I know less about that one than I do about this 24 one that is here.

Q On September 24, 1977, Davis-Besse, PORV

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51 Moseley 4.12 1 2 stuck open, the pressurizer level rose, and the 3 operator turned off the high pressure injection based 4 on that rise in the pressurizer level. Are you aware of that transient? 5 A Yes. I have read that report. 6 7 Q Which report is that? It would have been LER for that --8 A Q When did you see that LER for that particular 9 10 transient? 11 A Subsequent to the Three Mile Island event. Q After March 28, 1979? 12 Yes. 13 A - Q How did that area come to your attention? 14 Well, in the reviews that were being made of the 15 A 16 previous events that may have been similar or related 17 to the Three Mile Island event. Q You were called upon to do a review of LER's 18 19 as to other possible similar events prior to Three 20 Mile Island? 21 A Not personally, but people were gathering the 22 things together, and I read these things. I also 23 presumed this is included in the Tedesco report which 24 I read. Q It is described in the Tedesco report. 25 BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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Moseley

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2 However, the premature termination of the HPI is not	
3 described in the Tedesco report. What I want to come	
4 to is how you learned that that particular facet of	
5 that transient had occurred.	
6 A I really don't know how I learned it.	÷,
7 Q Well, did you learn it from the LER?	
8 A I simply don't know how I came to that knowledge.	
9 Q Are you learning it from me for the first	
10 time or have you heard it previously?	
11 A I believe I have heard it previously.	
12 Q Okay. Where have you heard it?	
13 A I simply don't know where I came into this	
14 - Q You mentioned the LER on this event. You	
15 read that LER?	
16 A Well, I don't have any specific recollection of	
17 exactly which LER's that I have read, and when I actuall	у
18 read them by and large. Most of these LER's, with the	
¹⁹ exception of the one that was attached to the Creswell	
20 memo, most of these I read only after the Three Mile	
21 Island event.	
22 Q Were you requested to do so?	
23 A I wasn't. I was trying to learn more about	
²⁴ what intelligence was available for us to go forward	
²⁵ from here.	

2 Q What intelligence did you get concerning 3 the Davis-Besse transient of 9/24/77?

4 A That it had some similarities to the Three Mile 5 Island event.

6 Q Did you look at an LER on the September 24, 7 1977 event?

8 A I presume that I have seen an LER on that, but 9 I can't tell you with certainty that I have seen the 10 LER for that event.

11 Q What response did the NRC make in connection 12 with that LER on September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-13 Besse?

14 A . I can't tell you from direct knowledge. J have 15 to presume that Region III looked into it and came to 16 some conclusions on it.

17 Q Let me see if I understand.

After March 28, 1979, you made an effort to 19 determine what prior transients had occurred that might 20 bear upon the Three Mile Island accident, is that right? 21 A Yes.

Q In doing that, you came across an LER on September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-Besse, is that right?

25 A I have read a number of LER's that were related

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Moseley

2 to B&W plants, and I cannot confirm right now that I 3 have read the September 24th LER; I believe that I have, 4 but I can't say with certainty.

Q Let me show you a document that has previously been marked as Exhibit 3 to the Creswell deposition that has previously been taken by this Commission's investigation, and ask you whether you have ever seen that document before.

10 A I don't recall having seen this before.

11 Q If you had followed up on the history of 12 the LER for the September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-13 Besse, would you have found that document? It is an 14 Inspection & Enforcement report prepared by Mr. Creswell 15 that relates to that transient?

16 A Well, I didn't mean to imply that I had done a 17 thorough study of the LER's that had occurred and all 18 of the follow-up actions that had been taken. I have 19 not done that.

20 Q. You have not traced the history of the 21 treatment of the Davis-Besse transient of September 24, 22 1977 through the NRC?

23 A No, I haven't.

24 Q Has anyone done that?

25 A I don't know whether anyone has done that or not.

SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

Q Would that be a source of concern to you in terms of the evaluation of that transient of September 24, 1977?

5 A Up to this point, my concern has not dwelled on 6 why something wasn't done sooner, but rather dwelled 7 on whether or not what we are doing now is the appro-8 priate thing.

9 At a later point in time, when I have the 10 time to put into it, then I will be looking at what 11 should we do differently in the future to unearth 12 these kinds of things in a more timely fashion. 13 Q I think you have misinterpreted the whole 14 thrust of my question.

If a prior transient occurred which involved essentially the same facets as occurred at TMI 2 on March 28, 1979, and if that transient had previously been evaluated by the NRC, wouldn't that evaluation be of some use to you in evaluating the situation at TMI 2?

21 A It may well be.

Q Wouldn't it give you some guidance as to how you might want to further analyze the accident at Three Mile Island 2?

25 A It may contain information that is useful, yes.

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56 Moseley 1 Q But you hadn't made any such inquiry so far 2 as to how the transient of September 24, 1977 was 3 previously evaluated? 4 I personally have not. A 5 Q Do you know of anyone else in the NRC who 6 would have done so? 7 I don't know what other people have done. I 8 A 9 don't know that --Q Would that be a function of the Inspection & 10 11 Enforcement Division to determine what evaluation had 12 previously been done? 13 A The function of the determining what action should be taken in terms of equipment modifications and require-14 15 ment modifications is principally in NRR. 16 0 Does ISE interface with NRR in terms of evaluation of transients that involves things such as 17 pressurizer aberrations and --18 Yes, we interface with them. 19 A 20 And again, to your knowledge, no one in NRR 0 is doing this either, tracing the history and determining 21 what evaluation has been made of this transient? 22 You see, they may be doing it and I wouldn't know. 23 A 24 I don't want to imply to anyone that no one is doing it.

25 I can only say that I don't have any knowledge of what

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2 Let me come back to the document that we Q 3 have marked as Exhibit 3 to this deposition, which you 4 do recall seeing towards the end of January. What did 5 you do with this particular document once you received 6 it? 7 A I turned it over to my staff and I asked them to 8 review it. 9 Q Who on your staff? 10 A Ed Jordan. 11 What did Mr. Jordan do? 0 12 A Mr. Jordan did review this. He discussed it 13 with people in licensing. He had discussions with the 14 people from the regional office, including Mr. Creswell. 15 When tid he have his discussions with 0 16 Mr. Creswell? 17 A They were undoubtedly during the month of February. 18 Q Did you say Mr. Jordan also spoke with other 19 people on your staff? 20 A Well, he would have spoken with other people on 21 the staff and people in NRR, as well as talking with 22 Mr. Creswell and Mr. Streeter and others. 23 Q Who did he speak to in NRR? 24 A You will have to ask him. I don't specifically 25 know.

1	Moseley 58
2	Q You do not know who he spoke to?
3	A No.
4	Q But you know he spoke to Mr. Creswell and
5	Mr. Streeter?
6	A Well, I know Mr. Creswell. I presume
7	Mr. Streeter would have been involved in it. He
8	specifically told me that no had talked with Creswell.
9	Q What determination did Mr. Jordan make
10	based on his conversations with Mr. Creswell and
11	Mr. Streeter?
12	A Mr. Jordan made the determination that the
13	information presented by Mr. Creswell did not present
14	new information or put a different light on information
15	that was available. Therefore, it was not necessary
16	or appropriate to go with this information to the
17	hearing board. His determination was specifically not
18	made that these matters were insignificant or should
19	not be given further review.
20	Q But it should not be sent to the hearing
21	board?
22	A That's right.
23	Q It did not present new information?
24	A That's right.
25	Q Let me see if I understand what you just
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2 said. He did not make a determination that the infor-3 mation did not deserve further study?

4 A That's right.

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Q Can you explain that? That sounds a little incongruous to me. If it is not new and not necessary to send it to the hearing board, how can it not be unworthy of further study?

9 A The forwarding of information to hearing boards 10 is not the way to resolve problems in the NRC. You 11 resolve problems through the normal course of doing 12 business. You identify things to hearing boards which 13 you believe are of sufficient importance that they 14 should specifically focus on those issues, as opposed 15 to the staff, ours and NRR and others, solving the 16 problems and presenting them, as part of their total 17 evaluation, what should be done about it.

18 Q Did you concur in this determination?
19 A Yes, I did.

Q Did you understand that at the time you did 21 so, that operators out in the field were relying on 22 pressurizer level to assess state of inventory in the 23 core?

A I knew that was the general premise that was used,
25 yes.

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2 0 Did you understand that Mr. Creswell was concerned about aberrations in pressurizer level? 3 Yes, but my understanding of Mr. Creswell's 4 A concern was that he was concerned with the pressurizer 5 6 voiding and thus leading to steam voids in the primary 7 coolant system itself, and he was concerned that once 8 the pressurizer level indication was lost, there was no direct indication of how large the void may have been. 9 10 0 Did you understand also that once the 11 pressurizer level was lost, the operator was deprived 12 of the primary parameter upon which he relied to assess the state of inventory in the core? 13 14 A - But not the only one. 15 Q But the primary one? The one that was used most, but I have to say 16 A 17 that it's incorrect to use that to the exclusion of 18 all others. 19 C Yes. I understand that. But on the other

20 hand, you did have it in mind that the operators were 21 using that as a primary parameter?

22 A As one of the parameters.

Q It did not occur to you that in light of what Mr. Creswell was concerned with, it might be appropriate to issue some type of advisory to the

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2 operators that under these types of circumstances,

3 they could not roly upon pressurizer level to indicate 4 state of inventory in the core, that it was simply a 5 misleading reading?

6 A I did not reach that conclusion that this should 7 be done.

8 Q Mr. Jordan did not, either?
9 A That's correct.

10 Q If someone like Mr. Creswell out there in 11 Region III identifies a generic safety concern with 12 B&W plants, what is the procedure he should follow? 13 A He should discuss it with his supervisor and he 14 should prepare a memorandum which goes through his 15 supervisor to this office, pointing out the problem and 16 requesting that it be reviewed and pursued with licensing 17 or whatever he thinks is the right course.

18 Q He should talk to his supervisor? He 19 should prepare an I&E report?

20 A No, this would be a memorandum.

Q Who should that be directed to?
A It should ultimately come to this office, to me
or to Jordan, probably to Jordan, either to me or Jordan.
Q Who should Mr. Creswell direct the memorandum
to?

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2 A It varies. In some cases, he might route it
3 through Mr. Streeter to Mr. Keppler or through
4 Mr. Streeter and Mr. Keppler to me or Jordan, or there

5 may be a series. It has the same end result.

6 Q That is the proper procedure? 7 A There is no defined procedure that says it must 8 be sent to Mr. X. The procedure says that if you 9 have -- and it's more informal than formal -- if you 10 have a concern, write it down and forward it into head-11 quarters for review.

12 Q There is no rigid established procedure for 13 raising generic safety concerns? It is an informal 14 procedure?

15 A It's informal in that it is not rigid. There is 16 not a form that is utilized. It's well known by all 17 the inspectors. They are admonished, encouraged, and 18 requested to bring these things to people's attention 19 in this fashion.

Q So Mr. Creswell would prepare a memorandum to either Mr. Streeter, his immediate supervisor, or to the head of his region, Mr. Keppler, or anybody else that he could send it to?

24 A It would either be addressed to them for further 25 forwarding or it would be addressed through them to

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2 this office.

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Q Who in this office?

4 A Either Mr. Jordan or myself.

Q What would be the next step, then?

A The next step would be that Mr. Jordan and his
7 staff would review this event or this suggestion and
8 probably discuss it with the suggester and decide what,
9 if any, action should be taken, and if they decide
10 that action should be taken, they would pursue it
11 with the licensees.

12 Q How long does that process usually take?
13 A It varies.

14 - Q Based on what?

15 A Based on the workload of the people involved and 16 the feeling of urgency that is felt by those people who 17 are acting on it.

Q If a particular report discloses that an operator has prematurely terminated HPI based upon erroneous water level in the pressurizer, does that raise a significant satury concern?

A It would depend on the circumstances and the result of and the perceived generic applicability of this action.

Q Do you have any idea what generic applicabilit

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2 was perceived in connection with Mr. Creswell's concern 3 on that point?

4 A The memorandum that you have indicated does not 5 describe such concerns.

6 Q I am not sure I know what you mean. Do 7 you mean Creswell Exhibit 3?

8 A Yes.

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What Creswell Exhibit 3 is, as I understand it, 9 0 is a letter directed to the licensee from Gaston 10 11 Fiorelli, who is the chief of the reactor operations and nuclear support branch in Region III, in which he 12 encloses the inspection enforcement report which was 13 prepared by Mr. Creswell and approved by Mr. Streeter. 14 15 This is what I really was referring to. There is A nothing that I read in this that exhibits this concern. 16 17 That's right. This simply talks about 0 18 aberrations in the pressurizer level, based upon the

19 November 29th transient.

20 A That's right.

Q That is Exhibit 3 to this deposition, which 22 is the memorandum of January 19, 1979, to you from 23 Mr. Keppler.

