NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

NRC/TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY

DEPOSITION OF WALTER CREITZ

Place -Washington, D. C. Date -Tuesday, 23 October 1979 Pages 1 - 48

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Telephone: (202) 347-3700

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
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	14	The deposition of WALTER CREITZ was convened at 8:55
	15	a.m., pursuant to notice.
	16	APPEARANCES:
	17	George T. Frampton, Jr., Esquire,
	10	-and-
	18	Chip Foster,
	19	Appearing for the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry.
	20	Matias Travieso-Diaz, Esquire,
	20	Appearing for Metropolitan Edison.
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	1	PROCEEDINGS					
	2	MR. FRAMPTON: This is a deposition being					
	3	conducted by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission					
	4	Special Inquiry Group for Mr. Walter Creitz on October 23rd,					
	5	1979, in Washington, D.C.					
	6	Present, in addition to Mr. Creitz, are Mr.					
	7	Frampton and Mr. Foster of the Special Inquiry Group and					
	8	Mr. Diaz, who is representing Metropolitan Edison Company.					
	9	Whereupon,					
	10	WALTER CREITZ					
	11	was called as a witness and, having been first duly swoin,					
	12	was examined and testified as follows:					
	13	EXAMINATION					
	14	BY MR. FRAMPTON:					
	15	Q Could you state your full name for the record.					
	16	A Walter M. Creitz, C-r-e-i-t-z.					
	17	Q Mr. Creitz, before we started, I showed you a					
	18	one-page witness notification form that describes the purpose					
	19	of our inquiry, and your rights in connection with this					
	20	interview, including the fact that the transcript of the					
	21	deposition may eventually become public information.					
	22	Have you read that, and do you understand it?					
	23	A I have read it.					
Reporters,	24	Q Thank you.					
	25	Now, as I mentioned to you before we began, our					

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primary interest is to focus on your activities and knowledge of other people's activities in the three or four days after the beginning of the accident on March 28, and we have the benefit of the deposition that was taken of you by the President's Commission staff, as well as other public testimony that you have given, so in some cases we will try not to repeat that testimony, simply for the purposes of saying that we did it, too, but rather to go to the things that might not be covered elsewhere that especially interest us.

I think your previous testimony and other information that's been made available by Met Ed indicates that on March 28, you learned about the incident about 7:30 in the morning from Mr. Troffer. Is that right?

A Indirectly, yes. George Troffer had called my secretary. I was still at home, and Mrs. Quillan called me up at home.

Q And do you recall getting some information from Mr. Fabian that morning before you went to work?

A No.

Q What do you recall was the next conversation? A My next conversation -- well, I immediately left for the office and upon arriving there, I had arranged to talk to George Troffer and talked to George Kunder and Gary Miller. Mr. Fabian then came to my office. Those were

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some of the initial conversations I had, being given a little 1 more detail of what the status was of the emergency. Also 2 to talk to Bob Arnold that morning, early that morning, and 3 4 Jack Herbein. Did you have telephone conversations with Mr. 5 0 Miller and Mr. Kunder in the control room? 6 7 Yes. A -- of Unit 2. Did you call them, do you remember? 8 0 9 A Yes. 10 Did you have any problem getting through to them 0 11 at that time? 12 I didn't at that time. A 13 And do you remember what they told you about what 0 14 had happened? 15 They described the conditions of a site emergency A 16 and a general emergency. They briefly told me what they felt 17 had happened, why the alarms went off; that there might be a 18 leak existing between the primary and secondary systems, which 19 might have provided such radiation on site, but we had no 20 indications that there was radiation off site. But they 21 were forming monitoring teams to be sent over to Goldsboro 22 and other areas to make that determination. 23 I guess I didn't press for a lengthy discussion 24 of details of the accident itself. I wasn't sure if anybody 25 really understood completely at that point, and secondly I

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didn't want to take more -- any more time than necessary, 1 but I -- those are the initial conversations with George 2 Kunder and Gary Miller. I'm not sure which one told me what 3 of that part of the conversation. 4 5 BY MR. FOSTER: Approximately what time was the conversation? 6 0 Some time after 9:00, I would say. Closer to 8:00. 7 A I would say closer to 8:00 o'clock. 8 Yes, yes. 9 BY MR. FRAMPTON: I think you've also said in previous interviews 10 0 that you talked to Mr. Arnold and he mentioned that the 11 radioactivity indicated some fuel failure. Do you recall 12 13 that conversation? Yes. He had indicated that there could be or might 14 A be, I'm not sure of the verb, but he implied that there 15 could be a fuel assembly damage. That was a little later, 16 that was perhaps closer to 9:00 -- some time after that 17 18 conversation. 19 Do you remember his demeanor in that phone 0 conversation? Was he concerned? Not especially concerned? 20 Bob, from his voice inflection, I wasn't sure, 21 A Bob ras gone through emergencies and trying conditions 22 previously. Bob is normally a very cool individual, and I 23 didn't detect any overexcitement in the discussion. There 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. was certainly an indication of concern. 25

	1	Q Let me jump ahead for a minute.
	2	You said that in your first conversations, you
	3	learned from the people in the control room that no offsite
•	4	releases had been detected.
	5	Do you remember when was the first time you learned
	6	something about offsite readings or offsite releases above
	7	background?
	8	A Yes.
	9	Q When was that?
	10	A That must have been around 10:30, 11:00 o'clock
	11	that morning.
	12	Q And from whom did you learn that? What do you
•	13	recall about the circumstances?
	14	A I believe that was a I was on the phone talking
	15	to someone at that particular instant, and my secretary
	16	brought me a note in with the information on it. George
	17	Troffer, I believe.
	18	Q And do you remember what the substance of that
	19	information was?
	20	A That low levels of radiation above background
	21	have been detected. I don't recall the numbers; numbers
•	22	of 2 to 4 millirems would ring a bell. I have I have
	23	some notes on some of these things which I could sort of
Ace-Federal Reporters,	24	perhaps zero in on and give you a more exact
	25	Q Do you have them with you?
		사망 수 있는 것은 것은 것은 것은 것을 하는 것이다. 그는 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것은 것을 가지 않는 것을 하는 것을 것을 했다. 것은 것을 가지 않는 것을 것을 했다.

