

*W. Pauler*



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

August 30, 1979

George L. Edgar, Esquire  
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius  
1800 M Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear George:

This will confirm my request to you on the telephone today that Babcock and Wilcox provide us with copies of the Site Problem Reports and Preliminary Safety Concerns listed below.

If it would be overly burdensome to provide photocopies of all of these documents, and if fiche is not a quick solution, I suggest that where files are quite thick the cover memo describing the PSC or SPR could be copied and sent to us; when we are down in Lynchburg conducting depositions, we can then review follow-up and other material for those files that appear to be most relevant.

SPRs

- 11100 PZR EMO Relief Lifted Inadvertently
- 22000 Inadvert. RC-V3 open
- 22500 Cant flush resin completely
- 2400 Req. Dev. to perform PZR oper.
- 25500 Low RG Flow Indication
- 26200 PZR Relief Valve Leakage
- 28000 Dropped Spare PZR relief va.
- 44401 RCU-1 Stm Leak and Damaged
- 45400 Check for resin in FW
- 53300 Loss FW pump/Emerg. FWF No. 5
- 54600 RC-V1 Shaft Scored
- 55600 Resin may be in SG frm POWD
- 56001 RC-V2 motor burnout-OULD
- 67900 ICS module failure
- 4600 No PRZ SPR VAL 40
- 5700 ICS Wiring Errors
- 6300 Excessive flow during ESOP
- 11300 Excess RCS cooldown rate inc.
- 19300 RCUI failed open - one more
- 19301 IRRC - failed in open pos.
- 19500 ICS run BK stpt on FDP PP
- 19600 HPI valve position for oper
- 22200 Leaking PRZ relief, block va

8001170 761

*P*

SPRs (contd)

29100 ICS transient  
4100 PZR level comp cannot calib.  
25400 IC Sys. Incident  
28900 ICS response during turb. tri.  
32200 ICS perf. flwng gen/ref trip  
10700 ICS errors  
14300 Electromatic relief leakage  
18300 RC-RV2 failed open reactor  
18500 FW trip on 4/19/78  
19500 RC RV-2 Electromatic relief  
30400 Electro relief salonoid STI  
31900 Relief val. replacement  
44500 OTSG boiled dry  
46300 Loss of FW Booster Pump  
46900 Reactor trip  
31500 ICS amplifier failure  
45600 Level indication PZR  
57100 Loss of feedwater to OTSG  
59600 Dry OTSG after turbine trip  
5800 Elect. rel. valv.  
6200 Quench tank over-PRZ  
6600 Position Indication Malfunc.  
13600 OP error - improper FW lineup  
14500 No PZR spray with 1 RCP OPE  
16000 ICS transient  
32400 PZR vent isol. VLV pkgn leak  
33000 Rapid cooldown transient  
1200 QA Missing  
1300 No QA  
1400 QA Missing  
11100 Relief valves - FHE diffr.  
21000 PZR safety valves set point  
24100 ICS component failures  
33200 ICS turbine bypass control  
36900 Electromatic relief vlv dan  
37900 Electromatic relief vlv mod  
38600 Elec. relief valve failure  
38800 ICS feedwater flow control  
39101 Failed Incore Detectors  
39400 ICS turbine HDR press contr  
41200 Dry OTSG conditions  
44000 ICS module failures  
44600 Upgrade of valves documents

PSCs

2-74	10-78
5-74	11-78
17-74	15-78
19-74	16-78
1-75	1-79
5-75	2-79
13-75	7-79
1-76	11-79
7-76	14-79
4-77	15-79
6-77	16-79
8-77	18-79
10-77	23-79
11-77	25-79
13-77	26-79
19-77	27-79
26-77	31-79
1-78	35-79
2-78	36-79
7-78	

In addition, I forgot to mention to you on the telephone that there are a number of specific drawings or diagrams, portions of which were exhibits to the Stevens Deposition taken by the President's Commission, that we would like to obtain in their entirety. These are drawings which were Deposition Exhibits 73 through 84, inclusive. (The drawing numbers are 136019 through 136027E, inclusive; 30755F; and 30765F, Rev. 4). Also, Exhibit 71 to the Stevens Deposition, a Standard Guide Spec., contains a drawing of the control room console layout (on page 4 of the spec) which makes it impossible on our copy to make out names and numbers. Could we get a better or larger copy of this page?

Thank you for your assistance.

Sincerely,

George T. Frampton, Jr.  
Deputy Director  
NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group

cc: Byron Nelson, Esq.  
Babcock & Wilcox  
Power General Group  
P.O. Box 1260  
Lynchburg, VA 24505

TITLE Pressurizer EMO Relief initted Inadvertently  
RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSG-\_\_\_\_\_. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.  
\_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS

3/25/74 - Review sheet to  
TTC / w / SPR

NA

Not Governed  
RJP

NSG-  
\_\_\_\_\_

Instructions For FDS-21091 - Site Problem Report

Initiated by Nuclear Service - Refer to NPC-0503-04

Initiated by B&W Construction Co. - Refer to NPC-0503-05

For Unirradiated CNFP-Supplied Core Components - Refer to NPC-0503-10

Affected Documentation audited by R Maggi Date 4-25-73

Changes Required:  No

Yes

(See Below)

Site Problem Report Affected Documentation Control for SRS- <u>111</u>		
Significant Engineer-		MSS - <u>03</u>
The following documentation requires revision as noted on the front of this Site Problem Report. This CONTROL shall remain in effect until the described changes have been completed, or otherwise resolved.		
Description of Changes	Resolution	Completed
Title		By
		Date
Title		By
		Date

Distribution:

Nuclear Service - 1302  
 Central Eng. Files

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

SPR# 111 Title ELECTROMAGNETIC RELIEF INADVERTENT ACTUATION  
 1. CUSTOMER Duke Power Company 3 VENDOR EMCo. DATE 6/9/71  
 SYSTEM AND COMPONENT (S) NHI-Reactor Pressure CREST# 22 00 00  
 REFERENCES E&W Dwg. #24918F

2. DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: At 11:55, 6/5/71, hand and auto power to NHI/ICS cabinet 4 were inadvertently de-energized and then re-energized. This resulted in depressurizing the RCS from 410 psig to zero in < 5 seconds, due to lifting of the electromagnetic relief valve on the pressurizer. It is not known at this time whether the relief lifted on the loss or reapplication of power. The relief valve control circuit (RC3-PS8) is temporarily modified to provide a NLT relief at 450 lb. It receives its control signal from wide range reactor pressure and a wide range reactor pressure transmitter was recalibrated to 0-500 vs 0-2500 psig. This report documents fact that valve worked under these conditions.

3. ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.:

None.

4. IS FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL:

~~YES~~/NO  
 BY WHOM:

5. RECOMMENDED ACTION:

6. RESOLUTION (INCLUDE JUSTIFICATION)

None Required.

7. THIS PROBLEM ~~DOES~~/DOES NOT AFFECT OTHER CONTRACTS.

Distribution:

W. Faasse R. V. Straub  
 D. W. Berger G. E. Kulynych  
 J. C. Deddens C. E. Thomas  
 H. F. Dobel H. Hennicke

Originated by: B. L. Day Problem Cleared 6/8/71  
 Submitted by H. A. Bailey Co. Field Rep.  
 S. O. M. H. A. Bailey SOM H. A. Bailey  
H. A. Bailey H. A. Bailey

6553-121K 80-111

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

SPR# 111 Title ELECTROMATIC RELIEF INADVERTENT ACTUATION

1. CUSTOMER Duke Power Co. NSS 3 VENDOR Bailey M.C. DATE 6/9/71

SYSTEM AND COMPONENT (S) NWI-Reactor Pressure CREST# 22 00 00

REFERENCES B&W Dwg. #249147

2. DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: At 11:35, 6/5/71, hand and auto power to NEI/MS cabinet 4 were inadvertently de-energized and then re-energized. This resulted in depressurizing the RCS due to lifting of the electromatic relief valve on the pressurizer. It is not known at this time whether the relief lifted on the loss or reapplication of power. The relief valve control circuit (RCS-PSB) is temporarily modified to provide a MDT relief at 450 lb. It receives its control signal from wide range reactor pressure and a wide range reactor pressure transmitter was recalibrated to 0-500 vs 0-2500 psig.

3. ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.:

None.

4. IS FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL:

YES/NO  
BY WHOM:

5. RECOMMENDED ACTION: When system is returned to normal line up, run power loss and reapplication test.

6. RESOLUTION (INCLUDE JUSTIFICATION)

7. THIS PROBLEM EXISTS/DOES NOT AFFECT OTHER CONTRACTS.

Distribution:

- W. Feasse
- D. W. Berger
- T. C. Deddens
- H. F. Schell
- R. V. Stramb
- G. E. Kulynych
- C. E. Thomas
- H. Hennicks

Originated by B.L. Day Problem Cleared \_\_\_\_\_  
 Submitted by \_\_\_\_\_ Cog. Field Eng. \_\_\_\_\_  
 S. O. M. H.A. Bailey SOM \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE Low R.C. Flow Indication

RELATED SPRs SPR 256

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NCS- 6, 7, 12, 13, 14. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

2/26/74 - Review sheet to J.F.C.

w/SPR.

3/20/74 Review sheet to B.A.K.

On Oct 25, 1974 I discussed this flow measuring system  
modification with Ken Wendling, Nuclear Science,  
and presented the information that Control Analysis  
has been sending a letter out applicable for each  
plant as to the full range ~~with~~ flow values and  
corresponding differential pressure transmitter range  
to have flows consistent with this SPR equation.

Robert Wills  
NCS-  
IN ALL CONTRACTS

Based on Control Analysis involvement in  
this entire problem & how it must be handled  
individually on each contract the problem  
will be taken off the generic problem  
list & closed. It's something that can't  
be cut off ahead of time & Control  
analysis is working continuously on it.

RWP

12-15-74



Instructi For PDS-21091 - Site Problem ort  
 Initiated by Nuclear Service - Refer to NPG-0503-04  
 Initiated by L&W Construction Co. - Refer to NPG-0503-05  
 For Unirradiated CNFP-Supplied Core Components - Refer to NPG-0503-10  
 Affected Documentation audited by R. M. [unclear] Date 4-2-73

Changes Required:  No  
 Yes

(See Below)

Site Problem Report Affected Documentation Control for SER- 255		
Cognizant Engineer- <u>J. D. Carlton</u>		NSS - 23
The following documentation requires revision as noted on the front of this Site Problem Report. This CONTROL shall remain in effect until the described changes have been completed or otherwise resolved.		
Description of Changes	Resolution	Completed
<u>Title Low RC Flow</u>	<u>J. D. Carlton's memo to</u> <u>Distribution dtd Jan. 19, 73</u> <u>forwards the results of the Reactor</u> <u>Coolant flow tests performed in</u> <u>December 1972 at Boone I. Also,</u> <u>this memo projects the results of</u> <u>these tests to the expected flow</u> <u>with the core.</u>	By <u>J. Carlton</u> Date <u>1/19/73</u>
<u>Title</u>		By Date

Distribution:

Nuclear Service - 12M2  
 Central Eng. Files

TRANSMITTAL SLIP  
FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To R. J. McCannell (2) For Information

J. D. CARLTON

G. Kulynych - Sr. Project Manager

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.

Central Engineering Files

H. F. Dobel - Quality Assurance

FILE: 12M2

Contract 620-00 03

SPR 255

TITLE LOW RC FLOW

INDICATION

DATE 10-13-72

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO:      N. S. Embrey

     G. E. Kulynych

     J. McFarland

G. M. Olds

R. T. Schoner

E. G. Ward

     J. Kaelin

     J. Kennedy

     K. Subrke

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 255 which has been processed on Contract 620-00 03. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc: R. Burnley

R. J. Pittman  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER	Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO.	620-0003	SPR NO.	255	SPR REV. NO.	
VENDOR	Bailey Meter	P.O. NO.		COMP. NO.	1	GROUP NO.	23
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS:						SPEC NOS.	
DWG NO.						EQUIP CODE LEVEL/DATE	
QA LEVEL <u>2</u>						QA SPEC NO.	
SITE ENGINEER			EARLY START DATE	ACTUAL START DATE	REQ'D COMP. DATE		
H. Hennicke							

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) Low RC Flow Indication

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

During operation of the two RC pumps in the "B" loop, the Bailey Meter Company flow instrumentation indicated lower than actual flow. Based on flow factors from University of Minnesota and measure  $\Delta P$ , the dual pump flow was calculated to be  $117.1 \times 10^6$  lbs/hr. The compensated flow indication is calibrated for  $0-100 \times 10^6$  lbs/hr. The uncompensated flow is calibrated for  $0-80 \times 10^6$  lbs/hr. The calculated  $\Delta P$  for  $100 \times 10^6$  lbs/hr at 160F and 400 PSIG is 782" H<sub>2</sub>O compared to the 716.18" H<sub>2</sub>O range of the BMOO delta transmitters.\*

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL

RECOMMENDED ACTION

Advise correct calibration for  $\Delta P$  transmitters.  
Investigate whether static multiplier is good for revised calibration.

\* NOTE: Attachments following are J.L. Hawks' calculations showing required  $\Delta P$ 's for  $100 \times 10^6$  lbs/hr (1) and maximum obtainable flows with present delta range (2).

APPROVALS	TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
	ORIGINATOR	H. Hennicke	(TWA)	-	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings
SITE CONSTR. REP.				<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
SITE OPER. MGR.	E. J. McConnell	(TWA)	-	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
NS SUPPORT ENGR.	J. L. Hawks		1-27-72	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
PROJECT MANAGER				<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs.	
				<input type="checkbox"/> PSAB/PSAR	
				<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Side Change	
DISTRIBUTION		Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D	Proj. Charge No. 3-28	Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
SITE OPS MANAGER	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.		Date Completed	Field Change No.	
PROJECT MANAGER	NSR - LINCOLN		By: _____	_____	
N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.	OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED		DEVIATIONS	Completes	
COGNIZANT ENGR.			<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	RMI - Carroll	
CONTRACT ADMIN.			<input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV _____	10/11/72	
NPG QA					
FILE 12T 3012-255					

Ittner

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Division

P.O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (703) 264-5111

October 11, 1972

312  
SOM 877  
SOP 255  
NSS-3

Duke Power Company  
Oconee Nuclear Station  
P.O. Box 1175  
Seneca, SC 29678

Attention: J. Ed Smith

Subject: RC Flow Calibration For HFT

Dear Sir:

As a result of all of the data taken during the last plant operation, the following recommendations are made as to reactor coolant flow measurements for the next HFT.

1. The flow ranges should remain as they now are RPS - 0 - 90 x 10<sup>6</sup> #/hr.  
NNI - 0 - 110 x 10<sup>6</sup> #/hr.
2. The flow coefficient that should be used in the flow equation is now 397100.00 instead of the 457443.76 as stated in my memo to you dated 2/15/72.
3. The 'By' Transmitters should be calibrated for 0 - 1202.8" H<sub>2</sub>O.

$$\text{Flow} = 397100 \sqrt{\Delta P / .023416}$$

where .023416 = specific vol. @ 604°F 2170 psia

$$90 \times 10^6 \text{ #/hr.} = 397100 \sqrt{\Delta P / .023416}$$

$$\Delta P = \left( \frac{90 \times 10^6}{39.71 \times 10^4} \right)^2 \times .023416$$

$$\Delta P = 1202.8 \text{ "H}_2\text{O}$$

Depending upon the results from HFT an additional range change may be required prior to fuel loading. In any event, a final range change will be required after establishing the true flow from the secondary heat balance.

Yours truly,

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

R. J. McConnell  
Site Operations Manager

RJM/elh

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Division

P.O. Box 1257, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone (703) 384-5111

September 14, 1972

B72-505

Mr. S. K. Blackley  
Mr. P. H. Barton  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 2178  
Charlotte, N. C. 28201

Subject: Oconee 1 R-40003  
BAW #10016

Gentlemen:

Attached are three copies of B&W Topical Report BAW-10016, "Analysis of Anticipated Transients Without Trip", which was submitted to the AEC on September 1, 1972. B&W has submitted this topical report in order to help you respond to the past and current ACRS concern for applicants to make a "study of means of preventing common failure modes from negating scram action and of design features to make tolerable the consequences of failure to scram during anticipated transients". B&W feels that this study provides a strong base from which you can work in establishing not only that the design features of your plant make tolerable the consequences of failure to scram during most of the postulated transients, but that the design features of your plant ensure the improbability of any such occurrences.

The following comments should be noted concerning our submittal of BAW-10016:

- (1) The cover letter for BAW-10016 states: "The accident analysis presented in the report is applicable for all B&W 177-fuel assembly plants with rated power levels of 2772 MWt or less." B&W does not identify the probability analysis presented in the report as being applicable to all plants.
- (2) Part of the introduction to the probability analysis section of the report states: "Due to the nature of probability analysis, it is necessary to study detailed hardware arrangements. Therefore, the probability analyses for the complete loss of feedwater flow and the reactor coolant pump coastdown transients presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4 were performed using a specific balance-of-plant system arrangement including a B&W NSS. While the numerical results presented in sections 4.3 and 4.4 may not be strictly applicable to all B&W NSS-supplied plants, it is felt that the conclusions based on these numerical results are indicative of the improbability of these postulated transients."

This qualification of section 4.3 and 4.4 of the probability analysis results allows B&W to make a positive statement concerning the improbability of these postulated occurrences, and at the same time does not require that you adopt any specific probability results as part of your application.

Babcock & Wilcox


Mr. P. H. Barton  
Mr. S. K. Blackley

-2-

September 14, 1972

You should evaluate your system design in light of the CRITERION transmitted to you in our letter of August 10, 1972 and develop a position concerning the improbability of these postulated occurrences. It is our understanding that the AEC intends to decide on and announce their guidelines related to ATWS in the near future; therefore, B&W submitted PAW-10016 at this time to assure that the AEC is aware of B&W's findings on the ability of the plants for which we supply the NSS to adequately terminate such accidents.

Very truly yours,



R. V. Straub  
Project Manager

RVS/slb

Attachments

CC: C. L. Sansbury w/o  
G. M. Baccich w/o  
W. Faasse w/o  
R. J. McConnell w/o ✓

*R.H.J. McConnell*

445-3 SPR-255  
- 256  
- 315

*Ray here's son of Rudy's  
comment on this*

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

RE: Review of EHS Procedures  
AND Compliance  
July 21, 1972

On the above date Doc Murphy and Mike Kidd from AND Compliance gave M.D. McIntosh and I several comments which they had on procedures completed during last Operational Testing. During the discussion of TP/1/2/300/25, TP/1/2/300/25, they injected several concerns broadly covering our procedure with RC flow.

1. They understand we have approximately 1000 RC flow on Unit 1 rather than 300. They feel that the FEAR should be revised to reflect these flow numbers. i.e.,

$100\% \text{ flow} = 131 \times 10^6 \times 1.03 \text{ lb/hr}$

2. What is the effect of reactor safety of the high flow rate?

This question should be addressed in a revised FEAR safety analysis.

3. What is the effect on safety of the installed snubbers in the RC flow impulse lines?

Doc Murphy would like to see a report which justifies the installation of snubbers on the basis of data taken during TP/1/2/300/25.

*NO. 117-107*  
*IF WE LET OUT OF 1000 GPM COME THROUGH*  
*NO.*  
*THIS UNIT IS APPROX 100 GPM 2.5 IN DIA LINE IN GULF STREAM*  
*can on*

Based on the letter from R.W. Straub to S.K. Blackley on RC Flow and Flow Signal Analysis dated June 28, 1972, I inferred Doc Murphy that we expected further information from ESW on the snubber installation.

*Robert H. Aschler*  
Robert H. Aschler  
Technical Support Engineer

RSC/mab

- cc: J.E. Smith  
R.L. Wilson  
R.C. Collins  
R.J. McConnell  
O.S. Tuck  
L.M. Barton

*RUS/SP1*  
*the above problems*  
*SPR 255, 270 & 285 have been*  
*outstanding for sometime. TP 200/25*  
*was completed on Jan 22. Doc*  
*is not aware of the 247. operation of*  
*to have the 247 potentially major*  
*problems with the FEAR*

*THE INSTALLED FLOW RATE NOW (2.27 GPM) IS EXACTLY WHAT*  
*WE WANTED FOR THE 247 UNIT TO DO UP OPERATIONAL PROBLEMS*  
*IT WAS 2.27 GPM 1000 GPM WE WERE PLANNING WE WERE PLANNING*

THE DUNLOP & WILCOX COMPANY  
LOWER GENERATION DIVISION - LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA

*R. J. McNeill*

cc: G. E. Kulynych  
D. W. Montgomery

*SRR-267*

to: R. V. STRASS - PROJECT MANAGEMENT

from: J. D. CARLTON *JDC* UNIT MANAGER, CONTROL ANALYSIS (EXT. 2260)

of: DUKE POWER COMPANY

File No.  
or Ref. NSS-3/10E13

subject: EVALUATION OF FLOW DATA

Date  
JUNE 28, 1972

This letter to you is a customer end use subject only.

We have evaluated the data taken in February and the basic conclusions we have reached from that data are described below.

1. The system flow rate based on the test data and adjusted for the core in place is expected to be 102% of design flow. This is 102% of 33,000 gpm per pump or approximately 50,000 gpm per pump. The overall accuracy for the measurements and calculations of flow has been established as  $\pm 4\%$ . We expect that the next refinement of the total flow will occur when a secondary heat balance is available. We expect that the heat balance will reduce the tolerance to  $\pm 2\%$ . The expected flow rate noted above was determined from evaluation of reactor vessel, steam generator, piping and pump pressure drop data, and correlation with the Westinghouse reactor coolant pump head capacity curves.
2. The results of the instrument line test carried out first at Oconee and in more detail at the Alliance Research Center indicates that instrument line motion contributes to, but is not a major factor in the flow signal oscillations. The pressure and pressure data taken at Oconee and loop and flow meter data taken at Alliance and flow meter output data obtained from Surrey indicate that the oscillations which were observed are typical system noise in high velocity systems with numerous bends, expansions and contractions. We believe that the Ashcroft snubbers, as outlined on the BY transmitters, provide an acceptable signal for protection and control. In addition we believe that the Oconee instrument line pipe arrangement is adequate and the Alliance tests indicate the coil arrangement is better than straight pipe for detuning mechanical vibration.
3. The coastdown data has been normalized to system pressure drop with the core in place and the coastdown criteria are met during the important part of the transient (the first 10 seconds). The cold coastdown results in several cases show a deviation below the acceptance criteria. We believe that the most significant information from the cold coastdown tests are the trends of the data, that is the flow is coasting approximately as expected and since operation is not planned or expected at low temperatures the absolute values of the coastdown flow are of no particular significance. We intend to repeat selected coastdowns with the core installed to verify the results. Test procedures are being written to simplify the coastdown tests. In addition, the acceptance criteria will be defined for hot coastdown with the core only.

A final report covering the three subjects above is in preparation and we expect these reports for internal review and limited external review to be available in early July.

JDC:khj

Please do not write below this line.



Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Division

June 28, 1972

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (703) 384-5111

872-233

Mr. S. K. Blackley  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 2178  
Charlotte, N. C. 28201

Subject: Oconee 1, R-40000  
RC System Flow and Flow Signal Analyses

Dear Mr. Blackley:

B&W has evaluated the magnitude of flow and flow signal oscillations recorded during the initial hot functional testing of Oconee 1 and reports are being drafted for internal review.

Several conclusions are firm and will be supported in the final reports:

1. Total reactor (with core) flow is expected to be 102% of 88,000 gpm. (Nominal flow rate per pump). The uncertainty now placed on this number is plus or minus 4%. This value is determined from evaluation of Delta-P's throughout the system, i.e., pumps, steam generator, reactor vessel, etc. This uncertainty is expected to reduce to  $\pm 2\%$  when determined by a secondary heat balance. However, the 4% uncertain  $\Delta P$  being used in evaluations concerning acceptability of the flow signal for protection system use. *Moyle et al*  
*Fisher*
2. Coastdown evaluations resulted in flows on or above the original coastdown criteria for the first 10 seconds. The critical MESA point is during the first five seconds. Test procedures are being written at the site and coastdowns are being limited to one test hot and one cold without the core. These will be considered information gathering tests only to help interpret the later hot (with core) results. An acceptance criteria will only be placed on the coastdown test run with the core.
3. The flow signal pulsations witnessed during hot functional testing have been evaluated by analysis and testing. B&W considers the signals to be typical of all flow loops, and capable of being conditioned for use within the reactor protection system. The Ashcroft snubbers are considered the best conditioning device having the best relationship of magnitude and time response. The flow meter impulse line piping is considered adequate for transmitting the flow signal to the RPS.

Reports are now in draft form regarding the flow coastdown and flow signal pulsations. I expect these reports to be ready for your information in early July.

In summary, the following conclusions have been reached by B&W:

1. Impulse line piping from the RC system flow meter is acceptable in its present state.

Eubrecht & Wilcox

Mr. S. K. Blackley  
PI System Flow and  
Flow Signal Analyses


-2-

June 28, 1972

2. Ashcroft snubbers as they are installed with the mid-point position are considered best for conditioning the flow signal.

Please call if there are further concerns prior to receipt of reports on these topics.

Very truly yours,



R. V. Straub  
Project Manager

iNS/slb

CC: C. M. Baccich  
W. Paasse  
R. J. McConnell ✓

To	J. D. CAPLTON	
From	R. V. STRAUB, PROJECT MANAGER, EXT. 2251	
Cust.	DURE POWER COMPANY	File No. or Ref. SPR - General
Subj.	REACTOR COOLANT FLOW PROBLEMS - SPR Resolutions	Date JUNE 26, 1972


This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

There are several SPR's in the general area of reactor coolant flow measurement problems that are still outstanding and I believe could be brought to a conclusion with some very concise statements from engineering. These SPR's are the following:

SPR - 217 - RC flow element noise  
 SPR - 255 - Low RC flow indication  
 SPR - 256 - High RC flow

It is my opinion that all of the above SPR's could have firm and final conclusions written by engineering, although not all of the flow or signal problems are yet completely analyzed and firm. Please respond to each of the above SPR's so that they can be put to rest and we can bore in on the problems needing resolution rather than documentation. Please respond by 6-29-72.

R. V. Straub  
 Project Manager



RVS/slb  
 CC: J. P. Ittner ✓  
 R. J. McConnell

bc: 12E22

May 1, 1972

B72-168

G. D. Quile  
J. D. Carlton  
J. L. Haskis  
J. P. Ittner ✓

Mr. S. K. Blackley  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 2178  
Charlotte, N. C. 28201

Attention: Mr. R. M. Sandifer

Subject: Oconee 1-3 R-40000, R-75748  
Reactor Coolant Flow Measurement  
Bailey "BY" Transmitters

Reference: Duke letter of April 14, 1972, same subject

Gentlemen:

B&W began action on March 7, 1972 to determine the 0-1000 inch range "BY" transmitter performance above the stated range. In addition, the effects on the RFS System were considered essential to the investigation.

Testing is now scheduled to begin first week in May and will consist of the following test activities:

- 1) Perform the following tests on two B&W BY 3x41X-A transmitters 0-1000" range.
  - A. Calibrate both transmitters for a range of 0-800" H<sub>2</sub>O. Record characteristics for both increasing and decreasing differential pressure over the 0-800" H<sub>2</sub>O.
  - B. Increase differential pressure to 1500" H<sub>2</sub>O. Hold 1500" H<sub>2</sub>O delta-P for a minimum of 12 hours.
  - C. Check for calibration drift by increasing and decreasing delta-P over the 0-800" H<sub>2</sub>O range. Record characteristics for both increasing and decreasing delta-P over the 0-800" H<sub>2</sub>O range. Record characteristics for both increasing and decreasing delta-P.
  - \*D. Calibrate both transmitters for 0-1000" H<sub>2</sub>O range and repeat steps A through C varying delta-P over the 0-1000" H<sub>2</sub>O. Record characteristics.
  - E. Determine and calibrate both transmitters for maximum range (not name-plate range) and repeat steps A through C for maximum range calibration. Record characteristics.
  - F. Apply delta-P to both transmitters for 150% range for 12 hours and repeat steps A through C at maximum range. Record characteristics.

Babcock & Wilcox

Mr. S. K. Blackley

Page 2


May 1, 1972

\*NOTE: Step "D" may be eliminated if the results of Step "E" are satisfactory.

- G. Analyze the data obtained from the preceding tests for calibration drift, linearity or accuracy changes. Check for possible damage or changes in accuracy due to over-ranging. Check accuracy of equipment operating outside of design limits (Steps E and F).
- 2) Analyze the IFS System input circuits to determine if and how voltage will affect the FPS. This voltage should be equal to the maximum voltage that the B transmitter is capable of producing as an output voltage.
- 3) Analyze the NFI flow channel to determine if and how over-voltage will affect this channel. This voltage should be equal to the voltage used in preceding Step 2.

We will keep you advised of progress during the month of May, and will supply a final test report for inclusion in the "B" report. If you have any other immediate concerns, please call.

Yours very truly,



R. V. Straub  
Project Manager

RVS:jdd

CC: F. H. Barton  
G. M. Baccich  
W. Faasse  
R. J. McConnell

Babcock & Wilcox

J. C. DEDDENS  
Power Generation Division

P.O. Box 1267, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone (703) 340-1300

February 17, 1972

30M-107

CFR-055

J. C. DEDDENS

FEB 17 1972

Duke Power Company  
Catawba Nuclear Plant  
Spartanburg, S. Carolina

Attention: G. Bradham

Re: IFR #347, RC Flow Range & Oscillation

Dear Sir:

As you stated in the reference IFR during initial runs of the RC pumps the calibration of the RC flow "BYs" did not allow for indication of the flow rates and it's that varied.

Operation of the pumps during October and November, 1971, indicated that the RCW's were pumping higher volumes than expected. This determination was initially based upon Michael-Dahl flow tube measurements. Subsequent information has confirmed that the true RCS flow is lower than that measured by the flow tube. A partial list of observations that support this are:

1. RCS system pressure drops, i.e. 0750, Rx vessel elbows.
2. Pump power.
3. Westinghouse pump data.

Unfortunately none of the above are sufficiently precise to provide us with a very accurate determination of what the real system flow is. The absolute determination, of just what the flow is, will have to await a secondary heat balance. It should be remembered that the purpose of the flow tubes is to indicate a function of flow, not absolute flow.

The attached calculations have been made based on the best data at this time. It is felt that at this time the RC flow channels should be modified as stated in the attachments. This change is meant to be temporary and will be further reviewed as additional information is obtained.

For further information, please contact J. L. Hawks.

Yours truly,

BABCOCK & WILCOX CO.

*R. J. McConnell*  
R. J. McConnell  
Site Operations Manager

JLM/jar

cc: J. C. Deddens  
G. E. Kulyrych

THE BRIDGES & VITCOX CO.  
GENERAL CALCULATIONS

*[Faint handwritten text, likely bleed-through from the reverse side of the page. The text is mostly illegible but appears to contain technical or mathematical notes.]*

DATE	BOOK NO.	ACCT NO.
CUSTOMER	PAGE NO.	EST. NO.
	SUMM. SHEET NO.	
BY	AMOUNT	REMARKS





NOVEMBER 22 1971


147 0413

2000

TO: P. K. SMITH

NOV 23 71 AM

FROM: R. J. MCCOMMELL



PROJECT: DPR #215

CUSTOMER: DUKE POWER CO. CONTRACT NO: 0093

VENDOR: BMCO. COMP NO. 1 GROUP NO 23 SEQ NO. 39748

SITE ENGINEER: H. HERNICKE

TITLE: LOW RC FLOW INDICATION

DESCRIPTION: DURING OPERATION OF THE TWO RC PUMPS IN THE "B" LOOP  
 THE BMCO FLOW INSTRUMENTATION INDICATED LOWER THAN ACTUAL FLOW.  
 BASED ON FLOW FACTORS FROM UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA AND MEASURE  
 "B" DELTA P, THE DUAL PUMP FLOW WAS CALCULATED TO BE  $117.1 \times 10^6$  #/HR.  
 THE COMPENSATED FLOW INDICATION IS CALIBRATED FOR  
 $1400 \times 10^6$  #/HR. THE UNCOMPENSATED FLOW IS CALIBRATED FOR  $0-80$   
 $\times 10^6$  #/HR. THE CALCULATED DELTA P FOR  $100 \times 10^6$  #/HR. AT 160F  
 400 PSIA IS 782 "H<sub>2</sub>O COMPARED TO THE 716.18 "H<sub>2</sub>O RANGE OF THE  
 BMCO DELTA TRANSMITTERS.

144-100-10000

NOVEMBER 23, 1971


144-100-10000

2460

NOV 23 71 AM

TO: F. K. SMITH

FROM: T. J. McBRIDE



RE: FLOW MEASUREMENTS AT POINTS 1 & 2

UNDER PUMP NO. 1 GROUP NO. 23 SEQ. NO. 30748

SITE ENGINEER: H. STAVICKS

SITE: 1.5 X 10 FLOW MEASUREMENT

DESCRIPTION: DURING OPERATION OF THE TWO NO PUMPS, THE FLOW  
 RATE INDICATOR IN STATION 10000 IS LOWER THAN ACTUAL FLOW.  
 PARTIAL FLOW MEASUREMENTS AT POINTS 1 & 2 WERE MADE  
 ON 11/23/71. THE FLOW RATE WAS CALCULATED TO BE 1.1 X  
 THE ACTUAL FLOW. THE CALCULATED FLOW MEASUREMENT IS UNRELIABLE FOR  
 FLOW RATE & FLOW. THE ACTUAL FLOW IS CALCULATED FOR OWN  
 FLOW RATE & FLOW. THE CALCULATED FLOW RATE FOR OWN FLOW IS 1.1 X  
 THE ACTUAL FLOW. THE CALCULATED FLOW RATE FOR OWN FLOW IS 1.1 X  
 THE ACTUAL FLOW.

A

BY DELTA P, THE SHAL PUMP FLOW WAS CALCULATED TO BE 117.1

TO 6 #/HR. THE COMPENSATED FLOW INDICATION IS CALIBRATED FOR

0-100 X 10 6 #/HR. THE UNCOMPENSATED FLOW IS CALIBRATED FOR 0-80

X 10 6 #/HR. THE CALCULATED DELTA P FOR 100 X 10 6 #/HR AT 160F

● ATTENTION: THE 715.12 CMHG RANGE OF THE  
SHAL DELTA P TRANSMITTERS.

● ATTENTION: THE FOLLOWING ARE THE CALCULATIONS SHOWING

● THE DELTA P AT 100 X 10 6 #/HR (1) AND MAXIMUM OBTAINABLE  
FLOW WITH PRESENT DELTA P RANGE (2).

ACTION

REV. 10/21

PROCEED WITH

ADVISE CORRECT CALIBRATION FOR DELTA P TRANSMITTERS.

INVESTIGATE WHETHER STATED RELIABILITY IS GOOD FOR REVISED CALIBRATION.

BY: J. E. YULYANOV

JEM

FOR INFO: 11/1/71

11/1/71



TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To \_\_\_\_\_ For Information FILE: 1242  
 Contract 620-00 03  
W.C. BUTT - ASE SPR 262  
G.E. KULYNICH Sr. Project Manager TITLE PRESSURIZER  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Adm. SAFETY VALVE  
P. A. Hanson - Eng. Files LEAKAGE  
H. F. Dobel - Quality Assurance DATE 5-19-72

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO:  N. S. Embrey  R. T. Schomer  
 G. E. Kulynich  E. G. Ward  
 J. McFarland \_\_\_\_\_  
 F. Norman \_\_\_\_\_  
 G. M. Olds \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 262 which has been processed on Contract 620-00 03. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: This fix applies as well to flat-face joints, where a standard compression-ring (CR) flexible can be used.

cc:

[Signature]  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO. 0003	SPR NO. 262	SPR REV NO.
VENDOR Dresser	P.O. NO. B0402	COMP. NO. 28	GROUP NO. 41
SEQ NO. 5	PRIORITY		
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: DRG NO. 28-41-602-04	SPEC NOS.	EQUIP CODE/LEVEL DATE	1
QA LEVEL	QA SPEC NO.		
SITE ENGINEER J. D. Phinney	EARLY START DATE	ACTUAL START DATE	REQ'D COMP. DATE 1/15/72

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) PRESSURIZER SAFETY VALVE LEAKAGE

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

Pressurizer safety valve LRC-RV4B is leaking past its seat when the RCS is pressurized. Leakage was detected with the RCS at 350 psig, with a steam bubble in the pressurizer at 43°F. The downstream piping is considerably hotter (40-60°F) from this valve than the other valves at equal distances from the valve. Pipe temperatures rose proportionally when the system was taken to 1000 psig, 544°F in the pressurizer. The leak rate is low, the rise in general tank level is not noticeable over a short period of time (1 hour).

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

Duke is aware of symptoms (Maurice MacIntosh). Discussed with R. G. Burnley and P. K. Smith (B&W, LYN); recommend action reflects their comments.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL

NCE, LYN

RECOMMENDED ACTION

Contact Dresser for recommended approach to corrective action. Replace RV4B with one of the spare valves, ordered with the contract, which are on site. Return LRC-RV4B to Dresser for repair. There is no evidence that any pressurizer safety valve has been tampered with at the site.

*See attached memo for resolution*

APPROVALS	TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
	ORIGINATOR	J. P. Kennedy			<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings
SITE CONSTR. REP.				<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>R. G. Burnley</i>		11/30/71	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
NS SUPPORT ENGR.				<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
				<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
				<input type="checkbox"/> PSAR/FSAR	
PROJECT MANAGER				<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Std. Change	
DISTRIBUTION		Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> I	Avib. Charge No.		
SITE OPS MANAGER		RESPONSIBILITY ASSIG.:		Date Completed <i>5/12/72</i>	
PROJECT MANAGER		DRESSER PROC.		By <i>J. D. Phinney</i>	
N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED		Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
COGNIZANT ENGR.		ALL		Field Change No. _____	
CONTRACT ADMIN.				Deviations <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____	
NPG QA				<i>David R. G. Burnley</i> 5/15/72	
FILE 12M2 _____					

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION DIVISION LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA

To J. P. Ittner, Nuclear Service Support Engineer

From E. L. Brown, Field Operations, Nuclear Service

Cust. Duke Power Company

File No. NSS-3, 1242  
or Ref. (SPR-262)

Subj. Pressurizer Relief Valve Gaskets

Date February 2, 1972

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

The Flexitallic Gasket Company recommends that ASME Code calculations be used to determine bolting loads but takes issue with Code recommended (but not mandatory) values for "m" (gasket factor) and "y" (minimum gasket seating stress). Using Code calculations with Flexitallic values we can determine required loading as follows:

- a) Obtain minimum required bolt load for operating conditions using this formula:

$$W_{b1} = \frac{3.14 G^2 P}{4} + 2b3.14GmP$$

where G = dia. of location of gasket load reaction (mean dia. in this case)

P = pressure

b = effective seating width N/2 or 3/32"

m = gasket factor (3 for S.S.)

- b) Calculating on basis of 3125 psi (hydro., which is maximum pressure) joint will see:

$$W_{b1} = \frac{(3.14)(3.562)^2(3125)}{4} + (2)(.094)(3.14)(3.562)(3125)(3)$$

$$= 51,000 \text{ lbs.}$$

Gasket seating requires a force equal to:

$$\begin{aligned} W_{s2} &= 3.14 bGy \\ &= (3.14)(.094)(3.562)(9000) \\ &= 9485 \text{ lbs.} \end{aligned}$$

The minimum torque is, for 8, 1-1/8-8 bolts:

$$\begin{aligned} T &= (.2)(1.125)(51,000)/(8)(12) \\ &= 95.6 \text{ ft.-lbs.} \end{aligned}$$

The gasket seating stress is:

$$\begin{aligned} D_S &= \frac{51,000}{(3.14)(.094)(3.562)} \\ &= 48,500 \text{ psi} \leftarrow \text{This is excessive, compression stop required.} \end{aligned}$$

Please do not write below this line.

February 2, 1972

At this point the Flexitallic Company (Mr. Wonderland) in Camden, New Jersey, was contacted and agreed to determine load required to reach optimum compression of gasket, provide recommended torque value and any other suggestions. Tests indicated that 10-12,000 lbs load was required to compress gasket to recommended thickness. Further compression will reduce recovery rate of gasket. Applying the full 51,000 lb load will reduce recovery of gasket to "in the neighborhood" of 1-2 mils. Any flange separation beyond this would result in leakage. Shaving of the male tongue on the valve or use of spacers (gauge ring) is recommended. Flexitallic agrees with loads and torques above.

*E. L. Brown/mw*

ELB/rv

cc: RG Burnley  
CE Kulynych  
✓ RJ McConnell  
RA Wallin



THE BARCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION DIVISION LYNCHBURG, VIRGINIA

To W. FIASSE - OOOEE  
From L. R. ALLEN - ASSOCIATE PROJECT MANAGER  
Cust. DUKE POWER COMPANY  
Subj. PRESSURIZER RELIEF VALVE INSTALLATION

*SPR-262*  
File No. 620-0004/0009  
or Ref. 12F28  
Date MAY 15, 1972

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

As a result of problems experienced on Unit 1 with leaking pressurizer code relief valves, you are requested to install these valves on Units 2 and 3 per the attached letter and sketch. Please note that the backing ring should be fabricated from stainless steel to the dimensions as shown (0.1625" thick, ID same as groove OD, OD to clear bolts).

Installation of the pressurizer code relief valves in this manner should circumvent the leakage problems experienced on Unit 1. This work is considered to be a normal change to the particular contract involved.

*L. R. Allen*  
L. R. Allen

ERA:jdd  
CC: J. E. Ittner  
R. G. Burnley  
R. J. McCornell

BABCOCK & WILCOX  
Nuclear Power Generation Department

Contract No. 620-0003

File No. IRM 2

Route To:

SPR-262

Record of Telephone Call

To J.P. ITTNER  
From K.R. ELLISON  
Date 2-18-72  
Subject PPR Rel. of Valve Flange.

W.C. BUTT  
J.D. PHINNEY  
E.L. BROWN  
R.V. STRAUB

Reference: J.P. Ittner to R.V. McConnell,  
"Pressurizer Relief Valve Installation, 9 February,  
1972.

Attached drawings to the above memo  
stated that backing ring material should  
be stainless steel. Previous to actual  
receipt of the memo, site had rings made  
of carbon steel.

The only requirement of the backing ring  
material be that it withstand the compression  
of the flanges; therefore, carbon steel rings  
are acceptable.

Stainless steel rings are preferred if  
the rings are to be compressed between the  
raised faces of the flange. These faces  
are also stainless steel. Transfer of corrosion  
able film from carbon steel rings will  
require that the facings be dressed at  
each reinstallation. Also, leakage of  
high-temperature steam, if any, would abrade  
carbon steel rings and require them to  
be replaced.

*[Signature]*

THE WAPCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
NUCLEAR GENERATION DIVISION, LANHAM, VIRGINIA

To: W. J. McDonald - Site Operations Manager

From: W. C. Butt - Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Code: Engineering Change

File No.  
or Ref.

Subject: Pressurizer Relief Valve Reinstallation

Date: February 9, 1972

This letter is for the customer and use paper only.


Reference: 1. E.L. Brown to J.S. Ittner, "Pressurizer Relief Valve Work is," February 2, 1972.

2. Drawing No: 19-11-600-01 (Dresser)  
190500-01 (B&W)

The relief valve gasketing and bolting configuration has been discussed with E. L. Brown and W. C. Butt, and it is agreed that the best and only proper method of making up the joint between the code relief valve and pressurizer nozzle flanges is as follows:


1. The flanges are standard 2-1/2-inch 2500F small-tongue-and-groove. According to ASME and NRC letters, the dimensions should be as per the attached sketch. Verify these dimensions.
2. In order to provide adequate flange compression for the type service involved, and to prevent overcompression of the Viscitalk (VMI) 41-33 gasket, a backing ring is necessary, located according to the attached sketch. Unless measurements show that the joint is not of the dimensions sketched, the dimensions shown for the backing ring should be used.
3. If different dimensions are determined by the site, the thickness of the backing ring should be such as to limit compression of the gasket to  $.100" \pm .005"$ .
4. The recommended torque is 150 ft-lbs. Maximum torque is 240 ft-lbs for this design flange and bolts. The studs and nuts should be thoroughly lubricated per standard practice.

Systems Engineering concurs with the above recommendations.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
W. C. Butt  
Auxiliary Equipment, NSE

JPI/nw


cc: EL Brown  
WC Butt  
JD Phinney  
K Schroeder  
EV Stamba



TONGUES  
 MIN. DIMENSIONS  
 MAX. 2ND AT 100  
 BEST 150 AT 100  
 CHECK FLANGE  
 SEPARATION, VERIFY  
 THIS HAS BEEN

ASA  
 STANDARD  
 FLANGE  
 2500# SMALL  
 TYPE & CODE

NOZZLE  
 2 1/2" DIA.



IF NOT STANDARD FLANGE  
 T = RING THICKNESS  
 A = TONGUE  
 B = GROOVE  
 $T = (A - B) \pm .005$

RECOMMENDED  
 R4-25H  
 .125 OR H  
 .100 COMP.

RING DIMENSIONS

I.D. = SAME AS GROOVE O.D.  
 O.D. = CLEARANCE

MATERIAL - STAINLESS STEEL (RING WILL REST ON SS. FLANGES)

DEAN POWER COMPANY  
 P.R. Relief Valve Installation

620-1003  
 1242-SPR202

FILE 12.M.2. SPR 262

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To R. McConnell For Action

Contract 620-00 03

SPR 262

TITLE PRESS SAFETY  
VALVE LEAKAGE

G. KAYNICH - NSS CONTS

R. HOLLANDER - MTV

K. SCHROEDER - SYS ENGR

MANHOUR LIMITS —

To PEGGY HANSON GEN ENGRS  
for Information

COST LIMITS —

C. PLUNKETT - NSS CONT

DATE 12-15-71

H. DOBEL - QA

CHARGE NO 620-0003-28


K. SUMRKE - NUC SVC

C. WOLFF - NUC SVC

ACTION REQUIRED 1. DRESSER PRODUCTS WAS CONTACTED  
AND THEY ADVISED CHECKS OF BOLTS ETC.  
A TEST IS BEING PERFORMED TO VERIFY  
IF VALVE IS LEAKING. SITE TO ADVISE  
RESULTS.

2. RECOMMENDED TORQUE ON JOINT  
STUDS IS 100 FT LB PER ATTACHED CALCS.

DATE FOR ACTION TO BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL

  
Technical Support  
Engineer

FILE 12.M.2. SPR 26

TRANSMITTAL SLIP  
FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To T. VIAR - PURCH For Action  
R. MCCONNELL - NUC SVR

Contract 620-00 03

SPR 262

TITLE LEAKING PRE  
URIZER RELIEF  
VALVE

MANHOUR LIMITS —

To \_\_\_\_\_ For Information


COST LIMITS —

DATE 12-16-71

G. BURNLEY - SYSTEMS  
G. KULYNYCH - NSSCONT  
C. WOLFF - NUC SVR

CHARGE NO. 620-003-

ACTION REQUIRED TESTS WERE COMPLETED AT THE  
SITE ON 12-16-71 AND LEAKAGE WAS  
CONFIRMED. DRESSER PROD WITNESSED  
THE TEST AND CONCURS THAT LEAKAGE  
EXISTS. THE SITE HAS BEEN ADVISED TO  
REPLACE THE VALVE WITH A SPARE AT  
THE SITE AND SHIP DEFECTIVE VALVE  
DOWN FOR ACTION TO BE COMPLETED TO DRESSER FOR  
REPAIR.

  
Technical Support  
Engineer

## 1. REFERENCES:

A. FLEXITALLIC CATALOG - SPIRAL WOUND GASKETS - ELEVENTH EDITION - COPYRIGHT 1967 (AVAILABLE FROM MR E. BROWN NUCLEAR SERVICE).

B. FLEXITALLIC SPIRAL WOUND GASKET DESIGN CRITERIA - COPYRIGHT 1971 (AVAILABLE FROM MR E. BROWN - NUCLEAR SERVICE)

C. SECTION VIII ASME CODE, 1968 EDITION

FROM REF B, THE MIN REQUIRED LOAD ON THE GASKET IS THE LARGER OF THE FOLLOWING:

$$\text{LOAD} = W_1 = \frac{3.14 G^2 P}{4} + 2 \cdot 3.14 G m P$$

OR

$$\text{LOAD} = W_2 = 3.14 b G y$$

where:

(FOR R4-25H GASKET)

$$G = 3.281'$$

$$P = 2500$$

$$b = b_0 = N/2 = .094$$

$$m = 3$$

$$y = 9000$$

$$W_1 = \frac{3.14 (3.281)^2 2500}{4} + 2 (.094) 3.14 (3.281) 3 (2500)$$

$$= 23,250 \#$$

$$W_2 = 3.14 \times .094 \times 3.281 \times 9000 = 8700 \#$$

∴ LOAD ON GASKET =  $23,250^{25,650}$  MIN.

THERE ARE 8 STUDS,  $1\frac{1}{2}''$   $\frac{1}{2}$  NC THREADS FROM SA 193-B7 LOW ALLOY STEEL WITH ALLOWABLE STRESS OF 20,000 PSI.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{MIN TORQUE} &= \frac{K F D}{12 \times 8} = \frac{.194 \times 23,250 \times 1.125}{12 \times 8} \\ &= 53^{81} \text{ FT LB} \end{aligned}$$

FROM REF A, PAGE 32 THE BOLT STRESS AT 53 FT LB IS:

$$\frac{30,000}{355} \times 53 = 4,500 \text{ PSI}$$

HIGHEST TORQUE ALLOWABLE IS:

$$\frac{2}{3} \times 355 = 236 \text{ FT LBS} = 315$$

ASSUMING FLANGE CAN TAKE LOAD, TORQUE CAN VARY FROM RANGE OF 53 TO 236 FT LBS.

RECOMMENDED VALUE IS 100 FT LBS.

P.K. SMITH 12-15-71



TITLE Dropped Spare Pressurizer Relief Valve  
RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS- None. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

The Pressurizer relief valve  
was dropped 4' from a Forklift.  
Sent back for inspection & retest.  
Test sat.

N.A to any other contract.  
(operator error.)

NSS- \_\_\_\_\_

**ACTION COMPLETE  
ON ALL CONTRACTS**

Instructions For VDS-21091 - Site Problem Report  
 Initiated by Nuclear Service - Refer to NPG-0503-04  
 Initiated by B&W Construction Co. - Refer to NPG-0503-05  
 For Unirradiated CNFP-Supplied Core Components - Refer to NPG-0503-10  
 Affected Documentation audited by R. M. [Signature] Date 3-29-73

Changes Required: No  
 Yes (See Below)

Site Problem Report Affected Documentation Control for SPR- 280  
 Cognizant Engineer- NGS - 03

The following documentation requires revision as noted on the front of this Site Problem Report. This CONTROL shall remain in effect until the described changes have been completed or otherwise resolved.

Description of Changes Title	Resolution	Completed	
		By	Date

Distribution:  
 Nuclear Service - 12M2  
 Central Eng. Files

TRANSMITTAL SLIP  
FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM RETURN

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To \_\_\_\_\_ For Information FILE: 12M2  
Contract 620-00 03  
\_\_\_\_\_ SPR - 280  
G. E. KALYNICH - Sr. Project Manager TITLE SPARE PRR  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin. RELIEF VALVE  
P. A. Hanson - Eng. Files \_\_\_\_\_  
H. F. Dobei - Quality Assurance DATE 5-15-72

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.


TO: ~~\_\_\_\_\_ N. S. Etbrey \_\_\_\_\_ R. T. Scherer~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_ G. E. Kalynich \_\_\_\_\_ E. G. Ware~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_ J. McFarland \_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_ F. Norman \_\_\_\_\_~~  
~~\_\_\_\_\_ G. M. Olds \_\_\_\_\_~~

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. \_\_\_\_\_ which has been processed on Contract 620-00 \_\_\_\_\_. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc:

J. P. ITTNER  
MAY 19 1972  
SUPPORT ENG.

  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

CUSTOMER	Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO.	0002	SPR NO.	280	SPR REV NO.	0
VENDOR	RAW	P.O. NO.	804067	COMP. NO.	23	GROUP NO.	41
SEQ NO.	6	PRIMARY DOCUMENTS:		SPEC NOS.		PRIORITY	
DWG NO.		EQUIP CODE LEVEL/DATE				02	
QA LEVEL	I	QA SPEC NO.		1841 SE 337			
SITE ENGINEER	J. D. Rainey	EARLY START DATE		ACTUAL START DATE		REQ'D COMP. DATE	

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) SPARE PRESS RELIEF VALVE

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
 During preparation of a spare PR relief valve for installation, a tag was found on valve indicating that the valve had been dropped. Investigation indicates that the valve fell from a fork lift 4'. There is no visible damage.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC  
 Duke, Dresser. Recommended to Duke that valve be returned to Dresser for inspection and retest.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
 NO

RECOMMENDED ACTION  
 Return valve to Dresser for inspection and retest.

*Valve returned to Site*

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS	ACTION
ORIGINATOR	<i>J.D. Rainey</i>	12/28/71	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>J.M. Connell</i>	12/28/71	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
NS SUPPORT ENGR.	<i>P.K. Smith</i>	1/3/72	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
			<input type="checkbox"/> P&ID/FSM	
PROJECT MANAGER	NA		<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Side Change	

DISTRIBUTION SITE OPS MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER N.S. SUPPORT ENGR. COGNIZANT ENGR. CONTRACT ADMIN. NPC QA FILE 12M2 SPR 280	Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> M <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> I	Auth. <i>030-0003-28</i> Charge No.	Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>
	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN. DPC	Date Completed <i>5/12/72</i> By: <i>J.D. Rainey</i>	Field Change No. _____
	OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED NONE	REVISIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____	<i>Completed</i> <i>J.M. Connell</i> <i>5/12/72</i>

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To R. McConnell For Action

Contract 620-00 03

SPR 280

TITLE SPARE PART  
RECEIPT VALUE

- T. VIRA - PUGH
- G. KAYNICH - NSS CONTRS
- X. SCHROEDER - SYSTEM
- To PEGGY HANSON - GEN ENG FILES For Information
- C. PLUNKETT - NSS CONTRS
- H. DOBEL - QA
- K. SCHRKE - NUCL SV
- C. WOLFF - NUCL SV

MANHOUR LIMITS -

COST LIMITS -

DATE 1-3-72

CHARGE NO. 620.0003-28

ACTION REQUIRED THE SITE IS REQUESTED TO  
CLEAR THE SPR AFTER THE VALUE  
HAS BEEN CLEARED.

DATE FOR ACTION TO BE COMPLETED AS SOON AS PRACTICAL

*[Signature]*  
Technical Support  
Engineer

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

CLOSED

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

→ TO: Charge Control For Distribution

S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance

Central Engineering files

T. G. Wolcott - Task Engineer

J. Lauer - Project Manager

FILE: 13-14-388

CONTRACT NO: 620-00 14

SPR 388

TITLE ICS Feedwater Flow

Control

DATE: 3/27/78

STATUS CODE C

\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED. \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ F. R. Faist - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Donnell - OFR \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 388 which was processed on Contract 620-00 14. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem ~~is~~ is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

B. H. Harris  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

1 of 6

**SITE PROBLEM REPORT**

*J.R. Faist*  
*Pascock & Wilcox*

PASCOCK & WILCOX SPR #388

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison Company	ORIGINATOR F.R. Faist	DATE 11/7/77	DWG. NO. 13-	CONT. NO. 626-0014	SPR NO. 388	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR BMCo	P.A. NO. 020 592 L	PART NO.	TRC. NO.	GROUP NO.	SEQ. NO.	
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) ICS Feedwater Flow Control			2-15/8011 ASSEMBLY NO. 11/18/77			

**DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:**

See attachment.  
(DB-267)

Req'd. Resolution Date: 11/15/77

Req'd. Completion Date: 1/2/78

**CLOSED**

**STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:**

Terry Murray, TECo, knows of this problem and is aware of the corrective action. Tom Wolcott, Lymb. Engineering, is aware of the problem and has approved the solution.

**FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:** 1. Wiring changes have been made as outlined in "Description of Problem". 2. Correct Dwg. No. D8034800C, per marked up drawing attached and "Description of Problem", and issue revised drawings to TECo, etc.

**RESOLUTION:** Drawing D8034800 Sheet 5 location SC relay 83/BFWP should be 83/BFWP. BMCo will correct drawing on final update. Other discrepancies noted between this drawing and actual wiring should be wired according to this drawing.

1/4 G.J. Gibbs  
 1/1 T.G. Wolcott

PREPARED BY *B. Harris* DATE *3/21/78* APPROVED BY \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

REVIEWED BY *J.P. Lauer* DATE *3/21/78* APPROVED BY *J.P. Lauer* DATE *3-21-78*

COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04- N/A	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
--	---	-----------------------	---

**SITE COMPLETION REPORT:** ICS wiring was corrected as noted in SPR. BMCo to make drawing corrections on final drawing update.

DEVIATIONS:  
 NONE  SPR REV NO.

DATE COMPLETED: 3/27/78

COMPLETED BY *J.R. Faist* DATE 3/27/78

F. R. Faist *J.R. Faist* 3/27/78

SHEET

2 of 6

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

RESOLUTION

COMPLETION

SP# 338  
620-0014  
Description of Problem  
11/7/77

Problem:

Problems surfaced when the F. W. pump controllers were placed on auto. Tracing out wiring showed some discrepancies. Dwg. D60348000 shows contacts 3, 4, and 5 of 83/AFWP being used twice, for different functions.

Checking logic makes it appear that the set towards the center of the drawing should be 83/BFWP, and the set towards the top left side should remain 83/AFWP. However, the wiring was found to be in the reverse of this order.

The wiring of contacts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of 83/BFWP were found connected to 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of 86/BFWPT. The wires that the drawing shows as going to 6, 7 and 8 of 86/BFWPT were, in turn, connected to 12, 13 and 14 of 86/BFWPT. There were no wires on 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of 83/BFWP.

Loop 2 was found to have the same mistakes, involving the shift of wires from 83/AFWP to 86/AFWPT, the shift of wires from 6, 7, and 8 of 86/AFWPT, and no wires on 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of 83/AFWP.

Dick Shaffer (BMCo) and Fred Faist (B&W) contacted J. Courtwright (BMCo) and T. Wolcott (B&W - Lynchburg). They reached a verbal agreement that the drawing be changed to show that contacts 3, 4 and 5 of 83/AFWP towards the center should be 83/BFWP, and that the appropriate wiring changes be made to order.

It was also agreed, on that matter of the other wiring discrepancies, that the wiring be changed to match the drawing. The wiring changes were made and the field drawings corrected. The systems then functioned properly.

3076



<b>PROBLEM REPORT</b>	PRODUCT SYSTEM SAL 1000R	FILE NO. (175)	DATE OF PROBLEM 11/3/77	FROM T.L. Grubough
ISSUE TO CUSTOMER MAIL OR BY AIR	CUSTOMER USE ONLY	EXCESSIVE WORK 1220 M	WORK ORDER NO. 020 592 LJ	WORK NO. 5221
CUSTOMER NAME Toledo Edison, Davitt-Besse I				WORK NO. 783
SUBJECT LINE ONLY AND TYPE OF SYSTEM PRODUCT F. W. Pump Control Loops Wiring Change		SERIAL NO. AND OR PART NO. N/A		

PROBLEM

See attached sheet.

EFFECT ON SYSTEM (BRIEFLY): F.W. Pump Control Loops would not work in automatic.

