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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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IN THE MATTER OF:

NRC/TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY

DEPOSITION OF WALTER CREITZ

Place - Washington, D. C.

Date - Tuesday, 23 October 1979

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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Deposition of:                   :  
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          WALTER CREITZ           :  
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NRC/TMI SPECIAL INQUIRY

Shaw, Pittman, Potts & Trowbridge  
1800 M Street Northwest  
Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, October 23, 1979

The deposition of WALTER CREITZ was convened at 8:55  
a.m., pursuant to notice.

APPEARANCES:

George T. Frampton, Jr., Esquire,  
-and-  
Chip Foster,

Appearing for the NRC/TMI Special Inquiry.

Matias Travieso-Diaz, Esquire,  
Appearing for Metropolitan Edison.

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C O N T E N T S

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WITNESS:

Examination by:

Page:

WALTER CREITZ

Mr. Frampton & Mr. Foster

3

Exhibits:

Identified:

[None.]

P R O C E E D I N G S

1  
2 MR. FRAMPTON: This is a deposition being  
3 conducted by the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
4 Special Inquiry Group for Mr. Walter Creitz on October 23rd,  
5 1979, in Washington, D.C.

6 Present, in addition to Mr. Creitz, are Mr.  
7 Frampton and Mr. Foster of the Special Inquiry Group and  
8 Mr. Diaz, who is representing Metropolitan Edison Company.  
9 Whereupon,

10 WALTER CREITZ

11 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,  
12 was examined and testified as follows:

13 EXAMINATION

14 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

15 Q Could you state your full name for the record.

16 A Walter M. Creitz, C-r-e-i-t-z.

17 Q Mr. Creitz, before we started, I showed you a  
18 one-page witness notification form that describes the purpose  
19 of our inquiry, and your rights in connection with this  
20 interview, including the fact that the transcript of the  
21 deposition may eventually become public information.

22 Have you read that, and do you understand it?

23 A I have read it.

24 Q Thank you.

25 Now, as I mentioned to you before we began, our

1 primary interest is to focus on your activities and knowledge  
2 of other people's activities in the three or four days after  
3 the beginning of the accident on March 28, and we have the  
4 benefit of the deposition that was taken of you by the  
5 President's Commission staff, as well as other public  
6 testimony that you have given, so in some cases we will try  
7 not to repeat that testimony, simply for the purposes of  
8 saying that we did it, too, but rather to go to the things  
9 that might not be covered elsewhere that especially interest  
10 us.

11 I think your previous testimony and other  
12 information that's been made available by Met Ed indicates  
13 that on March 28, you learned about the incident about 7:30  
14 in the morning from Mr. Troffer. Is that right?

15 A Indirectly, yes. George Troffer had called my  
16 secretary. I was still at home, and Mrs. Quillan called me  
17 up at home.

18 Q And do you recall getting some information from  
19 Mr. Fabian that morning before you went to work?

20 A No.

21 Q What do you recall was the next conversation?

22 A My next conversation -- well, I immediately left  
23 for the office and upon arriving there, I had arranged to  
24 talk to George Troffer and talked to George Kunder and Gary  
25 Miller. Mr. Fabian then came to my office. Those were

1 some of the initial conversations I had, being given a little  
2 more detail of what the status was of the emergency. Also  
3 to talk to Bob Arnold that morning, early that morning, and  
4 Jack Herbein.

5 Q Did you have telephone conversations with Mr.  
6 Miller and Mr. Kunder in the control room?

7 A Yes.

8 Q -- of Unit 2. Did you call them, do you remember?

9 A Yes.

10 Q Did you have any problem getting through to them  
11 at that time?

12 A I didn't at that time.

13 Q And do you remember what they told you about what  
14 had happened?

15 A They described the conditions of a site emergency  
16 and a general emergency. They briefly told me what they felt  
17 had happened, why the alarms went off; that there might be a  
18 leak existing between the primary and secondary systems, which  
19 might have provided such radiation on site, but we had no  
20 indications that there was radiation off site. But they  
21 were forming monitoring teams to be sent over to Goldsboro  
22 and other areas to make that determination.

23 I guess I didn't press for a lengthy discussion  
24 of details of the accident itself. I wasn't sure if anybody  
25 really understood completely at that point, and secondly I

1 didn't want to take more -- any more time than necessary,  
2 but I -- those are the initial conversations with George  
3 Kunder and Gary Miller. I'm not sure which one told me what  
4 of that part of the conversation.

5 BY MR. FOSTER:

6 Q Approximately what time was the conversation?

7 A Some time after 9:00, I would say. Closer to 8:00.  
8 Yes, yes. I would say closer to 8:00 o'clock.

9 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

10 Q I think you've also said in previous interviews  
11 that you talked to Mr. Arnold and he mentioned that the  
12 radioactivity indicated some fuel failure. Do you recall  
13 that conversation?

14 A Yes. He had indicated that there could be or might  
15 be, I'm not sure of the verb, but he implied that there  
16 could be a fuel assembly damage. That was a little later,  
17 that was perhaps closer to 9:00 -- some time after that  
18 conversation.

19 Q Do you remember his demeanor in that phone  
20 conversation? Was he concerned? Not especially concerned?

21 A Bob, from his voice inflection, I wasn't sure,  
22 Bob has gone through emergencies and trying conditions  
23 previously. Bob is normally a very cool individual, and I  
24 didn't detect any overexcitement in the discussion. There  
25 was certainly an indication of concern.

1 Q Let me jump ahead for a minute.

2 You said that in your first conversations, you  
3 learned from the people in the control room that no offsite  
4 releases had been detected.

5 Do you remember when was the first time you learned  
6 something about offsite readings or offsite releases above  
7 background?

8 A Yes.

9 Q When was that?

10 A That must have been around 10:30, 11:00 o'clock  
11 that morning.

12 Q And from whom did you learn that? What do you  
13 recall about the circumstances?

14 A I believe that was a -- I was on the phone talking  
15 to someone at that particular instant, and my secretary  
16 brought me a note in with the information on it. George  
17 Troffer, I believe.

18 Q And do you remember what the substance of that  
19 information was?

20 A That low levels of radiation above background  
21 have been detected. I don't recall the numbers; numbers  
22 of 2 to 4 millirems would ring a bell. I have -- I have  
23 some notes on some of these things which I could sort of  
24 perhaps zero in on and give you a more exact --

25 Q Do you have them with you?



1           A       I believe so. I hope I have the information  
2 to respond to that particular question.

3                   [Pause.]

4           I am sorry, but the magnitude of the reading  
5 above background doesn't appear in my notes at that time  
6 in the morning.