I believe so. I hope I have the information 1 A 2 to respond to that particular question. 3 [Pause.] I am sorry, but the magnitude of the reading 4 above background doesn't appear in my notes at that time 5 6 in the morning. 7 I wonder, Mr. Creitz, if you are looking at the 0 same thing that I am. Met Ed has provided us with a couple 8 9 of different chronologies. This probably was used in preparation -- I'm sure 10 A 11 it was part of one of what you have. 12 Does the document that you are looking at reflect 0 your own typed-up version of your own notes and recollections, 13 14 or is that additional -- those of additional people? This was something that I had put together several 15 A days after the accident, together with Blaine Fabian, and 16 I'm sure that this has been used to put together the final 17 18 statement, parts of it. 19 MR. FRAMPTON: Why don't we go off the record for 20 a minute. 21 [Discussion off the record.] MR. FRAMPTON: Back on the record. 22 For the record, Mr. Creitz, we have looked at 23 the typed-up notes that you were referring to, and it 24 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc appears to be a draft or earlier draft of the document 25

that has been provided to us by Met Ed.

I think you also mentioned while we were off the record that there was another subject that we didn't cover that came up in your conversation with people in the control room, around 8:00 or 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock? Is that correct?

THE WITNESS: Yes.

BY MR. FRAMPTON:

Q What was that?

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A George Kunder and/or Gary Miller brought me up to date on the status of the emergency plan. They told me that all steps of the emergency plan had been carried out, that the state had been notified, the local folks in the county had been notified, the NRC had also been notified, following the site emergency announcement.

Q The chronology that we have indicates that at some point around 10:30 in the morning, you and Mr. Troffer and Mr. Fabian all got together because you realized that there was conflicting information about offsite releases, and you were trying to reconcile that conflicting information. Do you recall that?

A I recall that I guess just the fact that there were offsite releases caused enough concern to be a lot more concerned, and I don't recall what the conflict at this instant, but I did think it would be -- would be well for some of us to be sure that at least those of us back in the

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corporate office have the same understanding.

Q Did you resolve that?

A I don't think so. I don't think so. It was resolved to the point that we recognized that we had offsite readings.

I also recognized that at that point, our people up at Three Mile Island were extremely busy, and I'm sure awfully concerned. I certainly was the last one that wanted to interfere. I would probably be the least helpful to waste any of their time.

I also recognized that Jack Herbein should be arriving on site within a very short period of time.

Q What was it that was conflicting? Was it the numbers, or whether there were any offsite releases?

A I honestly don't recall what the conflicting part was. I believe one of the questions perhaps was are we really talking offsite or are we talking on site, but I'm not sure.

Q The chronology also indicates that because there was no direction to change the statement being given out to the media and the public upon request, that communication services people continued to offer no confirmation of any release. I take it that is any confirmation of offsite release.

Was that something that you discussed at that

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2	A I believe that I just never felt very comfortable
3	and satisfied with some of the information that I was getting,
4	and I was concerned of providing inaccurate, erroneous
5	information to the public. A couple of nights before this
6	I was at a movie house and saw a film called "The China
7	Syndrome," and I was equally concerned that I wanted to
8	provide information to the public.

I sort of recall that executive, he didn't, and 9 that isn't the way we operated at Met Ed, but I was very 10 much concerned and I just didn't fee comfortable with the 11 information I had. I was pretty well convinced that our 12 people were very carefully monitoring the situation so if 13 there be any possibility for indication that perhaps 14 evacuation should be considered by the state, to be sure 15 that the state would be getting that information, and I hope 16 that I impressed my people that whenever we get any -- signals 17 occur, this might be necessary, that we certainly want to 18 let the right people know about it. 19

At the time we were trying to start up the pump. There were just a lot of things that were happening that was just hard to put the whole thing together and to come up with a statement that would make any sense.

BY MR. FOSTER:

Prior to the point in time when Mr. Troffer Q

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notified you that you were getting some offsite readings, were you personally handling any inquiries from media or government officials?

A I did not talk to any news media people directly. We had put together a statement early that morning, and I know Bob Arnold had also put together a statemen with the GPU people. I did not talk to any news media people myself at that point. That's very unusual. Normally I would want to talk to news media people, but I just didn't feel that we really had something that would make any sense at that point.

Q Were you talking to any government officials, federal or state?

A Yes. But I'm not sure at exactly what time. Some time in the morning I had talked to several of the offices of Congress, some of our Congress people. Walker, who serves Lancaster County, Ertel, who serves Dauphin County, and Goodling, who serves your county.

Again this was in the morning. I had talked to Lieutenant Governor Scranton after we were convinced that there was offsite releases. I tried to get to Governor Thornburgh earlier without success, and then after we had the releases, I tried again, and couldn't, and I'm not sure if I suggested. well, let me try to talk to Lieutenant Governor Scranton, or if they suggested it. But one way or

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the other, I did talk to Scranton some time during the latter part of the morning.

BY MR. FRAMPTON:

Q What was the purpose of that call? Was that to tell him that there were some offsite readings? Was that the primary purpose?

A Yes. He had just had a press conference in which he indicated that things were well under control at Three Mile Island. It was a very strong statement he made. It sort of shocked me, and when I got the word of the releases, I felt it was incumbent that we'd better get to the Governor's office. Probably when I wasn't successful on that route, to get to the Lieutenant Governor's office. I had no trouble getting to Lieutenant Governor Scranton, incidentally.

