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*Decay Heat Removal Problem Associated With
Recovery From a Very Small Break LOCA
for CE System 80 PWR*

Nuclear Systems Analysis Section

May, 1977

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Combustion Engineering

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1. Introduction

During the emergency feedwater meeting with Combustion Engineering on May 27-28, 1975, TVA expressed concern for a class of small break LOCA's whose depressurization rates are relatively slow (when compared to those analyzed in CESSAR as small breaks) and thus might lead to inadequate makeup rates from the high pressure injection pumps. This concern was answered by Combustion Engineering in letter No. TD-CE-161 (September 18, 1975) a copy of which is included as Appendix B in this report. An ongoing qualitative consideration of this concern by TVA now predicts a decay heat removal problem during post-LOCA recovery which needs to be resolved. This problem and its associated background material are the subject of this report.

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2. Physical Arrangement and Characteristics

The physical arrangement of the reactor coolant system for a typical system 80 plant is shown in Figure 1. The plant has two steam generators each with a single hot leg piping connection (42 inch) and two cold leg piping connections (30 inch) with a reactor coolant pump provided in each cold leg. The pressurizer is attached to one of the hot leg pipes by an 80 foot long surge pipe (12 inch). The reactor vessel has two corresponding hot leg piping nozzles and four cold leg nozzles.

The plant elevations corresponding to various points in the reactor coolant system are given in Table 1. Other reactor coolant system characteristics of interest are given in Table 2.

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3. Predicted Post-LOCA Modes of Decay Heat Removal

The conditions predicted to be associated with each quasi-steady-state post-LOCA mode of decay heat removal are detailed in Appendix A. These conditions are for a very small break ($\leq 0.1 \text{ ft}^2$) for which the steam generator must remove a significant portion of the decay heat; otherwise, reactor coolant system repressurization occurs since the break is too small to accommodate the transport of all decay heat to the environs. Modes 1-6 are based on loss of off-site power, no operator actions, minimum core cooling (no train) response using cold leg injection, closure of main steam isolation valves, and steam generator at saturation conditions corresponding to the lowest safety valve set point.

Modes 1-7 given in Appendix A define

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The conditions which are thought to exist in
the reactor coolant system to provide decay heat
removal during the relatively slow changing
post-LOCA period. These conditions are
summarized in Table 3.

The achievement of Modes 1-3 appears
straightforward although there might be some
concern if the transition to core boiling is
not accompanied by a relatively rapid
drainage of the steam generator tubes. If an
adequate condensing surface is not exposed
quickly, ^{cyclic} excessive steam bubbling ^{and condensation may} might
occur within the tubes. ^{mechanical shock}

operation in Mode 4 appears reasonable
to achieve although the reactor operators ^{would} will
be unaware as to what is happening to
reactor vessel level. ^{to discover what is going on with}
Mode 5 is thought to be the most

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uncertain operation which will take place. The onset of Mode 5 cannot be predicted or controlled since there is no level information available to the operator. The flooding of the hot leg pipes and steam generator inlets will disrupt normal steam flow from the core to the steam generator and will lead to an intermittent voiding ^("pulsation effect") of the hot leg piping as the steam is forced through. It appears reasonable that adequate decay heat transport might be achieved during this transition period although there should be some concern about the mechanical effects of slug flow on steam generator tubes.

In order to re-establish natural circulation decay heat removal which is Mode 6, it is necessary that Mode 5 terminate by filling the steam generator tubes with liquid and

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establishing the density gradients required for natural circulation. It is not clear how this can be accomplished while maintaining an adequate heat transport rate from the core region through the hot leg piping and inlet side tubing. There could be a problem with a persisting slug flow from the reactor vessel and significant accumulations of non-condensable gases in the steam generator U-tubes. If enough non-condensable gases have accumulated, natural circulation cannot be re-established (unless the gases can be removed by some means).^{**}

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If Mode 6 cannot be established, it will be necessary to wait until the decay heat level is sufficiently low to provide prolonged cooling by a rapid filling (subcooling) of the reactor vessel and establishment of stratification.

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Cooling system (SCS) operation before core boiling is re-initiated. This variation of Mode 7 might be difficult to achieve unless the reactor vessel water level is sufficiently low to permit a large cold water addition to the core region. The proposed maneuver may be difficult to achieve without a reactor vessel level indication that guide the control of water addition during the swaying and reflood periods.