Let me show you another document which has
25 been marked as Exhibit 6 to the Creswell deposition.

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2 This, again, as I understand it, is a copy of an I&E 3 report prepared by Mr. Creswell in January of 1979, and 4 it is attached to a cover letter to the licensee, Toledo 5 Edison, dated February 7, 1979, again from Gaston 6 Fiorelli, the chief of reactor operations in nuclear 7 support branch in Region III. I want to specifically 8 direct your attention to Paragraph 2 on Page 2 of the 9 I&E report, which reads, "Unresolved item -- during the 10 exit interview on November 2, 1978, the inspector again 11 requested to review the licensee's evaluation concerning 12 high pressure injection delay which would demonstrate 13 the HPI flow experienced during the September 24, 1977 14 event was conservative when compared to accident analysis 15 assumption. The inspector was informed that the analysis 16 was not available for review. During the entrance 17 interview on December 20, 1978, the inspector again 18 requested the analysis and again it was not available 19 for review. During the exit interview on December 22, 20 1978, the inspector informed the licensee that, prior 21 to returning to power operation, the licensee should 22 assure that the flow delay did not indicate the HPI 23 system was inoperable."

Would problems with the HPI system and
 questions about the flow rate be considered a significant

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2 safety problem at a B&W plant?

A I have not read this report, but from what you 4 read, I would say that this was an area of some 5 concern to the inspector. However, from characteriza-6 tion as an unresolved item, it implies that it is not 7 perceived by the inspector at this point in time to 8 be a significant safety issue that demands resolution 9 promptly. Otherwise it would have been categorized 10 as a safety issue.

11 Q It is simply at that point noted as an open 12 item?

13 A That's right. By the handling of it, labeling 14 it this way, that attaches some level of significance 15 as perceived by the inspector.

Let me show you another document that has 16 0 been previously marked as Exhibit 7 to the Creswell 17 18 deposition. This is a copy of an inspection enforcement report. The inspection trip took place in February of 19 The report itself is dated in March of 1979. 20 179. 21 Again, it is attached to a cover letter to the licensee 22 from Region III, the cover letter being dated March 28, Specifically directing your attention to Page 4 23 1979. 24 of that report, it says: "Unresolved item: High 25 pressure injection performance. The inspectors met

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with power engineering personnel on February 7, 1979, 2 to discuss inspector comments related to the high 3 pressure injection review performed by power engineering. The inspector noted that a flow versus pressure compari-5 son of the September 1977 event and the small break 6 analysis had not been made. The licensee stated that 7 pre-operational test results and consideration of 8 instrument errors verified HPI system operability. 9 The licensee also stated that NRR had reviewed the 10 September 24, 1977 event and by its review had approved 11 the HPI operability issue." It goes on to describe a 12 number of items of information requested by the 13 14 inspectors in connection with this issue.

This report indicates, I take it, that 15 again, the question of the HPI operation during the 16 September '77 transient was still an open item. This 17 is as of February of 1979. It concerns a transient 18 which occurred in September of 1977. Is it customery 19 for such open items relating to HPI performance to 20 remain open like that for over a year after the event 21 occurred? 22

A It should not go on that long. Again, it depends
on what the inspector's perceived level of concern is.
If his level of concern was that continued operation

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68 Moseley 1 2 of this plant is unsafe with this type of thing unresolved, 3 then he should have made a larger issue of it than simply issuing, listing it as an unresolved item in his report. 4 Q Did Mr. Creswell make a larger issue of this? 5 Not to me. A 6 Did he make it to anyone else? 7 0 I understand that he talked with Mr. Keppler on 8 A one occasion. 9 0 When was that? 10 A I don't recall exactly. It would have been 11 12 sometime prior to March 28. Q During 1978? 13 - I don't have that specific. I don't know. 14 A Q During 1977? 15 I don't really know. 16 A How did you learn of this? 17 0 Mr. Keppler told me of this. I did not ask him 18 A at what time this had occurred. 19 What did Mr. Keppler tell you? 3 20 He said that Mr. Creswell had come to him and 21 A f stated that he believed that the Davis-Besse plant 22 should be shut down, should not be allowed to operate 23 for some reasons that Mr. Keppler told me were more 24 related to the management deficiencies that were 25

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2	exhibited at the plant and his concern for the fact
3	that problems were not resolved as rapidly as
4	Mr. Creswell thought they should have been.
5	Q What were those management deficiencies?
6	A I didn't get that specifically from Mr. Keppler.
7	I know that Mr. Keppler has had meetings with the
8	Davis-Besse management to express concern that they
9	were not deeply involved enough with the ongoing
10	operations and did not pursue resolution of problems
11	as rapidly as he felt they should, and that he wanted
12	to call their attention to the need for their involve-
13	ment and this attention to detail.
14	- (Continued on next page.)
15	(continued on next page.)
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tp6	2 Q What was the result of that conversation
	3 that Mr. Keppler had with the management of Davis-
	4 Besse?
C	5 A Well, he got assurances from them that they
	6 would do things differently.
	7 Q What things?
	8 A I wasn't at the meeting. I can't report on
	9 the specifics of it.
	10 Q When did you talk to Mr. Keppler about
	11 this?
	12 A It would have been probably in April or
	13 something of that nature.
	14 - Q April of 1979?
	15 A I suspect it was in that time frame. I don't
	16 recall exactly.
L	17 Q How did it come about that you were
	18 talking with Mr. Keppler at that time?
	19 A Well, there were concerns about this was
	20 in the time period before the B&W order was issued,
	21 or the orders were issued to all B&W plants that
	22 they should stay down until the order was lifted.
	23 So we were discussing what, if anything, should be
	24 done about Davis-Besse. Davis-Besse was not at
t	25 that time operating. They were down, I believe, fo
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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71 Moseley 1 2 refueling and had not started back up, and they had 2 agreed with Mr. Keppler that they would not start 3 back up until the further review of the Three Mile 4 Island event, so the discussions were related to 5 whether or not there was something additionally needed 6 for Davis-Besse to do before they were allowed to 7 8 begin operation. In the course of that conversation, then, 9 0 you began to talk to Mr. Keppler about prior conver-10 sations he had with the Davis-Besse management? 11 12 Well. yes. A

13 Q He also told you that Mr. Creswell was 14 concerned about problems not being resolved as rapidly 15 as possible or as rapidly as Mr. Creswell would have 16 liked?

17 A Yes.

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Q What problems were those?

I can't give you the specifics. They related to 19 A equipment and operational things that were not re-20 solved as rapidly as Mr. Creswell wanted, and Mr. 21 Keppler told me he had shared some of Mr. Creswell's 22 concern. A wever, he did not feel that they were 23 sufficient to order the plant shut down. 24 He did agree with Mr. Creswell's concerns? 25 0

 A He shared some of Mr. Creswell's concerns. Q Did he tell you what he had done about Mr. Creswell's concerns? A He told me that he had had this previous meeting and told me that he had indeed planned a meeting which would have taken place, I believe, the very same week that the Three Mile Island event occurred, but it was postponed because of the Three Mile Island event, and that he planned to have that meeting as soon as he could reschedule it. Q He had scheduled it the same week as the Three Mile Island event? A · I believe, or the following week. It had been already scheduled, but was postponed. Q That was meeting with Mr. Creswell? A No, with the management of Davis-Besse. Q Did Mr. Streeter tell you whether or not there would be a prior evaluation of Mr. Creswell's concerns concerning Davis-Besse? A I didn't talk to Mr. Streeter. Q Do you know, independently of any conversation with Mr. Keppler, what evaluation, if 	1	Moseley 72
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24 Q Do you know, independently of any		Q I'm sorry; Mr. Keppler.
Q Do you know, independenci, or any		A We did not talk of that.
25 conversation with Mr. Keppler, what evaluation, if		Q Do you know, independently of any
	25	conversation with Mr. Keppler, what evaluation, if

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73 Moseley 1 any, by NRC was made of Mr. Creswell's concerns 2 about Davis-Besse? 3 I don't know. 4 A Q Do you know if anyone in NRR was con-5 tacted concerning Mr. Creswell's concerns about 6 Davis-Bessa? 7 I'm not aware of either whether Mr. Creswell 8 had concerns prior to these that were expressed, or 9 if there were any, what action was taken on them. 10 Again, coming back to it, you do recall 11 0 having looked at one point at an LER that related 12 to the September 24, '77 transient? 13 A . After the TMI event. 14 Did you determine at that time that that 15 0 transient involved any items of significance relative 16 to the TMI event? 17 A Yes, there were items of significance that 18 related to the TMI event. 19 What were those items? 20 0 As you have reminded me, the turning off of 21 A the high pressure injection system, the voiding, 22 apparent voiding in the core, and things of this 23 24 nature. Did you make any determination at that 25 0

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74 Moseley 1 time as to how or why these events had occurred at 2 3 Davis-Besse? 4 No. I didn't. A Q Did you make any attempt to determine 5 whether or not anyone else in the NRC had determined 6 how or why these events had occurred? 7 No, and you understand that at this point, 8 A we had already issued bulletins which would require 9 the HPI to be, to remain inoperative until certain 10 things were satisfied, so any event preceeding that 11

12 where people had terminated HPI would no longer be 13 of independent concern.

Q Are you aware of any corrective action
that was taken at Davis-Besse in response to the
transient that they had on September 24, 1977?
A I'm not aware.

18 0 If any action?

A I'm not aware what corrective action was
 taken at all.

Q So it could have been none?
A It could have been none, it could have been
something. I don't know.

Q How often do you have occasion to refer to LER's, to examine them?

1	Moseley 75
2	A The written report?
3	Q Yes, Licensee Event Report.
4	A Not very often.
5	Q Does anyone in your division have occasion
6	to look regularly at LER's?
7	A Yes, I have two people in my group who have as
8	one of their job 'responsibilities review of LER's.
. 9	One person reviews these for PWR's and another for
10	BWR's.
11	Q Do they review all Licensee Event Reports
12	that are submitted on PWR's and BWR's?
13	A That is their hope, to be able to review them
14	all. They have other job responsibilities, and some
15	of them get reviewed.
16	Q How many LER's are submitted to these
17	people in one week, for example?
18	A It varies. It may be as many as twenty or
19	thirty a week.
20	Q Is that per person?
21	A It could be as high as that. I don't know
22	what the average is. Probably less than that.
23	Q How about per month?
24	A I don't know what the average rate is over
25	a long period of time.

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1 76 Moseley 2 Q Have you ever made any attempt to 3 determine whether or not these people are getting 4 too many LER's? 5 I know they are getting too many and they A 6 are unable to do it. At the present time I am trying 7 to get additional people to do just that. Positions 8 have been advertised and we are in the process of 9 filling those positions. 10 How long have you had two staff people 0 11 reviewing LER's? 12 A At least as long as I have been in my present 13 job. 14 • Q That has been since 1978? 15 A Yes. 16 Q During the time you were director of the 17 Division of Reactor Construction Inspection, did 18 you have occasion to look at Licensee Event Reports? 19 A Very little, about the same or even less than 20 I personally do now. 21 Q Have you ever seen a Licensee Event 22 Report that did not contain the phrase "The health 23 and safety of the public was not affected"? 24 I don't know. Certainly, if I have seen one, A 25 it has been a rare event. I can't say that I have

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2	never seen one, but I will agree with you that
3	statement is in most of them.
4	Q It is pretty much kind of a rote thing
5	that the licensee puts in there?
6	A Yes.
7	Q The licensees prepare the LER reports,
8	do they not?
9	A Yes.
10	Q How much weight is given to determination
11	by the licensee that the event described in the LER
12	does not affect the health and safety of the public?
13	A That statement is ignored for our review.
14	- Q It is ignored?
15	A Yes.
16	Q What does IGE do in order to test the
17	statement in the LER's whether or not the health
18	and safety of the public was affected?
19	A We attempt to make an independent review.
20	By "independent," I mean at least an independent
21	judgment. We don't in all cases go out and try to
22	get independent data, but we try to make an
23	independent judgment based on the facts. If we
24	find those facts are insufficient, then we go and
25	try to get some additional facts.