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Q What do you recall about your conversation? A Simply told him that at this point -- the main point of the conversation was at this time we have detected radiation readings above background.

Q What was his reaction, do you remember?

A No. He certainly didn't appear to be panicking or anything of that nature. It was a very pleasant conversation. I'm not sure, of course, I wasn't completely normal at that point, either, so I'm not sure how you detect or determine how the other fellow was reacting.

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Q Was that -- did that seem to be, insofar as you could tell, something that contradicted his understanding as it was when he gave his news conference?

A Yes. Oh, yes, he had no -- he didn't know, I didn't know at that instant. I believed that there were offsite releases. I believe there were some people from Met Ed or GPU, perhaps, at that press conference, and I guess they didn't know, either.

BY MR. FOSTER:

Q The substance of what the Lieutenant Governor said in that press conference, was that based on his prior conversation earlier with you that morning?

A No, no, I didn't get -- this was my first conversation with the Lieutenant Governor. Earlier I had tried to get to the Governor's office, and didn't. I don't know what the reason was, we just didn't get through to him. In the meantime, there were other calls coming in, other things to do, and I really almost sort of dropped it at that point, until I got word that there were offsite releases, and then perhaps I made a much stronger effort to get to him.

The Lieutenant -- I believe the Lieutenant Governor's office -- your record would show this -- had a conversation with maybe Gary Miller or some of our people earlier that day.

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BY MR. FRAMPTON:

Q I believe that the chronology provided us reflects that there had been a telephone conversation between the Unit 2 control room and the Lieutenant Governor earlier in the morning.

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Uh-huh.

Q This chronology also indicates that you got some more information later on in the morning, around noon, from Mr. Troffer, that offsite radiation readings -- and that you and Mr. Fabian recognized that there was a difference in the information being given out by the NRC and Met Ed. What do you remember about that? Can you expand on that? A I can't recall what the differences might have been.

Q Well, at that point, is it possible that your communications people were still putting out a statement that said that radiation was confined to the site, and the NRC in Washington was saying, we have some offsite readings?

A I would hardly think so. At that point we knew there were offsite readings, so if we were having a concern of the differences of what the NRC and we might have been saying -- I sometimes had trouble understanding some of our own information, simply because perhaps a reading at one particular spot at a particular instant of time had so many millirems, and 10 minutes later that reading was completely different, and I believe that it was pointed out to me -- I certainly learned a lot that morning -- that radiation drifts sort of like clouds, in the form of clouds, and when you don't have very much wind, it sort of moves around from one spot to the other, and getting different readings at different times, at different instances of time, led to, I'm sure, some of the discrepancies in some of the reporting.

Q At about the same time, I believe the Lieutenant Governor called you back and asked to be briefed by somebody; is that right?

A That's right.

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Q What do you remember about that conversation? A He 'ed for some official from the company to meet with him some time that afternoon, at 2:00 o'clock, 2:30, and I said fine, we'll have someone there.

Q And then you called Mr. Herbein at the observation center?

A I believe Blaine Fabian was in my office at the time, and I then called Jack Herbein and asked him to be at the Lieutenant Governor's office.

Q Did you specifically ask him to take some other people from the plant, or did you just ask him to go, or for him to see that somebody went? What do you remember about that?

A Well, I didn't tell him to take anybody with him.

I recognized that Jack just got on site himself. I think your record shows that he is in the Navy Reserve, and he was on duty with them at that time. I guess I wouldn't have been surprised if he wanted to take somebody with him. I felt it was important to have a person like Jack Herbein who knew the broader picture of our nuclear energy program at Met Ed, someone who had a good rapport in responding to questions previously with various groups, community groups, and so forth.

I also recognized that some of the people at the plant who also -- who perhaps had more detailed knowledge were also very busy. Jack Herbein seemed to be, in my mind -and this was entirely my judgment -- but the person -- I think I might have said something to Blaine Fabian, "What do you think?" Blaine Fabian's report -- the reports that Blaine Fabian had on Jack Herbein's appearances in responding to questions prior to the accident were excellent. I felt it had to be somebody that had some technical knowledge. Jack Herbein seemed to meet these requirements.

Q Before he left to go brief the Lieutenant Governor, he gave his own press briefing at the observation center.

A Uh-huh.

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that you instructed or encouraged him to do this, in part

And I think you mentioned in a previous interview

because just answering the telephones at your offices didn't really seem to be satisfying the media. Can you expand on that a little bit?

Jack, in that same conversation, Jack said there A is a lot of news people in the area. I had no idea how many he was talking about, and I recognized, too, that I didn't feel that I was -- that those of us sitting back in the corporate office were being very helpful to the news media, and felt that if Jack would take a few minutes before he went to the Lieutenant Governor's office, perhaps he could answer some of their questions. I supported the thought that Jack should talk to those news media people.

Was he asking you, "What should I do? Is it 0 all right to talk to them?" Or did you suggest that he talk to them, do you remember?

I believe he mentioned that the news media people A were there. He might have said, you know, he might have said they -- they want to talk to us, or what do I do with them, and so forth. I'm not sure if I suggested and told Jack, why don't you talk to them, or he said should I talk to them.

Regardless of how he asked the question, I would have -- I would feel -- I would want Jack to at least meet with them before he went to the Lieutenant Governor's office.

Did you and Mr. Herbein talk about what he was 0 going to say, or how he should say it, in any way? Did you

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A No, sir. No, no, simply what he knew at that point relative to the releases, where we were relative to plant stability, trying to get the -- one of the pumps running, and whatever questions the news media might have.

Q The chronology reflects that about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a statement was drafted by you in your name describing the low offsite releases. Is that the first specific statement that had been drafted up about offsite releases for the telephone people to answer, that you know of?

A First off, that's the first one that I guess perhaps might have had my name on it. The fact that we recognize that we had offsite releases, I assumed that our communications people were mentioning that in response to telephone conversations.