CUSTOMER ATTITUDE  
 MAJOR CONCERN  
 CONCERNED  
 UNCONCERNED

DATE SOLUTION REQUIRED \_\_\_\_\_ OR  INFO ONLY

SIGNATURE T.L. Grubough DATE 11/7/77

FOR FIELD USE

WARRANTY SERVICE \_\_\_\_\_  
 CLASS SERVICE \_\_\_\_\_  
 EXPENSES \_\_\_\_\_  
 MATERIAL \_\_\_\_\_  
 SPONO \_\_\_\_\_

ALLOCATION  
 PRODUCT  
 SYSTEM  
 WARRANTY  
 SYS ENGR ERROR  
 OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

DEFECTIVE PART RETURNED  
 NO  
 YES ON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE  
 RM NO \_\_\_\_\_

FAILURE OCCURRED  
 ON RECEIPT  
 IN SERVICE (WARRANTY)  
 IN SERVICE (NON-WARRANTY)  
 2 YRS. 1ST TIME IN SERVICE

POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR PROBLEM

30  FAULTY MATERIAL  
 31  FAULTY MANUFACTURING  
 32  FAULTY DESIGN  
 33  PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCY  
 34  FAULTY PACKAGING  
 35  COMPONENT FAILURE  
 36  WEAROUT  
 37  IMPROPER APPLICATION  
 38  OPERATING ENVIRONMENT  
 39  INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS DOCUMENTATION

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION & CORRECTIVE ACTION (FIELD IF APPLICABLE)

OPERATING CONDITIONS  
 AMBIENT TEMP 75 °F  
 ATMOSPHERE  CLEAN  
 AVERAGE  DIRTY  
 HUMIDITY  HI  LO  AVG

TIME REQUIRED TO REPAIR \_\_\_\_\_ TROUBLESHOOT \_\_\_\_\_  
 RECALL RATE \_\_\_\_\_

FAILURE DETAILS  
 BMCO PART NO \_\_\_\_\_  
 DESCRIBE (CODE, CAP, TRANSFORM, ETC)  
 CIRCUIT SYMBOL (L, R, Q)  
 MFG OF PART (IF KNOWN)  
 HOW PART FAILED  
 SHORT  OPEN  
 MECH DAMAGE  
 ADJUSTMENT  
 DIRTY  UNKNOWN  
 OTHER (DESCRIBE)

COPIES: QUALITY ASSURANCE PROD. LIABILITY PROD. MANAGEMENT MPO FPO WPO ASPO WARRANTY REPAIR CONTINUATION ENGR. COMPONENT ENGR.	COPIES	<input type="checkbox"/> PRELIMINARY ANS <input type="checkbox"/> FINAL SOLUTION	SIGNATURE	DATE	APPROVAL	DATE
	FOLLOW UP ON CORRECTIVE ACTION			DISP OF R/M _____ DATE RECD _____ DATE RETURNED _____ HOURS SPENT SOLUTION DEPT _____ MAN _____		

QTY	NAME	PART NO	COMMENTS
			4086

DB-267  
620-0014  
1220M  
11/7/77

Problems.

Problems surfaced when the F. W. pump controllers were placed on auto. Tracing out wiring showed some discrepancies. Dwg. D8034800C shows contacts 3, 4, and 5 of 83/APWP being used twice, for different functions.

Checking logic makes it appear that the set towards the center of the drawing should be 83/BFWP, and the set towards the top left side should remain 83/APWP. However, the wiring was found to be in the reverse of this order.

The wiring of contacts 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of 83/BFWP were found connected to 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of 86/BFWPT. The wires that the drawing shows as going to 6, 7 and 8 of 86/BFWPT were, in turn, connected to 10, 13 and 14 of 86/BFWPT. There were no wires on 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11 of 83/BFWP.


Loop 2 was found to have the same mistakes, involving the shift of wires from 83/APWP to 86/APWPT, the shift of wires from 6, 7, and 8 of 86/APWPT, and no wires on 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 of 83/APWP.

Dick Shaffer (BMC) and Fred Faist (B&W) contacted J. Courtwright (BMC) and T. Wolcott (B&W - Lynchburg). They reached a verbal agreement that the drawing be changed to show that contacts 3, 4 and 5 of 83/APWP towards the center should be 83/BFWP, and that the appropriate wiring changes be made to order.

It was also agreed, on that matter of the other wiring discrepancies, that the wiring be changed to match the drawing. The wiring changes were made and the field drawings corrected. The systems then functioned properly.

TLG:nlf



5 of 6





Done correct  
 but TELC required to  
 83/BFWP needs to have  
wiring changes reqd

→ Done wrong  
 should be 83/BFWP  
 was wired to 83/AFWP  
needs wiring change

NO.	DATE	DESCRIPTION
1	5-7-8	...
2	5-7-8	...
3	5-7-8	...
4	5-7-8	...
5	5-7-8	...
6	5-7-8	...
7	5-7-8	...
8	5-7-8	...
9	5-7-8	...
10	5-7-8	...



Dwg is correct if #1 was wired correctly  
However wired to 2-7-8. 12, 13, 14



Dwg is correct if #2 was wired correctly  
However wired to 2-7-7 12, 13, 14  
which will work

RECEIVED

JUN 1 1977

D. E. SHAFFER

777-M-53-57-3

RECEIVED  
AUG 28 1977

777-M-53-57-3

RECEIVED

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

To: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
G. J. Gibas - Task Engineer(s)  
R. C. Luken - Project Manager

File: 13-14-392  
Contract No.: 620-00 14  
SPR: 392 Rev 0  
Title: Four Amps Ckt.  
Board Failures  
Date: 6/19/78  
Status Code: C

/ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED. / P. E. Perrone  
/ F. R. Faist - TOLEDO / W. M. Kelly  
/ J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support  
/ B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 392 which was processed on Contract 620-00 14. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem ~~is~~ is not considered applicable to other contracts

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

J. D. Fulcher  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

Pg 1 of 4

SITE PROBLEM REPORT		BABCOCK & WILCOX		SPR #392
CUSTOMER Toledo Edison	ORIGINATOR F.R. Faist	DATE 11/15/77	DOC. ED. CONT. NO. 13-620-0014	SPR NO. 392
VENDOR Bailey Meter Co.	P.A. NO. 020 592 LJ	PART NO./TRK NO. GROUP NO. SEQ. NO. 25/001/001		
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) Four Ampex Ckt. Board Failures		PROBLEM CONTACT M. L. Nelson <i>MLN</i>		
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION	DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: (DB-269/DB-270) Intermittent failures of the 855 plant computer on 11/6/77 were determined to be caused by the Ampex Circuit Boards listed below: (1) DR4-3228802-02L - possible failure of 2nd bit assigned 70,000 - 77,777. Bits 0 - 3. Intermittent loss of "1" bit. (2) DR4-3228802-02J - Possible failure of 3rd bit assigned 20,000 - 27,777. Bits 24, 25 and parity. Intermittent loss of parity bit. R. W. Kunes of BmCo arrived on site on 11/7/77, but the above cards had already been replaced. Mr. Kunes did, however, help TECO identify the problem with the paper tape punch (SPR #393). The above two boards failed again 11/14/77 and were replaced. (3) DR4-3228802-02L, From Drawer 3, A-17. Failure of Bits 0, 1, 2, 3 for Address 20,000 - 27,777. (4) DR4-3228802-02J, From Drawer 3, B-22. Failure of Bits 20, 21, 22, 23 for addresses 30,000 - 37,777.			
	STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED: Above four cards returned to Bailey. TECO P. O. #020 561 LF. B&W P. O. #032424LT. Dennis Rice contacted for the P. O. number.			
	FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL: Site to clear on return of the four boards.			
RESOLUTION	RESOLUTION: <i>Repair above cards on PO# 032424 LT. (BMC)</i>			
	PREPARED BY <i>Jerry J. Seltzer</i>	DATE 11-18-77	APPROVED BY <i>J. A. [Signature]</i>	DATE 11-18-77
	REVIEWED BY <i>W. M. [Signature]</i>	DATE 11-18-77		
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER		FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		F.C.A. NO. CL- N/A
				SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT: Per BmCo P.S.S. all parts returned to TECO.		DEVIATIONS: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE    SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>	
			DATE COMPLETED: 6/6/78	
			COMPLETED BY: P. R. Faist <i>PRFaist</i> DATE: 6/6/78	
			P. R. Faist <i>PRFaist</i> 6/6/78	
		SHEET 2 OF 4		



<b>PROBLEM REPORT</b> <small>PRODUCT-SYSTEM</small> <small>DATE</small>	<small>FILE NO.</small> <small>(TR)</small>	<small>DATE OF PROBLEM</small> 11/8/77 <small>TIME</small> 1220 M	<small>FROM</small> T. L. Grubaugh <small>EXP NO.</small> 5221 <small>ACC NO.</small> 783												
<small>CUSTOMER NAME</small> Toledo Edison, Davis-Besse I	<small>CNO</small> <small>USE ONLY</small>	<small>JUST ORDER NO.</small> 000 561 LF	<small>MAIL STA./OO</small> Bitt (DB-269)												
<small>ADDRESS (LINE ONE ONLY) AND TYPE OF SYSTEM/PRODUCT</small> Annex Ckt. Board Failures (855)		<small>DATE OF ISSUE</small> --	<small>ORDER NO. AND/OR PART NO.</small> DR4-3228802-02J/02J												
DR4-3228802-02L: Possible failure of 2nd bit assigned 70,000 - 77,777 - Bits 0-3. Intermittent loss of "1" Bit.		<small>CLASS. SERVICE</small> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/> CLASS. SERVICE <input type="checkbox"/> EXPENSES <input type="checkbox"/> MATERIALS <input type="checkbox"/> SPORE													
DR4-3228802-02J: Possible failure of 3rd bit assigned 20,000 - 27,777 - Bits 24, 25 and parity. Intermittent loss of parity bit.		<small>ALLOCATION</small> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PRODUCT <input type="checkbox"/> SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> WARRANTY <input type="checkbox"/> SYS ENGR. ERROR <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER													
<small>EFFECT ON SYSTEM (BRIEFLY)</small> Caused intermittent failure of plant computer system.		<small>DEFECTIVE PART RETURNED</small> <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES ON 11-15-77 DATE <small>RM NO.</small> 20375													
<small>CUSTOMER ATTITUDE</small> <input type="checkbox"/> MAJOR CONCERN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONCERNED <input type="checkbox"/> UNCONCERNED		<small>FAILURE OCCURRED</small> <input type="checkbox"/> ON RECEIPT <input type="checkbox"/> IN SERVICE (WARRANTY) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> IN SERVICE (NON-WARRANTY) 2 YRS. EST. TIME IN SERVICE													
<small>DATE SOLUTION REQUIRED</small> <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> INFO ONLY		<small>POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR PROBLEM</small> <input type="checkbox"/> 01 FACTORY MATERIAL <input type="checkbox"/> 02 FACTORY MANUFACTURING <input type="checkbox"/> 03 FACTORY DESIGN <input type="checkbox"/> 04 PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> 05 FAILURE PACKAGING <input type="checkbox"/> 06 COMPONENT FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> 07 WEAR/OUT <input type="checkbox"/> 08 IMPROPER APPLICATION <input type="checkbox"/> 09 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT <input type="checkbox"/> 10 INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS (DOCUMENTATION)													
<small>REPORT OF INVESTIGATION &amp; CORRECTIVE ACTION (BY FIELD IF APPLICABLE)</small>		<small>OPERATING CONDITIONS</small> <small>AMBIENT TEMP</small> 70-90 °F <small>ATMOSPHERE</small> <input type="checkbox"/> CLEAN <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AVERAGE <input type="checkbox"/> DIRTY <small>HUMIDITY</small> <input type="checkbox"/> HI <input type="checkbox"/> LO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> AVG													
<small>COPIES</small> QUALITY ASSURANCE PROD. LIABILITY PROD. MANAGEMENT NPO FPO IPPO ASPO WARRANTY REPAIR CONTINUATION ENGR COMPONENT ENGR		<small>TIME REQUIRED TO</small> REPAIR _____ TROUBLESHOOT _____ RECALIBRATE _____													
<small>COPIES</small>		<small>FAILURE DETAILS</small> <small>BMCO PART NO.</small> <small>DESCRIBE (INDIC. CAP, TRANSISTOR, ETC.)</small> <small>CIRCUIT SYMBOL (E.I., R.I., G.I.)</small> <small>MFG. OF PART (IF KNOWN)</small> <small>HOW PART FAILED</small> <input type="checkbox"/> SHORT / <input type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> MECH. DAMAGE <input type="checkbox"/> ADJUSTMENT <input type="checkbox"/> DIRTY <input type="checkbox"/> UNKNOWN <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (DESCRIBE)													
<small>PRELIMINARY ANS.</small> <input type="checkbox"/>		<small>SIGNATURE</small> T. L. Grubaugh													
<small>FINAL SOLUTION</small> <input type="checkbox"/>		<small>DATE</small> 11/8/77													
<small>FOLLOW UP ON CORRECTIVE ACTION</small>		<small>APPROVAL</small> DATE													
<small>DISP. OF R.M.</small> DATE REC'D _____ DATE RETURNED _____		<small>HOURS SPENT SOLUTION</small> <table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th>DEPT.</th> <th>MAN</th> <th>HRS.</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>		DEPT.	MAN	HRS.									
DEPT.	MAN	HRS.													
<table border="1" style="width:100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <th>QTY</th> <th>NAME</th> <th>PART NO.</th> <th>COMMENTS</th> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </table>		QTY	NAME	PART NO.	COMMENTS									4 of 4	
QTY	NAME	PART NO.	COMMENTS												



TITLE No pressurizer spray Valve 40% open light

RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NOS-\_\_\_\_\_. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

3/26/74 -- Review sheet to JFC  
S.O. error. Not Generic says Leon Mc Bee.

P. Pothman 10/18/75  
L.M.

NOS- \_\_\_\_\_

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To H. J. McConnell For Information FILE: 12M2  
 Contract 620-00 - 04  
 \_\_\_\_\_ SPR 46  
G. E. Kolynych - Sr. Project Manager TITLE PRZ SPRAY  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin. VALVE 407.  
 Central Engineering Files LIGHT  
E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance DATE 9-7-73

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO:  J. N. Kaelin-Arkansas \_\_\_\_\_  
 J. P. Kennedy-SMD \_\_\_\_\_  
 K. E. Suhrke \_\_\_\_\_  
 ~~H. J. Walsh~~ \_\_\_\_\_  
 J. D. Phinney-Met Ed \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 46 which has been processed on Contract 620-00-04. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

cc: G. QUALE  
 R. BURNLEY

R. L. Pittman  
 NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO 600-0000	SPR NO. 46	SPR REF NO 0
VENDOR BMCo	P.O. NO.	COMP. NO. 22	GROUP NO. 01
SEC NO. 01	PRIORITY		
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS:	SPEC NOS.		
DWG NO.	EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE		
QA LEVEL	QA SPEC NO.		
SITE ENGINEER J. L. Hawks	EARLY START DATE	ACTUAL START DATE	REQ'D COM. DATE 1-1-73

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) PRG Spray Valve 40% Light

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

See Attached BMCo FR ONE 1-37

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

Reported to BMCO

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL

By BMCo through Site Representative.

RECOMMENDED ACTION Refer to reply from BMCo. Nuclear Project office on the attached BMCo. PR. REF

BMCo. REP. REPORTS THAT PROPER INDICATION HAS NOW BEEN INSTALLED.

JLW  
9/23

APPROVALS	TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
	ORIGINATOR	<i>J. L. Hawks</i>	10/12/72	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
	SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
	SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>R. M. Connell</i>	10/12/72	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
	NS SUPPORT ENGR.	<i>R. L. Pittman</i>	10/12-72	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
				<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs.	
	PROJECT MANAGER	- N R -		<input type="checkbox"/> PSAR/PSAR	
DISTRIBUTION		Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> A <input type="checkbox"/> J	Auth. Charge No. NONE	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Site Change	
SITE OPS MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER N.S. SUPPORT ENGR. COGNIZANT ENGR. CONTRACT ADMIN. NPG QA FILE 12M: SPR 46		RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN <b>BM Co.</b>	Date Completed _____	Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED	By: _____	Field Change No. _____	
			DESIGNATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____	<i>Complete R.M. Connell 9-4-73</i>	



<b>PROBLEM REPORT</b>		PRODUCT SYSTEM FILE NO. (CMI)	FILE NO. (SER)	DATE October 9 1972	EMGR R. T. Getty								
TO SERVICE ENGINEERING		CMG	RMG/SO MO 2130K/1600L1002	EMGR NO 2550	ALCT NO 773								
MAX STA INC A3-23		USE ONLY	QUST. ORDER NO A-28855	MAIL ROOM Clemson									
CUSTOMER & PLANT Duke Power Co., Oconee Unit #2		NOMENCLATURE SERIES LABEL		SERIAL NO. AND OR PART NO.									
SUBJECT (LINE ONLY) Press, Spray Valve 40% Open Ind. Light													
PROBLEM RC3-MIS-1 and RC25-MIS were supplied as Type RZ1000BX Model CCCACC-1 on SO 1700K1002, page 2. On Units 2 and 3 2130K1002, page 2 and 1600L1002, page 2 a Type RZ1000BX Model CCCOCC-1 was supplied. This indicator does not have pressurizer spray valve 40% indicating lights. The relay logic for this light is shown on Unit 2 Dwg. 8038900. Unit 3 drawing is available for checking. 8041467 2 P/N 6621475-10-YO indicator assemblies with proper engraving have been ordered on FR 7167 and will be installed to correct Units 2 and 3.				JOB FIELD USE DAYS SERVICE _____ SERVICE \$ _____ EXPANSES \$ _____ MATERIAL \$ _____ S.E.O. NO. _____									
DATE SOLUTION REQUIRED <u>11/1/72</u> OR <input type="checkbox"/> INFO ONLY				ALLOCATION <input type="checkbox"/> PRODUCT <input type="checkbox"/> PRODUCT APPLICATION <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SYSTEM <input type="checkbox"/> SYSTEM APPLICATION <input type="checkbox"/> WARRANTY <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____									
REPORT OF INVESTIGATION & CORRECTIVE ACTION (BY FIELD IF APPLICABLE)				EFFECTIVE PART RETURNED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> YES ON _____ DATE RM NO _____									
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> CONT'D ON SEPARATE SHEET <i>[Signature]</i>				FAILURE OCCURRED <input type="checkbox"/> IN WARRANTY <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ON RECEIPT <input type="checkbox"/> IN SERVICE EST. TIME IN SERVICE _____									
POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR PROBLEM <input type="checkbox"/> FACILITY MATERIAL <input type="checkbox"/> FACILITY MANUFACTURING <input type="checkbox"/> FACILITY DESIGN <input type="checkbox"/> PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> FACILITY PACKAGING <input type="checkbox"/> COMPONENT FAILURE <input type="checkbox"/> WORKMANSHIP <input type="checkbox"/> IMPROPER APPLICATION <input type="checkbox"/> OPERATING ENVIRONMENT <input type="checkbox"/> INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS				INVESTIGATOR ASSIGNED _____ MAIL #74 ACTION DATE _____ EXPECTED REPLY DATE _____ FINAL DISPOSITION SIGNATURES ENGINEERING _____ RELIABILITY _____ QC/OA _____ MFG. FOREMAN _____									
<input type="checkbox"/> PRELIM. ANSWER		<input type="checkbox"/> FINAL SOLUTION		DISPOSITION OF RM # _____ DATE RECEIVED _____ DATE RETURNED _____									
SIGNATURE _____ DATE _____		ACCOUNT ALLOCATION: COST CENTER _____ ASSIGNING INITIALS _____ APPROVAL INITIALS _____											
CONSIDER REP. S-SOLI		FOLLOW UP ON CORRECTIVE ACTION (FIELD OR CMCI) ACTION REQUESTED _____ RESULTS _____		ASSIGNED TO _____ DATE _____ APPROVAL _____ DATE _____									
PARTS REPLACED DURING REPAIR IN FIELD, MFG OR ENGINEERING		RM NO _____ DATE RCVD _____ REPAIR MO _____ REPAIRED BY _____ DEPT. _____ DATE _____											
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>QTY</th> <th>NAME</th> <th>PART NO</th> <th>COMMENTS</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> <td> </td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		QTY	NAME	PART NO	COMMENTS								
QTY	NAME	PART NO	COMMENTS										

The specification sheets for 2130K and 1600L1002, page 2, should be revised at the earliest date possible <sup>AT</sup> ~~with~~ the discretion of the System Manager.

*T. B. Kelly*

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

To: Change Control ← For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
P. E. Manula - Task Engineer(s)  
R. C. Luken - Project Manager

File: 13-14-391-01  
Contract No.: 620-00 14  
SPR: 391, Rev 01  
Title: Failed Incore Detectors

Date: 7/6/78  
Status Code: C

L. C. Rogers - MET. ED.                       P. E. Perrone  
 F. R. Faist - TOLEDO  
 J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support  
 B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 391-01 which was processed on Contract 620-00 14. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem ~~is~~/is not considered applicable to other contracts

REMARKS:

**COMPLETED**

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

sh 186

*Cleared*

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX SPR #391.01

CUSTOMER Telephone Edison Company	ORIGINAL DATE P. R. Faist 11/22/77	DOC. ID. CONT. NO. 13- 620-0014	SPR NO. 391	REV. NO. 01
VENDOR B&W	P. A. NO. 026734IK	PART NO./TASK NO. 24/001/001	GROUP NO.	SEQ. NO.

FILE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) Failed Incore Detectors	PROBLEM CONTACT D. L. Allison <i>D. L. Allison</i>
---	---

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

In accordance with P. E. Mamola & H. D. Warren's request, additional leakage measurements have been performed to verify the measurement technique used in SPR #391, Rev. 0. The following information is provided under Enclosure 01. (See attachment).

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED: Discussed the information obtained on 11/15/77 with P. E. Mamola and H. D. Warren. Received concurrence the information obtained on string 31 is consistent with leakage measurements of MOO.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL: TECO I&C to check levels 1 & 3 on string #9 from the multiplexer through the detector to verify operability of these levels. Site to clear this Rev. when Rev. 0 is cleared.

RESOLUTION: *Site to hold SPR until Rev. 0 is cleared. (Rev. 0 resolution transmitted 11-22-77)*

RESOLUTION

PREPARED BY <i>Doug Holsted</i>	DATE 11-22-77	APPROVED BY	DATE
REVIEWED BY <i>D. L. Allison</i>	DATE 12/19/77	<i>J. P. Law</i>	12-12-77

COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04- N/A	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
--	---	-----------------------	---

COMPLETION

SITE COMPLETION REPORT: See Rev. 0 of this SPR for site completion report.	DEVIATIONS: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SPR REV NO.
	DATE COMPLETED: 6/21/78
	COMPLETED BY F. R. Faist <i>F. R. Faist</i> DATE 6/21/78
	F. R. Faist <i>F. R. Faist</i> 6/21/78
SHEET <i>2</i> OF <i>5</i> 206	



ENCLOSURE 01

On 11/15/77, incore leakage measurements were performed on string #31. String #31 is a non-symmetric detector using  $Al_2O_3$  insulation. The following are the results.

String #31:

	<u>NO VOLTS APPLIED</u>	<u>+10 V</u>	<u>-10 V</u>
Level 1	$+ .21 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ .15 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ .275 \times 10^{-6}$
Level 2	$+ .3 \times 10^{-6}$	$- .36 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ .97 \times 10^{-6}$
Level 3	$+ .32 \times 10^{-6}$	$- 1.2 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ 1.75 \times 10^{-6}$
Level 4	$+ .33 \times 10^{-6}$	$- 1.5 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ 2.2 \times 10^{-6}$
Level 5	$+ .34 \times 10^{-6}$	$- 1.25 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ 1.95 \times 10^{-6}$
Level 6	$+ .295 \times 10^{-6}$	$- 2.25 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ 2.85 \times 10^{-6}$
Level 7	$+ .14 \times 10^{-6}$	$- 2.2 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ 2.45 \times 10^{-6}$
Bkg.	$- 7.4 \times 10^{-9}$	$- 3.1 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ 3.1 \times 10^{-6}$

In addition to the above measurements, String 9, Levels 1, 3, 2 & 4 were rechecked with the following results:

<u>String #9</u>	<u>NO VOLTS</u>	<u>+10 V</u>	<u>-10 V</u>
Level 1	$- .1 \times 10^{-6}$	$> -10 \times 10^{-3}$	$+ 5.3 \times 10^{-3}$
Level 3	$+ .02 \times 10^{-3}$	$> -10 \times 10^{-3}$	$+ 4.9 \times 10^{-3}$
	$+ 3.4 \times 10^{-6}$	$> -10 \times 10^{-3}$	$+ 5.5 \times 10^{-3}$
	→ Varying - went to $- .2 \times 10^{-3}$		
Level 2	$+ .39 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ .38 \times 10^{-6}$	$+ .39 \times 10^{-6}$
Level 4	$+ .1 \times 10^{-9}$	$+ .02 \times 10^{-9}$	$+ .05 \times 10^{-9}$

306  
385

Levels 1 & 3 are still questionable - A leakage measurement on string #9 will be performed for these levels from the multiplexer to the detector. It was concluded after discussions with P. E. Mamola and H. D. Warren that the values obtained are still not a good indication of a failed detector since + Non-e-Amp values are still measured. There still may be a problem with the hook-up unique to string #9, since leakage measurements have varied and computer data also varies.

Level #2 - Good detector.

Level #4 - Values too low - would indicate an open in the lead wire or at the female connector more than a bad detector. In any case, bad detector.

Cables were interchanged between string 31 & 32. Both cables were disconnected at the multiplexer and the incore tank. The values on string 32, per Attachment 1, are string #32's values. TECO should replace either the connector in the incore tank or cable.

This data is provided for information for further analysis, if desired.

Based on the data herein, the measurement technique has been verified and additional checks will be performed.

DIA:nlf  
encl.  
11/21/77

4016  
4035

Attachment 1

PLANT: TULEDO EDISON CO. DAVIS RESSE ONE

TIME	YEAR	77	MONTH	14	DAY	15	HOUR	14	MINUTE	31	REF	EST		
PP04	SPNO-UNC	28224E	03	43955E	03	47151E	03	48726E	03	79434E	22	42776E	03	15422E
PP05		24544E	03	35656E	03	34807E	03	42245E	03	42929E	03	36151E	03	10422E
PP06		28929E	03	42554E	03	45063E	03	45458E	03	46958E	03	41287E	03	20422E
PP07		28175E	03	40957E	03	42321E	03	44154E	03	39423E	03	39778E	03	16272E
PP08		27972E	03	41251E	03	38745E	03	41238E	03	45734E	03	41361E	03	23722E
PP09		22478E	03	33127E	03	34545E	03	35297E	03	36729E	03	34089E	03	9575E
PP10		27314E	03	40147E	03	39044E	03	40953E	03	44844E	03	39269E	03	20551E
PP11		23915E	03	34927E	03	36589E	03	36475E	03	38503E	03	32933E	03	15851E
PP12	9-	76856E	18	41303E	03	14189E	04	76856E	18	46125E	03	41946E	03	24333E
PP13		23178E	03	33972E	03	34617E	03	34948E	03	37552E	03	33689E	03	19122E
PP14	12-	76856E	18	39927E	03	39122E	03	41572E	03	44413E	03	42497E	03	22422E
PP15		26584E	03	42151E	03	39119E	03	39225E	03	45649E	03	41742E	03	23522E
PP16		28253E	03	41259E	03	41025E	03	42184E	03	44919E	03	40192E	03	22153E
PP18		24159E	03	33726E	03	31225E	03	32874E	03	37763E	03	35325E	03	18181E
PP19		27569E	03	42421E	03	38970E	03	40212E	03	45237E	03	38285E	03	21565E
PP20		23587E	03	33451E	03	28036E	03	38568E	03	35217E	03	29713E	03	28744E
PP21		22495E	03	32721E	03	29465E	03	31171E	03	35954E	03	32529E	03	13564E
PP22		26432E	03	40339E	03	39164E	03	41236E	03	45315E	03	41083E	03	22531E
PP23		23827E	03	34947E	03	31936E	03	32946E	03	38594E	03	34323E	03	18993E
PP24		26188E	03	37294E	03	37305E	03	38733E	03	42209E	03	36516E	03	19372E
PP25		29517E	03	42447E	03	40574E	03	43138E	03	45612E	03	43378E	03	21439E
PP26		23256E	03	32444E	03	29323E	03	30914E	03	36397E	03	33793E	03	18722E
PP27		27284E	03	39464E	03	21826E	03	22169E	03	43159E	03	38555E	03	19719E
PP28	35% FP	27156E	03	39428E	03	40359E	03	41746E	03	45523E	03	42387E	03	24751E
PP29		26446E	03	37378E	03	34151E	03	36108E	03	42278E	03	40163E	03	18187E
PP30		26456E	03	36374E	03	19556E	03	21541E	03	41112E	03	36964E	03	19772E
PP31		21565E	03	33936E	03	30927E	03	31341E	03	36566E	03	34168E	03	19285E
PP32	NEW CABLE	27192E	03	43972E	03	42539E	03	43496E	03	45781E	03	41287E	03	23267E
PP33		28275E	03	41946E	03	44231E	03	43995E	03	45058E	03	39757E	03	14454E
PP34	31	22611E	03	76856E	18	76856E	18	76856E	18	76856E	18	76856E	18	76856E
PP35	32	22316E	03	33283E	03	34932E	03	32834E	03	35172E	03	33756E	03	18132E
PP36		21128E	03	30342E	03	25949E	03	28584E	03	32495E	03	29455E	03	16574E
PP37		21534E	03	30657E	03	27516E	03	28621E	03	34261E	03	32915E	03	17225E
PP38		22688E	03	33932E	03	31159E	03	31837E	03	37722E	03	34488E	03	16513E
PP39		24547E	03	36567E	03	37417E	03	37616E	03	39222E	03	34328E	03	16271E
PP40		17959E	03	28982E	03	31337E	03	31373E	03	32965E	03	27963E	03	12939E
PP41		22932E	03	35922E	03	31952E	03	35237E	03	36267E	03	32824E	03	12783E
PP42	39	76856E	18	76856E	18	76856E	18	95827E	02	76856E	18	46119E	02	76856E
PP43		23781E	03	35217E	03	32982E	03	36564E	03	48373E	03	35783E	03	17689E
PP44		22498E	03	32984E	03	30597E	03	31852E	03	35938E	03	32766E	03	16571E
PP45		24225E	03	36593E	03	33397E	03	35979E	03	36541E	03	35916E	03	16924E
PP46		23812E	03	32826E	03	32751E	03	33125E	03	35612E	03	34537E	03	18981E
PP47	44	76856E	18	34936E	03	34569E	03	35572E	03	36746E	03	34325E	03	13849E
PP48		18936E	03	26454E	03	26899E	03	28521E	03	29249E	03	25349E	03	13576E
PP49		12138E	03	19244E	03	20275E	03	20225E	03	21278E	03	18531E	03	82423E
PP50		22934E	03	33432E	03	30212E	03	32118E	03	37459E	03	33897E	03	18724E
PP51		15349E	03	22582E	03	22935E	03	23930E	03	24894E	03	21925E	03	12773E
PP52		16449E	03	25319E	03	25734E	03	26109E	03	26167E	03	25733E	03	12573E
PP53		23187E	03	33588E	03	30967E	03	26845E	03	37952E	03	33168E	03	16914E
PP54		24977E	02	13957E	03	14787E	03	15178E	03	17221E	03	14726E	03	83715E
PP55		18159E	03	14519E	03	14069E	03	15375E	03	16865E	03	14722E	03	54284E
PP56	BYG	83212E	02	26172E	02	95051E	01	37477E	01	14247E	02	10529E	02	25962E
PP57	12	7249E	01	18486E	02	91553E	01	48471E	01	75855E	18	14932E	02	23467E
PP58		13975E	02	43992E	01	12879E	01	72482E	01	47327E	01	10761E	02	54671E
PP59		15289E	02	99715E	01	42424E	01	21418E	02	72758E	01	55160E	01	12432E
PP60	31	72073E	02	26925E	02	76856E	18	11842E	01	12462E	01	34995E	01	14525E
PP61	39	63175E	01	56127E	02	76856E	18	94682E	01	75767E	01	49912E	01	14525E
PP62		86718E	01	28797E	02	48928E	01	39215E	01	43755E	01	57224E	01	14271E
PP63		18777E	01	28033E	01	12372E	02							

5006 5085

SITE PROBLEM REPORT  
TRANSMITTAL FOR ACTION

DEC 19 1977

→ To: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein For Information  
 To: F. Faist For Action  
J.A. Costanza For Action info  
 To: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
B. A. Karrasch For Information  
D. Hallman Nuclear Service

File: 13-  
 Contract No: 620-00 14  
 SPk Number: 391. Rev. 01  
 Title: Failed Incore  
Detectors  
 Status Code: A

Date of Transmittal: 12-13-77

Reply Required By: ASAP

Action Requested: Fred Faist is requested to complete this SPR.

Reply and Return This Transmittal to:

Doug Halsted  
 Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Reply: Please provide resolution on the SPR Form

1. Is this problem applicable to other contracts? Yes \_\_\_ ; No \_\_\_  
 A. If yes - identify applicable contracts \_\_\_\_\_
2. Please provide Disposition on or before the Reply Required date if Resolution is incomplete \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

(Signed) (Date)

CC: C. C. Plunkett-Contract Administration (1) L. C. Rogers-TMI Site  
 J. R. Bohart - International Support P. E. Perone-OFR (1&2)  
 F. R. Faist-TECo Site

*Handwritten initials/signature*

X

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

To: Change Control For Distribution

File: 13-14-440

S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance

Contract No.: 620-00 14

Central Engineering Files

SPR: 440, Rev D

B.J. Shepherd - Task Engineer (s)

Title: ICS Module

R.C. When - Project Manager

Failures (820)

Date: 10/4/78

Status Code: C

L. C. Rogers - MET. ED.

P. E. Perrone


J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support

J. Laubenheimer

B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 440 which was processed on Contract 620-00 14. This SPR has been reviewed for generic applicability and this problem ~~is~~ is not considered applicable to other contracts.

REMARKS:



**COMPLETED**

J.D. Fulcher

NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

1004

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

*P. Faist*

BABCOCK & WILCOX SPR #440

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison Company	ORIGINATOR F. R. Faist	DATE 4/21/78	DOC. ID. CONT. NO. 13-620-0014	SPR NO. 4	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR EMCO	P.A. NO. 020 592 IJ	PART NO./TASK NO. 21/015/001		GROUP NO.	SEQ. NO.
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) ICS Module Failures (820)			PROBLEM CONTACT F. P. Faist <i>P. Faist</i>		

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

- #1 P/N 6623695A1 Sumner + Bias Module - Sumner output oscillates +1-0.06 VDC.
- #2 P/N 6624150A1 Sumner + Integral Module (BAL-2 Pot has no effect) - will not slow down, will not speed up. Can't balance - Pin 11 grounded.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

TECO aware of problem. Requested RMM & P. O.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

- 1. Bobby Harris obtain P. O. requisition.
- 2. Site to clear upon repair and return of parts.

RESOLUTION:

MODULES TO BE REPAIRED UNDER P.O. # 032981LT (A.A. # 83-761094-04)

RESOLUTION

PREPARED BY <i>Herman Z. Rice</i>	DATE	APPROVED BY	DATE
REVIEWED BY <i>J. O. Lauer</i>	DATE 4/25/78	<i>J. O. Lauer</i>	4-25-78
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM OTHER <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>		FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	F.C.A. NO. 04- N/A
		SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES NO <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	

COMPLETION

SITE COMPLETION REPORT: Bailey records show repaired parts returned to TECO via UPS on 7/5/78. TECO records are not able to confirm. Customer notified. We consider the item closed.	DEVIATIONS: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE	SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>
	DATE COMPLETED: 9/22/78	
	COMPLETED BY T. F. Scott	DATE 9/22/78
	I. D. Green, <i>IDG</i> 9/22/78	
SHEET 1 OF 3 <i>200</i>		

BABCOCK & WILCOX  
NPGO

PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION (PA)

SHEET 1 OF 2

TO: D. M. TURNER	CONTRACT NO. 620-0014	PS NO. 83-761094-04
FROM: D. L. RICE	SUPPLIER Bmco.	DATE 4-21-78
CUSTOMER & PLANT SITE TECO DAVIS BESS I		PURCHASE ORDER NO. 03247127
FUNCTION <input type="checkbox"/> REQUEST FOR BID <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> PLACEMENT OF ORDER <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE FOR ENARG <input type="checkbox"/> REL. FOR MAT'L PROC. <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE FOR MFG.	ATTACHMENTS SPR-440	RECEIVED APR 24 1978 Release Administration
<input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE FOR SHIP. <input type="checkbox"/> CHANGE ORDER <input type="checkbox"/> HOLD <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER _____ <input type="checkbox"/> QA APPROVED SUPPLIER NOT REQUIRED		
DOES 10CFR21 APPLY? <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO IF YES, IDENTIFY APPLICABLE ITEMS _____		

INSTRUCTIONS

Re. old P.O. # 020 592 LJ  
SPR # 440

REQUEST A PURCHASE ORDER BE ISSUED TO Bmco. TO REPAIR OR REPLACE THE FOLLOWING (820) MODULES:


- 1) SUMMER + BIAS MODULE, P/N 6623695A1.
- 2) SUMMER + INTEGRAL MODULE, P/N 6624150A1.

CHG. JE NO. 859-2014 21-14 ITEM NO. PART OR TASK GROUP SEQ RI: 21-015-001	DISTRIBUTION LIST J.A. LAVER R.L. PITTMAN J.B. WOLCOTT F.R. FAIST PROJECT CONTROL C.L. PLUNKETT QUALITY ASSURANCE S.H. KLIPIN REL. ADM./R.C.	SIGNATURE & DATE PREPARED BY D. L. Rice 4-21-78 REVIEWED BY [Signature] for W.H. Slinger 4-21-78 APPROVED BY C. P. Turner 4-24-78 SUPPLIER/FABRICATOR ACCEPTANCE
--	---	---

\*ALTERING THIS PA CONSTITUTES A REJECTION REQUIRING WRITTEN ASSENT FROM THE ORIGINATOR BEFORE PROCEEDING

Pg 2 of 3  
SPR 440

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To	T. D. Murray, Station Superintendent	
From	 I. D. Green, Site Operations Manager, NCS-14	BDS 661-5
Cust.	Toledo Edison Company	File No. 620-0014 or Ref. 12B21
Subj.	Bailey Shipment of Repaired Equipment	Date 9/22/78

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only

Dear Terry:

Bailey's records of repaired equipment indicate that the following equipment has been shipped to Toledo Edison, Devis-Besse I, by UPS on July 5, 1978:

- a. Summer & Integral Module (820), Part #6624150A1 (RMR-6188).
- b. Summer & Bias Module (820), Part #6623695A1 (RMR-6187).

We have tried to confirm the receipt of this equipment in TECo's storerooms. But have been unsuccessful. B&W is closing our records on these repairs.

If you have any questions, please advise.

IDG:TFS:nlf  
cc: J. R. Lingenfelter  
D. C. Hitchens  
K. P. Aebie

484  
~~Start 3 of 3~~  
440



SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

To: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
R. L. Lutz - Task Engineer(s)  
R. C. Lohman - Project Manager

File: 13-14-379  
Contract No.: 620-00 14  
SPR: 379, Rev 0  
Title: 2 Ampex Ckt.  
Brd. Failures (BSS)  
Date: 7/31/78  
Status Code: C

L. C. Rogers - INT. ED. P. E. Perrone  
I-D. GREEN-TOLEDO  
J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support  
B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 379 which was processed on Contract 620-00 14. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is/is not considered applicable to other contracts

REMARKS:  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

J. D. Falcher  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

1 of 3

NOV 10 1977

*Cleared*

FDS-21091-5(8-76)

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

*Stewart* BABCOCK & WILCOX SPR #379

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison Company	ORIGINATION DATE F.R. Faist 10/24/77	DOC. ID. CONT. NO. SPR NO. REV. NO. 13 - 620-0024 379 0
VENDOR BMCo	P.A. NO. 020 561 LF	PART NO./TASK NO. GROUP NO. SEQ. NO. 25/030/003
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) 2 Ampex Ckt. Brd. Failures (855)		PROBLEM CONTACT D. L. Allison <i>[Signature]</i>

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: (DB-255) Part #DR-4-3228802-02J  
 One card, as tagged, DRB-20 from Drawer 4 has a failure associated with Bit 3.  
 Other card, as tagged, DRB-17 from Drawer 5 has an intermittent loss of Bit 2.  
 Both problems were corrected by replacing the card from customer stock.

Req'd. Resolution Date: 11/20/77      Req'd. Completion Date: 12/1/77

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

BMCo P.S.S. aware of problem.  
 TECo aware of problem.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

Dennis Rice is requested to obtain P. O. for repair of the above two cards.

RESOLUTION: *Repair circuit cards on P.O.# 03 2372 LT.  
 Use repaired circuit cards to replace spares.*

RESOLUTION

PREPARED BY <i>J. J. Holsted</i>	DATE 10-28-77	APPROVED BY	DATE
REVIEWED BY <i>Wm. L. King For K.R. Sullivan</i>	DATE 10/31/77	<i>[Signature]</i>	11-2-77

COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> OTHER	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04- <i>N/A</i>	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
--	---	------------------------------	---

COMPLETION

SITE COMPLETION REPORT:  
 Bailey records show repaired parts returned. TECo records are not able to confirm. Customer notified. We consider the item cleared.

DEVIATIONS: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE	SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>
DATE COMPLETED: 7/28/78	
COMPLETED BY T. F. Scott <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 7/28/78
F. R. Faist <i>[Signature]</i>	7/28/78
SHEET <i>2</i> OF <i>3</i>	

<b>PROBLEM REPORT</b>	PRODUCT/SYSTEM FAULT CODE	FILE NO. (ITS)	DATE OF PROBLEM 10/11/77	FROM D. E. Shaffer
NO. OF PARTS NO. OF ASSEMBLY	DATE OF FAILURE 1220 M	DATE OF REPORT 120 561 LF	TEMP NO. 2432	ACCT. NO. 753
LOCATION OF FAILURE Toledo Edison, Davis-Besse I	TYPE OF FAILURE Circuit Ckt. Boards Failures (655)	DATE CODE	MAIL STATION Site (DB-255)	SERIAL NO. AND/OR PART NO. DR-4-3228002-02J

One card, as tagged: DRB-20 from Drawer 4 has a failure associated with Bit 3.

Other card, as tagged: DRB-17 from Drawer 5 has an intermittent loss of Bit 2.

Both problems were corrected by replacing the card from customer stock.

WORK FIELD USE

DAYS OF SERVICE \_\_\_\_\_

CLASS OF SERVICE \_\_\_\_\_

EXPENSES \$ \_\_\_\_\_

MATERIAL \$ \_\_\_\_\_

SPO NO. \_\_\_\_\_

ALLOCATION

PRODUCT

SYSTEM

WARRANTY

SYS ENGR. ERROR

OTHER \_\_\_\_\_

DEFECTIVE PART RETURNED

NO

YES ON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE

RM NO. \_\_\_\_\_

FAILURE OCCURRED

ON RECEIPT

IN SERVICE (WARRANTY)

IN SERVICE (NON-WARRANTY)

3 YRS - EST. TIME IN SERVICE

EFFECT ON SYSTEM (BRIEFLY): Caused intermittent failures of the plant computer system.

CUSTOMER ATTITUDE

MAJOR CONCERN

CONCERNED

UNCONCERNED

DATE SOLUTION REQUIRED \_\_\_\_\_ OR  INFO ONLY

SIGNATURE \_\_\_\_\_ DATE 10/19/77

CONT'D ON SEPARATE SHEET

POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR PROBLEM

00 FAULTY MATERIAL

01 FAULTY MANUFACTURING

02 FAULTY DESIGN

03 PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCY

04 FAULTY PACKAGING

05 COMPONENT FAILURE

06 WTAFCUT

07 IMPROPER APPLICATION

08 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT

09 INADEQUATE INSTRUCTIONS (DOCUMENTATION)

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION AND CORRECTIVE ACTION (BY FIELD IF APPLICABLE)

OPERATING CONDITIONS:

AMBIENT TEMP 70-90 °F

ATMOSPHERE  CLEAN

AVERAGE  DIRTY

HUMIDITY  HI  LO  AVG

TIME REQUIRED TO

REPAIR \_\_\_\_\_ TROUBLESHOOT \_\_\_\_\_

RECALIBRATE \_\_\_\_\_

FAILURE DETAILS

SMCO. PART NO. \_\_\_\_\_

DESCRIBE (IDOLC, CAP., TRANSISTOR, ETC.)

CIRCUIT SYMBOL \_\_\_\_\_ (C1, R1, Q1)

MFG. OF PART (IF KNOWN) \_\_\_\_\_

HOW PART FAILED:

SHORT  OPEN

MECH. DAMAGE

ADJUSTMENT

DIRTY  UNKNOWN

OTHER (DESCRIBE) \_\_\_\_\_

COPIES QUALITY ASSURANCE PROD. LIABILITY PROD. MANAGEMENT NPO FPO WPO ASPO WARRANTY SERVICE INVENTION ENGR. COMPONENT ENGR.	COPIES PRELIMINARY ANS <input type="checkbox"/> FINAL SOLUTION <input type="checkbox"/> FOLLOW UP ON CORRECTIVE ACTION	SIGNATURE _____	DATE _____	APPROVAL _____	DATE _____								
		DISP. OF R.M. _____ DATE REC'D. _____ DATE RETURNED _____		HOURS SPENT SOLUTION DEPT. _____ MAN. _____ HRS. _____									
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>QTY</th> <th>NAME</th> <th>PART NO.</th> <th>COMMENTS</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		QTY	NAME	PART NO.	COMMENTS					3 of 3			
QTY	NAME	PART NO.	COMMENTS										

MAR 7 1978

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

→ TO: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
B.J. Shepherd - Task Engineer  
J. Laquet - Project Manager  
N.M. Seeling

FILE: 13-14-394  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 14  
SPR 394  
TITLE ICS Turbine  
Headst Pressure Control  
DATE: 2/20/78  
STATUS CODE C

- \_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED.
- \_\_\_\_\_ F. R. Faist - TOLEDO
- \_\_\_\_\_ J. K. Bohart - Intl. Support
- \_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Donnell - OFR
- \_\_\_\_\_ B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration

CLOSED

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 394 which was processed on Contract 620-00 14. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem ~~is~~ is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

B. H. Davis  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

1 of 3

MAR 7 1978 *Cleared*

FD-21091-9(8-76)

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

*W. C. Baskcock & Wilcox* SPR #394

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison Company	ORIGINATOR F.R. Faist	DATE 11/23/77	DOC. ID. 13	CONT. NO. 620-0014	SPR NO. 394	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR BMC	P.A. NO. 020 592 LJ		PART NO./TASK NO. 21/030/001	GROUP NO.	SIG. NO.	

TITLE (MAX 50 CHARACTERS)  
ICS Turbine Header Pressure Control

PROBLEM CONTACT  
P. C. House *P. Faist*

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: On 11/21/77, while trouble shooting a problem with #2 HP governor valve, the turbine "latch" was reset while the turbine bypass valves were in automatic. This action caused the ICS to control from the selected pressure transmitter. The opposite header pressure went high and lifted the main steam code safety valves. TECo operations know they should have taken manual control of turbine bypass valves in accordance with startup procedure. SPR #356 addresses the same type problem.

Req'd. Resolution Date: ASAP  
Req'd. Completion Date: ASAP

CLOSED

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

TECo aware of problem. Gary Gibbs aware of problem.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

NPGD Engineering evaluate configuration of ICS as wired per FCP #33, Rev. 01.

RESOLUTION:

*See attached sheet*

RESOLUTION

PREPARED BY <i>W. Ham</i>	DATE 2/13/78	APPROVED BY	DATE
REVIEWED BY <i>K. E. Hahn for KRS/HSW</i>	DATE 2/14/78	<i>J. G. Laws</i>	2-20-78

COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04- <i>MA</i>	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
---	---	-----------------------------	---

COMPLETION

SITE COMPLETION REPORT:  
See attached sheet.

DEVIATIONS:  
 NONE SPR REV NO.

DATE COMPLETED: 2/8/78

COMPLETED BY  
F. R. Faist *F. R. Faist* DATE 2/8/78

F. R. Faist *F. R. Faist* 2/8/78

SHEET 2 OF 3

SPR #394  
620-0014

SITE COMPLETION REPORT:

No further action required.

This situation was created when the resolution to SPR #356 was implemented.

Turbine trip signal to ICS is a turbine latch signal, and doesn't necessarily mean that both MS loops are connected when trying to control bypass valves in both loops with one signal.

Operators have resolved this by placing turbine bypass valve controls in manual when latching turbine. Once stop valves are opened, they return them to manual.

RECOMMENDATION:

Turbine trip signal to ICS should come off turbine stop valve closed position, or operators should be instructed to take manual control of turbine bypass valves when stop valves are closed.

FRF:nlf  
2/8/78

383

FEB 13 1978

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

→ TO: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Control Engineering Files  
R. G. Burnley - Task Engineer  
C. D. Russell - Project Manager


FILE: 13-09-145  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 09  
SPR 145  
TITLE No PZR Spray  
flow with 1 RCP Op.  
DATE: 2-1-78  
STATUS CODE C

- \_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED.
- \_\_\_\_\_ F. R. Faist - TOLEDO
- \_\_\_\_\_ J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support
- \_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Donnell - OFR
- \_\_\_\_\_ B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration

CLOSED

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 145 which was processed on Contract 620-00 09. This problem is/has been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is/has been considered applicable to other contracts is not a general "system" problem although it does occur.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_



1083

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

FEB 13 1978

CUSTOMER Duke Power Co.	ORIGINATOR H.W. Pollock	DATE 1/25/78	DOC. ID. CONT. NO. 13-620-0009	EPR NO. 145	REV. NO. 00
VENDOR	P.A. NO.	PART NO./TASK NO.	GROUP NO.	SEQ. NO.	
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTER) LO PER Spray with 1 RCP Op.			PROBLEM CONTACT H.W. Pollock		

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:  
 1-24-78 (1200) - Plant was being heated up following final venting after maintenance SID. Temp = 200°F, Press. = 400 psi. Attempts to initiate spray flow with one RCP operating, were unsuccessful. RCP 3B1 was operating, and all parameters appeared normal. As a further effort, RCP1 → closed and RCP-2 & 3 → opened, but this was also unsuccessful. One RCP provides insufficient dP to cause spray flow.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:  
 started RCP 3A1 and noted normal spray flow.  
 Heatup was delayed approx. 6 hrs.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:  
 Site will provide a note in the startup procedure calling attention to possible necessity to have 2 RCP's running in order to achieve proper spray flow.

RESOLUTION:

RESOLUTION

INFORMATION ONLY CLOSED

N S S

L O S T

PREPARED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 2-	APPROVED BY	DATE
REVIEWED BY	DATE		
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04- NA	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO

COMPLETION

SITE COMPLETION REPORT:

DEVIATIONS:  
 NONE  SPR REV NO.

COMPLETED:  
 COMPLETE DATE

INCOMPLETION

T Y

SHEET 2 OF 2



SITE PROBLEM REPORT

PASCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER CNS-3	ORIGINATOR P	DATE 1/25	DOC. ID, CONT. NO., SPR. NO., REV. NO. 13
VENDOR B/W	P.A. NO.	PART NO./TASK NO. GROUP NO. SEQ. #	
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) MISC DELAYS IN START-UP			PROBLEM CONTACT

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

01200 - 1/24/78 Initiating RCS heat up following completion of final vent. Attempted to initiate spray flow via RC-1 & RC-3, unsuccessful. 381 RCP pump operations, all parameters appeared normal. ~ 6 hours (24)

① 1-23 thru 1/25/78 Misc chemistry holds. RCS cl + secondary spec. cond. in 19 in final flow. ~ 24 hour total

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

① closed RC-1, opened RC-2 & RC-3 in attempt to establish spray flow. Not successful. Started RCP 3A. Flow normal. Note that under certain conditions, RCP provides insufficient ΔP to establish flow.

② Clean up RCS via degenerating drain proved successful.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

① Insert note in start up procedure to high heat poss. b. ht. of possible requirement for 2 RCP's to provide PZR spray flow.

② Request Powder React prior to RCS heat up.

RESOLUTION:

091 004 - MARK 40 spray control valve  
091 002 - 3RC-V2  
091 006 3RC-V5/3-5003 PZR spray inlet VLV

NO FAILURE OF EQUIPMENT. ERROR IN PROCEDURE.

PREPARED BY TJ	DATE 1/25	APPROVED BY	DATE
REVIEWED BY	DATE		

COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04-	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
---	--	-------------------	--

COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT:	DEVIATIONS: <input type="checkbox"/> MORE <input type="checkbox"/> SPR REV NO.
		DATE COMPLETED:
		COMPLETED BY: DATE
		SHEET 3 OF 3

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

To: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
R. J. Wilson - Task Engineer (s)  
R. J. Wilson Project Manager


File: 13- 4-291  
Contract No.: 620-00 ed  
SPR: 291 Rev 1  
Title: ICS transmit  
  
Date: 2/9/79  
Status Code: C

E. C. Rogers - MET. ED.  
J. P. Bohart - Intl. Support  
B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration

P. E. Perrone  
A. E. Paulson  
Bill Street

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 286 which was processed on Contract 620-00 ed. This SPR has been reviewed for generic applicability and this problem ~~is~~ is not considered applicable to other contracts.

REMARKS: Fixed load reduction



**COMPLETED**

Alma Dixon  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

182



SS- 8  
SPR 596

TITLE DRY OTSG Following Turbine Trip Test  
RELATED SPRs

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS-. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

Not Generic.  
RFP  
1-23-75

NSS-

3

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.

C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance

J. F. Housie - Task Engineer

G. A. Olds - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 12M2

CONTRACT NO: 620-00 08

SPR 596

TITLE DRY OTSG AFTER  
TURBINE TRIP TEST.

DATE: 2/18/75

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Hollis - FLORIDA \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ J. A. BAILEY - ARK. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 596 which was processed on Contract 620-00 08. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc: R. E. Kosiba

[Signature]  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Arkansas Power & Light		CONTRACT NO. 0008	SPR NO. 596	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR BAW	P.O. NO. 6M04	TASK NO. 55	GROUP NO. 10	SEQ. NO. 1
SITE ENGINEER D. A. Downtain	REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE		
TITLE LRY OESG FOLLOWING TURBINE TRIP TEST				
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM See Attached Sheet.				
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED See Attached Sheet.				
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL See Attached Sheet.				
APPROVED BY <i>[Signature]</i>		SIGNATURE <i>J. A. Bailey</i>		DATE 1/8/75
RESOLUTION SEE S.F. HOOSIC LETTER TO G.K. WAGHLING DATED 1/17/75 (ATTACHED) CLASSIFIED TRANSIENT.				
RESOLUTION	APPROVED BY N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER <i>[Signature]</i>	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE 1/20/75
	TASK ENGINEER	SEE LETTER FROM S.F. HOOSIC DATED 1/17/75 SETTING CLASSIFICATION TO TRANSIENT.		1/17/75
	PROJECT MANAGER	<i>[Signature]</i>		2/19/75
	COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM			
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ		FC NO.
COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT SEE REM - 1 written to customer advising him of classification of transient.			<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO. _____			FINAL DISTRIBUTION
	DATE COMPLETED 1/24/75	SIGNED BY <i>D. A. Downtain</i>		PROJECT MANAGER
	S.O.M. / CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>J. A. Bailey</i>	DATE 1/24/75	S.O.M. / CONSTR. REP.	
				QA DOC. FILE
				CENT. ENGR
				FILE 12M 2

SPR #596

Description of Problem

Following the Turbine Trip Test from 100% FP, the plant operators started the Auxiliary Feedwater Pump and secured the Main Feedwater Pump (actual elapsed time between trip and securing of Main FW Pump is unknown - estimated to be  $\approx$  3 to 5 minutes). Because of problems with the Auxiliary FW Pump, feedwater flow was not adequate to maintain OTSG level. As a result, approximately 27 minutes after the Turbine was tripped, the level in 'A' OTSG had dropped below 8 inches on the Startup Range with an accompanying drop in OTSG outlet steam pressure from approximately 960 psig to approximately 700 psig. Attached is Figure 8 - OTSG Pressure and Level vs. Time, from STR #189-Turbine/Reactor Trip, TP 800.14-Turbine Trip from 100% FP.

At the same time, 'B' OTSG level reached approximately 8 inches on the Startup Range and steam pressure of approximately 700 psig. At this point in time, Emergency Feedwater was initiated and 'A' OTSG level was restored using condensate from the Condensate Storage Tank while 'B' OTSG remained on Main Feedwater.


Status - Action to Date Including Persons Contacted

R. J. McConnell, et. al., informed during morning status telecon.

Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel

Request that Lynchburg analyze data for classification of transient.

FIG. 8 - OTSG PRESSURE & LEVEL VS. TIME





THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To		
From	G. K. WANDLING - NUCLEAR SERVICE, LYNCHBURG	
	J. P. HOOSIC - NPGD - MECHANICAL DESIGN WEST BARBERTON ENGINEERING	903 663-1
Cust.	ARKANSAS POWER	File No. or Ref. 620-0008-55
Subj.	SPP NO. 596 - DRY OTSG FOLLOWING TURBINE TRIP TEST	Date JAN. 17, 1975

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

West Barberton's choice for classification of this transient is 17A (loss of feedwater to one OTSG), as described in Specification CS(F) 3-83/MSR-8/0372. The second most appropriate choice is 8B (reactor trip).

*J. P. Hoosic*  
J. P. Hoosic

JPH:cah

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE  
SITE PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

TO: J. A. BAILEY For Action

FILE - 12M2

CONTRACT 620-00 08

SPR 596

TITLE DRY OTSG

TO: G. M. OLDS For Information

FOLLOWING TURBINE

J. F. HOOSIE

TRIP TEST.

E. M. LIVINGSTON

DATE 1/20/75

Date Final Resolution Required by  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: SITE IS REQUESTED TO CLEAR  
THIS SIR. TRANSIENT CLASSIFIED BY WEST  
BARBERTON (J.F. HOOSIE) - SEE ATTACHED MEMO.

cc: Central Engineering Files  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - NPG Quality Assurance  
E. L. Logan - SMUD  
J. A. Bailey - ARKANSAS  
B. L. Day - TOLEDO  
J. L. Hollis - FLORIDA  
R. E. Kosiba

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support  
Engineer. Please reply immediately  
whether answer is final or preliminary.

G. K. WANDLING  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

NSSE

MANHOOR LIMITS	_____
COST LIMITS	_____
CHARGE NO.	_____
APPROVED:	_____
	Project Manager

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE  
SITE PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

**ORIGINAL**

TO: E. M. LIVINGSTON For Action

FILE - 12M2

CONTRACT 620-00 08

SPR 596

TITLE DRY OTSG

TO: G. M. OLDS For Information

FOLLOWING TURBINE

TRIP TEST.

DATE 1/13/75

Date Final Resolution Required by  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: E. M. LIVINGSTON IS REQUESTED TO  
ANALYZE THIS SPR & ACCOMPANYING DATA FOR  
CLASSIFICATION OF TRANSIENT.

- cc: Central Engineering Files  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - NPG Quality Assurance  
E. L. Logan - SMUD  
J. A. Bailey - ARKANSAS  
B. L. Day - TOLEDO  
L. C. Rogers - MET ED  
J. L. Hollis - FLORIDA  
K. E. Kosiba

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support  
Engineer. Please reply immediately  
whether answer is final or preliminary.

G. K. WANDLING  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

MANHOOR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
CHARGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Project Manager



TITLE Elect. rel. valve  
RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSC-\_\_\_\_\_. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

*That a B:W Problem - customer problem*

ORIGINAL

*RG/B*

NSC- \_\_\_\_\_

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To \_\_\_\_\_ For Information FILE: 12M2  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Contract 620-00 09  
 \_\_\_\_\_ SFR 58  
C.A. Crecy TITLE Electromatic  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Relief Valve failed  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin. \_\_\_\_\_ to open  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Central Engineering Files \_\_\_\_\_  
C.M. Fletcher Quality Assurance DATE AUG 6 1974

The attached, cleared SFR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ B.L. Day \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaelin  
 \_\_\_\_\_ L.C. Rogers \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ E.L. Logan \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ R.G. Bumby \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 58 which has been processed on Contract 620-00 09. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: At normal temperature and pressure the valve operated properly

cc:

  
 NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

Earl H. Davis, Jr.