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BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1 Moseley 78 2 Q How do you determine whether the facts 3 are insufficient or not? 4 A It's based on the review, whether there is 5 enough information to complete the review and to 6 answer the principal questions that come to mind 7 as a result of reviewing this. 8 Suppose portions of the event are left 0 9 out by the licensee, not mentioned at all? 10 This we expect to be picked up by the regional A 11 office in their review of the LER on a plant specific 12 basis. 13 0 How can the regional office do that if 14 the licensee left it out? 15 A The region doesn't just read the report. On 16 some percentage of them, they go and review the 17 events, look at records, charts and logs. They do 18 not do it for every one, but on a percentage of 19 them they do, for most of the 14-day reports. 20 0 Most of the 14-day reports? What about 21 the regular 30-day reports? 22 A They take a sample, and the sample is designed 23 to determine that the licensee is including all the 24 appropriate facts, as well as to determine the 25 depth of their analysis.

1 Moseley 79 2 What sampling do they do? What per-0 3 centage of 30-day reports? 4 A A small sample, 20 percent or so. 5 Do you know if any check was done at Q 6 Davis-Besse in connection with the September 24, 7 1977, transient to determine whether or not 8 licensees had properly reported the termination of 9 HPI by the operator? 10 I don't know specifically. We have to con-A 11 clude that Region III, Mr. Creswell's, specially 12 does pursue that from the things you have shown me. 13 Do you know when Mr. Creswell first Q 14 began to pursue that? 15 A I don't know. 16 Mr. Creswell has previously testified Q 17 that he came across the matter for the first time 18 in the middle of 1978. Would it be customary for 19 there to be an approximate 9-month lapse between 20 that type of event taking place and someone actually 21 beginning to look into it from the region? 22 A Well, as I said, we don't review all of these 23 events, so it's possible that this event wasn't 24 reviewed earlier. I can't say why. 25 Q A certain portion of the 30-day LER's

2 are checked as to the records which the licensee 3 actually maintains?

Moseley

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4 A Yes.

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5 Q How would the inspector know what to 6 look for if certain portions of the events were 7 simply not mentioned in the LER?

8 A From his knowledge and experience. He would 9 look at recorder charts and log books and this kind 10 of thing, and he would say, he would ask himself and 11 then ask the licensee, "What about this parameter? 12 What was it doing during that time period?" And he 13 would look at that.

If the licensees were deliberately leaving it
out, that's the way he would come upon it.

16 Q So simply, the bottom line would be the 17 knowledge and experience of the inspector?

18 A That's right.

19 Q To your knowledge, has that kind of thing beer 20 caught in the past with licensees?

A There have been occasions where, let's say, things were presented in a different light than they would have been had the inspector written the report. I'm not aware of 'my situation where we have determined that licensees have knowingly omitted

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 significant information with the intent to deceive 3 us.

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Q You are not aware of any such situation
where there has been an intentional deception?
A No.

7 0 I want to jump back to this document 8 that we have been talking about that has been 9 marked as Exhibit 3 to this deposition. You said 10 that Mr. Jordan, during February, did an analysis 11 and determined there was no new information and that 12 there was no necessity to transmit it to a hearing 13 board, that you concurred in that determination. 14 What did you do then?

15 A Well, I believe there were memoranda written 16 to the hearing board people. Let me back up. First 17 there was a discussion between Mr. Jordan and, I 18 believe, it involved Mr. Brian and some other 19 people in Region III, during which this was discussed, 20 and the discussion went that we in headquarters did 21 not believe that this information was required to 22 be reported to the board and asked if Mr. Creswell 23 still felt strongly that it should be, and at the 24 end of this conversation the decision was made by 25 Mr. Jordan to recommend to me that since Mr. Creswell

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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still felt that it should be reported to the board, 3 that the board should be notified, but it should be stated that we did not agree that it was required.

5 Subsequently, there was another memoranda, of 6 March 27, to Mr. Tedesco from Mr. Jordan, in which he 7 goes on to say that we planned to follow up on the 8 pressurizer level problem with a further request 9 to NRR. One of the items in Mr. Creswell's list 10 of concerns had to do with an electrical problem, 11 and our subsequent pursuit of that issue resulted 12 in the issuance of a bulletin on that particular 13 problem, so there was not a signoff of Mr. Creswell's 14 concerns at this time but rather that the notification 15 of the board was not necessary.

16 What was the electrical problem? 0 17 I will have to go to the list and see. I A 18 don't recall the specifics. It's Item 4 in Mr. 19 Creswell's memorandum.

20 Item 4 on page 2 of this January 8 0 21 memorandum, which is part of the exhibit we have 22 marked as Exhibit 3, does refer to a memorandum from 23 B&W regarding the control rod drive system trip 24 breaker maintenance. That was an electrical problem 25 that was subsequently followed up?

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 83
2 .	A Yes.
3	Q What about the pressurizer level question?
4	Was that ever followed up?
5	A There is this memorandum that I just referred to.
6	Q This is a memorandum to Robert Tedesco,
7	entitled "Evaluation of Items for Licensing Board."
8	It refers to six items relating to B&W plants which
9	were submitted to Mr. Vassallo on March 1, 1979, for
10	transmittal to appropriate licensing boards. Pre-
11	liminary evaluation by ISE at that time indicated
12	that notification was not required.
13	If I understand it, the determination that
14	notification was not required was based upon your
15	determination and Mr. Jordan's determination that
16	this was not new information.
17	A It was not new information, nor did it shed
18	new light on a problem, an older problem. Those
19	are the two criteria for notification of the board.
²⁰ Q	At that time, did you regard operator reliance as
21	a primary parameter for state of inventory in the
22	core on pressurizer level indication to not be a
23	new problem?
24	A Well, as you recall, going back to Mr.
25	Creswell's memorandum, his concern expressed in here

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BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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1	Moseley 84
2	was the size of the pressurizer and the level of
3	instrumentation.
4	Q And the aberrations of pressurizer level
5	during certain transients, correct?
6	A If you read his specific concern, it's not
7	that broad.
8	Q I am looking at page 2 of the January 8
9	memorandum from Mr. Creswell to Mr. Streeter, which
10	is part of the document we have marked as Exhibit 4
11	in his deposition. The first sentence of Paragraph 3
12	on page 2 is "Inspection and Enforcement Report" it
13	gives the number "documented that pressurizer
14	level had gone offscale for approximately five
15	minutes during the November 29, 1077. loss of off
16	site power event. There are some indications that
17	other B&W plants may have problems maintaining
18	pressurizer level indications during transients."
19	If I understand that, he is talking
20	here about the loss of pressurizer level indication,
21	correct?
22	A Yes.
23	Q At the time this was evaluated by your
24	office, by you and by Mr. Jordan, you were aware,
25	I think you have stated, that operators were relying
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 upon pressurizer level indications to assess the
3 state of inventory in the core as a primary
4 parameter.

5 A As one parameter.

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Q As one primary parameter. When you read this and evaluated this, did that not indicate to you that there was the possibility of operator error utilizing that parameter to assess the state of inventory in the core?

11 A If operators relied solely on the pressurizer 12 level, then they would have been without any indica-13 tion of inventory in the core. If, however, they 14 used the pressurizer level together with pressure 15 temperature indications a direct correlation of 16 level is obtainable. That is not to say that I think 17 that having no indication of level in the pressure 18 is a good thing to have.

Q You feel it is a bad thing to have?
A Yes.

21 Q Did you feel it was bad at the time 22 that you read this document?

A I was not happy with it, that's correct.
 That's the reason for our intention to follow up
 on this concern.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 86
2	Q But not in the subject of licensing
3	boards?
4	A Not in terms of referring it to the licensing
5	boards.
6	Q Not in the context of notifying the
7	licensees they should not rely upon pressure level
8	indications?
9	A I did not reach that conclusion at that time.
10	Q Were you aware of the fact that in the
11	meantime, the situation was continuing?
12	A Well, I guess you have to presume if you don't
13	tell somebody to do something different then what has
14	been done, it will continue.
15	Q Were you aware of the fact that Mr.
16	Creswell's concerns were as to a transient which
17	occurred in 1977 in Davis-Besse, in November,
18	approximately 12, 13, 14 months before you were read-
19	ing this document?
20	A I don't recall being impressed by the date
21	of the event.
22	Q Do you recall being impressed by the
23	time this was taking for this problem to be
24	evaluated?
25	A Since I was not impressed by the date, the
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

Moseley 87
time span was not particularly highlighted for me.
Q Would it be customary within ISE to tak
over 13 months for an evaluation to be made of this
kind of problem?
A To a large extent, the timing depends on the
manpower available to work on these things and the
perceived importance of that particular issue at th
time.
Q Again, it was pretty much a matter of
priorities of work load that you had at that time?
A That had a large influence.

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the

13 The other large influence would be that Q 14 you-did not particularly perceive this to be that 15 significant a problem at the time?

It was not perceived as being the most important 16 A 17 problem that had to be worked on at that time.

[Continued on next page.]

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Moseley

Q When you say it was not perceived, you mean by your office?

A Yes.

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Q Let's have this other document you provided to me marked as Exhibit 4. It is an evaluation of items for licensing boards, the document you have been referring to as the notification that this matter would be sent on to a licensing board.

¹⁰ A There are other documents that do that. Maybe ¹¹ they are included as attachments. Let me look at it. ¹² This document is not the one that specifically said ¹³ to send it over to the board. The document which ¹⁴ specifically said to send it on to the board is this one.

This is a document dated February 28, 1979. 0 16 It is a memorandum for Dudley Thompson, executive officer 17 for operations support; i.e. from you, Mr. Moseley. 18 The subject of notification of licensing boards, and 19 it has a number of attachments, including the 20 January 8, 1979 memorandum from Mr. Creswell to Mr. 21 Streeter that we have been referring to. There is 22 a previous cover letter to Mr. Reid of NRR, dated 23 December 22, 1978, from Toledo Edison, as well as a 24 letter dated June 12, 1978, from Mr. Faz of Babcock 25 & Wilcox to Mr. Murray of Davis-Besse.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 There is also a letter dated August 9, 1978. 3 from Mr. Green of Babcock & Wilcox to Mr. Murray, again, of Davis-Besse, with a number of attachments that appear 5 to relate to a transient which occurred on March 20, 6 1978. 7 Let's have this document marked as Exhibit 4 8 to this deposition, and then I would like to ask a 9 few questions about it. 10 (The above described document was marked 11 Moseley Exhibit 4 for identification, this date.) 12 0 This document we have had marked as 13 Exhibit 4. The cover memorandum on top is dated 14 February 28, 1979. It states that the preliminary 15 evaluation made by your office indicates that the 16 items do not appear to be new issues or to put a 17 different light on the issues and, therefore, in your 18 opinion, it does not meet the intended criteria for 19 board notification. It also says the originator --20 I take it that is Mr. Creswell -- was informed of 21 that determination on February 27, 1979, and he ex-22 pressed his position that the evaluation provided by 23 your office did not provide any information he did 24 not already have, that his concern was whether or not 25 these items had beer considered and resolved on a

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2 generic basis for all B&W plants. At that time, 3 February 28, 1979, did you also have a concern as to whether or not these items had been resolved on 5 a generic basis for B&W plants? 6 I was concerned that we needed to look into this 7 more deeply than we had to determine if there was a 8 generic issue to resolve and if there was, to get it 9 resolved. 10 What else did you need to know at that point 0 11 to determine whether or not there was a generic safety 12 issue involved here? 13 Well, our review had been principally restricted A 14 to the piece of paper that Mr. Creswell referred to in 15 his request. We had not at that time had an opportunity 16 to go back and do the review of other transients that 17 other people had had and to put it all together. 18 Given the priorities of work loads that you 0 19 had at the time, how much of an opportunity would you 20 have needed to have gone back and explored the other 21 transients at Davis-Besse that might have related to 22 this matter? What physically is involved? 23 A Time. 24 How would you go about it? 0 25 We would go through and identify the transients A SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 and then pull out the paperwork associated with them, 3 the LER itself, perhaps the inspection report, and 4 assemble the documents and review them and put them 5 together, get all the information, enmesh it, and 6 see whether or not, what the extent of the problem 7 area is.

Q Couldn't you just call Mr. Keppler at
Region 3 and tell him you wanted what documentation
he had on any transients at Davis-Besse that related
to the kinds of concerns Mr. Creswell was raising?
A I could have, yes.

Q Couldn't you have talked to Mr. Creswell about what documentation he had that related to these transients?

16 A Obviously, I could have.

Q Did you or anyone in your office in fact.
 ask Mr. Creswell what documentation he had relating
 to those transients?

A The discussion was, rather than identification of
 documentation, identification of what is the source of
 the concern.