7           Q       I wonder, Mr. Creitz, if you are looking at the  
8 same thing that I am. Met Ed has provided us with a couple  
9 of different chronologies.

10          A       This probably was used in preparation -- I'm sure  
11 it was part of one of what you have.

12          Q       Does the document that you are looking at reflect  
13 your own typed-up version of your own notes and recollections,  
14 or is that additional -- those of additional people?

15          A       This was something that I had put together several  
16 days after the accident, together with Blaine Fabian, and  
17 I'm sure that this has been used to put together the final  
18 statement, parts of it.

19               MR. FRAMPTON: Why don't we go off the record for  
20 a minute.

21                   [Discussion off the record.]

22               MR. FRAMPTON: Back on the record.

23           For the record, Mr. Creitz, we have looked at  
24 the typed-up notes that you were referring to, and it  
25 appears to be a draft or earlier draft of the document

1 that has been provided to us by Met Ed.

2 I think you also mentioned while we were off the  
3 record that there was another subject that we didn't cover  
4 that came up in your conversation with people in the control  
5 room, around 8:00 or 8:00 to 9:00 o'clock? Is that correct?

6 THE WITNESS: Yes.

7 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

8 Q What was that?

9 A George Kunder and/or Gary Miller brought me up to  
10 date on the status of the emergency plan. They told me that  
11 all steps of the emergency plan had been carried out, that  
12 the state had been notified, the local folks in the county  
13 had been notified, the NRC had also been notified, following  
14 the site emergency announcement.

15 Q The chronology that we have indicates that at  
16 some point around 10:30 in the morning, you and Mr. Troffer  
17 and Mr. Fabian all got together because you realized that  
18 there was conflicting information about offsite releases,  
19 and you were trying to reconcile that conflicting informa-  
20 tion. Do you recall that?

21 A I recall that I guess just the fact that there  
22 were offsite releases caused enough concern to be a lot  
23 more concerned, and I don't recall what the conflict at this  
24 instant, but I did think it would be -- would be well for  
25 some of us to be sure that at least those of us back in the

1 corporate office have the same understanding.

2 Q Did you resolve that?

3 A I don't think so. I don't think so. It was  
4 resolved to the point that we recognized that we had offsite  
5 readings.

6 I also recognized that at that point, our people  
7 up at Three Mile Island were extremely busy, and I'm sure  
8 awfully concerned. I certainly was the last one that wanted  
9 to interfere. I would probably be the least helpful to  
10 waste any of their time.

11 I also recognized that Jack Herbein should be  
12 arriving on site within a very short period of time.

13 Q What was it that was conflicting? Was it the  
14 numbers, or whether there were any offsite releases?

15 A I honestly don't recall what the conflicting part  
16 was. I believe one of the questions perhaps was are we  
17 really talking offsite or are we talking on site, but I'm  
18 not sure.

19 Q The chronology also indicates that because there  
20 was no direction to change the statement being given out  
21 to the media and the public upon request, that communication  
22 services people continued to offer no confirmation of any  
23 release. I take it that is any confirmation of offsite  
24 release.

25 Was that something that you discussed at that

1 time?

2 A I believe that I just never felt very comfortable  
3 and satisfied with some of the information that I was getting,  
4 and I was concerned of providing inaccurate, erroneous  
5 information to the public. A couple of nights before this  
6 I was at a movie house and saw a film called "The China  
7 Syndrome," and I was equally concerned that I wanted to  
8 provide information to the public.

9 I sort of recall that executive, he didn't, and  
10 that isn't the way we operated at Met Ed, but I was very  
11 much concerned and I just didn't feel comfortable with the  
12 information I had. I was pretty well convinced that our  
13 people were very carefully monitoring the situation so if  
14 there be any possibility for indication that perhaps  
15 evacuation should be considered by the state, to be sure  
16 that the state would be getting that information, and I hope  
17 that I impressed my people that whenever we get any -- signals  
18 occur, this might be necessary, that we certainly want to  
19 let the right people know about it.

20 At the time we were trying to start up the pump.  
21 There were just a lot of things that were happening that  
22 was just hard to put the whole thing together and to come  
23 up with a statement that would make any sense.

24 BY MR. FOSTER:

25 Q Prior to the point in time when Mr. Troffer

1 notified you that you were getting some offsite readings,  
2 were you personally handling any inquiries from media or  
3 government officials?

4 A I did not talk to any news media people directly.  
5 We had put together a statement early that morning, and I  
6 know Bob Arnold had also put together a statement with the  
7 GPU people. I did not talk to any news media people myself  
8 at that point. That's very unusual. Normally I would want  
9 to talk to news media people, but I just didn't feel that  
10 we really had something that would make any sense at that  
11 point.

12 Q Were you talking to any government officials,  
13 federal or state?

14 A Yes. But I'm not sure at exactly what time.  
15 Some time in the morning I had talked to several of the offices  
16 of Congress, some of our Congress people. Walker, who  
17 serves Lancaster County, Ertel, who serves Dauphin County,  
18 and Goodling, who serves your county.

19 Again this was in the morning. I had talked to  
20 Lieutenant Governor Scranton after we were convinced that  
21 there was offsite releases. I tried to get to Governor  
22 Thornburgh earlier without success, and then after we had  
23 the releases, I tried again, and couldn't, and I'm not sure  
24 if I suggested, well, let me try to talk to Lieutenant  
25 Governor Scranton, or if they suggested it. But one way or

1 the other, I did talk to Scranton some time during the  
2 latter part of the morning.

3 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

4 Q What was the purpose of that call? Was that  
5 to tell him that there were some offsite readings? Was  
6 that the primary purpose?

7 A Yes. He had just had a press conference in which  
8 he indicated that things were well under control at Three  
9 Mile Island. It was a very strong statement he made. It  
10 sort of shocked me, and when I got the word of the releases,  
11 I felt it was incumbent that we'd better get to the  
12 Governor's office. Probably when I wasn't successful on  
13 that route, to get to the Lieutenant Governor's office. I  
14 had no trouble getting to Lieutenant Governor Scranton,  
15 incidentally.

16 Q What do you recall about your conversation?

17 A Simply told him that at this point -- the main  
18 point of the conversation was at this time we have detected  
19 radiation readings above background.

20 Q What was his reaction, do you remember?

21 A No. He certainly didn't appear to be panicking  
22 or anything of that nature. It was a very pleasant conversa-  
23 tion. I'm not sure, of course, I wasn't completely normal  
24 at that point, either, so I'm not sure how you detect or  
25 determine how the other fellow was reacting.

1 Q Was that -- did that seem to be, insofar as you  
2 could tell, something that contradicted his understanding  
3 as it was when he gave his news conference?