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4. Available Quantitative Results

Information concerning a Combustion Engineering analysis for the small break LOCA for a System 80 plant is included as Appendix B. This analysis is for cold leg breaks which are 0.1, 0.05, and 0.005 square feet in size (about 4, 3, and 1 inch diameters respectively). The analysis, the "standard" scenario of 455000 lb of steam, assumes loss of off-site power, the worst single

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failure of emergency equipment, and no operator action. The steam generator are assumed to remain at the saturation pressure corresponding to the lowest setpoints of the safety valves (1285 psia).

The results shown in Figure 1 of Appendix B indicate that the reactor vessel level will drop into the hot leg piping for each assumed break size within 15 to 30 minutes following the break, thus leading to the predicted occurrence of the first six modes of operation outlined in Appendix A. The results show that the core will remain covered at all times including Mode 4 operation.

Some correlation can be recognized between the curves in Appendix B and the modes of operation predicted in Appendix A.

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5. Area of Concern

The transition from core boiling to natural circulation which is predicted in Appendix A (Mdo5), to occur during reactor vessel level recovery following a very small break will require that the steam generator U-tubes become refilled. It is not clear how this can be accomplished, particularly if a significant amount of non-condensable gas has accumulated in the tubes. If the refilling is not accomplished, plant recovery from a very small break LOCA might be unacceptably delayed pending additional fuel cooldown.

Adding to this concern is the uncertainty associated with unknown vessel level, the adequacy of emergency operating instructions and training for this event, and the consequences of the unstable slug flow conditions which are predicted to develop as

the reactor level recovers.

This operational difficulty appears to be generic for pressurized water reactors although it may be aggravated somewhat on the CE System 80 because of the lower head and capacity of the high pressure injection pumps. In PWR systems designed by other vendors, higher head pumps with greater flow capacity at a given pressure assure that for a greater range of very small breaks the reactor vessel level will not drop below the hot leg nozzle and thereby disrupt natural circulation.

6. Additional Considerations

This qualitative consideration of recovery from a very small break LOCA did not include the problem of assuring a continuous long-term source of clean auxiliary feedwater for the steam

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generators. This difficulty might materialize if the recovery should be delayed pending additional fuel cooldown.

It should also be recognized that long-term recovery could involve recirculation of water from the primary containment sump if makeup water from the refueling water tank is no longer available or water accumulation inside of containment become limiting. The likelihood of requiring recirculation will increase if a delay for additional cooldown is experienced. This recirculation mode of operation with the reactor at high pressure is not an established design requirement and has not been evaluated for feasibility.

Additional complications appear likely if it is required to use the high pressure pumps for reactor makeup from the sump which

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operating the Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) since it involves some common piping including a common return pipe. This mode of operation has also not been a design requirement.

In addition, the high pressure pumps do not have minimum flow protection while taking suction from the sump. If the flow rate to the reactor is very low, pump damage could be a consideration.

The effect on primary containment of very small breaks was not considered. A low-low pressurizer pressure will appear early in the event and initiate containment isolation. A subsequent high-high containment pressure will initiate containment spray. The operators may not be able (or desire) to intercept the automatic spray. A prolonged isolation due to delay for additional cooldown will increase

* However, these pumps (motors and electrical) are not designed to survive the post-LOCA environment in its state except for very small breaks.

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the likelihood of containment spray.

The effect of the safety injection tanks starting to dump at about 610 psia was not evaluated. Unless the nitrogen pressure is reduced or the water level is lowered sufficiently, a dump will occur automatically. The tanks can be isolated manually below 415 psia but they are programmed to reopen if the pressure exceeds 500 psia.

A loss of offsite power was assumed in preparing this report. If the very small break should not be accompanied by an offsite power loss, the effect of continued operation of the reactor coolant pumps would need to be evaluated. The loss of system overpressure at a high average reactor coolant temperature might lead to unacceptable pump & seal damage if the operator does not manually

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trip the pumps within a few minutes. Physical damage might be induced by excessive vibration or a severe flow instability. Even if offsite power is lost, the operator must take steps within about one-half hour to re-establish seal cooling by loading the CVCS pumps on the diesel generator. If not done, an additional loss of coolant will develop through the pump seals. The consequence of this scenario was not developed.