Q He was identifying the source of concern
 as being a generic safety issue in connection with
 B&W plants and pressurizer level, is that correct?

1 Mosaley 92 2 A That's correct. 3 You did not ask him what documentation 0 4 he had that related to that? 5 No, the documentation is a second step. The A 6 first step is to communicate with the individual and 7 say, "Hey, what is bothering you and why?" This was 8 done. As a result of that, the conclusion was teached 9 that this was not an issue which deserved and fit our 10 criteria for board notification. 11 Do you think, based on what you know today, 0 12 that that is true as of today? 13 Based on what I know today, it's different. A 14 - Q How is it different? 15 It obviously is a more significant problem than A 16 we perceived it to be in February of this year. 17 In February of this year, were you aware 0 18 that the operator had prematurely terminated HPI at 19 Davis-Besse on September 24, 1977? 20 A I am not sure that I had that information at 21 that time. As I told you earlier, I don't recall when 22 I came into that knowledge. 23 0 If you had had that information, would you 24 probably have considered that this was not a generic 25 safety issue for B&W plants?

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2 A It's possible.

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3 Q Could you explain to me how that is pos-4 sible?

Moseley

5 A If the fault lies in the operator defeating 6 a safety system from operating, that doesn't make it 7 a generic issue.

8 If in looking into that matter, you 0 9 determined that operators generally were relying, as 10 you have indicated you were aware, upon pressurizer 11 level to assess the state of inventory in the core, 12 and you were further aware that these types of aberra-13 tions relating to pressurizer level occurred under 14 certain types of small break LOCAS wouldn't that pose 15 a generic safety issue?

¹⁶ A I think it's clearer to all of us now in retro-¹⁷ spect than it was at the time these events were taking ¹⁸ place in isolation. It is not clear to me now or ¹⁹ ever that operators relied solely on pressurizer level ²⁰ as their indication of what was going on in the core. ²¹ This was never right.

Q Is it clear to you that based on what you know of the September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-Besse, that the operator was relying on pressurizer water level to determine state of inventory in the core?

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 94
2	A It is my recollection from this that he may have
3	for a period of a few minutes, and either he or someone
4	else recognized that that was the wrong thing to do,
5	and something else was done. Our recollection was
6	that there was a short period of time when this oper-
7	ator did indeed rely solely on that.
8	Q It was approximately 20 minutes?
9	A Yes.
10	Q Are you aware that the B&W training for
11	operators in the pressurizer water reactors has stressed
12	very heavily the use of water level in the pressurizer
13	to assess the state of inventory in the core?
14	A - Yes.
15	Q Were you aware of that before March 28,
16	1979?
17	A I am more aware of it now than I was at that time.
18	Q But you were aware of it then?
19	A I was aware that it was certainly, has always
20	been in pressurizer water reactors that the level in
21	the pressurizer is a very important indicator and that
22	operators do look at it very, very closely. I also
23	am aware that operators have been given considerable
24	caution about taking a system solid, which is over-
25	filling the pressurizer.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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Q Why is that such a concern? Why is there so much emphasis on pressurizer water level and not going solid?

5 A Water is not compressible, and once the system 6 is totally full of water, then any pressure -- there 7 is no cushion for pressure transients and starting 8 the pump or temperature rises can cause wide fluctu-9 ations in pressure, which is solid, and the concern 10 then is of rupturing something in the system from 11 pressure spikes.

12 Q The way to prevent going solid or to come 13 back from a condition of going solid once the ECCS 14 has been actuated would be to interrupt the HPI, is 15 that right?

16 A That is a way of doing it, yes.

Q Once the HPI is on, that would be the only way you could do it, isn't that right? You would have to do something about the HPI?

20 A You would have to throttle it to shut it off.

21 Q The HPI is a primary safety system, isn't 22 it?

A Yes, but the same pumps are used for the makeup
 pumps.

Q I understand that. That is something else

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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I wanted to ask you about, because I am aware already that the distinction is made consistently between safety related equipment and non. Makeup pumps per se are not safety related, are they?

⁶ A No, but if a piece of equipment has a dual ⁷ function, if one of those is safety related, then ⁸ it's treated as safety related.

9 Q It's all safety related, even thoughout
10 can have a non safety related function as well?
11 A Yes.

12 In any event, coming back to the point, 0 13 this concern over going solid, this pressurizer water 14 level concern, necessarily involves terminating or 15 throttling the HPI once the ECCS has been actuated in 16 order to come back from going solid, and I take it 17 your responses indicated that that was generally 18 recognized and known within the NRC. That was the 19 procedure that would be followed. Given that situ-20 ation and given the situation that occurred at Davis-21 Besse, why wasn't it recognized that once the 22 plant went solid, the operator was going to have to 23 interrupt a primary safety function, that is, the 24 operation of the HPI?

A I can't say why it was not recognized. Again, in BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 retrospect, it should have been, but it wasn't. 3 0 Let's have marked as Exhibit 5 this other 4 document that you have provided, dated March 27, 1979. This is a note to Robert Tedesco related to evaluation 5 6 of items for licensing boards, and it's a copy, I 7 guess, of a document that was at some time signed by N. Jordan. I'm curious about something. The memorandum 8 9 that we marked as Exhibit 4 is dated February 28, 1979. 10 This is the formal transmittal for purposes of notifi-11 cation of licensing boards, is that right? 12 A There is yet another piece of paper which transmits 13 it from -- it's just a little short forwarding memo-14 randum -- transmits it from Dudley Thompson to someone 15 in Licensing, and there is another one that transfers 16 it over to somebody in the Legal Department who then 17 transmits it to the Board, so there are several inter-

18 vening.

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19 Q Before we come to those, this is your formal 20 transmittal of the matter to Dudley Thompson?

21 A That's right.

Q What is Exhibit 5?

A Exhibit 5 is a memorandum to Tedesco explaining
 what we have done and our intention to pursue this one
 particular item on the pressurizer further by another

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1 98 Moseley 2 piece of paper, which did not occur because of the 3 intervening TMI accident. 4 This Exhibit 5 is dated the day before, Q 5 March 27. Let's have it marked. 6 (The above described document was marked 7 Moseley Exhibit 5 for identification, this 8 date.) 9 I have here a document which is dated 0 10 March 6, 1979. It's a memorandum for Edward 11 Christenbery who is the Hearing Division director and 12 chief counsel for OELD, which is what? 13 A Office of Executive Legal Director. 14 · 0 It's from a Mr. Vassallo, assistant 15 director for light water reactors, Division of Project 16 Management, NRR. The subject is board notification, 17 reactor inspector, concerns regarding B&W plants. 18 This memorandum is dated March 16, 1979, so that 19 would predate the item we have marked as Exibit 5. 20 I see here that Mr. Vassallo makes the statement that 21 he has not yet received ISE's written discuss: . and 22 evaluation of these matters. Is that the document we 23 have marked as Exhibit 5? 24 No. that would be in here. A 25 Q Let's have this marked.

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1	Moseley 99
2	(The above described document, dated
3	March 16, 1979, was marked Moseley Exhibit 6
4	for identification, this date.)
5	Q The document we have marked Exhibit 6 is
6	dated March 6, 1979. Is that the response by
7	Mr. Vassallo to the memorandum directed to Mr. Thompson
8	that we have marked as Exhibit 4? I am trying to get
9	the chronology.
10	A What is the date of that?
11	Q March 6th.
12	A It looks like the same. Then there is a March 1
13	memorandum in this document, which is from Thompson
14	to Vassallo.
15	Q Let's have this marked.
16	(A document was marked Moseley Exhibit 7
17	for identification, this date.)
18	Q Mr. Moseley, we have been trying to nail
19	down the chronology with regard to the treatment of
20	Mr. Creswell's concerns, and we have previously been
21	provided with a stack of documents called the Creswell
22	package. It did have an indexing on the top of it,
23	and I see you have made reference to that as a
24	chronological listing of how the Creswell concerns
25	were handled through the NRC process, beginning in
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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•	Moseley 100
2	January of 1979. In looking at that list, can you
3	just briefly describe how the Creswell concerns were
4	routed through? We have already made reference to
5	a memorandum of January 19, 1979, which is marked as
6	Exhibit 3, and then a memorandum of February 28, 1979,
7	which is marked as Exhibit 4, and I think it is at
8	that point that the chronology began to get a little
9	mixed up.
10	A Then there was a memorandum dated March 1, from
11	Thompson to Vassallo, which transmitted an enclosure
12	for further transmittal to the hearing counsel. Then
13	a memorandum dated
14	• Q That one we do not have at this time.
15	A No, we have that in the package.
16	Q The March 1 memorandum?
17	A Yes, it's in one of these other exhibits.
18	Q It is part of Exhibit 7?
19	A Yes.
20	Q Exhibit 7 is a collection of everything
21	that went before, Exhibits 3 and 6?
22	A Yes.
23	Q Keep going.
24	A Then the March 6 memorandum from Vassallo to
25	Christenbury. Then there followed a memorandum of
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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March 7 from myself to Thompson concerning notification of the board, stating that evaluations would be sent later. There is a memorandum from Thompson to Vassallo which transmitted the March 6 memorandum. Then there is a memorandum from myself to Thompson, dated March 28, which contained the evaluation of concerns.

9 Memorandum of March 29 from myself to 10 Thompson advising that we have change our previous. conclusion on the basis of the TMI incident. Memo-11 12 randum from Thompson to Vassallo dated March 29, 13 forwarding the evaluation of concern for trans-14 mittal to the board. Then finally, a letter, March 29, 15 sent on to the service list, which amounts to notifi-16 cation of the board.

Q So the whole history amounts, then, to some ten memoranda, many of which include pieces of prior memoranda, and stretches over a period from January 19, 1979 to March 29, 1979, and at the end of that process, does result in notification of the board.

23 A That's correct.

Q Now, I have here a memorandum which is dated March 7, which I believe is -- there is a March

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE


	1	Moseley 101-a
	2	March 12th memorandum, which is the one which was
	3	missing from this chronology, so you now have them all.
	• 4	Q This was the March 12th memorandum from
	5	Thompson to Vassallo which transmitted the prior memo-
	6	randum of March 6, 1979, from Vassallo to Christenbury?
	7	A Yes.
	8	(Continued on the following page.)
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	1	1 Moseley
IHB/slc tp9	2	Q Is there a normal process in which a
cha	3	safety concern that the originators insisting should
-	4	be brought up to a licensing board would be followed?
C	5	A It is the procedure that would be followed when
	6	this request that the board be notified yes, that's
	7	just the normal procedure. If, for instance, in the
	8	initial evaluation the board should be notified, then
	9	there would be fewer memorandum.
	10	Q Is this the customary time frame in
	11	which these things are processed?
	12	A Actually it is a little longer, because it
	13	took us longer to do the valuation than we would
	14	have liked.
	15	Q Was that simply priority of work once
	16	again?
	17	A It was manpower, yes.
	18	Q And, again, if we can, so I can leave
	19	this subject to round it out, prior to January 19,
	20	1979, did you have any notification of any concerns
,	21	by James Creswell about safety problems at Davis-
(22	Besse?
	23	A I have no recollection of any knowledge
	24	prior to receipt of that first memorandum.
	25	Q As of today, do you have any knowledge
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE







IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3)



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART



	103
1	2 Moseley
2	concerning any investigation conducted by Region III
3	as to the validity of Mr. Creswell's concerns about
4	Davis-Besse transients?
5	A I am aware that an inspection was conducted
6	at the B&W Lynchberg facilities. I believe it was
7	sometime in January or February, I can't recall when.
3	Q When did you first become aware of that
9	investigation having occurred?
10	A Subsequent to the Three Mile Island.
11	Q How did you become aware of it?
12	A I believe I became aware of it when the
13	President's Commission asked for certain people to
14	appear to give depositions.
15	Q In connection with our investigation then?
16	A Yes.
17	Q Are you aware of what determination was
18	made as to Mr. Creswell's concerns as part of that
19	investigation?
20	A I've not seen that investigation report. I
21	have been told by Mr. Keppler that the investigation
22	did not turn up any did not substantiate the
23	concerns that were being looked into as part of that
24	investigation.
25	Q As you are aware, our investigation

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Moseley

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has looked into that matter and it does appear that the determination was made within Region III that Mr. Creswell's concerns constituted or related to an operational inconvenience only and not a safety concern?

7 A Yes.

8 Q Based on what you know today, the TMI 2 9 incident, and what you know now about the prior 10 incidents at Davis-Besse, do you concur in that 11 determination?