4 A Yes. Oh, yes, he had no -- he didn't know, I  
5 didn't know at that instant. I believed that there were  
6 offsite releases. I believe there were some people from  
7 Met Ed or GPU, perhaps, at that press conference, and I guess  
8 they didn't know, either.

9 BY MR. FOSTER:

10 Q The substance of what the Lieutenant Governor  
11 said in that press conference, was that based on his prior  
12 conversation earlier with you that morning?

13 A No, no, I didn't get -- this was my first conversa-  
14 tion with the Lieutenant Governor. Earlier I had tried to  
15 get to the Governor's office, and didn't. I don't know  
16 what the reason was, we just didn't get through to him. In  
17 the meantime, there were other calls coming in, other things  
18 to do, and I really almost sort of dropped it at that point,  
19 until I got word that there were offsite releases, and then  
20 perhaps I made a much stronger effort to get to him.

21 The Lieutenant -- I believe the Lieutenant  
22 Governor's office -- your record would show this -- had a  
23 conversation with maybe Gary Miller or some of our people  
24 earlier that day.

1 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

2 Q I believe that the chronology provided us reflects  
3 that there had been a telephone conversation between the  
4 Unit 2 control room and the Lieutenant Governor earlier in the  
5 morning.

6 A Uh-huh.

7 Q This chronology also indicates that you got some  
8 more information later on in the morning, around noon, from  
9 Mr. Troffer, that offsite radiation readings -- and that  
10 you and Mr. Fabian recognized that there was a difference  
11 in the information being given out by the NRC and Met Ed.  
12 What do you remember about that? Can you expand on that?

13 A I can't recall what the differences might have  
14 been.

15 Q Well, at that point, is it possible that  
16 your communications people were still putting out a statement  
17 that said that radiation was confined to the site, and the  
18 NRC in Washington was saying, we have some offsite readings?

19 A I would hardly think so. At that point we knew  
20 there were offsite readings, so if we were having a concern  
21 of the differences of what the NRC and we might have been  
22 saying -- I sometimes had trouble understanding some of our  
23 own information, simply because perhaps a reading at one  
24 particular spot at a particular instant of time had so many  
25 millirems, and 10 minutes later that reading was completely



1 different, and I believe that it was pointed out to me -- I  
2 certainly learned a lot that morning -- that radiation  
3 drifts sort of like clouds, in the form of clouds, and  
4 when you don't have very much wind, it sort of moves around  
5 from one spot to the other, and getting different readings  
6 at different times, at different instances of time, led to,  
7 I'm sure, some of the discrepancies in some of the reporting.

8 Q At about the same time, I believe the Lieutenant  
9 Governor called you back and asked to be briefed by somebody;  
10 is that right?

11 A That's right.

12 Q What do you remember about that conversation?

13 A He asked for some official from the company to  
14 meet with him some time that afternoon, at 2:00 o'clock,  
15 2:30, and I said fine, we'll have someone there.

16 Q And then you called Mr. Herbein at the observa-  
17 tion center?

18 A I believe Blaine Fabian was in my office at the  
19 time, and I then called Jack Herbein and asked him to be at  
20 the Lieutenant Governor's office.

21 Q Did you specifically ask him to take some other  
22 people from the plant, or did you just ask him to go, or  
23 for him to see that somebody went? What do you remember  
24 about that?

25 A Well, I didn't tell him to take anybody with him.

1 I recognized that Jack just got on site himself. I think your  
2 record shows that he is in the Navy Reserve, and he was on  
3 duty with them at that time. I guess I wouldn't have been  
4 surprised if he wanted to take somebody with him. I felt  
5 it was important to have a person like Jack Herbein who knew  
6 the broader picture of our nuclear energy program at Met Ed,  
7 someone who had a good rapport in responding to questions  
8 previously with various groups, community groups, and so  
9 forth.

10 I also recognized that some of the people at the  
11 plant who also -- who perhaps had more detailed knowledge  
12 were also very busy. Jack Herbein seemed to be, in my mind --  
13 and this was entirely my judgment -- but the person -- I  
14 think I might have said something to Blaine Fabian, "What  
15 do you think?" Blaine Fabian's report -- the reports that  
16 Blaine Fabian had on Jack Herbein's appearances in responding  
17 to questions prior to the accident were excellent. I felt it  
18 had to be somebody that had some technical knowledge. Jack  
19 Herbein seemed to meet these requirements.

20 Q Before he left to go brief the Lieutenant  
21 Governor, he gave his own press briefing at the observation  
22 center.

23 A Uh-huh.

24 Q And I think you mentioned in a previous interview  
25 that you instructed or encouraged him to do this, in part

1 because just answering the telephones at your offices didn't  
2 really seem to be satisfying the media. Can you expand on  
3 that a little bit?

4 A Jack, in that same conversation, Jack said there  
5 is a lot of news people in the area. I had no idea how many  
6 he was talking about, and I recognized, too, that I didn't  
7 feel that I was -- that those of us sitting back in the  
8 corporate office were being very helpful to the news media,  
9 and felt that if Jack would take a few minutes before he went  
10 to the Lieutenant Governor's office, perhaps he could answer  
11 some of their questions. I supported the thought that Jack  
12 should talk to those news media people.

13 Q Was he asking you, "What should I do? Is it  
14 all right to talk to them?" Or did you suggest that he  
15 talk to them, do you remember?

16 A I believe he mentioned that the news media people  
17 were there. He might have said, you know, he might have said  
18 they -- they want to talk to us, or what do I do with them,  
19 and so forth. I'm not sure if I suggested and told Jack,  
20 why don't you talk to them, or he said should I talk to them.

21 Regardless of how he asked the question, I would  
22 have -- I would feel -- I would want Jack to at least meet  
23 with them before he went to the Lieutenant Governor's office.

24 Q Did you and Mr. Herbein talk about what he was  
25 going to say, or how he should say it, in any way? Did you

1 talk about guidelines of --

2 A No, sir. No, no, simply what he knew at that  
3 point relative to the releases, where we were relative to  
4 plant stability, trying to get the -- one of the pumps  
5 running, and whatever questions the news media might have.

6 Q The chronology reflects that about 3:00 o'clock  
7 in the afternoon, a statement was drafted by you in your  
8 name describing the low offsite releases. Is that the first  
9 specific statement that had been drafted up about offsite  
10 releases for the telephone people to answer, that you know of?

11 A First off, that's the first one that I guess  
12 perhaps might have had my name on it. The fact that we  
13 recognize that we had offsite releases, I assumed that  
14 our communications people were mentioning that in response  
15 to telephone conversations.