**CLEARED**

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company		CONTRACT NO. 620-0009		SPR NO. 56	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR <i>DRESER</i>		P.O. NO.	TASK NO. <i>28</i>	GROUP NO. <i>41</i>	SEQ. NO. <i>02</i>
SITE ENGINEER J. J. Wald		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE		
TITLE ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE 3 RC - 66 (3 RC - RV3)					
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  SEE ATTACHED:					
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED					
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  NONE - for information only  Will clear SPR if valve operat <sup>es</sup> satisfactory at 2155 psi and 532° F Reactor Coolant System conditions.					
<i>J. J. Wald</i>		DATE <i>6/20/74</i>	<i>R. J. Baber</i>		DATE <i>6/4/74</i>
RESOLUTION					
RESOLUTION	APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE
	N. S. SUPPORT ENGINEER <i>NSP</i>		<i>[Signature]</i>		
	TASK ENGINEER				
	PROJECT MANAGER				
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM					
AUTH. CHARGE NO.			<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ.		FC NO.
COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT AT REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM CONDITIONS OF 2.15 PSI AND 532°F VALVE 3RC-66 (3RC-RV3) OPERATED PROPERLY.				<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.				FINAL DISTRIBUTION
	DATE COMPLETED <i>6-20-74</i>		SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>		PROJECT MANAGER
	S.O.M./CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE <i>6/20/74</i>		S.O.M./CONST. REP.
					QA DOC. FILE
					CENT. ENGR
					FILE 12M.2

Babcock & Wilcox

SPR - #58 Rev. 0  
June 4, 1974  
Oconee - Unit 3

Title: ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE 3 RC-66 ( 3RC-RV3)

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

The pilot actuated electromatic relief valve failed to open during the low pressure steam test sequence of TP/230/10, Quench Tank Operational Test. Subsequent investigation revealed that the vent port plug cap had not been removed. After the plug cap had been removed, the valve opened normally; however, it would not close. The solenoid shaft had become cocked and jammed against the pilot valve lever arm. Duke Power Company Maintenance personnel reported that after re-aligning the shaft and lubricating the roller, the valve operated properly.

JJW/bh

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

JUN 26 1978

→ To: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
B.W. Shepherd - Task Engineer(s)  
L.R. Plette - Project Manager

File: 13-06-185  
Contract No.: 620-00 06  
SPR: 185, Rec 0  
Title: Loss of Feedwater  
Trip on 19 APR '78  
Date: 6/23/78  
Status Code: C

- L. C. Rogers - MET. ED.
- F. R. Faist - TOLEDO
- J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support
- B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration
- P. E. Perrone
- W.H. Kelly
- G.K. Wondling

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 185 which was processed on Contract 620-00 06. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is/is not considered applicable to other contracts.

REMARKS:

**COMPLETED**

J. D. Fulcher  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

sh 104



SITE PROBLEM REPORT		BABCOCK & WILCOX			
CUSTOMER Jersey Central	ORIGINAL DATE L. Rogers 4/30/78	DOC. ID. 13	CONT. NO. 620-0006	SPR NO. 185	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR	P.A. NO.	PART NO./TASK NO. GROUP NO. SEQ. NO.		21-01-101	
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) Loss of Feedwater Trip on 19 April 1978			PROBLEM CONTACT J. M. Phelan		
PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION	DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: An operator was blowing down the strainer on the operating condensate pump which caused it to trip on loss of suction; this in turn tripped the operating booster pump. This consequently tripped the feedwater pumps which lost feed to the system. The emergency feed pumps came on, but the flow was not sufficient enough to keep the reactor from tripping out on a high pressure. A summary of the analysis on the memory trip review data is attached.				
	STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED: W. Spangler and K. Wandling Work is continuing on the main steam relief valve problem identified.				
	FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL: Instruct operators not to blow down suction strainers on an operating pump.				
	RESOLUTION: Concur with recommended action. SPR considered 'For Information Only'.				
RESOLUTION	PREPARED BY <i>Herrin P. Rice</i>	DATE 6/6/78	APPROVED BY <i>L.R. Phelan</i>	DATE 6/14/78	
	REVIEWED BY <i>M.R. Patton for A. Baker</i>	DATE 6/7/78			
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER		FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		F.C.A. NO. 04-	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT: <i>RECOMMENDED ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE CUSTOMER. THIS SPR CAN BE CLOSED</i>			DEVIATIONS: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE    SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>	
				DATE COMPLETED: <i>6-20-78</i>	
				COMPLETED BY: <i>S.R. Schabel skabs</i>	
				<i>sh-284</i>	
			SHEET <i>1</i> OF <i>3</i>		

→ H-111 0.6175  
JLS

METROPOLITAN EDISON COMPANY Subsidiary of General Public Utilities Corporation

Subject LOSS OF FEEDWATER REACTOR TRIP OF 4-19-78

Location TMI Nuclear Station  
Middletown, Pa.

To J. L. SEELINGER

Date May 1, 1978

An analysis of the memory trip review data for the subject trip was performed with particular attention paid to OTSG level and feedwater system performance.

In summary the emergency feedwater system appears to have functioned according to design in that EF pumps were actuated on FW-P-1 trip and commenced providing approximately 1200 gpm of emergency feedwater within 6 seconds of main feed pump trip.

OTSG levels began decreasing prior to EF actuation due to the reduced condensate flow resulting from the opening of condensate pump suction strainer blowdown valves and continued to decrease after EF actuation due to reactor power remaining at approximately 15%. OTSG pressure began decreasing with EF actuation due to the lower temperature of emergency feedwater but turned and began increasing prior to reactor trip at 6:01:30.

Concurrent with reactor trip, OTSG levels began recovering while OTSG pressure continued to increase until at 6:03 a "B" OTSG MS safety valve lifted at ~ 1000 psig some 50 psig below minimum setpoint. "B" OTSG level again decreased to zero while blowdown continued for 1½ minutes to a pressure of 600 psig.

A similar reduction in OTSG level and pressure was observed for the "A" OTSG when its MS safety valve lifted at 1055 psig. After holding OTSG pressure at this setpoint for > 1 minute, rapid blowdown to 600 psig was commenced.

It is evident from the trip data that with OTSG levels on low level limits at a reactor power level of 15% the emergency feedwater system is unable to maintain OTSG level unless reactor power is immediately reduced. Had the unit been operating at a higher power level with ICS stations in auto, OTSG levels would have been considerably higher and reactor power would have been decreased concurrent with the initiation of emergency feedwater, thus preventing OTSG levels from reaching zero.

It is also evident from OTSG pressure data that MS safety valves performed in a manner other than expected. The premature lifting of the "B" OTSG relief, the delayed blowdown of the "A" OTSG relief and the extent of blowdown of both reliefs are matters of concern that will be resolved as a result of the continuing investigation into expansion joint liner failures on main steam reliefs.


*J. L. Seelinger*  
~~\_\_\_\_\_~~

TAM:pls

cc: J. R. Floyd  
G. P. Miller

INTER-OFFICE MEMORANDUM

sh 304  
2073



LOSS OF FEEDWATER  
AND  
REACTOR TRIP

0601 - 4/12/76

FA PWR = 15%

TRIP - SBL

REACTOR TRIP

*[Handwritten signature]*

404  
30f3

TITLE Quench Tank over-pressurization

RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
 NCS-\_\_\_\_\_. The following  
 is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

No SPR in check file 10/16/79 exo

10/25/79 - This SPR rec'd cleared from the  
 site & is not generic since engineering  
 reviewed it & did not even consider it  
 necessary to be done on the originating  
 contract.

R. Pittman 10 - 25/79

Closed

NCS-  
 \_\_\_\_\_

CLEARED

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.

C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance

J. F. Cavelier - Task Engineer

C. A. Crecy - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 1242

CONTRACT NO: 620-00 09

SPR 62

TITLE Branch Tank  
Overpressurization

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaelin - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - OCONEE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET ED \_\_\_\_\_

R. E. Kosiba

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 62 which was processed on Contract 620-00 09.

REMARKS: Engineering considered this to be a  
nice to have item and not a requisit for  
operation

cc:

  
EARL H. DAVIS, ENGINEER  
NUCLEAR SERVICE, SUPPORT

CLEARED

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO. 620-0009	SPR NO. 62	REV. NO. C
VENDOR B. & W. P.O. NO.	TASK NO. 22	GROUP NO. 401	SEQ. NO. 1
SITE ENGINEER J. R. Albert	REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE	

TITLE **QUENCH TANK OVER-PRESSURIZATION**

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

SEE ATTACHED:

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED

Duke Instrument People repaired leak, filled reference leg, and checked calibration. Calibration on both level and pressure transmitters checked out.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL

NPGD to determine if a second level transmitter is required to provide added personnel safety; and, to minimize the possibility of overpressurizing the Quench Tank and causing equipment damage.

RESOLUTION

*J. R. Albert* 6/18/74 *B.R. Day* 6/20/74

APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE	DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER	<i>C. H. Davis</i>	10/15/74
TASK ENGINEER		
PROJECT MANAGER	<i>C. G. Cracy</i>	10-15-74
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NJRM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> ? <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM		
AUTH CHARGE NO	<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ	FC NO

COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
	<i>Eng. does not feel second level transmitter is necessary.</i>	FINAL DISTRIBUTION
	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.	PROJECT MANAGER
DATE COMPLETED 10/21/74	SIGNED BY <i>C. H. Davis</i>	S.O.M. CONST. REP.
S.O.M. CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>B.R. Day</i>	DATE 11/21/74	QA DOC. FILE
		CENT. ENGR
		FILE 121.2

## DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

While conducting Quench Tank Operational Test (TP/230/10), the level in the tank was maintained above a minimum level of 85" as required by operating procedure. When the Pressurizer Relief Valve (RC-V3) was opened the pressure in the tank very rapidly increased. The reason for the pressure increase was that the nozzle to the tank was not submerged, therefore there was very little quenching effect to reduce the pressure.

3WD-LT 1 and 3WD-PT3 share a common tap, which is the level transmitter reference leg. (Water leaked out of the reference leg due to a leaking manifold fitting.) The cause of the leaking was that a gasket in the fitting was not in place, and the fitting was only hand-tightened.

Due to the loss of the wet reference leg, the level as read was higher than the actual water level. Also, the pressure as read, was lower than the actual tank pressure. The error would be equal to the static head of the water normally in the reference leg.

As a result of level in the Quench Tank being low, when the pressurizer relief (RC-V3) discharged into the quench tank; the quench tank pressure increased to an indicated pressure of about 57 psi.

The Brush Recorder which was reading tank pressure at the time shows pressure reached 59.5 psi. If the error introduced by a dry reference leg were added, pressure would be 57.5 psi (READ) + 4.37 psi (static head) = 59.87 psi.

The rupture disc on the Quench Tank is supposed to blow-out at  $55 \pm 4$  psi. It did not during the subject Quench Tank High-Pressure condition. This was possibly due to the fact that tank pressure was not as high as calculated. Second possibility is that since tank pressure was over 50 psi for only about 2-4 seconds, the rupture disc did not blow out due to the short duration of the pressure increase.

The reference leg was filled after the cause of the leak was repaired. The calibration of 3WD-LT1 and 3WD-PT3 was checked. Both transmitters were within allowable tolerances.

This is the second time that this problem has occurred during Hot Functional Testir

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE  
SITE PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

FILE - 12M2

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Action

CONTRACT 620-00 09

SPR 62

TITLE Quench Tank  
over-pressurization

TO: C.A. Cready For Information  
J.F. Guvelier

DATE OCT 15 1974

Date Final Resolution Required by  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: This SPR is considered by engineering  
as a nice to have item. Since engineering does  
not feel this item is significant the site is requested  
to clear this SPR.

cc: Central Engineering Files  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - NPG Quality Assurance  
E. L. Logan - SMUD  
J. N. Kaelin - ARKANSAS  
B. L. Day - OCONEE  
L. C. Rogers - MET ED

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support  
Engineer. Please reply immediately  
whether answer is final or preliminary.

Earl H. Davis  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

MANHOOR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
CHARGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Project Manager



NSS- 7  
EPR 304

TITLE EL. TRIPPER RELIEF SOLENOID STICKING.

RELATED CARS \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by the Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS- 00 . The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

NOT CONSIDERED GENERIC TO CONTRACTS NSS-3714.  
HOWEVER, SPR SENT TO G.M. JACKS FOR REVIEW ON  
FUTURE CONTRACTS FOR BETTER LONG-TIME SITE  
STORAGE.

*[Signature]* 11/12/75

USS-

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
S. E. Klein - Quality Assurance  
R. G. BARNETT - Task Engineer  
C. E. BORRIONE - Project Manager

FILE: 17M2  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 07  
SPR 304  
TITLE ELECTROMATIC  
BELIEF SCANDIOL  
SLICKING  
DATE: 11/22/75

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ K. L. Logan - FLORIDA \_\_\_\_\_ J. W. STAWSKI - PURCH.  
\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ R. J. Esker - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ K. L. Day - Intl. Support \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ P. E. PERRONE - OFR \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 304 which was processed on Contract 620-00 07. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem  is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_.

REMARKS: \* NOT CONSIDERED GENERIC TO CONTRACTS HSS-3-714.  
HOWEVER G. M. JACKS SHOULD REVIEW FOR FUTURE CONTRACTS.

cc: \* G. H. Jacks - Plant Integration  
This SPR has been reviewed IAW NRC-1707-01 \_\_\_\_\_  
[Signature]  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

**SITE PROBLEM REPORT**

60

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER <i>Florida Power Corp.</i>		CONTRACT NO. <i>600-2007</i>		SPR NO. <i>304</i>	REV. NO. <i>0</i>
VENDOR <i>Dresser</i>		P.O. NO. <i>81309215</i>	TASK NO. <i>28</i>	GROUP NO. <i>43</i>	SEQ. NO. <i>6</i>
SITE ENGINEER <i>P. Grisbaum</i>		WCU'D RESOL. DATE	REQ'D COMP. DATE		
TITLE <b>STICKING SCHEMOLI ON ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE</b>					
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM During electrical checks it was found that the solenoid was in the down (ported) position. Inspection indicated binding between Pt. 35 (spring bracket) and Pt. 322 (spring guide). Readjustment and light lubrication cleared problem and successive Electrical Operations (6-8) showed no sign of problem return.  Ref: B & W Drawing 28-41-002-01					
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  NONE					
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL In cases of long site storage better protection against rust contamination and rough handling must be made.					
SIGNATURE <i>P. Grisbaum</i> DATE <i>11-5-75</i> S.O. NO. <i>500-2007</i> SIGNATURE <i>E.B. Barchdale</i> DATE <i>11/5/75</i>					
RESOLUTION Readjustment of Guide/Bracket, clean-up, and lub. to obtain free motion.					
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE	
M.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>11/2/75</i>	
TASK ENGINEER / M.S. UNIT MANAGER		<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>11/5/75</i>	
P.L.T. START-UP MGR./SEW. & MAINT. MGR.		<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>11/24/75</i>	
PROJECT MANAGER / CONTRACT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>11/25/75</i>	
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> HORD <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> E <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM					
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ		FC NO.	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT  INFORMATION ONLY					
DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.					
DATE COMPLETED <i>11/5/75</i>		SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE <i>11/5/75</i>	
S.O. N./CONST. REP. APPROVAL <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE <i>11/5/75</i>		SHEET 1 OF	

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PWS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by B&W Construction or NPGD Nuclear Service

- (1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Number; Sequence Number; Base; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (NPGD only - if applicable)
- (2) Senior B&W Construction - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; or Site Operations Manager Date.
- (3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.
- (4) Nuclear Service Unit Manager - Fill in: Resolution; FC Req. and FC Number; and/or Task Engineer Signature and Date.
- (5) Plant Start-up Section - Approve Resolution; Signature; Date. Manager or Service and Maintenance Unit Manager
- (6) Project Manager or Contract Engineer - Verify Charge Number; Approve Resolution; Signature and Date.
- (7) Senior B&W Construction - Implement resolution; upon completion, fill in: Co. Site Representative Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature. or Field Engineer
- (8) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign. or Senior B&W Construction Co. Site Representative

# BOP

DEC 2 1977

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
W. M. Kelly - Task Engineer  
J.T. Janis - Project Manager  
Jim Shetter - SMUD

FILE: 13-11-324  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 11  
SPR 324  
TITLE PER VENT ISOLA-  
TION VALVE PACKING LEAK.  
DATE: NOV. 18, 1977

## INFORMATION ONLY

## BOP LOST CAPACITY

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

*David H. Culbertson*

NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

# CLEARED

1082

NOV 2 1977

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER SMUD		CONTRACT NO. 620-0011		SPR NO. 324	REV. NO. 00
VENDOR N/A	P.O. NO. N/A	TASK NO. 01	GROUP NO. 001	SEQ. NO. 001	
SITE ENGINEER J.T. JANIS		REQ'D RESOL. DATE 11/17/77	REQ'D COMP. DATE 11/17/77		
TITLE PZR VENT ISOLATION VALVE PACKING LEAK					
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM UNIT RCS UNACCOUNTED FOR LEAKAGE EXCEEDED 1.0 GPM (1.5 GPM REPORTED) BY TECH SPECS. UNIT WAS SHUT DOWN TO HOT STANDBY AT 1617 HRS ON 11/17/77. PRESSURIZER VENT ISOLATION VALVE (HV 21515 - NOT B&W SCOPE OF SUPPLY) PACKING WAS LEAKING. PACKING LEAK WAS REPAIRED AND UNIT RETURNED TO POWER OPERATION AT 2000 HRS 11/17/77.					
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED ABOVE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY SMUD CONTROL ROOM FROM OPERATORS LOG.					
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL NONE - PROBLEM IS APPARENTLY RESOLVED - SPR FOR INFORMATION ONLY.					
<b>BOP LOST CAPACITY</b>					
RESOLUTION		11/18/77		11/18/77	
<b>INFORMATION ONLY</b>					
RESOLUTION	APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE		DATE	
	N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER				
	TASK ENGINEER N.S. UNIT MANAGER				
	PLT START-UP MSR/SERV. & MAINT. MGR.				
	PROJECT MANAGER/ CONTRACT ENGINEER	<i>J. T. Janis</i>		11/18/77	
COST CATEGORY		<input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> B <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM			
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ NO		FC NO. NA	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT					
<b>INFORMATION ONLY</b>					
COMPLETION	DEVIATIONS		<input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO. _____		
	DATE COMPLETED		SIGNED BY		
	S.O.M./CONST. REP. APPROVAL		<i>J. T. Janis</i> DATE 11/18/77		SHEET 1 OF

2 of 2

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by B&W Construction or NPGD Nuclear Service

- (1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Number; Sequence Number; Name; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (NPGD only - if applicable)
- (2) Senior B&W Construction - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Co. Site Representative Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; or Site Operations Manager Date.
- (3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.
- (4) Nuclear Service Unit Manager - Fill in: Resolution; FC Req. and FC Number; and/or Task Engineer Signature and Date.
- (5) Plant Start-up Section - Approve Resolution; Signature; Date. Manager or Service and Maintenance Unit Manager
- (6) Project Manager or - Verify Charge Number; Approve Resolution; Signature and Contract Engineer Date.
- (7) Senior B&W Construction - Implement resolution; upon completion, fill in: Co. Site Representative Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature. or Field Engineer
- (8) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign. or Senior B&W Construction Co. Site Representative

SEP 14 1977

**BOP**

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: Change Control For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
W. M. Kelly - Task Engineer  
C. D. Russell - Project Manager

FILE: 13-9-136  
 CONTRACT NO: 620-00 09  
 SPR 136  
 TITLE Operator Error -  
Improper FW lineup.  
 DATE: 9/7/77

**BOP** **VERIFICATION ONLY**

CLOSED

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

David H. Culbertson  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

1 of 3



SITE PROBLEM REPORT		SEP 14 1977 BABCOCK & WILCOX				
CUSTOMER <i>Duke Power Co.</i>	ORIGINATOR <i>H.W. Pollack</i>	DATE <i>8/23/77</i>	DOC. ID. CONT. NO. <i>13-620-0009</i>	SPR NO. <i>136</i>	REV. NO. <i>00</i>	
VENDOR	P.A. NO.	PART NO./TASK NO.	GROUP NO.	SEQ. NO.		
		<i>01</i>	<i>01</i>	<i>01</i>		
TITLE (MAX 50 CHARACTERS) <i>OP ERROR - IMPROPER FW LINEUP</i>			PROBLEM CONTACT <i>H.W. Pollack</i>			
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: <i>At 2318 on 8/21/77, during Rx startup following replacement of failed CRD stator, a high pressure reactor trip resulted from an improper FW lineup. Operators had inadvertently left FDW block valves shut. When noticed, the valves were opened, and the resulting surge into the ORSB and surge in reactor power caused a high pressure reactor trip. (The high pressure resulted from RC-3 being throttled such that PZR spray flow was insufficient to control the accompanying pressure increase.)</i>						
STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:  <i>Blocking valves were opened and startup commenced at 0212 8/22/77.</i>						
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:  <i>None</i>						
<div style="font-size: 2em; opacity: 0.5; transform: rotate(-15deg); position: absolute; top: 50%; left: 50%; pointer-events: none;">                         BOP-LOST CAPACITY                          INFORMATION ONLY                     </div>						
RESOLUTIONS:						
PREPARED BY <i>David H. Culleton</i>		DATE <i>9/7/77</i>	APPROVED BY		DATE	
REVIEWED BY		DATE				
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER		FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. <i>04- N/A</i>	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		
SITE COMPLETION REPORT:			DEVIATIONS: <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>			
<div style="font-size: 2em; opacity: 0.5; transform: rotate(-15deg); position: absolute; top: 50%; left: 50%; pointer-events: none;">                         INFORMATION ONLY                     </div>			DATE COMPLETED: <i>8/22/77</i>			
			COMPLETED BY <i>David H. Culleton</i>		DATE <i>9/7/77</i>	
			SHEET <i>2 OF 3</i> / OF <i>1</i>			

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER CWS-3	ORIGINATOR JW	DATE 5/13	DOC. ID. CONT. NO. SPR NO. REV NO. 13-
VENDOR B/W	P.F. NO.	PART NO./TASK NO. GROUP NO. SEQ. NO.	
TITLE (MAX 39 CHARACTERS) 2/20 1100 Rods		PROBLEM CONTACT	

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

2/20 1100 Rods, Group 3 dropped during PT inspection for. Reducing power to borate rods out. Received constant to 55%. Shutdown Rx to replace stator.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

Replaced stator  
1435 Rx start up.  
2318 Rx TRIP on High Pressure.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

TRIP CAUSED BY FLOW block valves being left closed. When opened surge into S/S caused Rx surge. P.C. 3 throttled

RESOLUTIONS

Not allowing RC-1 to reduce pressure rapidly enough.  
Rx start up @ 0214 2/22 -  
GEN on line @ 0452.

PREPARED BY JW	DATE 2/13	APPROVED BY	DATE
REVIEWED BY	DATE		

COST CATEGORY		FIELD CHANGE REQ		F.C.A. NO.	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY	
<input type="checkbox"/> NORM	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	<input type="checkbox"/> YES	<input type="checkbox"/> NO	04-	<input type="checkbox"/> YES	<input type="checkbox"/> NO

SITE COMPLETION REPORT:

DEVIATIONS:	
<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>
DATE COMPLETED:	
COMPLETED BY	DATE

**SITE PROBLEM REPORT**

**L. B. LAUER**

**DABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG**

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison Co. CONTRACT NO. NSS 14 SPR NO. 14 SPR REV. NO. 0  
 VENDOR Plexitallic P.O. NO. 021103 LA COMP. NO. ~~43~~ GROUP NO. ~~53~~ SEQ. NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_  
 DWG NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 SITE ENGINEER \_\_\_\_\_ EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES)

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
 No Q.A. release.  
 No Purchase Order.  
 No mat'l listing or information on drawing.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
 None

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
 N.P.G. Q.A. to release.

RECOMMENDED ACTION  
 N.P.G. projects to expedite.  
**No QA RELEASE REQ'D**  
 J. A. L.  
 APR 30 1973

APPROVALS		TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
	ORIGINATOR		<i>CR Hilling</i>	4-23-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
	SITE CONSTR. REP.		<i>W. C. Hilling</i>		<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
	SITE OPER. MGR.				<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
	NS SUPPORT ENGR.				<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
					<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
	PROJECT MANAGER		<i>J. A. Lauer</i>	5-15-73	<input type="checkbox"/> PEAB/ISAB	
DISTRIBUTION					<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended	
SITE OPS MANAGER		Category <input type="checkbox"/> N <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> L			<input type="checkbox"/> Side Change	
PROJECT MANAGER		Auth. Charge No. _____			<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change Req.	<input type="checkbox"/>
N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.		Date Completed 5-15-73			<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change No.	_____
COGNIZANT ENGR.		By: <i>J. MARSHALL</i>				
CONTRACT ADMIN.		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED			DEVIATIONS <b>96</b>	
NPG QA					<input type="checkbox"/> NONE	
FILE 12M.2 _____					<input type="checkbox"/> SEE KEY _____	

TITLE ? QA RELEASE PROBLEM  
RELATED SPRs NSS-14 SPRs 10, 11, 12, & 13

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS- 00 . The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

11/20/74 - REVIEWED WITH J. A. LAUER: NOT APPLICABLE TO OTHER  
CONTRACTS. *[Signature]*

ACTION COMPLETE  
ON ALL CONTRACTS

NSS- \_\_\_\_\_

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison Co. CONTRACT NO. WSS 14 SPR NO. 14 SPR NO. 0  
 WOODRIDGE Flexibility P.O. NO. 1A COMP. NO. 15 ORD. NO. 97 SPR NO. 0  
 PRIMARY DOCUMENTS, SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_  
 D.S. NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP. CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 SITE ENGINEER \_\_\_\_\_ EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ 100% COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE: \_\_\_\_\_  
 DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: *John [unclear]*  
 No Q.A. release.  
 No Purchase Order.  
 No mat'l listing or information on drawing. *EHD*

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
 None

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
 N.P.G. O.A. to release.

RECOMMENDED ACTION  
 N.P.G. projects to expedite. *J. A. [unclear]*  
*No QA release req'd* *ASR 30 1975*

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	REVISIONS	ACTION
ORIGINATOR	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>4-25-75</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Exchange	
SITE CONSTR. REP.	<i>[Signature]</i>		<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Spec.	
SITE OPER. MGR.			<input type="checkbox"/> Inst. Guide	
US SUPPORT ENGR.			<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Test Cases	
PROJECT MANAGER	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>5-15-75</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Test Plans	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Site Changes	

RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN. Categories:  Perm  C  O  S  
 Field Check Req.   
 Field Change No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED:  None  See Ref. \_\_\_\_\_

T. D. STABLES

TO

J. A. LAVER

T. D. STABLES

CUST.

FILE NO. OR REF.

SUBJ.

DATE

I thought we didn't want these!  
Please advise.

Jal

YOU'RE RIGHT - WE DON'T WANT THEM  
(J. MANIAK)  
Y DB SIDE A HAS AGREED NOT TO ISSUE  
ANY MORE SAA'S DUE TO LACK OF  
QA DOCUMENTATION. HOWEVER, WE ACCEPTED  
3 OR 4, JUST TO GET RID OF THEM SINCE  
THEY WERE ALREADY ISSUED.

JOE LAVER

6-5-73

JUL 5 1973

PROBLEM REPORT

E. P. LAUER

BARCODE & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison CONTRACT NO. 1985 14 SER. NO. 14 SER. REV. NO. 0  
 WILCOX Electric P.D. 10 EQUIP. NO. 55 GROUP NO. 97 SER. NO.  
 PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: PWD NO. PROJECT  
 DATE ENGINEER: [ ] SCHEDULE DATE: [ ] ACTUAL DATE: [ ] DATE TO'D COMP. DATE: [ ]

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
 No Q.A. release.  
 No Purchase Order.  
 No mat'l listing or information on drawing.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PREVIOUS CONTROLS, COMPLIMENTS MADE, ETC.  
 None

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
 N.P.G. Q.A. to release.

RECOMMENDED ACTION  
 N.P.G. projects to expedite.  
 No QA RELEASE REQ'D  
 APR 30 1973

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	APPROVAL	REMARKS
ORIGINATOR	<i>[Signature]</i>	5-15-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REF.	<i>[Signature]</i>		<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Sperr	
SITE OPER. MOD.			<input type="checkbox"/> Mat'l Sperr	
HS SUPPORT ENGR.			<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Sperr	
			<input type="checkbox"/> ROAD/PSAB	
PROJECT MANAGER	<i>[Signature]</i>	5-15-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Site Change	
DISTRIBUTION			<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change Fee	<input type="checkbox"/>
RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.			<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change Fee	
OTHER CONTROLS AFFECTED				

DATE: 6/20/73  
 ENGINEER: [ ]  
 HS SUPPORT ENGR.: [ ]  
 ASSISTANT ENGR.: [ ]  
 CONTRACT NO.: [ ]  
 NPG, CA  
 FILE: 12M [ ]

**SITE PROBLEM REPORT**

CUSTOMER: *Teledyne Edison Co.* CONTRACT NO. *WMS 74* SFR NO. *14* BABCOCK & WILCOX NPG  
 VENDOR: *Flexitallic P.O. NO. 026783* LA COMP. NO. *43* GROUP NO. *53* SFR REV NO. *6*  
 PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_ SER. NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 EQ. LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL DATE \_\_\_\_\_ PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE ENGINEER \_\_\_\_\_

EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ RECD COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) \_\_\_\_\_

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
 No Q.A. release.  
 No Purchase Order.  
 No mat'l listing or information on drawing.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
 None

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
 N.P.G. Q.A. to release.

RECOMMENDED ACTION  
 N.P.G. projects to expedite.  
**No QA RELEASE REQ'D**

APR 30 1973

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	INSTRUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
ORIGINATOR	<i>J.A. Lauer</i>		<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REP.	<i>W.P. [unclear]</i>	<i>5-15-73</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
SITE OPER. MGT.			<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Best.	
NS SUPPORT ENGR.			<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
			<input type="checkbox"/> PSAB/PSAR	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Side Change	
PROJECT MANAGER	<i>J.A. Lauer</i>	<i>5-15-73</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
DISTRIBUTION	Category: <input type="checkbox"/> Main <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> E	Auth Charge No. _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change No. _____	
SITE MGR/MANAGER	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.	Date Completed <i>5-15-73</i>		
PROJECT MGR LAGER		By: <i>J. MARSHALL</i>		
NS SUPPORT ENGR.	OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED	DEVIATION NO. <i>96</i>		
CONTRACT ENGR.		<input type="checkbox"/> NONE		
CONTRACT ADMIN.		<input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____		
NPG QA				
FILE NO. _____				



J. A. LAVER

T. D. STABLES

FILE NO. OR REF.

DATE

I thought we didn't want these!  
Please advise.

Joe

You're right - we don't want them  
(I think)  
+ DB will not agree not to issue  
the other SAs due to loss of  
of information. However, we received  
3 of them, just to get rid of them since  
they were already issued.

Joe Laver

6-5-73

TITLE HPI Valve position for operation

RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NCS- RO 107B. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

ORIGINAL

NCS- \_\_\_\_\_

NCS- \_\_\_\_\_

3  
**CLEARED**

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

**ORIGINAL**

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance  
R. G. BURNLEY - Task Engineer  
W. A. COBB - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 12M2  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 04  
SPR 196  
TITLE QUESTIONABLE HPI  
VALVE POSITION -  
OPEN OR CLOSED?  
DATE: 1/13/75

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_  
J. A. Builey - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_  
E. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_  
B. L. Day - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_  
L. C. Rogers - MET ED \_\_\_\_\_  
J. L. Hollis - FLORIDA \_\_\_\_\_  
R. J. BAKER - OCONEE

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 196 which was processed on Contract 620-00 04. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_.

REMARKS: THIS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN WRITTEN UP  
AS A PROBLEM! (R.G. BURNLEY)

cc: R. E. Kosiba

G. K. WANDLING  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER  
NSSE

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER <u>Lake Power Company</u>		CONTRACT NO. <u>600-0004</u>		SPR NO. <u>196</u>	REV. NO. <u>00</u>
VENDOR <u>N/A</u>	P. O. NO. <u>N/A</u>	TASK NO. <u>35</u>	GROUP NO. <u>101</u>	SEQ. NO. <u>01</u>	
SITE ENGINEER <u>G. Glei</u>		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE		
TITLE <u>HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION VALVE POSITION FOR OPERATION (2HP-V2413)</u>					
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  SEE ATTACHED:					
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  SEE ATTACHED:					
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  SEE ATTACHED:					
ORIGINAL	SIGNATURE	DATE	SIGNATURE		
	<i>[Signature]</i>	<u>6/14/74</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>		
RESOLUTION <u>AS LONG AS THE TWO MANUAL VALVES IN THE LINE BETWEEN "B" AND "C" HPI PUMPS ARE NORMALLY CLOSED. R.G.B. 1/13/75</u>					
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE	
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		<u>1/13/75</u>	
TASK ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		<u>1/27/75</u>	
PROJECT MANAGER		<u>C. A. Creamy</u>		<u>1-27-75</u>	
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM					
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ		FC NO.	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT					
<u>Bob Burnley stated on telcon with R.S. Auer that if Duke wants to operate with subject valve open it up to Duke. No problem operating with valve open.</u>				<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE	
FINAL DISTRIBUTION					
PROJECT MANAGER					
S.O.M./CONST. REP.					
QA DOC. FILE					
CENT. ENGR					
FILE 121.2					
DEVIATIONS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.					
DATE COMPLETED <u>12/12/74</u>		SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>			
S.O.M. CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE <u>12/13/74</u>			

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NPG Nuclear Service

- (1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Number; Sequence Number; Name; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (if applicable).
- (2) Site Operations Manager - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; Date.
- (3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.
- (4) Task Engineer - Fill in: Resolution; Recommended Std.'s Change\*; (if applicable, FC Req. and FC Number); Signature and Date.  
  
\*If recommended standard's change, transmit a copy to cognizant Standard Task Engineer to resolve with Standard Plant Manager.
- (5) Field Engineer - Implement resolution; upon completion, fill in: Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature.  
  
NOTE: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation and submit revised SPR to the Site Operations Manager.
- (6) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign.

Initiated by B&W Construction Company

- (1) Originator - (Same as (1) above)
- (2) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (2) above)
- (3) Project Manager - (Same as (3) above)
- (4) Task Engineer - (Same as (4) above)
- (5) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (5) and (6) above)

Babcock & Wilcox

SPR # 196 Rev. C  
June 4, 1974  
Oconee - Unit II

Title: HIGH PRESSURE INJECTION VALVE POSITION FOR OPERATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

The B. & W. HPI/Makeup and Purification drawing (P & ID) for Oconee Unit II shows the HPI isolation valve (valve # 2HP-V24B in the HPI line that connects to the reactor inlet line loop A) as normally closed. This same valve is also shown on Duke Power Company drawings as normally closed. However, paragraph 3.2.35 of Oconee OP/2/A/1102/01 indicates that this valve is opened during unit startup and remains open during plant operation. Question: Are there potential or operational problems associated with continued "normally open" operation of this valve? If not, why does B. & W. recommend that this valve be normally closed?

STATUS -ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS NOTIFIED:

Briefly discussed problem with John Merchant on 5/31/74, and he felt that the "normally open" operation of this valve would cause no difficulties (assuming that the two manual valves in the line between the "B" and "C" HPI pumps are normally closed).

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

Answer questions noted above and notify Duke Power Company if continued operation with this valve "normally open" is not recommended by B. & W. Engineering.

GG/bh

SITE PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

SPR File

To J.R. Shetter For Action

R.G. Burnley

File 12M2  
CONTRACT 620-00 04

SPR 196

TITLE HPI valve

To J.W. Merchant For Information

position for operation  
(211P-V24B)

DATE JUN 14 1974

Date Final Resolution Required by  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: J.R. Shetter & R.G. Burnley are requested to  
give their opinion of the consequences encountered if  
this valve is left open during operation. Answers to  
be forwarded through the NSSE.

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support  
Engineer. Please reply immediately  
whether answer is final or preliminary.

- cc:
- C. C. Plunkett-Contract Admin.
  - Central Engineering Files
  - C.M. Fletcher -NPG Quality Assurance
  - B.L. Day
  - J. N. Kaelin
  - E.L. Logan
  - L.C. Rogers

Earl B. Davis  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

C.A. Cready

MAN-OUR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
CHARGE No. \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Project Manager

NES- 4  
SPR 113

TITLE Excessive RCS Cooldown Rate

RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS- All . The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

The Rx coolant system was cooled down from 532° to 410° in  $\approx$  57 minutes.  $\Rightarrow$  cooldown rate of 128°F/hr. Component Eng. has determined that there is no reason for concern with respect to the structural adequacy of the Rx vessel of S.C. if the transient is counted as one of the 200 cycles by the equipment specification. This is applicable to all contracts per B.A. Karache & Xmitted for info. only.

↪ Applicable for info in case ~~Def~~ problem reoccurs.

NSS- This may re-occur but it will be a different occurrence or value each time & will require a separate review. This will be closed for generic following.  
RTP 10-9-74

**ACTION COMPLETE**



TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To R. J. McConnell (2) For Information

FILE: 1242  
Contract 620-00 -04

SPR 113

G. E. Kulynych - Sr. Project Manager

TITLE Excessive

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.

Res Cool-down

Central Engineering Files

Rate

E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

DATE 11-1-73

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: J. N. Kaelin-Arkansas

J. P. Kennedy-SMJD

K. E. Suhrke

H. J. Vorhies

J. D. Phinney-Met Ed

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 113 which has been processed on Contract 620-00 - 04. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: Justification letters for acceptance of this transient - on file in NUC Service

cc:

R. P. Pittman  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BARCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER <i>Duke Power</i>	CONTRACT NO. <i>620-0004</i>	SPR NO. <i>113</i>	SPR REV NO. <i>0</i>
VENDOR	P.O. NO.	COMP. NO. <i>51</i>	GROUP NO. <i>10</i>
SEQ NO. <i>01</i>	PRIORITY		
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS:	SPEC NOS.		
DWG NO.	EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE		
QA LEVEL	QA SPEC NO.		
SITE ENGINEER <i>E. L. Logan</i>	EARLY START DATE	ACTUAL START DATE	REQ'D COMP. DATE

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) *Excessive RCS Cooldown Rate*

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

~~During~~ Following the Quench Tank Routine DSC Incident (STR 2-012) the reactor coolant system was cooled down from 532°F to 410°F in approximately 57 minutes. This is a cooldown rate of approximately 128 °F/hr.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

FEEDBACK ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL

ENERG TO REVIEW FOR ANY ACTION AND/OR DETERMINE IF AN RCS DESIGN CYCLE HAS BEEN USED.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS APPLIED	ACTION TAKEN
ORIGINATOR	<i>E. L. Logan</i>	<i>10-1-73</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>R. J. Pittman</i>	<i>10/3/73</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
MS SUPPORT ENGR.	<i>R. J. Pittman</i>	<i>10/6/73</i>	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
			<input type="checkbox"/> PSAB/PSAR	
PROJECT MANAGER			<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Std. Change	

DISTRIBUTION SITE OPS MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER N.S. SUPPORT ENGR. COGNIZANT ENGR. CONTRACT ADMIN. NPG QA FILE 12M2 <i>NSS 4</i> <i>SPR 113</i>	Cost Category: <input type="checkbox"/> Non <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> I	Auth. Charge No. _____ Date Completed _____ By: _____	Field Change No. _____ Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>
	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN. _____	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____	<i>R. J. Pittman</i> <i>10/29/73</i>
	OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED _____		

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To	G.E. Kulynych, Senior Project Manager	
From	<i>AHL</i> A.H. Lazar, Manager, Component Engineering (Ext. 2315)	805 663.3
Cust.		File No. or Ref. NSS-4/12E51612E55
Subj.	Component Engineering Analysis of 130° F Per Hour Cooldown Transient at Oconee II	Date September 24, 1973

This letter is letter and contains one subject only

Component Engineering has evaluated the subject transient and has determined that there is no reason for concern with respect to the structural adequacy of the reactor vessel or steam generator. This statement is made provided that this transient is counted as one of the 240 cycles by the equipment specification.

A summary of the evaluation for the steam generator is attached in a memo from D.A. McKinley to B.N. McDonald dated September 17, 1973.

A summary of the evaluation for the reactor vessel is attached in a memo from H.W. Ehnke to B.N. McDonald dated September 21, 1973.

AHL/jk  
Attachments

cc: (with attach)  
R.N. Bottorf  
C.A. Creacy  
J.C. Deddens  
R.M. Douglass  
B.N. McDonald

0819

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

File NSS- 4  
12M2-SPR- 113

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROGRAM REPORT

To \_\_\_\_\_ For Action

CONTRACT 620-00 -04

SPR 113

TITLE Excessive RCS

To B. J. McConnell For Information

Cooldown Rate

J. N. Kielin

DATE 10-8-73

J. P. Kennedy

J. D. Phinney

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

K. Subaka

Action Requested: THE attached Analysis provides the basis for accepting this transient. THE site is requested to clear this SPR

P. L. Pittman  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

- cc: G. E. Kalynych
- C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance
- R. N. Batten
- B. N. McDonald
- R. M. Douglass

MAN-HOUR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

CHARGE No. \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED: [Signature]  
Project Manager

SPR 113

AH LAZAR

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

A. H. LAZAR

SEP 20 1973

To: B. N. MC DONALD - NPOB - COMPONENT ENGINEERING, LYNCHBURG

MECHANICAL DESIGN

From: D. A. MCKINLEY - NPOB - WEST BARBERTON ENGINEERING

2.5.2

201 cc. 3

Subject: PURE POWER

File No.  
or Ref.

620-0004-08-05

Date

SEPTEMBER 17, 1973

This letter is sent to customer and one subject only.

Reference: B. N. McDonald to R. M. Douglass & R. N. Bortorf dated 8/22/73,  
contract 620-0004-03-05 & attached "Summary Test Report 2-012".

Mechanical Design has just completed its review of the 130<sup>o</sup>F/hr. cooldown  
transient caused by a rupture disc blow out on the quench tank as trans-  
mitted in the above reference.

The attached pages are a summary of the review.

All critical areas on the OTSG are covered by the review.

The results show the transient is acceptable, provided it is considered to  
be one of the 240 allowable cooldowns.

It should be noted that the main reason the transient is acceptable is that  
it only lasted for one hour, and as such, limited the temperature drop.  
If the transient had lasted to the normal starting point for the decay heat  
system of 280<sup>o</sup>F, the transient would not have been acceptable.

If you have questions, please contact me.

*D. A. McKinley*  
D. A. McKinley

DAMo:jav

Attachment

cc: with attachment

- C. A. Creacy
- R. M. Douglass
- E. M. Livingston
- R. N. Tornow

Transient: (Primary Side)

1.47 hr., 327°F to 10.77 hr., 200°F or 120°F to 0.21 hr., or  
1.17 hr.

Max. nature drop stabilizes at 10.77 hr.

Pressure: (Primary Side)

2130 psi, 9.23 hr. to 180 psi, 9.57 hr.

Pressure stabilizes at 9.57 hr.

Initial Conditions: Zero percent power

Feedwater: 180°F @ 206 GPM/DESU

Initial Flow @ 66 Pwr.

Areas of Concern:

- 1) Support skirt analysis
- 2) Tubesheet analysis (upper & lower)
- 3) Tubes

The primary nozzles are not an area of concern due to their low stressed condition.

The fast cooldown transient will not affect the secondary shell, because it is isolated from the fast changing primary fluid by the thick tubesheet ring. Any changes in the feedwater conditions will have little effect, as the flow conditions used in the shell analysis are for a much greater flow (2000 GPM). Also, the bleed steam in the feedwater annulus will quickly bring the cold feedwater up to saturation temperature.

The feedwater nozzle will not be affected, as it is analyzed for 180°F feedwater at full flow. Any feedwater flow changes will result in a less severe condition than those analyzed in the Design Report.

9/12/73

### Support Skirt

The worst time for the fast cooldown transient will be end of ramp, or the time the fluid reaches  $402^{\circ}$  (0.94 hr.) At this time the fluid has dropped  $123^{\circ}$ F in 0.94 hours at a rate of  $131^{\circ}$ F/hr.

For something as massive as a support skirt, the gradient will depend on the ability of the skirt to conduct heat down its length. As the ramp rate for the fast cooldown is only 3% greater than the normal cooldown, we can equate the conditions at time 0.94 hours to a time in the support skirt analysis when the primary fluid has dropped approximately  $131^{\circ}$ F or about 1.3 hours. The closest time greater than this is 2.0 hours. For the skirt, the worst stress location is 3.6 inches from the top of the skirt taper at the bottom of segment two. At this point the range of primary plus secondary stress is -76.4 ksi for heating, and -41.4 ksi for cooldown at time 3.2 hours. At 2.0 hours, the cooldown stress drops to -31.2 ksi. This means that the fast cooldown transient will not cause stresses greater than those in the Design Report. Therefore, the transient is acceptable for the skirt if it is considered to be included in the total of 240 allowable cooldowns. Any feedwater changes will not affect the skirt due to its remote location.

These stresses come from the Design Report Section E, Page B-16-4 & 5.

9/12/73

Discussion

From the upper and lower tubesheet analysis, Section F of the Design Report, Page 4-2, it can be seen that the maximum primary plus secondary stress intensity range for either of the upper or lower is 35 ksi on the secondary side of the upper tubesheet, versus an allowable of 80 ksi. This occurs at the shell-to-ring juncture.

As the fast cooldown transient is  $131^{\circ}\text{F}$  per hour versus the  $100^{\circ}\text{F}$  per hour as analyzed in the Report, it is conservative to assume the cooldown stresses increase by 31 percent. This is conservative in that the worst time during cooldown occurs at the start of decay heat removal, or three hours into cooldown, which gives the gradients more time to spread, thus giving higher stresses. The fast cooldown transient is equivalent to about 1.3 hours into cooldown based on ramp rate adjustment.

The actual stress intensities involved are -23.0 ksi for heatup and +12.0 ksi for cooldown. If the 12.0 ksi intensity is increased by 31%, we get +15.7 ksi for a range of 38.7 ksi.

This is well within the allowable of 80 ksi, and if considered one of the 240 allowable cooldowns, can be accepted for the tubesheets.

The feedwater side coefficients are based on full flow during cooldown, ( 15000 GPM) so feedwater changes will have a negligible effect on the final stresses.

9/12/73



Tubes

The fast cooldown transient will have no adverse effects on the tubes. The worst tube to shell  $\Delta T$ , and thus maximum tube load, occurs right at the point the primary pumps shut down, and the decay heat system is started.

The tubes will cool faster than the secondary shell, so the longer the time involved, the larger the tube to shell  $\Delta T$ , and tube load.

The start of decay heat removal occurs 3.2 hours after the start of cooldown under normal conditions, and has a primary temperature drop of  $557^{\circ}\text{F}$  at 8% power to  $280^{\circ}$ , or  $277^{\circ}\text{F}$  in 3.2 hours.

The fast cooldown transient drops from  $523^{\circ}\text{F}$  at 9.83 hours to  $400^{\circ}\text{F}$  at 10.77 hours, or a drop of  $123^{\circ}\text{F}$  in 0.4 hours.

From comparing these figures, it can be seen that normal cooldown will develop larger tube to shell  $\Delta T$ 's and loads due to the larger temperature drop, and the longer time involved.

Therefore, the GTSG fast cooldown transients will not adversely affect the steam generator tubes.

9/13/73

A. H. LAZAR

SEP 24 1973

ANL

THE DABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

Manager

B.H. McDonald - Development - NPGD-CE - Lynchburg

Principal Engineer

H.W. Behrke - Mechanical Design - NPGD-CE - Mt. Vernon

609 563

File No.  
or Ref.

620-0004-51

Date

September 21, 1973

Device III Cool-down Transient

Reviser to cover one customer and one project only.

Mt. Vernon Mechanical Design has reviewed the rapid cool-down experienced by the NSS-4 reactor and offers the following comments.

A stress report for this type of plant has been prepared considering 240 cycles of 100°/hr. cool-down. This report also reflects a transient of 200°/hr. cool-down for 15 minutes. (Rapid Depressurization). Based on this analysis it is concluded that no harmful effects have been initiated by the 125°/hr. cool-down on the NSS-4 reactor and that no specific analysis is required for this particular transient.

H.W. Behrke  
H.W. Behrke

BB/lab

cc: R.F. Hollander

TRANSMITTAL SLIP  
PLANT STATUS SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Centra Engineering 11/1/74  
C. C. Plumbett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance  
R. W. Wicks - Tech Engineer  
H. A. Baker - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 1292  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 28  
SPR 571  
TITLE Loss of Fuelable  
to CTSS  
DATE: 11/2/74

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaclin - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - SHUD \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - COOPER \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - NET ID \_\_\_\_\_  
R. E. Kesha

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 571 which was processed on Contract 620-00 28. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem  is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS: refer to letter Wicks to Davis 11/2/74  
and some letters 451 & 503

cc:

Earl H. Davis  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BAEDOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER <i>Ambridge Power &amp; Light</i>	CONTRACT NO. <i>0000</i>	SPR NO. <i>071</i>	REV. NO. <i>00</i>
VENDOR <i>IBM</i>	P.O. NO.	TASK NO.	GROUP NO.
SITE ENGINEER <i>D. A. Dombeln</i>	REQ'D. RESOL. DATE <i>11/27/76</i>	REQ'D. COMP. DATE <i>11/27/76</i>	SEQ. NO.
TITLE <i>LOSS OF PRINTER TO OTSG</i>			
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM <i>See Attachments.</i>			
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED <i>See Attachments.</i>			
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL <i>See Attachments.</i>			
<p><i>Approved by Customer</i></p> <p>RESOLUTION <i>SOM letter being drafted to customer reaffirming action to be taken on loss of Fuelwater and Recovery from Dry OTSG.</i></p>			
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE	DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>11/27/76</i>
TASK ENGINEER			
PROJECT MANAGER			<i>11/27/76</i>
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM			
AUTH. CHARGE NO. <input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHARGE REQ. <input type="checkbox"/> FC NO.			
SITE COMPLETION REPORT			<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STOS. CHANGE
DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO. _____			FINAL DISTRIBUTION
DATE COMPLETED <i>11/27/76</i> SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>			PROJECT MANAGER
S.O.M. CONST. REP. APPROVAL <i>11/27/76</i> DATE <i>[Signature]</i>			S.O.M. COST REP.
			ON ADD. FILE
			CHG. PROJ. FILE NO.

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER <i>Advanced Power &amp; Light</i>	CONTRACT NO. <i>0003</i>	SPR NO. <i>173</i>	REV. NO. <i>00</i>
VENDOR <i>AW</i>	P.O. NO.	TASK NO.	GROUP NO.
SITE ENGINEER <i>D. A. Davidson</i>	REQ'D. RETOL. DATE <i>4-20-74</i>	REQ'D. COMP. DATE <i>4-20-74</i>	SEQ. NO.

TITLE *LOSS OF FRESHWATER TO STEAM*

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
*See Attachments.*

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  
*See Attachments.*

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  
*See Attachments.*

*David Davidson*

RESOLUTION *Engineering response (letter RW-10 to E Davis, Nov 6 1973) "Upon loss of total flow, operator is to manually trip reactor as soon as possible"; "normally RPL would trip reactor" Therefore auto reactor trip on loss of FW is not required. Two letters (dated Sept 4 & 11 1973) written to customer to specify method of recovery from loss of FW fuel so as to...*

APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE	DATE
V.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>11/20/74</i>
TASK ENGINEER		
PROJECT MANAGER		

COST CATEGORY  NORM  C  D  G  L  VENDOR CLAIM

AUTH. CHARGE NO.  FIELD CHANGE REQ.  FC NO.

SITE COMPLETION REPORT

RECOMMENDER STDS. CHANGE

FINAL DISTRIBUTION

PROJECT MANAGER

S. O. M. CONSTR. REP.

CA. DOC. FILE

TEXT. ENG.

FILE 1272

DEVIATIONS  NONE  SEE SPP REV. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

DATE COMPLETED *11/20/74* SIGNED BY *[Signature]*

S. O. M. CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL *[Signature]* DATE *11/20/74*

Bab  
 2  
 3  
 4  
 5  
 6  
 7  
 8  
 9  
 10  
 11  
 12  
 13  
 14  
 15  
 16  
 17  
 18  
 19  
 20  
 21  
 22  
 23  
 24  
 25  
 26  
 27  
 28  
 29  
 30  
 31  
 32  
 33  
 34  
 35  
 36  
 37  
 38  
 39  
 40  
 41  
 42  
 43  
 44  
 45  
 46  
 47  
 48  
 49  
 50  
 51  
 52  
 53  
 54  
 55  
 56  
 57  
 58  
 59  
 60  
 61  
 62  
 63  
 64  
 65  
 66  
 67  
 68  
 69  
 70  
 71  
 72  
 73  
 74  
 75  
 76  
 77  
 78  
 79  
 80  
 81  
 82  
 83  
 84  
 85  
 86  
 87  
 88  
 89  
 90  
 91  
 92  
 93  
 94  
 95  
 96  
 97  
 98  
 99  
 100

SNR-571

Description of Events

On October 10, 1976, SNR-1 Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped at 1356. The sequence of events which led to the manual tripping of the reactor is as follows:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
Prior to 1354:00	Reactor at 4120 KW (Reactor Power)
Prior to 1354:00	Turbine header at 1800 psig. Turbine header off line - encountering problems with 2" CSB'S in trying to open to the grid.
1354:00	'B' Main Feedwater Pump tripped on high turbine exhaust pressure
1355	Manually tripped Main Turbine
1356	Manually tripped Reactor
1357:15	Main Steam Safety Valve lifted at 1010 psig and reclosed at 930 psig

The 'B' Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) trip on high turbine exhaust pressure was caused by an incorrect valve lineup. MFP-1 'B' Main MFP turbine exhaust to condenser, the 10-inch manual butterfly valve, was closed. 101-0111, the 12-inch bypass rupture disc, had blown and was the path to the condenser for the turbine exhaust steam. As that was the only path available, the 12-inch bypass line could no longer handle the steam flow and the pump turbine tripped on high turbine exhaust pressure.

The Auxiliary Feedwater pump was started within 30 seconds (manual start by operator) and at about the same time the Main Turbine was manually tripped.

From the time of the 'B' MFP trip until the manual trip of the reactor, about 14 minutes, no operator action was taken to reduce reactor power. Pressurizer level increased until reaching 830 inches, the reactor was manually tripped per Administrative directive.

Immediately after the Reactor trip, Turbine Header Pressure began to increase above 800 psig because of the 12" pipe valve placed on Turbine Header Pressure setpoint. However, as can be seen in Figure 4, Turbine Header Pressure only reached 975 psig before it began decreasing, indicating dry or nearly dry CSB'S.

For the next several minutes, Feedwater flow oscillated back-and-forth between the CSB'S. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the back-and-forth feeding of the CSB'S. An explanation for this is the following:

- 1) The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump starts filling the CSB'S, but because of the large amount of recirculation, the discharge pressure is about 900 psig (only a gage).

- 2) Steam pressure began to increase in the 'A' CDS, but was higher in 'A' CDS than in 'B' CDS. When steam pressure in 'A' CDS reached the discharge pressure on the Aux. Feedwater pump, feed flow to 'A' CDS stopped but continued to feed 'B' CDS.
- 3) Steam pressure in 'B' CDS continued to increase, but lack of feed flow caused 'A' CDS steam pressure to decrease. At some point in time, 'B' CDS steam pressure would prevent Auxiliary Feedwater pump from starting the 'B' CDS any longer, and at that point where 'A' CDS steam pressure had decreased below Aux. Feedwater pump discharge pressure, 'A' CDS would begin to fall again.

From a previous loss of all feedwater flow incident, it was noted that with immediate manual tripping of the reactor and subsequent start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pump, the transient the system went through was very minor; i.e., the CDS level was properly maintained at Low Level Setpoint. The Immediate Action Section of SW Unit 1 Emergency Procedure for Loss of Steam Generator Feed, CP 1202.26, states,

"Verify that reactor tripped and carry out the reactor trip procedure (CP 1202.24)."

The resulting system transients from lack of immediate operator action to trip the reactor can be greatly worsened if the Auxiliary Feedwater pump fails to start, since there is no automatic initiation of the Emergency Feedwater System at this site at this time. See SW-490, J. N. Kaelin to R. J. McCormick, "Recovery from a Dry CDS Condition," for a discussion of this situation.

Status - Action to Date Involving Persons Contacted

R. J. McCormick, Manager, Plant Startup Service

Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel

1. Evaluate possibility for automatic reactor trip upon loss of all Feedwater Flow to prevent CDS'S from boiling dry.
2. Resolve, as soon as possible, the questions raised in SW-490.

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 534-5111

November 15, 1974

SCM-481

Arkansas Power and Light Company  
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit-1  
Russellville, AR 72801

Attention: Mr. J. W. Anderson, Jr.

Subject: OCS LIMITS AND PRECAUTIONS/RECOVERY FROM A DRY OCS

Dear Mr. Anderson:

Paragraph 1.3.6 of DP 1101 01 (Plant Limits and Precautions) refers to a 25 °F differential temperature limit between the OCS upper downcomer and the RCS cold leg. This constraint is no longer required and should be deleted from Plant Limits and Precautions.

This differential temperature limit was intended to be used during refilling of a dry Steam Generator. A dry Steam Generator is defined as eight (8) inches (neglecting instrumentation string inaccuracies) or less of level indicated on the startup range instrumentation. Recovery from this condition is accomplished by using the emergency feedwater pump(s) and auxiliary feed nozzles until minimum level is established, at which time the main nozzles and main feedwater pump(s) or auxiliary feedwater pump can be used to maintain normal OCS level.

Plant Limits and Precautions, DP 1101 01, is presently being updated and will incorporate the above. If I can provide any further details in this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Very truly yours,

THE BABCOCK AND WILCOX COMPANY

*J. A. Bailey*

J. A. Bailey  
Senior Site Representative

JAB/TRE/sp

cc: R. Gulp (AP&L)                      R. J. McConnell  
W. Cavanaugh III (AP&L)              G. M. Olds  
G. H. Miller (AP&L)                    D. B. Tulodicki  
T. Cogburn (AP&L)                      J. F. Walters



# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 12622, Charlotte, N.C. 28212

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

November 13, 1974

SCM-503

Arkansas Electric and Utility Company  
Arkansas Electric Company, Unit-1  
Russellville, AR 72450

Attention: Mr. J. W. Anderson, Jr.

Subject: RECOVERY FROM LOSS OF FEEDWATER TO STEAM GENERATORS

- References:
- 1) CP 1202 25 Rev-1, Loss of Steam Generator Feed, April 3, 1974
  - 2) Letter, H. A. Baker to B. Katanica, "Automatic Turbine Trip on Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps," March 19, 1974
  - 3) Bechtel DCN #3, E-141 3B-1 Rev 9, October 19, 1974  
Bechtel DCN #1, E-141 Rev 4, October 18, 1974  
Subject: "Automatic Turbine Trip on Loss of Both Main Feedwater Pumps"
  - 4) Letter, J. A. Bailey to J. W. Anderson, Jr., "OTSG Loading and Precautions/Recovery From a Dry OTSG," SCM-503, 11/11/74

Dear Mr. Anderson:

During the last few months of reactor power operation, there have been several occasions in which total feed flow to the OTSG's has been lost; that is, both main FW pumps tripped and the auxiliary FW pump not running. On each occasion the immediate response was to start/restart the auxiliary feedwater pump to reinitiate OTSG feed flow through the main feedwater nozzles. The immediate action specified in the emergency operating procedure for Loss of Steam Generator Feed (Reference 1) is to trip the reactor and start an emergency feedwater pump. Once relatively stable plant conditions have been established and the OTSG levels are under control at minimum level, normal feed flow through the main feedwater nozzles can be reinitiated and the emergency feedwater system secured.