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The very small leak postulated for this report was assumed to be located at the top of a cold leg pipe. Other break locations were not considered in detail. However, the break location is not thought to be a major influence on the estimates of the predicted operating modes given in Appendix A, i.e., these estimates are on more break sizes and locations which will result in the occurrence of each predicted mode.

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Table 1Reactor Coolant System Elevations

<u>Component</u>	<u>Elevation (ft)</u> *
Pressurizer :	
Vessel High Point (inside)	570
Vessel Low Point (inside)	529
Hot Leg Connection	512
Full Power Water Level	554
After Scram Water Level	544
Tap of Heaters	539
Horizontal Surge Pipe (center)	519
Steam Generator:	
Highest Tube (center)	551
Lowest Tube (center)	543
Full Power Water Level	556
Tubesheet (face)	517
Reactor Vessel:	
Vessel High Point (inside)	530
Hot Leg Nozzle (high point)	512
Hot Leg Nozzle (low point)	508.5
Active Fuel (high point)	505
Active Fuel (low point)	492.5

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* Approximate values.

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Table 2

Reactor Coolant System Characteristics

Full Power Temperatures (°F):

Core Entry	565
Core Midplane	593
Core Exit	621
Pressurizer Liquid	653
SG Steam	553
SG Feedwater	450

Full Power Pressures (psia):

RC Pump Discharge	2319
Core Midplane	2288
Core Exit	2260
SG Steam	1070

Safety Valve Settings (psia):

Pressurizer	2500
Steam Generator	1285

Volumes (ft³):

Pressurizer (steam space)	900
Pressurizer (above heaters)	1500
Pressurizer (total)	1800
Reactor Vessel (above hot legs)	2700*

Actuation Pressures (psia):

Safety Injection Pumps	1600
Safety Injection Tanks	610
Reactor Scram	1750

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* Approximate value.

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Table 3

Post-LOCA Modes of Decay Heat Removal^a

<u>Mode</u>	<u>Condition</u>	<u>Press. Level</u>	<u>RV Level</u>	<u>System Press.</u>	<u>SG Tube Level</u>
1	Natural Circulation ^b	R-Decr.	Full	R-Decr.	Full
2	Natural Circulation ^c	S-Incr.	S-Decr. ^d	Stable	Full
3	Transition	Drain	S-Decr. ^e	Stable	Drain
4	Cave Boiling	Empty	S-Decr. ^f	Stable	Empty
5	Transition	Empty	S-Incr. ^e	S-Decr.	Refill
6	Natural Circulation ^c	Refill	S-Incr.	S-Decr.	Full
7	Forced Circulation ^g	Full	Stable	S-Decr.	Full

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a. Nomenclature: Press. Level is pressurizer level.
 RV Level is reactor vessel level.
 System Press. is system pressure.
 SG Tube level is steam generator tube level.
 R-Decr. is rapidly decreasing.
 S-Decr. is slowly decreasing.
 S-Incr. is slowly increasing.
 Stable is no significant changes.

b. With pressurizer pressure controlling.

c. With reactor vessel pressure controlling.

d. Reactor vessel steam bubble has formed.

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e. Reactor vessel level has reached top of hot leg nozzles.

f. Reactor vessel level will reach a minimum and start to increase.

g. Using Shutdown Cooling System.

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(PROPOSED) YELLOW CREEK NUCLEAR PLANT
REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM




Figure 1
Typical C.E. System 80 Reactor
Coolant Loop

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Appendix A

Conditions Associated With Post-LOCA

Modes of Decay Heat Removal

For Very Small Break LOCA *₁

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* Numbered notes are included, at end of appendix.

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Mode 1²Decay Heat Removal by Natural Circulation³With Pressurizer Pressure Controlling

- a. Pressurizer steam bubble pressure is above saturation pressure corresponding to reactor vessel top plenum effective liquid temperature and is superheated to pressurizer effective metal temperature.
- b. Pressurizer level and pressure are decreasing rapidly (steam bubble expanding) due to fluid loss through the break in excess of makeup capability.
- c. Pressurizer liquid is partially flashing to steam (thereby cooling) in an attempt to maintain constant pressure as the steam bubble expands.