A Well, I'm not sure what concerns were being -since I haven't read the report, I'm not sure what
concerns were being --

15 The same ones that were raised in the 0 16 January 19. 1979 memorandum to you from Mr. Thornberg 17 and the ones which you discussed with Mr. Creswell, 18 that is loss of pressurizer level indication off 19 the low end of the scale, and the determination was 20 made in Region III that that constituted an operational 21 inconvenience only, and not a safety concern, and 22 my question to you is, based on what you know today, 23 do you concur in that determination?

A I think that the loss of pressurizer level on the low end of the scale is much less significant

1	4 Moseley 105
2	that the problem that was experienced at Three
3	Mile Island. That is the hangup of the pressurizer
4	level, because what a low level in the pressurization
5	no matter whether you are using pressure or the
6	other parameters to monitor the status of the core,
7	that says put more water into the core.
8	So I think it is a safety concern, yes, but
9	it is of less magnitude than the hangup of levels
10	that has occurred in Three Mile Island.
11	Q It is a less significant safety concern?
12	A Yes.
13	Q Fine.
14	- MR. CHOPKO: For the record, Kevin,
15	are you referring to Mr. Foster's report on
16	the B&W inquiry?
17	MR. KANE: I am aware there is a
18	controversy there. I believe Mr. Foster
19	testified that that was not his determination,
20	I believe Mr. Kohler testified that it was the
21	determination that it was an operational
22	inconvenience.
23	MR. CHOPKO: That is Mr. Foster's
24	determination that you are referring to, and
25	not Region III's determination.

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1	5	Moseley
2		MR. KANE: It is my understanding that
3		Mr. Foster and Mr. Kohler were acting on behalf
4		of Region III in conducting that investigation,
5		is that incorrect?
6		MR. CHOPKO: The way that I understand
7		the basis for your question, you are asking a
8		question based on a report written by one
9		investigator after he has talked to personnel
10		at the Babcock & Wilcox facility at Lynchberg.
11		MR. KANE: No, I am basing my questions
12		on the testimony given in the course of the
13		depositions we took from Mr. Kohler and Mr.
14	. · ·	Foster and Mr. Creswell, and it is my under-
15		standing, based on that testimony, and the
16		documents produced in connection with that
17	N S	testimony, that Mr. Foster and Kohler
18		investigated the manner as to the timeliness
19		of B&W's evaluation; that they had been
20		informed that NRR had previously concluded
21		that this was an operational inconvenience
22		only, and not a safety concern; that they were
23		focusing on the timeliness of evaluations; that
24		based on their investigation they concluded
25		it had been timely evaluated and ultimately

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1	6	Moseley 107
2		there was a briefing session in which they
3		explained to Mr. Creswell exactly what their
4		findings were, and they had no reason to do
5		anything except to concur with what Mr. Creswell
6		had already been informed of, that is, an
7		operation inconvenience only, and not a safety
8		concern, and there was no untimeliness in the
9		evaluation itself.
10		MR. CHOPKO: Okay. You are basing it
11		mostly on the Foster and Kohler
12		MR. KANE: And Creswell.
13		MR. CHOPKO: deposition.
14		MR. KANE: And Anderson.
15		MR. CHOPKO: Anderson?
16		MR. KANE: And Tamber.
17		MR. CHOPKO: But you are not basing it
18		on any document which comes from Region III
19		that says this is the Region III position as to
20		the loss of pressurizer level on the low end.
21		MR. KANE: I have seen so many documents
22		over the past two weeks, I just can't recall
23		offhand if I have seen a Region III document
24		that specifically says that.
25		MR. CHOPKO: Okay. That's just all I

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7 1 Moseley 2 wanted to know. Mr. Moseley. I would like to get some 3 0 4 idea of just what your involvement was with the TMI 2 5 accident from the time you were notified of it on 6 March 28. 1979. 7 When did you first learn of the incident 8 at TMI 2? 9 It was around 8 o'clock when Mr. Davis called A 10 me. I believe, first, and said did I know what was 11 going on in Three Mile Island, and I told him I did 12 not. However, I would try to find out. And he 13 subsequently appeared in my office, and I had in 14 the interim. I told one of my staff members to call 15 Region I. and when Mr. Davis appeared in my office, 16 we -- I called Mr. Greer, and we got an update briefing 17 from him, which was all they knew at that time. 18 Did you go to the Instant Response 0 19 Center at any time on March 28? 20 Yes. Almost immediately after talking with A 21 Mr. Greer. I went to the -- I went to the Instant 22 Response Center, and had my staff members report there 23 also. 24 What was your function at the IRC? 0 25 I had the -- in that particular event, I had A

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1	8 Moseley 109
2	the title of IRAT director.
3	Q What is the function of an IRAT
4	director?
5	A The function is to direct the people who are
6	involved in gathering information from the site or
7	wherever we were gaining information, and to assess
8	this and to keep the EMT informed, and if the
9	recommendations are to be made for actions by the EMT,
10	to make those recommendations.
11	Q That is to make recommendations to the EMT
12	for action to be taken?
13	A By the EMT, yes.
14	. Q The EMT is the Emergency Management Team?
15	A Yes.
16	Q Would one of your functions as IRAT
17	director be to determine the propriety of any pro-
18	posed action that the licensee wants to take in
19	dealing with the accident?
20	A Well, it is to keep advised of the actions
21	that the licensees are taking, and to see that
22	those actions are evaluated by people here to see
23	that the things that are required to be done and
24	should be done. It is not there specifically not to
,25	approve licensee actions.

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Moseley

Q It sounds more like the function of a conduit. You pass through information, make sure it gets to where it needs to go, make sure it is evaluated, and make sure the evaluation comes back through again. A Well, let me say that the EMT and the IRAT do not have a direct function for the licensee. Our mission is to assess what the licensee is doing, not to direct the licensee, and not to approve those things that the licensee does.

11 Q If, on the other hand, a licensee, let 12 us take the TMI 2 situation, if you were the director 13 of IRAT, and the licensee wanted to do a particular 14 thing in dealing with the accident, if you felt that 15 was highly inappropriate, it is a terrible thing to do, 16 what would you or could you do?

17 A I would first advise against it and ask that they 18 consider it and, you know, ask questions about what 19 about this and what about that, and what about the 20 other thing.

If it was sufficiently unsafe in my view, then would probably say you ought not to do that. If it came to an order, that should come from the EMT. Q So you would advise against it? A Yes.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	10	Moseley 110-a
2		Q And if you felt that your advice was not
3	going	to be followed, and you felt sufficiently strong
4.	about	it, would you go to the EMT?
5	A	Yes.
6		Q And request
7	A	them to order the licensee to not do this
8	or to	do that.
9		[Continued on next page.]
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mf	1	Moseley 111
T-10	2	Q And presumably as IRAT director your re-
	3	quest would be given due weight?
	4	A Presumably.
	5	Q As you understood it, it was the EMT that
	6	had the authority to order the licensee to do or not
	7	to do certain things?
	8	A That's correct.
	9	Q And that would not be the function of the
	10	IRAT director?
	11	A That's correct. Although I would, you know, if
	12	I felt strongly that something was happening right
		then, and what have you, I am sure my voice would carry
		the feeling that you better not do that.
	15	Q About seven and a half hours into the event,
	16	there was a decision made by the licensee Met Ed that
	17	they should attempt to rapidly depressurize the system.
	18	That was just mentioned in the NRC sequence of events.
	19	It has come up in a number of contexts.
	20	Were you familiar with that determination
	21	by Met Ed at the time they made it, were you informed
	22	of that?
	23	A I was aware that they were in the process of or
	24	they had elected to depressurize. I was not aware,
		as it turned out later, that they intended to
		BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1 Moseley 112 2 depressurize to an intermediate position to, as they 3 call it, float on the cumulator tanks. 4 It was my understanding that their intention 5 was to depressurize and go onto the low pressure in-6 jection or RHR coolant. 7 That would normally be the reason to de-Q 8 pressurize, wouldn't it, under the circumstances they 9 had at that time? 10 4 That's correct. 11 To try and go onto decay heat removal? Q 12 A Yes. 13 And as I understand it, the reason to 0 14 attempt to go to decay heat removal would be to ultimately 15 achieve a cold shutdown, right? 16 Yes, to ultimately get there, yes. A 17 Would it also be true in rapidly depres-0 18 surizing, they would be attempting to force voids out 19 of the system that were currently in there? 20 There are several things that may have been A 21 done at that time. One thing would have been to open 22 the PRV and to continue to inject with the high pres-23 sure system, to simply get more water into the system. 24 They may have done that and throttle flow 25 somewhat, and allowed pressure to decay, and sort of

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² continue to put water in, and you could get the ac-³ cumulated action at a later time, but get down to ⁴ the point where you can have both the low and the ⁵ high injection going on.

Q But at the time that you were first made aware of the fact that they were attempting to depressurize, you thought they were trying to depressurize all the way down to decay heat removal?

10 A Well --

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Q You thought that was the intent?
A I wasn't thinking, really, in terms of really
getting to cold shutdown so much as I was getting the
core flooded, and the low pressure pumps of a higher
flow rate capacity so you can get more water in quicker
at a lower pressure.

Q So again, my question is, at the time you became aware that the Met Ed was attempting to rapidly depressurize, you understood that what they were trying to do was to go all the way down to decay heat removal? A Yes.

Q And it turned out later on they were not intending to do that, they were intending an intermediate depressurization?

A Yes. They went down to an intermediate level, and

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2 got some comfort from the actions of the accumulators.

Then later they did attempt to go down to a pressure to put on the decay heat removal pumps, and the pressure hung up, and they weren't able to get down --

7 Q When they started the depressurization, 8 was it in fact a situation where they were trying to 9 depressurize all the way and then they got down to the 10 intermediate level and decided to take some comfort 11 in that?

A There was a difference of what my perception was
 at the time and what I now know or believe to be their
 intention.

Q I see.

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¹⁶ A What I now believe to be their intention was that ¹⁷ they were coming down to float on the accumulators, and ¹⁸ they had not intended to go all the way down to the ¹⁹ decay heat.

20 My understanding of that on March 28th 21 was that they were going directly down to a low enough 22 pressure to get the decay heat pumps operating.

Q At the time that you were informed of that, did you feel that was an appropriate step to take? A Yes.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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115 2 Based on what you know today, do you 0 3 feel that was an appropriate step to take? 4 I think that the pressurization, repressuriza-A 5 tion, and starting the recirc pump was a better thing 6 to have done. 7 Q So it would have been to repressurize? 8 It would have been better to do what was ul-A 9 timately done. 10 Q Which was after attempting to depressurize, 11 they ultimately came to the conclusion that they should 12 repressurize? 13 A That's correct. 14 • Q What is it that you know today that indicates 15 to you that the depressurization was not a more appro-16 priate thing to do at the time? 17 A Because of the amount of super heat that was 18 there, and the temperatures that were -- that the fuel 19 had reached, it is likely that, you know, a significant 20 portion of the core would have been uncovered before 21 reaching the lower temperature. Maybe all the way, 22 I don't know. 23 Q So it could have been a highly inappropriate 24 thing to do? Core uncovery is a very bad thing, isn't 25 it?

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2 The damage had already been done, you see. A 3 There was a certain amount of damage that had already 4 been done, if ultimately it had to cool the core, so 5 it is hard for me to say that that would have been a 6 very bad thing to do. Had they not been able to 7 start the reactor coolant pumps or ultimately, you 8 would have a coolant to the core, even if it allowed 9 some additional damage to occur.

Q But again, based on what you know today about the core temperatures, et cetera, if they had persisted in attempting to depressurize and had never gone to repressurization, what would have occurred? A - I am not sure, but let me just say that it is probable that additional damage would have been done to the core.

Q And again, so we can focus, the information that you would have liked to have had at that time in properly evaluating this depressurization, would have been temperatures in the core?

A The in core thermocouple readings would have been very useful in making that determination.

23 Q You did not have that information at that 24 time?

A That's correct.