Q Do you know of an earlier statement that had been drafted for people to read over the telephone?

A A statement per se? I don't recall. But certainly I would -- well, that's hearsay. I'll drop it. Q Well, even if it's hearsay, I wonder what you remember about it.

A Well, as far as I was concerned, it was a fact that we had offsite releases and I would have to assume that that's exactly what our people downstairs were telling the world, and that's the type of thing I wanted Jack to tell

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the news media people.

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At some point in the evening, I think you left 0 your office and went to the site; is that right?

> A That is right.

And what -- what was the purpose of your going to 5 0 6 the observation center?

That -- the following morning I was to be inter-7 A viewed on ABC and NBC from Harrisburg. I wanted to see Jack, to tie it together.

Was it your plan to try to stay there overnight 10 0 or something near the plant, to get briefed in the morning 11 before you went on these shows? Was that part of your plan 12 13 at that time?

> A I did.

Okay. What -- let me ask you this: When you 0 left your office, had you learned that they had gotten the main reactor coolant pump started again, do you remember that?

I don't think I knew that when I left for A Harrisburg -- left my office. I knew it upon arriving there. 1 remember Jack telling me that the coolant pump was running. I'm not -- I don't seem to be aware that it was running before I left my office.

What did you learn when you got to the site about 0 the status of the plant?

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I guess the main thing was everybody was pleased 1 A that the pump was running. It was sort of the main objective 2 of the day, one of the main objectives on the site was to 3 get the pump running, that the offsite readings, if I 4 recall correctly, certainly hadn't increased. I don't recall 5 if any disappeared at that point. 6 I know one of our workers had been apparently 7 overexposed in the process. 8 I think those are sort of the -- some of the main 9 10 points that I can recall. Were you told in substance that the situation 11 0 was stabilized, that the plant was stable, with the pump 12 13 operating? I don't think it was said quite in -- quite in 14 A that context. The point was that a major accomplishment had 15 been made, that the pump was running, and that was awfully 16 important, and I guess it was, you know, it was awfully good 17 news to all of us. We didn't totally understand the depth 18 19 of the accident at that particular instant. Well, I guess that's what I'm getting at. What 20 0

Q Well, I guess that's what I'm getting at. What was the sense of what was conveyed to you? Was it relief?

A The sense that I got, you know, I'm not sure that's what was being told -- being said to me, but what I was hearing was that, you know, this was a big event, that from here on in I had the feeling that the situation would

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probably improve.

Q I think that you mentioned in a previous interview that you were accosted or collared by press people as you were leaving the observation center that night. Do you remember that?

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A Uh-huh. Uh-huh. Did I use that word? I hope not.
Q That's my characterization.

A Okay. They were friendly. They just encircled me.
Q What do you remember about the questions that
were asked and the answers that you gave on that occasion?

A Sort of an uncontrolled discussion. It started out really with one or two news people asking me a question as I left the observation center, and I guess before I had two sentences, I was sort of surrounded by the news media, and it was an uncontrolled interview, questions popping up all over. They asked questions about offsite releases, and I told them, I guess, what I had understood, that the magnitude was very low, but there were radiation levels above background.

They asked me about or I told them about the pump that was in operation. I can't recall any of the questions they asked. They asked if anybody -- I believe one of them asked if anyone was overexposed. I believe I spent about maybe 10 minutes, 10 or 15 minutes with them, as I recall. This was after midnight.

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Q And then you were briefed again in the morning

by Mr. Kunder and Mr. Logan before you taped the television 1 2 show? 3 I talked to them before I went over for the taping. A Was that on the phone? 4 0 5 A Yes. From the hotel? 0 6 7 A Uh-huh. Did they give you a status report or a picture 8 Q that was changed substantially from the night before? 9 10 No, uh-uh. A What do you remember that they told you about 11 Q 12 plant status? The pump was still running. I don't recall 13 A exactly what they said about offsite readings. Either 14 they continued to be very small at the various locations --15 I'm not sure of that -- or there were none. It was insignificant 16 to me at that point, I guess, and therefore probably they 17 were telling me none at that time. They confirmed the point 18 that there was nobody on site that received any high level 19 radiation. That's a matter of -- of keeping the plant under 20 control and proceeding to take steps to bring the unit back 21 22 on. Physically where were you during the day on 23 0 Thursday? Were you at the site or in the Harrisburg area? 24 Ace-Fuderal Reporters, Inc. Well, let's start again. This is my first 25 A

upon awakening and getting dressed, I talked to the plant, it must have been about 4:00 o'clock in the morning, I believe, and then I proceeded into the center of Harrisburg to have the two tapings.

Jack Herbein also had a taping that morning. I believe it was CBS. And I then proceeded on to -- down to Hershey with Jack Herbein in preparation for a news conference, press conference at 10:30 or 11:00 o'clock.

Following that I called the --

Q You and Mr. Herbein did that?

A Yes. I then called Wilson Goode, who is chairman of the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission, and he called in the other two commissioners at that time, and brief ϵ 1 them on the status of what we told the news media and where we were.

I also talked to the Lieutenant Governor's office. In fact, he had initiated a call to us requesting that he be granted permission to go on site, which we arranged for.

I then went over to the observation center at Three Mile Island. Herbein and Deickamp had arrived in there at some time that morning and stayed there for the rest of the afternoon, during which period of time Deickamp and Herbein had briefed the various senators and Congress people that arrived in two flights, two groups.

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Following that, I attended a meeting of the Pennsylvania Electric Association Executive Committee at Hershey, briefed the other utility executives of the happenings of the day.

What time was that? Was that a late afternoon 0 meeting?

That would have been 6:00, 6:30, 7:00 o'clock in A the evening.

Up to that time, had you received any information 0 indicating that the accident was worse than you had thought it was on Wednesday night, let's say?