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d. Pressurizer steam bubble is superheating to pressurizer effective metal temperature (through cooling walls).

e. Without an effective heat input* other than from the pressurizer metal to compensate for the heat removed by flashing the pressurizer liquid and heat loss to the surroundings, the pressurizer pressure decreasing rapidly as the steam bubble expands.

f. Pressurizer steam bubble may expand until superheated steam is rising and condensing in the circulating liquid at pressurizer connection to the hot leg piping.

* Pressurizer heaters are unable to supply the amount of heat required - or various methods

Mode 2

Decay Heat Removal by Natural Circulation³

- With Reactor Vessel Pressure Controlling

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- a. Steam bubble forms in reactor vessel plenum when pressurizer pressure decreases to below the saturation pressure corresponding to top plenum liquid temperature.
- b. Reactor vessel level starts decreasing (top plenum steam bubble expanding) due to fluid loss through the break in excess of makeup capability.
- c. Reactor vessel top plenum liquid is partially flashing to steam (thereby cooling) in an attempt to maintain constant pressure as the steam bubble expands.
- d. Decay heat is providing an effective heat input to compensate for the heat removed by flashing the top plenum liquid, thereby assuring a liquid temperature and corresponding steam bubble pressure which follows closely.

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the slowly changing effects of decay heat reduction, heat loss to the surroundings, and heat transport through the break.

e. Pressurizer surge line is filled with semi-quiet liquid which is subcooling to below the reactor vessel top plenum effective liquid temperature due to heat loss through the surge line in excess of heat gain by transport from the hot leg pipe.

f. Pressurizer steam bubble pressure is in equilibrium with slowly decreasing reactor vessel steam bubble pressure and is most likely contracting (pressurizer level slowly increasing) as steam from the pressurizer bubble is condensed on the pressurizer wall at a rate which is commensurate

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with heat loss to the surroundings.

Mode 3²

Decay Heat Removal During Transition From
Natural Circulation³ to Core Boiling⁴ Mode

- a. Reactor vessel level reaches top of hot leg nozzles and starts to extend into hot leg pipes and steam generator inlets due to fluid loss through the tank in excess of makeup capability.
- b. Reactor vessel steam bubble enters pressurizer connection and causes a hestup and gravity drain of any water in the pressurizer.
- c. Reactor vessel steam bubble enters steam generator inlets and causes a gravity drain of water in the U-tubes back to the hot and cold leg piping.

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d. Natural circulation through the reactor core and steam generator is disrupted.

e. Water in the reactor core starts to boil aggressively due to loss of natural circulation core cooling.

Mode 4²

Decay Heat Removal by Core Boiling⁴

a. Reactor vessel level continues to decrease due to fluid loss through the break in excess of makeup capability. POOR ORIGINAL

b. Reactor vessel steam bubble remains at saturation pressure corresponding to reactor core exit temperature and is fed directly by steam formed in the core at a rate which is commensurate with the decay heat input, steam generator condensation

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rate, and the volumetric expansion, and which follows closely the slowly changing effects of decay heat reduction, heat loss to the environs, and heat transport through the break.

c. Liquid from condensation inside steam generator tubes is returned to reactor vessel by gravity countercurrent along the bottom of each partially filled hot leg pipes and by gravity flow to the pump loop seals and the cold leg pipes. POOR ORIGINAL

d. Reactor core exit temperature and reactor vessel steam bubble pressure are decreasing in response to a decay heat reduction without a commensurate reduction in heat loss to the environs and heat transport through the break, and eventually in response to

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a reduction in steam generator pressure (and temperature) due to heat loss to the environs exceeding decay heat transferred after the safety valves are closed. (If operator action is considered, the steam generator pressure may be reduced by opening atmospheric dump valves and thereby reduce the steam generator and reactor coolant system temperatures).

e. Fluid loss through the break is decreasing and makeup rate is increasing due to reduction in reactor vessel pressure.

f. Reactor vessel level starts to increase as makeup capability exceeds fluid loss through the break.