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Q Why didn't you have that information? 2 It wasn't provided to us. I know now that during 3 A that time period there were people on site who had 4 some knowledge of these temperatures, but they didn't 5 6 believe them. 7 Q What was the difficulty in providing that 8 information to you? 9 A Not believing the information, I presumed was 10 the motivation for not passing it along. 11 Who was it that did not believe it? 0 12 I understand Mr. Miller didn't believe it. He A was the one that I have now some knowledge of, that 13 14 he knew of it. 15 Q Mr. Miller of Met Ed? 16 A Yes. 17 Q And why didn't Mr. Miller believe the in-18 formation he had? 19 A You will have to ask Mr. Miller. 20 Q He didn't tell you that? 21 A No. 22 Did he tell you or are you aware of how 0 23 he got that information? 24 Well, as I understand it, he got the information A 25 from potential tear reading from the thermocouples, BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1 Moseley 118 2 since the computer was not programmed to print higher 3 than, I believe, 700 deg ses. 4 Q And in fact, of course, the temperatures 5 went substantially in excess of 700 degrees? 6 A Substantially. 7 0 Has anyone investigated why the computer 8 was programmed only to read up to 700 degrees? 9 A. I don't know that anyone has made an investiga-10 tion. I believe the reason was that this was not ac-11 cident instrumentation, this was operational instrumen-12 tation. It was not installed to be used in monitoring 13 accident situations. 14 • Q Was there any instrumentation installed in 15 place at TMI on March 28th, which had been installed 16 to monitor in core temperatures under accident co ... 17 ditions? 18 In core? A 19 O Yes. 20 A Not to my knowledge. 21 Q Is there any consideration today of the 22 requirement to have in core temperature reading devices 23 that can function under accident conditions? 24 I expect that that which is under consideration A 25 by the licensing group, but I can't give you personal

2 knowledge of that.

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3 Q It is not in the Lessons Learned interim
4 report, is it?

Moseley

5 A I don't recall it being in there, either, but 6 Lessons Learned has long term and short term. What 7 you have seen is short term recommendations.

Q On the other hand, if you have another scenario in which you have high core temperatures under accident conditions at other plants, that also lack that instrumentation, you are going to be in the same position as you were in TMI 2, you are not going to have that information?

A · I don't -- I think our lines of defense are
 going to be long before that point. We are working
 diligently to preclude getting in this situation again.

Q Sure. But if it came to it, you still wouldn't know what the temperature was in the core, would you?

A Lacking a requirement and having those things
 there, you would not know. As you know, all plants
 don't have those thermocouples at all.

Q Yes. Do you know how many plants actually lack any thermocouples?

25 A I don't know.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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120 Q Is it true that at TMI 1, the thermo-

3 couples were installed, but they were never hooked 4 up to the instrumentation board in the control room? 5 I don't know that. A 6 Do you know if there was any requirement 0 7 for in core thermocouples at older plants in the 8 United States, say over ten years old? 9 I really don't know, but I suspect not. A 10 Q Did anyone in the IRC officially or formally concur in the determination by Met Ed that they should 11 rapidly depressurize? 12 13 A No. There really isn't a concurrence function 14 here, and so there wouldn't have been a concurrence. 15 There may have been and probably were some questions 16 as to why don't you do this. 17 Q Suggestions along those lines? 18 Suggestions, maybe; it is certainly questions, A 19 have you considered this. 20 Q Did anyone in the IRC object to the determin-21 ation by Met Ed that they should attempt to rapidly 22 depressurize? 23 A None that I heard. 24 Q Did you discuss the rapid depressurization 25 question with Mr. Stello at the IRC at the time it

2 came up?

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³ A We must have. There was general discussion.
⁴ He must have been included, but I don't have specific
⁵ recall.

6 Q Did you have any doubts about whether 7 or not that was the appropriate thing to do at that 8 time?

⁹ A At that time I really didn't have doubts that ¹⁰ that was an appropriate thing to do.

Q Was there anything else you would have needed to adequately assess the depressurization option besides temperature in the core?

A - Well, yes. If you had some way of knowing
 what the non-condensible gasses were, that would help
 in that assessment. The amount of super heat, which
 the temperatures really ultimately lead to is helpful
 information.

19 (Continued on the following page.) 20 21 22 23 24 25 T11.1 IHB/pw 1

Moseley

2 Q You didn't have any of that information 3 at that time either?

4 A That's correct.

5 Q I am sure you have heard about the Novak 6 memorandum before now, Mr. Moseley, it's been discussed 7 a good deal. It was a memorandum generated in January 8 of 1978 over Mr. Thomas Novak's signature from the 9 Reactor Systems Branch. It apparently was drafted for 10 his signature by Mr. Sandy Israel.

When did you first learn of the Novak memorandum?

13 A Subsequent to Three Mile Island. I don't know
14 the exact date, but it was sometime later.

15 Q Was it very soon after?

16 A Not really. It was probably -- it was many days, 17 if not weeks, after.

18 Q I see.

How did you become aware of it?
A I believe, I don't know, I guess -- I believe it
was mentioned in ACRS meetings, and I subsequently
obtained a copy of it. It was either that or in a
Commission meeting, I don't recall where, but I took
the initiative to get a copy of it after it had been
mentioned to me.

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Have you acquired any information as to how Q 2 the Novak memorandum was circulated within the NRC before 3 March 28, 1979? A I have no indication other than there was some 5 6 CC's listed on the memorandum, and I presume those people 7 saw it. 0 Anything beyond that information? 8 I have no other information. A 9 Q I am sure you have also heard of the Michelson 10 report? 11 12 A Yes. Q Because that's been discussed quite a bit, 13 14 and as I understand it, there are at least three versions of the Michelson report, two handwritten versions and a 15 16 typed version. Have you seen any of the versions of the Michelson report? 17 I have seen the typed version, yes. 18 A 19 Q And when was the first time you saw the typed version of the Michelson report? 20 A It was subsequent to the Three Mile Island accident. 21 I don't again recall the exact time. I received it as 22 an attachment to a memorandum that, as I recall, Eisenhut 23 signed, and this was days after the Three Mile Island 24 25 accident.

2 Q Do you recall what that Eisenhut memorandum 3 concerned?

4 A As I recall, it simply said here is something 5 that was provided by Mr. Michelson some time ago for 6 your information. It was just more like a transmittal 7 memorandum.

8 Q Do you have any information as to who within 9 the NRC saw any version of the Michelson report typed 10 or handwritten prior to March 28, 1979?

11 A I have been told that Mr. Israel saw it, and I
12 have been told that one of the members of the ACRS, I
13 can't remember his name right off the top of my head -14 . 0 Would that be Mr. Ebersole?

15 A Yes.

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16 Q Mr. Jesse Ebersole?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Do you know whether anybody connected with 19 the NRC saw the Michelson report before March 28, 1979? 20 A I don't know of others. I have only been told 21 of their having access to it.

Q Do you have any information that anyone within B&W seeing the Michelson report before March 28, 1979?

25 A I have no information about that.

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3 occurred prior to March 28, 1979 at TMI 2 itself, 4 which concerned some aspects of things which did occur on March 28, 1979. One of them occurred on March 29, 5 6 1978, almost one year to a day before the incident 7 itself, in which the PORV stuck open. Are you familiar with that transient? 8 I have heard of that transient, but I am really 9 A not familiar with the details of it. 10 Q Have you reviewed the LER that relates to 11 that transient? 12 I suspect I have, you know, as part of this thing 13 A 14 . talked about earlier, but I don't have specific 15 re .lection now of that event. Q Have you determined where that LER on that 16 17 transient went within the NRC? I haven't. 18 A O Have you determined whether any evaluation 19 20 was made by the NRC as to the significance of that LER which was submitted on that event? 21 A I haven't. 22 Q Isn't that a subject that, again, in 23 evaluating the TMI 2 situation, and looking to the 24 25 lessons learned aspect of that event, that you want to

2 know?

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3 A I think I will want to look into that type of 4 thing again when I get to the point that I can direct 5 my attention to what should we do to our inspection 6 program in the future. The things that I have been 7 doing since the Three Mile Island accident have not 8 led me to believe that that is something that I needed 9 to know at this point in time.

10 Q Have you determined whether or not the NRC 11 made any attempt, any division of the NRC, made any 12 attempt to notify the licensees of that kind of problem 13 relating to PORV's before March 28, 1979?

14 A . I know of no such notification.

Q Are you aware of any follow-up action that was taken by the NRC after March 29, 1978, as a result of that event at TMI 2 and before March 28, 1979?

18 A Could you repeat that?

19 Q I was using two dates. I am fixing the 20 period before March 19th, and I am addressing it to the 21 transient which occurred on March 29, 1978 at TMI 2.

22 Are you aware of any follow-up action taken 23 by the NRC in cranection with that transient?

24 A That may have been included in one of the things.25 I really haven't checked for it. I haven't looked for

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127 Moseley 1 that particular one. However, there was a Current 2 Event which was published December 19'7 which had the 3 Davis-Besse event in it, and --4 Is that the one that describes the 5 0 6 September 24, 1977 transient at Davis-Eesse? Yes. 7 A Q Could you look at that description and tell 8 me if you find anywhere in that description ... ny descrip-9 10 tion of the operators' interruption of the HPI in connection with that transient? 11 12 MR. CHOPKO: Identify the document for the record. 13 MR. KANE: We will do that. 14 15 A No, I don't find any reference in here to that. Q 16 Can you think of any reason why operator 17 interruption, premature interruption, of the HPI would have been left out of a description of that event that 18 19 was distributed to licensees by the NRC? 20 I don't believe that it was generally recognized A 21 that the pressurizer had hung up in this event until 22 after the Three Mile Island event, and then in retrospect, you go back and look at it, and it becomes more 23 24 clear to you, but I don't think that was clearly 25 recognized.

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2 Q When you say the pressurizer level hung up, 3 do you mean went off scale high?

4 A I mean it may have been water in the pressurizer 5 held by a steam pressure in the line leading to it.

6 Q In other words, somewhat the same situation 7 as _t TMI 2?

8 A Apparently now in retrospect there was some element
9 of that. I don't believe that is recognized in the
10 initial evaluation events.

11 Q Yes, but given the fact that the operator 12 on September 24, 1977 at Davis-Besse turned off the HPI, caused voiding in the system, and then ultimately 13 realized his mistake and closed the block valve of the 14 PORC and turned on the HPI again. Totally aside from 15 TMI 2, a premature interruption of a major safety 16 system like HPI is a significant matter, isn't it? 17 When you identify that it is premature interruption, 18 A 19 yes.

20 Q Would it always be a premature interruption 21 if you had formation of voiding in the core or in the 22 primary cooling system?

23 A If that voiding resulted from turning it off, yes.
24 Q As I understand that was the situation on
25 September 24, 1977.

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Isn't that the kind of thing that should be 2 3 included in this circular which is sent out by the NRC to licensees? 4 A Had it been recognized as that, it should have 5 been. 6 7 Q Can you think of any reason why it wasn't recognized? 8 9 A No, I can't justify it, because now in retrospect. it seems much clearer than it did at the time. 10 11 Q Isn't it a violation of the technical specifications for the operator to promaturely terminate 12 13 HPI? A . The tech specifications don't address that 14 15 specifically. 16 Q Isn't it a violation of any procedure 17 established by the NRC or approved by it to prematurely terminate HPI under these circumstances? 18 19 A The bulletins now require the HPI to stay on until 20 certain conditions are satisfied. No such requirements

21 existed prior to Three Mile Island.

Q I see. And so if I understand it, the best explanation you can come up with why in the text HPI is not mentioned in the bulletin that we have been discussing here is simply because the significance of

1	Moseley 130
2	that facet of the transient was not recognized at the
3	time?
4	A That's my belief.
5	MR. KANE: Let us have that marked as
6	MR. CHOPKO: Is this already an exhibit
7	to the Creswell deposition? I note for the record
8	that the document that was being discussed in this
9	portion of the deposition is entitled "Current
10	Events, Power Reactors," published by the USNRC,
11	December 1977. That reviews events based on
12	operating experience at nuclear power plants from
13	September 1st to October 31st, 1977.
14	- (The above-described document was marked
15	Moseley Exhibit 8 for identification, this date.)
16	Q We have now marked this document, Current
17	Events Power Reactor, as Exhibit 8 for this deposition,
18	Mr. Moseley, and if I understood what you said, this
19	is a document which is prepared by the NRC.
20	A Yes.
21	Q And is distributed to licensees, is that
22	correct?
23	A Correct.
24	Q Is this kind of a newsletter to NRC licensees
25	to inform them of events that have occurred at other
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1	Moseley 131
2	power plants?
3	A Yes.
4	Q What is the purpose behind keeping them
5	informed about that kind of thing?
6	A It is to assist them in identifying things that
7	might be troublesome in their plants, and might be
8	problems in their plants.
9	Q So that they can then take appropriate
10	steps to change their procedures or instruct their
11	operators or something like that?
12	A That's right, even though there is not a require-
13	ment to do it, it is information they could use for
14	that_purpose.
15	MR. KANE: Let me jump back for a moment,
16	since I see that through my oversight we neglected
17	to have marked a previous exhibit which we had been
18	discussing. This is a document dated March 12,
19	1979. It is a memorandum from Mr. Vassallo of
20	NRR from Dudley Thompson of ISE concerning infor-
21	mation for board notification.
22	Q Again, this is a transmittal memorandum in
23	connection with Creswell's concern as to Davis-Besse,
24	is that correct?
25	A That's correct.