In view of the fact that OTSG level can be restored by either the emergency feedwater pump(s) using the auxiliary feedwater nozzles or the auxiliary feedwater pump using the main feedwater nozzles, a re-evaluation of the recovery from a loss of feed to the OTSG's has been made with consideration given to the methods presently available.

Mr. J. W. Anderson, Jr.  
S-14-07, P. 2  
November 18, 1974

- a) Emergency feedwater pump(s) and the auxiliary feedwater recirculator using Condensate Storage Tank (if activated) water (-1-100 °F water dependent on ambient air temperature). The emergency feedwater pump(s), as well as OWS level control valves require operator action.
- b) Auxiliary feedwater pump and the main feedwater heater using the normal feedwater supply from the reactor, through the feedwater heater and condenser deaerators. Feedwater temperature depends on a number of loads;  $\approx 200$  °F at base power,  $\approx 175$  °F at 40% power and  $\approx 150$  °F at full power. Operator action is required to reinstitute feed flow.

After considering the availability of the electric driven auxiliary feedwater pump, the temperature and chemistry of the feedwater being added to the OWS's and the present requirements for manual reinstitution of any feedwater to the OWS's, the recommended response to a total loss of feedwater to the OWS's has not changed from that originally recommended and incorporated in OWS-1000-01 (Reference 1). For your information, I have re-emphasized the recommended response to this emergency situation:

- 1) Upon loss of total feedwater flow, the control room operator is to manually trip the reactor as soon as possible, provided the Reactor Protection System has not already tripped the reactor.
- 2) As recommended in Reference 1 and subject to interpretation of this recommendation in Reference 2, the turbine should trip automatically upon loss of both main feedwater pumps. The turbine should be tripped immediately if loss of both main feedwater pumps and a reactor trip fails to trip the turbine.
- 3) The emergency feedwater pump(s) should be started as soon as possible and the emergency feedwater system readied to restore and/or maintain OWS minimum level. The Integrated Control System will provide an automatic start of the steam driven emergency feedwater pump and activate OWS level control upon loss of both main feedwater pumps with the auxiliary feedwater pump not running. However, this automatic ICS function is presently bypassed, therefore requiring operator action to initiate the emergency feedwater equipment. Since feedwater flow must be re-established to both OWS's within 60 seconds to prevent lifting of pressurizer code relief valves upon loss of all feedwater, this automatic ICS response should be reinstated to minimize the delay in establishing a source of emergency feedwater.
- 4) Once an emergency feedwater pump has been started and the emergency feedwater system is available to supply emergency feed, the auxiliary feedwater pump can be started and the main feedwater system readied to supply normal feed flow through the main feedwater heater. However, as indicated in Reference 4, should the OWS(s) go dry (3 inches or less on the startup level instrumentation,

ick & Wilcox

Mr. J. A. Anderson, Jr.  
N-1001, Page 3  
November 11, 1974

the emergency feedwater system must be used to restore minimum level. Consequently, prior to initiating feed through the main feedwater nozzles and/or securing the emergency feedwater system, the level in both CWS's should be under control to assure that a "dry" CWS condition will not occur.

- 5) R.R. letdown flow should be secured and RRS makeup flow increased until the RR pressure and pressurizer level have turned around and started to increase or until the pressurizer heaters are covered and operational.

The methods of recovery from loss of feed to the steam generators available at ANO-1 have been re-evaluated by our engineering department. The recommended method of recovery is by feeding the CWS's through the auxiliary feedwater nozzles with the emergency feedwater system and reverting to the main feedwater nozzles when CWS level is under control.

Although our recommendation has not changed from that originally specified and included in CP 1802 P6, if I can provide any further details in this matter, please do not hesitate to call.

Sincerely,

THE BARBOCK AND WILCOX COMPANY



J. A. Bailey  
Senior Site Representative

JAB/SRF/tp

cc: R. Culp (AP&L)  
W. Cavanaugh III (AP&L)  
G. H. Miller (AP&L)  
T. Cogburn (AP&L)  
R. J. McConnell  
G. M. Olds  
D. B. Talodietki  
J. F. Walters

E. H. Davis  
Page two  
November 6, 1974

The evaluation of the transient data plotted by Mr. David Doughton revealed that turbine bearing temperatures did not increase significantly (to about 700 psig) nor did OILS start to leak out below the 10 inch level. The combination of these two events constitutes a dry run.

KW:hr

cc: H. A. Baker  
R. J. McManis  
D. B. McManis  
E. J. Cappola  
D. H. Roy  
R. F. Ryan  
A. F. McManis  
B. A. Harrach

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE  
SITE PROBLEMS REPORT TRANSMITTAL

TO: R. W. Wilke For Action

FILE - 1292

CONTRACT 620-03 03

SPS 571

TITLE Loss of Feedwater  
to OTSG's

cc: H. A. Baker For Information

DATE OCT 29 1974

Final Resolution Required by  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: R. W. Wilke is requested to evaluate  
the possibility for automatic condenser trip upon loss  
of all Feedwater Flow to prevent OTSG's from  
boiling dry.

cc: Central Engineering File ←  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - NRC Quality Assurance  
E. L. Loran - SMD  
J. V. Enolia - ADMASAS  
B. L. Day - CORNE  
L. C. Rogers - MET ED  
R. E. Kosiba

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support  
Engineer. Please reply immediately  
whether answer is final or preliminary.

Earl H. Davis  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer  
Earl H. Davis Jr.

MANAGER LIMITS	_____
COST LIMITS	_____
CHANGE NO.	_____
APPROVED:	_____
	Frank J. McHenry

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Ba

CUSTOMER <i>Washington Power &amp; Light</i>		CONTRACT NO. <i>100-10</i>	SPR NO. <i>100</i>	REV. NO. <i>02</i>
VENDOR <i>W</i>	P.O. NO.	TASK NO.	GROUP NO.	SEQ. NO.
SITE ENGINEER <i>T. J. ...</i>		REQ'D. SCHED. DATE	REQ'D. CMT. DATE	
TITLE <i>... ..</i>				
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  <i>See Attachments.</i>				
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  <i>See Attachments.</i>				
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  <i>See Attachments.</i>				
<i>...</i>				
RESOLUTION				
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>10/2/74</i>
TASK ENGINEER				
PROJECT MANAGER				
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NPM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM				
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ.		FC NO.
SITE COMPLETION REPORT				<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SCE SPR REV. NO. _____				FINAL DISTRIBUTION
DATE COMPLETED		SIGNED BY		PROJECT MANUAL
S O M. CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL		DATE		S O M. CONST. REP.
				CA DOC. FILE
				CONSTR. ENGR.
				FILE 100-2

RESOLUTION

COMPLETION

Babcock & Wilcox

REF 4571

Resummary of Problem

On October 11, 1974, AGR-1 Unit 1 reactor was manually tripped at ~1306. The sequence of events which led to the manual tripping of the reactor is as follows:

<u>Time</u>	<u>Event</u>
Prior to ~1304:30	Reactor at ~114 MW (Reactor Power)
Prior to ~1304:30	Turbine rolling at 1800 rpm. Turbine/Generator off line - encountering problems with AUTO SYNC in trying to sync. to the grid.
1304:30	'B' Main Feedwater Pump tripped on high turbine exhaust pressure
1305	Manually tripped Main Turbine
1306	Manually tripped Reactor
1307:15	Main Steam Safety Valve lifted at 1010 psi and resealed at 935 psi

The 'B' Main Feedwater Pump (MFP) trip on high turbine exhaust pressure was caused by an incorrect valve lineup. AGR-1 'B' Main MFP turbine exhaust to condenser, the 60-inch manual butterfly valve, was closed. TUB-0111, the 12-inch bypass rupture disc, had blown and was the path to the condenser for the turbine exhaust steam. As time and steam flow increased, the 12-inch bypass line could no longer handle the steam flow and the pump tripping tripped on high turbine exhaust pressure.

The Auxiliary Feedwater pump was started within 30 seconds (manual start by operator) and at about the same time the Main Turbine was manually tripped.

From the time of the 'B' MFP trip until the manual trip of the reactor, about 1 1/2 minutes, no operator action was taken to reduce reactor power. Pressurizer level increased; upon reaching 290 inches, the reactor was manually tripped per Administrative directive.

Immediately after the Reactor trip, Turbine Header Pressure began to increase above 800 psig because of the 105 psig bias placed on Turbine Header Pressure setpoint. However, as can be seen in Figure 4, Turbine Header Pressure only reached 975 psig before it began decreasing, indicating dry or nearly dry CDS'S.

For the next several minutes, feedwater flow oscillated back-and-forth between the CDS'S. Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the back-and-forth feeding of the CDS'S. An explanation for this is the following:

- 1) The Auxiliary Feedwater Pump starts filling the CDS'S, but because of the large amount of recirculation, the discharge pressure is about 900 psig (only a guess).

- 2) Steam pressure began to increase in the CDS'S, but was higher in 'A' CDS than in 'B' CDS. When steam pressure in 'A' CDS reached the discharge pressure on the Aux. Feedwater pump, feed flow to 'A' CDS stopped but continued to feed 'B' CDS.
- 3) Steam pressure in 'A' CDS continued to increase, but lack of feed flow caused 'A' CDS steam pressure to decrease. At some point in time, 'B' CDS steam pressure would prevent Auxiliary Feedwater pump from filling the 'B' CDS any longer, and at that point where 'A' CDS steam pressure had decreased below Aux. Feedwater pump discharge pressure, 'A' CDS would begin to fill again.

From a previous loss of all feedwater flow incident, it was noted that with immediate manual tripping of the reactor and subsequent start of the Auxiliary Feedwater pump, the transient the system went through was very minor; i.e., the CDS Level was promptly maintained at low level setpoint. The Immediate Action Section of Unit 1 Emergency Procedure for Loss of Steam Generator Feed, CP 1202.26, states,

"Verify that reactor tripped and carry out the reactor trip procedure (CP 1202.24)."

The resulting system transients from lack of immediate operator action to trip the reactor can be greatly worsened if the Auxiliary Feedwater pump fails to start, since there is no automatic initiation of the Emergency Feedwater System at this site at this time. See SGM-90, J. H. Babin to R. J. McConnell, "Recovery from a Dry CDS Condition," for a discussion of this situation.

Action to Date Including Items Completed

R. J. McConnell, Manager, Plant Startup Service

Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel

1. Evaluate possibility for automatic reactor trip upon loss of all Feedwater Flow to prevent CDS'S from boiling dry.
2. Resolve, as soon as possible, the questions raised in SGM-90.




HE 1412 TO THE GENERATOR 14.12.54

461510

THE J-100 TEMPERATURE VS. TIME



RES PRESSURE (SIG)



1000  
1100  
1200

2300  
2200  
2100  
2000  
1900  
1800  
1700

0  
50  
100  
150  
200  
250  
300  
350  
400  
450  
500  
550  
600

40 1516

1/2" x 10" TO THE CENTER OF THE 19 x 20 CM. HOLES

FIG. 3: PRESSURIZER LEVEL VS. TIME






FIG. 5: Loop Feedwater Flows (vs. Time)



461516

KE 10 X 10 TO THE CENTIMETER 18 X 25 CM  
REDFEL & TROTTER CO. MADE IN USA

FIG. 4: TURBINE HEADER PRESSURE VS. TIME





- 01 +0000 +0000
- 04 +0000 +0000 Turbine T-33
- 05 +0000 +0000 ACS Press 'B'
- 07 +0000 +0000 ACS T-1 'B'
- 09 +0000 +0000 ACS T-2 'B'
- 11 +0000 +0000 Pen. Lvl
- 12 +0000 +0000 Mu Tank Lvl
- 17 +0000 +0000 Turbine Header Press
- 18 +0000 +0000 ACTSG S/U Lvl
- 20 +0000 +0000 B'RAIN Fw Flow
- 21 +0000 +0000 B'RAIN Fw Flow
- 22 +0000 +0000 B'CTSG S/U Lvl

TEST NO. NOW IS = 0000  
 TEST NO. DESIRED 14 = 0000  
 BLOCK NO. IS = 0001  
 BLOCK NO. DESIRED 14 = 0001  
 STARTING RECORD NO. IS = 00216  
 STARTING DATA CUR NO. IS = 01  
 DELETING INTERVAL IS = 00001  
 PLAYBACK CHANNELS IS =

01 04 05 07 09 11 12 17 18 20 21 22 99

7  
 The  
 9  
 Tes  
 11  
 Pzkhed

"SWITCH 0 IS QUIT SWITCH"

Block	01	04	05	07	09	11	12	17	18	20	21	22	99
0000216	3	+0000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0163.6						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0163.9						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0163.1						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0162.9						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0162.6						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0163.0						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0163.1						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0162.5						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.6						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.4						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.4						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.8						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.5						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0160.9						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0160.8						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.1						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.6						
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2100.0	+2100.0	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0161.2						

0000216	3	+2000.0	-2105.4	+2130.0	+0575.2	+0570.2	+0161.3
+0038.3		+0578.4	+0023.0	+0570.6	+0023.7	+0024.2	
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2105.6	+2131.7	+0576.1	+0570.2	+0161.3
+0038.1		+0377.2	+0023.4	+0573.9	+0024.5	+0024.6	
0000216	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2135.5	+0576.2	+0570.2	+0161.2
+0037.9		+0373.7	+0023.9	+0574.3	+0571.9	+0023.9	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2105.7	+2137.6	+0576.1	+0570.2	+0161.3
+0037.7		+0378.7	+0023.9	+0574.3	+0570.4	+0024.2	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2136.5	+0576.1	+0570.2	+0161.2
+0037.7		+0373.8	+0029.1	+0570.5	+0021.0	+0024.8	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2105.6	+2136.7	+0576.2	+0570.2	+0162.0
+0037.6		+0379.3	+0023.5	+0575.4	+0173.4	+0024.5	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2105.5	+2136.5	+0576.1	+0570.1	+0161.6
+0037.4		+0373.5	+0022.5	+0611.5	+0349.5	+0024.9	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2137.2	+0576.0	+0570.1	+0161.0
+0038.5		+0379.4	+0029.2	+0510.0	+0005.3	+0025.1	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2137.5	+0576.0	+0570.0	+0161.1
+0038.5		+0379.4	+0023.6	+0579.4	+0006.2	+0024.7	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2136.5	+0576.0	+0570.0	+0161.6
+0038.4		+0379.0	+0023.5	+0575.6	+0021.4	+0024.9	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2157.2	+2136.2	+0576.0	+0570.0	+0161.7
+0038.3		+0377.2	+0023.9	+0542.4	+0027.1	+0024.2	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2137.7	+0576.0	+0570.0	+0161.5
+0039.1		+0379.9	+0023.9	+0552.0	+0027.1	+0024.7	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2136.6	+0576.0	+0570.0	+0160.7
+0039.0		+0379.7	+0029.1	+0378.5	+0253.7	+0025.4	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2107.2	+2135.3	+0575.9	+0570.0	+0160.5
+0037.9		+0378.5	+0027.5	+0064.2	+0031.7	+0025.1	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2135.1	+0575.9	+0569.9	+0160.2
+0037.2		+0379.1	+0029.9	+0661.1	+0012.5	+0024.9	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.6	+2136.2	+0575.8	+0569.2	+0161.0
+0037.6		+0380.1	+0029.7	+0555.7	+0020.3	+0025.2	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.6	+2135.3	+0575.7	+0569.7	+0160.2
+0037.4		+0380.3	+0029.0	+0597.0	+0007.2	+0025.2	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2133.0	+0575.7	+0569.6	+0160.0
+0037.3		+0380.4	+0029.7	+0019.9	+0000.0	+0025.1	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.6	+2133.2	+0576.2	+0569.5	+0159.7
+0037.2		+0380.1	+0029.7	+0592.4	+0017.2	+0025.6	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2106.6	+2137.9	+0575.6	+0569.5	+0159.7
+0037.1		+0380.0	+0030.0	+0012.8	+0377.0	+0025.5	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2107.2	+2135.0	+0575.4	+0570.4	+0159.9
+0036.9		+0380.2	+0029.9	+0562.7	+0007.6	+0026.1	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2107.2	+2133.3	+0575.4	+0569.3	+0160.0
+0036.7		+0380.4	+0029.6	+0530.9	+0003.1	+0025.0	
0000217	3	+2000.0	-2107.2	+2137.2	+0575.4	+0569.3	+0159.5
+0035.5		+0379.5	+0029.3	+0535.8	+0001.2	+0024.6	
0000215	3	+2000.0	-2105.6	+2134.3	+0575.3	+0569.2	+0159.2
+0035.3		+0379.1	+0029.9	+0004.9	+0001.2	+0025.1	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2106.6	+2135.3	+0575.3	+0569.2	+0159.2
+0035.2		+0377.9	+0030.2	+0006.3	+0378.1	+0024.9	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2106.6	+2136.7	+0575.3	+0569.1	+0159.7
+0035.0		+0379.2	+0029.3	+0571.4	+0001.0	+0025.6	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2106.0	+2135.8	+0575.3	+0569.2	+0160.0
+0035.5		+0378.9	+0025.7	+0573.2	+0370.2	+0024.4	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2106.6	+2143.4	+0575.3	+0569.2	+0159.9
+0035.7		+0377.1	+0027.3	+0535.5	+0044.6	+0025.0	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2105.4	+2143.6	+0575.3	+0569.2	+0159.5
+0035.5		+0379.0	+0023.7	+0555.9	+0006.2	+0024.5	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2105.1	+2144.9	+0575.3	+0569.2	+0159.9
+0035.4		+0379.0	+0029.2	+0564.0	+0007.6	+0024.5	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2105.1	+2142.4	+0575.3	+0569.3	+0160.3
+0035.3		+0378.8	+0029.3	+0536.5	+0006.7	+0024.6	
0000218	3	+2000.0	-2104.6	+2148.2	+0575.3	+0569.3	+0160.3



+0000.1	+0376.0	+0000.7	+0000.0	+0000.0	+0000.0	+0000.0	+0000.0
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2147.5	+0575.4	+0569.3	+0161.1
+0000.2	+0379.2	+0000.2	+0000.2	+0000.2	+0000.2	+0000.2	+0000.2
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2151.7	+0575.4	+0569.4	+0160.5
+0000.1	+0377.3	+0000.4	+0000.0	+0741.1	+0000.0		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2133.6	+0575.4	+0569.4	+0160.2
+0000.0	+0334.9	+0000.1	+0000.1	+0000.9	+0000.6		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2163.3	+0575.5	+0569.6	+0161.9
+0000.9	+0389.3	+0000.4	-0000.1	+0000.4	+0000.6		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2182.4	+0375.6	+0570.1	+0164.1
+0000.8	+0367.2	+0000.1	-0000.1	+0000.3	+0018.5		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2203.5	+0576.0	+0570.7	+0166.1
+0000.6	+0351.2	+0019.3	-0000.1	+0001.6	+0016.4		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2209.4	+0576.7	+0571.4	+0167.8
+0000.8	+0374.6	+0017.6	-0000.1	+0000.3	+0014.3		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2249.7	+0577.3	+0572.3	+0170.9
+0000.5	+0369.5	+0015.7	-0000.1	+0001.6	+0012.7		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2248.3	+0576.1	+0573.3	+0175.8
+0000.4	+0330.6	+0014.1	-0000.1	+0001.6	+0011.0		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2240.7	+0576.9	+0574.4	+0181.3
+0000.5	+0365.3	+0013.0	-0000.1	+0001.3	+0010.0		
0000019	3	+2000.0	-2104.5	+2242.1	+0579.9	+0575.5	+0187.9
+0000.4	+0365.0	+0011.6	-0000.1	+0001.6	+0009.3		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.9	+2243.4	+0581.0	+0576.7	+0194.1
+0000.3	+0363.7	+0011.1	-0000.1	+0016.3	+0008.2		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2259.7	+0582.1	+0578.0	+0200.9
+0000.5	+0370.9	+0010.7	-0000.1	+0002.9	+0008.1		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+2277.3	+0583.4	+0579.4	+0203.6
+0000.8	+0370.8	+0010.7	-0000.1	+0000.1	+0000.6		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2276.6	+0584.7	+0580.6	+0216.5
+0000.8	+0474.6	+0011.7	-0000.1	+0000.6	+0007.0		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+2277.1	+0585.9	+0581.0	+0224.3
+0000.6	+0375.1	+0012.3	-0000.1	+0001.4	+0006.9		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2296.7	+0587.2	+0582.9	+0231.3
+0000.7	+0375.8	+0012.1	-0000.1	+0000.4	+0007.3		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+2300.3	+0588.3	+0583.9	+0237.1
+0000.7	+0373.6	+0012.7	+0000.7	+0438.8	+0005.4		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2304.0	+0589.3	+0584.9	+0244.6
+0000.3	+0370.3	+0012.7	+0000.7	+0438.5	+0000.0		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2309.9	+0590.3	+0585.0	+0250.7
+0000.3	+0371.1	+0011.8	+0000.6	+0462.7	+0000.7		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0001.3	+2309.3	+0591.3	+0587.1	+0257.3
+0000.7	+0372.2	+0010.3	+0000.7	+0421.3	+0012.0		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+2310.0	+0592.3	+0588.2	+0262.7
+0000.3	+0371.3	+0010.5	-0000.1	+0000.0	+0010.6		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2310.0	+0593.2	+0589.4	+0266.8
+0000.8	+0377.6	+0011.7	-0000.1	+0700.7	+0010.8		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2309.9	+0594.3	+0590.5	+0269.2
+0000.2	+0374.7	+0011.5	-0000.1	+0000.3	+0000.7		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2309.3	+0595.2	+0591.3	+0272.2
+0000.2	+0369.8	+0010.9	-0000.1	+0000.9	+0000.5		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2308.3	+0596.1	+0592.0	+0277.7
+0000.0	+0365.6	+0013.7	-0000.1	+0000.9	+0007.5		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2308.2	+0596.9	+0592.5	+0283.6
+0000.2	+0379.1	+0015.3	+0007.8	+0427.9	+0007.4		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2301.0	+0597.3	+0593.1	+0287.9
+0000.3	+0370.3	+0013.2	+0000.0	+0000.1	+0000.7		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2293.1	+0598.2	+0593.8	+0291.3
+0000.2	+0369.9	+0011.7	+0000.3	+0000.5	+0000.1		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2297.7	+0598.8	+0594.7	+0296.0
+0000.4	+0375.0	+0010.3	+0000.3	+0000.2	+0000.4		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+2292.1	+0599.5	+0595.6	+0300.1
+0000.4	+0365.6	+0010.0	+0010.7	+0000.1	+0010.0		
0000019	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+2295.8	+0600.3	+0596.7	+0303.2





+0010.9	+0723.4	+0011.0	-0000.1	+0049.0	+0011.2		
0000223	3	+0000.0	-0000.0	+1795.6	+0070.0	+0570.2	+0155.1
+0011.1	+0725.1	+0011.7	-0000.1	+0050.5	+0011.0		
0000223	3	+0000.0	-0000.0	+1792.7	+0050.4	+0569.7	+0153.5
+0011.9	+0721.4	+0011.5	-0000.1	+0072.9	+0007.0		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1791.0	+0011.8	+0569.1	+0152.0
+0011.2	+0720.1	+0011.7	-0000.1	+0423.5	+0007.5		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1790.9	+0001.0	+0568.6	+0149.7
+0011.7	+0717.7	+0011.2	+0010.7	+0400.9	+0003.3		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1785.3	+0007.0	+0568.2	+0147.6
+0011.4	+0726.6	+0011.8	+0010.0	+0407.5	+0000.5		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1783.5	+0007.4	+0567.8	+0145.9
+0011.3	+0728.9	+0011.4	+0000.0	+0401.0	+0010.0		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1780.0	+0007.0	+0567.4	+0144.2
+0011.0	+0726.0	+0011.5	+0043.0	+0400.6	+0010.5		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1780.2	+0006.6	+0567.2	+0142.7
+0011.3	+0734.3	+0011.6	+0044.7	+0400.2	+0012.6		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1778.0	+0006.2	+0567.0	+0140.4
+0011.5	+0735.0	+0011.0	+0047.6	+0400.4	+0012.0		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1775.9	+0003.9	+0566.7	+0138.0
+0011.2	+0749.2	+0011.0	-0000.1	+0407.1	+0014.1		
0000223	3	+0000.0	-0000.0	+1769.2	+0005.6	+0566.5	+0136.0
+0011.9	+0724.0	+0011.5	+0021.6	+0407.1	+0014.1		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1767.5	+0005.2	+0566.4	+0134.2
+0011.5	+0729.7	+0011.0	+0021.2	+0407.0	+0010.5		
0000223	3	+0000.0	-0000.0	+1764.9	+0004.9	+0566.2	+0132.7
+0011.4	+0705.6	+0011.2	+0011.5	+0400.0	+0017.6		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1764.1	+0004.6	+0566.0	+0130.3
+0011.1	+0711.7	+0011.8	+0003.7	+0400.5	+0010.4		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1761.2	+0004.3	+0565.8	+0128.6
+0011.9	+0710.6	+0011.4	-0116.9	+0429.1	+0010.4		
0000223	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1757.7	+0004.0	+0565.6	+0127.0
+0011.7	+0720.6	+0011.3	-0000.1	+0543.9	+0010.5		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1757.9	+0003.7	+0565.4	+0125.6
+0011.3	+0741.4	+0011.0	-0000.1	+0552.3	+0010.1		
0000224	3	+0000.0	-0000.0	+1750.0	+0003.8	+0565.1	+0124.6
+0011.1	+0743.2	+0011.0	-0000.1	+0550.7	+0017.7		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1755.5	+0003.8	+0564.7	+0123.2
+0011.9	+0739.4	+0011.1	-0000.1	+0601.3	+0017.1		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1753.1	+0002.9	+0564.2	+0121.0
+0011.7	+0736.5	+0011.0	-0000.1	+0601.1	+0010.1		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1752.5	+0002.5	+0563.6	+0119.2
+0011.4	+0735.2	+0011.7	-0000.1	+0654.0	+0010.6		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1748.4	+0002.0	+0562.0	+0117.6
+0011.0	+0730.0	+0011.0	-0000.1	+0600.2	+0014.6		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1746.3	+0001.9	+0562.4	+0116.2
+0011.3	+0730.1	+0011.7	-0000.1	+0603.6	+0014.0		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1743.7	+0001.0	+0561.8	+0114.6
+0011.5	+0725.6	+0011.6	-0000.1	+0602.4	+0013.4		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1742.0	+0000.5	+0561.2	+0112.3
+0011.3	+0727.1	+0011.3	-0000.1	+0601.1	+0012.9		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1742.0	+0000.9	+0560.6	+0110.4
+0011.6	+0726.0	+0011.1	-0000.1	+0600.7	+0010.2		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0001.0	+1741.7	+0000.4	+0560.1	+0108.9
+0011.7	+0705.2	+0011.5	-0000.1	+0601.0	+0011.7		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1737.6	+0000.9	+0559.5	+0107.4
+0011.3	+0724.0	+0011.0	-0000.1	+0642.8	+0011.2		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1736.0	+0000.5	+0559.0	+0106.3
+0011.3	+0724.1	+0011.3	-0000.1	+0607.1	+0010.7		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1734.6	+0000.0	+0558.5	+0104.4
+0011.0	+0723.2	+0011.5	-0000.1	+0640.1	+0010.0		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1730.0	+0000.0	+0558.0	+0102.8
+0011.7	+0719.3	+0011.4	+0000.0	+0415.7	+0010.0		
0000224	3	+0000.0	+0000.0	+1727.0	+0000.1	+0557.9	+0101.6

+0073.3	+0091.0	+0001.7	+0036.8	+0405.7	+0011.6		
0000224	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1731.2	+0355.2	+0556.9	+0097.3
+0073.5	+0013.0	+0021.2	+0037.9	+0405.4	+0012.0		
0000224	3	+2000.0	+0001.2	+1727.2	+0355.2	+0556.7	+0096.0
+0073.3	+0013.0	+0021.1	+0041.3	+0405.7	+0015.7		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1729.7	+0355.6	+0556.5	+0094.6
+0073.1	+0013.2	+0020.0	+0034.7	+0405.7	+0010.0		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1728.3	+0355.3	+0556.2	+0093.2
+0073.3	+0013.4	+0020.1	+0070.1	+0405.3	+0017.0		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1721.0	+0355.0	+0556.0	+0091.8
+0073.5	+0013.3	+0017.5	+0033.2	+0405.3	+0013.9		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1721.3	+0354.7	+0555.8	+0089.2
+0073.2	+0017.1	+0013.3	+0020.0	+0405.9	+0020.2		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1713.2	+0354.0	+0555.6	+0083.0
+0071.3	+0027.7	+0018.2	+0029.3	+0405.7	+0021.3		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.9	+1714.6	+0354.0	+0555.4	+0086.5
+0071.5	+0021.2	+0017.5	+0029.0	+0405.7	+0022.2		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1714.3	+0353.3	+0555.2	+0085.0
+0071.1	+0024.7	+0017.0	+0020.7	+0405.7	+0023.1		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1713.3	+0353.5	+0555.0	+0083.8
+0071.3	+0027.5	+0018.5	+0025.2	+0405.5	+0023.6		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1714.5	+0353.2	+0554.8	+0082.2
+0070.7	+0030.0	+0016.0	+0025.3	+0405.0	+0024.3		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1713.0	+0352.9	+0554.6	+0080.6
+0070.4	+0022.6	+0015.6	+0070.7	+0405.1	+0026.3		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1711.1	+0352.0	+0554.4	+0079.3
+0070.4	+0023.4	+0015.3	+0070.3	+0405.3	+0027.3		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1710.9	+0352.4	+0554.1	+0078.2
+0070.0	+0023.1	+0014.3	+0070.2	+0405.7	+0023.3		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1707.4	+0352.1	+0553.9	+0077.0
+0069.6	+0010.0	+0014.0	+0029.0	+0405.0	+0029.6		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1705.0	+0351.2	+0553.7	+0075.7
+0069.4	+0010.0	+0014.3	+0049.6	+0405.2	+0030.3		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1704.9	+0351.5	+0553.5	+0074.3
+0069.0	+0015.2	+0013.3	+0029.5	+0407.9	+0031.0		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1703.2	+0351.3	+0553.3	+0073.1
+0068.7	+0010.0	+0013.5	+0023.9	+0414.3	+0031.6		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1705.8	+0351.0	+0553.1	+0072.4
+0068.5	+0021.4	+0012.3	+0110.9	+0405.3	+0032.5		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1705.5	+0350.8	+0552.9	+0071.7
+0068.2	+0026.2	+0013.5	+0020.1	+0513.0	+0032.8		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1701.9	+0350.6	+0552.6	+0070.7
+0067.9	+0033.7	+0014.0	+0000.1	+0703.9	+0032.5		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1707.5	+0350.3	+0552.3	+0069.8
+0067.5	+0040.1	+0015.0	+0000.1	+0027.7	+0032.5		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1707.2	+0350.1	+0551.9	+0069.1
+0067.4	+0044.7	+0016.8	+0000.1	+0701.2	+0032.2		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1704.3	+0349.3	+0551.4	+0068.5
+0067.1	+0047.2	+0017.9	+0000.1	+0713.0	+0031.8		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1704.6	+0349.5	+0550.9	+0067.3
+0066.3	+0047.4	+0019.5	+0000.1	+0700.0	+0031.4		
0000225	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1706.7	+0349.1	+0550.4	+0066.6
+0066.5	+0046.3	+0020.0	+0000.1	+0711.6	+0031.1		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1701.1	+0348.7	+0549.8	+0065.4
+0066.3	+0046.3	+0022.0	+0000.1	+0715.1	+0030.5		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1701.7	+0348.3	+0549.3	+0064.3
+0065.9	+0044.2	+0023.2	+0000.1	+0713.3	+0030.1		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1699.2	+0347.5	+0548.7	+0063.3
+0065.7	+0043.2	+0024.5	+0000.1	+0712.2	+0029.4		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1697.3	+0347.4	+0548.2	+0062.3
+0065.3	+0040.1	+0025.3	+0000.1	+0700.0	+0028.9		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1695.6	+0346.9	+0547.7	+0060.8
+0065.1	+0041.1	+0027.1	+0000.1	+0712.0	+0028.2		

+0055.1	+0941.2	+0007.2	-0000.1	+0712.2	+000.4		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.5	+0543.0	+0547.2	+0059.3
+0054.7	+0940.4	+0000.4	-0000.1	+0709.2	+0000.0		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1094.3	+0546.1	+0546.7	+0056.2
+0054.4	+0940.7	+0007.5	-0000.1	+0700.5	+0037.5		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1094.0	+0545.7	+0546.2	+0057.1
+0054.3	+0943.2	+0030.2	-0000.1	+0700.0	+0037.4		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0001.2	+1094.2	+0545.0	+0545.7	+0056.1
+0053.9	+0944.0	+0021.5	-0000.1	+0703.2	+0026.0		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.1	+0544.3	+0545.2	+0054.8
+0053.7	+0945.2	+0023.0	-0000.1	+0701.2	+0023.5		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.0	+0544.5	+0544.8	+0053.6
+0053.4	+0945.9	+0034.3	-0000.1	+0701.6	+0023.3		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.3	+0544.1	+0544.4	+0052.7
+0053.1	+0945.2	+0035.0	-0000.1	+0697.0	+0026.0		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1093.2	+0543.7	+0544.1	+0051.8
+0052.7	+0945.0	+0030.5	-0000.1	+0695.2	+0025.1		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.2	+1093.5	+0543.4	+0543.7	+0051.0
+0052.4	+0945.0	+0027.0	-0000.1	+0697.7	+0025.5		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.3	+0543.1	+0543.4	+0050.0
+0052.1	+0944.3	+0033.3	-0000.1	+0699.4	+0025.2		
0000226	3	+2000.0	+0000.5	+1093.7	+0542.5	+0543.1	+0049.1
+0051.5	+0943.5	+0040.0	-0000.1	+0700.1	+0024.9		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1093.5	+0542.5	+0542.8	+0048.2
+0051.3	+0942.5	+0040.0	-0000.1	+0703.4	+0024.7		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.7	+0542.2	+0342.5	+0047.6
+0051.0	+0941.4	+0041.5	-0000.1	+0695.7	+0024.7		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1094.1	+0541.9	+0542.2	+0046.9
+0051.0	+0940.2	+0040.0	-0000.1	+0697.9	+0024.4		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.1	+0541.6	+0542.0	+0045.9
+0050.7	+0939.9	+0044.0	-0000.1	+0699.2	+0024.2		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.7	+0541.4	+0541.7	+0045.1
+0050.3	+0937.5	+0045.0	-0000.1	+0692.0	+0023.9		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.5	+0541.1	+0541.4	+0044.5
+0050.2	+0936.0	+0040.4	-0000.1	+0699.3	+0023.5		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.3	+0540.9	+0541.2	+0044.0
+0050.0	+0934.5	+0047.4	-0000.1	+0699.4	+0023.5		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1093.0	+0540.6	+0540.9	+0043.3
+0050.0	+0933.0	+0043.3	-0000.1	+0701.0	+0023.2		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1097.1	+0540.4	+0540.6	+0042.5
+0050.0	+0931.4	+0040.5	-0000.1	+0701.2	+0022.9		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1090.4	+0540.1	+0540.4	+0041.9
+0050.4	+0927.7	+0050.9	-0000.1	+0703.2	+0022.7		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1094.3	+0539.9	+0540.1	+0041.3
+0050.0	+0925.0	+0051.5	-0000.1	+0705.5	+0022.6		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.5	+1092.9	+0539.6	+0539.9	+0040.9
+0050.7	+0922.3	+0053.0	-0000.1	+0703.0	+0022.4		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1700.2	+0539.4	+0539.7	+0040.3
+0050.4	+0924.0	+0054.5	-0000.1	+0699.7	+0022.3		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1095.1	+0539.1	+0539.4	+0039.6
+0050.9	+0922.3	+0055.5	-0000.1	+0701.2	+0022.0		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1095.9	+0538.9	+0539.2	+0039.1
+0050.5	+0921.0	+0056.5	-0000.1	+0701.6	+0021.7		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1094.4	+0538.7	+0538.9	+0038.7
+0050.2	+0717.1	+0057.7	-0000.1	+0705.0	+0021.3		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1092.1	+0538.4	+0538.7	+0038.4
+0050.7	+0917.2	+0059.1	-0000.1	+0703.7	+0021.6		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1092.3	+0538.2	+0538.5	+0037.8
+0050.3	+0915.3	+0060.1	-0000.1	+0703.2	+0021.4		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1093.0	+0537.9	+0538.2	+0037.2
+0050.0	+0913.4	+0060.9	-0000.1	+0703.7	+0021.1		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.9	+1093.0	+0537.7	+0538.0	+0036.8
+0050.5	+0911.5	+0061.9	-0000.1	+0704.0	+0021.0		
0000227	3	+2000.0	+0000.2	+1093.2	+0537.4	+0537.7	+0036.4

+0054.0	+0909.5	+0003.2	-0000.1	+0007.5	+0000.7		
0000228	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1685.5	+0537.1	+0537.5	+0036.1
+0055.7	+0907.6	+0002.4	-0000.1	+0700.1	+0000.0		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1690.4	+0537.3	+0537.3	+0035.6
+0056.3	+0905.7	+0003.0	-0000.1	+0700.3	+0000.0		
0000230	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1691.7	+0537.7	+0537.1	+0035.1
+0057.9	+0903.8	+0002.7	-0000.1	+0697.9	+0000.0		
0000231	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1693.1	+0536.5	+0536.9	+0034.7
+0058.5	+0901.9	+0002.7	-0000.1	+0691.1	+0019.9		
0000232	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1697.3	+0536.3	+0536.7	+0034.5
+0059.1	+0900.0	+0002.2	-0000.1	+0673.9	+0019.3		
0000233	3	+2000.0	-0000.3	+1697.1	+0536.1	+0536.4	+0034.3
+0060.7	+0898.3	+0002.3	-0000.1	+0667.0	+0019.6		
0000234	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1695.9	+0535.9	+0536.2	+0033.8
+0061.3	+0896.6	+0002.9	-0000.1	+0662.5	+0019.4		
0000235	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1697.3	+0535.6	+0536.1	+0033.5
+0062.9	+0893.7	+0002.0	-0000.1	+0651.5	+0019.5		
0000236	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1697.3	+0535.4	+0535.9	+0033.7
+0063.5	+0892.9	+0002.3	-0000.1	+0650.2	+0019.6		
0000237	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1690.1	+0535.2	+0535.6	+0033.2
+0064.0	+0891.2	+0002.9	-0000.1	+0641.5	+0019.6		
0000238	3	+2000.0	+0001.8	+1697.4	+0535.6	+0535.7	+0033.2
+0064.9	+0876.3	+0002.3	-0000.1	+0633.4	+0020.0		
0000239	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1696.4	+0534.0	+0535.6	+0032.9
+0065.3	+0867.6	+0002.3	+0031.4	+0615.2	+0021.0		
0000240	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1697.3	+0534.8	+0535.6	+0032.7
+0065.9	+0865.8	+0002.2	+0627.4	+0603.7	+0022.0		
0000241	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1697.5	+0534.6	+0535.6	+0032.7
+0066.4	+0864.7	+0002.0	+0641.5	+0600.4	+0023.4		
0000242	3	+2000.0	+0000.9	+1694.7	+0534.6	+0535.7	+0032.6
+0066.4	+0863.3	+0002.3	+0660.6	+0603.3	+0025.1		
0000243	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1695.2	+0534.5	+0535.7	+0032.4
+0067.3	+0862.6	+0002.3	+0650.2	+0605.5	+0027.1		
0000244	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1698.2	+0534.4	+0535.7	+0032.0
+0067.7	+0861.1	+0002.4	+0657.1	+0605.7	+0023.7		
0000245	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1698.3	+0534.3	+0535.7	+0031.6
+0068.1	+0859.6	+0002.2	+0667.1	+0604.8	+0020.0		
0000246	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1697.3	+0534.2	+0535.7	+0031.3
+0068.2	+0858.1	+0002.2	+0655.5	+0605.3	+0021.3		
0000247	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1698.3	+0534.6	+0535.7	+0030.9
+0068.3	+0856.0	+0002.1	+0657.3	+0605.1	+0023.4		
0000248	3	+2000.0	-0000.3	+1693.1	+0533.9	+0535.6	+0030.5
+0068.6	+0853.7	+0002.5	+0653.4	+0604.0	+0024.5		
0000249	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1691.1	+0533.7	+0535.5	+0029.9
+0068.8	+0851.6	+0002.1	+0665.3	+0604.9	+0026.6		
0000250	3	+2000.0	-0000.3	+1678.9	+0533.6	+0535.4	+0029.5
+0069.0	+0849.7	+0002.2	+0666.3	+0604.9	+0027.1		
0000251	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1677.2	+0533.4	+0535.3	+0029.5
+0069.8	+0848.9	+0002.3	+0673.1	+0604.9	+0028.6		
0000252	3	+2000.0	-0000.3	+1689.3	+0533.1	+0535.2	+0029.3
+0069.8	+0847.3	+0002.4	+0657.7	+0604.6	+0029.7		
0000253	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1688.0	+0532.7	+0535.0	+0030.1
+0070.3	+0845.7	+0002.3	+0670.7	+0604.0	+0040.3		
0000254	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1692.0	+0532.4	+0534.9	+0030.2
+0070.5	+0843.8	+0002.1	+0670.5	+0604.0	+0042.3		
0000255	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1696.3	+0532.1	+0534.6	+0030.5
+0070.7	+0842.2	+0002.0	+0659.9	+0604.7	+0044.0		
0000256	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1693.3	+0531.8	+0534.3	+0030.9
+0070.9	+0841.1	+0002.0	+0669.7	+0604.2	+0045.0		
0000257	3	+2000.0	+0001.5	+1692.5	+0531.5	+0534.1	+0031.3
+0071.2	+0841.2	+0002.5	+0663.6	+0604.4	+0046.4		
0000258	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1693.3	+0531.2	+0533.8	+0031.5
+0071.4	+0840.3	+0002.2	+0667.7	+0604.6	+0047.7		
0000259	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1696.2	+0530.9	+0533.5	+0031.7

+0051.2	+0306.1	+0061.5	+0472.9	+0404.2	+0052.1		
0000229	3	+2000.0	-0000.3	+1701.8	+0529.3	+0532.3	+0032.9
+0052.3	+0305.0	+0060.3	+0475.6	+0404.9	+0057.5		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1707.1	+0529.3	+0532.0	+0033.2
+0053.3	+0303.9	+0059.0	+0477.0	+0404.7	+0055.3		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1703.1	+0529.0	+0531.7	+0033.7
+0054.3	+0302.8	+0057.9	+0478.5	+0404.7	+0057.1		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1709.9	+0529.7	+0531.4	+0034.1
+0055.7	+0301.6	+0057.7	+0478.0	+0405.3	+0058.2		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1709.2	+0529.4	+0531.1	+0034.6
+0056.9	+0300.5	+0057.6	+0476.5	+0404.9	+0059.4		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1715.3	+0528.1	+0530.8	+0034.8
+0058.2	+0299.3	+0057.4	+0465.9	+0405.5	+0060.6		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1718.0	+0527.3	+0530.5	+0035.1
+0059.3	+0298.2	+0057.3	+0441.3	+0406.6	+0062.3		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1715.6	+0527.5	+0530.2	+0035.6
+0062.5	+0297.1	+0057.0	+0447.3	+0406.6	+0063.3		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1724.7	+0527.2	+0529.9	+0036.1
+0063.8	+0296.0	+0056.5	+0448.2	+0407.1	+0064.9		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1734.0	+0526.9	+0529.6	+0036.6
+0065.1	+0295.2	+0056.3	+0438.4	+0417.3	+0066.0		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1729.6	+0526.6	+0529.3	+0036.9
+0066.4	+0294.1	+0056.3	+0422.4	+0422.3	+0067.0		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1733.5	+0526.3	+0529.0	+0037.4
+0067.1	+0293.4	+0056.4	+0413.1	+0425.0	+0067.5		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1734.0	+0526.0	+0528.7	+0038.0
+0068.2	+0293.3	+0056.5	+0403.2	+0426.1	+0068.8		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1735.3	+0525.7	+0528.4	+0038.7
+0069.4	+0292.4	+0056.7	+0390.1	+0435.7	+0068.6		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1741.0	+0525.5	+0528.0	+0039.3
+0070.1	+0292.0	+0057.0	+0380.1	+0452.9	+0069.2		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.9	+1731.0	+0525.2	+0527.6	+0039.7
+0071.3	+0291.5	+0057.3	+0360.1	+0458.9	+0069.3		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1737.2	+0524.9	+0527.2	+0040.2
+0072.0	+0291.0	+0056.5	+0350.1	+0443.2	+0070.2		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.9	+1742.5	+0524.6	+0526.8	+0040.9
+0073.2	+0290.4	+0057.5	+0336.1	+0451.2	+0070.6		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1753.3	+0524.3	+0526.4	+0041.5
+0074.9	+0289.7	+0070.4	+0330.1	+0458.0	+0070.3		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1753.3	+0523.3	+0526.0	+0042.0
+0075.0	+0289.9	+0070.9	+0322.1	+0473.7	+0071.1		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1755.9	+0523.5	+0525.6	+0042.4
+0075.7	+0289.9	+0071.9	+0300.1	+0486.6	+0071.2		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1763.0	+0523.2	+0525.2	+0042.6
+0076.3	+0289.7	+0072.7	+0290.1	+0491.3	+0071.2		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.0	+1762.2	+0522.9	+0524.7	+0043.4
+0076.1	+0289.7	+0074.0	+0280.1	+0493.3	+0071.6		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1770.5	+0522.5	+0524.3	+0043.5
+0076.3	+0289.5	+0075.2	+0260.1	+0492.7	+0071.7		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.3	+1769.2	+0522.3	+0523.9	+0043.2
+0076.4	+0289.1	+0076.1	+0240.1	+0491.3	+0071.3		
0000229	3	+2000.0	+0000.6	+1764.2	+0522.3	+0523.6	+0043.0
+0076.5	+0288.3	+0077.5	+0220.1	+0487.5	+0071.5		

RECORDER IS ON REAL MODE

PUT SW. 0 DOWN

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE VALUES, 0=NO, 1=YES 0

TEST NO. NOW IS = 0002

TEST NO. DESIRED 14 = 0002

REC'D NO. NOW IS = 0001

REC'D NO. DESIRED 14 = 0001

STARTING ADDRESS NO. IS = 00200

STARTING DATE SET NO. IS = 01

STARTING TIME SET NO. IS = 0110



STARTING DATA SET NO. = 01  
 DISCRETE INTERVAL IS 00010  
 PLYWASH CHANNELS IS =  
 04 05 17 20 21 22

033.2  
 033.7  
 034.1  
 034.6  
 034.3  
 035.1  
 035.6  
 036.1  
 036.6  
 036.9  
 037.4  
 038.0  
 038.7  
 039.3  
 039.7  
 040.2  
 040.9  
 041.5  
 042.0  
 042.4  
 042.6  
 043.4  
 043.5  
 043.2  
 043.0

TEST NO.	INLET	OUTLET	TEMP	TEMP	TEMP	TEMP
000000	-2150.3	+2101.4	+0579.4	+0507.3	+0540.9	
000001	-2145.4	+2104.3	+0579.4	+0574.3	+0507.0	
000002	-2144.5	+2103.9	+0579.4	+0614.0	+0506.9	
000003	-2144.5	+2103.4	+0579.1	+0590.2	+0507.1	
000004	-2142.6	+2107.4	+0579.8	+0509.0	+0503.1	
000005	-2141.4	+2103.2	+0579.4	+0509.3	+0546.8	
000006	-2139.6	+2161.3	+0579.7	+0609.3	+0500.3	
000007	-2137.1	+2158.7	+0579.4	+0577.6	+0547.7	
000008	-2137.1	+2150.9	+0579.6	+0555.7	+0553.9	
000009	-2135.3	+2151.9	+0573.9	+0595.0	+0553.9	
000010	-2135.3	+2153.1	+0579.4	+0595.6	+0504.2	
000011	-2133.5	+2149.3	+0575.9	+0504.9	+0554.3	
000012	-2133.3	+2148.7	+0579.3	+0554.4	+0556.6	
000013	-2132.6	+2148.0	+0579.6	+0553.1	+0507.6	
000014	-2132.4	+2146.4	+0579.2	+0509.1	+0553.6	
000015	-2134.7	+2142.9	+0579.5	+0570.5	+0541.8	
000016	-2134.3	+2143.0	+0579.2	+0551.8	+0567.3	
000017	-2133.5	+2141.0	+0579.3	+0600.7	+0541.7	
000018	-2131.3	+2139.4	+0579.5	+0501.3	+0547.1	
000019	-2131.3	+2135.4	+0579.3	+0554.8	+0553.4	
000020	-2131.3	+2139.1	+0579.7	+0570.1	+0557.6	
000021	-2118.5	+2139.0	+0579.2	+0508.9	+0550.3	
000022	-2117.3	+2137.5	+0579.3	+0570.6	+0556.9	
000023	-2114.6	+2141.9	+0579.1	+0501.0	+0553.5	
000024	-2114.9	+2140.4	+0579.4	+0507.9	+0550.6	
000025	-2113.3	+2137.0	+0577.6	+0500.5	+0551.6	
000026	-2111.5	+2134.5	+0579.3	+0570.9	+0547.0	
000027	-2103.5	+2133.4	+0579.3	+0503.3	+0553.9	
000028	-2103.75	+2130.3	+0575.4	+0507.5	+0508.2	
000029	-2107.3	+2133.2	+0579.5	+0509.6	+0553.3	
000030	-2107.3	+2133.1	+0579.5	+0508.6	+0507.4	
000031	-2103.5	+2130.5	+0578.0	+0590.2	+0570.2	

REORDER IS ON HEAD LOGS  
 PUT SU. 0 DOWN

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE VALUES, 0=NO, 1=YES 1  
 CHANNEL NO.=12, MIN.=+01-14, MAX.=+01-14  
 00 +0520 +0120 RCS TO 'A'  
 15 +0100 +0150 DTSG 'A' OUT SIM FEEDS TEMP  
 23 +0000 +0500 'A' FW TEMP  
 24 +0100 +0650 DTSG 'B' OUT SIM FEEDS TEMP  
 99

TEST NO. 01 IS = 0002  
 TEST NO. 02 IS = 0002  
 TEST NO. 03 IS = 0001  
 TEST NO. 04 IS = 0001  
 STARTING DATA SET NO. IS = 00216  
 DISCRETE INTERVAL IS = 00005  
 PLYWASH CHANNELS IS =  
 03 10 23 24 25

TEST NO.	INLET	OUTLET	TEMP	TEMP	TEMP
000032	+0507.3	+0576.3	+0139.0	+0576.3	
000033	+0553.7	+0573.3	+0133.9	+0573.3	
000034	+0507.4	+0576.3	+0134.9	+0576.3	

0000216	+0507.2	+0510.4	+0100.2	+0570.2
0000217	+0507.1	+0510.3	+0100.2	+0570.0
0000217	+0507.0	+0510.0	+0100.2	+0570.3
0000217	+0507.9	+0570.0	+0100.2	+0570.3
0000217	+0507.1	+0570.0	+0100.9	+0570.7
0000218	+0507.4	+0570.8	+0100.2	+0570.6
0000218	+0507.3	+0570.7	+0100.7	+0570.5
0000218	+0507.2	+0170.4	+0100.7	+0570.3
0000218	+0507.0	+0570.4	+0100.7	+0570.3
0000219	+0570.5	+0570.8	+0100.4	+0570.1
0000219	+0570.2	+0570.0	+0100.8	+0570.4
0000219	+0570.5	+0570.0	+0100.7	+0570.5
0000219	+0570.7	+0570.8	+0100.7	+0570.5
0000220	+0570.2	+0570.7	+0100.9	+0570.3
0000220	+0570.0	+0570.5	+0100.0	+0570.3
0000220	+0570.1	+0570.6	+0100.0	+0570.2
0000220	+0570.4	+0570.3	+0100.0	+0570.7
0000221	+0570.6	+0571.4	+0100.4	+0570.7
0000221	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0100.4	+0570.6
0000221	+0570.4	+0570.4	+0100.2	+0570.9
0000221	+0570.3	+0570.7	+0100.3	+0570.7
0000222	+0570.5	+0570.4	+0100.4	+0570.4
0000222	+0570.7	+0570.1	+0100.3	+0570.4
0000222	+0570.9	+0570.1	+0100.1	+0570.6
0000222	+0570.7	+0570.2	+0100.1	+0570.3
0000223	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0100.2	+0570.6
0000223	+0570.0	+0570.8	+0100.1	+0570.4
0000223	+0570.6	+0570.9	+0100.3	+0570.6
0000223	+0570.7	+0570.2	+0100.9	+0570.4
0000224	+0570.3	+0570.7	+0100.7	+0570.4
0000224	+0570.9	+0570.5	+0100.5	+0570.4
0000224	+0570.0	+0570.6	+0100.5	+0570.5
0000224	+0570.5	+0570.4	+0100.0	+0570.3
0000225	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0100.0	+0570.4
0000225	+0570.0	+0570.0	+0100.1	+0570.9
0000225	+0571.4	+0571.7	+0100.0	+0570.6
0000225	+0570.2	+0170.5	+0100.5	+0570.3
0000226	+0570.9	+0570.6	+0100.3	+0560.9
0000226	+0570.4	+0560.2	+0100.2	+0560.3
0000226	+0570.7	+0560.0	+0100.4	+0560.9
0000226	+0570.9	+0560.3	+0100.5	+0560.9
0000227	+0570.0	+0560.1	+0100.4	+0560.3
0000227	+0570.0	+0560.4	+0100.2	+0560.1
0000227	+0570.3	+0560.0	+0100.1	+0560.8
0000227	+0571.3	+0561.0	+0100.0	+0560.4
0000228	+0570.4	+0561.8	+0100.9	+0560.7
0000228	+0570.2	+0561.7	+0100.9	+0560.9
0000228	+0570.1	+0561.3	+0100.8	+0559.1
0000228	+0570.5	+0560.6	+0100.9	+0557.3
0000229	+0570.3	+0560.5	+0100.4	+0559.2
0000229	+0570.2	+0560.2	+0100.3	+0553.5
0000229	+0570.2	+0559.9	+0100.0	+0549.5
0000229	+0570.4	+0559.0	+0100.0	+0547.1
0000230	+0570.7	+0558.0	+0100.0	+0545.2
0000230	+0570.1	+0558.8	+0100.9	+0544.2
0000230	+0570.0	+0558.5	+0100.4	+0543.7
0000230	+0570.3	+0558.3	+0100.3	+0543.5
0000231	+0570.7	+0551.6	+0100.4	+0543.7
0000231	+0570.2	+0549.9	+0100.1	+0544.2
0000231	+0570.7	+0549.9	+0100.0	+0544.6
0000231	+0570.3	+0549.2	+0100.7	+0545.0
0000231	+0570.0	+0548.0	+0100.0	+0545.1
0000231	+0570.7	+0548.0	+0100.0	+0545.1
0000231	+0570.0	+0547.9	+0100.5	+0545.1

0000001	+0000.0	+0000.0	+0000.0	+0000.0
0000002	+0000.4	+0000.0	+0000.0	+0547.1
0000003	+0000.7	+0000.0	+0000.3	+0545.2
0000004	+0000.1	+0000.4	+0001.0	+0544.2
0000005	+0000.0	+0000.5	+0000.4	+0540.7
0000006	+0000.2	+0000.6	+0010.5	+0543.5
0000007	+0000.7	+0001.0	+0010.4	+0543.7
0000008	+0000.2	+0000.9	+0010.1	+0544.2
0000009	+0001.7	+0017.0	+0017.8	+0544.6
0000010	+0001.3	+0016.0	+0017.7	+0545.0
0000011	+0001.0	+0015.3	+0017.6	+0545.1
0000012	+0000.7	+0014.0	+0017.0	+0545.1
0000013	+0000.8	+0014.0	+0017.0	+0545.1

INCREMENT IS 0.1 READ WORD  
 PUT SW. 0 EOL.