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Mode 5²Decay Heat Removal During Transition From
Cave Boiling⁴ to Natural Circulation³ Mode

- a. Reactor vessel level continues to increase to top of hot leg nozzle as makeup capability exceeds fluid loss through break.
- b. Steam generator inlets are flooded or severely choked by slug flow and entrainment thereby disrupting steam flow to the tubes.
- c. Reactor core exit temperature and corresponding reactor vessel steam bubble pressure start to increase in response to disruption of steam flow to the tubes.
- d. Reactor vessel level will decrease in response to the steam pressure increase, thereby releasing intermittent steam bubbles

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to the steam generator tubes.

e. Reactor vessel steam bubble pressure will be communicated somewhat equally to the water filled hot and cold leg pipes due to a liquid coupling through the gap between the core barrel and the hot leg nozzles and a steam coupling through the bypass holes around the vessel plenum area.

f. Reactor vessel level decrease (pressure increase) will be accompanied by a compensating water level rise (perhaps equalized) and steam pressure increase inside the steam generator tubes.

g. If sufficient water is available in the reactor vessel top plenum and if steam in the tubes can be condensed before the next cycle of steam bubbles reaches the steam generator, the tubes might become completely filled with

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liquid and the density gradients established which are required for natural circulation.

k. If sufficient quantities of non-condensable gases (principally dissolved hydrogen and oxygen released during depressurization) have accumulated in the steam generator U-tubes due to prolonged sweeping of the core region and subsequent concentration during steam condensation at the top of the tubes, it will not be possible to refill the tubes and thereby establish natural circulation.

Mode 6²

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Delay Heat Removal After Re-establishing Natural Circulation³ with Reactor Vessel Pressure Controlling

a. Natural circulation is assumed to be re-established with a reactor vessel level

above the hot leg nozzles and with the steam generator tubes full of liquid.

b. Reactor vessel level continues to increase (top plenum steam bubble contracts) as makeup capability exceeds fluid loss through the break.

c. The rate of level increase will be commensurate with the reactor vessel steam bubble pressure which responds to changes in the decay heat input, heat loss to the surroundings, and heat transport to the steam generator and through the break.

d. Pressurizer surge line is filled with liquid and pressurizer contains a trapped steam bubble which is in pressure equilibrium with the reactor vessel steam bubble.

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e. Pressurizer steam bubble is contracting as steam is condensed on pressurizer walls at a rate which is commensurate with heat loss to environs.

f. Pressurizer will eventually fill with liquid unless limited by non-condensable gases as the pressurizer steam bubble condenses.

Mode 7⁵

Decay Heat Removal by Forced Circulation⁶
Using Shutdown Cooling System*

a. Natural circulation has been previously established with reactor vessel level above hot leg nozzle and the pressurizer completely filled with liquid.

b. Reactor vessel level has been stabilized by adjusting makeup capability to equal

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fluid loss through the break. (In the long term, operator action may be used to re-establish a pressurized steam bubble and establish a stable pressurized level.)

c. Shutdown Cooling System (SCS) is in operation to provide forced circulation decay heat removal from the reactor core.

d. Reactor vessel top plenum is partially filled with steam bubble at saturation pressure corresponding to top plenum liquid temperature (unless pressurized pressure control has been established).

e. Reactor vessel pressure is below SCS design operating pressure and decreasing at a rate commensurate with decay heat input, heat loss to environs, heat transport through break, and heat removal by the SCS.

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Notes

1. A very small break LOCA ($\leq 0.1 \text{ ft}^2$ for CE) is one for which the steam generator must remove a significant portion of the decay heat; otherwise, reactor coolant system repressurization occurs since the break is too small to facilitate the transport of all decay heat to the surroundings.

2. Assuming a very small break, reactor scram, loss of off-site power, no operator actions, minimum core cooling (as train) response using cold leg injection, closure of main steam isolation valves, and steam generator at saturation conditions corresponding to safety valve set points (as long as possible). The Safety Injection Tanks are assumed not to dump.

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3. Decay heat removal is by natural circulation through the reactor core and steam generator tubes with the core exit temperature (also assumed to be reactor vessel top plenum effective liquid temperature) established by the decay heat rate and natural convection heat transfer and transport coefficients.
4. Decay heat removal is by boiling heat transfer in the core, saturated steam heat transport from the reactor vessel to steam generators, and condensing heat transfer inside the steam generator tubes.
5. Assuming a very small break, loss of off-site power, operator actions permissible where required, closure of main steam isolation and steam dump valves, and minimum core cooling (one train) response

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using SCS for heat removal and safety injection, and charging pumps for makeup.