16 Q Do you know of an earlier statement that had  
17 been drafted for people to read over the telephone?

18 A A statement per se? I don't recall. But  
19 certainly I would -- well, that's hearsay. I'll drop it.

20 Q Well, even if it's hearsay, I wonder what you  
21 remember about it.

22 A Well, as far as I was concerned, it was a fact  
23 that we had offsite releases and I would have to assume that  
24 that's exactly what our people downstairs were telling the  
25 world, and that's the type of thing I wanted Jack to tell

1 the news media people.

2 Q At some point in the evening, I think you left  
3 your office and went to the site; is that right?

4 A That is right.

5 Q And what -- what was the purpose of your going to  
6 the observation center?

7 A That -- the following morning I was to be inter-  
8 viewed on ABC and NBC from Harrisburg. I wanted to see Jack,  
9 to tie it together.

10 Q Was it your plan to try to stay there overnight  
11 or something near the plant, to get briefed in the morning  
12 before you went on these shows? Was that part of your plan  
13 at that time?

14 A I did.

15 Q Okay. What -- let me ask you this: When you  
16 left your office, had you learned that they had gotten the  
17 main reactor coolant pump started again, do you remember  
18 that?

19 A I don't think I knew that when I left for  
20 Harrisburg -- left my office. I knew it upon arriving there.  
21 I remember Jack telling me that the coolant pump was running.  
22 I'm not -- I don't seem to be aware that it was running  
23 before I left my office.

24 Q What did you learn when you got to the site about  
25 the status of the plant?

1           A       I guess the main thing was everybody was pleased  
2 that the pump was running. It was sort of the main objective  
3 of the day, one of the main objectives on the site was to  
4 get the pump running, that the offsite readings, if I  
5 recall correctly, certainly hadn't increased. I don't recall  
6 if any disappeared at that point.

7                   I know one of our workers had been apparently  
8 overexposed in the process.

9                   I think those are sort of the -- some of the main  
10 points that I can recall.

11           Q       Were you told in substance that the situation  
12 was stabilized, that the plant was stable, with the pump  
13 operating?

14           A       I don't think it was said quite in -- quite in  
15 that context. The point was that a major accomplishment had  
16 been made, that the pump was running, and that was awfully  
17 important, and I guess it was, you know, it was awfully good  
18 news to all of us. We didn't totally understand the depth  
19 of the accident at that particular instant.

20           Q       Well, I guess that's what I'm getting at. What  
21 was the sense of what was conveyed to you? Was it relief?

22           A       The sense that I got, you know, I'm not sure  
23 that's what was being told -- being said to me, but what  
24 I was hearing was that, you know, this was a big event, that  
25 from here on in I had the feeling that the situation would

1 probably improve.

2 Q I think that you mentioned in a previous interview  
3 that you were accosted or collared by press people as you  
4 were leaving the observation center that night. Do you  
5 remember that?

6 A Uh-huh. Uh-huh. Did I use that word? I hope not.

7 Q That's my characterization.

8 A Okay. They were friendly. They just encircled me.

9 Q What do you remember about the questions that  
10 were asked and the answers that you gave on that occasion?

11 A Sort of an uncontrolled discussion. It started  
12 out really with one or two news people asking me a question  
13 as I left the observation center, and I guess before I had  
14 two sentences, I was sort of surrounded by the news media,  
15 and it was an uncontrolled interview, questions popping up  
16 all over. They asked questions about offsite releases, and  
17 I told them, I guess, what I had understood, that the magnitude  
18 was very low, but there were radiation levels above background.

19 They asked me about or I told them about the  
20 pump that was in operation. I can't recall any of the  
21 questions they asked. They asked if anybody -- I believe  
22 one of them asked if anyone was overexposed. I believe I  
23 spent about maybe 10 minutes, 10 or 15 minutes with them,  
24 as I recall. This was after midnight.

25 Q And then you were briefed again in the morning

1 by Mr. Kunder and Mr. Logan before you taped the television  
2 show?

3 A I talked to them before I went over for the taping.

4 Q Was that on the phone?

5 A Yes.

6 Q From the hotel?

7 A Uh-huh.

8 Q Did they give you a status report or a picture  
9 that was changed substantially from the night before?

10 A No, uh-uh.

11 Q What do you remember that they told you about  
12 plant status?

13 A The pump was still running. I don't recall  
14 exactly what they said about offsite readings. Either  
15 they continued to be very small at the various locations --  
16 I'm not sure of that -- or there were none. It was insignificant  
17 to me at that point, I guess, and therefore probably they  
18 were telling me none at that time. They confirmed the point  
19 that there was nobody on site that received any high level  
20 radiation. That's a matter of -- of keeping the plant under  
21 control and proceeding to take steps to bring the unit back  
22 on.

23 Q Physically where were you during the day on  
24 Thursday? Were you at the site or in the Harrisburg area?

25 A Well, let's start again. This is my first



1 upon awakening and getting dressed, I talked to the plant,  
2 it must have been about 4:00 o'clock in the morning, I  
3 believe, and then I proceeded into the center of Harrisburg  
4 to have the two tapings.

5 Jack Herbein also had a taping that morning. I  
6 believe it was CBS. And I then proceeded on to -- down to  
7 Hershey with Jack Herbein in preparation for a news conference,  
8 press conference at 10:30 or 11:00 o'clock.

9 Following that I called the --

10 Q You and Mr. Herbein did that?

11 A Yes. I then called Wilson Goode, who is chairman  
12 of the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission, and he  
13 called in the other two commissioners at that time, and  
14 briefed them on the status of what we told the news media  
15 and where we were.

16 I also talked to the Lieutenant Governor's  
17 office. In fact, he had initiated a call to us requesting  
18 that he be granted permission to go on site, which we arranged  
19 for.

20 I then went over to the observation center at  
21 Three Mile Island. Herbein and Deickamp had arrived in there at  
22 some time that morning and stayed there for the rest of  
23 the afternoon, during which period of time Deickamp and Herbein  
24 had briefed the various senators and Congress people that  
25 arrived in two flights, two groups.

1                   Following that, I attended a meeting of the  
2 Pennsylvania Electric Association Executive Committee at  
3 Hershey, briefed the other utility executives of the happenings  
4 of the day.

5           Q        What time was that? Was that a late afternoon  
6 meeting?

7           A        That would have been 6:00, 6:30, 7:00 o'clock in  
8 the evening.

9           Q        Up to that time, had you received any information  
10 indicating that the accident was worse than you had thought it  
11 was on Wednesday night, let's say?

12          A        No.

13          Q        There wasn't anything that you learned during the  
14 day on Thursday after that point that would have suggested  
15 that things were a lot worse than you previously thought?

16          A        No, that's right. I went home that evening, in  
17 fact, thinking that we're just on our -- you know -- that  
18 we're on the process of getting back in a normal operation.  
19 I didn't expect that it would happen the following day, but  
20 at least we were on that track.