DO YOU WISH TO CHANGE VALUES, 0=NO, 1=YES



12:23:42	0500	0730	0435	0434	0433	0426	0427	0424	0430	0425	0515	0476	1245
12:31:33	16.0	2150	204.3	195.6	194.2	569.6	569.5	576.7	570.5	576.6	2153	02.1	30.25
12:40:30	17.0	2153	204.3	195.2	195.1	569	569.0	577.3	570.6	576.3	2152	02.1	30.25
12:50:32	17.1	2170	204.5	194.6	195.0	569.0	569.8	577.2	570.9	577.0	2159	02.2	30.26
GROUP 33	17.2	2195	204.3	195.7	194.6	570.3	570.0	577.5	571.2	577.3	2160	02.3	30.27
12:56:31													
10/11/74													

REACTIVITY BALANCE 12:56:07 10/11/74

ROTOR POSITION	REACTIVITY	FUEL SM	TRIP	PEAK MONTH AFTER	MFT CODE	TIME TO PEAK
15.39	8.34	20.15	4.00	13.10	-6.13	7.04

12:58:30 GROUP TREND  
OPERATOR GROUP D

0500	0730	0435	0434	0433	0426	0427	0424	0420	0430	0425	0515	0375	1265
17.2	2150	204.2	195.4	195.2	570.4	570.3	577.9	571.5	570.1	577.5	2137	02.3	30.26
GROUP 4	.1	2079	361.3	207.0	125.7	592.6	591.2	586.3	590.2	588.1	1965	02.6	30.26
13:11:50													
10/11/74													

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS REVIEW

13:05:40:00	2938	SCAM SPARE											
13:05:51:00	2937	TURBINE EXHAUST HOOD 250 F TRIP											
13:05:52:20	2941	TURBINE SOLENOID TRIP											
13:05:52:20	2904	GENERATOR EXCITED FIELD ACR TRIP											
13:05:52:243	2904	GENERATOR EXCITED FIELD ACR TRIP											
13:05:52:336	2911	STOP THEATRE VALVES CLOSED											
13:05:52:355	2959	SCAM SPARE											
13:07:37:025	2950	SCAM SPARE											
13:07:42:204	2950	SCAM SPARE											
13:10:00:530	2972	RP CH C FC LO PRESS											
13:10:00:533	2992	RP REACTOR PROTECTION CH D											
13:10:00:712	2971	RP CH C FC LO PRESS											
13:10:00:713	2991	RP REACTOR PROTECTION CH C											
13:10:05:000	2909	RP CH A FC LO PRESS											
13:10:05:001	2999	RP REACTOR PROTECTION CH A											
13:10:18:268	2870	RP CH B FC LO PRESS											
13:10:18:271	2890	RP REACTOR PROTECTION CH B											

13:16:31 GROUP TREND  
OPERATOR GROUP D











13:17:55	643.	216.5	229.7	260.7	262.9	266.2	263.6	261.1	263.9	267.0	270.0	273.0	276.0	279.0	282.0	285.0	288.0	291.0	294.0	297.0	300.0	303.0	306.0	309.0	312.0	315.0	318.0	321.0	324.0	327.0	330.0	333.0	336.0	339.0	342.0	345.0	348.0	351.0	354.0	357.0	360.0	363.0	366.0	369.0	372.0	375.0	378.0	381.0	384.0	387.0	390.0	393.0	396.0	399.0	402.0	405.0	408.0	411.0	414.0	417.0	420.0	423.0	426.0	429.0	432.0	435.0	438.0	441.0	444.0	447.0	450.0	453.0	456.0	459.0	462.0	465.0	468.0	471.0	474.0	477.0	480.0	483.0	486.0	489.0	492.0	495.0	498.0	501.0	504.0	507.0	510.0	513.0	516.0	519.0	522.0	525.0	528.0	531.0	534.0	537.0	540.0	543.0	546.0	549.0	552.0	555.0	558.0	561.0	564.0	567.0	570.0	573.0	576.0	579.0	582.0	585.0	588.0	591.0	594.0	597.0	600.0	603.0	606.0	609.0	612.0	615.0	618.0	621.0	624.0	627.0	630.0	633.0	636.0	639.0	642.0	645.0	648.0	651.0	654.0	657.0	660.0	663.0	666.0	669.0	672.0	675.0	678.0	681.0	684.0	687.0	690.0	693.0	696.0	699.0	702.0	705.0	708.0	711.0	714.0	717.0	720.0	723.0	726.0	729.0	732.0	735.0	738.0	741.0	744.0	747.0	750.0	753.0	756.0	759.0	762.0	765.0	768.0	771.0	774.0	777.0	780.0	783.0	786.0	789.0	792.0	795.0	798.0	801.0	804.0	807.0	810.0	813.0	816.0	819.0	822.0	825.0	828.0	831.0	834.0	837.0	840.0	843.0	846.0	849.0	852.0	855.0	858.0	861.0	864.0	867.0	870.0	873.0	876.0	879.0	882.0	885.0	888.0	891.0	894.0	897.0	900.0	903.0	906.0	909.0	912.0	915.0	918.0	921.0	924.0	927.0	930.0	933.0	936.0	939.0	942.0	945.0	948.0	951.0	954.0	957.0	960.0	963.0	966.0	969.0	972.0	975.0	978.0	981.0	984.0	987.0	990.0	993.0	996.0	999.0	1002.0	1005.0	1008.0	1011.0	1014.0	1017.0	1020.0	1023.0	1026.0	1029.0	1032.0	1035.0	1038.0	1041.0	1044.0	1047.0	1050.0	1053.0	1056.0	1059.0	1062.0	1065.0	1068.0	1071.0	1074.0	1077.0	1080.0	1083.0	1086.0	1089.0	1092.0	1095.0	1098.0	1101.0	1104.0	1107.0	1110.0	1113.0	1116.0	1119.0	1122.0	1125.0	1128.0	1131.0	1134.0	1137.0	1140.0	1143.0	1146.0	1149.0	1152.0	1155.0	1158.0	1161.0	1164.0	1167.0	1170.0	1173.0	1176.0	1179.0	1182.0	1185.0	1188.0	1191.0	1194.0	1197.0	1200.0	1203.0	1206.0	1209.0	1212.0	1215.0	1218.0	1221.0	1224.0	1227.0	1230.0	1233.0	1236.0	1239.0	1242.0	1245.0	1248.0	1251.0	1254.0	1257.0	1260.0	1263.0	1266.0	1269.0	1272.0	1275.0	1278.0	1281.0	1284.0	1287.0	1290.0	1293.0	1296.0	1299.0	1302.0	1305.0	1308.0	1311.0	1314.0	1317.0	1320.0	1323.0	1326.0	1329.0	1332.0	1335.0	1338.0	1341.0	1344.0	1347.0	1350.0	1353.0	1356.0	1359.0	1362.0	1365.0	1368.0	1371.0	1374.0	1377.0	1380.0	1383.0	1386.0	1389.0	1392.0	1395.0	1398.0	1401.0	1404.0	1407.0	1410.0	1413.0	1416.0	1419.0	1422.0	1425.0	1428.0	1431.0	1434.0	1437.0	1440.0	1443.0	1446.0	1449.0	1452.0	1455.0	1458.0	1461.0	1464.0	1467.0	1470.0	1473.0	1476.0	1479.0	1482.0	1485.0	1488.0	1491.0	1494.0	1497.0	1500.0	1503.0	1506.0	1509.0	1512.0	1515.0	1518.0	1521.0	1524.0	1527.0	1530.0	1533.0	1536.0	1539.0	1542.0	1545.0	1548.0	1551.0	1554.0	1557.0	1560.0	1563.0	1566.0	1569.0	1572.0	1575.0	1578.0	1581.0	1584.0	1587.0	1590.0	1593.0	1596.0	1599.0	1602.0	1605.0	1608.0	1611.0	1614.0	1617.0	1620.0	1623.0	1626.0	1629.0	1632.0	1635.0	1638.0	1641.0	1644.0	1647.0	1650.0	1653.0	1656.0	1659.0	1662.0	1665.0	1668.0	1671.0	1674.0	1677.0	1680.0	1683.0	1686.0	1689.0	1692.0	1695.0	1698.0	1701.0	1704.0	1707.0	1710.0	1713.0	1716.0	1719.0	1722.0	1725.0	1728.0	1731.0	1734.0	1737.0	1740.0	1743.0	1746.0	1749.0	1752.0	1755.0	1758.0	1761.0	1764.0	1767.0	1770.0	1773.0	1776.0	1779.0	1782.0	1785.0	1788.0	1791.0	1794.0	1797.0	1800.0	1803.0	1806.0	1809.0	1812.0	1815.0	1818.0	1821.0	1824.0	1827.0	1830.0	1833.0	1836.0	1839.0	1842.0	1845.0	1848.0	1851.0	1854.0	1857.0	1860.0	1863.0	1866.0	1869.0	1872.0	1875.0	1878.0	1881.0	1884.0	1887.0	1890.0	1893.0	1896.0	1899.0	1902.0	1905.0	1908.0	1911.0	1914.0	1917.0	1920.0	1923.0	1926.0	1929.0	1932.0	1935.0	1938.0	1941.0	1944.0	1947.0	1950.0	1953.0	1956.0	1959.0	1962.0	1965.0	1968.0	1971.0	1974.0	1977.0	1980.0	1983.0	1986.0	1989.0	1992.0	1995.0	1998.0	2001.0	2004.0	2007.0	2010.0	2013.0	2016.0	2019.0	2022.0	2025.0	2028.0	2031.0	2034.0	2037.0	2040.0	2043.0	2046.0	2049.0	2052.0	2055.0	2058.0	2061.0	2064.0	2067.0	2070.0	2073.0	2076.0	2079.0	2082.0	2085.0	2088.0	2091.0	2094.0	2097.0	2100.0	2103.0	2106.0	2109.0	2112.0	2115.0	2118.0	2121.0	2124.0	2127.0	2130.0	2133.0	2136.0	2139.0	2142.0	2145.0	2148.0	2151.0	2154.0	2157.0	2160.0	2163.0	2166.0	2169.0	2172.0	2175.0	2178.0	2181.0	2184.0	2187.0	2190.0	2193.0	2196.0	2199.0	2202.0	2205.0	2208.0	2211.0	2214.0	2217.0	2220.0	2223.0	2226.0	2229.0	2232.0	2235.0	2238.0	2241.0	2244.0	2247.0	2250.0	2253.0	2256.0	2259.0	2262.0	2265.0	2268.0	2271.0	2274.0	2277.0	2280.0	2283.0	2286.0	2289.0	2292.0	2295.0	2298.0	2301.0	2304.0	2307.0	2310.0	2313.0	2316.0	2319.0	2322.0	2325.0	2328.0	2331.0	2334.0	2337.0	2340.0	2343.0	2346.0	2349.0	2352.0	2355.0	2358.0	2361.0	2364.0	2367.0	2370.0	2373.0	2376.0	2379.0	2382.0	2385.0	2388.0	2391.0	2394.0	2397.0	2400.0	2403.0	2406.0	2409.0	2412.0	2415.0	2418.0	2421.0	2424.0	2427.0	2430.0	2433.0	2436.0	2439.0	2442.0	2445.0	2448.0	2451.0	2454.0	2457.0	2460.0	2463.0	2466.0	2469.0	2472.0	2475.0	2478.0	2481.0	2484.0	2487.0	2490.0	2493.0	2496.0	2499.0	2502.0	2505.0	2508.0	2511.0	2514.0	2517.0	2520.0	2523.0	2526.0	2529.0	2532.0	2535.0	2538.0	2541.0	2544.0	2547.0	2550.0	2553.0	2556.0	2559.0	2562.0	2565.0	2568.0	2571.0	2574.0	2577.0	2580.0	2583.0	2586.0	2589.0	2592.0	2595.0	2598.0	2601.0	2604.0	2607.0	2610.0	2613.0	2616.0	2619.0	2622.0	2625.0	2628.0	2631.0	2634.0	2637.0	2640.0	2643.0	2646.0	2649.0	2652.0	2655.0	2658.0	2661.0	2664.0	2667.0	2670.0	2673.0	2676.0	2679.0	2682.0	2685.0	2688.0	2691.0	2694.0	2697.0	2700.0	2703.0	2706.0	2709.0	2712.0	2715.0	2718.0	2721.0	2724.0	2727.0	2730.0	2733.0	2736.0	2739.0	2742.0	2745.0	2748.0	2751.0	2754.0	2757.0	2760.0	2763.0	2766.0	2769.0	2772.0	2775.0	2778.0	2781.0	2784.0	2787.0	2790.0	2793.0	2796.0	2799.0	2802.0	2805.0	2808.0	2811.0	2814.0	2817.0	2820.0	2823.0	2826.0	2829.0	2832.0	2835.0	2838.0	2841.0	2844.0	2847.0	2850.0	2853.0	2856.0	2859.0	2862.0	2865.0	2868.0	2871.0	2874.0	2877.0	2880.0	2883.0	2886.0	2889.0	2892.0	2895.0	2898.0	2901.0	2904.0	2907.0	2910.0	2913.0	2916.0	2919.0	2922.0	2925.0	2928.0	2931.0	2934.0	2937.0	2940.0	2943.0	2946.0	2949.0	2952.0	2955.0	2958.0	2961.0	2964.0	2967.0	2970.0	2973.0	2976.0	2979.0	2982.0	2985.0	2988.0	2991.0	2994.0	2997.0	3000.0
----------	------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	-------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------	--------

14:03:13 GROUP TOTAL  
 OPERATOR GROUP D  
 0507 0779 0435 0634 0433 0426 0427 0424 0420 0430 0425 0515 0376 1165  
 .0 2107. 199.7 192.9 125.1 535.1 534.7 534.9 536.4 535.3 534.8 2151. 87.6 30.22

14:04:25

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To C. A. Creacy - Service Manager

From D. J. Morris - Plant Equipment Services Section (Ext. 2057)

BDS 663-5

Cust. Duke Power Company

File No.  
or Ref. NSS-3,4, & 9

Subj. Trip Report  
PZR Code Safety Valves Meeting

Date May 25, 1976

This letter is cover and customer and has subject only

ATTENDEES

B&W

C. A. Creacy  
J. C. Simonis  
D. J. Morris

Duke Power Company

C. D. Hatley  
G. W. Hallman  
Bill Keisler  
Mike Alexander  
S. A. Holland  
W. E. Martin  
Harry Lipe-McGuire  
Ray Rider-McGuire

PURPOSE OF MEETING

To present to Duke the results of B&W's effort toward improving performance of pressurizer code safety valves. The meeting was conducted in accordance with the meeting agenda (Attachment 1).

MEETING MINUTES

Introduction - Presented an outline of the joint effort between B&W, Duke Power, and Dresser (Attachment 2).

Instrumentation on Oconee Unit 2 - Technical presentations by Jack Simonis on the PIPING LOADS/STRAIN GAUGE STUDY and the VIBRATION/ACCELEROMETER STUDY were very well received. These presentations readily demonstrated both the time and effort expended on these studies and the high degree of technical competence of the personnel involved. Due to his direct involvement in this program, he was also able to correlate his findings with other areas of the overall program. Following each technical presentation, a discussion of both specific and general conclusions which could be drawn from these studies as a result of both data analysis AND visual observations/common sense approach to all data presented.

DISCUSSION

Operating Plant Survey - Discussed the extensive nationwide PWR survey on operating plants. These included plants from coast to coast with several on-site visits. Both B&W and non-B&W plants were included in this survey. Specific areas of Maintenance, Handling, Testing, Piping arrangements, and Operating History were covered. A multitude of correlations were made which complemented the theories and results of the presentations by Jack Simonis.

Several questions were raised by the customer during this discussion in each of the areas covered, indicating a high degree of enthusiasm toward the information presented. At the conclusion of the Survey discussion, handouts were presented on the information obtained (Attachment 3), and a sample of the Survey questionnaire (Attachment 4).

Present Status at TMI and Crystal River - A brief discussion of recent events at these plants was conducted which primarily emphasized the high degree of correlation between these events and previously discussed theories and information.

Conclusions and recommendations were then presented, along with the schedule for implementing the action plan (Attachments 5 and 6). Duke agreed to the action plan and as a result of the discussions, decided to implement vertical handling of these valves as soon as possible. The agreement was made to have detailed maintenance, handling and testing procedures available for use and an on-site test facility constructed in time for the Unit 3 refueling in September.

The meeting was highly successful and more than adequately accomplished its purpose.

Duke Power was impressed with the work that was required to retrieve the information and well pleased with E&W's interpretation and analysis which provided a logical/common sense set of recommendations.

DJM:NF  
Attachments

cc: K. R. Ellison  
J. A. Middleton  
R. L. Pittman  
H. Houig  
J. M. Neilson (ARC)  
J. C. Simonis

DUKE POWER COMPANY  
PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY VALVES  
MEETING 5/19/76

A G E N D A

INTRODUCTION	DuWayne Morris
PIPING LOADS/STRAIN GAUGE STUDY	Jack Simonis
VIBRATION/ACCELEROMETER STUDY	Jack Simonis
DISCUSSION	DuWayne Morris
OPERATING PLANT SURVEY (INCLUDES MAINTENANCE, HANDLING, AND TESTING)	
PRESENT STATUS AT TMI AND CRYSTAL RIVER	
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS	
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OCONEE NUCLEAR STATION	
ACTION PLAN AND SCHEDULE	

INTRODUCTION

Efforts were initiated by B&W toward improving performance of pressurizer code safety valves as a direct result of B&W and customer concern over recurring problems with excessive valve leakage. This concern was expressed to Dresser which resulted in a joint effort between B&W and Dresser.

The first step taken was to determine, by joint discussion, the probable causes for excessive leakage based upon all information available at the time. The following items were determined to be the most probable causes for excessive leakage:

PROBABLE CAUSES

- A. Ambient temperature and associated thermal profile effects.
- B. External piping loads created by thermal growth during hot startup resulting in excessive mechanical strain on valve internals.
- C. Vibration of sufficient magnitude may result in relative seat/disc movement and associated surface degradation.
- D. Maintenance techniques may need to be more stringent to insure proper seating.
- E. Handling and installation should be closely scrutinized to insure that the seating surfaces are not damaged during these processes.
- F. Valve testing, specifically hot vs. cold setting of these valves, needs closer analysis to determine set point drift associated with the thermal growth of valve internals.

Subsequent to determination of the most probable causes listed above, a course of action was established to facilitate assignment of relative magnitudes and/or eliminate each of the aforementioned probable causes as follows:

ACTION TAKEN

- A. An extensive nationwide PWR survey was undertaken on operating plants to provide additional information, both general and specific. This included several on-site visits coast to coast and lengthy survey questionnaires at both B&W and non-B&W plants.
- B. Determine external piping loads at Duke Power Company's Oconee Unit II through both visual observations and installation of strain gauge instrumentation.
- C. Determine effects of vibration at Oconee Unit II by installation of accelerometer instrumentation on the valve body.

- 2 -

- D. Installation of thermocouple instrumentation to provide valve and piping thermal profile information at Oconee Unit II.
- E. Discuss the results of the above listed actions with Dr. [redacted].
- F. Formulate a new plan.

With regard to the action plan, tremendous cooperation, effort, and technical assistance was obtained from all personnel involved in the instrumentation and data retrieval on the Oconee Unit II valves. The efforts of Olie Bradham, Bill Keisler, Mike Alexander, John Neilson (ARC), Bill Crawford (ARC), and Jack Simonis (OFR) were particularly outstanding and greatly appreciated.

ATTACHMENT 3

PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES GENERAL INFORMATION

PLANT	REACTOR SUPPLIER	ARCHITECT ENGINEER	VALVE VENDOR	LOOP SEAL	INLET SIZE	NET WGT	COMMERCIAL DATE	LCDN TEST CAPACITY DATA PROBLEMS	ORIGINS REQUIRED	SPARE PCT. OF DESIG. CAPACITY	FINAL BUSHING GET	WELD PROBLEMS LAPPING?	LOCATION UP TESTING?	TEST METHOD	HANDLING
ARKANSAS 1	B+W	BENTEL	DRESSER	No	3"	810	10/74	-0-LCD	2155	86.2	1000	VENDOR	IN PLACE	INVERT	
CALVERT CLIFFS	COMBUSTION	BENTEL	DRESSER	No	2 1/2"	800	10/75	YES	2250	90	1000	UTILITY	HOT SHOP	HYDROSTATIC	VERTICAL
MILSTONE 2	COMBUSTION	BENTEL	DRESSER	No	3"	790	11/72	N/D	2235	89.9	8000	UTILITY	WILEY LAB.	STATIONARY	TRUCK
MILSTONE 2	COMBUSTION	BENTEL	DRESSER	YES	2 1/2"	880	10/75	No							
ROSEBUD	B+W	UTILITY	DRESSER	No	2 1/2"	987	2-7/80	10,75 LCD	2155	86.2	1000	VENDOR	WILEY LAB.	STATIONARY	TRUCK
PARISADES	COMBUSTION	BENTEL	DRESSER	No	3"	700	12/71	4-10/75	1800	72	1700	UTILITY	HOT SHOP	HYDROSTATIC	VERTICAL
SANDHURST	WESTINGHOUSE	BENTEL	CRUSBY	No	3"	430	1/68	45,000	2085	83.9	8000	UTILITY	CONTAINMENT	HYDROSTATIC	VERTICAL
SMUD	C+W	BENTEL	DRESSER	No	3"	913	4/75	-0-LCD	2155	86.2	1000	UTILITY	MINI SHOP	N <sub>2</sub> DILUTE	VERTICAL
TRI-I	B+W	GILBERT	DRESSER	Yes	2 1/2"	818	9/74	20 LCD	2155	80.7	1000	VENDOR	CONTAINMENT	HYDROSTATIC	VERTICAL

NOTES: CALVERT CLIFFS 1 - HAS 1/2" INLET EXPANSION LOOP - SET POINT CHANGES NOTED BETWEEN FIRST (SECOND) HOT CHECK SET POINTS (27) MAINS YANKEE - SUMMER OF '75 UPGRADED PRIMARY PRESS FROM 1800 TO 2250 PSI, NO CHANGES NOTED THIS YEAR - UP UNTIL LAST PURSING CHECK TESTING WAS CONDUCTED ON SITE WITH ME.

PARISADES - 1973 DE-RATED PRIMARY PRESS. FROM 800 TO 1000 PSI NORMAL OPERATING

FIELD REPRESENTATIVES - SMUD - WERNER STELZ  
 TRI-I - ROLAND PARTT - Tom Cassidy  
 CLONIE - Tom Cassidy  
 PARISADES - WERNER STELZ

\*MILSTONE 2 - Loop seal is electrically heated to 235°F

© 1974 by Westinghouse Electric Corp. All rights reserved.  
 G. J. ...  
 A. R. ...



ATTACHMENT 3

PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES AND ARRANGEMENT

PLANT	GENERAL TEST POINTS	BELLOWS	SPRING HOLDERS	HYDRAULIC SERVICES	INLET TAP	INLET LOOP SEAL	(CUSTOMER COMMENTS)
ARRANGEMENT 1	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	YES SEE TEST RESULTS BY BECHTEL TP 800029
ARRANGEMENT 2			Yes	Yes	Yes	No	
ARRANGEMENT 3				Yes	N/A	Yes	
ARRANGEMENT 4	Yes-16A	No	No	Yes	No	No	YES
ARRANGEMENT 5					No	No	No
ARRANGEMENT 6	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	COULD BE STANDARD
ARRANGEMENT 7	Yes-20A	Yes	No	No	No	No	OK
ARRANGEMENT 8	No	No	Yes	No	N/A	Yes	Yes

PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES CRAFTSMANSHIP

PLANT	WHO PERFORMS LAPPING GRIT #	OPTICAL FLATNESS CHECKS		VISUAL INSPECTION		COUNTED AS ORIGINAL PARTS	OPTICAL PLATS CALIBRATED	MICROSCOPIC TESTS FOR UNIFORMITY TO WORKING	CLEANING FLUID USED	WHO PERFORMS REWORK	IS IT PART OF PROGRAM?
		LAPPING BLOCKS SENDER OR OTHER USE	WAVE SENT	WAVE PIN	BRIDGE FLICK						
REACTOR 1	VENDOR 1000	No	No	No	EXCEL	EXCEL	NOT USED	No	ACETONE	UTILITY	No
CONDENSER 1	UTILITY 1000	No	No	No	EXCEL	EXCEL	NOT USED	No	ACETONE	UTILITY	No
CONDENSER 2	UTILITY 8000	No	No	No	EXCEL	EXCEL	NOT USED	No	SOLVENT	UTILITY	No
CONDENSER 3	VENDOR 1000	No	No	No	EXCEL	EXCEL	NOT USED	No	SPRAYS	UTILITY	No
REACTOR 2	UTILITY 1000	No	No	No	EXCEL	EXCEL	NOT USED	No	ACETONE	UTILITY	No
CONDENSER 4	UTILITY 8000	Yes	Slight	No	EXCEL	EXCEL	GOOD	MISSING GUIDE	ACETONE	UTILITY	Yes
SMUD	UTILITY 1000	Slight	No	No	EXCEL	EXCEL	GOOD	No	A	UTILITY	No
TRG 1	VENDOR 1000	WAVE	VENDOR		EXCEL	EXCEL	GOOD			GENERATOR	No

ATTACHMENT 3

PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES TESTING & HANDLING

**K-LIFT TESTING** - LEAKAGE TESTING - IN PLACE TESTING - HANDLING - SUPERVISION

PLANT	ISOLATION OR TESTING	AMBIENT TEMP	TEST MEDIUM	SET POINT	LEAK TEST PRESSURE	LEAK TEST MEDIUM	LEAK TEST TIME	LEAK TEST SPECIFICATIONS	IN PLACE TESTING	TESTING SUCCESS	TESTING TIME	HANDLING	SUPERVISION
REACTORS 1	IN PLACE	2500	STEAM						YES	GOOD	45 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 1	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 2	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 3	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 4	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 5	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 6	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 7	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 8	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 9	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY
CLIMATE CLIPPER 10	HOT SHOP	AMBIENT	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	2485.2% NOTE: W/LOW	2350 PSI	N <sub>2</sub> + H <sub>2</sub> O	5 MIN	410 BAR/200 PSI	NO	N/A	15 MIN	NO	UTILITY

NOTES: CLIMATE CLIPPER 1 - SET POINT DEVIATION IS NOTED ON FIRST LIFT CHECK - IN ONE CASE, MANUAL ACTIVATION REQUIRED; HOWEVER, SUBSEQUENT LIFT CHECKS ARE OK. VALUES ARE NOT COMPLETELY OPTICAL AT ALL TIMES DUE TO PUMP ARRANGEMENT DISCREPANCY DURING INSTALLATION.

CLIMATE CLIPPER 1 - MAIN YANKEE - LEAK TEST SPECIFICATIONS: ZERO CONDENSATION ON MIRROR HELD AT DISCHARGE. RELEASABLE CHANGE IN TRANSDUCER WATER LEVEL AFTER THREE AS A CLOSED SYSTEM DISCHARGE.

## PRESSURIZER CODE SAFETY RELIEF VALVES QUESTIONNAIRE

Page 1 of 8

## OPERATING HISTORY:

1. Do you have machinery history on the valves?  
If yes, may I obtain a copy?
2. Can you discuss the operating history and any items which may not appear in machinery history?  
Include:
  - A.) Description of malfunction:
    1. Downstream temperatures
    2. Quench tank temperature
    3. Time from installation to malfunction
    4. Calculated or known leak rates
    5. Plant conditions or transients which may have contributed to malfunction such as lifting of the electromagnetic relief valve.
  - B.) Any opinion on cause of malfunction?
  - C.) Any unusual conditions noted on disassembly or subsequent testing?  
Including:
    1. Wire drawing, cutting, visual appearance + ability to lap clean.
    2. Foreign matter in seat area?
    3. Internal misalignment?
    4. Scratches and/or cracks in seat or disk?  
Description and size.
    5. Set point OK on re-assembly?
    6. Leak test OK after testing?
    7. Have valves been cause for plant shutdown?
3. What model Number valve do you have?  
Inlet size:            Outlet size:
4. Has there been a difference in performance between one valve installation and the other? If so, what do you attribute this performance to? Briefly describe any difference in downstream piping arrangements.

## PLANT OPERATIONS:

5. Have the code safety valves ever lifted as protective action (overpressurization)?  
If so, describe plant conditions and results.

(2)

Page 2 of 8

6. What is plant operating pressure?  
Electromagnetic relief set press?      Code relief set press?
  
7. Has there ever been a change in the specified normal plant op rating pressure?  
If so, state the approximate date of change; state what the change was, and  
any noted change in code valve performance.

CRAFTSMANSHIP:

8. Who actually performs valve lapping? (Utility - Vendor)
  
9. What type and grit number of lapping compound is used for final polish?
  
10. Are any mechanical aides used to provide uniformity in lapping? If yes,  
please describe.
  
11. Are lapping blocks checked for optical flatness prior to use? If yes,  
what is the required specification for acceptable use?
  
12. Are lapping blocks re-used? Do you change lapping blocks when changing from  
a low to a higher grit number lapping compound?
  
13. Are lapping blocks visually inspected prior to use? If yes, is a magnifying  
glass used?
  
14. Describe your cleanliness procedures and lapping compound removal techniques.
  
15. Are lapping blocks checked for flatness after lapping. If yes, what is acceptable?  
Is a visual inspection of lapping blocks conducted after final polishing?

(3)

16. Is the valve seat and/or disk checked for optical flatness after lapping? If yes, what is the flatness required?
17. Do you conduct a visual inspection of the valve seat and disk after final polish? Describe the technique used.
18. Who supervises lapping assembly? (Utility - Vendor)
19. Who performs the assembly and adjustment of the valves? (Utility - Vendor)
20. Is dirt or other foreign matter a problem?
21. Are any special techniques used for assembly? Is verticality maintained throughout assembly?
22. Are the optical flats used for maintenance of these valves in good conditions and calibrated?

TESTING:

23. Where are the valves tested? (Containment, shop, off-site).
24. How often are valves disassembled and tested?
25. How are the valves tested? (Hydro-assist, N<sub>2</sub> Press, steam, in place etc.)

(4)

26. Lift pressure specification?
27. Are the valves heated during testing?  
State temperature. Any set-; int drift noted?
28. Leak testing pressure: Temp:  
Medium (H<sub>2</sub>O, N<sub>2</sub>, steam): Leakage specification:  
Success?
29. Have the valves ever been tested in place?  
Primary press: Temperature: Success?
30. Are there any decontamination problems with these valves?
31. Who supervises the testing?

## HANDLING:

32. Are the valves ever shipped by air or freight?  
Opinion of handling? Re-work required?
33. What method of handling is used on site?  
(Sling, verticality maintained, crate to fork lift used, prevention of bumping and jolting).

34. Who supervises handling? (Utility - Vendor - supervisory personnel)

PROCEDURE:

35. Do you have a written maintenance procedure for these valves? If yes, may I obtain a copy?

PIPING ARRANGEMENT:

36. May I obtain a copy of code valve discharge piping drawings including isometrics?

27. Describe your discharge piping arrangement including the following:

A.) Bellow expansion

B.) Spring hangers

C.) Hydraulic snubbers

D.) Girbal expansion joints

E.) Distance from inlet flange to pressurizer?

F.) Describe any cold spring noted during installation or removal.



(6)

Page 6 of 8

38. Have you ever installed:

- A.) Thermocouples
- B.) Strain measuring equipment
- C.) Vibration monitoring equipment
- D.) Pipe displacement measuring equipment

If yes, what were the results and what is the opinion with regard to data reliability?

39. State your opinion of your code valve piping arrangement including the following:

- A.) Designed well?
- B.) Eliminates excessive stress?
- C.) Has valve Vendor commented on it?
- D.) Opinion of A/E who designed + installed system?

40. Have there been changes in discharge piping and/or support system since initial installation? If so, when? Why? What is your opinion of before and after such modifications?

41. What is your opinion on the H<sub>2</sub> erosion theory?

(7)

Page 7 of 8

42. What is your opinion of inlet loop seals?

QUESTIONS ABOUT THE VALVE VENDOR:

43. What is your opinion of valve performance?

44. Do you receive good parts support?

45. What Vendor representatives have you been associated with?

46. What is your opinion of their craftsmanship and technical competence?

47. What is your opinion of their availability and co-operation?

48. Has the Vendor made any modifications or material changes? Why? Did this affect performance? Did you agree with the changes made?

49. What is your opinion of the other Vendor? (Crosby-Dresser)  
What experience have you had with Crosby-Dresser?

50. Have you ever requested or acquisitioned new valves as spares or replacements?  
If so, why? What time-lag resulted from such requests?

(8)

Page 8 of 8

51. Do you notify the Vendor each time you have a problem? If yes, what are the results of such notification?

MISCELLANEOUS

52. Have you discussed code valve problems with other utilities? Who? Problems? Co-operation? Scope of discussion?

53. If you have discussed code valve problems with other utilities, do you believe such discussion and/or visits are useful?

HM:me



TRANSMITTAL SLIP

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

ORIGINAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 Central Engineering Files  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 R. G. Burnley - Task Engineer  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 W. A. Cobb - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 1242  
 CONTRACT NO: 620-00 04  
 SPR 222  
 TITLE LEAKING PRESSURIZED  
RELIEFS & BLOCK VALVES  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 DATE: 1/29/75


The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Hollis - FLORIDA \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ F. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ R. J. BAKER - OCONEE \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ L. C. ROGERS - MET ED \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ J. A. BAILEY - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 222 which was processed on Contract 620-00 04. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is not considered applicable to other contracts NSS-3 -> 14.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_

cc: R. E. Kosiba

G. K. WANDLING  
  
 NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER  
 NSSSE

CLEARED

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BARCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER <i>Duke Power Co.</i>		CONTRACT NO. <i>610-0004</i>		SPR NO. <i>222</i>	REV. NO. <i>0</i>
VENDOR <i>Oresser</i>		P.O. NO.	TASK NO. <i>28</i>	GROUP NO. <i>41</i>	SEQ. NO. <i>2-5</i>
SITE ENGINEER <i>R. J. Baker, Jr.</i>		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE <i>NA</i>	REQ'D. COMP. DATE <i>NA</i>		
TITLE <i>Leaking Pressurizer Reliefs and Block Valves</i>					
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  <i>See attached</i>					
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  <i>See attached</i>					
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  <i>Duke is handling this problem - no B&amp;W action required at this time.</i>					
ORIGINATOR SIGNATURE <i>R. J. Baker, Jr.</i>		DATE <i>1/20/75</i>	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>		
RESOLUTION					
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE	
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		<i>1-27-75</i>	
TASK ENGINEER		<i>NO ENG. ACTION REQUIRED</i>			
PROJECT MANAGER		<i>C. D. Cressy</i>		<i>1-30-75</i>	
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM					
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ.		FC NO.	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT					
<i>See attached</i>					<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
FINAL DISTRIBUTION					
PROJECT MANAGER					
S.O.M./CONST. REP.					
QA DOC. FILE					
CENT. ENGR					
FILE 12M 2					
DEVIATIONS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO. _____		SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>			
DATE COMPLETED		DATE <i>1/24/75</i>			
S.O.M. CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL		DATE <i>1/24/75</i>			

RESOLUTION

COMPLETION

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NPG Nuclear Service

- (1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Number; Sequence Number; Name; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (if applicable).
- (2) Site Operations Manager - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; Date.
- (3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.
- (4) Task Engineer - Fill in: Resolution; Recommended Std.'s Change\*; (if applicable, FC Req. and FC Number); Signature and Date.  
  
\*If recommended standard's change, transmit a copy to cognizant Standard Task Engineer to resolve with Standard Plant Manager.
- (5) Field Engineer - Implement resolution; upon completion, fill in: Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature.  
  
NOTE: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation and submit revised SPR to the Site Operations Manager.
- (6) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign.

Initiated by B&W Construction Company

- (1) Originator - (Same as (1) above)
- (2) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (2) above)
- (3) Project Manager - (Same as (3) above)
- (4) Task Engineer - (Same as (4) above)
- (5) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (5) and (6) above)

Description of Problem

With reactor power at about 100% from the first of the year, the plant had to be shut down and cooled down on 1/18/75 due to the general tank temperature being at 230°F.

On 1/7/75 the temperature was at about 200°F and so Duke shut the electromagnetic relief valve block (2RC-V2). The tank temperature dropped to 195°F by the next day but slowly started increasing again. Between 1/9/75 and 1/18/75, Duke succeeded in keeping the tank temperature below 215°F (DP-1101-01 limit) by using the Unit 1 and 2 A bleed hold up tanks as a source of water to bleed and feed with. This cooled the general tank to about 205°F but raised the "A" BAVT temperature to about 195°F on Unit 1 and 2. On 1/18/75 the general tank temperature went to 230°F despite all efforts and the plant had to be shut down.



N55-4/SFR-222

Status - Action to Date

Nuclear Service in Lynnhaven (R. J. McLaughlin, J. P. Kennedy) informed on morning phone call each day from 1/7/75 until S/O on 1/18/75.

Duke made a complete check of all pipes leading to the pump tank while the plant was still at hot condition and the following in the results:

1. The thermocouples mounted on the discharge pipes of the three pressurizer relief valves were not reading correctly due to not being installed properly or not installed at all.
2. One or both of the pressurizer cool relief was/were leaking through the seat (s).
3. The electromechanical relief (ZRC-RV3) was also leaking through the seat.
4. ZRC-V2 was also leaking through seat because it was not shut completely tight.

NSS-4/SAR-222

Site Completion Report

Since Unit I was shutdown and Parker spare code relief are at the factory, the Ocome I code reliefs (RC-RV4 A+B) were removed and installed on Ocome II. The spare reliefs are to be shipped back to the site before Ocome I reaches there.

The electronic relief (2RC-RV3) was inspected and found to have two steam cuts on the disc of the valve. Parker replaced the disc with spares.

The electronic relief valve block valve (2RC-V2) would not shut tightly because of the old continuing problem of this valve on all B&W units sticking shut at hot conditions (See NSS-9/SAR-91). In an attempt to prevent this valve from sticking in the shut position, Parker, sometime in the past, reduced the torque switch setting. Because of this the valve did not shut tightly enough to prevent leakage. Parker is

NSS-4/SAR-222

increasing the torque switch setting on this valve  
and writing a letter to B&W outlining all the  
problems they are having with this valve and water.

The thermocouples have been installed  
properly on the discharge pipes of the relief and  
the plant is presently heating up with no  
leakage past the relief noted yet.

TITLE RCV4 (RC-V2) Motor Burnout #2

RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Taca Engineering crews and is applicable to  
NSS- None. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

Per Rb. Bundy this problem  
is not applicable to any other  
contract. Damage was caused by  
operator error. (overriding overloads)

NSS- \_\_\_\_\_

NSS- \_\_\_\_\_

**ACTION COMPLETE  
ON ALL CONTRACTS**

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information

Central Engineering Files

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.

C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance

R. G. Burnet - Task Engineer

W. B. Cobb - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 1742

CONTRACT NO: 620-00 03

SPR 560 (Rev 0 9 1)

TITLE RC-102

MOTOR BURNOUT

DATE: 11/24/74

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaelin - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_

R. E. Kosiba

\_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Day - OCONEE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET ED \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 560 which was processed on Contract 620-00 03. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem  is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc:

G. F. WARDLING

G. F. Wardling  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

TECHNICAL SUPPORT SUPERVISOR

**CLEARED**

10/9/73

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO. 620-0003	SPR NO. 560	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR B. & W.	P.O. NO.	TASK NO. 28	GROUP NO. 41
SITE ENGINEER E. L. Logan	REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. CORP. DATE	

TITLE RC-4 (RC-V2) MOTOR BURNOUT

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM On 10-5-73 RC-4 overloads had been over-ridden at A.E.C.'s direction. During dropped rod incident (See SPR 558), reactor operator attempted to open RC-4. The valve would not open and attempts resulted in a burned out actuator motor. Valve actuator was replaced on 10/7/73. Valve is now in service with overloads still bypassed.

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  
 ENG'R SHOULD RE-EVALUATE NEED FOR EQUALIZATION VALVE - GATE VALVES NORMALLY HAVE THIS FEATURE. ALSO REEVALUATE INST MANUAL SHOWS EQUALIZATION VALVES BOTH UNIT 1 & 2 VALVES HAVE STUCK SHUT WHILE HAVING 14600 V. FREQUENTLY PASS. ACROSS GATE.

ORGANIZATION SIGNATURE	DATE	SIGNATURE	DATE
<i>[Signature]</i>	10-9-73	<i>[Signature]</i>	10/9/73

RESOLUTION

APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE	DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER	<i>R. E. Pittman</i>	10-12-73
TASK ENGINEER		
PROJECT MANAGER	<i>G. E. Cray</i>	11-7-74
COST CATEGORY	<input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM	
AUTH. CHANGE NO.	<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ	FC NO. 276

SITE COMPLETION REPORT  
 FC-276 change motor from a 15 ft<sup>3</sup> to a 25 ft<sup>3</sup> motor.

DEVIATIONS	<input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.	<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
DATE COMPLETED	10/28/74	SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>
S.O.M./CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL	<i>[Signature]</i>	DATE 10/30/74

FINAL DISTRIBUTION  
 PROJECT MANAGER  
 S.O.M./CONSTR. REP.  
 QA DOC. FILE  
 CENT. OVER  
 FILE 124.2

10/9/73

R. P. W. [Signature]

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PCS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NPC Nuclear Service

*Rjm*

(1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Number; Sequence Number; Name; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (if applicable).

(2) Site Operations Manager - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; Date.

(3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.

(4) Task Engineer - Fill in: Resolution; Recommended Std.'s Change\* (if applicable, FC Req. and FC Number); Signature and Date.

\*If recommended standard's change, transmit a copy to cognizant Standard Task Engineer to resolve with Standard Plant Manager.

(5) Field Engineer - Inherent resolution; upon completion, fill in: Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature.

NOTE: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation and submit revised SPR to the Site Operations Manager.

(6) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign.

Initiated by B&W Construction Company

(1) Originator - (Same as (1) above)

(2) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (2) above)

(3) Project Manager - (Same as (3) above)

(4) Task Engineer - (Same as (4) above)

(5) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (5) and (6) above)

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company		CONTRACT NO. 600-0003	SPR NO. 560	REV. NO. 1
VENDOR B & W	P.O. NO.	TASK NO. 23	GROUP NO. 4	SEQ. NO. 02
SITE ENGINEER E. L. Logan		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. CORP. DATE	
TITLE RC-4 (RC-V2) MOTOR BURNOUT # 2				
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM Same as reported on Revision 0- On 10-9-73 motor was again burned out when an attempt was made to open the valve with the overloads bypassed.				
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED				
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  Same as recommended on Revision 0.				
ORIGINATOR'S SIGNATURE		DATE	REP. SIGNATURE	
<i>[Signature]</i>		10-12-73	<i>[Signature]</i>	
RESOLUTION				
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>R. Pittman</i>		10/16/73
TASK ENGINEER				
PROJECT MANAGER				
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM				
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ	FC NO. 276	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT FC-276 change motor from a 15 ft lb to a 25 ft lb motor				<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.				FINAL DISTRIBUTION
DATE COMPLETED 10/23/74		SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>		PROJECT MANAGER
S.O.M./CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE 10/29/74		S.O.M./CONSTR. REP.
				QA DOC. FILE
				CENT. ENGR
				FILE 12M. 2



INSTRUCTIONS FOR PDS-21001 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NPS Nuclear Service

- (1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Leader; Sequence Number; Name; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (if applicable).
- (2) Site Operations Manager - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; Date.
- (3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.
- (4) Task Engineer - Fill in: Resolution; Recommended Std.'s Change\* (if applicable, FC Req. and FC Number); Signature and Date.  
  
\*If recommended standard's change, transmit a copy to cognizant Standard Task Engineer to resolve with Standard Plant Manager.
- (5) Field Engineer - Implement resolution; upon completion, fill in: Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature.

NOTE: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation and submit revised SPR to the Site Operations Manager.

- (6) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign.

Initiated by B&W Construction Company

- (1) Originator - (Same as (1) above)
- (2) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (2) above)
- (3) Project Manager - (Same as (3) above)
- (4) Task Engineer - (Same as (4) above)
- (5) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (5) and (6) above)

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

File NSS- 3  
SME-SPR- 560/1

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To W.C. BUTT - NSE For Action

R.G. BURLEY - NSE

CONTRACT 620-00 03

SPR 560/1

TITLE RC-4 (RC-V2)

MOTOR BURNOUT

IT2

DATE 10/16/73

To R. J. McConnell (2) For Information

J. N. Kaelin

J. P. Kennedy

J. D. Phinney

K. Subota

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: Attached is Rev 1 of SPR 560 docu-  
menting a 2nd motor burnout when Duke  
operations bypassed the motor overloads. THE  
motor has been rewound by DUKE and re-  
installed. The actuator is now set for torque  
closing (setting of 1) and torque opening of 2 1/4.  
The valve operated with these values at lower  
temperatures but will not open at WOP, NOT  
E.G. Burley is investigating whether there is  
a temp differential problem.

P. J. Pithman  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

cc: G. E. Kulynych  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
Central Engineering Files  
E. V. McCarli - Quality Assurance

MANOUR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
CHARGE No. \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVED: [Signature]  
Project Manager

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

File NJS- 3  
 ME-SPR- 560

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To W.C. BUTT - NSE For Action

CONTRACT 620-00 - 03

SPR 560

TITLE RC-4 (RC-V2)  
Motor Burnout

To K. J. McConnell For Information

J. N. Kaelin

J. P. Kennedy

J. D. Phinney

K. Subirke

DATE 10-12-73

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
 Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: W.C. BUTT states that the valve does not need the equalization feature. However he is investigating the use of the solid wedge vs the split wedge in this application. Site is requested to provide the torque switch setting on this actuator.

R. L. Pittman  
 Nuclear Service Support Engineer

cc: G. E. Kulynych  
 C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
 Central Engineering Files  
 E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

MANHOOR LIMITS	20 354 / CC 350
	<u>10 MHS / 16 MHS</u>
COST LIMITS	_____
CHARGE No.	<u>620-0003-08-47</u>
APPROVED:	<u>C. P. Ciacy</u> Project Manager

WILCOX COMPANY  
DOMESTIC WIRE MESSAGE

For use only in connection with U. S. Canada and Mexico

WESTERN UNION

RECEIVED FROM THE  
1.00 1.00 1.00  
MEMPHIS, LA. 74301  
URGENT 1 PAGE 0-2

File No. 43

ADVISED TO INSTALL, AT NO CHARGE TO BUYER, REPLACEMENT  
ELECTROMATIC MOTOR FOR DUNE I, II, AND III. INST. I AND  
II ON ELECTROMATIC ISOLATION VALVE.  
REQUEST TO FURNISH REPLACEMENT ELECTROMATIC MOTOR AND TORQUE  
SPRING BACK. PER TELECOM DECEMBER 14, 1973. COX ON PRESSER  
AND C. E. SUND OF BAW.  
ADVISE SHIPPING SCHEDULE ASAP.

*6/17/74 These arrived - were at hunter  
Jim Albert took two of them to Ocala in his  
car. RJD*

- REC: R.G. Burnley  
E.V. Straub  
R.I. Pittman  
W.C. Delicente  
C.E. Burkhardt  
E.H. Davis

*dwd*

C. E. SUND - SR. BUYER - PURCHASING DEPT.

Date DECEMBER 21, 1973

Do not type below this line

Valve Body Stress Analysis

AEC's concern was whether or not the Weld Zone was analyzed in the response of January 22, 1974. Dr. Lai and Tom Conlon discussed the analysis and it was finally understood that AEC interpreted the Joint Design as a Cylinder and Flat Head whereas Dresser's analysis is for a Hub and Flange. It was agreed that the following would be done and included in the revision of the report:

1. Dresser will do Stress analysis of Cylinder and Flat Head as it applies to Electromechanical Design.
2. AEC wants to see that someone else has reviewed the Stress Analysis in addition to Dr. Lai. Dresser will do. Dr. Lai will also apply his PE stamp to the analysis.

Effects of Hydrostatic Over-Pressurization

AEC doesn't understand the response included in the January 22, 1974 revision. There is a statement in Appendix E1 and a Computer Printout included as Appendix E2 but no explanation as to what the printout is or how to use it. AEC suggested that Appendix E should be expanded to explain the printout or amplify the statements in App. E1. Dresser will expand the statements in App. E1 to explain in words that the valve was not overstressed due to the cold Hydrostatic Test. The printout will be deleted.

Dresser committed to having their work complete in one week and will send to Mr. Thielsch who will revise the report for re-submittal by Duke to AEC.

It is fully expected that this will resolve all AEC questions and the valve Design will be acceptable to AEC.

The final report to be submitted for NSS-3,4,9 will be used as a generic answer with specific references on a contract basis as may be required for NSS-5,6,7,8 & 11.

cc: K. Schroeder  
G. E. Kulynych  
R. V. Straub  
H. A. Baker  
C. E. Barksdale  
W. S. Delicate  
W. A. Cobb  
J. T. Janis  
G. F. Gleib  
G. T. Sund

*R. B. Burnley*

RE: Report No. 1158, dated November 4, 1973, "Evaluation of Weld Joint Design in Soundness and Integrity of Weld and Base Metal in Electromatic Relief Valves RV-67 (RC-66) Dresser Industrial Valve & Instrument Division, Units 1, 2, 3 Oconee Nuclear Power Station, Duke Power Company" and Report No. 1143, dated November 3, 1973, "Resolution of Acceptance of Electromatic Relief Valves 1RV-67 (RC-66) from Dresser Industrial Valve & Instrument Division, Units 1, 2, 3 Oconee Nuclear Power Station, Duke Power Company transmitted by Duke Power Company letter of November 30, 1973.

The above named reports have been reviewed in the RO:II offices. This review disclosed deficiencies in the following areas:

- 1. Weld documentation
- 2. Valve body analysis
- 3. Effects of hydrostatic overpressurization
- 4. Purchase specification
- 5. Past performance of valves

The following paragraphs describe these deficiencies and list additional information that should be provided by the licensee.

1. Weld Documentation

There are variations in the welding procedures used on the valve and those used for the mockup, particularly in the area of post-weld heat treatment.

Welding procedure qualification data conflicts with the welding procedure since the procedure requires no post weld heat treatment while the procedure qualification (WS-97, Rev 2, dated October 16, 1973, and WS-65, Rev 3, dated October 17, 1973) indicates post weld heat treatment. Moreover, these procedure qualifications do not provide material thickness nor thickness range qualified.

Drawing 418463 indicates that the welding procedures to be used for the lower base to top flange weld joint are WS-345 and WS-304. Documentation indicates that WS-65 and WS-97 were used on both the mockup and the production valves.

The licensee should furnish documented evidence that qualified welding procedures, with continuity, were used throughout fabrication of the valves and in accordance with appropriate codes and specifications.

2. Valve Body Stress Analysis

Review of the Dresser stress analysis for valve body as outlined in Duke Power Company report No. 1143, Appendix E, revealed no specific stress analysis of the weld joint between the top flange and the lower base as shown on Dresser Dwg 418463. In addition to the structural discontinuity at the weld joint, there appears to be a possible stress concentration

*Approved by [Signature] 12/14/74*

MAR 11 1974

BDS 683 3

From	W. C. B. , Unit Manager	File No. NSS-3,4,9,5,6,7,8,1 or Ref.
From	R. G. Burnley, Aux. Systems (2281)	8A30,41 Dresser
Cust.	Duke, MET-ED, JCP&L, FPC, AP&L SMUD	Date
Subj.	Meeting with Duke, Dresser & AEC on Electromatic Relief Valve	3/5/74

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only

I attended the subject meeting held at DP Co. in Charlotte N. C. on Friday March 1, 1974. The following personnel were present:

Duke	AEC (RO II)	Dresser	B&W
S. K. Blackley, Jr.	A. Herdt	T. R. Bordelon	R. Burnley
L. R. Davison	T. Conlon	Y. S. Lai	
Tom Cotton	J. C. Bryant		
K. C. Canady	Frank Jape		
Dan Gardner			
Helmut Thielsch (Duke Consultant)			

The meeting was held to discuss additional AEC concerns in response to the revised report that was submitted by Duke on January 22, 1974. There were five (5) areas where AEC had asked for additional information (See Attachment #1) and they felt the responses submitted to items A, B, & C were not adequate or their questions had been mis-interpreted. AEC has no additional questions; however, replies to A, B, & C must be expanded as follows:

#### A. Weld Documentation

A modified Appendix B-6 to the report should be included to show the Thickness Range for which the Weld Procedure was qualified.

B31.7, which was referenced in the specification, requires all NDT to be performed after Heat Treating. Mr. Thielsch stated that in this case it wouldn't make any difference whether NDT was before or after Heat Treating. It was agreed that Dresser would try to establish the sequence in Manufacturing to determine at what point NDT was performed. If no records are available Mr. Thielsch will add a statement in the report to the effect that it makes no difference with the materials and design of the Electromatic Relief Valves.

Apparently, either one or both of the above responses are acceptable.

existing at the edge of the weld zone and the interface formed by the mating parts.

The licensee should evaluate this stress concentration and the possible effect that it could have on the calculated stress levels in the welded joint. In addition, the licensee should take into consideration the stress due to structural discontinuities at the welded joint as evidenced by Dresser Dwg #18463.

C. Effects of Hydrostatic Overpressurization

The hydrostatic records indicate that the valves were tested to 9000 psig for three minutes. This is considerably above the hydro test requirements of ASME Section III, 1968 Edition.

The licensee should evaluate the possible damage caused by the excess pressurization.

D. Purchase Specification

The reports list several codes and editions.

The licensee should state the code and specifications under which the valves were purchased.

E. Past Performance of Valves

Report No. 1143 states that this particular Dresser design has been confirmed by satisfactory service of similar valves, some in nuclear plants.

If this is being used as supporting evidence for a basis of valve acceptance, the licensee should furnish documented history providing the locations, dates in service, conditions of service, etc.

*Attachment #1*



Tom Borden et al

318-640-2250

BABCOCK & WILCOX  
Nuclear Power Generation Department

SPR 560

Contract No. NS3349

File No. 8A30.41

Record of Telephone Call

Route To:

To Tom Borden et al

C. Crazey

From T. Borden / R. Buehly

R. Pittman

Date \_\_\_\_\_

T. Borden

Subject Review Gate Valve  
RC-V2

I Discuss possible fixes for RC-V2 problems

1. Investigate valve body up to bonnet-yoke joint

2. Possibly use flexible welds; Bureau is investigating

a. Review splicing - need to define special tools needed

b. New steps, weld by Bureau; investigate material availability

3. Possibility of using 25' motor; need to test and would like to see class B motor for testing.

Can some testing be done on Unit II if this done and items 2 and 3 are then performed?

II Electromech

Photo-type of welded joint sent to Duker consultant  
Saturday 10-20-73.

R. Buehly

To RRR/RUS/CAC

LP

R.R. Beach

JPT

**Babcock & Wilcox**

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

February 5, 1974

E74-26

*at least this should be considered  
a temporary fix. An engineering exam-  
must address the following questions*

- 1) Why does the valve force up?
- 2) What margin/lag is margin doest  
25 ft. motor provide?
- 3) What is the margin of pushing load for  
failure of this valve in either the open or closed  
position can and has had serious  
implications
- 4) Is the valve suitable for this service?

Mr. S. K. Blackley  
Duke Power Company  
Post Office Box 2178  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28201

ATTENTION: T. L. Overcash

SUBJECT: Oconee 1, 2, and 3  
Dresser Shutoff Valve RCV2

- REFERENCE:
1. Duke letter to B&W dated February 1, 1974, same subject (OS-18)
  2. B&W letter to Duke dated November 13, 1973, same subject

Gentlemen:

After further review of the operating data on 2 RC-V2 with the 25 ft./15. motor, Dresser has stated that the larger motor is a satisfactory resolution of the operator problem. As you are aware, the present motor on 2 RC-V2 does not meet insulation specification for service in that area. Dresser has ordered replacement motors for all three Oconee units, and they should be available for installation about June 1974.

If you have any further questions, please advise.

Very truly yours,

*C. A. Creacy*

C. A. Creacy  
Associate Project Manager

CAC/wwv

- cc: R. J. McConnell  
C. M. Baccich  
W. Faasse

POWER GENERATION GROUP

To	H. E. Beach	
From	E. L. Logan <i>EL</i>	
Cust.	Duke Power	File No. or Ref.
Subj.	MORE ON 1 RC-4 (RC-V2) and 1 RC-1 (RC-V1)	Date 12/18/73

805 663.5

This letter to cover the customer and one subject only.

Limit Switch 12-9 was added to the 1 RC-V2 circuit on 12/12/73. (See Fig. 1) The switch was set to stop valve travel at 4 turns of the handwheel from the full closed position. This appears to have solved the opening problem as this valve was opened on 12/16/73 at full temperature and pressure. Now the valve cannot be closed. Two attempts were made on 12/17/73 and both times the overloads tripped. The 15 ft # motor is evidently not strong enough to start the valve toward the closed position.

As you know Duke replaced the yoke bushing on 1 RC-1 ( 1 RC-V1 ) on 11/23/73 (SPR # 570). The replacement bushing was not the correct one as Rockwell had shipped the wrong replacement part to Duke. Duke had planned to replace this bushing during the December outage. The valve became inoperable on 12/16/73. The valve indicates open when commanded open, but system conditions indicate the valve stays closed. If the bushing is stripped as before, it seems the valve would be hung open rather than closed. This problem will have to be investigated during the next Unit I shutdown. Duke has closed 1 RC-3 ( 1 RC-V ) to preclude an open failure of 1 RC-1 causing a plant shutdown as occurred on 11/20/73.

The Unit I pressurizer valve line-up is as follows:

- Spray Valve (RC-1) - Closed and Inoperable
- Spray Block (RC-3) - Closed
- Electromatic Relief (RC-66)- Operable
- Elec. Block (RC-4) - Open and Inoperable

Since 12/19/73 we have been able to obtain comparative RCS and pressurizer boron concentrations. This is in response to SPR-557 and B. A. Karrasch's memo of 11/19/73. Figures 2 and 3 are plots of these values for both Units I and II. The Unit I continuous vent (.1 to .4 gpm) was secured on 12/17/73. Before the system is cooled down, we will investigate for leaking valves, etc. Unit II is indicative of normal operation since a conscious effort has been made to maintain RCS boron concentration constant with only the spray valve bypass flow into the pressurizer.

ELL/bh

- cc: J. P. Ittner
- R. V. Straub
- C. A. Creacy
- R. L. Pittman ✓
- R. C. Burnley
- E. L. Logan
- W. C. Butt
- B. Karrasch
- R. J. McConnell

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To

R. J. McConnell, Site Operations Manager

From

R. L. Pittman, Nuclear Service (2805)

BOS 663.5

Cust.

Duke Power Company

File No.

or Ref. NSS-3 SFR 560

Subj.

RC-V2

Date

November 1, 1973

This letter is cover one customer and one subject only.

NSS-3 SFR 560 reported that two motors had burned out while attempting to open the subject valve at normal operating temperatures and pressure, with the thermal overloads on the motor bypassed.

NSS-4 SFR 110 reported that the valve was cycled (on Unit II) during several temperature increments while the plant was being heated up. The valve operated satisfactorily at lower temperatures but when the system was approximately 500°F the valve would not operate, even though it had been cycled every 100°F while heating up.

Several contacts have been made with the Dresser Valve Company, and it is now felt that the problem may be due to differential expansion between the valve gate and the valve body, since there are different metals involved.

NSS-4 Field Change 126 changed the operator motor on this valve from a 15 ft/lb to a 25 ft/lb motor. The valve body was also insulated by the Dresser field service representative at this time.

When this system (NSS-4) is heated up RC-V2 should be cycled open and closed every 50°F increase in the pressurizer temperature. Once the unit has reached normal operating temperature the valve should be opened and closed every hour for at least four hours to determine if the larger motor will continue to operate the valve. The valve should then be opened and closed after approximately 24 hours at normal operating temperature. If operation is then satisfactory, new motors (25 ft/lb) will be requested from Dresser to replace the present 15 ft/lb motors on Units I and III. If, however, the larger motor is not satisfactory a modification to the solid gate will be initiated by Dresser.

In the interim while a final resolution is pending, the Unit I valve (which is now closed) should be made operable especially for plant transients. In order to accomplish this you should make the following recommendations to the customer.

- 1) When the reactor is shutdown, open the valve by hand and set the operator to close the valve on position vice torque. (Even though the valve wouldn't close off completely, it would preclude jamming the gate into the seat.)
- 2) The valve should then be tested to insure operability.

It is believed that with the operator set up in this manner the valve can be utilized if necessary for plant transients, and will serve as a temporary resolution

Pittman to McConnell

-2-

November 1, 1973

to the problem.

With the 25 ft/lb motor installed on 2 EC-W2 a torque switch setting of 2 1/2 (open direction) should not be exceeded without further consultations with Dresser.

RLP/cs

cc: J. P. Ittner  
R. V. Straub  
C. A. Creacy  
R. R. Beach  
R. G. Burnley  
E. L. Logan  
W. C. Butt

*R. L. Pittman*

**DRESSER**

**DRESSER INDUSTRIAL VALVE & INSTRUMENT DIVISION**

DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.  
P. O. BOX 1430  
ALEXANDRIA, LOUISIANA 71301

TEL (504) 833-2700  
TELEX 454605  
TRX (504) 445-5324  
CABLE MARRIAGE

November 1, 1971

cc  
C.A. CREACY  
R.L. PITTMAN

Messrs: Bob Bernley  
Tom Sand  
Sibcock & Wilcox  
P.O. Box 1760  
Lyachburg, Va. 24505

Subject: 7900 Gate Valve,  
Oconee Units 1, 2 & 3


Gentlemen:

Realizing the manner in which we have been trying to expedite resolution of the Gate Valve problem, I felt that it was necessary that we establish Dresser recommendations relative to this project. These recommendations have previously been submitted to you over the telephone.

1. The Gate Valve body should be completely insulated up to the joint where the body and yoke are bolted.
2. Although calculations indicated a 15 ft.-lb. operator would be adequate, it is felt that the heavier hammer blow of a 25 ft.-lb. operator along with the insulation previously recommended may resolve the problem.
3. Should either or both of the recommendations above prove to be inadequate, then the next suggested fix would be of a flexible wedge design. We have set up a prototype wedge and successfully cut through the sections as required to make the wedge flexible. The next step if required, would be to prepare new wedges with appropriate NDT or attempt to cut existing wedges installed in the valve during a plant shutdown.

-Continued-

AMCROFT GAUGES AND INSTRUMENTS • HANCOCK VALVES • CONSOLIDATED SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES



DRESSER INDUSTRIAL VALVE & INSTRUMENT DIVISION

DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.

P. O. BOX 1480

ALEXANDRIA, LOUISIANA 71301

TELEPHONE 610-2100  
TELEX 018-6129  
FAX 1121 44-1334  
CABLE MARRING

Page -2-

November 1, 1973

Additionally, I think I need to summarize my personal evaluation of all the facts to insure that we are all properly working towards the same goals.

1. The Gate Valve on Oconee #1 is inoperative at this time.
2. Tests conducted on Oconee #1 and #2 indicated that the valve operated adequately up to 500°F. At that point, the wedge became locked and the valve could not be opened. Two motors were subsequently burned out by shorting out the motor thermal over load and the limit switches in an attempt to open the valve. Although calculations indicate the motor to be adequate and because of the test results we have gained, it is theorized that thermal expansion is a major factor.
3. In following our suggestions, you have insulation on Oconee #2. Although we cannot presently conduct tests. In addition, we have arranged this past weekend for our Mr. McCormack and a Limit Torque Service Representative along with the B & W Representative to install a 25 ft.-lb. motor for temporary usage. Presently Dresser has bought the motor and is absorbing other cost, however, this is being done only in an effort to expedite resolution of the problem. Upon a field fix for the problem, we can then negotiate cost, etc.
4. Although we have purchased the operator and it is currently installed, to my knowledge this operator is not adequate since it is not provided with a heater nor any of the special seals required.