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There wasn't anything that you learned during the 0. day on Thursday after that point that would have suggested that things were a lot worse than you previously thought?

No, that's right. I went home that evening, in A fact, thinking that we're just on our -- you know -- that we're on the process of getting back in a normal operation. I didn't expect that it would happen the following day, but at least we were on that track.

That takes me up to the -- I guess that will sort of briefly describe my Thursday activities.

Q Okay, maybe you can go to Friday now and tell us what the first thing was that you learned on Friday morning. The first thing I learned was that we did have A

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offsite releases. I guess that would be the first thing. 1 Of course, I talked to some more people about it, confirmed 2 it. I wasn't clear exactly what happened at that point in 3 my mind, but I knew that there was definitely offsite 4 5 releases. Q Had you known that on Thursday? Did you know 6 that there were small periodic releases? 7 8 A No. Causing offsite readings of some kind? 9 0 10 A No. 11 If there were on Thursday? 0 No, I didn't know that at that time, that there 12 A 13 were releases. 14 Q So you weren't aware on Thursday afternoon or evening that there were any releases continuing, or periodic 15 16 releases from the plant at all? 17 A No. That was new information to you on Friday morning. 18 0 19 Were you in your office? 20 A Yes. 21 Friday morning when you learned about this 0 22 evacuation flap and so forth? 23 A Yes. 24 And is that the first thing that got your Q Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 attention?

A Yes, and the only thing that got my attention, I guess, that morning.

MR. DIAZ: Shall we take a break? MR. FRAMPTON: Sure, let's take a short break. [Recess.]

MR. FRAMPTON: Okay, we'll go back on the record. BY MR. FRAMPTON:

Q Mr. Creitz, there are a number of things that we want to come back to, but I think in the chronology we were up to Friday, and I had asked you what you recalled about your activities and whereabouts on Friday when you learned various things.

A Friday morning was obviously quite hectic in finding out about the releases. It seems like Friday morning passed by very rapidly. I had several conversations with some of our people, Jack Herbein and others. I was mainly concerned about the conditions that would exist, that would be considered dangerous, and they reviewed with me the guidelines, perhaps they are called, that would determine if an evacuation would be recommended.

Q Are those the protective action guidelines? A I don't know. I don't know. They pointed out that there were guidelines, there were numbers established, and that they assured me again that this information was being provided to the government, and by that I assume

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they meant the state and perhaps the NRC, although NRC 1 people were on site in abundance at that point, and were 2 getting firsthand information. 3 When you say "they" assured you, who are you 4 0 5 talking about? I'm not sure, it was possibly Jack Herbein, 6 A 7 depending on -- my people. You were in your office in Reading, and you were 8 0 talking with Mr. Herbein and others at the site? 9 10 That's right. A 11 Was this after you learned that there had been 0 12 an evacuation recommendation or some sort of advisory? I think it was before that. I believe the 13 A original information I had was simply that there were off-14 15 site readings, there were releases of radioactive gas. In fact, it was -- the first information that I was made aware 16 17 of was, I guess, some time -- I wasn't aware of the reading that was taken of either 1200 or 1300 or 1400 millirems 18 19 taken by helicopter immediately above the plant. And I believe the thought of the evacuation, that I had perhaps 20 picked up in some of my radio or TV set at the time, occurred 21 about that same time, that that information incorrectly was 22 23 reported by the news media. 24 But you learned initially from the site that 0 Ace-Federal Reporters Inc. 25 there were some releases; is that right?

Yes.

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And then subsequently you learned that there 0 had been advisory recommendations concerning evacuation, or at about the same time?

I hadn't, no, not at that early hour. I had A discussions on making sure that -- I was very much concerned about giving accurate information to the state. I recognized very clearly that it was not Met Ed's responsibility to order an evacuation, but certainly the information that Met Ed was gathering might be . key factor in it, and I had personally very major concerns that the information that we were providing was accurate.

I certainly didn't want to -- I mentioned I had two concerns: concerns.

One, that we obviously gave correct information; but more importantly, whatever that was, that we didn't either be too optimistic or too pessimistic. I knew that if Met Ed would get some indication that regardless of what the readings would be that, you know, maybe evacuation should be had, should be made, if Met Ed would be guoted on indicating that there probably would be massive evacuation, and I was very concerned that if that would happen, that people would be, perhaps in the rush be killed, and everything else, and J was really alarmed and shocked. And I guess you might say this was one of the -- I had two major concerns, 25

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and I believe I expressed, you know, that we just have to be sure we give them all the information and correct information, so that the state can make the proper judgment.

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Q Do you recall discussing with Mr. Herbein or anyone else from the site that some kind of an evacuation advisory, or stay-indoors advisory had in fact been made, and whether that was justified or not?

A I believe the announcement from the state or whoever it came from about staying indoors indicated it was a precautionary measure. I viewed it at the time that it might be more comforting to the people at least, you know, at least they were told to do something instead of packing up and getting out of the area.

So in the context that it was a precautionary measure it wasn't a major item on my list of concerns at that particular time. I guess I was partly comforted by at least, you know, my people telling me that there would be no reason to recommend evacuation, that the readings were very low, and this might keep the people under some -- might keep the people under some better control.

Q Did you have any contact, direct contact, with state people during the day on Friday?

A No.

Q The Governor's office, the Lieutenant Governor's, the DRA, anyone else from the state, you personally?

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No. The Public Utility Commission, I talked to 1 A I believe, Wilson Goode that morning, or it might have been 2 Carter that morning, I'm not sure, but I did tell the 3 commission I knew that our people were keeping the -- were 4 keeping the state informed. I had received some calls from 5 some of the offices of the Congress people that morning, in 6 the process I believe I placed a call to the NRC, but the 7 call was buried for one reason or another with other calls 8 coming in, and then I think in the midpart of the morning --9 midpart of the morning I had received a call from Chairman 10 Hendrie. At that particular instant I believe I was talking 11 to -- I don't know who -- the commission, perhaps, PUC, and 12 by the time I got off that call and got to pick up Hendrie's 13 call, he was in a meeting, I guess, and I held on there for 14 a while and finally it was decided that his office would call 15 me back when he was available again, and that occurred around 16 17 noon, I believe. You had previously tried to call the NRC in 18 0

Washington?