21                   That takes me up to the -- I guess that will sort  
22 of briefly describe my Thursday activities.

23          Q        Okay, maybe you can go to Friday now and tell us  
24 what the first thing was that you learned on Friday morning.

25          A        The first thing I learned was that we did have

1 offsite releases. I guess that would be the first thing.  
2 Of course, I talked to some more people about it, confirmed  
3 it. I wasn't clear exactly what happened at that point in  
4 my mind, but I knew that there was definitely offsite  
5 releases.

6 Q Had you known that on Thursday? Did you know  
7 that there were small periodic releases?

8 A No.

9 Q Causing offsite readings of some kind?

10 A No.

11 Q If there were on Thursday?

12 A No, I didn't know that at that time, that there  
13 were releases.

14 Q So you weren't aware on Thursday afternoon or  
15 evening that there were any releases continuing, or periodic  
16 releases from the plant at all?

17 A No.

18 Q That was new information to you on Friday morning.  
19 Were you in your office?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Friday morning when you learned about this  
22 evacuation flap and so forth?

23 A Yes.

24 Q And is that the first thing that got your  
25 attention?

1           A       Yes, and the only thing that got my attention, I  
2 guess, that morning.

3           MR. DIAZ:   Shall we take a break?

4           MR. FRAMPTON:   Sure, let's take a short break.

5           [Recess.]

6           MR. FRAMPTON:   Okay, we'll go back on the record.

7           BY MR. FRAMPTON:

8           Q       Mr. Creitz, there are a number of things that we  
9 want to come back to, but I think in the chronology we were  
10 up to Friday, and I had asked you what you recalled about  
11 your activities and whereabouts on Friday when you learned  
12 various things.

13          A       Friday morning was obviously quite hectic in  
14 finding out about the releases. It seems like Friday morning  
15 passed by very rapidly. I had several conversations with  
16 some of our people, Jack Herbein and others. I was mainly  
17 concerned about the conditions that would exist, that would  
18 be considered dangerous, and they reviewed with me the  
19 guidelines, perhaps they are called, that would determine  
20 if an evacuation would be recommended.

21          Q       Are those the protective action guidelines?

22          A       I don't know. I don't know. They pointed out  
23 that there were guidelines, there were numbers established,  
24 and that they assured me again that this information was  
25 being provided to the government, and by that I assume

1 they meant the state and perhaps the NRC, although NRC  
2 people were on site in abundance at that point, and were  
3 getting firsthand information.

4 Q When you say "they" assured you, who are you  
5 talking about?

6 A I'm not sure, it was possibly Jack Herbein,  
7 depending on -- my people.

8 Q You were in your office in Reading, and you were  
9 talking with Mr. Herbein and others at the site?

10 A That's right.

11 Q Was this after you learned that there had been  
12 an evacuation recommendation or some sort of advisory?

13 A I think it was before that. I believe the  
14 original information I had was simply that there were off-  
15 site readings, there were releases of radioactive gas. In  
16 fact, it was -- the first information that I was made aware  
17 of was, I guess, some time -- I wasn't aware of the reading  
18 that was taken of either 1200 or 1300 or 1400 millirems  
19 taken by helicopter immediately above the plant. And I  
20 believe the thought of the evacuation, that I had perhaps  
21 picked up in some of my radio or TV set at the time, occurred  
22 about that same time, that that information incorrectly was  
23 reported by the news media.

24 Q But you learned initially from the site that  
25 there were some releases; is that right?

1           A       Yes.

2           Q       And then subsequently you learned that there  
3 had been advisory recommendations concerning evacuation, or  
4 at about the same time?

5           A       I hadn't, no, not at that early hour. I had  
6 discussions on making sure that -- I was very much concerned  
7 about giving accurate information to the state. I recognized  
8 very clearly that it was not Met Ed's responsibility to order  
9 an evacuation, but certainly the information that Met Ed  
10 was gathering might be a key factor in it, and I had  
11 personally very major concerns that the information that we  
12 were providing was accurate.

13                   I certainly didn't want to -- I mentioned  
14 concerns. I had two concerns:

15                   One, that we obviously gave correct information;  
16 but more importantly, whatever that was, that we didn't  
17 either be too optimistic or too pessimistic. I knew that  
18 if Met Ed would get some indication that regardless of what  
19 the readings would be that, you know, maybe evacuation  
20 should be had, should be made, if Met Ed would be quoted  
21 on indicating that there probably would be massive evacuation,  
22 and I was very concerned that if that would happen, that  
23 people would be, perhaps in the rush be killed, and everything  
24 else, and I was really alarmed and shocked. And I guess you  
25 might say this was one of the -- I had two major concerns,

1 and I believe I expressed, you know, that we just have to be  
2 sure we give them all the information and correct information,  
3 so that the state can make the proper judgment.

4 Q Do you recall discussing with Mr. Herbein or  
5 anyone else from the site that some kind of an evacuation  
6 advisory, or stay-indoors advisory had in fact been made, and  
7 whether that was justified or not?

8 A I believe the announcement from the state or  
9 whoever it came from about staying indoors indicated it was  
10 a precautionary measure. I viewed it at the time that it  
11 might be more comforting to the people at least, you know,  
12 at least they were told to do something instead of packing  
13 up and getting out of the area.

14 So in the context that it was a precautionary measure  
15 it wasn't a major item on my list of concerns at that  
16 particular time. I guess I was partly comforted by at least,  
17 you know, my people telling me that there would be no reason  
18 to recommend evacuation, that the readings were very low, and  
19 this might keep the people under some -- might keep the people  
20 under some better control.

21 Q Did you have any contact, direct contact, with  
22 state people during the day on Friday?

23 A No.

24 Q The Governor's office, the Lieutenant Governor's,  
25 the DRA, anyone else from the state, you personally?

1           A       No. The Public Utility Commission, I talked to  
2 I believe, Wilson Goode that morning, or it might have been  
3 Carter that morning, I'm not sure, but I did tell the  
4 commission I knew that our people were keeping the -- were  
5 keeping the state informed. I had received some calls from  
6 some of the offices of the Congress people that morning, in  
7 the process I believe I placed a call to the NRC, but the  
8 call was buried for one reason or another with other calls  
9 coming in, and then I think in the midpart of the morning --  
10 midpart of the morning I had received a call from Chairman  
11 Hendrie. At that particular instant I believe I was talking  
12 to -- I don't know who -- the commission, perhaps, PUC, and  
13 by the time I got off that call and got to pick up Hendrie's  
14 call, he was in a meeting, I guess, and I held on there for  
15 a while and finally it was decided that his office would call  
16 me back when he was available again, and that occurred around  
17 noon, I believe.