-Continued-

ASHCROFT GAUGES AND INSTRUMENTS • HANCOCK VALVES • CONSOLIDATED SAFETY AND RELIEF VALVES

DRESSER

DRESSER INDUSTRIAL VALVE & INSTRUMENT DIVISION

DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.

P. O. BOX 1420

ALEXANDRIA, LOUISIANA 71301

TEL. (504) 435-2110  
TELEX 528-5423  
FAX (504) 435-2288  
EASLE MANNING

Page -3-

November 1, 1973

5. I am currently waiting for information relative to our new field fix as it is transmitted to Dresser by B & W.

Very truly yours,


DRESSER INDUSTRIAL VALVE  
& INSTRUMENT DIVISION

T.R. Bordelon

TRB/es



NOTE: LS-9 ADDED 12/19/73 TO STOP VALVE TRAVEL BEFORE FULLY TORQUED CLOSED POSITION.



STOP VALVE CLOSED

IRC-4 Control Wiring  
(REV 200-V2)

FIGURE 1

LOGAN

OCONEE  
UNIT I BORON

— RCS  
--- FREE

① STARTED VARYING FREE LEVEL BETWEEN 220" & 270" @ 0830 12/13/13




FIGURE 2

LE-103

OCONEE  
UNIT II BORON

— RCS  
--- FREE






FIGURE 3

LOGAN



137



## LONGHAND MEMORANDUM

THE BABCOCK &amp; WILCOX COMPANY

TO

R. L. PITTMAN ✓

FROM

E. L. LOGAN

CUST.

DUKE

FILE NO. OR REF.

SUBJ.

IRC-4 (IRC-V2)

DATE

12/14/73

I FOUND OUT TODAY THAT THE LIMIT SWITCH MOD WAS MADE TO THIS VALVE ON 12/12/73. THE VALVE WAS CLOSED AND THEN THE HANDWHEEL WAS CRANKED 4 TURNS TOWARD THE OPEN POSITION. THE CLOSE LIMIT SWITCH WAS THEN SET TO STOP VALVE CLOSING TRAVEL AT THIS POSITION. SOME WIRING MODS WERE NECESSARY. WILL SEND A SKETCH AS SOON AS I CAN DIG IT OUT.

Ed.

cc: BOB BURNLEY, SYS. ENG., OPR

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

FILE

From

L. R. ALLEN, ASSOCIATE PROJECT MANAGER EXT. 2310

BDS 463.5

Cust.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

File No.

or Ref. 8A30.41 Dresser

Subj.

DRESSER ELECTROMATIC RELIEF VALVE MEETING MINUTES

Date

10-11-73

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

A meeting was held at Oconee on October 10, 1973, to discuss AEC's concerns on the subject valve.

Attendees

DUKE POWER

AEC

DRESSER

B&W

L. R. Dadson  
L. E. Barnes  
A. R. Hollins  
T. F. Wyke  
D. G. Gardner  
J. W. Hampton  
T. L. Cotton  
R. E. Dickens  
D. L. Freeze

C. E. Murphy  
W. D. Kelley

T. R. Bordelon  
Y. S. Lai

E. L. Logan  
L. R. Allen  
W. C. Butt

The following summarizes discussions which took place during this meeting:

Murphy: I talked to Washington last week and asked that they accept the latest stress analysis which included cyclic analysis however they would not accept the weld joint. Therefore, this meeting was required.

Wyke: We have had H. Thielsch prepare a report on this valve which addresses this weld joint. Please, at this time, review this draft report and determine whether it answers your concerns on this weld joint. (Draft of report attached)

Kelley: Reference page 4, paragraph 1. Solid wedge valve in service such as this block valve could cause problems. Friction factor extremely high for solid wedge valves. Im concerned with operator's ability to close valve with extremely high flow through valve.

Bordelon: The operator was sized to close & open the valve against full 2500 pis differential pressure.

Kelley:

Questioned fit up of top and bottom pieces prior to welding. Looked at drawings and welding procedures. Questioned the definition of "seal pass" i.e., with or without filler metal. (It was pointed out that the assembly drawing specifies weld rod for the seal pass). In spite of what the drawing specifies, he would guess that seal pass was fused without filler metal. Also expressed concern over size of the remaining passes and the heat input. Stated that this type weld, unlike a butt weld, since it is bottomed out prior to welding does not allow for weld shrinkage. Since base material strength properties were used in the stress analysis & it can't be proven that cracking did not occur in the heat affected zone, the stress analysis is not adequate. Stated that shop radiograph was meaningless from the standpoint of locations the type cracks with which he is concerned. Stated that if Dresser could show that heat input during welding is sufficiently low such that cracking would not occur during cool-down there would be no problem or if there were some way to NDT weld and heat affected zone to prove that cracks did not exist then previously submitted stress analysis would be acceptable.

Murphy:

Basis of our concern is heat input & weld pass size. If heat input is not "high" and weld pass size is not "heavy" then this valve design should be ok.

Allen:

Could you quantify "high" & "heavy"?

Kelley:

Not really. Had hoped that the weld procedure would have been more specific. Meeting the code from a weld procedure standpoint is really not enough. You could do an engineering analysis which includes cracks and shows that there is no problem if they exist. Radiograph will most likely not show type of cracks which concern me. We could not find this type crack on Hatch vessel with radiograph.

Murphy:

We have identified questions which need to be addressed. We will review any analysis which is submitted.

Kelley:

You may want to submit a weld mock up.

Bordelon:

If I made a mock up and it showed no cracks, would that be an acceptable answer.

Kelley:

It would be a better position. The simplest out would be to find a way to NDT this joint and show no cracks exist, then your stress analysis is ok. I would think a mock up and destructive testing would put you on very firm ground. Cracks can exist so long as the stress analysis backs up that the crack will not grow. Also, Duke must submit documentation to show that isolation valve will close under most adverse operating condition.

Lai:

If we assume 1/4" crack exists and will not grow over design life, is that acceptable?

Wyke: Would like to submit Thielsch's report for evaluation.

Kelley: We will forward any analysis or report for evaluation. In Summary: Weld joint and welding process should be addressed. Also the stress analysis should take into account cracking which could occur in the heat affected zone during solidification. Keep in mind that you may have 4 valves with no cracks and the 5th one may have cracks.

At this point the meeting broke up. Duke contacted H. Thielsch by telephone. Wyke and Thielsch had a private conversation at the end of which Wyke stated that Duke wanted Dresser to make a mock up and send it to Thielsch for evaluation and analysis. Borden agreed but said he would need to clear it with his management. At this point Duke, B&W, and Dresser talked to Thielsch relative to how the mock up should be made. The mock up should be made as follows:

1. Should be cylindrical
2. Same material as in valve (will need physicals and chemicals)
3. Same welding procedures, conditions and post weld heat treatment

Thielsch stated that he could submit his report to Duke within 3 days of receipt of the mock up. Assuming this justification is acceptable, we intend to use it across our other plants.

  
IR Allen

LRA:ch  
cc: CE Thomas w/attachs.  
RR Beach  
SPMs  
K Schroeder  
WC Butt  
RG Burnley  
GT Sund  
KW Whittaker



REPORT No. 1143

10/9/72

H. THIELSCH

DRAFT

FOR REVIEW AND  
DISCUSSION

### INTRODUCTION

In Units 1, 2 and 3, one Dresser pilot-operated electro-matic relief valve No. IRV-67 (EC-66) each was installed. One additional relief valve of the same type had been purchased as a spare.

Photographs of the spare relief valve are shown in Figs. 1 and 2.

The valve is a 2½" size. The gaseous waste disposal piping systems (57), in which the three valves are installed, are Class C piping systems. They are subject to the following service conditions - 2500 psi and 670°F. The maximum operating pressure is 2155 psi. The valves are normally subject to a system pressure of 2155 psi from the pressurizer tanks.

The valve shells were tested by the manufacturer at 9000 psig for three minutes. The valve seats were subsequently tested at ~~6000~~ psig for three minutes. (saturation temperature)

After erection, the piping systems in which the valves are installed are tested hydrostatically at a pressure of 3125 psi. However, since this valve was preset to open, it was isolated by isolation valve RC-4.

The documentation applicable to each valve, and identified by the Units (1, 2 or 3) in which they are installed, are included in Appendices A to D.

#### Weld Assembly

The valves are assembled by welding previously machined Type 304 stainless steel components.

The weld assembly is shown in Fig. 3. One of the welds involved represents a circumferential butt type weld identified by the letter "A" between the flange and lower base sections. It represents a "sleeve-type" of butt joint where one member also serves as a back-up for the other member.

The flanged member of the body is generally seated tightly against the lower base member as detailed in Fig. 4. Since this represents a "socket-type" of weld joint, the tight seating can be subject to questioning since Section ANSI B31.7 shows in Fig. 1-727.4.4(c) a gap in the root of socket joints of approximately 1/16", Fig. 5. Similar requirements are shown in other piping and pressure vessel codes. These, however, generally refer to

fillet type of socket welds normally involving one light wall member such as a small diameter pipe (usually  $2\frac{1}{2}$ " or smaller nominal outside diameter). In these socket fillet-type of weld joints, illustrated in Fig. 5, the pipe member may heat up more rapidly and thus expand to a somewhat greater extent than the adjacent heavier mass of base metal whenever hot gas or steam flows suddenly through the pipe. Frequent temperature cycling may in time result in cracking across the fillet weld.

The susceptibility to cracking depends upon factors such as temperature shock, the number of temperature cycles, principally the heating cycles, the length of the leg below the fillet weld, the size of the fillet weld, the materials, etc.

The socket type leg on the Drassler pressure relief valve, shown at "B" in Fig. 4, depending upon machining, may vary from nearly 0" to approximately  $1/8$ ". It will probably average  $1/16$ ". Because of the mass of metal involving the flange and the cage, ~~the temperature~~, even if measuring  $1/8$ " will not be subject to uneven heating or thermal fatigue - even if subject to severe temperature cycling, as the large metal mass, including the cage will equalize the metal temperatures in the flange and lower base sections at the weld location. The tight seating at "C" and the  $1/16$ " average socket length at "B" thus will be of no significance.

Moreover, this valve, functioning as a pressure relief valve, will not even be subject to frequent actuation.

Must state could misla

Don't know whether block  
was tested at condition  
reg'd to operate  
has experienced  
in service - 39 valves  
no velocity these valves  
on relief valve failures -

Minneapolis:  
failure of nuclear  
operated valves to  
perform on  
demand -  
MC valves  
reliability  
very low

Furthermore, this valve can be readily isolated by the isolation valves located between the pressure relief valves and the pressurizer tanks.

The extensive experience with valve and component failures in fossil fuel, nuclear and chemical plants, also supports the conclusions that the specific weld joint design applicable to this Dresser valve in the operating conditions involved, should not result in failure.

The entirely satisfactory service of this particular Dresser design has also been confirmed by the entirely satisfactory service of 99 valves from A182 forgings operating in commercial ~~fossil fuel power~~ plants at pressures as high as 2500 psi and temperatures as high as 1000°F. In addition, 14 of these valves to date have been installed in nuclear power plants.

Even when a socket weld of more conventional long socket leg design has failed because of tight "bottom" positioning, the occasional failure encountered in fossil fuel power plants or chemical plants have almost always occurred as localized cracking over part of the joint circumference rather than involving a complete system.

Radiographic Examination

To verify that the "modified socket" was less than 1/8", the valve was radiographed by multiple exposures as detailed in the shooting sketch shown in Fig. 6. Prints of the several exposures are shown in Figs. 7 to 9. They indicate that the socket is likely to be approximately 1/16" and may even be less.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of the following criteria, the 2500 lb. class Dresser Consolidated Electromatic Pressure Relief Valves type 2 $\frac{1}{2}$ -31533VX-30(25)x2-KMYI-US126, as detailed on Dresser Drawings No. CP-1549 and 418463 are considered acceptable.

- (1) The wall thicknesses shown in Appendix E and evaluations confirm compliance with the requirements of Section, III 1971 edition of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code.
- (2) The socket type weld joint with a socket leg length of less than 1/8" is not subject to significant localized stress levels even under the most severe conditions of thermal cycling to which this valve might be subjected.
- (3) The valve, and weld assembly conditions, as detailed on Dresser Sketch No. 418463, have been verified by supplementary final radiography.
- (4) The acceptability of the flange and lower body materials have been confirmed by Dresser responsible for the verification of the supplier's mill test certificates and ultrasonic and liquid penetrant inspection reports.

(5) The soundness of the weld assembled flanged body was further confirmed by Dresser Industries by a hydrostatic pressure test of the "shell" performed at a pressure of 9000 psig for <sup>5</sup> 3 min., which involves more than three times the maximum working pressure.

(6) Verification of these test results and compliance with the Section III requirements of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was done by Babcock and Wilcox Company.

(7) Confirmation by Dresser that weld failures have not occurred in the Electronic Pressure Relief Valves of identical "modified socket" weld joint design and tight seating, and that these valves have been produced for over five years and operate in service environments considered equivalent to or more severe than conditions applicable to the specific operations of the gaseous waste disposal piping systems of Units 1, 2 and 3 at the Conoco Nuclear Power Station.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance  
R.G. Burnley - Task Engineer  
W.A. Cobb - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 1242  
 CONTRACT NO: 620-00 03  
 SPR 560  
 TITLE: Motor Burnout  
RCU2  
 DATE: SEP 6 1974

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaelin - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - OCONEE \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET ED \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 560 which was processed on Contract 620-00 03. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is/is not considered applicable to other contracts 4, 5, 7, 9.

REMARKS: New motor is on site & will be installed next outage per EC 276.

cc:

Earl H. Davis, Jr.  
 NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER  
 Earl H. Davis, Jr.

RJP

TECHNICAL SUPPORT SUPERVISOR  
**CLEARED**

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company		CONTRACT NO. 630-0103		SPR NO. 559	REV. NO. .
VENDOR B & W	P.O. NO.	TASK NO. 28	GROUP NO. 47	SEQ. NO. 02	
SITE ENGINEER E. L. Logan		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE		
TITLE RC-4 (RC-V2) MOTOR BURNOUT # 2					
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM Same as reported on Revision 0- On 10-9-73 motor was again burned out when an attempt was made to open the valve with the overloads bypassed.					
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED					
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  Same as recommended on Revision 0.					
ORIGINATOR SIGNATURE		DATE	PREPARED BY SIGNATURE	DATE	
		10-17-73		10/27/73	
RESOLUTION					
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE	
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		10/16/73	
TASK ENGINEER					
PROJECT MANAGER		<i>C. A. Cressy</i>		8-6-74	
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM					
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ		FC NO.	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT New operator motor (25 ft ll) is on site and will be installed the next time plant conditions permit as per FC-276. This valve is presently open and the 15 ft ll motor installed now is operational. This also clears Rev. 0				<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE	
DEVIATIONS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.				FINAL DISTRIBUTION	
DATE COMPLETED 8/28/74		SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>		PROJECT MANAGE-	
S.O.M./CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE 8/28/74		S.O.M./CONST. REP.	
				QA DOC. FILE	
				CENT. ENGR	
				FILE 12M.2	

RESOLUTION COMPLETE



**SITE PROBLEM REPORT**

**SABCOCK & WILCOX**

CUSTOMER <i>Duke Power Company</i>		CONTRACT NO. <i>620-0303</i>	SPR NO. <i>550</i>	REV. NO. <i>0</i>
VENDOR <i>B. &amp; W.</i>	P.O. NO.	TASK NO.	GROUP N.J.	SEQ. NO.
SITE ENGINEER <i>E. L. Logan</i>		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. CWR	DATE
TITLE <i>RC-4 (RC-V2) MOTOR BURNOUT</i>				
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM <i>On 10-5-73 RC-4 overloads had been crew-ridden at A.E.C.'s direction. During dropped rod incident (See SPR 558), reactor operator attempted to open RC-4. The valve would not open and attempts resulted in a burned out actuator motor. Valve actuator was replaced on 10/7/73. Valve is now in service with overloads still bypassed.</i>				
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED				
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL <i>ENGR SHOULD RE-EVALUATE NEED FOR EQUALIZATION VALVE - CATER VALVES NORMALLY HAVE THIS FEATURE. ALSO PRESSURE MUST MAINTAIN SUFFICIENT EQUALIZATION VALVE. BOTH IN 1 &amp; 2 VALVES HAVE SINK SHUT WHILE HAVING - ACH DIFFERENTIAL PRESS. ACROSS GATE.</i>				
ORIGINATOR SIGNATURE <i>E. L. Logan</i>		DATE <i>10-9-73</i>	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i> DATE <i>10/9/73</i>	
RESOLUTION				
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER				
TASK ENGINEER				
PROJECT MANAGER				
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM				
AUTH. CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ	FC NO.	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT				
				<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
				FINAL DISTRIBUTION
DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO. _____				PROJECT MANAGER
DATE COMPLETED		SIGNED BY		S.O.M./CONST. REP.
S.O.M./CONST. REP. APPROVAL		DATE		QA DOC. FILE
				CENT. ENGR
				FILE 12M.2

R.J.M.

File - 560  
SPR  
Unit I

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To	R. R. Beach	File No. or Ref.
From	R. J. McConnell / E. L. Latham	Date
Cust.	Duke Power	12/4/73
Subj.	Another chapter in the continuing SAGA of: RC-V2 (RC-4) ELECTROMATIC RELIEF BLOCK VALVE	

BOS 663 5

This letter is cover and customer and the subject only

- Reference: 1. HSG-2 SPR-560, 11-1-73, (R. L. Pittman to R. J. McConnell)  
 2. B73-290, 11-13-73 (C. A. Creacy to S. K. Blackley)

I. Problem

As of this date neither the Unit 1 or 2 Pressurizers are being operated as they were designed. The electromatic relief valves (RC-V5) are essentially isolated from the systems for the following reasons:

1. An AEC requirement that the block valves (RC-V2) be closed except during plant transients (concern over electromatic valve wall thickness).
2. The inability to open IRC-V2 (This valve has not been remotely operable since 10-5-73 and was highly unreliable prior to that time).
3. Failure of the Reactor Operators to open IRC-V2 during an unexpected plant transient.

The first two trips during the Unit 2 Power Escalation Series resulted from high RCS pressure due to reason 3 above. We are unable to complete the Unit 2 Test Program (turbine trip test and unit loss of electrical load both from 95% power) due to reasons 1 and 2 above.

II. Corrective Action Taken

On Dresser Industries recommendation, the following corrective actions have been taken:

1. The bodies of both 1 RC-V2 and 2 RC-V2 have been insulated.
2. The 15 ft # actuator motor on 2 RC-V2 was changed to a 25 ft # (Class B insulation) motor by Mr. G. L. Padgett of Litorque on 10-27-73. Mr. W. A. McCormick of Dresser Industries was on-site for this modification. A heavier torque spring was also installed. (See Field Change 126)

### III. Results

Since the motor changeout on 2 RC-V2, the valve has been cycled eighteen (18) times. Eleven of these cycles were at full temperature and pressure of 630° F and 2150 psig. The other seven (7) cycles were at approximately 575° F and 1000 psig. On the first cycle at full power conditions, the valve failed to close. The closing torque switch was bypassed until the valve started to move. After removing the jumper, the valve continued to the closed position. All subsequent operation has been normal.

1 RC-V2 still will not operate.

It seems from the results that insulating the valve does not solve the problem, but that a bigger motor plus valve insulation does give satisfactory operation.

### IV. Recommendations

We were informed on 11-8-73 that Dresser would order replacement motors (25 ft #, class H insulation) for these valves. The customer was notified of this both here at the site and by letter (Ref. 2). R. L. Pittman now informs us that Dresser has not ordered the larger motors and is requesting more test data. It seems to us that operation of 2 RC-V2 since 11-27-73 has shown that the larger motor is the solution to the problem. Duke Power personnel also feel this way and continue to ask when the new motors will be delivered.

It is imperative that Purchasing pursue this situation with Dresser.

ELL/th

cc: J. P. Ittner  
R. C. Pittman  
J. C. Beddens  
G. E. Kulyngen  
P. V. Streb  
C. A. Creany

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Va. 24505  
Telephone: (703) 344-4111

November 13, 1973

413-200

Mr. S. K. Blackley  
Duke Power Company  
P. O. Box 2170  
Charlotte, N. C. 28201

Attention: Mr. T. L. Overcash

Subject: Oconee 2 R-75748 FC-126  
Dresser Shutoff Valve 28C-V2

Dear Mr. Blackley:

The motor installation covered by FC-126 has been accomplished and 28C-V2 has been operated at full temperature and pressure.

Based on incomplete test results it appears that the 25 foot pound motor will be a satisfactory resolution to the valve operation problem. As you are aware the present motor does not meet all the specifications for this service, thus new 25 foot pound motors meeting all specifications for this service have been ordered by Dresser for Oconee 1, 2 and 3. The insulation for the motors will be Class H rather than Class F as requested in your letter of November 2, 1973 in that B&W considers Class H a superior insulation to Class F for this service. The final conclusion as to whether the new motors will be a satisfactory resolution of the problem awaits further test data.

Very truly yours,

*C. A. Creacy*  
C. A. Creacy  
Associate Project Manager

CAC:vw

cc: G. M. Baccich  
R. J. McConnell  
W. Farnne

TITLE RCV-2 failed open

RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS- 3, 9 & \*5. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

CHECKING

ORIGINAL

New operators are being supplied by Rockwell  
Inf. Due to ships in Dec. 1974.  
RGB.

\* NOTE: GPU DECIDED TO CUT THIS VALUE OF OF  
LINE @ TMI-1 & USED A UNIT II VALUE.  
UNKNOWN WHETHER GPU PLANS TO PUT THIS  
Rockwell VALUE IN UNIT II. RGB

NSS-8 Fred H. Faust says no problem ~~on~~ on work

Andy A. Clark ENTD NOV 1974

Dec 14th at 210 both the spray & the spray block valve failed  
to close. CAP/11-21-75

These valves have had problems and the  
problems are carried on the Top Generic problem

NSS- list They are being tracked generically on  
another SPR. (See 496 NSS-3)

# ARED

## TRANSMITTAL SLIP

### PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information

Central Engineering Files

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.

C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance

R. G. Bernley - Task Engineer

W. A. Cobb - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 12M2

CONTRACT NO: 620-00 04

SPR 193

TITLE RCV-2 Failed  
in open position

DATE: AUG 28 1974

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaelin - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Dry - OCONEE \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET ED \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 193 which was processed on Contract 620-00 04. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is ~~not~~ considered applicable to other contracts 03, 09, 05.

REMARKS: operation has been OK after replacing stripped yoke  
bushing; presently operating with re-wound motor  
until new motor operator arrives... scheduled for  
December 74 maintaining Rev 2 open

cc:

Carl B. Dewitt  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER  
East H. Dept. 31

R. J. P.  
TECHNICAL SUPPORT SUPERVISOR

# CLEARED

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company		CONTRACT NO 620-0004		SPR NO. 193	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR Rockwell P.O. NO.		TASK NO. 28	GROUP NO. 41	SEQ. NO. 01	
SITE ENGINEER K. H. Fischer		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE		
TITLE RC-1 FAILED IN OPEN POSITION					
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  SEE ATTACHED					
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  SEE ATTACHED					
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL Lynchburg inform site as to when the smaller operators for this valve will be shipped, and how many cycles the spray nozzle is designed for.					
ORIGINATOR SIGNATURE K. H. Fischer		DATE 6/13/74		APPROVED BY SIGNATURE R.A. Baber	
ORIGINATOR DATE 6/13/74		APPROVED BY DATE 6/13/74			
RESOLUTION					
APPROVED BY		SIGNATURE		DATE	
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		<i>[Signature]</i>		6/14/74	
TASK ENGINEER					
PROJECT MANAGER		C.A. Crary		8-29-74	
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> S <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM					
AUTH CHARGE NO.		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ		FC NO	
SITE COMPLETION REPORT U.R. Miller's letter to R.B. Reynolds letter dated 7/19/74 states that no damage occurred to spray nozzle. Duke will change operator when it arrives on site. Duke retained existing operator with the speed motor. Valve checked out OK after replacing stripped valve bushing.					
<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE					
FINAL DISTRIBUTION					
PROJECT MANAGER					
S.O.M. CONSTR. REP.					
QA DOC. FILE					
CENT. ENGR					
FILE 121.2					
DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.		DATE COMPLETED 8/14/74		SIGNED BY R.A. Baber	
S.O.M. CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>[Signature]</i>		DATE 8/19/74			

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NPC Nuclear Service

- (1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Number; Sequence Number; Name; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (if applicable).
- (2) Site Operations Manager - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; Date.
- (3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.
- (4) Task Engineer - Fill in: Resolution; Recommended Std.'s Change\*; (if applicable, FC Req. and FC Number); Signature and Date.  
\*If recommended standard's change, transmit a copy to cognizant Standard Task Engineer to resolve with Standard Plant Manager.
- (5) Field Engineer - Implement resolution; upon completion, fill in: Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature.

NOTE: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation and submit revised SPR to the Site Operations Manager.

- (6) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign.

Initiated by B/W Construction Company

- (1) Originator - (Same as (1) above)
- (2) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (2) above)
- (3) Project Manager - (Same as (3) above)
- (4) Task Engineer - (Same as (4) above)
- (5) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (5) and (6) above)



DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

After the last reactor trip on Unit II on May 30, 1974, it was impossible to keep the normal operating pressure in the pressurizer with all heater banks on.

It appeared that the yoke bushing threads of the motor-operated valve 2RC-1 are stripped because the shaft does not move in and out of the valve, although the motor runs and indicates closed or open position of 2RC-1 in the control room.

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

To maintain the pressure in the pressurizer 2RC-3 was closed after the Reactor trip.

With 2RC-3 closed a minimum bypass spray flow of 0.75 gpm is not maintained as per EP 1101-01 section 1.2-5.

Stan Holland and Jim Hampton were informed that keeping RC-3 shut violates limits and precautions and that if they continue to operate, RC-3 should not be opened unless absolutely necessary to minimize the number of cycles on the spray nozzle. Duke was also asked to rewire RC-3 so that it could be throttled to maintain some small continuous spray flow. As yet this has not been done, but Duke is checking into it.

At this time, Duke is sampling the pressurizer for Boron every 8 hrs, and opening RC-3 only if the pressurizer boron concentration is not within  $\pm 50$  ppm of the RC System Boron Concentration.

Duke has been asked to keep a log of the number of times RC-3 is opened and the spray line temperature just before RC-3 is opened.

Ted Stables has been informed about this problem.  
See Oconee I, SPR - 570 for same problem.

RJB/XHF/bh

MODIFICATION REQUEST		DATE: 6/4/74	1
STATION: Oconee	2 APPLICABLE TO: 3 UNIT 1 - YES ( ) NO (X) UNIT 2 - YES (X) NO ( ) UNIT 3 - YES ( ) NO (X)	REV: 4 1 - 2 - 3	5
		STRUCTURE, SYSTEM OF COMPONENT AFFECTED: Reactor Coolant	6
DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATION:			7
Modify valve ZRC-3 breaker seal in circuit such that the valve can be operated as a throttle valve rather than open-closed type.			
REFERENCES: 8	ATTACHMENTS: 9		
1. PD 100A-2 H-5	1. SAFETY ANALYSIS ATTACHED ( ) YES (X) NO		
2.	2.		
3.	3.		
JUSTIFICATION FOR MODIFICATION: 10			
With normal pressurizer spray valve ZRC-1 inoperable we need the capability of maintaining a small, continuous spray flow to the pressurizer for the following reasons.			
1. Prevent B <sup>10</sup> concentration buildup in pressurizer. 2. Prevent excessive thermal cycle of the pressurizer spray nozzle. 3. Allow continuation of certain portions of the 75% power test program.			
REQUEST ORIGINATED BY: 11	PRESENT STATUS: 12		
NAME: S. A. Holland	(ACTION TO DATE, PERSONS CONTACTED ETC.)		
DEPARTMENT: Oconee-Operations	None		
ASSIGNMENT: Assistant Operating Engineer			
PRIORITY: 13			
1. ( ) REQUIRED PRIOR TO <u>soon as possible</u> , FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:			
2. (X) REQUIRED FOR PROPER SYSTEM OR UNIT OPERATION.			
3. ( ) DESIRABLE FOR PROPER SYSTEM OR UNIT OPERATION.			
AUTHORIZATION FOR REQUEST: 14	SAFETY-RELATED MODIFICATION ( ) YES (X) NO 15		
APPROVED: <i>S. A. Holland</i>	Per Policy Definition		
DATE: 6/4/74	This Modification involves an unreviewed safety question or a change in technical specifications ( ) YES (X) NO 16		



WHEN THE SPRAY VALVE WAS SHUT, THE FLUID IN THE SPRAY LINE COOLED. WHEN THE SPRAY VALVE WAS OPENED, THE COOLER WATER WAS FORCED THRU THE PRESSURIZER SPRAY NOZZLE. THE FOLLOWING CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT THE RESULTING THERMAL STRESSES IN THE SPRAY NOZZLE HAD NO APPRECIABLE EFFECT ON THE FATIGUE LIFE OF THE NOZZLE.

ASSUMPTIONS

1. THE INITIAL SPRAY NOZZLE TEMPERATURE IS 650°F
2. THE NOZZLE IS SHOCKED WITH 375°F WATER
3. THE DURATION OF TIME THE COOL WATER IS IN CONTACT WITH THE PRESSURIZER SPRAY NOZZLE IS SMALL.

ANALYSIS

THE EFFECT OF THE COLD WATER IS TO PRODUCE THERMAL SKIN STRESSES IN THE NOZZLE. SINCE THE CARBON STEEL PART OF THE NOZZLE IS PROTECTED BY A THERMAL SLEEVE, IT WILL NOT EXPERIENCE A TEMPERATURE CHANGE. THE SKIN STRESS FOR THE STAINLESS SECTION MAY BE CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATED BY

$$\sigma_H = \sigma_L = 1.43 E \alpha \Delta T$$

WHERE  $E = 26 \times 10^6$  PSI  
 $\alpha = 9.96 \times 10^{-6}$  /°F INSTANTANEOUS VALUE AT 400°F  
 $\Delta T = 650 - 375 = 275$  °F

$$\therefore \sigma_H = \sigma_L = 1.43(26 \times 9.96)(275) = 101836 \text{ PSI}$$

$$S = 102 \text{ KSI}$$

ALTERNATING STRESS = 51 KSI

FROM FIG N-415(B) ALLOWABLE CYCLES = 20,000

$$\text{USAGE FACTOR} = \frac{\text{TOTAL CYCLES}}{\text{ALL. CYCLES}} = \frac{150}{20,000} = 0.0$$

CONCLUSION

THE DESCRIBED CONDITION HAD NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE FATIGUE LIFE OF THE SPRAY NOZZLE.

BABCOCK & WILCOX  
DEPARTMENT OF SERVICE

DATE 7-19-74 BY URM

REVISION

PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

For Action

File 1342  
CONTRACT 620-00 04

SPR 193

TITLE RCV-1 Failed  
in OPEN position

For Information

C. A. Creacy  
Q. G. Burnley

JUN 14 1974  
DATE

Date Final Resolution Required by  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Requested: The smaller operator will be available  
by 26, 1974

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support  
Engineer. Please reply immediately

whether answer is final or preliminary.

*Earl W. Davis Jr.*  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer  
Earl W. Davis Jr.

- C. C. Plunkett-Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- C. M. Fletcher -NIG Quality Assurance
- D. L. Day
- J. N. Kaelin
- E. L. Logan
- L. C. Rogers

T. D. Stables

MAN-HOUR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

CHARGE No. \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Project Manager

# CLEARED

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

PLANT STARTUP SERVICE SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
C. M. Fletcher - Quality Assurance  
R. B. Reynolds - Task Engineer  
W. A. Cobb - Sr. Proj. Manager

FILE: 1.M2

CONTRACT NO: 620-00 04

SPR 193 (REV 1)

TITLE 2 RC-1 FAILED

IN OPEN POSITION

DATE: 12/10/74

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaelin - ARKANSAS \_\_\_\_\_ R. E. Kosiba  
\_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - SMUD \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - OGDNEE \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MEI ED \_\_\_\_\_  
J. L. Hollis - FLORIDA

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 193 which was processed on Contract 620-00 04. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is not considered applicable to other contracts 3, 5, 9.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc:

G. A. WAREING

G. A. Wareing  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO 620-0004	SPR NO 193	REV. NO. 01
VENDOR Rockwell	P. O. NO.	TASK NO. 28	GROUP NO. 12
SITE ENGINEER <i>K. J. ...</i>	REQ'D RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE	

TITLE 2RC - 1 FAILED IN OPEN POSITION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
See Attached:

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  
See Attached:

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  
See attached:

APPROVED BY <i>R.B.</i>	DATE <i>6/21/74</i>	REPRESENTATIVE SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE <i>6/17/74</i>
-------------------------	---------------------	---	---------------------

RESOLUTION	APPROVED BY <i>[Signature]</i>	SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE <i>12/10/74</i>
	N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER		
	TASK ENGINEER		
	PROJECT MANAGER <i>C. A. Creasy</i>		DATE <i>12-12-74</i>
	POST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L		<input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM
	AUTH CHARGE NO	<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ	FC NO <i>155</i>

SITE COMPLETION REPORT  
FC-281(NSS-3), FC-155(NSS-4), FC-102(NSS-9)  
will be issued to install ~~valve~~ speed operator on valve.  
*reduced*  
This clears all parts of this SPR.

DEVIATIONS <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV. NO.	RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE <input type="checkbox"/>
DATE COMPLETED <i>12/5/74</i>	SIGNED BY <i>[Signature]</i>
S.O.W. CONSTR. REP. APPROVAL <i>[Signature]</i>	DATE <i>12/4/74</i>

FINAL DISTRIBUTION  
PROJECT MANAGER  
S.O.W. CONSTR. REP.  
CA DOC. FILE  
CENT. ENGR  
FILE 121.2



DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

After ~~the last~~ reactor trip<sup>4</sup> on Unit II on May 30, 1974, it was impossible to keep the normal operating pressure in the pressurizer with all heater banks on.

It appeared that the yoke bushing threads of the motor-operated valve 2RC-1 are stripped because the shaft does not move in and out of the valve, although the motor runs and indicates closed or open position of 2RC-1 in the control room.

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

To maintain the pressure in the pressurizer, 2RC-3 was closed after the Reactor trip.

With 2RC-3 closed a minimum bypass spray flow of 0.75 gpm is not maintained as per DP 1101-01 section 1.2-5.

Stan Holland and Jim Hampton were informed that keeping RC-3 shut violates limits and precautions and that if they continue to operate, RC-3 should not be opened unless absolutely necessary to minimize the number of cycles on the spray nozzle. Duke was also asked to rewire RC-3 so that it could be throttled to maintain some small continuous spray flow.

Additionally, Mr. V. Miller and Mr. R. Reynolds of Mt. Vernon were contacted in an effort to determine what the effects of frequent cycling of 2RC-3 would be on the pressurizer spray nozzle. Mr. Miller could not provide an absolute number as to the allowable number of cycles, or even what constitutes a cycle; however, he did state that with the pressurizer at normal operating temperature, spray line temperatures as low as 522° F had been analyzed. The results of these analysis indicated that the expected nozzle lifetime was not significantly reduced.

Based on this additional information, Mr. Stan Holland and Duke Power operating personnel were informed that if they were going to cycle 2RC-3 in order to maintain pressurizer boron concentration, then they should cycle the valve at a frequency such that spray line temperature did not decrease to below 522° F. This information was also provided to Duke Power Company in a letter. (Encl. #1)

By June 11, Duke Power Co. had completed electrical modifications to the 2RC-3 operator to allow this valve to be stopped at intermediate positions, thus allowing it to be used as a throttle valve to maintain continuous spray line flow. The valve is now being operated to maintain continuous spray line flow. The data requested by the letter of Enclosure #1 is here included as Enclosure #2. This data is highly suspect, since a brief examination of it will reveal gross discrepancies between time-between cycles, and spray line temperature prior to cycling the valve. These are unexplained at this time.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NPG Nuclear Service

- (1) Originator - Fill in: Customer; Contract Number; Vendor; Purchase Order Number; Task Number; Group Number; Sequence Number; Name; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Recommended by Site Personnel; Originator Signature and Date; Vendor Claim (if applicable).
  - (2) Site Operations Manager - Fill in: SPR Number; Revision Number; Req'd. Resol. Date; Req'd. Comp. Date; Approval Signature; Date.
  - (3) Nuclear Service Support Engineer - Fill in: Cost Category; Authorized Charge Number.
  - (4) Task Engineer - Fill in: Resolution; Recommended Std.'s Change\*; (if applicable, FC Req. and FC Number); Signature and Date.  
  
\*If recommended standard's change, transmit a copy to cognizant Standard Task Engineer to resolve with Standard Plant Manager.
  - (5) Field Engineer - Implement resolution; upon completion, fill in: Completion Report; Date Completed and Signature.
- NOTE: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation and submit revised SPR to the Site Operations Manager.
- (6) Site Operations Manager - Approve completion; sign.

Initiated by B&W Construction Company

- (1) Originator - (Same as (1) above)
- (2) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (2) above)
- (3) Project Manager - (Same as (3) above)
- (4) Task Engineer - (Same as (4) above)
- (5) Construction Co. Site Representative - (Same as (5) and (6) above)

With 2RC-3 in a throttling position, the following data was obtained from Unit II:

Tave = 579° F  
Tc = 553° F  
Pres = 2155  
T (spray line) = 473.5 °F  
Rx. Power = 75%

By comparison, Unit I parameters are shown below:

Tave = 579° F  
Tc = 556° F  
Pres = 2155  
T (spray line) = 482.8  
Rx. Power = 99 + %

The above data should be compared with the transient data of enclosure #2 to determine the validity of RC Spray line temperatures as listed. Note: Spray line thermocouples are on the exterior of the pipe and therefore do not measure true fluid temperature.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL

It is recommended that the data of enclosure 2 be forwarded to Mr. R. Reynolds for analysis of the thermal shocks to which the spray nozzle was subjected. It is further recommended that more definitive information concerning the following be generated for all contracts:

- 1) What temperature differential constitutes a spray nozzle cycle?
- 2) How many cycles are available?
- and 3) Given the same situation repeats itself, what is the best way to operate the system while continuing plant operations?

**Babcock & Wilcox**

*file*  
Encl. (1)

Power Generation Group

P. O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 354 5111

June 5, 1974

SCM 2081

Duke Power Company  
Oconee Nuclear Station  
P. O. Box 1175  
Seneca, South Carolina 29678

Subject: Unit II Spray Line Stop Valve (2RC-3)

Attention: Mr. J. Ed Smith

Dear Mr. Smith:

Recent failure of the spray line valve (2RC-1) in an intermediate position has required that the spray line isolation valve (2RC-3) be shut and opened only as necessary to maintain pressurizer boron concentration.

Mr. Stan Holland and Mr. Jim Hampton were informed by B. & W. personnel that operating with 2RC-3 shut violates limits and precautions, DP 1101-01, in that the minimum required spray flow of 0.75 gpm is not maintained. B. & W. has further recommended that if this method of operation is continued, 2RC-3 should not be operated unless absolutely necessary to minimize the number of temperature transients on the spray nozzle.

An additional factor to consider is the severity of the thermal shock suffered by the spray nozzle each time the valve is cycled. Analysis of temperature transients has been previously performed with 522° F as the limiting minimum spray flow temperature. Thus, it is further recommended that if it is anticipated that continuous cycling of 2RC-3 will be required to prevent excessive boron concentration buildup in the pressurizer, then the valve should be cycled at a frequency such that spray line temperature does not decrease to below 522° F.

While operating the pressurizer in this configuration, it is requested that you log the following data each time 2RC-3 is cycled:

- 1) time at which the valve is opened
- 2) time at which the valve is closed
- 3) temperature in the spray line just prior to opening the valve.

Babcock & Wilcox

SOM Letter # 2091  
June 5, 1974  
Oconee - Unit II

Based on conversations with Unit II operating personnel and Mr. Stan Holland of Duke Power Company, this data is now being logged. It is additionally recommended that you consider re-wiring the controller for 2 PC-3 such that the valve may be partially opened in order to maintain a small continuous spray flow.

Yours truly,

*B. L. Day by R. L. Baker, Jr.*

B. L. Day  
Site Operations Manager

JJW/oh

cc: H. J. McConnell  
W. A. Cobb  
H. L. Pittman  
Stan Holland (DPC)  
Loyd Schmid (DPC)  
W. O. Parker (DPC)

2RC-3 Cycling

<u>Date</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>Stop</u>	<u>Temp.</u>
6/11/74	0029	0030	412
	0128	0130	---
	0201	0202	427
	0258	0259	422
	0407	0408	410
	0500	0501	420
	0607	0608	408
	0700	0701	417
	0857	0858	393
	0922	0923	443
	1025	1025	425
	1046	1046	450
	1245	1248	400
	1416	1419	450
1522	1524	460	
6/11/74	1639	1633	560.9
	1801	1802	566.6
	1901	1903	564.0
	2006	2007	562.9
	2126	2128	565.5
	2305	2307	561.7
	0100	0103	394.7
	0243	0244	428.2
	0317	0318	442.8
	0406	0407	424.8
	0501	0503	419.5
	0624	0625	428.5
	0705	0707	431.9
6/9/74	2203	2204	414.6
	2301	2302	416.4
6/10/74	0101	0102	394
	0204	0205	411
	0303	0304	412
	0402	0403	414
	0505	0506	412
	0606	0607	413
	0701	0702	417
	0805	0806	413
	0925	0926	406
	1103	1104	399
	1206	1207	424
	1304	1305	427
	1401	1402	421
	1503	1504	424

Babcock & Wilcox

Enclosure #2  
 SFR 193 - Oconee II  
 June 14, 1974  
 Page 2 of 3

<u>Date</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>Stop</u>	<u>Temp.</u>
6/10/74 (cont'd)	1602	1603	417.2
	1703	1704	417
	1759	1800	415.4
	1903	1904	413.0
	2015	2016	405.6
	2046	2047	434.9
	2207	2208	418.8
	2301	2302	412.4

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time Open</u>	<u>Time Shut</u>	<u>Spray Line Temperature</u>
6/8/74	1237	1238	374.8
	1333	1334	421.7
	1433	1434	416.2
	1534	1535	418.3
	1623	1624	425.3
	1807	1808	400.9
	1902	1903	425.2
	2002	2003	415.8
	2124	2125	407.7
	2202	2203	430.6
6/8/74	2300	2301	425.3
6/9/74	0014	0015	452.8
	0118	0119	414.3
	0205	0206	425.7
	0303	0304	418.7
	0405	0406	421.3
	0528	0529	407.8
	0603	0603	437.9
	0702	0703	423.2
6/9/74	0822	0823	408.1
	0929	0931	413
	1018	1019	432.9
	1109	1110	424.2
	1220	1220	430.1
	1329	1329	561.4
	1555	1556	412.4
	1741	1742	397.5
	1809	1810	438.7
	1902	1903	420.9
	2008	2009	413.5
	2104	2105	416.4
6/4/74	0619	0620	371.9
	1030	1031	564.5
	1144	1145	560.3
	1229	1250	560.4
	1342	1343	561.1

after } ?

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time Open</u>	<u>Time Shut</u>	<u>Spray Line Temperature</u>
6/4/74	1430	1431	564.5
	1529	1530	561.3
	1710	1711	566
	1915	1916	566.7
	2041	2041	564.7
	2145	2145	558.5
	2239	2240	558.2
	2348	2349	558.3
	6/5/74	0150	0153
0258		0259	427
0353		0354	429
6/6/74	0322	0323	420
6/7/74	0055	0056	---
	0900	0901	566
	1008	1009	566

JGW/bh

Between 5/30 and 6/4 no records were kept on cycling RL-3, but I don't feel that the valve was cycled more than 40 times during this time.

*R. Baber*



4-753

**SITE PROBLEM REPORT**

DASCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER	Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO.	00-0004	SPR NO.	00	REV. NO.	0
VENDOR	Rockwell Int'l Co.	TASK NO.	08	ECLIP NO.	01	SEP NO.	01
SITE ENGINEER	K. H. Fischer	REQ'D RESOL. DATE		REQ'D COMP. DATE			

TITLE: **NO-1 FAILED IN OPEN POSITION**

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

*SEE ATTACHED*  
*Will clear 12/5/74*

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

*SEE ATTACHED*

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

Lynchburg inform site as to when the smaller operators for this valve will be shipped, and how many cycles the spray nozzle is designed for.

K. H. Fischer *5/13/74* *R. B. Reynolds* *5/13/74*

RESOLUTION:

APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE	DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER	<i>[Signature]</i>	<i>[Date]</i>
TASK ENGINEER		
PROJECT MANAGER		

CODE CATEGORY:  NORM  C  D  G  L  VENDOR CLAIM

CHARGE NO.  FIELD CHANGE REQ. FC NO.

COMPLETION REPORT

*See letter to R.B. Reynolds letter <sup>FC 201</sup> ~~...~~*  
*... no damage occurred to spray nozzle.*  
*... change operator when it arrives on site. O-We*  
*... operator with 1/2 speed motor. Valve*  
*... placing site...*

RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE

FINAL DISTRIBUTION:

SEE SPP REV. NO. *SEE Rev 1*

SIGNED BY *R. B. Reynolds*

DATE *5/13/74*

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

After the last reactor trip on Unit II on May 30, 1974, it was impossible to keep the normal operating pressure in the pressurizer with all heater banks on.

It appeared that the yoke bushing threads of the motor-operated valve ZRC-1 are stripped because the shaft does not move in and out of the valve, although the motor runs and indicates closed or open position of ZRC-1 in the control room.

STATUS - ACTION & DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

To maintain the pressure in the pressurizer ZRC-3 was closed after the Reactor trip.

With ZRC-3 closed a minimum bypass spray flow of 0.75 gpm is not maintained as per DP 1101-01 section 1.2-5.

Stan Holland and Jim Hampton were informed that keeping RC-3 shut violates limits and precautions and that if they continue to operate, RC-3 should not be opened unless absolutely necessary to minimize the number of cycles on the spray nozzle. Duke was also asked to rewire RC-3 so that it could be throttled to maintain some small continuous spray flow. As yet this has not been done, but Duke is checking into it.

At this time, Duke is sampling the pressurizer for Boron every 8 hrs, and opening RC-3 only if the pressurizer boron concentration is not within  $\pm 10$  ppm of the RC System Boron Concentration.

Duke has been asked to keep a log of the number of times RC-3 is opened and the spray line temperature just before RC-3 is opened.

Ted Stables has been informed about this problem.  
See Source I, SFR - 570 for same problem.

BIB/KHF/zh

MODIFICATION REQUEST

DATE:

1

STATION:  
Oconee

2

APPLICABLE TO:

3

UNIT 1 - YES ( ) NO (X)  
UNIT 2 - YES (X) NO ( )  
UNIT 3 - YES ( ) NO (X)

REV:

10 - 0

5

STRUCTURE, SYSTEM OR COMPONENT AFFECTED:

Reactor Coolant

6

DESCRIPTION OF MODIFICATION:

Modify valve 2RC-3 preher seal in circuit such that the valve can be operated as a throttle valve rather than open-closed type.

7

REFERENCES:

- 1. PO 1004-2 H-3
- 2.
- 3.

8

ATTACHMENTS:

- 1. SAFETY ANALYSIS ATTACHED ( ) YES (X) NO
- 2.
- 3.

9

JUSTIFICATION FOR MODIFICATION: With normal pressurizer spray valve 2RC-1 operable we need the capability of maintaining a small, continuous spray flow to the pressurizer for the following reasons.

10

- 1. Prevent B<sup>10</sup> concentration buildup in pressurizer.
- 2. Prevent excessive thermal cycle of the pressurizer spray nozzle.
- 3. Allow continuation of certain portions of the 75% power test program.

REQUEST ORIGINATED BY:

NAME: S. A. Holland  
DEPARTMENT: Oconee-Operations  
ASSIGNMENT: Assistant Operating Engineer

11

PRESANT STATUS

(ACTION TO DATE, PERCENT COMPLETED ETC.)  
None

12

PRIORITY:

- 1. ( ) REQUIRED PRIOR TO SOON AS POSSIBLE FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
- 2. (X) REQUIRED FOR PROPER SYSTEM OR UNIT OPERATION.
- 3. ( ) DESIRABLE FOR PROPER SYSTEM OR UNIT OPERATION.

13

THREATENED TO PROTECT:

14

SAFETY-RELATED ( ) YES (X) NO ( )  
Per Policy 20.1.1.1

15

APPROVED:

DATE:

*[Signature]*  
6/14/68

This Modification Involves an unreviewed safety modification change in technical specifications ( ) YES (X) NO

16

C. A. CREASY

BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

4 25 1974

To	Pressurizer Task Engineer R.B. Reynolds - Component Management - NPGD-CE -Mt. Vernon
From	Lead Engineer (Ext. 319) U.R. Miller - Mechanical Design, NPGD-CE - Mt. Vernon

BOS 663-5

Cust.	Duke Power Company	File No. or Ref.	2.5.2 620-0004-59
Subj.	SPR 193 Rev. 1	Date	July 19, 1974

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

The subject Site Problem Report described a condition where the spray valve was shut and opened periodically. When the valve was shut, the fluid in the spray line lost heat to the atmosphere and, thus, the fluid temperature decreased. When the valve was opened, the cooler water in the spray line came in contact with the pressurizer spray nozzle. Mechanical Design has conducted a simplified, yet conservative, analysis that shows that the fatigue life of the pressurizer spray nozzle has not been significantly affected by the conditions presented in the subject SPR.

If you have any questions and/or comments, please call.

*U.R. Miller*  
U. R. Miller

C. A. CREASY:

lab  
Attachments

THIS SHOULD RESOLVE  
SPR 193 R+V.1. IF THERE  
ARE ANY QUESTION, PLEASE  
CALL.

*R.B. Reynolds*

JUSTIFICATION FOR SPR 1973 NEVI CONTRACT 620-0004-59

WHEN THE SPRAY VALVE WAS SHUT, THE FLUID IN THE SPRAY LINE COOLED. WHEN THE SPRAY VALVE WAS OPENED, THE COOLER WATER WAS FORCED THRU THE PRESSURIZER SPRAY NOZZLE. THE FOLLOWING CALCULATIONS INDICATE THAT THE RESULTING THERMAL STRESSES IN THE SPRAY NOZZLE HAD NO APPRECIABLE EFFECT ON THE FATIGUE LIFE OF THE NOZZLE.

ASSUMPTIONS.

1. THE INITIAL SPRAY NOZZLE TEMPERATURE IS 650°F
2. THE NOZZLE IS SHOCKED WITH 375°F WATER
3. THE DURATION OF TIME THE COOL WATER IS IN CONTACT WITH THE PRESSURIZER SPRAY NOZZLE IS SMALL.

ANALYSIS

THE EFFECT OF THE COLD WATER IS TO PRODUCE THERMAL SKIN STRESSES IN THE NOZZLE. SINCE THE CARBON STEEL PART OF THE NOZZLE IS PROTECTED BY A THERMAL SLEEVE, IT WILL NOT EXPERIENCE A TEMPERATURE CHANGE. THE SKIN STRESS FOR THE STAINLESS SECTION MAY BE CONSERVATIVELY ESTIMATED BY

$$\sigma_H = \sigma_L = 1.43 E \alpha \Delta T$$

WHERE

$$E = 26 \times 10^6 \text{ PSI}$$

$$\alpha = 9.96 \times 10^{-6} / ^\circ\text{F} \text{ INSTANTANEOUS VALUE AT } 400^\circ\text{F}$$

$$\Delta T = 650 - 375 = 275^\circ\text{F}$$

BABCOCK & WILCOX

DEPARTMENT MECHANICAL ENGINEERING

DATE 7-19-74 BY (U) 11

REVISION

$$\therefore \sigma_H = \sigma_L = 1.43(26 \times 9.56)(275) = 101836 \text{ PSI}$$

$$S = 102 \text{ KSI}$$

ALTERNATING STRESS = 51 KSI

FROM FIG N-415(B) ALLOWABLE CYCLES = 20,000

$$\text{USAGE FACTOR} = \frac{\text{TOTAL CYCLES}}{\text{ALL. CYCLES}} = \frac{150}{20,000} = 0.0075$$

CONCLUSION

THE DESCRIBED CONDITION HAD NO SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE FATIGUE LIFE OF THE SPRAY NOZZLE.

BABCOCK & WILCOX  
DEPARTMENT NRC-CE

DATE 7-19-74 BY URM

REVISION

SIT PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

To P. F. SHELTON For Action

File 1242

CONTRACT 620-00

04

SPR

193 (REV 1)

TITLE

2 RC-1 FAILED

To W. A. COBB For Information

IN OPEN POSITION

C. A. CRESLEY

DATE

7/30/74

Date Final Resolution Required by Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: P. F. SHELTON IS REQUESTED TO REVIEW THIS SPR AND PROVIDE NSSE WITH AN ANSWER TO SITR'S QUESTION: "GIVEN THE SAME SITUATION REPEATS ITSELF, WHAT IS THE BEST WAY TO OPERATE THE SYSTEM WHILE CONTINUING PLANT OPERATIONS?"

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support Engineer. Please reply immediately whether answer is final or preliminary.

cc:

C. C. Plunkett-Contract Admin.  
Central Engineering Files

J. H. Kaelin

L. C. ROGERS

B. L. DAY

E. L. LOGAN

-QUALITY ASSURANCE

*[Signature]*  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

MANICUR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

CHARGE No. \_\_\_\_\_

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

Project Manager

SIT PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

File 13M2

CONTRACT 620-00 04

SPR 193 Rev 1

TITLE 2RC-1 FAILED

IN OPEN POSITION

DATE 7/15/74

R.B. REYNOLDS For Action

To C.A. CREACY For Information

Date Final Resolution Required by  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: L.B. REYNOLDS IS REQUESTED TO EVALUATE THE  
TRANSIENT EFFECTS ON THE SPRAY NOZZLE AND RESPOND  
TO NSSE AS REQUESTED BY THIS SPR. (REPLY MEMO  
ATTACHED)

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support

Engineer. Please reply immediately

whether answer is final or preliminary.

[Signature]  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

- cc: ~~Division~~
- C. C. Plunkett-Contract Admin.
- ~~Central Engineering Files~~
- ~~By Value and NSQ Quality Assurance~~
- ~~J. F. Kennedy~~
- ~~J. H. Austin~~
- ~~R. J. McConnell~~
- ~~J. D. Finney~~
- B. L. DAY

MANHOUR LIMITS 40 Hrs CC 314

COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

CHARGE No. 620-0004-08-07

APPROVED: SEE ATTACHED PAGE  
Project Manager



SITE PROBLEM REPORT TRANSMITTAL

To R.B. Rignolds For Action

File 1342  
CONTRACT 620-00 04

SPR 193 REV 1

TITLE SPR 1 TAIL

To C.A. Cracy For Information  
PERSONAL MAILING

IN (P) (D) (P) (T) (H) (A) (S)

DATE 6/20/79

Date Final Resolution Required by Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: R.B. Rignolds is requested to submit the cause of  
error to and report to NSSE as requested by this  
SPR. Reply memo attached

Further information is available in ANSWERED  
the attached memo.  
40

Direct reply in writing to N.S. Support Engineer. Please reply immediately whether answer is final or preliminary.

- cc: C. C. Plunkett-Contract Admin.  
Central Engineering Files  
E. V. DeCarli-NPS Quality Assurance  
E. LOGAN  
J. N. Kaelin  
J. D. Phinney

J.D. Phinney  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer  
J. K. Handling

MANHOUR LIMITS 40 hrs @ 314  
COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
CHARGE No. 620-0004-08-07  
APPROVED: C.A. Cracy  
Project Manager



With EPC-3 in a throttling position, the following data was obtained from Unit II:

? Tave = 579° F    WHAT IS Tc + Tave    Tc = RCS COLD LEG TEMP. (REACTOR INLET)  
 Tc = 558° F  
 Prcs = 2155  
 T (spray line) = 473.5° F  
 Rx. Power = 75%

By comparison, Unit I parameters are shown below:

? Tave = 579° F    WHAT IS Tc + Tave  
 Tc = 556° F  
 Prcs = 2155  
 T (spray line) = 482.8  
 Rx. Power = 99 + %

The above data should be compared with the transient data of enclosure #2 to determine the validity of RC Spray line temperatures as listed. Note: Spray line thermocouples are on the exterior of the pipe and therefore do not measure true fluid temperature.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL

~ 2" MIRROR INSULATION YES...

It is recommended that the data of enclosure 2 be forwarded to Mr. R. Reynolds for analysis of the thermal shocks to which the spray nozzle was subjected. It is further recommended that more definitive information concerning the following be generated for all contracts:

- 1) What temperature differential constitutes a spray nozzle cycle? 100° F
- 2) How many cycles are available? ∞ if less than 100° F
- and 3) Given the same situation repeats itself, what is the best way to operate the system while continuing plant operations?

2 LYNCH.  
 SYSTEMS WILL  
 ANSWER QDS.

21C-3 Cycling

SPRAY LINE  
 TEST RESULTS

Date	Start	Stop	Temp.	
6/11/74	0029	0030	412	
	0128	0130	---	
	0201	0202	427	
	0258	0259	422	
	0407	0408	410	
	0500	0501	420	
	0607	0608	408	
	0700	0701	417	
	0857	0858	393	
	0922	0923	443	
	1025	1025	425	
	1046	1046	450	
	1245	1248	400	
	1416	1419	450	
	1522	1524	460	
6/11/74	1630	1633	560.9	
	1801	1802	566.6	
	1901	1903	564.0	
	2006	2007	562.9	
	2126	2128	565.5	
	2305	2307	561.7	
	0100	0103	394.7	
	0243	0244	428.2	
	0317	0318	442.8	
	0406	0407	424.2	
	0501	0503	419.5	
	0624	0625	428.5	
	0705	0707	431.9	
	6/9/74	2203	2204	414.6
		2301	2302	416.4
6/10/74	0101	0102	394	
	0204	0205	411	
	0303	0304	412	
	0402	0403	414	
	0505	0506	412	
	0606	0607	413	
	0701	0702	417	
	0805	0806	413	
	0925	0926	406	
	1103	1104	399	
	1206	1207	424	
	1304	1305	427	
	1401	1402	421	
	1503	1504	424	

1. 11/11/74  
 TEST RESULTS  
 OF THE  
 PUMP  
 ...  
 ... ~ 648°F  
 (SAT. TEMP. FOR 2155 PSIG)

SPRAY NOZZLE ~ 648°F  
 THEREFORE, TEMP. ~  
 NOZZLE WOULD DECREASE.  
 THE AMOUNT DEPENDING  
 UPON SPRAY LINE TEMP.  
 PRIOR TO OPENING VALVE.

