

Bill,  
See sound page,  
INTERESTING COMMENT IN  
LIGHT OF THE BEENAW INCIDENT.  
Fred.

Thanks  
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ISRAEL/NOVAK  
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Eisenhut/Mi 9  
Job T 4/8/79

ACRS CONCERNS TMI -2 INCIDENT

1. What assurance do we have that the TMI event will not happen at another B&W reactor tomorrow?

The initiating event (loss of condensate and feedwater pumps) is an anticipated transient, i.e., it is expected to occur and may occur tomorrow. However, the severity of the consequences in the TMI-2 incident was caused by multiple circumstances and actions which are addressed by the April 5, 1979 IE Bulletin 79-05A. The purpose of that Bulletin is to prevent recurrence of the contributing circumstances and actions thereby preventing recurrence of the incident. The Bulletin requires licensees to: review their procedures and operator actions and determine that they are adequate to prevent a similar incident particularly with regard to termination of HPI flow and tripping of RCS pumps and with regard to reliance placed on pressurizer level indicators in determining operator actions; review containment isolation signals to determine that proper isolation will be provided; and assure that adequate auxiliary feedwater flow will be provided by observing specific requirements provided in the bulletin regarding auxiliary feedwater systems operability and availability when the plant is at power.

2. There has been much discussion of this accident as a B&W problem. What makes this accident unique to B&W PWRs?

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7. Is there anything unique about the TMI containment isolation features?

Five other operating B&W designed plants have similar designs as TMI, however, the actions described by the Bulletin will preclude a similar occurrence.

The large majority of other operating plants have containment isolation systems that by design would have prevented flooding of the Auxiliary Building (i.e., loss of containment). Most plants utilize safety injection as a signal to initiate containment isolation in addition to containment pressure. SI was initiated 2 minutes for these other operating plants at that time, rather than at 5 hours as was the case at TMI. Therefore, little radioactivity would have been released.

8. What is the single basic difference in the plant designs of other operating plants that might by itself preclude a similar incident as at TMI?

We currently believe that the single most important difference in other PWR designs is related to the location of the pressurizer and routing of its surge line. BWRs of course do not have a pressurizer. Other types of PWR designs locate the pressurizer and surge line so that core levels are directly reflected in the pressurizer where reactor system level is measured. The TMI design requires operator interpretation of a number of instruments to properly identify reactor coolant system level. Other designs lend themselves to more direct measurement.

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