18           Q       You had previously tried to call the NRC in  
19 Washington?

20           A       No. I believe I tried to call the NRC in the  
21 region.

22           Q       And had not gotten through?

23           A       Yes. I don't really recall why. The line was  
24 busy or --

25           Q       Do you remember why you tried to call them?



1           A       It probably was around the time when we were  
2 getting -- we were getting reports. I believe the NRC  
3 was being credited for this reading of 12 or 1300, and I  
4 wanted to be sure that we had the same understanding of what  
5 that reading was all about.

6                   I think that was one of the key reasons I tried  
7 to reach the NRC.

8           Q       And what do you recall about the conversation that  
9 you eventually had with Mr. Hendrie?

10          A       Well, of course, at that time it was noon, and he  
11 had made the decision to send people to Three Mile Island,  
12 key people. He wanted me to be aware of it. He told me  
13 who they -- who was arriving, that Harold Denton would be  
14 leading this contingent and would be arriving some time that  
15 afternoon.

16                   He also expressed concern that -- or interest  
17 and concern that it was important that the industry --  
18 by industry, I think he was talking about other utilities,  
19 manufacturers, and so forth -- that the nongovernmental part  
20 of the nuclear industry provide support to our recovery efforts,  
21 and this information I passed on to Bob Arnold, Herman  
22 Deickamp, I believe, who was, incidentally, doing exactly  
23 this at that time.

24                   I told Chairman Hendrie that I planned to leave  
25 for the island some time after lunch. I never did get lunch,

1       come to think of it, and that afternoon when I -- I guess  
2       I arrived about the same time Harold Denton was there, and I  
3       met him and his associate, some of the other people.

4               Q       Let me go back to the telephone call with Chairman  
5       Hendrie. Did he indicate to you or tell you in words or  
6       substance that he didn't want any major changes in plant  
7       status to be made without the NRC being consulted?

8               A       No, I don't recall any indication, directly,  
9       definitely I don't recall anything, and indirectly I don't  
10      remember any -- any such implication. I can't recall.

11              Q       Was there any discussion in that conversation  
12      about who should be making --

13              A       No, let me just get back to that. Even if he  
14      would have implied something like that, I don't think it  
15      would have been -- would have been significant to me because,  
16      you know, the NRC people were there, they are the ones that  
17      issued our license, and I had -- I had no reason to feel  
18      that our people were not cooperating with the NRC in everything  
19      that we were doing. So if he might have implied something  
20      like that, it wouldn't have turned on any lights in my mind.  
21      I would assume that we were doing it. I had no reason to feel  
22      we weren't.

23              Q       But as you sit here, you don't specifically recall --

24              A       No.

25              Q       -- his conveying some message to you about the

1 NRC wanting to approve any changes or approve any major  
2 evolutions in the plant status, or anything like that?

3 A No. The only thing that he -- let me think a  
4 second.

T.2 5 Nothing I can recall that would say hey, make  
6 sure whatever you think you're going to do, you better get  
7 our approval on it.

8 Q Right, that's what I'm getting at.

9 I'm not suggesting that such a conversation took  
10 place. I'm merely asking for your recollection as to whether  
11 it might have.

12 A Again he only talked about bringing in the non-  
13 government part of the nuclear industry. We seemed to have a  
14 short few words relative to putting some kind of a plan  
15 together or something of that nature, but again it wasn't  
16 with a tinge of get the plant approved by us. I don't recall  
17 that.

18 Q Okay, do you recall any conversation about who  
19 should be making information available to the press about a  
20 single spokesman, or we have to avoid conflicting information,  
21 anything like that, in that conversation?

22 A No. I'm sure one of the things we did talk about,  
23 probably talked about, was conflicting reports, but nothing  
24 was said or indicated that there should be a single report.

25 Q Okay. Now you said you then went to the site and

1 met Mr. Denton or talked to him?

2 A Uh-huh. He was quite busy at that point, just  
3 unpacking and trying to get -- some of his people were trying  
4 to get lines established back to the White House, but I did  
5 met with him, chatted with him a few minutes.

6 Q During the afternoon on Friday, was there any  
7 discussion at the site with any NRC people about either of  
8 those two topics that I asked about a minute ago? Namely,  
9 whether the NRC was going to assume some particular role  
10 in approving anything that you did or, on the other hand,  
11 about whether there ought to be a single spokesman to the  
12 press?

13 A One of the questions that either Harold asked me,  
14 or maybe it was Vic --

15 Q Vic Stello, you're speaking of?

16 A Yes. Who was in charge, and at that time Bob  
17 Arnold and Jack Herbein were on site, and I believe my response  
18 was since we are the operators of the plant and Jack Herbein  
19 is the one that is recognized by the NRC as being the officer  
20 in charge, I said Jack Herbein at that time -- there was  
21 nothing said to me, however, that, hey, be sure whatever  
22 Jack Herbein wants to do, you'd better clear it with us.

23 I think we had an understanding that -- I believe  
24 the atmosphere was such that whatever we wanted to do or  
25 were trying to do, we were consulting with the NRC, and I hope

1 the record bears that out from the NRC.

2 Relative to your other point, on Thursday after--  
3 Thursday morning after the press conference, I did take a  
4 few minutes to talk to Blaine Fabian and Dick Hyde, Richard  
5 Hyde, who was with the -- he happened to be in the area  
6 that day and sat in the press conference, and we discussed  
7 the concern about different people reporting at different  
8 times of the day, perhaps slight differences in what is  
9 being said, and that at times this being taken out of context  
10 by the news media people was indicating that -- well, it was  
11 indicating to some of the public that perhaps they were  
12 getting conflicting statements.

13 Q This was on Thursday?

14 A This was Thursday, and we thought that perhaps  
15 the state and the NRC and Met Ed could arrange for joint  
16 meetings with the news media, so that all news media were  
17 hearing the same information.

18 I had a discussion with Joe Fouchard, I know,  
19 on Saturday morning, about this. I think I mentioned it to  
20 him. I think I mentioned it to him also on Friday.

21 Let me go back. I did have a discussion with Joe  
22 Fouchard Saturday morning. I believe I might have mentioned  
23 it in passing to Joe the night before. Joe again was  
24 extremely busy running all over the place, trying to get  
25 these communications established, and we really didn't spend

1 any time on it. I think I mentioned it to him in passing.  
2 We did have a discussion on it Saturday morning.