A No. I believe I tried to call the NRC in the region.

Q And had not gotten through?

A Yes. I don't really recall why. The line was
busy or --

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Do you remember why you tried to call them?

A It probably was around the time when we were getting -- we were getting reports. I believe the NRC was being credited for this reading of 12 or 1300, and I wanted to be sure that we had the same understanding of what that reading was all about.

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I think that was one of the key reasons I tried to reach the NRC.

Q And what do you recall about the conversation that you eventually had wi Mr. Hendrie?

A Well, of c se, at that time it was noon, and he had made the decision to send people to Three Mile Island, key people. He wanted me to be aware of it. He told me who they -- who was arriving, that Harold Denton would be leading this contingent and would be arriving some time that afternoon.

He also expressed concern that -- or interest and concern that it was important that the industry -by industry, I think he was talking about other utilities, manufacturers, and so forth -- that the nongovernmental part of the nuclear industry provide support to our recovery efforts, and this information I passed on to Bob Arnold, Herman Deickamp, I believe, who was, incidentally, doing exactly this at that time.

I told Chairman Hendrie that I planned to leave for the island some time after lunch. I never did get lunch,

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come to think of it, and that afternoon when I -- I guess I arrived about the same time Harold Denton was there, and I met him and his associate, some of the other people.

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Q Let me go back to the telephone call with Chairman Hendrie. Did he indicate to you or tell you in words or substance that he didn't want any major changes in plant status to be made without the NRC being consulted?

A No, I don't recall any indication, directly, definitely I don't recall anything, and indirectly I don't remember any -- any such implication. I can't recall.

11 Q Was there any discussion in that conversation 12 about who should be making --

No, let me just get back to that. Even if he 13 A would have implied something like that, I don't think it 14 would have been -- would have been significant to me because, 15 you know, the NRC people were there, they are the ones that 16 issued our license, and I had -- I had no reason to feel 17 that our people were not cooperating with the NRC in everything 18 that we were doing. So if he might have implied something 19 like that, it wouldn't have turned on any lights in my mind. 20 I would assume that we were doing it. I had no reason to feel 21 22 we weren't.

Q But as you sit here, you don't specifically recall --A No.

Q -- his conveying some message to you about the

NRC wanting to approve any changes or approve any major evolutions in the plant status, or anything like that? A No. The only thing that he -- let me think a second.

Nothing I can recall that would say hey, make sure whatever you think you're going to do, you better get our approval on it.

Q Right, that's what I'm getting at.

9 I'm not suggesting that such a conversation took 10 place. I'm merely asking for your recollection as to whether 11 it might have.

A Again he only talked about bringing in the nongovernment part of the nuclear industry. We seemed to have a short few words relative to putting some kind of a plan together or something of that nature, but again it wasn't with a tinge of get the plant approved by us. I don't recall that.

Q Okay, do you recall any conversation about who should be making information available to the press about a single spokesman, or we have to avoid conflicting information, anything like that, in that conversation?

A No. I'm sure one of the things we did talk about, probably talked about, was conflicting reports, but nothing was said or indicated that there should be a single report. Q Okay. Now you said you then went to the site and

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met Mr. Denton or talked to him?

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A Uh-huh. He was quite busy at that point, just unpacking and trying to get -- some of his people were trying to get lines established back to the White House, but I did met with him, chatted with him a few minutes.

Q During the afternoon on Friday, was there any discussion at the site with any NRC people about either of those two topics that I asked about a minute ago? Namely, whether the NRC was going to assume some particular role in approving anything that you did or, on the other hand, about whether there ought to be a single spokesman to the press?

A One of the questions that either Harold asked me, or maybe it was Vic --

Q Vic Stello, you're speaking of?

A Yes. Who was in charge, and at that time Bob Arnold and Jack Herbein were on site, and I believe my response was since we are the operators of the plant and Jack Herbein is the one that is recognized by the NRC as being the officer in charge, I said Jack Herbein at that time -- there was nothing said to me, however, that, hey, be sure whatever Jack Herbein wants to do, you'd better clear it with us.

I think we had an understanding that -- I believe the atmosphere was such that what ver we wanted to do or were trying to do, we were consulting with the NRC, and I hope

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the record bears that out from the NRC.

Relative to your other point, on Thursday after--Thursday morning after the press conference, I did take a few minutes to talk to Blaine Fabian and Dick Hyde, Richard Hyde, who was with the -- he happened to be in the area that day and sat in the press conference, and we discussed the concern about different people reporting at different times of the day, perhaps slight differences in what is being said, and that at times this being taken out of context by the news media people was indicating that -- well, it was indicating to some of the public that perhaps they were getting conflicting statements.

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O This was on Thursday?

A This was Thursday, and we thought that perhaps the state and the NRC and Met Ed could arrange for joint meetings with the news media, so that all news media were hearing the same information.

I had a discussion with Joe Fouchard, I know, on Saturday morning, a'out this. I think I mentioned it to him. I think I mentioned it to him also on Friday.

Let me go back. I did have a discussion with Joe Fouchard Saturday morning. I believe I might have mentioned it in passing to Joe the night before. Joe again was extremely busy running all over the place, trying to get these communications established, and we really didn't spend

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any time on it. I think I mentioned it to him in passing. We did have a discussion on it Saturday morning.

Okay, what do you remember about your Saturday 0 morning conversation with him?

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-- about this. This is about the question of 0 joint statements.