<u>Date</u>	<u>Start</u>	<u>Stop</u>	<u>Temp.</u>
6/10/74 (cont'd)	1602	1603	417.2
	1703	1704	417
	1759	1800	415.4
	1903	1904	413.0
	2015	2016	405.6
	2046	2047	434.9
	2207	2208	418.8
6/10/74	2301	2302	412.4

<u>Date</u>	<u>Time Open</u>	<u>Time Shut</u>	<u>Spray Line Temperature</u>	
6/8/74	1237	1238	374.8	
	1333	1334	421.7	
	1433	1434	416.2	
	1534	1535	418.3	
	1623	1624	425.3	
	1807	1808	400.9	
	1902	1903	425.2	
	2002	2003	415.8	
	2124	2125	407.7	
	2202	2203	430.6	
	2300	2301	425.3	
6/8/74	0014	0015	452.8	
6/9/74	0118	0119	414.3	
	0205	0206	425.7	
	0303	0304	418.7	
	0405	0406	421.3	
	0528	0529	407.8	
	0603	0603	437.9	
	0702	0703	423.2	
	6/9/74	0822	0823	408.1
		0929	0931	413
		1018	1019	432.9
		1109	1110	424.2
1220		1220	430.1	
1329		1329	561.4	
1555		1556	412.4	
1741		1742	397.5	
1809		1810	438.7	
1902		1903	420.9	
2008		2009	413.5	
2104	2105	416.4		
6/11/74	0619	0620	371.9	
	1030	1031	564.5 after }	
	1144	1145	560.3	
	1229	1250	560.4	
	1342	1343	561.1	

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To W.C. BUTT - NSE For Information FILE: 13M2  
R.G. BURNLEY - NSE Contract 620-00 03  
G. KULYNCH - Sr. Project Manager SPR 444  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin. TITLE RC V1 STEAM  
Central Engineering Files LEAK  
E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance DATE 6-4-73  
R.J. McCONNELL - S.O.M. (2)

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: / A. S. Embrey / E. G. Ward  
/ G. E. Kulynych / J. Kaelin - Arkansas  
/ J. McFarland / J. Kennedy - SMUD  
/ C. M. Olds / K. Suhrke  
/ R. T. Schomer / H. Worsham  
/ J. Phinney - MET ED

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 444 which has been processed on Contract 620-00 03. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: Refer also to SPR 461 for related problems.

cc:

R.J. Maggi  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company CONTRACT NO. NSS 3 SPR NO. 444 SPR REV. NO. 2

VENDOR Rockwell P.O. NO. 31480 COMP. NO. 28 GROUP NO. 41 SEQ. NO. 2

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_ PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DWG NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SITE ENGINEER H. Hennicke EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) RCV Steam Leak

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

In addition to the problems described in Rev. 1, the design of the back seal does not seem to be adequate. (refer to SPR 461).

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

~~RECOMMENDED~~ ACTION ~~RECOMMENDED~~ BY ~~OTHER THAN~~ SITE PERSONNEL  
 Recommended

(1) Re-design back seat.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

TITLE		APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	COMMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
APPROVALS	ORIGINATOR	<i>H. Hennicke</i>	11/7/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
	SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc Specs	
	SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>R. M. Gurnell</i>	11/19/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr Books	
	NS SUPPORT ENGR.	<i>R. L. Patterson</i>	1-22-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
				<input type="checkbox"/> Tech Specs	
PROJECT MANAGER				<input type="checkbox"/> PSAR/FSAR	
DISTRIBUTION		Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> None <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> L	Auth Charge No.	<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended	
SITE OPS MANAGER		RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.	Pers Completed _____	<input type="checkbox"/> Stds. Change	
PROJECT MANAGER			By: _____	Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.				Field Change No. _____	
COGNIZANT ENGR.		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED	DEVIATIONS		
CONTRACT ADMIN.			<input type="checkbox"/> NONE		
NPG QA			<input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____		
FILE 12M2 <u>SPR 444</u>					

INSTRUCTIONS FOR (DS-2109) - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by Nuclear Service.

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.  
 Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, (b) Indicate "Not Required" in space provided for project manager's approval, and (c) Distribute as indicated in step 5 below.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are to be incurred, approve SPR and forward to project manager for approval (step 4).  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-07; obtain field change No. from project manager, and indicate field change No. on SPR.
4. PROJECT MANAGER - Approve SPR and Return to Nuclear Service Support Engineer.
5. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - Distribute in Accordance With Procedure No. NPG-0402-04; Initial Action Taken Box (on Support Engineer's File Copy) When Documents Affected Have Been Corrected.
6. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.  
 Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-04. Return completed SPR to nuclear service support engineer.

Initiated by B&W Construction Company

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer. Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.  
 Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. PROJECT MANAGER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, and (b) Distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are to be incurred, obtain abnormal cost charge No. from contract administration; approve and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-07; assign field change No., have approved and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.
4. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.  
 Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05. Return completed SPR to the project manager.



SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX-MPG

CUSTOMER	Duke Power Company	CONTRACT NO.	620-303	SPR NO.	444	SFR REV. NO.	1
VENDOR	Rockwell	P. O. NO.	081480	COMP. NO.	28	GROUP NO.	41
PRIMARY DOCUMENTS:						PRIORITY	
SPEC NOS.		EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE				1	
DWG NO.		QA LEVEL				QA SPEC NO.	
SITE ENGINEER	J. L. Hollis	EARLY START DATE	ACTUAL START DATE		REQ'D COMP. DATE		

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) RCVA Steam Leak

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

1. Valve has excessive travel and yoke bushing threads were cut by stem.
2. During Replacement of yoke bushing, steam was leaking past RC 3.
3. Valve could not be packed without removal of operator and yoke bushing.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

See Attached Sheet

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL Rockwell to inspect valve disk, disk nut, and stem to determine reason for failure. Rockwell to bring Service engineer from Raleigh Plant and limitorque Service rep to inspect RC-3 and RC-1 after HPT.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
ORIGINATOR	<i>J. L. Hollis</i>	1-4-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>A. M. Bennett</i>	1-4-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
NS SUPPORT ENGR.	<i>R. L. Pittman</i>	1-9-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
			<input type="checkbox"/> PSAB/PSAR	
PROJECT MANAGER			<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Side Change	

DISTRIBUTION SITE OPS MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER N. S. SUPPORT ENGR. COGNIZANT ENGR. CONTRACT ADMIN. NPG QA FILE 12M2 SPR 444	Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> Norm <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> I	Auth. Charge No. _____ Date Completed _____ By: _____	Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/> Field Change No. _____
	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.	OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. 0

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NUCLEAR SERVICE

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Item; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature, Date.  
 Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, (b) Indicate "Not Required" in space provided for project manager's approval, and (c) Distribute as indicated in step 4 below.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are to be incurred, approve SPR and forward to project manager for approval (step 4).  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-02; obtain field change No. from project manager, and indicate field change No. on SPR.
4. PROJECT MANAGER - Approve SPR and Return to Nuclear Service Support Engineer.
5. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - Distribute in Accordance With Procedure No. NPG-0402-04; Initial Action Taken Box (on Support Engineer's File Copy) When Documents Affected Have Been Corrected.
6. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.  
 Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-04. Return completed SPR to nuclear service support engineer.

Initiated by B&W Construction Company

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature, Date.  
 Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. PROJECT MANAGER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, and (b) Distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are to be incurred, obtain abnormal cost charge No. from contract administration; approve and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-02; assign field change No., have approved and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.
4. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.  
 Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05. Return completed SPR to the project manager.

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE

1. Status - valve bonnet, stem, disk assembly, gland assy's replaced with RC-1 parts from Unit II. Spline gear which connects stem to limiter torque operator also replaced. Valve placed back in limited service until completion of HPT, i.e. not to be used except during cooldown.
2. Action - Inspected valve internals with Clinton L. Sumrall (Sales Representative) of the Atlanta sales office of Rockwell.

Mr. Sumrall took valve internals with him to ship to the Raleigh, NC plant for analysis and expects to have an answer/analysis for reason of failure by 1/4/73.

He also agreed to try and have a service representative from the Raleigh, NC Rockwell Plant and a limiter torque representative here on site on 1/8/73 for RC-1 and RC-3 removal and inspection.

Mr. Sumrall said that this valve is designed to back seat to a limit switch - not a torque switch, and that this is set in the Raleigh Plant prior to shipment. He agreed that the limit switch apparently failed or was improperly set.

Upon inspection of the stem Mr. Sumrall said that we probably had a bad stem, i.e. the flanged end which keeps the stem attached to the disk and disk nut assembly was too thin. The stem should be  $\approx 3/8$  inches thick and appears to have been  $\approx 1/16$  inch at most.

\* During replacement of yoke bushing by DPC they found that the valve cannot be repacked without removing the valve operator and yoke bushing. This is due to the size of the bonnet being so small that the gland seal and lantern gland, when pulled back for packing prohibits the insertion of packing below the lantern gland. Mr. Sumrall agrees that this is an unsatisfactory design and stated that Rockwell has extended bonnets which would allow packing with operator in place. He agreed to investigate the possibility of supplying these longer bonnets (this would also require a longer stem) but, was not sure what the delivery date would be or who would pay. See photo #3

NOTE: Mr. P. Burnley, B & W Engineering, indicates that the following 83 valves at this site are of the same design. We do not know which, if any, have the longer bonnet and valve stem.

B & W valve #'s for Oconee I, II, & III.

<u>#</u>	<u>SIZE</u>
ECV-1, 5	(2 1/2")
CFV-2A, 2B, & 3A, 3B	(1")
CAV-1, 2, 3, 4A, 4B, 5A, 5B	(1" or 1/2")
EPV-1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 3	(2 1/2")
EPV-4, 43A, 43B, 43C, 43D	(1 1/2")
EPV-12, 13, 24A, 24B	(4")

Oconee I only (Westinghouse Pumps)

<u>#</u>	<u>SIZE</u>
EPV-15, 49	(1")

2. Inspection of valve shows the following: *See photo #1*

Stem - End of stem has separated below disk nut. Stem shows evidence of excessive wear at disk end  $\approx$  2 inches and is marked on the entire length.

*See photo #1*

Disk - Disk back seat (on disk nut) is heavily scored while main seat remains in good condition. The inner surface of the disk nut is heavily scored with material deposited on it, possibly from stem.


Question: Should the contact area on the end of the stem and the disk nut be of a bearing material? When the valve is back seated this area has force and twist applied and will therefore, have a cutting action if limit switch fails.

The disk nut tack weld was drilled out and the disk & disk nut were inspected.

a. The bottom of the disk nut shows evidence of wear on the inside diameter surface. *See photo #2*


b. A bronze colored ring was found loose under the disk nut. Thickness was .017 to .030 inches

*See photo #2*



c. Under stem there is an area which could be the stellite bearing pushed and broken, or it could be the bottom of the stem,  $\approx$  1/32 of an inch thick. This piece is pushed into a groove in the body of the disk

*See photo #2*




*Holes through disk*

Yoke Bushing - Inner threads stripped out in a coil when the unthreaded portion of the stem was torqued through the bushing.

Junk Ring - Outer surface shows evidence of galling and wear.

Bonnet - Back seat area shown excessive wear as does back seat area of disk nut.

spline - Connects valve stem to operator - shows evidence of excessive wear and has a hair line crack.



SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company CONTRACT NO. 620-0003 SPR NO. 444 SPR REV. NO. 0

VENDOR P.O. NO. COMP. NO. 59 GROUP NO. 10 SEQ NO. 01

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dwg NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_

PRIORITY

SITE ENGINEER R. J. Baker EARLY START DATE ACTUAL START DATE REQ'D COMP. DATE

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) RC - VI Steam Leak

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
  
See Attachment

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
  
None

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
  
Yes, Lynchburg Engineering investigate to see if any damage may have occurred to the spray nozzle.

RECOMMENDED ACTION Resolution

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DEPARTMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
ORIGINATOR	<i>R. J. Baker</i>	12/20/72	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Space	
SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>Sr. R. M. Cornell</i>	12/22/72	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
MS SUPPORT ENGR.	<i>B. H. Allen</i>	12/29/72	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Space	
			<input type="checkbox"/> P&ID/PS&I	
PROJECT MANAGER			<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Site Change	

DISTRIBUTION SITE OPS MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER N. S. SUPPORT ENGR. COGNIZANT ENGR. CONTRACT ADMIN. NPG QA FILE 12M2 _____	Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> Harm <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> I	Auth. Charge No. _____ Date Completed _____ By: _____	Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/> Field Change No. _____
	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.	OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED <p style="text-align: center;">All</p>	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____
	<p style="text-align: right;"><i>Checked R. M. Cornell 5-23-73</i></p>		

INSTRUCTIONS FOR FDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by Nuclear Service

1. **ORIGINATOR - FILL IN:** Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. **SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - FILL IN:** SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.  
Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. **NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - FILL IN:** Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, (b) Indicate "Not Required" in space provided for project manager's approval, and (c) Distribute as indicated in step 4 below.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are to be incurred, approve SPR and forward to project manager for approval (step 4).  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-03; obtain field change No. from project manager, and indicate field change No. on SPR.
4. **PROJECT MANAGER - Approve SPR and Return to Nuclear Service Support Engineer.**
5. **NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - Distribute in Accordance With Procedure No. NPG-0402-04; Initial Action Taken Box (on Support Engineer's File Copy) when Documents affected have been corrected.**
6. **SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.**  
Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-04. Return completed SPR to nuclear service support engineer.

Initiated by BMW Construction Company

1. **ORIGINATOR - FILL IN:** Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. **SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - FILL IN:** SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.  
Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. **PROJECT MANAGER - FILL IN:** Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, and (b) Distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are to be incurred, obtain abnormal cost charge No. from contract administration; approve and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-03; assign field change No., have approved and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.
4. **SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.**  
Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05. Return completed SPR to the project manager.

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

RC - VI developed a steam leak out of the steam leak off connection on 12/18/72. This leak lasted for about 0.5 hours at a rate of about 6 gpm. Plant conditions during this time were as follows:

R. C. Temperature 532°F  
R. C. Pressure 2150 psig  
Pressurizer temperature 645°F  
4 R. C. Pumps running.

To repair the leak, spray flow was secured for 10 minutes by shutting RC 3 and RC 9. Since RC 1 was shut during the leak, and RC 2 was throttled to maintain minimum required spray flow, there probably was no spray flow to the pressurizer for the entire duration of the leak. Instead, the flow probably was out of the pressurizer through the spray nozzle and out RC - VI to the R. B. atmosphere. With RC-VI shut the leak was located on the pressurizer side of RC-VI.

This was in violation of DP 1101 01, section 1.2-6 which requires 0.75 gpm spray flow at all time when RC Temperature is greater than 200°F.

After RC-VI was repaired, spray flow was reinstated very slowly to minimize the thermal shock to the spray nozzle.



THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

RL Lawson

LR ALLEN - PROJECT MANAGEMENT

From

RG BURNLEY - AUX. SYSTEMS (2281)

803 003.5

To

DUKE POWER Co.

File No. NSG-3/1242  
or Ref. NSG-3.4.9/8A30.41

Subj.

ROCKWELL VALVES SPR-444 & 461

Date  
FEBRUARY 2, 1973

This letter is cover one customer and one subject only.

- Ref: 1. SPR - 444 File 1242  
2. SH - 461 " "  
3. Memo AL Lowe, Jr. to LR Allen 1-23-73, SPR-444 File 1242  
4. Ltr., DPCo. to GE Kulyrch, 1-12-73, Subj. Rockwell Valves

The writer and GT Sund (Purchasing) met with Rockwell personnel, Jan. 31, 1973, at their plant in Raleigh N.C. The following Rockwell personnel attended:

Harry O Crane, Product Reliability Manager  
RL Lawson, Chief Product Design Engineer  
JC Morris, Mgr. Customer Service & Sales Orders

The following items were discussed with the objective of formulating resolutions to the problems and questions described in the references noted above:

1. Backseating Problem

The design and effectiveness of the Univalve backseat is questioned by 1 or more of the referenced above. Rockwell disassembled and examined the component parts of RC-V5. We also visually examined these parts and discussed the problem.

Rockwell personnel do not believe that a cause for this backseat leaking can be fixed. They did state that they have thousands of the Univalves in service since 1963, and the design and effectiveness are proven. They also stated that their valves are given a backseat test at shell hydro pressure (5400psig for these valves) with packing in but with the gland loose.

examined

SPR-444 also questioned the backseat design in the stem to disk nut area; the assumption made that the SS stem shoulder rotated against the SS disk nut. Rockwell advises the lower end of the disk nut is in fact stollited (see attachment #1).

Rockwell does not believe it credible that the stem shoulder was only 1/16" thick as was reported in SPR-444. The attached sketch shows the actual size of the component parts and the entire stem is machined from a single piece of bar stock. Based on visual observations by the writer, it appears that the end of the stem was worn away by the grinding action due to repeated

cycling of the valve after initial damage occurred. The two holes in the disk are to prevent pressure buildup in the cavity inside the disk.

2. RC-V3 Cracked Seat & Scored Stem

A dye check was performed on the seat of this valve while we were at Rockwell's plant. There is a small crack across the Stellite seat.

Rockwell feels it is not possible to determine the cause. Although it does not occur with any great frequency, cracks in stellite seats does happen occasionally. Rockwell will either repair this unit or furnish a new one.

The scored stem was visually observed and compared with an actual size detailed drawing. Considering the location of the scored portion, the relative locations of junk ring, lantern gland and travel distance of stem, the scoring had to occur in the lantern ring zone. Again, cause is indeterminate, but it is highly probable that the scoring is the result of the lantern ring being cocked in the stuffing box. Rockwell stated they have never before seen or had reports of this type of damage. If the valve was repacked at the site the lantern ring could have been slightly cocked and subsequent cycling of the valve could have caused the scoring of the stem. There is no evidence or indications on the lantern ring of this, but since the lantern ring is stellite it probably wouldn't show. Rockwell also feels that it is possible the lantern ring could have been slightly cocked when initially installed at the factory. Regardless of how or when the problem occurred. Rockwell will replace this stem-disk assembly.

It was further stated by Rockwell that the inconel wire insert in the John Crane 187-1 packing could not have caused the scoring on the stem.

3. Lantern Ring - Repacking Problem

Without question Rockwell agrees that the arrangement as furnished does not allow repacking the lower stuffing box without removing the operators. It is a design error by Rockwell. They have designed a four piece lantern gland to solve this problem. The new Lantern Glands will consist of 2 pieces of the part shown on Rockwell dwg. B-182952 and the split cylinders part shown on dwg. B182953.

Two sets of these are finished and Rockwell will have the rest completed the week of Feb. 5 for the eleven (11) Geonsee I valves.

4. Grafoil Packing

Grafoil packing was discussed with the Rockwell Raleigh personnel and also with Mr. Roger Norden, Rockwell Pittsburgh. Rockwell has not formally stated their corporate position regarding the use of Grafoil. They pointed out that the test work was performed to establish some data on use of grafoil in valves. They have not done further work than that described in their report V REP 72-1. A portion of Rockwell's report showing their conclusions is reproduced and included as attachment #2. After the conference call with Mr. Norden it was concluded that Rockwell feels that their Univalve is suitable for use with Grafoil packing provided the following items are done properly:

- a. Tolerances are critical. The interference fit recommended by the makers of Grafoil (Union Carbide) must be used - that is a diametrical interference of 0.005" to 0.010" relative to the stuffing box and 0.002" to 0.005" with the stem.
- b. The rings of packing should be inserted two (2) max. at a time and compressed 25 to 35% and the steps repeated for each additional set of two rings.
- c. The user must assure himself that he has obtained the highest quality, low chloride content Grafoil, TYPE GEN.
- d. Some type of special tooling will be required for the Univalve with deep stuffing box such as we have. Rockwell has not developed any tooling or procedures since they feel it is the user's decision, at this point in time, whether or not to use Grafoil.

Please note that with respect to item C above, Rockwell is aware of a report from some plant where Grafoil was installed in various valves. Subsequently, it was found that there was severe pitting of valve stems and it was later confirmed that the Grafoil used had 1200 ppm leachable chlorides. It is reported today that Union Carbide now designates the grafoil for nuclear use as GEN. It is more expensive and the manufacture performs additional work to assure that chlorides are 200 ppm or less. It is also reported that this designated packing is being supplied with sacrificial metal wafers for insertion between rings of packing to prevent corrosion attack on the valve stems.

5. Rockwell will submit failure analysis reports on both RC-V1 and RC-V5.

#### Summary and Recommendations:

1. The Univalve backseat design is considered more than adequate and effective by Rockwell.
2. Replacement parts for RC-V1 are being manufactured. Rockwell will not assume responsibility since the damage was not due to design or faulty components.
3. Replacement parts for RC-V5 are being supplied by Rockwell at their expense since the damage is of indeterminate cause.
4. New lantern glands to allow repacking without removing operators are being supplied by Rockwell at their expense.
5. BW should advise the customer that if they choose to use Grafoil it should be their responsibility because there are too many unknowns about Grafoil. Also, at the time BW purchased these valves, Grafoil was unknown; therefore BW should not be expected to retro fit. There could be additional problems such as extrusions of the Grafoil in valves which do not have the junk ring and close tolerances that are characteristic of the Rockwell Univalve.
6. The stem material used in the Rockwell valves is not the 400 series stainless steel referred to in the DPCo letter, reference 4. The stems were to ASTM Spec A-1 grade (30 17-4 PH. Mr. AL Lowe's memo. Ref. 3, covers this subject.

Based on this writing, SFR's 444 & 461 should be cleared.


RCB: jgc

CC: WC Butt w/att  
TA Mong w/att  
RL Pittman w/att  
O Putzgruber w/att  
K Schroeder w/att  
T Stables w/att  
GT Sund w/att

*R. G. Beverly*

DETAIL OF UNIVALVE DISK ARRANGEMENT

OBTAINED FROM ROCKWELL MFG. RALPHIGH, N.C. 1-31-73



ATTACHMENT #1

RGB 2-1-73



FIGURE 5—Grafoil Packing, Test Nos. 1 thru 5, Bonnet No. 17. This is one of the original Grafoil stuffing boxes. Note the almost complete absence of crystal deposits around the stem and gland.

*Grafoil* is essentially expanded graphite produced by subjecting flake, powder or chip graphite particles, with a high degree of atom orientation, to an oxidizing medium such as sulfuric acid and nitric acid. The oxidizing agent forms openings between the layers of carbon networks in the graphite. When removed from the acid and then rapidly heated, the gas trapped within the graphite layers expands, in turn expanding the graphite. This expanded mass is then compressed or compacted to the desired density by mechanically rolling, producing a sheet material. An expansion of 80 to 200 times the original thickness is preferred because this will produce a cohesive sheet material without the need for binders, leaving the product virtually pure graphite.

Graphite has excellent mechanical properties at elevated temperatures, good friction properties, is radiation resistant and chemically inert, and possesses the necessary basic properties of a good compression packing material for nuclear service. Other packing materials possess many of these same properties, particularly the graphite filament packings, but one important property all the others lack is a high resistance to compression set. It is this characteristic, the ability to maintain its preload on the valve stem and stuffing box walls despite thermal and pressure cycling, that makes *Grafoil* an exceptional packing material.

While most packings lose weight from temperature exposure (due to a loss of volatiles), *Grafoil* does not, and in fact, weighed samples showed an increase due to probable moisture absorption. Sets removed from bonnets 5, 15 and 17 averaged a 27 percent weight increase. By comparison, *J-C 1871X* lost an average four percent. *J-C 1625GF* was not evaluated but it should not show significant change.

In regard to the second question, the reason for the two *Grafoil* failures: it was concluded that these resulted from the fact that the rings were not tailored dimensionally for the Univalve stuffing box. That is, the manufacturer recommends a diametrical interference of 0.005 to 0.010" relative to the stuffing box and 0.002 to 0.005" with the stem. For unknown reasons, the rings used apparently did not provide these fits. A review of the valve dimensions and the probable packing dimensions, based on unused rings, shows that the two failed *Grafoil* packings, bonnets 3 and 15, probably had clearances of several thousandths around the bottom rings. The top rings probably ranged from zero to 0.002" interference, still less than half the minimum 0.005". Performing a similar analysis on the other five sets, all of which performed very well with minimum crystal deposits only, all had some interference on both or either of the top and bottom rings, ranging from a probable

minimum of 0.001" to 0.004" maximum. This is still not the optimum five to ten thousandths, but does support the "improper fit" theory.

A review of the leakage of the *Grafoil* sets shows that all but one of the seven had fewer deposits around the stem compared to the gland O.D., suggesting the fit with the stuffing box was not perfect. (This was an anomaly at first, because static seals are normally superior to a stem, or moving seal.) It is, therefore, most important that *Grafoil* rings are designed to fit the specific dimensional range (i.e., including normal manufacturing tolerances) of the valve stuffing box. It may not be possible to use "off the shelf" rings, and communication with the *Grafoil* supplier must be adequate to assure that the proper rings are manufactured.

Comments on the appearances of the packings observed during the post-test examinations may also be of interest. *Grafoil* was essentially unchanged, except that it could not be removed easily as whole rings and would break into layers. The *J-C 1625GF* graphite filament packings varied considerably, some being intact as when installed and others breaking down into very short fibers. Some rings were much like new, still soft and resilient, while others were hard and stiff. Some were rather wet, others very dry. It would appear that high mechanical loading causes the fibers of *J-C 1625GF* to fracture. The *J-C 1871X* packing was generally somewhat harder and less resilient than when new. In summary, the greatest change was shown by *J-C 1625GF*, the least by *Grafoil*.

Operating torques of the valve stems were never excessive, except for packing E-1 in Tests 1 and 2. *Grafoil* in particular had rather low stem operating torques at full operating pressures.

## CONCLUSIONS

1. Traditional braided asbestos-graphite impregnated packings are not recommended for critical nuclear services where high pressure borated water is encountered and periodic gland adjustments cannot be performed.

2. Most packings fail by compression set, or a loss of resiliency, thereby removing the preload necessary for an effective, maintenance-free stem seal.

3. Union Carbide *Grafoil* packing is superior to all other types examined in this project in terms of sealability and minimal maintenance, due to its inherent properties of inertness, temperature and radiation resistance, and freedom from compression set.

4. *Grafoil* packing can be satisfactorily installed in valves now in service with standard dimensions and finishes without extraordinary cleaning procedures.

5. When installing *Grafoil* in new or used valves, the manufacturer's specifications for interference fits with both the stuffing box bore and stem diameter must be followed for low leakage performance.

6. A composite packing using one *Grafoil* ring and *J-C 1625GF* for the other rings will greatly reduce the cost of a full *Grafoil* system, but at the probable expense of higher leakage and shorter service life.



The author wishes to thank the packing manufacturers for their assistance in conducting these tests. In particular, the cooperation of the Crane Packing Company and the Union Carbide Corporation is acknowledged, which enabled testing to proceed with minimum delay in several instances when additional test samples were needed.

ATTACHMENT #2



B-2953

R	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L
	P	Q	R	S	T	U	V	W	X	Y	Z	



STEP #1

STEP #2

REV	CHG. NO.	DATE	BY	PART NO.	MAKE FROM	MATERIAL	REMARKS
				182954		02820	
				182953		02710	

GENERAL TOLERANCES		Rockwell	
±		2 1/2 30 28 J	
±		WEB, LANTERN GLAND	
±		SUPER B-20 24 18 15 10 8 6 4 3 2 1 0	
±		SIZES PER ASTM A 1.15	
±		DRWN	CHKD
±		APPR	DATE
±		SCALE	2X
±		DATE	11.5
±		CHARACTER 1ST THREAD	8-182953

PRINTED IN U.S.A.



THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To	K. SCHEMMEER - MANAGER - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS	
From	L. R. ALLEN, ASSOCIATE PROJECT MANAGER (EXT. 2510)	
Cust.	DUKE POWER COMPANY	File No. or Ref. 12E28
Subj.	PRESSURIZER - SPRAY VALVE	Date 3/29/73

EDS 663.5

This letter is cover one customer and one subject only.

Reference: Memo R.G. Burnley to K. Schroeder dated March 16, 1973,  
Subject: Pressurizer Spray Line Valve Leakage Problems  
(RC-V1 & RC-V5)

The referenced memo summarized the observations made and the conclusions drawn during the site visit made by Messrs. Butt, Burnley, and Putzgruber. I feel that this visit was helpful and that this memo provides badly needed documentation to this problem.

I am attaching for your information, Product Specification M202 which describes Belfab's nuclear valve stem bellows. During a recent visit to Belfab I discussed this product with Chuck Turcotte and Bob Rhein. Belfab is currently fabricating several of these bellows, Model B150, for Copps-Vulcan. These valves will be installed in a Westinghouse plant. I was not able to determine what service these valves, only that it was high pressure, high temperature, borated water service. I understand that these are globe valves in the 2 1/2" to 4" size range.

It may be worthwhile to pursue this with Copps-Vulcan in the event we continue to experience problems with the Rockwell valves.

  
L. R. Allen

IRA:ch  
cc: W. C. Butt  
K. G. Burnley  
O. Putzgruber  
R. L. Pittman  
K. V. Straub

Attachment

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To

K. SCROFLEPP - MANAGER - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS

From

R. G. BURNLEY - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS (2281)

Cust.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

Subj.

PRESSURIZER SPRAY LINE VALVE LEAKAGE PROBLEMS  
(RC-VI & PC-V5)

9 Itt...  
ARB  
KE...  
R.L.P.  
BOS 663-5  
File No. NSS-3/12M2 &  
or Ref. NSS-3,4,9/8A30.41  
Rockwell

Date  
MARCH 16, 1973

- References:
1. SPR-444 File 12M2
  2. SPR-461 File 12M2
  3. SPR-496 File 12M2
  4. Ltr. DPCo. to G.E. Kulynych 1-12-73 - Rockwell Valves
  5. Memo R.G. Burnley to L.R. Allen 2-12-73, File 12M2
  6. Telecopy Memo B.L. Day to L.R. Allen 3-12-73

The writer, W.C. Butt, and O. Putzgruber were at the Oconee Site Tuesday afternoon March 13 and most of Wednesday March 14 to assist in assessing the application of the two B&W valves in the Pressurizer Spray Line and to formulate a resolution to the latest leakage problem covered by SPR-496 Rev. 1.

Briefly summarized, the references above have covered numerous problems including broken stem/disc assemblies, cracked seat, damaged operator parts, repacking problems and excessive stuffing box leakage. The latest problem was excessive leakage through the stuffing box and out the stem leakoff connection.

In addition to the Auxiliary Systems personnel, the following personnel were involved in several discussions at different times to come up with a resolution:

Clint Sumnerall - Rockwell Sales  
Neil West - Rockwell Service Engr.  
James Sigman - DPCo Maintenance  
R.J. McConnell - B&W Site Service  
B.L. Day - B&W Site Service  
Bob Baker - B&W Site Service

Upon arrival at the site, we went to the area where the valves are mounted. The two Rockwell people, two Duke Maintenance workers and B. Day were already there removing the Grafoil packing. B. Day had already checked the accessible area of the valve stem with a dial indicator by manually actuating the operator. In the area checked, there was one point of .001" runout detected and this could have been some grease or foreign matter on the stem. It was concluded that the stem is not bowed or out of alignment in the area checked.

One interesting observation made by both Duke and B&W site per tel is that prior to and during the first hot functional test, there were no leakage problems. During this time, the stem leakoff connections were either capped or welded closed. The leakage began after the leakoff connections were hooked up. This may or may not be significant. To speculate, it could be that during the first tests the additional packing above the lantern gland was sufficient even though there was some leakage up through the first set of packing rings. It may be that the lantern gland and stem leakoff are not necessary. As previously discussed, the shutdown cooler valves have not leaked excessively and the stem leakoff is plugged. Mr. Sigman has suggested to Duke Engineering that a small manual valve be added in the leakoff line for isolation to find out if the packing will hold without stem leakoff open.

A verbal report has just been received from B. Baker, B&W Site (3-16-73, 0800 hrs) that the repacking and testing has been completed. There is no leakage @ 1000 psig applied on the stuffing box. RC-V5 will be checked in the same manner and if there is leakage, it will be repacked using the same procedure as used for RC-VI.

RGB:ebc

*R. A. Barclay*

cc: LR Allen  
WC Butt  
BL Day/B Baker  
J Ittner  
GE Kulynych  
R Pittman  
O Putzgruber

As far as possible, the stem area in the stuffing box was visually inspected and no scoring of the stem was observed. Note that it is not possible to see the stem area in the lower stuffing box. We later tried to observe this area with a Fibrescope, but this was not successful. There is no reason to suspect stem scoring in the lower stuffing box since it was previously concluded that scoring occurred in the lantern ring zone.

During several discussions Wednesday, March 14, it was confirmed by Mr. Sigman that Grafoil had been installed, but no procedure was used to assure conformance with the recommendations of Union Carbide, the manufacturers of this packing. Without some special tools for compressing this material, it is not possible to install properly in valves with deep stuffing boxes, lantern gland, and gland nut arrangement such as we have. It was concluded that the valve had been packed improperly and this was the cause of excessive leakage.

The plan of corrective action is as follows:

1. Duke will make necessary tools as required to pack valves using Grafoil.

NOTE: It is Duke's decision to use Grafoil packing.

2. Valve is to be packed in the prescribed manner as recommended by packing manufacturer.
3. Check torque to assure each gland nut is tightened equally.
4. Cycle valve by hand and check stem alignment using dial indicator.
5. Pressurize packing chamber through stem leakoff connection with portable hydro pump:
  - a. Pressurize to 500 psig, hold and cycle. Check for leakage.
  - b. Increase pressure to 1000 psig, cycle and check for leakage.

After each cycle, it may be necessary to further tighten gland nuts. This should be done in accordance with packing manufacturer's recommendations.

This procedure and testing are to be observed by BSW with the results documented and reported upon completion. The real proof of the packing efficiency cannot be checked on this valve until the system is back to temperature and pressure.

We do not believe there is any reason for disqualifying the Uni valve for service in the spray line. The inlet and outlet valves for the letdown coolers are identical with the exception of a smaller Limitorque, and there are no reports of excessive leakage. The operation of PC-VI is slightly different in that it goes to 40% open whereas the letdown valves are either fully open or fully closed. However, the 40% travel should not be of concern because the stem moves only about 3/4" of its total stroke of 1 7/8."

Bob Burnly

R. L. PITTMAN

R. J. Baker

CUST.

FILE NO. OR REF.

D. K. Packer Co.

SUBJ.

SPR-444

DATE

Packing RC-VI with Grafoil packing

3/16/77

The following is the procedure actually used to pack and test RC-VI.

1. The valve was packed using the attached recommended procedure. The thickness of each ring of packing was  $\frac{1}{4}$ " before being compressed. The valve after being packed has 11 rings below and 3 rings above the lantern ring. The lantern ring is lined up with leak off hole. This was verified by inserting a stainless steel wire into the leak off line and having contact with metal. The torque on the packing gland nuts after packing was 40 ft lb.
2. A hydro pump (manual) was connected to the leak off line and using demin. water, the lantern ring space was pressurized to 500 psi and 1000 psi and held at each pressure for 5 min. No leakage was observed and no drop in hydro pressure was seen.
3. The pressure was reduced to 500 psi and the valve was cycled two times electrically. No leakage was observed and the gauge remained at 500 psi.
4. The pressure was increased to 1000 psi and again the valve was cycled fully two times electrically. After 10 min, no leakage or pressure drop was observed.

CUST.

FILE NO. OR FILE

SUBJ.

DATE

3/14/73

5. The pressure was dropped to 0 psi and the hydro pump disconnected. Today, Russ plans to insert a small piece of tubing into the leak off line and blow the water out with filtered air. This should prevent the water from corroding the stems.

6. The packing gland nuts were rechecked and found to be at about 20 ft. lbs torque after the hydro, so the nuts were re-torqued to 40 ft. lbs.

The actual time required to repeat this valve with two men was about 45 hours (15 hrs to remove the old packing and 30 hrs to install new packing).  
Because this packing procedure takes so long, it requires near constant supervision to prevent short cuts from being taken.

CC SPI  
RLP

## RECOMMENDED PRACTICES

### Installation of The Formed Indented GRAYCEL Rings For Industrial Valve Packing

GRAYCEL is a new, reliable and resilient form of graphite produced by Union Carbide Corporation. When lubricated and packed in ring form, it has been found to be an exceptionally high performance valve packing material. This type of packing is unlike any other packing material; this form of solid graphite valve packing. These instructions must be carefully followed.

#### Inspection of the Valve Chamber and Valve Before Packing.

1. The housing must be clean and free from extraneous material before packing with GRAYCEL. If packing a new valve, wiping with a clean rag should be sufficient. If repacking a previously packed valve, care should be used to remove all old packing. The use of any heavier types of packing tools to remove old packing is not recommended since it is likely to result in scored stems. Hand pack types of packing removal tools are preferred. An air blast may be advantageously used to remove all loose material. Inspection should be made of all packing surfaces in the valve, especially the stem finish.
2. Recommended finishes on the stem are 32 RMS or better for hand operated valves and 16 RMS or better for control type valves. Scratches and pits on the stem will considerably increase the probability of leakage, since the GRAYCEL will hold in these non-smooth surfaces and be torn in subsequent valve operations.
3. Recommended finishes for the valve housing I.D. are 125 RMS or better. Although the contact of GRAYCEL with this surface does not require a moving seal, the packing must hold into the surface and be compressed there. Too rough a housing finish will require excessive gland pressure for correct compression leading to potential leakage around the outside of the packing.
4. Radial clearances in the packing box from stem to wall must not exceed 0.003" radially. This applies to the bottom of the packing chamber and also to any lantern ring clearances. Radial clearances greater than the recommended 0.003" can result in extrusion of the GRAYCEL into the annular space under compression with destruction of the lamellar structure of the packing ring. Correction of excessive radial clearances in existing valves may be made by the use of an anti-extrusion washer (anti ring) made from a corrosion resistant metal or ceramic. The use of a carbon ring will remove any chance of the washer welding to or galling the stem finish. Care must be taken in the case of metal washers with respect to thermal expansion of the stem and housing under service temperature conditions. The use of asbestos types of anti-extrusion rings are

Installation of Preformed  
Leaded Graphite Rings  
For Backseat Valve Packing

not recommended since with aging this type of material can form particles or lumps which may work into the space between the packing and stem. This condition will result in abrasion of the stem and progressive leakage.

Inspection of GRAPHITE Packing Rings.

1. Rings of packing are generally shipped in polyethylene bags. Split rings are sealed in the bags or split halves and should be installed in the valve chamber in split halves.
2. Packing rings are designed dimensionally for interference fit in both valve seat and box g. This is to insure proper sealing. If the ring drops loosely into the box g. the application of pressure, poor sealing will result and the ring should not be used.
3. The number of GRAPHITE packing rings supplied as a packing set are sufficient to more than fill the packing housing as designed by the valve manufacturer. The use of anti-extrusion rings at the bottom of the packing housing and at either side of the lantern rings (if any) may result in spare packing rings. These may be collected and used on other valves of the same dimensions.

Packing Procedure.

1. Back-seat valve or bleed off all line pressure.
2. Remove gland nuts, flange, gland, and any lantern rings.
3. Remove all old packing (if repacking) and blow out chamber with compressed air.
4. Inspect chamber as recommended above for scratches and pits.
5. Install anti-extrusion ring if necessary (see above, Inspection of Valve Chamber, Step 4).
6. Gently ease one packing ring (or one set of matching halves if a split ring is used) into the entrance chamber. The gland ring or equivalent must be used at this point. Do not poke or prod the packing ring with pointed tools. The insertion of one ring into the chamber requires that care be taken at this point to uniformly press the packing ring to prevent cracking and structural damage to the ring. If the ring is split, place the first ring in the chamber with the beveled ends facing up. Place the second split ring into the chamber with the beveled ends facing down. Make sure the split in each packing ring is staggered 45° to 90° so that the splits on succeeding rings are not aligned.



7. Using a split ring follower (for example, a piece of pipe of the same dimensions cut lengthwise), press the rings to the bottom of the chamber. Do not attempt to pack more than two rings at one time as the pressure applied may not be sufficient to hold the lower rings and to densify them.
8. With the split ring follower (or the pipe if dimensionally available) in place, replace the gland flange and gland nut. Torque each set of two rings to at least a unit load of 1,000 ft. lbs. torque (or most packings) uniformly. This uniform torque holds the rings to the stem, chamber wall and uniformly densifies all rings.
9. Remove gland nuts, gland, and split follower (if used) and repeat Steps 6, 7, and 8 until honing is completely packed. Lantern rings and anti-extrusion rings must be installed in each chamber to assure that grain location in chamber will end up opposite the lantern.
10. When packing chamber housing is totally full and gland and gland nuts are in place, compress the packing to such a degree that the final height of the packing in the gland is 60% to 75% of its original uncompressed height. (Corrected for any anti-extrusion rings and lantern rings used.) This last compression ensures that a load has been placed on the rings to force the packing into the elastic region, assuring a good seal.
11. One or two additional rings of packing may be added if the gland compression step seats the gland flange to the chamber wall. The gland flange should be free from seating by  $1/8"$  or more.
12. Operate the valve two full cycles (open to close to open to closed to open to closed is considered a cycle). If the valve is butterfly type valves operate a complete 360° to 180° and return to packing and reverse 360° to effect a cycle.
13. Pressurize the packing and check for leakage. If necessary, tighten by turning each gland nut one-fourth (1/4) turn and recheck for leakage. Repeat if necessary until leakage is stopped. If it is necessary to tighten the packing after Step 13 above, operate the valve one cycle after each tightening.

The above torque values, 30-40 ft. lbs., are based on well lubricated threads.

The above procedure is based on normal operating conditions and may have to be modified. The basic sealing properties of preformed graphite packing rings depend on interference fit, stem and chamber wall, followed by sufficient compression to densify, reform and hold the rings in the chamber. Subsequent gland pressure, working the packing material in its elastic condition, then affords the sealing action.

*Copy to:*  
*Larry Allen*  
*3-12-73*

Supplementary Information to SPR's 444  
447  
495

BC-VI

1. First Failure

Symptom - Gross leakage through packing - excessive travel.

Inspection: Button sheared from end of stem - stem no longer connected to plug. Stem scored by lantern gland ring. Yoke nut stripped.

Action: Replaced valve internals, yoke and yoke nut.


Evaluation: Limitorque improperly set up. Backseating on torque switch. Reset to shutoff on limit switch so as not to coast into back seat. Backseating to be done by hand. Some cycles on new internals prior to resetting operator.

Comments: Both yokes were loose in the threads on the valve body. Stem scoring attributed by Rockwell (Ray Green) to mis - alignment.

2. Second Failure

Symptom - Valve stuck shut.

Inspection: Stem had to be cut to permit dis-assembly. Seat in body and on plug damaged. Stellite gone on one side of plug. Stem scored by lantern gland. Backseat damaged. Limitorque gears damaged.



Motor side of clutch in close direction per sketch. Hand wheel side of clutch in open direction (no heat marks) in similar condition. Handwheel damage probably occurred during attempts to backseat valve during 1st failure. Yoke nut destroyed during disassembly.

Action: Lapped in seat. Replaced plug & stem. Refaced limitorque operator mounting plate to improve alignment. Repacked with "Graffoil" and installed split lantern ring. Repaired operator.

Evaluation: Possibly partial engagement of clutch on motor gear allowed slippage and repeated hammer blows to drive valve into seat without opening torque switch. Heat marks and damage to limitorque gears suggest this. Operator would eventually stop on thermal overloads.

Comments: Ray Green (Rockwell Engineer) stated that he still suspects mis-alignment. No way to measure with valve installed. Operate and inspect stem for repeated scoring. Stem scoring & loss of stellite are symptoms of mis-alignment. Fix is to replace yoke if mis-alignment confirmed. Yoke has already been replaced once. DPC maintenance personnel report that both yokes were loose in the threads and the threads would not provide alignment. Top of yoke was bowed due to excessive stem thrust. New yoke nut

would not screw in until threads were partially machined away.

3. Third Failure

Symptom: Gross packing leak (1st Set Only)

Inspection: To begin Tuesday 3/13 with Rockwell service man. Observation of operation gives impression (no quantitative measurement) that stem is whipping as it rotates and is moving laterally at the valve seats.

BLD/elc

cc: E. R. Kand  
E. L. Day

Telecopy to Larry Allen.

Copy to each SPR involving RC-VI

Copy to Nuclear Service Support Engineer.

*L. S. Pittman*

**Babcock & Wilcox**

Power Generation Division  
P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505  
Telephone: (703) 384-5111

February 6, 1973

B73-034

Mr. S. K. Blackley  
DUKE POWER COMPANY  
P. O. Box 2178  
Charlotte, N. C. 28201

Attention: Mr. T. F. Wyke

Subject: Oconee 1, 2 & 3  
Rockwell Valves

Reference: Duke letter dated January 12, 1973, Sbj: Rockwell Valves

Gentlemen:

The following is submitted to comments made on the subject valves in the referenced letter:

1. Stem Material: The stem material of valves supplied by Rockwell is ASTM-A461, Grade 630. This material is not a ferritic stainless steel. It is, however, a precipitation hardened 17-4 pH material. This type material is used in numerous other places in the reactor coolant system and is considered to be completely compatible with boric acid solutions at high temperatures. For this reason we see no reason to pursue stem placement on the subject valves.

In addition, Rockwell is supplying a replacement for the damaged stem from 1 RC-V1. The replacement stem will be ASTM-A638, Grade 660. We have reviewed this material for this application and find it to be acceptable.

2. Scored Stem: The scored stem from 1RC-V5 was visually examined by B&W and Rockwell personnel at Rockwell's Raleigh Plant. The stem was compared with a full sized detail drawing. Considering the location of the scored portion, the relative locations of the junk ring, the lantern gland, and the travel distance of the stem, the scoring had to occur in the lantern ring zone. The exact cause of the scoring is not known, however, it is highly probable that it was the result of the stellite lantern ring being cocked in the stuffing box. Rockwell personnel stated that they had not seen this type of damage before. They further stated that the lantern ring could have been installed in a cocked position at the factory or after repacking in the field. There was no evidence of wear or indications on

Pittman

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

L. R. Allen - Associate Project Manager - Reactor Contracts

From

A. L. Lowe, Jr. - Materials-Development - Component Engr.

(2170) BPS 663.5

Cust.

Duke Power Company

File No. NSS-3 SPR444/1  
or Ref. 12K2

Subj.

Rockwell Valve Stem Material

Date

January 23, 1973

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

Reference: Memo From R. L. Pittman To L. R. Allen,  
Subject: Rockwell Valves, File No. As  
Above, Dated 1/22/73.

I would like to clarify the statement in the above referenced memo concerning valve stem material.

The currently used material is 17-4 PH which is a precipitation-hardening stainless steel that was probably purchased to ASTM A-461, Grade 630. Although a stainless steel, it is only a distant cousin to Type 304 stainless steel. The 17-4 PH is considered compatible with the boric acid water environment of PWR's provided it is in the proper heat treated condition, (i.e., Condition H1150).

The ASTM dropped the A-461 specification and replaced it with a new specification for 17-4 PH. This new specification is A-564 but is so new that it did not make the 1972 Edition of the ASTM Standards. Because of this change in specifications, the vendor apparently had chosen a readily available new alloy for the stem. This new alloy is included in ASTM A-638 as Grade 660. The material is known commercially as A-286 Alloy which we use for several applications in our nuclear systems. The alloy is a stainless alloy, but its only similarity to 17-4 PH is the fact it is precipitation-hardening.

Please keep Duke Power Company correctly informed.

- ALL, Jr./ja
- cc: R. R. Beach
- R. S. Burnley
- J. C. Daddens
- H. Hennicke
- J. P. Ittner
- G. E. Kulynych
- P. J. McConnell
- R. L. Pittman
- R. V. Straub
- G. T. Sund
- S. S. Walker
- Files

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

File NSS- 3  
1242-SFR- 444/2

To W.C. BUTT - NSE For Action  
R.G. Burnley - NSE

CONTRACT 620-00 03  
SFR 444/2  
TITLE RC V1 STEAM  
LEAK

To R.J. McConnell - S.O.M. For Information  
J. Kaelin  
J. Kennedy  
K. Subrke  
H. Worsham  
T. Sund - Punch

DATE 1-23-73

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer  
Feb 1, 73

Action Requested: W.C. Butt IS REQUESTED TO Review  
this SFR and advise Nuclear Service on  
what action will be taken to resolve  
this problem.

- cc: G. E. Kulynych
- E. G. Ward
- G. M. Olds
- R. T. Schoner
- N. S. Embrey
- J. McFarland
- C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

R. L. Pittman  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

STEVE DEW  
O. Putts gruber

MANHOOR LIMITS	<u>see SFR</u>
COST LIMITS	<u>see SFR</u>
CHARGE No.	<u>461</u>
APPROVED:	<u>J. Pullen</u> Project Manager

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

POWER GENERATION GROUP

To | L. B. ALLEN, ASSOCIATE PROJECT MANAGER

From | E. L. BERTMAN, NUCLEAR SERVICE (2805)

BCS 663-5

Cust. | DUKE POWER COMPANY

File No. NSS-3 SFR 444/1  
or Ref. 12M2

Subj. | ROCKET VALVES

Date  
JANUARY 22, 1973

Reports from the BW site office have indicated that doubts are being expressed by some parties, concerning the compatibility of the stem material in our RC-V5 and RC-V1 with borated water.

Since this question has arisen, a complete review of these materials has been conducted.

These valve stems were manufactured from a 304 stainless steel; precipitation hardened to further enhance its strength characteristics. Upon completion of this hardening process, this material met all requirements of the ASTM A61, Grade 630. In summary, this material is a 17-4 PH stainless steel, which is considered compatible with high temperatures and borated water.

An order has already been placed with the Rockwell Corporation to furnish a replacement stem for RC-V1 which was damaged during hot functional testing. Since the original stem material is no longer available, it will be necessary to furnish a similar grade of 17-4 PH stainless steel, which meets the requirements of ASTM 638, Grade 660, and is considered by our Materials personnel as being acceptable for its proposed application.

Preliminary failure analysis to determine reasons for failure on 1-RC-V1 is that it was caused by a faulty limit switch setting. I have been advised by our Engineering Department that this is a setting performed in the field by the customer, which should alleviate BW of any liability for this problem (SFR 444/1).

Please advise Duke Power Company of this matter.

ELB:aw

cc: W.E. Beach  
W.C. Burnley  
J.D. Deidens  
H. Hennicke  
J.R. Ittner  
G.E. Kalynych  
A.L. Lowe  
R.C. McConnell  
R.W. Straub  
G.T. Sund  
G.S. Walker

*Pittman*

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To |  
R. G. Burnley - Auxiliary Systems

From |  
A. L. Lowz, Jr. - Materials-Development - Component Engr.

(...72) 805 643 3

Cust. |  
Duke

File No.  
or Ref. NSS-3/8M30.41  
Rockwell

Subj. |  
Valve Stem Materials-Spray Line Valve RC-VI

Date  
January 17, 1973

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only

I have reviewed Rockwell Manufacturing Company's proposed replacement stem material ASTM A638 Gr. 660 and find it acceptable for the proposed application.

Should they wish to continue to use this replacement stem material, I would recommend that it be specified in accordance with ASTM A564-72, "Hot-Rolled And Cold-Finished Age-Hardening Stainless And Heat-Resisting Steel Bars And Shapes."

I expect that one of their reasons for wanting to change this material is that they were not aware of the new specification covering Gr. 632 alloy.

- ALL, Jr./ja  
cc: L. R. Allen  
D. F. Levstek  
B. W. McDonald  
K. L. Pittman  
K. Schroeder  
Files



THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To: A. L. Lowe - Principal Materials Engineer

From

A. G. Burnley - Auxiliary Systems (2201)

ADS 003.8

Cust.

Duke

File No. Rockwell  
or Ref. NSS-3/8A30.41

Subj.

Valve Stem Material - Spray Line Valve RC-VI

Date

January 16, 1973

This letter is for the customer and one subject only.

Due to damage that occurred to the original stem due to an improper set limit switch, the stem for the subject valve must be replaced.

The original stem material was furnished to ASTM A461 Grade 630. This ASTM spec was discontinued in 1971 and was replaced by A637, A638 and A639.

Rockwell Mfg. Co. proposes to furnish a replacement stem to ASTM A638 Gr 660. Maximum design conditions for the location of this valve (spray line to pressurizer) as 2500 psig @ 670F. Normal operation will be 2220 psig @ 555 to 580F.

Please review this proposed valve stem material and let us have your recommendations. Per AI Manual, procedure NPC-0408-08.

Mr. Larry Allen, Proj. Mgmt., has given verbal approval for time required to be charged to 620-0003-98-05.

RGB:ebc

cc: LR Allen  
K Schroeder/WC Bitt  
RL Pittman

*A. G. Burnley*

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

Distribution	
From	R. L. Pittman, Nuclear Service (2805) <i>RJP</i>
Cust.	Duke Power Company
Subj.	Rockwell Valves (SPR 444- NSS 3)
File No. or Ref.	NSS-3 SPR 444 12M2
Date	January 15, 1973

BDS 603-5

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

Distribution

R. R. Beach	R. J. McConnell
J. P. Ittner	H. Hennicke
G. E. Kulynych	G. T. Sund
L. R. Allen	S. S. Walker
R. V. Straub	J. C. Deddens
R. G. Burnley	

On 1-12-73 a conference call was placed to the Rockwell Corporation in Raleigh, North Carolina to discuss the problems which have been recently experienced at the Oconee site.

The following personnel participated in the call from B&W:

L. Allen  
R. Burnley  
T. Sund  
S. Walker  
R. Pittman

The call was placed to Harry Crane, Dick Lawson and Jim Morris, all assigned to the Rockwell plant in Raleigh.

Among the several items discussed, Mr. Crane was informed of the immediate requirement for replacement parts to repair RC-V1 on Unit II, since parts had been removed from this valve during HPT to repair the damaged valve on Unit I. Dick Lawson replied that spare parts for this valve were not stocked and it would require 3-4 months for machining and delivery unless it was of such urgency as to necessitate hand carrying them through the shop. Since these parts shall be used on 2 RC-V1, a target of one month was requested. Mr. Crane was advised that a Rockwell Service Engineer is requested to be at the Oconee site to re-assemble 2 RC-V1 when the parts are ready for shipment. Mr. Crane stated that the cause for failure on 1 RC-V1 was determined to be a faulty limit switch on the operator and that since this is a setting made by the customer, Rockwell is considered relieved of the financial responsibilities associated with this incident. This point was mutually agreed upon by both parties and a written report of this failure analysis was requested and promised for immediate delivery.

Mr. Crane was then reminded that there are at least 83 Rockwell valves at the Oconee job site that cannot be repacked with the operator in place and B&W is awaiting a

January 15, 1973

solution to this apparent design discrepancy. It was explained to us that a lantern ring similar to the existing one shall be utilized except that it will be in four pieces so it may be lifted up and removed from the valve allowing easy access to the lower packing rings. Mr. Crane was advised that this was considered by B&W as a Rockwell responsibility, and we needed an estimate of time involved before the correction will be made. He also agreed that the responsibility associated with this problem belonged to Rockwell and that they will make every effort to have these lantern rings machined and delivered to the job site during the first week of February, 1973. However, this is the plan for only 12 of the 83 valves concerned (the 2½" valves) because the remaining 1" valves were produced at the Rockwell plant in Sulphur Springs, Texas. Tom Sund agreed that he will contact the local Rockwell sales representative to coordinate the same solution for this problem on the remaining Rockwell valves, as agreed upon for the 2½" valves.

The next item presented to Rockwell was "that we question the ability to repack these valves in service by back seating them" as was specified by B&W when they were ordered. They were informed that two holes are in each disc plug which will seemingly allow system pressure inside the plug and into the area of the packing thus preventing packing removal under pressure. Dick Larsen explained that this valve has two backseats; one in its usual location and the second on the end of the stem, seating against the underside of the disc nut which prevents system pressure on the packing gland when the valve is backseated. According to the drawing of this valve it appears that this would indeed perform as Mr. Larsen had stated. Hart Hennicke has now informed me that when 1-RC-V5 was disassembled, that the backseat apparently would not seat because there was a sufficient amount of steam coming from the packing gland cavity to cause concern. If it is determined that other valves of this type are also leaking past the backseat, then it must be resolved with Rockwell. This should be established by the site if probable, considering other scheduled commitments.

Mr. Crane was advised that as soon as 1 RC-V5 is cut from the system it shall be returned to him for repairs to the cracked seat. It is his opinion that this valve can be readied for return to the site within 3-4 months. Meanwhile, the valve from Unit III will be borrowed and installed in Unit I. It was mutually agreed that responsibility for this valve belongs to Rockwell.

Finally, Jim Morris stated that the stem material originally used to machine RC-V1 was no longer available (ASTM 461, grade 630). He stated that this material was a 316 SS, precipitation hardened, further enhancing its strength characteristics and meets the specifications of ASTM 461, grade 630. The new stem will be made from a similar material that is also considered acceptable for use with high temperatures and high concentrations of boric acid. The original material is a 17-4 ph SS, thus suitable for its application.

RLP/cs

TO

SPR 444/1 File

R. PITTMAN

CUST.

DUKE Power Co.

FILE NO. OR REF.

NSS3 SPR 444/1

SUBJ.

RCV-1

DATE

1-12-73

Internals from RCV-1 (Unit 2) was used to replace the damaged ones on Unit I. Parts are being made to reassemble the Unit II valve.

R. Pittman

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To R.G. Burnley - NSE For Action  
T. Sund - Purch.

CONTRACT 620-00 -03  
SPR 444  
TITLE RCV STEAM

To R.J. McConnell - S.C.M. (2) For Information

Leak and DAMAGE

J. Kaelin - ARK

J. Kennedy - SMUD

K. Suhrke

H. Worsham

MANHOURLIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

DATE 1-9-73

CHARGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

- G.E. Kulynych
- E.G. Ward
- G.M. Olds
- R.T. Schomer
- J. McFarland
- C.C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- H.F. Dobel - Quality Assurance

ACTION REQUIRED Bob Burnley and T. Sund are requested to review the initial specs required by B&W and determine if B&W received the valves as they were specified (cannot repack w/o removing the operator) A meeting shall then be arranged to decide what course of action will be taken to resolve the problem on this "and" the other valves listed in this SPR with the same problem. Rockwell Rep is on site.

DATE FOR ACTION TO BE COMPLETED ASAP

RECOMMENDED R. J. Puttgruber

Nuclear Service Y/1  
Support Engineer

cc:

STEVE DEW  
O. Puttgruber

APPROVED

R. J. Puttgruber  
Project Manager

ISSUE/CHANGE NO.	
16	620-003-03-41

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To R.E. Ham - C.E. Responsible

CONTRACT 620-00 03

SPR 444

TITLE RC-VI Secam

To V.V. Sevaub - PM For Information

Leak

J.N. Kaelin - SOM

MANHOURLIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

J.P. Kennedy - SOM

COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

T.J. McConnell - SOM

DATE 1/3/73

K.E. Sahrke - Mgr Field Eng.

CHARGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

G.E. Kulynych

E.G. Ward

G.M. Olds

R.T. Schomer

J. McFarland

C.C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.

Central Engineering Files

H.F. Dobel - Quality Assurance

ACTION REQUIRED

After discussion with Bob Ham concerning possible damage to the spray nozzle, it was resolved that no damage was done considering the AT existing at the time. This should resolve this SPR and the site should clear SPR-444 REV00 upon receipt of this transmittal.

DATE FOR ACTION TO BE COMPLETED \_\_\_\_\_

cc: R.G. Bunley - S.E.

Stanley S. Walker  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

TRANSMITTAL SLIP  
FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To R.E. Ham - C.E. For Action

CONTRACT 620-00 03

SPR 444

TITLE RC-VI STEAM

To R.V. Straub - PM For Information

Leak

J.N. Kaelin - SOM

J.P. Kennedy - SOM

R.J. McConnell - SOM

K.E. Sultke - Mgr Field Eng

MANHOURLIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_

DATE 12/29/72

CHARGE NO. \_\_\_\_\_

- G.E. Kulynych
- E.G. Ward
- G.M. Olds
- R.T. Schomer
- J. McFarland
- C.C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- H.F. Dobel - Quality Assurance

ACTION REQUIRED

RE Ham is requested to investigate the possibility of damage to the spray nozzle as a result of the operations performed to stop the steam leak on RC-VI.

DATE FOR ACTION TO BE COMPLETED ASAP after HET

cc: R.G. Burnley

Stanley B. Halpin  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer  
SHalpin

ACQUISITION -- EQUIPMENT SERVICES

BRIDGEMAN & WILCOX WPGD

TO: Purchasing Date: 1/12/73 Serial No. N333/L35-00

FORM: Contract  EDO  Proposition  Other

Contract, EDO or Proposition No.	Contract	Comp No.	28	Group No.	41	Seq No.	1	<input type="checkbox"/> Normal Cost
								<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Abnormal Cost

If Abnormal Cost: Charge No. 620-00003-98-05

Customer: Duke Power Company

Req. for Quotation <input type="checkbox"/>	Mfg Release <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	Attachments SPR 444/1
Placement of Order <input type="checkbox"/>	Other <input type="checkbox"/>	
Change Order <input type="checkbox"/>		

Please issue a purchase order to Rockwell Corp. to manufacture the following parts to be used as replacements for the ones removed from RCV-1 on Duke Unit II.