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	Moseley 132
	MR. KANE: Let us have this marked as
	Exhibit 9.
	(The above-described document was marked
	Moseley Exhibit 9 for identification, this date.)
	Q Mr. Moseley, prior to March 28, 1979, did
	you have any recognition of the fact that at TMI 2
	they were having a troublesome amount of valve leakage?
	A No, I was not.
	Q Would leaking valves be the kind of thing
	that would come to the attention of the ISE Division?
	A Yes, to the inspector.
	Q Would they be covered in LER's?
	A Some might. It depends on where the valve is and
	how much the leakage is.
	Q Prior to March 28, 1979, would the leakage
	around the PORV valve be the subject of a Licensee
	Event Report?
	A No.
	Q And why not?
	A There are limits on both known and unknown leakage
	within containment, and as long as those limits are
	complied with, then there is no other requirement on
	leakage for valves, with the exception that there are
:	leakage requirements for valves whose function is
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 containment integrity.

3 Q Containment integrity, that is the contain-4 ment building around the reactor?

5 A Yes.

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0 The reason I asked that question is because 6 the Commission has already had testimony from some of 7 the operators who were in the control room at the time. 8 9 and one of the questions has come up several times is why the operators did not rely upon tailpipe temperature 10 11 readings in order to know if the POVC was jammed open. and the explanation they received from the operator was 12 13 although his operating procedures called for him to recognize that they had a problem with the PORV, the 14 15 tailpipe temperature was in excess of 130 degrees, in 16 fact, due to regular leakage around the valve, they were getting regular readings as high as 195 degrees, and he, 17 18 of course, had an alarm that would register on the 19 computer when he reached 200 degees, but he was coming very close to that point on a regular basis prior to the 20 21 accident. As a result, when he had a reading as high 22 as 232 degrees, which he recalls getting at a certain 23 point, it still didn't mean anything to him, because he 24 had already leakage in the past that came up to as close as 200 degrees. 25

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What I am wondering is whether those regular readings as high as 195 degrees on the PORV would come to the attention of the NRC in the ordinary course, and I think what you have told me is they would not, is that right?

7 A They are not required to be reported.

8 Q Is there any kind of requirement for that 9 leakage reporting now?

10 A No.

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11 Q Are you aware of any reports made to the 12 NRC concerning maintenance problems at TMI 2, that is 13 lack of personnel or shoddy standards in terms of keeping 14 things clean at TMI 2?

15 A I am not specifically aware of that.

16 Q No problem like that has come to your 17 attention in connection with TMI 2, is that right? 18 A I now know that they had many leaking valves, and 19 these may have been caused by lack of attention or lack 20 of manpower in the maintenance area, but prior to the 21 event, I had no such knowledge.

Q And to this day, there is still no requirement that those kinds of things be reported to the NRC, is that right?

25 A Unless the malfunction effects the operability

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

Moseley 135 2 of a safety system, it is not reportable. Q Let me take you to what I think is a 4 containment safety system. On September 7, 1978, the licensee Met Ed discovered a containment isolation valve had failed to close due to a dirty relay, and that was apparently the subject of an LER, which was submitted on September 27. 1978. Did that come to your attention prior to March 28, 1979? A To my personal attention specifically, I don't recall that, no.

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14 . Q Did it come to anyone else's attention 15 within your division?

A If an LER was submitted on it, it obviously 16 did come to my people, yes. 17

18 Q You say "obviously," but I think before you 19 were testifying to the effect that due to manpower 20 problems, et cetera, this was a situation where only a 21 sampling of these things are, in fact, examined. Do 22 you know if this particular LER --

23 A It is more like most of them are done, but some 24 of them are done very hurriedly.

Q Do you know if this was done hurriedly

1	Moseley 136
2	or
3	A I can't state it.
4	Q Do you know if your division instituted
5	any follow-up action to determine why a containment
6	isolation valve had failed to close due to a dirty
7	relay?
8	A A dirty relay is not an unusual event. Dirt
9	doesn't necessarily mean filth, it might mean just
10	some coating on the electrodes. So this maintenance,
11	preventive maintenance to clean relays is a normal
12	practice in plants, because these films do occur.
13	Q Do you know how that preventive maintenance
14	on the relay at TMI 2 was conducted?
15	A I don't know.
16	Q Do you know if anyone in NRC has made that
17	kind of evaluation to determine how often that was done?
18	A I don't know.
19	Q is a containment isolation valve a safety-
20	related device?
21	A Yes.
22	Q Is it the kind of device, you would most
23	definitely want to function?
24	A Of course we would want it to function, yes.
25	Q If it failed, could it, in fact, result in
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 a release of radioactivity to the environment?
3 A Failure of one valve will not result in release
4 of radioactivity to the environment.

5 Q I would like to talk a little bit about 6 the whole containment isolation situation at TMI. It 7 is my understanding that the containment isolation at 8 TMI 2 was actuated upon psi in the containment building. 9 It is also my understanding that under the

10 standard review plan, it is required that containment 11 isolation be actuated on at least two out of three 12 principles. The principle being, or the factors being 13 radiation, psic in the containment building or HPI 14 actuation.

Do you know why TMI 2 was not required to have containment isolation triggered by more than just psi in the containment building?

18 A The present standard review plan was -- came along 19 at a period of time after the TMI 2 had -- let me start 20 over.

21 Whenever a new version of a standard review plan 22 comes out, a conscious decision is made as to how it 23 will apply to plants. It is always forward looking, 24 but then to the extent back-fitting or the point at which 25 you require plants who are in process to do it, there is

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

a conscious decision that has to be made as to which
plants this applies. My understanding is that this
standard review plan was specifically not made applicable
to Three Mile Island.

6 Q Is containment isolation actuation a safety-7 related item?

8 A Yes.

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Does it strike you as unsafe to have a Q 9 situation where containment isolation actuation is based 10 only on one event rather than on at least two? 11 My preference would be to have the containment 12 A isolation initiated on more than one event. It is not 13 unsafe, I guess we have made a decision that it is not 14 unsafe, otherwise no plants would have been approved 15 with that design. 16

Do you feel it is unsafe if the containment 17 0 design is also coupled with an automatic sump pump 18 feature which automatically removes radioactive water 19 from the sump to the auxiliary building? 20 Again, I think it is preferable not to do that. 21 A As you may or may not know, in the Three Mile Island 22 event, initially it was thought that the source of some 23 of the radioactive releases from the Three Mile Island 24 was from water that was spilled on the floor of the 25

auxiliary building as a result of pumping these sumps.
3 It turned out on later examination that this did not
4 contribute to this event.

5 Q But you still don't feel it is a preferable 6 situation to have an automatic sump pump feature 7 combined with a containment isolation system which 8 actuates only on psi?

9 A That's correct.

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10 Q Why not?

A Because I think that the -- there is a possibility that you could release some radioactivity from the source, so I would feel that a better way, and a safer way of doing it, is not to have these features, to have the containment isolation, for instance, hooked to --

Q Are there any other plants operating in the United States at the present time where containment isolation is actuated only on psi in the containment building?

20 A I haven't made a survey of all of these things.
21 I really don't know.

Q Based upon the situation you just described concerning TMI and the SRP plan, would it be your expectation that there are such other plants? A Yes, it would.

1	Moseley 140
2	Q TMI was not the only one that was relieved
3	from certain portions of compliance from the SRP, is
4	that right?
5	A Well, I wouldn't say it that way. I would state
6	that the SRP's are made specifically applicable to
7	certain plants, so they are really not excused as much
8	as they are simply not included.
9	Q Okay. Let me rephrase it then.
10	There are other plants which were simply
11	not included the same way TMI was not?
12	A Yes.
13	Q And those plants could well have the same
14	type.of actuation mechanism?
15	A Yes, they could.
16	Q And that is tying it only to psi in the
17	containment building and not to anything else?
18	A That's possible.
19	Q Do you know what the volume of the contain-
20	ment building is at TMI 2?
21	A Very large, I don't know the number. Many cubic
22	feet.
23	Q Is an automatic sump pump an unusual
24	feature in a reactor containment building?

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25 A There are some that don't have automatic sump

2 pumps. There are some that do. So the answer I 3 guess is no, it is not unusual. There are others that 4 have it.

5 Q And as far as you know, as of today, those 6 plans still have those features?

7 A As far as I know.

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g Q I would like to jump back for a minute to
9 your situation in the Incident Response Centerion
10 Wednesday, March 28, 1979.

11 After you arrived it the Incident Response 12 Center, was there any discussion about the core becoming 13 uncovered?

14 A - Not early on. Sometime during the day it became 15 obvious that the core had to have been uncovered at some 16 point in time.

17 Q What made that obvicus to you?
18 A Well, in order to have the amount of activity
19 that was seen in the primary coolant system, there had
20 to be some core damage, which would almost have required
21 the core to be uncovered.

22 Q Did you discuss that with people at the 23 Incident Response Center?

24 A Well, we discussed the core damage, that there 25 was some damage to the core, yes.

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And in connection with that, did you Q 2 3 discuss what was causing that, i.e., the core uncovery? We must have. I am sure we must have. Would you have discussed that with 0 5 Mr. Stello? Among others, I am sure we did. 7 A Did you discuss that with members of the 0 8 emergency management team? 9 It is sort of like everybody knew it. It is 10 A not the kind of thing that would be startling to anyone 11 there, so it is not the kind of thing that you would 12 run to say, hey, this has occurred. 13 - Q Wouldn't there have been other people at 14 the Incident Response Center who didn't know enough 15 about how a reactor worked to be able necessarily to 16 make the connection between core damage and core 17 18 recovery? I am sure there are, yes. 19 A Q So for those people it wouldn't be just 20 assumed, they would presumably hear it, they would know 21 about it from talking with people? 22 A I don't -- I wasn't in the emergency EMT. They 23 may well have discussed this among themselves. 24 O Were you called upon at any point on 25

1	Moseley 143
	March 28 to brief the EMT as to what was going on as
3	far as you knew?
4	A Not in terms of a briefing, no, I didn't.
	Q Not a formal thing, but just to explain
5	그는 것 같은 것 같
6	what you knew, what you were hearing?
7	A I talked with various members of the EMT who would
8	drift in to the IRAT to discuss it, but I don't recall
9	on that day, you know, appearing before them as a body.
10	Q Did you talk with any of the comissioners
11	of the NRC on March 28, 1979?
12	A I believe there were two of the commissioners who
13	were in the IRAT for portions of the time on March 28th.
14	- Q Which commissioners were those?
15	A Commissioner Ahearne and Commissioner Bradford,
16	as I recall.
17	Q And they came into the IRAT where you were
18	physically located?
19	A Yes.
20	Q And did they talk to you about what was
21	going on at that point?
22	A We must have had some conversations. They were
23	mostly listening.
24	Q Did you discuss with them the core damage?
25	A I don't recall specifically discussing that with

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2 them.

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3 Q Would that have been something that was on 4 your mind at the time?

Moseley

5 A Yes, it was on my mind.

Q So to the extent that you have been talking 6 to them at all what you knew about the plant situation 7 you probably would have mentioned that, wouldn't you? 8 A I don't know. You see, their role there was 9 ill-defined, and I didn't feel compelled to brief them 10 in any way. I responded to questions, but I had other 11 things to do, and I didn't really pay much attention 12 to them, frankly. 13

Do you think it is possible that anyone in - 0 14 the IRE for any appreciable time on March 29, 1979 15 would not have known that there was a core uncovery? 16 I don't think there was anyone who had responsi-17 A bility for assessing what was going on who would not 18 have known that. There may have been people who have 19 other responsibilities who may not have known that. 20

21 Q But the people who had responsibility for 22 assessing the situation would certainly have known? 23 A I think so, yes.

Q Was Chairman Hendry at the IRC at any time on March 29th?

SENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 A I didn't see him on that day.

Q Did you speak with Chairman Hendry at any point concerning what you knew about the status of the situation?

6 A No.

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Q Let me jump over to March 29th. Did you
8 speak with Chairman Hendry on March 29th about what
9 you knew?

10 A No.

11 Q Did you brief any of the commissioners of 12 the NRC on March 29th as to what you knew about the 13 plant situation?

14 A . No, I don't recall.

Q Did you speak to Darrell Eisenhut on
March 29th concerning what you knew about the plant?
A I don't know.