Yes, sir, concern about conflicting statements. A Statements that might vary a little bit and the impact it has on the news media, and more importantly, the public, and I suggested that we should consider having a joint press conference. I told him we had one scheduled around noon 12 that day, 11:00 o'clock or noon, and suggested that should 13 be a joint conference.

Joe disagreed and wanted to have his own independent news conference to avoid a continuation of possible conflicting statements. I then told Joe that this would be probably our last one. I don't know if I said probably or I said it would be our last one.

I talked to Bill Murray about it. In fact, I think Bill Murray was with me when we talked to Joe, and we simply decided that we would not have them, we would not have a separate one after this one. We would announce that th' - would be our last regular one, and we would pull away. We recognized that it would adversely impact Met

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Ed's credibility, which was not very good at that particular instant, but we could not afford to have a continuation of conflicting statements, regardless of how minor they were. Was the decision that you made at that time not 0

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to make any further statements to the press, or was it really a decision to discontinue these daily morning briefings?

I believe the implication was that we would dis-A continue these briefings and, in fact, would leave the -leave any statements of the status of the plant to the NRC as our regulator and the licensor of our plant.

This was a decision that you made on Saturday 0 morning?

Yes. It was an item that Bill Murray and I had A talked about. I believed that this was the right thing to do. I'm not evare of why -- Bill Murray felt the same way, simply because it looked like the best thing to do or not, but I had no -- I had no indication if Bill Murray was under any pressure from anyone in the NRC at that time.

Did you receive any suggestion or any pressure 0 from anybody in the NRC to take the route of letting the NRC --I did not.

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-- being the sole spokesman?

No. A

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You did not? 0

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BY MR. FOSTER:

Q	Did the substance of the discussion between your-
self and	Mr. Murray relating to your decision not to hold
any more	press briefings, did that occur prior to the
conversat	ion with Mr. Fouchard, or subsequent?

Well, Bill was there and I had talked to Bill 6 A Murray before when I went over to see Joe, and I -- I 7 believe -- I thought that the NRC would want to do this, and yet looking back on it, I can understand why the regulator or the licensor would want to keep a -- would want to have their own press conference, rather than having one jointly with us, to continue to have credibility with -- with the 12 people in the area and throughout the country as the regulator. 13 I guess it would make some sense for them to not have a joint 15 press conference with the licensee.

Again trying to understand the logic behind the 0 decision here, did you go over to talk to Mr. Fouchard with the idea in mind that, look, we'll make a presentation to them that we can hold a joint press conference on Saturday morning, and if they decide against that, then maybe we should discontinue holding our own separate briefings?

I'm not sure if we really -- Bill Murray and I A talked about that latter part prior to going over there or as we were talking among ourselves over at Trailer City with Joe. I can't recall. But when we found -- when we

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realized that the NRC would prefer -- would not have a joint press conference, I believe I said to myself, you know, what are the alternatives, to continue having our own, which was devastating, and it just seemed to be logical at that time to discontinue having our own.

Joe Fouchard or Denton or Vic, none of those people indicated to me that we'll be the spokesman for the accident. Never. We'll be the exclusive spokesman, rather. BY MR. FRAMPTON:

10 Q You mentioned a minute ago that by Saturday 11 morning, Met Ed's credibility with the press was none too 12 high. Do you have any thoughts about why that happened, and 13 what kinds of things Met Ed or other utilities ought to do 14 in the luture to plan for accidents or incidents like this, 15 that would improve on that situation?

A I think part of it has occurred. I believe there are a lot more people in the news media that have a little more knowledge on radiation and nuclear generation than they did on the morning of the 28th. News media people that have covered accidents over the years just were not prepared to report on an accident which they couldn't see.

There were no bodies to count, there was no property damage to take pictures of, and I don't believe that they knew how to respond to this type of accident, just like we didn't know how to respond to the news media.

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Very few understood radiation. The fact that there was radiation above background, even though it was very small, seemed very significant to them. I don't know if an accident would, heaven forbid, occur similar to that, with what they know today, how reporting would be, the fact that they do have a better knowledge of radiation, and the type of accident. I'm sure that these two factors would change some of their reporting.

The news media, in their eyes, we changed our 9 story several times, and we did. We tried, even though it was 11 -- I felt our statements were not satisfactory at times and incomplete. We tried to tell them what we saw and how we 12 13 saw it, but what we saw and how we saw it changed as we 14 learned more about the accident, significantly.

There was a feeling by some, and I don't know how many, that perhaps we were lying, and I guess if I'd be a reporter there, I could come to that type of conclusion, and at that point they were really out for bear, and we certainly knew pulling back and not issuing releases on status of the plant, or having the news conferences, would not help us at that point.

BY MR. FOSTER:

Mr. Creitz, were you on site Saturday evening, 0 I believe, that Mr. Delokamp got a call from Jack Watson at the White House?

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A When you say on site --

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Q Were you aware of that conversation? A I was in the Dewey Schneider home or in Trailer City or in the observation center that evening. I understand that Herman had a call and he did have a discussion with somebody at the White House. I don't know if I was sitting in the room when that call came in, and I can't recall exactly when Herman mentioned it to me. It was after the time that I talked to Joe Fouchard and again what I was told, I wasn't on the telephone at the time, was that there was a concern, grave concern, about conflicting reports.

I was never told that the White House informed GPU or Met Ed not to report on the status of the accident. What I had understood was there was grave concern again about conflicting statements.

Q Do you know what, if any, action this call prompted with respect to your Hershey news center operation?

A At that point, we had established the fact that we were not giving out any reports. Perhaps it just sort of firmed up the fact that as long as we couldn't have joint conferences with the NRC, that to avoid conflicting statements, there was just no alternative, but we had decided that previously, so it really didn't bother me at the time that we had the call from the White House.

