



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

AUG 21 1979

NOTE TO: J. Heltemes

FROM: A. Thadani

SUBJECT: STUCK OPEN PORV. AT FOREIGN REACTOR

Reference: Memo from R. DeYoung to H. Denton, "Precursor Event In a Foreign Reactor," 7/24/79

In response to your request for my comments and responses to the above referenced DeYoung memo, the following are my views on the first two items in the DeYoung memo:

Item 1:

- a) At a meeting with Westinghouse on April 26, 1979, in response to my questioning, Westinghouse (W) stated that a foreign reactor designed by W had experienced a stuck open PORV event.
- b. After determining the country where the event had occurred, H. Faulkner of International Programs, S. Newberry of RSB and I discussed (tele con - 5/15/79) this event with the officials of that country to better understand the scenario and any other pertinent information we could gather. The event discussion was provided to us on a confidential basis.
- c. Immediately afterwards (5/15/79) I issued a memo to D. F. Ross in which I explained the sequence of events and noted the potentially serious deficiency in the W designed plant's ECCS actuation logic and emphasized the need to assure that recommendations of Bulletins 79-06 and 79-06A as they pertain to this issue were vigorously followed and implemented. This memorandum, copies of which were sent to E. Case, R. Mattson, R. Tedesco, T. Novak, H. Faulkner, and S. Newberry was given classification, "Confidential," by J. D. Lafleur.
- d. On 5/15/79, I believe, I also verbally described the event to R. Mattson and E. Case (D. Ross was on travel).
- e. Subsequently I had several discussions of this event with D. F. Ross and H. Faulkner.
- f. Subsequently, in response to our (H. Faulkner and A. Thadani) request, a proprietary technical report on the event was sent to NRC and distributed by P. O'Reilly in a memorandum dated June 4, 1979. Copies of the report were also given to the ACRS.

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- g. During mid-June, I requested H. Faulkner to obtain copies of appendices referenced in the proprietary technical report.
- h. During this period (can't remember the date) D. Ross and I talked to T. Anderson of W to determine if they (W) had seen the report, and T. Anderson indicated that they had indeed seen a report on the incident.
- i. On 6/26/79, an unclassified paragraph summarizing the event only was sent to H. Faulkner by the officials of the country involved and H. Faulkner transmitted the information to me on 6/28/79.
- j. During this period, and subsequently, I discussed this event and its implications with F. Hebdon of the "TMI Special Inquiry Group."

Item 2:

The safety significance of this event is that for a number of years the W designed plants continued operation with a design deficiency in the ECCS actuation logic. This deficiency had been corrected as a result of NRC Bulletins 79-06 and 79-06A, resulting from the TMI-2 evaluations, issued on April 11, 1979 and April 13, 1979, respectively.

A C Thadani

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cc: E. Case
R. Mattson
D. Ross
T. Novak
T. Speis
H. Faulkner