18 Q Were you called upon to brief anyone from 19 the NRC for the purpose of allowing or enabling that 20 person to then brief the NRC commissioners?

21 A Well, I think my exchange of information would 22 have been more in terms of answering questions that 23 people may have had. People may have come to me and 24 asked a quesion and I would answer and they would use 25 that in briefing others. That may have happened, but

2 I was not knowingly participating in preparation for 3 briefings.

Moseley

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4 Q Do you recall having anybody come to you 5 and say, "Look, I need to know some information because 6 I have to be called upon to brief the commissioners 7 later on today"?

8 A No one told me that specifically, to the best of9 my knowledge.

10 Q The reason I am asking this, as of yesterday, 11 we did speak to Mr. Stello, and he does recall that in 12 the morning of March 29th, Darrell Eisenhut had 13 Mr. Stello brief him, because Eisenhut was then going 14 to have to go and brief the commissioners, and I am 15 wondering if Mr. Eisenhut spoke to you about the same 16 thing.

17 A Well, like I say, he may have well have discussed 18 some things with me, but I wasn't aware or at least I 19 don't recall being aware that he was gathering this 20 information specifically to brief anyone.

21 Q Let me just jump back a few minutes to the 22 I&E functions in analyzing LER's and in determining 23 what safety concerns are.

24 How does the I&E determine whether or not 25 a safety concern is or is not generic?

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 A It is a judgment based on knowledge of whether or not this particular piece of equipment is used by 3 others or may be used by others. That's it. It is 4 an engineering judgment, a technical judgment. 5 Q For example, if you have a problem with a 6 PORV, it is my understanding that virtually every 7 pressurized water reactor has a PORV, is that correct? 8 Yes. 9 A At least the newer ones? 0 10 Yes. 11 A Q So if there are problems with the PORV and 12 it involves anything relating to safety, does that 13 automatically make it a generic safety concern? 14 No, there has to be a threshold of level. In the 15 truer sense, anything, as you described, anything that 16 happens at PORV is potentially generic to all plants, but 17 to become a generic concern it has to be above a certain 18 19 threshold in terms of how significant this particular failure or malfunction is in relation to the operation 20 21 of the other plants. 22 I see. And again, that's a judgment Q 23 question? 24 That's a judgment question. A

25 Q Is the initial judgment on that made by the

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 inspector who finds the problem?

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3 A Frequently it is. It can also be made by my 4 staff on reviewing the daily report or in discussion 5 with the inspector of the item at the time it occurred, 6 or it could be picked up by my staff who reviewed these 7 things, so anyone along the line can label something as 8 potentially generic.

9 Q Does the I&E function extend to evaluation 10 of control room layout?

11 A Not per se. If a person had some concern that 12 the control room layout was sufficient to cause it to 13 be a safety problem, then we might get involved in it, 14 but otherwise, we wouldn't.

15 Q And does the I&E function extend to instru16 mentation in the control room?

Again, the review of the design is principally 17 A The only time we would raise design questions 18 NRR. 19 is when we feel something may have been overlooked in 20 the design by NRR, or even if approved by NRR, and we 21 feel it is still wrong, then we would raise that question. 22 For example, I made reference before to the Q 23 transient that occurred on March 29, 1978 at TMI 2 when 24 the PORV stuck open, and it is my understanding that 25 thereafter, the command signal indicator which was

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2 mounted on the control board was installed to enable 3 the operator to have some indication of whether or not 4 the PORV was opened, or some further indication.

5 Was it an I&E function to evaluate that 6 problem and to recommend a solution?

7 A No, it was an I&E function to review the adequacy 8 of the actions that were taken as a result of this. So 9 to this extent my previous answer about design review 10 is deficient. We do review designs when there are 11 modifications made, so long as the modifications are 12 within the envelope of the review and approval that 13 Licensing has previously given.

14 . Q So the design modification to add the 15 command signal indicator then was subject to review by 16 I&E?

17 A Subject to review, yes.

18 Q And do you know what review was performed
19 by I&E on that subject?

20 A I don't personally know.

Q Would that have been through your office?
A It would have been done by the inspector.

23 Q By the inspector or on the site at that 24 time?

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25 A Yes.

BENJAMIN REP TING SERVICE

1	Moseley 150
2	Q Do you know who that inspector was?
3	A No, I don't.
4	Q Do you know whether or not any further
5	safety problem was raised by that inspector in connec-
6	tion with the use of a command signal indicator?
7	A I don't know.
8	Q Do you know why a command signal indicator
9	was chosen rather than an actual position indicator?
10	A Because it is easier to do, I suspect.
11	Q Was that the only reason you are aware of
12	it?
13	A I am speculating. I really don't know why it
14	was chosen.
15	Q Has any summary of monthly operating
16	reports or licensee event reports for TMI 2 been prepared
17	by your office?
18	A We are in the process of preparing a sort of a
19	history of Three Mile Island. It has not been completed.
20	This will include the LER's, the items of non-compliance,
21	the inspection history, these kinds of things.
22	Q Were there many items of non-compliance
23	extant in connection with Three Mile Island 2, and by
24	"many," I realize that's a relative term.
25	A As compared to others, they didn't stand out as
	BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

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2 having a high number. In fact, the people at Region I
3 rated Three Mile Island as an average or perhaps
4 slightly better than average plant.

5 Q Based on what you know today, would you 6 concur in that evaluation?

7 A I am not really in a position to make an evaluation
8 as to where they sit on the -- in terms of the other
9 plants.

10 Let me see if I can place that in context. 0 11 You have had a substantial role in inspection and 12 enforcement for some time. You have had an impressive record with the NRC in connection with the reactor 13 14 inspections yourself. I am sure you must have some 15 feel for how good or bad a particular plant can be based on the LER's that come into your office, and the inspec-16 17 tion and enforcement reports, and all the other docu-18 mentation.

All I am really asking is, since TMI 2, March 28, 1979, you have obviously had an opportunity and the incentive to look into the situation at TMI 2 much more closely.

Based on that, do you still feel that TMI 2 Had no more significant numbers of problems than most operating plants in the country?

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2 A Well, based on the history, I don't think they 3 had more in numbers.

Moseley

We have been singularly unsuccessful in being able to rate licensees. We have made several attempts to rate them in a better-than-average, average, and below average, and we find that's an extremely difficult thing to do, even though there are many motivations to be able to do it.

We find that using one technique for a particular licensee and another is unique for another group. So my response is, really, that we haven't been very successful in rating these things.

14 . To answer what I think your basic thrust is, I 15 think there are some things at Three Mile Island that 16 need to be modified and upgraded and corrected, and it 17 will be before they start operating.

Sure, but I guess the other thrust of my 18 0 question was, based in your experience, do you think 19 20 that's likely to be the situation at many other plants or does TMI 2 kind of stand out as a sore spot? 21 2' Well, I don't have any information that would A lead me to think that everything at TMI was bad and 23 24 everything was unsafe. It is not true. There were

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

some things that were -- that have come to light since

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2 the accident that need some attention.

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At any plant, when we identify those things that thave to be taken care of, we pursue those promptly with that licensee.

Again, my question was, based on what you 0 6 know about TMI 2 today, that is all the history before 7 March 28, 1979, and everything that's occurred since 8 March 28, 1979, as well as what did occur on March 28, 9 1979, does TMI 2 stick out in your mind as a plant in 10 significantly worse condition in operation and 11 efficiency and maintenance and safety than other plants 12 13 around the country?

14 A I am having difficulty answering the question 15 that you have asked, because it is --

Q Let me put it in context again. We have already said, and I said in the interview we had with you, and speaking to a lot of people, up to March 22, 19 1979, TMI 2 wasn't an example of a bad operation.

20 A That's right.

21 Q As a matter of fact, it was about average, 22 or perhaps above average?

23 A Yes.

Q A little better than some of the others.
I am wondering if since March 28, 1979,

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

2 anything has come to your attenti n that would change 3 that estimate on your part?

Moseley

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4 A Well, I think that to answer that, you have to look into what do we know about the Three Mile Island 5 accident, and what I know is that there were a combina-6 7 tion of things which both caused the accident and 8 caused it to be as severa as it was. Some of the things are not related to Met Ed. Some of the things 9 10 are related to the design of the plant, which B&W provided; some of those things are related to our own 11 deficiencies as regulators, so I am not ready to point 12 a finger and say but for this everything would have been 13 cool at Three Mile Island on the 28th. I'm just not 14 15 ready to say that.

16 Q I don't think anyone can.

A So I am not likewise ready to say that Met Ed had the worst plant in the country or that Three Mile Island was the worst plant in the country. So I can't really answer the question that I think you have asked me, because I don't know enough.

Q Let me try to rephrase it again. Are you prepared to say that Met Ed was about average? A They certainly were before. It was everyone's consensus that they were about average before.

BENJAMIN REPORTING SERVICE

1 Moseley 155 2 0 What is the consensus now? I don't know that there is a consensus in relation 3 A to how Three Mile Island, Met Ed stacks up to the other 4 5 plants. What is your opinion now, are they still, in 6 0 your mind, about average, based on what you know? 7 A Let us say that based on what I know, they are 8 not -- I don't know how to say it. 9 10 Let me put it this way: Up until March 28. Q 1979, your opinion was that they were about average, I. 11 12 think you have said that? 13 A My opinion was based on what other people have 14 told-me. 15 0 Okay. 16 For me to get an independent opinion, then I have A 17 to look at them personally and look at other people 18 personally, and I don't really look at anybody 19 personally in this. 20 Q Regardless of what you based it on, up to 21 March 28, 1979, your opinion and the opinion of many 22 other people was that Met Ed was about average? 23

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24 Q All I am asking is, since March 28, 1979, 25 did you change your mind as to that opinion?

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Yes.

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A In certain areas I have become knowledgeable of
things that I think that is below average, but to say -Q What things, can you describe what those
things are?

6 A In the health physics area I have, based on some 7 of the things that we have found during the investiga-8 tion, and some of the things that I have heard of since 9 the investigation, that I think they are not as good as 10 they ought to be and as good as other plans are in the 11 health physics area.

12 There have been little, if any, operational evaluations to make on Three Mile Island since the 13 accident, because they have been doing things that are 14 totally unrelated to operation, so I really don't have 15 any data on which to base the operations aspect of this. 16 17 So as far as you know, as far as the infor-0 mation you have, except for the one instance you 18 19 mentioned, health physics, they are still about average? 20 I guess ' will have to back into that by saying A I don't know anything right now to significantly change 21 22 whatever assessments were made earlier from an operation 23 standpoint.

24 MR. KANE: Okay. That's all the questions
25 I have.

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1	Moseley 157
2	MR. CHOPKO: I have no questions.
3	MR. KANE: Let me just say, Mr. Moseley,
4	that although I have exhausted the questions I
5	have for you at this time, this is an ongoing
6	investigation, and as a result, it may be
7	necessary to bring you back for a further depo-
8	sition at some point in the future. We will
9	certainly endeavor to avoid that, but given the
10	ongoing status of the investigation, it may be
11	necessary. For that teason, I would like to
12	just adjourn the deposition rather than terminate
13	the deposition, and let me ask you once again
14	· if you could please follow-up on that letter I
15	previously asked you about relating to the
16	Oconee 3. We would very much like to know what
17	documentation was engendered in response to that
18	letter.
19	THE WITNESS: There were a number of things
20	you asked about, and I have my staff working on
21	it, and we will get it to you as soon as we can.
22	MR. KANE: I appreciate that. Thank you
23	for your time, sir.
24	(The deposition was adjourned at 1:30 p.m.)
25	Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of, 1979. NORMAN C. MOSELEY
	Notary Public

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2	STATE OF NEW YORK)
3	COLNTY OF NEW YORK)
4	We, IRWIN H. BENJAMIN, CSR, and TERRY LOUIS,
5	Notaries Public of the State of New York, do hereby
6	certify that the foregoing deposition of NORMAN
7	C. MOSELEY, was taken before us on the 25th day
8	of July, 1979.
9	The said witness was duly sworn before the
10	commencement of his testimony; that the said
11	testimony was taken stenographically by ourselves
12	and then transcribed.
13	The within transcript is a true record of
14	• the said deposition.
15	We are not related by blood or marriage to
16	any of the said parties, nor interested directly
17	or indirectly in the matter in controversy, nor
18	are we in the employ of any of the counsel.
19	IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we have hereunto set
20	our hands this 22 day of July, 1979.
21	· G. /
22	IRWIN H. BENJAMIN, CSR
23	U
24	TERRY LOUIS
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