On Friday, prior to the Met Ed news conference, 1 0 2 do you remember having any conversations with Jack Herbein? 3 I talked to Jack and I talked to other people A 4 at the plant, yes. 5 Do you recall having any discussions concerning 0 what information would be provided at the news conference 6 on Friday with Mr. Herbein? 7 No specifics, only whatever the status was of the 8 A plant, whatever we knew relative to our readings on radiation, 9 10 specifically the 12 or 1400 millirem puff. I'm sure that 11 that was part of my conversation with Jack, to make sure 12 that the world understood what that reading was all about. 13 What I'm really saying is that was a reading over 14 the plant. It was not a reading offsite. 15 You do specifically recall that 1200 number with 0 16 them? 17 I certainly do. A Jumping around a little bit here, whose decision 18 0 was it to hold the once daily briefings as opposed to maybe 19 twice a day, three times a day? Was there a conscious 20 21 decision? A We recognized on the first day that simply 22 responding to telephone calls from news media was impossible. 23

There's just no way of handling it. We decided we would

have a briefing, and there wasn't that much -- the question

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was when, and I believe our discussion on this occurred 1 after Jack Herbein's briefing that he had with the news 2 media -- we recognized we should have one the following day. 3 11:00 o'clock seemed reasonable. 4 5 Certainly if there would have been any -- let me see -- very possibly I suggested let's hold a news 6 conference once a day. I think it was probably as simple as 7 that. I can't recall any extended conversation. I was 8 9 the one that made the decision. These discussions with respect to press briefings 10 0 11 would have been with Mr. Fabian? Uh-huh. And possibly touching base with, I'm 12 A 13 sure I mentioned it to Jack Herbein. 14 Q Did you have any discussions with Mr. Fabian 15 concerning who should be the principal spokesman at your 16 stand-up briefings? 17 Jack handled it on Wednesday, and I was satisfied A at that point and felt that Jack could handle it again on 18 19 Thursday. He was on site. 20 Did you --0 I believe I should have recognized that Jack was 21 A in need of more sleep and rest, but I let him handle it. 22 Was there any dialog between yourself and Mr. 23 0 24 Fabian with respect to whether or not you should have a

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public relations person present with Mr. Herbein?

A I believe it would have been -- I believe both of us would have said it would be desirable and that our public relations people were at that point establishing their news center in Hershey. At that time the only one that I would feel -- would feel comfortable with, would be Blaine himself, and I felt Blaine was fairly busy trying to handle the overall PR problem for us, and I was misquoted on this when I said we were not prepared for the accident.

I'm sure you've seen that quote of mine, and it was really in the context we were talking about our communications with the news media. I said we were not prepared to handle this, and that's what I was talking about. We really did -- we don't -- we didn't have the manpower.

Q Prior to Friday, did you have any discussions with the GPU management with respect to media interface?

A Prior to Friday, no. Well, let me -- repeat the question.

Q Did you discuss with GPU management how Met Ed should handle the media interface for --

A Blaine, I believe, had had some conversations with Bill Murray, and I'm sure I had, too. They were aware of the fact that we had the request to appear on the "Today" show and "Good Morning, America," and considering what we knew about -- what we knew, what GPU knew, what the world knew about the accident, it seemed like a -- just a matter

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of keeping the world posted on the status of the plant. 1 2 And you felt then that the television programs 0 3 would be a good medium to accomplish this? Certainly. It seemed it would have been very 4 A 5 detrimental not to accept the invitation. MR. FRAMPTON: Let's take a real short break. 6 7 [Recess.] 8 MR. FRAMPTON: On the record. 9 BY MR. FRAMPTON: Mr. Creitz, I just wanted to go back and ask you 10 0 11 about what you can recall of your conversation with Mr. 12 Herbein on Friday morning before the press briefing that he gave, relevant to this 1200 or 1400 or 1300 MR release. 13 That is, what was your understanding at the time and what 14 15 have you talked to Mr. Herbein about? 16 Uh-huh. We did talk about that release, and he A 17 explained to me -- and I might have gotten this information also from George Kunder or George Troffer previous to that. 18 19 But he again explained to me that it was a reading taken over the stack, directly above the stack by a meter in a helicopter, 20 and that it was not a reading that was recorded offsite. 21 This is Mr. Herbein you're referring to? 22 0 23 A Uh-huh. 24 And did you talk about whether he was going 0 Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc. 25 to try to clarify that in the press briefing?

A I believe he understood that it was a point of major -- and it should be very clearly discussed and mentioned.

Q Okay. I'd like to ask you one final question, and that is whether you have any thoughts in light of the accident at TMI about what kinds of background and training individuals who operate and manage nuclear power plants cught to have.

A I'll be glad to comment on that question. You do know that I'm not a nuclear engineer, and I do have to rely on people like Jack Herbeins and Bob Arnolds to give me the nuclear technical advice and direction, but I also -- looking back at it, I also did feel that we were very highly organized and trained to handle very severe accidents and, incidentally, I still believe that we are, and I believe we were taken by our own safety record and perhaps became somewhat complacent.

I believe that we were set for an accident. We didn't recognize the intermediate type of occurrence or accident that happened, and the importance of having highly trained, knowledgeable technical people available to evaluate a situation like the accident on March 28, but our emergency plan certainly was not designed for the intermediate type of accident, nor were we prepared to talk to the news media.

Again we were prepared for the very severe

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accident in which it would be evacuation. The news people wouldn't have been there for a press conference. We simply were not, you know, we weren't prepared for this type of an accident. Technical people, availability, news media, people, emergency plan. We have to improve all these areas, and I believe Met Ed is taking steps to demon-strate to the world that it is. We have now in our property probably the greatest nuclear lab that the world has ever known. MR. FRAMPTON: Mr. Creitz, thank you very much. We appreciate your time and your cooperation. Thank you. [Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the deposition was adjourned.] Ace-Federal Reporters, Inc.