3 Q Okay, what do you remember about your Saturday  
4 morning conversation with him?

5 A All right.

6 Q -- about this. This is about the question of  
7 joint statements.

8 A Yes, sir, concern about conflicting statements.  
9 Statements that might vary a little bit and the impact it  
10 has on the news media, and more importantly, the public, and  
11 I suggested that we should consider having a joint press  
12 conference. I told him we had one scheduled around noon  
13 that day, 11:00 o'clock or noon, and suggested that should  
14 be a joint conference.

15 Joe disagreed and wanted to have his own independent  
16 news conference to avoid a continuation of possible conflicting  
17 statements. I then told Joe that this would be probably our  
18 last one. I don't know if I said probably or I said it  
19 would be our last one.

20 I talked to Bill Murray about it. In fact, I  
21 think Bill Murray was with me when we talked to Joe, and we  
22 simply decided that we would not have them, we would not  
23 have a separate one after this one. We would announce that  
24 that would be our last regular one, and we would pull away.

25 We recognized that it would adversely impact Met

1 Ed's credibility, which was not very good at that particular  
2 instant, but we could not afford to have a continuation of  
3 conflicting statements, regardless of how minor they were.

4 Q Was the decision that you made at that time not  
5 to make any further statements to the press, or was it really  
6 a decision to discontinue these daily morning briefings?

7 A I believe the implication was that we would dis-  
8 continue these briefings and, in fact, would leave the--  
9 leave any statements of the status of the plant to the NRC  
10 as our regulator and the licensor of our plant.

11 Q This was a decision that you made on Saturday  
12 morning?

13 A Yes. It was an item that Bill Murray and I had  
14 talked about. I believed that this was the right thing to do.  
15 I'm not aware of why -- Bill Murray felt the same way, simply  
16 because it looked like the best thing to do or not, but I  
17 had no -- I had no indication if Bill Murray was under any  
18 pressure from anyone in the NRC at that time.

19 Q Did you receive any suggestion or any pressure  
20 from anybody in the NRC to take the route of letting the NRC --

21 A I did not.

22 Q -- being the sole spokesman?

23 A No.

24 Q You did not?

1 BY MR. FOSTER:

2 Q Did the substance of the discussion between your-  
3 self and Mr. Murray relating to your decision not to hold  
4 any more press briefings, did that occur prior to the  
5 conversation with Mr. Fouchard, or subsequent?

6 A Well, Bill was there and I had talked to Bill  
7 Murray before when I went over to see Joe, and I -- I  
8 believe -- I thought that the NRC would want to do this, and  
9 yet looking back on it, I can understand why the regulator  
10 or the licensor would want to keep a -- would want to have  
11 their own press conference, rather than having one jointly  
12 with us, to continue to have credibility with -- with the  
13 people in the area and throughout the country as the regulator.  
14 I guess it would make some sense for them to not have a joint  
15 press conference with the licensee.

16 Q Again trying to understand the logic behind the  
17 decision here, did you go over to talk to Mr. Fouchard  
18 with the idea in mind that, look, we'll make a presentation  
19 to them that we can hold a joint press conference on  
20 Saturday morning, and if they decide against that, then  
21 maybe we should discontinue holding our own separate briefings?

22 A I'm not sure if we really -- Bill Murray and I  
23 talked about that latter part prior to going over there or  
24 as we were talking among ourselves over at Trailer City with  
25 Joe. I can't recall. But when we found -- when we



1 realized that the NRC would prefer -- would not have a joint  
2 press conference, I believe I said to myself, you know, what  
3 are the alternatives, to continue having our own, which was  
4 devastating, and it just seemed to be logical at that time  
5 to discontinue having our own.

6 Joe Fouchard or Denton or Vic, none of those  
7 people indicated to me that we'll be the spokesman for the  
8 accident. Never. We'll be the exclusive spokesman, rather.

9 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

10 Q You mentioned a minute ago that by Saturday  
11 morning, Met Ed's credibility with the press was none too  
12 high. Do you have any thoughts about why that happened, and  
13 what kinds of things Met Ed or other utilities ought to do  
14 in the future to plan for accidents or incidents like this,  
15 that would improve on that situation?

16 A I think part of it has occurred. I believe there  
17 are a lot more people in the news media that have a little  
18 more knowledge on radiation and nuclear generation than  
19 they did on the morning of the 28th. News media people that  
20 have covered accidents over the years just were not prepared  
21 to report on an accident which they couldn't see.

22 There were no bodies to count, there was no  
23 property damage to take pictures of, and I don't believe  
24 that they knew how to respond to this type of accident,  
25 just like we didn't know how to respond to the news media.

1 Very few understood radiation. The fact that there was  
2 radiation above background, even though it was very small,  
3 seemed very significant to them. I don't know if an accident  
4 would, heaven forbid, occur similar to that, with what they  
5 know today, how reporting would be, the fact that they do  
6 have a better knowledge of radiation, and the type of  
7 accident. I'm sure that these two factors would change some  
8 of their reporting.

9 The news media, in their eyes, we changed our  
10 story several times, and we did. We tried, even though it was  
11 -- I felt our statements were not satisfactory at times and  
12 incomplete. We tried to tell them what we saw and how we  
13 saw it, but what we saw and how we saw it changed as we  
14 learned more about the accident, significantly.

15 There was a feeling by some, and I don't know how  
16 many, that perhaps we were lying, and I guess if I'd be a  
17 reporter there, I could come to that type of conclusion,  
18 and at that point they were really out for bear, and we  
19 certainly knew pulling back and not issuing releases on  
20 status of the plant, or having the news conferences, would  
21 not help us at that point.

22 BY MR. FOSTER:

23 Q Mr. Creitz, were you on site Saturday evening,  
24 I believe, that Mr. ~~Deickamp~~ got a call from Jack Watson at  
25 the White House?

1 A When you say on site --

2 Q Were you aware of that conversation?

3 A I was in the Dewey Schneider home or in  
4 Trailer City or in the observation center that evening.  
5 I understand that Herman had a call and he did have a  
6 discussion with somebody at the White House. I don't  
7 know if I was sitting in the room when that call came in,  
8 and I can't recall exactly when Herman mentioned it to me.  
9 It was after the time that I talked to Joe Fouchard and again  
10 what I was told, I wasn't on the telephone at the time, was  
11 that there was a concern, grave concern, about conflicting  
12 reports.

13 I was never told that the White House informed  
14 GPU or Met Ed not to report on the status of the accident.  
15 What I had understood was there was grave concern again about  
16 conflicting statements.

17 Q Do you know what, if any, action this call  
18 prompted with respect to your Hershey news center operation?

19 A At that point, we had established the fact that  
20 we were not giving out any reports. Perhaps it just sort of  
21 firmed up the fact that as long as we couldn't have joint  
22 conferences with the NRC, that to avoid conflicting state-  
23 ments, there was just no alternative, but we had decided  
24 that previously, so it really didn't bother me at the time  
25 that we had the call from the White House.

