

FILE TT 3.3

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| ORIGINATOR Terry Murray | COMPANY/ORGANIZATION Toledo Edison Company | ROUTE TO: 1. |
| CALL MADE TO: Bill Spangler | COMPANY/ORGANIZATION B&W Lynchburg | 2. |
| CONFERENCE CALL PARTIES Fred Faist, Chuck Domeck, Ed Kane, Dick DeMars, Bob Winks, Ray Luken, | | 3. |
| Al Lazar | | 4. |
| STATION/UNIT D-B #1 | DATE July 25, 19 78 | TIME 1430 a.m. p.m. |

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
POOR ORIGINAL

SUBJECT:

Terry Murray reviewed the question that was discussed, i.e., on the November 29th Event 1977 when the pressurizer level dropped below indicated range, how can we, Toledo Edison, rationalize continued operation given the fact that during this event pressurizer level did go off scale. We must also consider that the second auxiliary feedpump did not start until later. The transient analysis indicates that we should not lose levels but in actual experience we did. What is the difference between the two? What have we done to correct the situation? Bob Winks of B&W reminded us that the main steam safety valves had a very large effect on the transient that was observed in the November 29th Event. During that event, steam pressure was allowed to drop to somewhere between 940-950 pounds. Based on the data observed during the 75% turbine trip in April of this year, we know that the adjustments that we made in the interim now prevented steam pressure from going below 975. Since the April 2nd turbine trip test, we have in fact made further adjustments to better refine the steam pressure control transient. Now we expect that steam pressure will be maintained ~~even~~ ^{either} higher than the 975 because there were several valves that had to have their setpoint adjusted upward. The improvements that were made as a result of these upward setpoint adjustments can be demonstrated by the fact that during the turbine trip test, we did in fact maintain pressurizer level on scale.

Another significant item that was brought out in the discussion with those people was that if in fact both auxiliary feedpumps did come on simultaneously as designed, and if there was a significant difference as a result of the second feedpump coming on, that the expansion of

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PREPARED BY  8001170797 5 DATE 7/26/78

the pressurizer steam bubble into the No. 2 Loop, i.e., the Loop that is connected to the pressurizer, that this would only give you a vapor lock or affect the natural circulation in the No. 2 Loop. The No. 1 Loop would still be available for natural circulation and one loop is sufficient to remove the decay heat.

Third item directly related to this is that the review of the strip charts and plots for the November 29th Event indicate that there was only approximately a minute difference in the time that the two pumps were actuated and that during this period of time the pressurizer level was still falling and that pressurizer decrease effect was a result of both auxiliary feedpumps feeding steam generators.

It was agreed that our position is one that we have made adjustments to the main steam safety valves which would greatly reduce the shrinkage that we see in the pressurizer in an event like this. Second point is that if both aux feedpumps do come on and you get steam blockage, it would only affect one loop. The other loop would be available for decay heat removal. The third point is that the actual difference in time between the two auxiliary feedpumps in the November 29th Event was so slight that in fact the effect that we saw was a result of both auxiliary feedpumps.

TDM/daw

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