6. Decay heat removal is by forced circulation through the reactor core and SCS heat exchangers using SCS pumps in the shutdown cooling mode of operation with the core exit temperature (also assumed to be the reactor vessel top plenum effective liquid temperature) established by the decay heat rate and forced convection heat transfer and transport coefficients.

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Appendix B

Small Break LOCA Analysis

by Combustion Engineering

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SMALL BREAK LOCA

Introduction

In a meeting held in Windsor on 5/27-5/28/75, Mr. Sabin of TVA expressed a concern for a class of small break LOCA's whose depressurization rates are relatively slow compared to those small breaks presented in CESSAR¹, Section 6.3.3.3. He worried about the possibility of inadequate HPSI flow for such breaks and also asked about the LOCA requirements for Emergency Feedwater and operator actions.

This transmittal constitutes a response to action item number 23 of Reference 2.

Summary

The results herein demonstrate that for any cold leg break less than or equal to 0.1 ft² in size, adequate liquid inventory is maintained in the reactor vessel to keep the active fuel completely covered at all times.

The results shown in CESSAR demonstrate that for those small breaks in which some degree of core uncover is predicted, the ECCS criteria³ are met and peak clad temperatures are less than 1200°F.

It has been assumed that for all breaks no operator actions are performed. At some later time following the LOCA, operator procedures for long term cooling will be implemented. This memo, however, does not address the long term cooling phase of the accident. Long term cooling performance and operator procedures will be discussed in a future submittal.

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Since NRC requires the assumption of loss-of-offsite power, main feedwater flow is not available. For breaks larger than 0.1 ft², those presented in CESSAR, Emergency Feedwater (EFW) was not represented and indeed was found to have little influence on the performance of such relatively large break sizes. However, for breaks equal to or smaller than 0.1 ft², EFW was found absolutely necessary. For these smaller breaks, the steam generators must remove a significant part of the decay energy generated in the core. If they do not, then primary side re-pressurization occurs since the break is too small to emit all of the steam boiled off in the core.

Discussion

Calculations of breaks 0.1 ft² and smaller have been performed with the CELEVEL code. This code was specifically written for application to such small breaks.

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The predicted two-phase level transients for several breaks 0.1 ft² and smaller are shown in Figure 1. The corresponding pressure transients are given in Figure 2. These results demonstrate that although the depressurization rates for such small sized break sizes are gradual, adequate HPSI pump inflow is provided to keep the core covered at all times.

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The Safety Injection Tanks (SIT) become activated at approximately 900 seconds for the 0.1 ft² case. Neither the .05 ft² nor the .005 ft² cases resulted in SIT activation before the level transient is turned around. For both breaks, the level transient bottoms out at an elevation above the top of the active fuel and recovers from there via HPSI inflow alone.

very small (ca. thus being likely Small break

For all of these breaks, steam generator heat transfer plays an important role. Since EFW is supplied to each steam generator, an adequate secondary liquid inventory is maintained to support heat removal by condensation of the steam in the U-tubes on the primary side. The secondary

inventory is assumed to be saturated at a temperature corresponding to the lower setpoint of the safety valves (1270 psia). The condensation film coefficient used was approximately 200 BTU/hr-ft²-°F. This is a conservative value which properly accounts for the influence of non-condensibles. *

To clearly indicate the influence of EFW, Figure 3 has been included. Results are shown for the reactor vessel pressure and level transients for cases with and without emergency feedwater. As shown, if EFW is not available a re-pressurization occurs which in turn reduces HPSI inflow and the level transient is significantly aggravated. Neither case shown in Figure 3 should be construed to specifically represent the performance of Sys 80. EFW is available on all System 80 plants. The case without EFW is shown only for demonstrative purposes. For both cases shown, the HPSI capacities assumed were much less than those of System 80. Thus, the level transient are more severe.

Major Assumptions

As required by NRC³, the following conservative assumptions were applied in analyzing all small breaks (< 1.3 ft²):

1. Loss of offsite power assumed upon a scram signal.
2. The worst single failure of emergency equipment was assumed (failure of one emergency diesel generator to start).
3. An uncertainty margin of +20% was added to the calculated decay heat generated in the reactor.
4. Conservative setpoints and delays were assumed for scram, SIAS and equipment startup.