1 Q On Friday, prior to the Met Ed news conference,  
2 do you remember having any conversations with Jack Herbein?

3 A I talked to Jack and I talked to other people  
4 at the plant, yes.

5 Q Do you recall having any discussions concerning  
6 what information would be provided at the news conference  
7 on Friday with Mr. Herbein?

8 A No specifics, only whatever the status was of the  
9 plant, whatever we knew relative to our readings on radiation,  
10 specifically the 12 or 1400 millirem puff. I'm sure that  
11 that was part of my conversation with Jack, to make sure  
12 that the world understood what that reading was all about.

13 What I'm really saying is that was a reading over  
14 the plant. It was not a reading offsite.

15 Q You do specifically recall that 1200 number with  
16 them?

17 A I certainly do.

18 Q Jumping around a little bit here, whose decision  
19 was it to hold the once daily briefings as opposed to maybe  
20 twice a day, three times a day? Was there a conscious  
21 decision?

22 A We recognized on the first day that simply  
23 responding to telephone calls from news media was impossible.  
24 There's just no way of handling it. We decided we would  
25 have a briefing, and there wasn't that much -- the question

1 was when, and I believe our discussion on this occurred  
2 after Jack Herbein's briefing that he had with the news  
3 media -- we recognized we should have one the following day.  
4 11:00 o'clock seemed reasonable.

5 Certainly if there would have been any -- let  
6 me see -- very possibly I suggested let's hold a news  
7 conference once a day. I think it was probably as simple as  
8 that. I can't recall any extended conversation. I was  
9 the one that made the decision.

10 Q These discussions with respect to press briefings  
11 would have been with Mr. Fabian?

12 A Uh-huh. And possibly touching base with, I'm  
13 sure I mentioned it to Jack Herbein.

14 Q Did you have any discussions with Mr. Fabian  
15 concerning who should be the principal spokesman at your  
16 stand-up briefings?

17 A Jack handled it on Wednesday, and I was satisfied  
18 at that point and felt that Jack could handle it again on  
19 Thursday. He was on site.

20 Q Did you --

21 A I believe I should have recognized that Jack was  
22 in need of more sleep and rest, but I let him handle it.

23 Q Was there any dialog between yourself and Mr.  
24 Fabian with respect to whether or not you should have a  
25 public relations person present with Mr. Herbein?

1           A       I believe it would have been -- I believe both  
2 of us would have said it would be desirable and that our  
3 public relations people were at that point establishing  
4 their news center in Hershey. At that time the only one  
5 that I would feel -- would feel comfortable with, would be  
6 Blaine himself, and I felt Blaine was fairly busy trying to  
7 handle the overall PR problem for us, and I was misquoted on  
8 this when I said we were not prepared for the accident.

9                   I'm sure you've seen that quote of mine, and it  
10 was really in the context we were talking about our  
11 communications with the news media. I said we were not  
12 prepared to handle this, and that's what I was talking about.  
13 We really did -- we don't -- we didn't have the manpower.

14           Q       Prior to Friday, did you have any discussions  
15 with the GPU management with respect to media interface?

16           A       Prior to Friday, no. Well, let me -- repeat the  
17 question.

18           Q       Did you discuss with GPU management how Met Ed  
19 should handle the media interface for --

20           A       Blaine, I believe, had had some conversations  
21 with Bill Murray, and I'm sure I had, too. They were aware  
22 of the fact that we had the request to appear on the "Today"  
23 show and "Good Morning, America," and considering what we  
24 knew about -- what we knew, what GPU knew, what the world  
25 knew about the accident, it seemed like a -- just a matter

1 of keeping the world posted on the status of the plant.

2 Q And you felt then that the television programs  
3 would be a good medium to accomplish this?

4 A Certainly. It seemed it would have been very  
5 detrimental not to accept the invitation.

6 MR. FRAMPTON: Let's take a real short break.

7 [Recess.]

8 MR. FRAMPTON: On the record.

9 BY MR. FRAMPTON:

10 Q Mr. Creitz, I just wanted to go back and ask you  
11 about what you can recall of your conversation with Mr.  
12 Herbein on Friday morning before the press briefing that he  
13 gave, relevant to this 1200 or 1400 or 1300 MR release.  
14 That is, what was your understanding at the time and what  
15 have you talked to Mr. Herbein about?

16 A Uh-huh. We did talk about that release, and he  
17 explained to me -- and I might have gotten this information  
18 also from George Kunder or George Troffer previous to that.  
19 But he again explained to me that it was a reading taken over  
20 the stack, directly above the stack by a meter in a helicopter,  
21 and that it was not a reading that was recorded offsite.

22 Q This is Mr. Herbein you're referring to?

23 A Uh-huh.

24 Q And did you talk about whether he was going  
25 to try to clarify that in the press briefing?

1           A       I believe he understood that it was a point of  
2 major -- and it should be very clearly discussed and men-  
3 tioned.

4           Q       Okay. I'd like to ask you one final question,  
5 and that is whether you have any thoughts in light of the  
6 accident at TMI about what kinds of background and training  
7 individuals who operate and manage nuclear power plants  
8 ought to have.

9           A       I'll be glad to comment on that question. You  
10 do know that I'm not a nuclear engineer, and I do have to  
11 rely on people like Jack Herbeins and Bob Arnolds to give  
12 me the nuclear technical advice and direction, but I also  
13 -- looking back at it, I also did feel that we were very  
14 highly organized and trained to handle very severe accidents  
15 and, incidentally, I still believe that we are, and I  
16 believe we were taken by our own safety record and perhaps  
17 became somewhat complacent.

18                   I believe that we were set for an accident. We  
19 didn't recognize the intermediate type of occurrence or  
20 accident that happened, and the importance of having highly  
21 trained, knowledgeable technical people available to evaluate  
22 a situation like the accident on March 28, but our emergency  
23 plan certainly was not designed for the intermediate type of  
24 accident, nor were we prepared to talk to the news media.

25                   Again we were prepared for the very severe



1 accident in which it would be evacuation. The news people  
2 wouldn't have been there for a press conference.

3 We simply were not, you know, we weren't prepared  
4 for this type of an accident. Technical people, availability,  
5 news media, people, emergency plan. We have to improve all  
6 these areas, and I believe Met Ed is taking steps to demon-  
7 strate to the world that it is.

8 We have now in our property probably the greatest  
9 nuclear lab that the world has ever known.

10 MR. FRAMPTON: Mr. Creitz, thank you very much.  
11 We appreciate your time and your cooperation. Thank you.

12 [Whereupon, at 10:30 a.m., the deposition was  
13 adjourned.]

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