Assumption (1) results in a description of the accident in which the reactor coolant pumps begin coastdown, the main steam isolation valves shut, and the main feedwater pumps stop upon receipt of a scram signal. Main steam and feedwater flows are ramped to zero in 0.5 seconds.

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* There must be that non-condensibles are present to some significant degree.

Assumption (2) allows credit for only one train of ECCS pumps and one train of Emergency Feedwater (EFW). Thus, only one HPSI pump and one EFW pump are available to satisfy LOCA requirements. It was additionally assumed that 25% of the HPSI inflow spills out through the break.

The flow capacity requirements for the HPSI and EFW pumps are proportional to values of decay heat. Assumption (3), therefore, results in a proportionate increase in these requirements. The HPSI pump capacity assumed is shown in Figure 4. The EFW capacity was assumed to be 875 gpm (minimum).

Assumption (4) resulted in the following setpoint and delay assumptions:

- a) Reactor scram occurs upon a low pressurizer pressure (LPP) indication of 1728 psia (minimum). Upon receipt of the LPP signal there is a 0.9 second delay before the control rods begin motion followed by a 3.5 second interval to fully insert the rods.
- b) SIAS occurs upon a pressurizer pressure indication of 1550 psia (minimum). The SIAS automatically starts the emergency diesel generators which provide power to the HPSI pumps and the EFW pumps. The total time from receipt of an SIAS to the time the HPSI pumps provide flow is 30 seconds (maximum). The total time delay from SIAS until EFW reaches the steam generators is 45 seconds (maximum).

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References

1. Combustion Engineering, Inc., Standard Safety Analysis Report (CESSAR), Docket No. STN-50-470, Amendment No. 31, Section 6.3.3.3.
2. D. V. Graf to D. A. Patterson, TD-CE-117, subject: "Meeting Minutes of 5/27 and 5/28 in Windsor."
3. Acceptance Criteria for Emergency Core Cooling Systems for Light-Water-Cooled Nuclear Power Reactors, Federal Register, Vol. 39, No. 3, Friday, January 4, 1974.

FIGURE 1

SYSTEM 30

TWO PHASE MIXTURE LEVEL
IN THE INNER VESSEL





FIGURE 2

SYSTEM 80

PRIMARY SYSTEM PRESSURE




COMPARISON OF RESPONSES FOR CASES

WITH AND WITHOUT EMERGENCY

FEEDWATER REPRESENTED

Break Area = .02 ft²



*The results shown on this figure do not specifically represent the System 80 response. Lower Capacity HPSI Pumps than those on System 80 were employed.

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0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

TIME, SECONDS

32
30
28
26
24
22
20
18
16
14
12
10
8

PRESSURE LEVEL

TOP OF ACTIVE FUEL (---)

PRESSURE LEVEL (---)


w/o EFW

WITH EFW

SYSTEM 80

HPSI PUMP CAPACITY

Minimum Capacity for One Pump



General


It appears it might be argued that as long as fuel is used (and fuel would not have been initially damaged by small break efforts)

Damage to S/G tubes might not be of much significance unless a large amount of water superheated above the 1100 ps. sat. temp of the secondary side had somehow accumulated in the primary loops because of inadequate "natural circulation" cooling. If this condition could exist - potential for overpressurization of the secondary system would exist.

In any case calculations should predict the course of water level including the transition to refill.


It is worth noting that immediately after startup after a long shutdown (or preferably with a new core) tests could be run with very little risk since ² at low fissile point strains would immediately terminate the test generation problem.

1. normal operation




*Mode 1
Decay Heat Removal by Natural
Circulation With Pressurizer Pressure Controlling*

POOR ORIGINAL




Mode 2
 Decay Heat Removal by Natural
 Circulation With Reactor Vessel Pressure Controlling

POOR ORIGINAL




Mode 3
 Decay Heat Removal During Transition
 From Natural Circulation to Core Boiling Mode

POOR ORIGINAL



Mode A
 Decay Heat Removal by
 Core Boiling

POOR ORIGINAL



Mode 5

Decay Heat Removal During Transition From Core Boiling to Natural Circulation Mode

POOR ORIGINAL