1. disc
2. disc nut
3. stem
4. lantern gland
5. junk ring
6. gland
7. yoke bushing
8. stem adaptor
9. set of packing

When these parts are ready for installation we shall require a service engineer from Rockwell at the site for rebuilding this valve as well as making the proper operator limit switch adjustments.

Any charges which have accrued up to this date as a result of Neil West's site visit and the failure analysis which is being forwarded by Rockwell should be included in this P.O.

Preliminary indications (telecon) has indicated that the reason for this failure is attributed to a faulty limit switch setting. Since this is a setting made by the customer, all charges associated with this problem should be back charged to Duke Power Company.

*THIS MUST BE ESTABLISHED MUCO FIRMLY BEFORE WE DOOR CHARGES AGAINST VENDOR.*

Distribution		Approvals		Date
Originator	R. L. Pittman	Originator	<i>R L Pittman</i>	1-12-73
Unit Mgr.	R. S. Beach	Mgr.	<i>R L Pittman</i>	1/12/73
Proj. Mgr.	R. V. Straub	Proj. Mgr.		
CS QA	E. V. Pollock			
Mgr. Contract Admin. (NSC Only)				
Mgr. Fuel Contract (NSC Only)				
Contract File	N33-3 SPR 444/1			
	1232			
	1233-90-05			



REQUEST FOR C. D. G. L ORDER

POWER GENERATION GROUP - NPGD

DATE: 1/11/73 CUSTOMER: Oconee I CONTRACT NO: 600-0003

SCOPE OF WORK AND REASON:

Procure replacement internals for RG-VI which were damaged as a result of incorrect limit switch setting by Duke.

REFERENCE: SPR 441-1

REQUIRED START DATE Jan. '73 REQUIRED COMPLETION DATE Jan. '73

OPINION OF RESPONSIBILITY:

VENDOR  \_\_\_\_\_ VENDOR P.O. NO.  
 B&W  \_\_\_\_\_ RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION  
 OTHER  Duke Power Co. SPECIFY

WORK CATEGORY:  
 C (CORRECTIVE)   
 D (DESIGN CHANGE)   
 G (GUARANTEE)   
 L (LICENSING)   
 S (Suspense)

ESTIMATED COST:

ERECTION  
 MANUFACTURING  
 ENGINEERING 20 hrs. @ 350  
 VENDOR Rockwell Mfg.  
 OTHER  
 TOTAL

MATERIALS	LABOR & EXP.	OTHER	TOTAL
			300.00
			1,700.00
			\$2,000.00

DISTRIBUTION:

PROJECT MANAGER G. E. Kalynech  
 MGR. CONTRACT ADM. C. C. Plunkett  
 CONTROLLER, NPG G. F. Boatright  
 MANAGER, NPG CA E. V. DeCarli  
 UNIT MGR., NPG K. Schroeder  
 \*MGR., NUCLEAR SERVICE J. C. Deddens  
 \*PLANT MANAGER  
 \*SHOP MANAGER  
 \*QC MANAGER  
 \*MGR., SITE OPERATIONS  
 \*MGR., REACTOR CONTRACTS  
 \*GEN. MGR., FUEL DEPT.  
 \*PURCHASING MANAGER R. A. Reel  
 \*DEPARTMENT MANAGER

REQUESTED BY: P. L. Pittman 1/11/73  
 PREPARED BY: J. T. Williams 1/11/73

APPROVALS	SIGNATURE	DATE
PROJ. MGR.	<i>[Signature]</i>	1/11/73
MGR. REAC. CONTRACTS		
MGR. NUC. SERV.		
GEN. MGR. REAC. DEPT.		
VICE PRES. NPG		

UPON APPROVAL OF THIS ORDER, CHARGE AUTHORIZED WORK AND COSTS TO THE FOLLOWING: 600-0003-08-05

MGR. CONTRACT ADM. *[Signature]* 1-11-73  
 SIGNATURE DATE

REV. NO. -0-  
 REV. DATE

REQUISITIONER'S COPY  
**THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY**

POWER GENERATION GROUP  
 P.O. Box 1200, Lynchburg, Va. 24395

653-1/435-00

REQUISITIONED BY & DATE  
 H. Patton (01127)

TO  
 Maxwell Mfg. Company  
 190 N. Lexington Ave.  
 Pittsburgh, Pa. 15204  
 Attention: Mr. R. Boyle

SHIP TO

PURCHASE ORDER

DATE: 022773  
 NUMBER: 62596062

VENDOR NUMBER

CONTRACT NUMBER

6209002501

THE REQUIRED DATA LISTED BELOW IS THE DATE MATERIALS/ITEMS ORDERED ARE REQUIRED AT DESTINATION IN U.S.A.

SHIP VIA

F.O.B.

TERMS OF PAYMENT

QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION	UNIT	PRICE	TOTAL
CONFIRMING PURCHASE ORDER TO J. C. MOHR'S RAILROAD PLANT.				
Furnish the following replacement parts for valve mark RC-VI furnished on B&W P.O. 0148618, subject to original terms & conditions.				
1	Disc, wise nut & stem assembly			4921.00
1	Junk ring			21.38
1	Gland			32.76
1	Yoke bushing			22.56
1	Stem adapter			43.38
1	Set packing (3 rings)			17.46
1	Coopy ring			62.58
1	Lantern glands			N/C
Furnish sufficient amount of lantern glands, split design, for replacement of one (1) piece lantern glands on 2 1/2" w/ wise valves. There is to be no additional charges to B&W for these lantern glands.				
The above parts were received at the Lake Power job-site Thursday February 6, 1973.				
Material Certs. for the disc and stem assembly are to be forwarded to B&W Lynchburg.				
Furnish service representative to job-site for disassembly and reassembly of valve RC-VI. This was performed starting Fri. night February 16, 1973.				
---continued on next page				

PLEASE FURNISH THE ITEMS ABOVE TO THE TERMS & CONDITIONS ON BACK HEREOF AND ACKNOWLEDGE THIS ORDER PROMPTLY AND STATE DEFINITELY WHEN SHIPMENT WILL BE MADE.

**THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY**  
 POWER GENERATION GROUP

SALE TAX STATUS  EXEMPT  NON EXEMPT STATE S.C. NO. 1082

PURCHASE ORDER, CONTRACT, ITEM AND FOLIO NO. MUST BE SHOWN ON ALL PACKAGES, INVOICES, PAPERS AND DRAWINGS.

BY \_\_\_\_\_ AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

INVOICE IN QUADRUPLE SHOWING OUR PURCHASE ORDER NO., CONTRACT NO., ITEM NO., FOLIO NO., WHETHER PARTIAL OR FINAL BILLING AND MAIL TO THE ACCOUNTS PAYABLE DEPARTMENT AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ORDER PLEASE COMMUNICATE WITH OUR BUYER

REQUISITIONED COPY  
**THE BACOCK & WILCOX COMPANY**  
 POWER GENERATION GROUP

PURCHASE ORDER

REQUISITIONED BY & DATE

|||||

Rockwell Mfg. Company  
 Page 2

DATE  
 4-22-71

NUMBER  
 02296613

VENDOR NUMBER

CONTRACT NUMBER

THE REQUIRED DATE LISTED BELOW IS THE DATE MATERIALS/ITEMS ORDERED ARE REQUIRED AT DESTINATION IN U.S.A.



SHIP VIA

FOB

TERMS OF PAYMENT

ITEM NO.	QUANTITY	DESCRIPTION	UNIT PRICE		TOTAL
			UNIT PRICE	UNIT PRICE	
		CHARGES FOR FACTORY SERVICE			
			Monday thru Friday		
			Saturday		
			Sunday and Holidays		
		Daily Base (8 hours)	\$120.00	\$180.00	\$240.00
		Overtime Rate, Per Hour	22.50	22.50	45.00

Minimum charge per day is the eight-hour base for the first day. On any following day when less than eight hours are worked, the charge per hour will be calculated at the overtime rate subject to a minimum charge of four hours and a maximum not to exceed the daily base for that day of the week.

In addition, all transportation and living expenses at actual cost.

5  
4  
3  
2  
1

PLEASE FURNISH THE ITEMS ABOVE TO THE TERMS & CONDITIONS ON BACK HEREOF. I KNOWLEDGE THIS ORDER PROMPTLY AND STATE DEFINITELY WHEN SHIPMENT WILL BE MADE

**THE BACOCK & WILCOX COMPANY**  
 POWER GENERATION GROUP

SALES TAX STATUS  EXEMPT  NO EXEMPT STATE \_\_\_\_\_ NO \_\_\_\_\_

PURCHASE ORDER, CONTRACT, ITEM AND FOLIO NO. MUST BE SHOWN ON ALL PACKAGES, INVOICES, PAPERS AND DRAWINGS.

INVOICE IN QUADRUPPLICATE SHOWING OUR PURCHASE ORDER NO., CONTRACT NO., ITEM NO., FOLIO NO., WHETHER PARTIAL OR FINAL BILLING AND MAIL TO THE ACCOUNTS PAYABLE DEPARTMENT AT THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

BY \_\_\_\_\_ AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

FOR INFORMATION REGARDING THIS ORDER PLEASE COMMUNICATE WITH OUR BUYER

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

JUL 13 1978

To: Change Control For Distribution

- S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance
- Central Engineering Files
- S. P. Lamanna - Task Engineer(s)
- R. C. Luken - Project Manager

File: 13-14-446  
 Contract No.: 620-00 14  
 SPR: 446, Rev 0  
 Title: Upgrade CF Valves  
Documentation  
 Date: 6/30/78  
 Status Code: C

- L. C. Rogers - MET. ED.
- F. R. Faist - TOLEDO
- J. R. Bohart - Intl. Support
- B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration
- P. E. Perrone

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 446 which was processed on Contract 620-00 14. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem ~~is~~ is not considered applicable to other contracts

REMARKS:

**COMPLETED**

*Joseph H. Luken*  
\_\_\_\_\_  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

10020

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX SPR #446

CUSTOMER Toledo Edison Company	ORIGINATOR F. R. Faist	DATE 5/15/78	DOC. ID. 13	CORR. NO. 600-0014	SPR NO. 446	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR Velan	P.A. NO. 023168LS	PART NO./TASK NO. GROUP NO. SEQ. NO. 31/041/003-006				
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) Upgrade CP Valves Documentation			PROBLEM CONTACT F. R. Faist			

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: See Attachment #1.

Req'd. Resolution Date: ASAP      Req'd. Completion Date: ASAP

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

C. Daft (TECo) advised site office of problem.  
T. Scott aware of problem.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

1. Correct QA documentation.
2. Confirm what nameplates go on what valves, old serial number vs new serial number.

RESOLUTION:

attached is data package from Velan which resolves the problems concerning the nameplates & documentation (original to be sent to site via NPGD QA)

PREPARED BY J.D. Fulcher	DATE 6/8/78	APPROVED BY R. C. Luker	DATE 6/9/78
REVIEWED BY H. B. ...	DATE 6/9/78		
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE OTHER <input type="checkbox"/>		FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04- N/A
		SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	

SITE COMPLETION REPORT: Revised QA documentation given to C. Daft, TECo. Nameplates are installed as noted on Column A, Attachment 1 of SPR.

DEVIATIONS: <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NONE	SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>
DATE COMPLETED: 6/19/78	
COMPLETED BY F. R. Faist	DATE 6/19/78
F. R. Faist	6/19/78
SHEET 1	OF 17

2020

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

RESOLUTION

COMPLETION

Description of Problem:

- References: 1. Memo, J. Lauer to C. Armontrout, January 9, 1978, "Upgrading of CF Valves".  
 2. Memo, J. Lauer to F. Faist, January 9, 1978, "Upgrading of CF Valves".

The CF valves to be upgraded are CF-HV2A, 2B, 5A, & 5B. The Velan Valve Form NPV-1, Manufacturers Data Report for Nuclear Pumps & Valves supplied (for Class II valves, certified November 24, 1977) contains the following information:

(#5) Valve Identification	(8b) Forgings Body Serial No.
A. W5-274-13MS CF-HV2B	1-1 826-1
B. W5-274-13MS CF-HV2A	1-3 825-1
C. W5-274-13MS CF-HV5A	1-4 827-1
D. W5-274-13MS CF-HV5B	1-2 824-1

The new nameplates are all identical, with the exception of the serial numbers, 824-1, 825-1, 826-1, 827-1. However, the following is the QA documentation discrepancies that exist:

Valve No.	A New Nameplate Serial No. to be applied per Ref. 2	B New Nameplate Ser- ial No. to be applied per Velan QA doc.	C Old Nameplate Serial No. as found	D Old Nameplate Serial No. as shown on New QA documentation
CF-HV2A	824-1	825-1	1-2	1-3
CF-HV2B	825-1	826-1	1-3	1-1
CF-HV5A	826-1	827-1	1-1	1-4
CF-HV5B	827-1	824-1	1-4	1-2

3-820

Attachment #1 - continued  
SPR #446 - 620-0014  
5/15/78

TECo has presently installed nameplates per Column A above, which is inconsistent with QA documentation. However, new QA documentation appears to be in error with regard to "Body Serial Number", old number vs new number.

FRP:nlf  
5/15/78

4020  
A

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To: C. A. ARMONTROUT, QUALITY ASSURANCE

From: J. A. LAUER, PROJECT MANAGER (X 2156)

BOS 003.5

At: TECO DB-1

File No. NSS-14  
or Ref. 8\*30,41/14

Subj: UPGRADING OF CF VALVES

Date JANUARY 2, 1978

This letter is cover and contains end use subject only

At TECO's request, we have asked Velan to upgrade the core flood vent and drain valves CF-HV2A&B and CF-HV3A&B from Class III of 1968 Pump & Valve Code to Class II of the same code. Velan has agreed and forwarded the attached revised data packages and new nameplates.

Will you please review the data packages, and if adequate, forward them directly to TECO QA. In the meantime I will send the replacement nameplates to Fred Faist. After the data packages are forwarded, I'll arrange for a Hartford inspector to witness the replacement of the nameplates.

*J. A. Lauer*  
J. A. LAUER

JAL/hj

Attachment

cc: F. R. Faist,

5920  
4



THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

F. R. FAIST, DAVIS-BESSE SITE

From J. A. LAUER, PROJECT MANAGER (X2156)

BDS 66J-5

Cust. TECO DB-1

File No. NSS-14  
or Ref. 8A30.41/14

Subj. UPGRADING OF CF VALVES

Date JANUARY 9, 1978

This letter is cover one customer and one subject only

Attached are replacement nameplates to be applied to Velan core flood valves as follows:

CF-HV2A	824-1
CF-HV2B	825-1
CF-HV5A	826-1
CF-HV5B	827-1

Please hold these nameplates until we verify the adequacy of the new QA data packages and forward them to TECO OA. Then call Mr. Henry in the Cleveland Office of Hartford Steam Boiler (Area 216-228-5200) and arrange a time when he can have an inspector witness the substitution of the new nameplates on the valves. You'll also have to have TECO maintenance available to actually change the nameplates.


Will you also save the old obsolete nameplates and send them to:

Velan Valve Corporation  
Beekmantown Road  
Plattsburgh, New York 12901

Attention: Mr. J. E. O'Donnel

You should include a letter identifying the valves and telling him the nameplate transfer has been made. If possible, get the Hartford inspector to countersign your letter as additional proof of the proper transfer.

JAL/hj

  
J. A. LAUER

Attachments (Velan letter  
and nameplates)

cc: B. V. Zachariah w/o att  
C. A. Armontrout w/o att

6420

FORM NPV-1 MANUFACTURERS' DATA REPORT FOR NUCLEAR PUMPS & VALVES -  
As required under the Provisions of the ASME Nuclear Pump & Valve Code

Manufactured by VELAN ENGINEERING LTD., 2125 Ward Ave., Montreal Order No. P1-0212-N ITEM: 1

1. Manufactured for THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY Contract No. 023168LS

2. Designer THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

3. Location TOLEDO EDISON

4. Valve Identification W5-274-13MS CF-HV2B *0102/1-3* *2/1 825-1* *and HV2B*

(a) Shop Drawing No. P1-0212-N-2 Rev. B Prepared by VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED

5. Design Conditions 700 psi 300 F Specified by BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

6. The Design Complies with Class I  II  III (Circle one) (Name of Co. & Dept.) VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)

(a) Design Information on file at

(b) Design Specification certified by

(c) Design Report on file at

(d) Design Report certified by

7. The Materials comply with Class I  II  III (Circle one)

Eng. (I)	Province	Reg. No.	Date
VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)			
A. K. VELAN	QUEBEC	16453	1955
Eng. (II)	Province	Reg. No.	Date

Mark No.	Mat. Spec.	Manufacturer	Body Ser. No.	Body M. Code	Boonal H.C.	Disc. Mark or H.C.
(a) Castings						
1. DISC	STELLITE 6	VESTSHELL INC.				RXI 113-6
2.						
3.						
4.						
(b) Forgings						
1. BODY	ASTM-A-182 316	CANFORGE	<i>1-1</i> 826-1	<i>826-1</i> DW		
2.						
3.						
4.						
(c) Bolting						
1.						
2.						
(d) Other Components						
1. STEM	ASTM-A-461 630	FIRTH BROWN ST.				690706
2.						
3.						
4.						

8. The Manufacture and Examination complies with Class I  II  III. (Circle one)

Shop Hydrostatic Test 2175 psi

Certificate of Authorization No. N1738

We certify the statements of items number 8 and 9 in this data report to be correct.

Date Nov 13<sup>th</sup> 1971 VELAN ENGINEERING LTD By M. Brown (Signature of Inspector)

**CERTIFICATE OF SHOP INSPECTION**

VALVE MADE BY VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED MONTREAL, CANADA

I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors of the Province of QUEBEC and employed by the DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR of QUEBEC

have inspected the valve described in this manufacturer's data report on the basis of the knowledge and belief, the manufacturer has constructed this valve in accordance with the ASME Code for Nuclear Pumps and Valves and state that signing this certificate with the Inspector and his employer makes any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the pressure vessel described in this manufacturer's data report. Furthermore, neither the Inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.

Date Nov 24 1971

Benoit Dublet Inspector's Signature

Commission 79 National Board or Province and No.

# VELAN ENGINEERING COMPANIES

## FORM NPV-1 MANUFACTURERS' DATA REPORT FOR NUCLEAR PUMPS & VALVES As required under the Provisions of the ASME Nuclear Pump & Valve Code

1. Manufactured by VELAN ENGINEERING LTD., 2125 Ward Ave., Montreal Order No. P1-0212-N ITEM: 1  
 2. Manufactured for THE BARCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY Contract No. 02116815  
 3. ~~Owner~~ THE BARCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
 4. Location TOLEDO EDISON  
 5. Valve Identification W5-274-13MS CF-HV 2A *old 128* 212724-1  
 (a) Shop Drawing No. P1-0212-N-2 Rev. B Prepared by VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED  
 6. Design Conditions 700 psi 300 \*F Specified by BARCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
 7. The Design Complies with Class I (II) III (circle one)  
 (a) Design Information on file at \_\_\_\_\_  
 (b) Design Specification certified by \_\_\_\_\_  
 (c) Design Report on file at \_\_\_\_\_  
 (d) Design Report certified by \_\_\_\_\_  
 9. The Materials comply with Class I (II) III (circle one)

Eng. III	Province	Reg. No.	Date
VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)			
A. W. VELAN	QUEBEC	16413	1955
Eng. III	Province	Reg. No.	Date

Mark No.	Mat. Spec.	Manufacturer	Body Ser. No.	Body H. Code	Bonnet H.C.	Disc. <del>Weight</del> H.C.
<b>(a) Castings</b>						
1.	DISC	STELLITE 6	VESTSHELL INC.			RXI 113-643
2.						
3.						
4.						
<b>(b) Forgings</b>						
1.	BODY	ASTM-A-182 3.6	CANFORGE	1-3 825-1	BW	
2.						
3.						
4.						
<b>(c) Bolting</b>						
1.						
2.						
<b>(d) Other Components</b>						
1.	S&EN	ASTM-A-461 630	FIRTH BROWN ST.			690706
2.						
3.						
4.						

9. The Manufacture and Examination complies with Class I (II) III. (circle one)  
 Shop Hydrostatic Test 2175 psi  
 Certificate of Authorization No. N1738  
 We certify the statements of items number 8 and 9 in this data report to be correct.  
 Date 166 15<sup>th</sup> 1977 By VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. *Robouzeau*  
 (Manager of Inspection)

### CERTIFICATE OF SHOP INSPECTION

VALVE MADE BY VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED at MONTREAL, CANADA  
 I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors of the Province of QUEBEC and employed by the DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR of QUEBEC  
 have inspected the valve described in this manufacturer's data report on 22<sup>nd</sup> 77 and state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the manufacturer has constructed this valve in accordance with the ASME Code for Nuclear Pumps and Valves by signing this certificate without the inspector nor his employer makes any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the pressure vessel described in this manufacturer's data report. Furthermore, neither the inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.  
 Date 22<sup>nd</sup> 77  
Robert F. Faudette Inspector's Signature  
 \_\_\_\_\_ Commissioner National Board of Province and No. 8020

# VELAN ENGINEERING COMPANIES

FORM NPV-1 MANUFACTURERS' DATA REPORT FOR NUCLEAR PUMPS & VALVES -  
As required under the Provisions of the ASME Nuclear Pump & Valve Code

1. Manufactured by VELAN ENGINEERING LTD., 2125 Ward Ave., Montreal Order No. PI-0212-N ITEM: 1  
 2. Manufactured for THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY Contract No. 02316815  
 3. Owner THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

4. Location TOLEDO EDISON  
 5. Valve Identification W5-276-13MS CF-HV54 *1-1000*  
 (a) Shop Drawing No. PI-0212-N-2 Rev. B *2001. NEW*

6. Design Conditions 700 psi *300*  
 7. The Design Complies with Class I (II) III (circle one)  
 Prepared by VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED  
 Specified by BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
 (Name of Co. & Dept.)  
VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)

(a) Design Information on file at  
 (b) Design Specification certified by  
 (c) Design Report on file at  
 (d) Design Report certified by  
 8. The Materials comply with Class I, (II) III (circle one)

Eng. (I)	Province	Reg. No.	Date
VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)			
A. K. VELAN	QUEBEC	16463	1965
Eng. (I)	Province	Reg. No.	Date

Mark No.	Mat. Spec.	Manufacturer	Body Ser. No.	Body H. Code	Ennet H.C.	Disc. H.C.
(a) Castings						
1. DISC	STELLITE 6	VESTSHELL INC.				RXI 113-643
2.						
3.						
4.						
(b) Forgings						
1. BODY	ASTM-A-182 316	CANFORCE	<i>1-4</i> 827-1	BW		
2.						
3.						
4.						
(c) Bolting						
1.						
2.						
(d) Other Components						
1. STEM	ASTM-A-461 630	FIRTH BROWN ST.				690706
2.						
3.						
4.						

9. The Manufacture and Examination complies with Class I, (II) III, (circle one)  
 Shop Hydrostatic Test 2175 psi  
 Certificate of Authorization No. N1738  
 We certify the statements of items number 8 and 9 in this data report to be correct.  
 Date Nov 13 1977 By VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. *Relonawely*  
 (Inspector of Inspection)

**CERTIFICATE OF SHOP INSPECTION**

VALVE MADE BY VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED at MONTREAL, CANADA  
 I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors of the Province of QUEBEC and employed by the DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR of QUEBEC  
 have inspected the valve described in this manufacturer's data report on Oct 24 of 1977 and state that  
 to the best of my knowledge and belief, the manufacturer has constructed this valve in accordance with the ASME Code for Nuclear Pumps and Valves.  
 By signing this certificate neither the Inspector nor his employer makes any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the pressure vessel described  
 in this manufacturer's data report. Furthermore, neither the Inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or  
 property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.  
 Date Nov 24 1977  
*Benoit Brunette*  
 Inspector's Signature  
 Cont. Inspections  
 National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors

FORM NPV-1 MANUFACTURERS' DATA REPORT FOR NUCLEAR PUMPS & VALVES

As required under the Provisions of the ASME Nuclear Pump & Valve Code

1. Manufactured by VELAN ENGINEERING LTD., 2123 Ward Ave., Montreal, Que. No. P1-0212-N ITEM: 1

2. Manufactured for THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY Contract No. 023168LS

3. Owner THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

4. Location TOLEDO EDISON

5. Valve Identification W5-274-13NS CF-RV-A

6. Design Conditions 700 psi

7. The Design Complies with

(a) Design Information on file at \_\_\_\_\_

(b) Design Specification certified by \_\_\_\_\_

(c) Design Report on file at \_\_\_\_\_

(d) Design Report certified by \_\_\_\_\_

8. The Materials comply with Class I, II, III (circle one)

Prepared by VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED

Specified by BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

CLASS (II) II

VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT)

Eng. (I) \_\_\_\_\_

Eng. (II) A. N. VELAN Date 16453 1955

Eng. (III) \_\_\_\_\_

Mark No.	Mat. Spec.	Manufacturer	Body Ser. No.	Body H. Code	Donnet H.C.	Disc. (Welded or I.I.C.)
a) Castings						
1. DISC	STELLITE 6	VESTSHELL, INC.				PXI 115-643
2.						
3.						
4.						
b) Forgings						
1. BODY	ASTM-A-182 316	CANFORGE	1-2 820-1	EW		
2.						
3.						
4.						
Bolting						
1.						
2.						
Other Components						
1. STEM	ASTM-A-461 630	FIRTH BROWN ST.				696706
2.						
3.						
4.						

9. Manufacture and Examination complies with Class I, II, III (circle one)

Shop Hydrostatic Test 2175 psi

Certificate of Authorization No. W1738

We certify the statements of items number 8 and 9 in this data report to be correct.

Date Nov 15 1977 By A. N. Velan (Manager of Inspection)

**CERTIFICATE OF SHOP INSPECTION**

VALVE MADE BY VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED at MONTREAL, CANADA

I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors of the Province of QUEBEC and employed by the DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR of QUEBEC

have inspected the valve described in this manufacturer's data report on Nov 24 1977 and state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the manufacturer has constructed this valve in accordance with the ASME Code for Nuclear Pumps and Valves. I am issuing this certificate under the Inspector's seal and signature, and state that I am not aware of any defect or condition which would render the valve unsafe for service. Furthermore, neither the Inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.

Date Nov 24 1977

A. N. Velan Inspector's Signature

[Signature] Commissions

10820

Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

June 9, 1978

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

J&W/TECO-QA24

File: NSS-14

T1.2

Toledo Edison Company  
5501 N. State Route 2  
Oak Harbor, OH 43449


Attention: Mr. J.D. Lenardson  
QA Director

Subject: Corrected NPV Form for  
Core Flood System Valves

Dear Mr. Lenardson:

Attached are corrected NPV Forms and revised Hydro Test Reports for Core Flood System Valves, CF-HV2A & B and CF-HV5A & B. Please insert this documentation into your copies of the QA Data Package for these valves and remove the obsolete documentation.

Very truly yours,



C. A. Armentrout  
QA Engineer

CAA:pbv  
Attachment

cc: w/o  
E.C. Novak  
J. Fulcher  
R. Luken

11320

**velan  
engineering**



**PLANTS-USINES:**

Montreal, Canada  
Granby, Que.  
Plattsburgh, N.Y., U.S.A.  
Leicester, England  
Paris, France

**Velan Engineering Ltd.**  
2125 Ward  
Montreal, Que. H4M 1T6  
Tel: (514) 748-7743  
Telex: 05-825668  
TWX: 610-421-3673

June 5, 1978.

Babcock & Wilcox  
Power Generation Group  
P.O. Box 1260  
Lynchburg, Va. 24505  
U. S. A.

Attention: Mr. B.V. Zachariah  
Senior Buyer

Subject: Corrected NPV Forms for the  
Core Flood System Valves  
Your Order: 023168 LS  
Velan Order: P1-0212-N Item 1



Gentlemen:

With reference to your dated May 17, 1978, attached please find two copies of each of the corrected NPV Forms and revised Hydro Test Reports for the subject valves.

Valve Tag No.	Data Package No.	Valve S/No.	Body S/No.	New Name Plate S/No.
CF-HV2A	770824	824-1	1-2	824-1
CF-HV2B	770825	825-1	1-3	825-1
CF-HV5A	770826	826-1	1-1	826-1
CF-HV5B	770827	827-1	1-4	827-1

Would you please arrange to insert the revised copies in the related Data Packages and destroy the ones issued previously.

Your cooperation would be greatly appreciated.

Yours truly,  
VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED

*A.S. Pokomandy*  
A.S. Pokomandy  
Manager of Quality Control

ASP:jp

*Resolution  
S.P.R. 446 1200*

*NOTE:  
ORIGINAL to B&W  
6/15/78  
(WAGS) GH*

*B&W GH to forward to site*

*12-0220  
A*



# VELAN ENGINEERING COMPANIES

Revised: Aug 24-1977 820824

## FORM NPV-1 MANUFACTURERS' DATA REPORT FOR NUCLEAR PUMPS & VALVES As required under the Provisions of the ASME Nuclear Pump & Valve Code

- Manufactured by VELAN ENGINEERING LTD., 3125 Ward Ave., Montreal Order No. PI-0212-N ITEM: 1
  - Manufactured for THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY Contract No. 023168LS
  - Owner THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY
  - Location TOLEDO EDISON
  - Valve Identification W5-274-13MS CF-HV 24  
(a) Shop Drawing No. PI-0212-N-2 Rev. B Prepared by VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED
  - Design Conditions 700 psi 300 °F Specified by BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY
  - The Design Complies with Class I (II) III (circle one)  
(Name of Co. & Rep.) VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)
- (a) Design Information on file at \_\_\_\_\_  
 (b) Design Specifications certified by \_\_\_\_\_  
 (c) Design Report on file at \_\_\_\_\_  
 (d) Design Report certified by \_\_\_\_\_
- | Eng. (I)                                   | Province      | Reg. No.     | Date        |
|--|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.) |               |              |             |
| <u>A. K. VELAN</u>                         | <u>QUEBEC</u> | <u>16463</u> | <u>1965</u> |
8. The Materials comply with Class I (II) III (circle one)
- | Eng. (I)                                   | Province      | Reg. No.     | Date        |
|--|---------------|--------------|-------------|
| VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.) |               |              |             |
| <u>A. K. VELAN</u>                         | <u>QUEBEC</u> | <u>16463</u> | <u>1965</u> |

Mark No.	Mat. Spec.	Manufacturer	Body Ser. No.	Body H. Code	Bonnet H.C.	Disc. <del>Weld</del> H.C.
(a) Castings						
1. DISC	STELLITE 6	VESTSHELL INC.				RXI 113-643
2.						
3.						
4.						
(b) Forgings						
1. BODY	ASTM-A-182 316	CANFORGE	<u>1-2</u> <u>824-1</u>	<u>BW</u>		
2.						
3.						
4.						
(c) Bolts						
(d) Other Components						
1. STEM	ASTM-A-461 630	FIRTH BROWN ST.				690706
2.						
3.						
4.						

9. The Manufacture and Examination complies with Class I (II) III (circle one)  
 Shop Hydrostatic Test 2175 psi  
 Certificate of Authorization No. N1738  
 We certify the statements of items number 8 and 9 in this data report to be correct.  
 Date Nov 15<sup>th</sup> 1977 VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. By A. K. Velan  
 (Manager of Inspection)

**CERTIFICATE OF SHOP INSPECTION**

VALVE MADE BY VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED at MONTRÉAL, CANADA  
 I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors of the Province of QUEBEC and employed by the DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR of QUEBEC  
 have inspected the valve described in this manufacturer's data report on Nov 24 1977 and state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the manufacturer has constructed this valve in accordance with the ASME Code for Nuclear Pumps and Valves. By signing this certificate neither the Inspector nor his employer makes any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the pressure vessel described in this manufacturer's data report. Furthermore, neither the Inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.

Date Nov 24 1977  
Benoit J. Jodanis  
 Inspector's Signature

Commissions \_\_\_\_\_  
 National Board or Province and No. \_\_\_\_\_

130620  
70



HYDROSTATIC TEST REPORT

VALVES

VELAN P.O. PI-0212-N

CUSTOMER P.O. 02316845

ITEM 1

QUANTITY 1

DWG. \* PI-0212-N-2 Rev 1B

SPEC. \* 1025-0469

VALVE DESCRIPTION \* 1" Bonnetless globe valve s/w cone - Stainless steel with  
Limitation motor operator (SHB-000-2)

VALVES ARE HYDROST. TESTED ACCORDING TO VEL-NDT-640 PROCEDURE.

	<u>SHELL</u>	<u>SEAT</u>	<u>BACKSEAT</u>
TIME	<u>10 mins.</u>	<u>5 mins</u>	<u>5 mins</u>
PRESSURE	<u>2145 PSI.</u>	<u>1500 PSI</u>	<u>1500 PSI</u>
RESULT	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u> LEAKAGE	<u>0</u> LEAKAGE

MOTOR SERIAL NO.: 158233

ALIGNMENT OF VALVE AND OPERATOR SYSTEM SHOP TESTED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY.

MOTOR TAG NO.: CF-HV2A

TORQUE: OPEN 1.5

CLOSE 1.0

DATE 3/27/43

TIME: OPEN 6.1 sec

TESTER J. D. Pinter

CLOSE 6.1 sec

INSPECTOR J. S. Silberg

WITNESSED (CUSTOMER REPRESENTATIVE)  
(IF REQUIRED)

\* Revised; May 26-1978 indicate: DWG, spec, & description

*[Handwritten signature]*

1400-20



# VELAN ENGINEERING COMPANIES

## FORM NPV-1 MANUFACTURERS' DATA REPORT FOR NUCLEAR PUMPS & VALVES

As required under the Provisions of the ASME Nuclear Pump & Valve Code

1. Manufactured by VELAN ENGINEERING LTD., 2125 Ward Ave., Montreal Order No. P1-0212-N ITEM: 1
2. Manufactured for THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY Contract No. 023168LS
3. Owner THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY
4. Location TOLEDO EDISON
5. Valve Identification W5-274-13MS CF-HV2B  
 (a) Shop Drawing No. P1-0212-N-2 Rev. B Prepared by VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED
6. Design Conditions 700 psi 300 °F Specified by BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
 (Name of Co. & Item)
7. The Design Complies with Class I  II  III  
 (circle one)  
 (a) Design Information on file at VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)  
 (b) Design Specification certified by \_\_\_\_\_  
 (c) Design Report on file at VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. (ENGINEERING DEPT.)  
 (d) Design Report certified by A. K. VELAN QUEBEC 16453 1965  
 Eng. (I) Province Reg. No. Date
8. The Materials comply with Class I  II  III (circle one)  
 Eng. (I) Province Reg. No. Date

Mark No.	Mat. Spec.	Manufacturer	Body Ser. No	Body H. Code	Bonnet H.C.	Disc. Washer H.C.
(a) Castings						
1. DISC	STELLITE 6	VESTSHELL INC.				RXI 113-643
2.						
3.						
4.						
(b) Forgings						
1. BODY	ASTM-A-182 316	CANFORGE	<u>1-3 825-1</u>	BW		
2.						
3.						
4.						
(c) Bolting						
1.						
2.						
(d) Other Components						
1. STEM	ASTM-A-461 630	FIRTH BROWN ST.				690706
2.						
3.						
4.						

9. The Manufacture and Examination complies with Class I  II  III. (circle one)

Shop Hydrostatic Test 2175 psi

Certificate of Authorization No. N1738

We certify the statements of items number 8 and 9 in this data report to be correct.

Date Nov 15<sup>th</sup> 1967 VELAN ENGINEERING LTD. By \_\_\_\_\_

*Belominsky*  
[Manager of Inspection]

### CERTIFICATE OF SHOP INSPECTION

VALVE MADE BY VELAN ENGINEERING LIMITED at MONTREAL, CANADA  
I, the undersigned, holding a valid commission issued by the National Board of Boiler and Pressure Vessel Inspectors of the Province of QUEBEC and employed by the DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR of QUEBEC

Have inspected the valve described in this manufacturer's data report on \_\_\_\_\_ and state that to the best of my knowledge and belief, the manufacturer has constructed this valve in accordance with the ASME Code for Nuclear Pumps and Valves. By signing this certificate neither the inspector nor his employer makes any warranty, expressed or implied, concerning the pressure vessel described in this manufacturer's data report. Furthermore, neither the inspector nor his employer shall be liable in any manner for any personal injury or property damage or a loss of any kind arising from or connected with this inspection.

Date Nov 24 1967  
Emmit Madlita  
Inspector's Signature

Commissioned \_\_\_\_\_  
National Board or Province and No.

*15820*

HYDROSTATIC TEST REPORT

770825

VALVES

VFLAN P.O. P1-0212-2 CUSTOMER P.O. 02316-S.H.S

ITEM 1 QUANTITY 1

DWG. P1-0212-N-2 Rev:B SPEC. 1025-0469

VALVE DESCRIPTION 1" Bonnetless Globe valve s/w conn. stainless steel with  
limitorque motor op rator (SM8-000-2)

VALVES ARE HYDROST. TESTED ACCORDING TO VEL-NET-640 PROCEDURE.

<u>SHELL</u>		<u>SEAT</u>		<u>BACKSEAT</u>	
TIME	<u>10 min.</u>	TIME	<u>5 min.</u>	TIME	<u>5 min.</u>
PRESSURE	<u>2175 PSI.</u>	PRESSURE	<u>1500 PSI.</u>	PRESSURE	<u>1500 PSI.</u>
RESULT	<u>0</u>	RESULT	<u>0</u>	RESULT	<u>0</u>
		LEAKAGE		LEAKAGE	

MOTOR SERIAL NO.: 158234

MOTOR TAG. NO.: C.F-HV2.B

TORQUE: OPEN 1.5

CLOSE 1.5

TIME: OPEN 6.2 sec

CLOSE 6.2 sec

ALIGNMENT OF VALVE AND OPERATOR SYSTEM SHIP TESTED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY.

DATE 3/28/73

TESTER: J. H. Britton

INSPECTOR: J. H. Britton



WITNESSED (CUSTOMER REPRESENTATIVE)  
(IF REQUIRED)

\* Revised: May 26-1978 Indicate: DWG, Spec & Description

*Handwritten signature*  
16820  
13



HYDROSTATIC TEST REPORT

776826

VALVES

VELAN P.O. PI-0212-N CUSTOMER P.O. 09316819

ITEM 1 QUANTITY 1

DWG. \*PI-0212-N-2 Rev B SPEC. \*1025-0469

VALVE DESCRIPTION \* 1" Bonnetless Globe s/w connection Studlex SH with Limitorque motor operator (SMB-000-2)

VALVES ARE HYDROST. TESTED ACCORDING TO VEL-NDT-640 PROCEDURE.

	<u>SHELL</u>	<u>SEAT</u>	<u>BACKSEAT</u>
TIME	<u>10 Min</u>	<u>5 Min</u>	<u>5 Min</u>
PRESSURE	<u>2175 PSI</u>	<u>1500 PSI</u>	<u>1500 PSI</u>
RESULT	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>
		LEAKAGE	LEAKAGE

MOTOR SERIAL NO.: 158235

MOTOR TAG NO.: CF-1115A

TORQUE: OPEN 1.0

CLOSE 1.5

TIME: OPEN 6.0 sec

CLOSE 6.0 sec

ALIGNMENT OF VALVE AND OPERATOR SYSTEM SHOP TESTED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY.

DATE 3/28/73

TESTER J. R. ...

INSPECTOR [Signature]

WITNESSED (CUSTOMER REPRESENTATIVE) (IF REQUIRED)

\* Revised; May 26-1978 indicate: DWG, Spec & Description

[Signature]

18 of 20



HYDROSTATIC TEST REPORT

VALVES

VELAN P.O. PI-0212-A' CUSTOMER P.O. 02316515

ITEM 1 QUANTITY 1

DWG. \* PI-0212-N-2 Rev: B SPEC. \* 1025-0469

VALVE DESCRIPTION \* 1" Bonnetless Globe valve s/w connection (stainless steel) with Limitorque motor operator (SMB-000-2)

VALVES ARE HYDROST. TESTED ACCORDING TO VEL-NDT-640 PROCEDURE.

<u>SHELL</u>		<u>SEAT</u>	<u>BACKSEAT</u>
TIME <u>10 min.</u>	TIME <u>5 min.</u>	TIME <u>5</u>	
PRESSURE <u>2175 PSI</u>	PRESSURE <u>1500 PSI</u>	PRESSURE <u>1500 PSI</u>	
RESULT <u>0</u>	RESULT <u>0</u> LEAKAGE	RESULT <u>0</u> LEAKAGE	

MOTOR SERIAL NO.: 158936

MOTOR TAG. NO.: C.F-HV5B

TORQUE: OPEN 1.0

CLOSE 1.0

TIME: OPEN 6.2

CLOSE 6.2

ALIGNMENT OF VALVE AND OPERATOR SYSTEM SHOP TESTED AND FOUND SATISFACTORY.

DATE 3/28/73

TESTER J.R. Saitta

INSPECTOR E.P. Maggipis



WITNESSED (CUSTOMER REPRESENTATIVE) (IF REQUIRED)

\* Revised: May 26-1978 indicate DWG, Spec & Description

HR

20820  
17

21140100	52.6	0	* 178.7-777.7	318.0	325.0	376.5	334.9	319.1	311.7	541.3	560.8	548.6	572.4-777.7	.6	145.4
21140100	52.5	0	* 178.6-777.7	318.1	325.0	376.3	334.5	312.8	311.4	541.3	559.4	541.0	572.4-777.7	.4	151.4
21150100	52.4	0	* 178.5-777.7	318.1	325.4	376.0	334.4	311.8	311.4	541.6	559.6	541.8	572.7-777.7	.2	154.9
21150100	52.3	4	* 178.5-777.7	317.8	325.1	376.8	334.4	311.8	311.2	541.6	559.4	542.6	571.9-777.7	.8	155.3



SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

CLOSED

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\* MAY 1 1977


TO: CHANGE CONTROL For Distribution  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
Central Engineering Files  
R. W. Bonsall - Task Engineer  
G. T. BURN - Project Manager  
S. J. ENGEL

FILE: 13-7-445  
CONTRACT NO: 620-0007  
SPR 445  
TITLE OTSG's Boiled Dry  
DATE: 5-19-77  
STATUS CODE C

- \_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - FLORIDA \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED. \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ F. R. Faist - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ J. R. Bohart - Int'l. Support \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Donnell - OFR \_\_\_\_\_
- \_\_\_\_\_ B. A. Karrasch - Plant Integration \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 445 which was processed on Contract 620-0007. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem ~~is~~/is not considered applicable to other contracts \_\_\_\_\_.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**



MAY 31 1977

PDS-21091(8-76)

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BARCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER Florida Power Corp.	DATE 5/29/77	DOC. ID. 13	CONT. NO. 620/0007	SPR NO. 405	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR Barcock & Wilcox	P.A. NO.	PART NO./TASK NO. 55	GROUP NO. 01	SEQ. NO. 01	
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) OTSG's Boiled Dry		PROBLEM CONTACT E. Hamilton			

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

PROBLEM IDENTIFICATION

SEE ATTACHED SHEET CLOSED

ALSO SEE CR III TRIP REPORTS 12, 13, & 14.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE, INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:

N/A

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL:

N/A

RESOLUTION:

INFORMATION ONLY

RESOLUTION

PREPARED BY <i>Randy J. Brown</i>	DATE 5-5-77	APPROVED BY <i>S. J. Faulstich</i>	DATE 5/18/77
REVIEWED BY <i>Randy J. Brown</i>	DATE 5/18/77		

COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO	I.C.A. NO. 04-	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO
---	--	-------------------	--

SITE COMPLETION REPORT:

ISSUED FOR "INFORMATION ONLY"


COMPLETION

DEVIATIONS:  
 NONE  SPR REV NO.

DATE COMPLETED:

COMPLETED BY  
*E. Hamilton* DATE  
4/29/77

SHEET OF







1871  
1872  
1873  
1874  
1875  
1876  
1877  
1878  
1879  
1880  
1881  
1882  
1883  
1884  
1885  
1886  
1887  
1888  
1889  
1890  
1891  
1892  
1893  
1894  
1895  
1896  
1897  
1898  
1899  
1900

1871  
1872  
1873  
1874  
1875  
1876  
1877  
1878  
1879  
1880  
1881  
1882  
1883  
1884  
1885  
1886  
1887  
1888  
1889  
1890  
1891  
1892  
1893  
1894  
1895  
1896  
1897  
1898  
1899  
1900


1871  
1872  
1873  
1874  
1875  
1876  
1877  
1878  
1879  
1880  
1881  
1882  
1883  
1884  
1885  
1886  
1887  
1888  
1889  
1890  
1891  
1892  
1893  
1894  
1895  
1896  
1897  
1898  
1899  
1900

1871  
1872  
1873  
1874  
1875  
1876  
1877  
1878  
1879  
1880  
1881  
1882  
1883  
1884  
1885  
1886  
1887  
1888  
1889  
1890  
1891  
1892  
1893  
1894  
1895  
1896  
1897  
1898  
1899  
1900



Date	Description	Debit	Credit	Balance
1890	Jan 1			
	Jan 2			
	Jan 3			
	Jan 4			
	Jan 5			
	Jan 6			
	Jan 7			
	Jan 8			
	Jan 9			
	Jan 10			
	Jan 11			
	Jan 12			
	Jan 13			
	Jan 14			
	Jan 15			
	Jan 16			
	Jan 17			
	Jan 18			
	Jan 19			
	Jan 20			
	Jan 21			
	Jan 22			
	Jan 23			
	Jan 24			
	Jan 25			
	Jan 26			
	Jan 27			
	Jan 28			
	Jan 29			
	Jan 30			
	Jan 31			
	Feb 1			
	Feb 2			
	Feb 3			
	Feb 4			
	Feb 5			
	Feb 6			
	Feb 7			
	Feb 8			
	Feb 9			
	Feb 10			
	Feb 11			
	Feb 12			
	Feb 13			
	Feb 14			
	Feb 15			
	Feb 16			
	Feb 17			
	Feb 18			
	Feb 19			
	Feb 20			
	Feb 21			
	Feb 22			
	Feb 23			
	Feb 24			
	Feb 25			
	Feb 26			
	Feb 27			
	Feb 28			
	Feb 29			
	Feb 30			
	Feb 31			
	Mar 1			
	Mar 2			
	Mar 3			
	Mar 4			
	Mar 5			
	Mar 6			
	Mar 7			
	Mar 8			
	Mar 9			
	Mar 10			
	Mar 11			
	Mar 12			
	Mar 13			
	Mar 14			
	Mar 15			
	Mar 16			
	Mar 17			
	Mar 18			
	Mar 19			
	Mar 20			
	Mar 21			
	Mar 22			
	Mar 23			
	Mar 24			
	Mar 25			
	Mar 26			
	Mar 27			
	Mar 28			
	Mar 29			
	Mar 30			
	Mar 31			
	Apr 1			
	Apr 2			
	Apr 3			
	Apr 4			
	Apr 5			
	Apr 6			
	Apr 7			
	Apr 8			
	Apr 9			
	Apr 10			
	Apr 11			
	Apr 12			
	Apr 13			
	Apr 14			
	Apr 15			
	Apr 16			
	Apr 17			
	Apr 18			
	Apr 19			
	Apr 20			
	Apr 21			
	Apr 22			
	Apr 23			
	Apr 24			
	Apr 25			
	Apr 26			
	Apr 27			
	Apr 28			
	Apr 29			
	Apr 30			
	Apr 31			
	May 1			
	May 2			
	May 3			
	May 4			
	May 5			
	May 6			
	May 7			
	May 8			
	May 9			
	May 10			
	May 11			
	May 12			
	May 13			
	May 14			
	May 15			
	May 16			
	May 17			
	May 18			
	May 19			
	May 20			
	May 21			
	May 22			
	May 23			
	May 24			
	May 25			
	May 26			
	May 27			
	May 28			
	May 29			
	May 30			
	May 31			
	Jun 1			
	Jun 2			
	Jun 3			
	Jun 4			
	Jun 5			
	Jun 6			
	Jun 7			
	Jun 8			
	Jun 9			
	Jun 10			
	Jun 11			
	Jun 12			
	Jun 13			
	Jun 14			
	Jun 15			
	Jun 16			
	Jun 17			
	Jun 18			
	Jun 19			
	Jun 20			
	Jun 21			
	Jun 22			
	Jun 23			
	Jun 24			
	Jun 25			
	Jun 26			
	Jun 27			
	Jun 28			
	Jun 29			
	Jun 30			
	Jun 31			
	Jul 1			
	Jul 2			
	Jul 3			
	Jul 4			
	Jul 5			
	Jul 6			
	Jul 7			
	Jul 8			
	Jul 9			
	Jul 10			
	Jul 11			
	Jul 12			
	Jul 13			
	Jul 14			
	Jul 15			
	Jul 16			
	Jul 17			
	Jul 18			
	Jul 19			
	Jul 20			
	Jul 21			
	Jul 22			
	Jul 23			
	Jul 24			
	Jul 25			
	Jul 26			
	Jul 27			
	Jul 28			
	Jul 29			
	Jul 30			
	Jul 31			
	Aug 1			
	Aug 2			
	Aug 3			
	Aug 4			
	Aug 5			
	Aug 6			
	Aug 7			
	Aug 8			
	Aug 9			
	Aug 10			
	Aug 11			
	Aug 12			
	Aug 13			
	Aug 14			
	Aug 15			
	Aug 16			
	Aug 17			
	Aug 18			
	Aug 19			
	Aug 20			
	Aug 21			
	Aug 22			
	Aug 23			
	Aug 24			
	Aug 25			
	Aug 26			
	Aug 27			
	Aug 28			
	Aug 29			
	Aug 30			
	Aug 31			
	Sep 1			
	Sep 2			
	Sep 3			
	Sep 4			
	Sep 5			
	Sep 6			
	Sep 7			
	Sep 8			
	Sep 9			
	Sep 10			
	Sep 11			
	Sep 12			
	Sep 13			
	Sep 14			
	Sep 15			
	Sep 16			
	Sep 17			
	Sep 18			
	Sep 19			
	Sep 20			
	Sep 21			
	Sep 22			
	Sep 23			
	Sep 24			
	Sep 25			
	Sep 26			
	Sep 27			
	Sep 28			
	Sep 29			
	Sep 30			
	Sep 31			
	Oct 1			
	Oct 2			
	Oct 3			
	Oct 4			
	Oct 5			
	Oct 6			
	Oct 7			
	Oct 8			
	Oct 9			
	Oct 10			
	Oct 11			
	Oct 12			
	Oct 13			
	Oct 14			
	Oct 15			
	Oct 16			
	Oct 17			
	Oct 18			
	Oct 19			
	Oct 20			
	Oct 21			
	Oct 22			
	Oct 23			
	Oct 24			
	Oct 25			
	Oct 26			
	Oct 27			
	Oct 28			
	Oct 29			
	Oct 30			
	Oct 31			
	Nov 1			
	Nov 2			
	Nov 3			
	Nov 4			
	Nov 5			
	Nov 6			
	Nov 7			
	Nov 8			
	Nov 9			
	Nov 10			
	Nov 11			
	Nov 12			
	Nov 13			
	Nov 14			
	Nov 15			
	Nov 16			
	Nov 17			
	Nov 18			
	Nov 19			
	Nov 20			
	Nov 21			
	Nov 22			
	Nov 23</			



**IMAGE EVALUATION  
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART**










GAB


FTIR

01









2.1 microns  
 2.2 microns  
 2.3 microns  
 2.4 microns  
 2.5 microns  
 2.6 microns  
 2.7 microns  
 2.8 microns  
 2.9 microns  
 3.0 microns

0.000 0.200 0.400 0.600 0.800 1.000 1.200 1.400 1.600 1.800 2.000 2.200 2.400 2.600 2.800 3.000




1700  
4-23-77  
Loss of offsite power

1202  
4-23-77  
Shutdown outside CR









Shutdown outside CR

Loss of CR power

Ed.

SAULT STEARNS

540

1000


100

Shutdown outside CR

7-22 WYCH

1000

7/2/71



12M

3PM

5PM

7PM

9PM

11PM

1AM

3AM

5AM







STATION 1000 UWA

2500

1000

2500

Shuteau Oxide CR

Reformation

Level of surface

2300

1000



2000

2000

1900

1500

1800

1400

1700

1700

1600

1500

1400

1300

1200

1100

1000

900

800

700

600


500

WORLDWIDE COMM. USA  
12000  
10000  
8000  
6000  
4000  
2000

Shutdown Outside CR

NOTES: OUTSIDE PRESSURE  
LOSS AT OFF-SITE PUMP

4/23/71



12000  
10000  
8000  
6000  
4000  
2000

12000  
10000  
8000  
6000  
4000  
2000







12111130	.4	.3	.2	.3	577.1	579.1	581.3	583.4	1961.	1957.	1964.	152.9	21.4	10.5	0	0.	1969.	1976.	508.6	589.7
12112130	.6	.5	.4	.5	577.3	579.7	582.3	585.4	1960.	1954.	1962.	149.4	21.3	20.8	0	0.	1967.	76.	508.8	589.1
12113131	.1	.3	.3	.2	571.3	576.9	571.5	572.1	1975.	1917.	1925.	128.7	21.5	24.7	0	0.	1967.	1806.	509.7	587.5
12114130	.3	.3	.3	.3	574.1	585.1	580.3	586.1	1914.	1909.	1916.	119.8	21.7	22.7	0	0.	1967.	1926.	508.3	585.0

	T212	T219	T262	T215	T246	G200	T312	T313	T314	T315	T316	T317	G208	G209	G210	T244	T303	T243	T226	T239
11144145	138.-7777.	21.57	1.48	1746.	52.2	.81	1.41	.52	1.46	3.26	2.97	1.97	.63	1.74	772.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11145145	138.-7777.	21.57	1.48	1746.	52.2	.85	1.41	.54	1.45	3.30	2.96	1.96	.62	1.74	772.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11146145	138.-7777.	21.57	1.48	1746.	52.2	.83	1.41	.52	1.45	3.26	2.98	1.97	.63	1.75	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11147145	138.-7777.	21.71	1.48	1746.	52.2	.81	1.41	.54	1.46	3.31	2.95	1.97	.62	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11148145	138.-7777.	21.71	1.48	1746.	52.2	.79	1.40	.56	1.46	3.32	2.95	1.96	.63	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11149145	138.-7777.	21.71	1.48	1746.	52.2	.82	1.41	.55	1.46	3.32	2.95	1.96	.63	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11150145	138.-7777.	21.56	1.48	1746.	52.2	.72	1.40	.55	1.47	3.33	2.95	1.96	.62	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11151145	138.-7777.	21.56	1.48	1746.	52.2	.83	1.40	.54	1.45	3.33	2.96	1.97	.63	1.75	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11152145	138.-7777.	21.42	1.48	1746.	52.2	.84	1.40	.55	1.46	3.33	2.97	1.96	.62	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11153145	138.-7777.	21.53	1.48	1746.	52.2	.92	1.40	.53	1.45	3.29	2.97	1.97	.61	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11154145	138.-7777.	21.78	1.48	1746.	52.2	.81	1.40	.56	1.46	3.34	2.96	1.96	.62	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11155145	138.-7777.	21.71	1.48	1746.	52.2	.85	1.40	.57	1.46	3.36	2.95	1.96	.62	1.75	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11156145	138.-7777.	21.55	1.48	1746.	52.2	.82	1.40	.55	1.45	3.34	2.95	1.96	.62	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11157145	138.-7777.	21.64	1.48	1746.	52.2	.85	1.40	.57	1.45	3.35	2.96	1.96	.61	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11158145	138.-7777.	21.55	1.48	1746.	52.2	.76	1.40	.54	1.44	3.31	2.97	1.97	.63	1.74	773.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11159145	138.-7777.	21.65	1.48	1746.	52.2	.85	1.40	.55	1.45	3.32	2.96	1.96	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11160145	138.-7777.	21.75	1.48	1746.	52.2	.74	1.40	.54	1.44	3.32	2.97	1.97	.63	1.75	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11161145	138.-7777.	21.71	1.48	1746.	52.2	.88	1.40	.56	1.45	3.34	2.96	1.97	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11162145	138.-7777.	21.71	1.48	1746.	52.2	.88	1.40	.56	1.45	3.33	2.96	1.97	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11163145	138.-7777.	21.74	1.39	1746.	52.2	.79	1.40	.57	1.45	3.34	2.96	1.96	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11164145	138.-7777.	21.74	1.39	1746.	52.2	.74	1.41	.56	1.44	3.34	2.95	1.96	.63	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11165145	138.-7777.	21.74	1.48	1746.	52.2	.82	1.40	.57	1.46	3.35	2.96	1.96	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11166145	138.-7777.	21.75	1.48	1746.	52.2	.82	1.40	.56	1.46	3.35	2.96	1.96	.63	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11167145	138.-7777.	21.75	1.48	1746.	52.2	.82	1.40	.56	1.46	3.35	2.96	1.96	.63	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11168145	138.-7777.	21.75	1.48	1746.	52.2	.82	1.40	.56	1.46	3.35	2.96	1.96	.63	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11169145	138.-7777.	21.67	1.48	1746.	52.2	.85	1.40	.55	1.44	3.32	2.97	1.96	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11170145	138.-7777.	21.81	1.34	1746.	52.2	.85	1.40	.55	1.43	3.31	2.98	1.97	.63	1.75	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11171145	138.-7777.	21.67	1.39	1746.	52.2	.85	1.40	.55	1.44	3.34	2.97	1.96	.61	1.75	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11172145	138.-7777.	21.71	1.39	1746.	52.2	.74	1.40	.57	1.44	3.33	2.96	1.96	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11173145	138.-7777.	21.72	1.40	1746.	52.2	.88	1.40	.56	1.44	3.34	2.96	1.96	.62	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11174145	138.-7777.	21.68	1.39	1746.	52.2	.81	1.40	.57	1.44	3.35	2.96	1.96	.61	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11175145	138.-7777.	21.78	1.39	1746.	52.2	.85	1.40	.58	1.46	3.35	2.96	1.96	.62	1.75	774.	423.-77.77	111.	344.		
11176145	138.-7777.	21.84	1.39	1746.	52.2	.76	1.38	.62	1.45	3.47	2.94	1.96	.63	1.74	774.	423.-77.77	32.	342.		
12130145	-7777.-7777.	19.33	1.01	1746.	52.2	.42	1.81	1.15	3.14	3.27	3.90	2.27	.69	1.45	774.	423.-77.77	23.	342.		
12131145	-7777.-7777.	17.38	1.06	1807.	52.4	.61	1.36	2.04	2.84	3.89	4.68	2.81	.54	1.06	774.	423.-77.77	19.	342.		
12132145	-7777.-7777.	16.53	1.18	1857.	52.5	.37	1.45	1.36	2.15	4.18	3.72	1.38	.27	.79	774.	423.-77.77	18.	342.		
12133145	-7777.-7777.	14.42	1.21	1839.	52.8	.28	1.98	1.04	2.24	3.28	2.81	1.36	.13	.68	757.	423.-77.77	16.	341.		
12134145	-7777.-7777.	13.70	1.19	1809.	52.6	.24	1.51	.87	2.08	4.78	2.43	1.01	.18	.45	757.	423.-77.77	15.	341.		
12135145	-7777.-7777.	12.53	1.18	1833.	52.6	.06	1.54	.65	2.27	4.25	2.19	.92	.04	.42	757.	423.-77.77	14.	341.		
12136145	-7777.-7777.	12.15	1.14	1833.	52.7	.14	1.53	.67	2.42	3.98	2.10	.93	.06	.47	757.	423.-77.77	13.	341.		
12137145	-7777.-7777.	15.64	1.13	1467.	52.3	.23	1.32	.88	2.73	3.83	2.08	1.03	.25	.53	746.	388.-77.77	12.	339.		
12138145	-7777.-7777.	16.66	1.13	1467.	52.9	.48	1.28	.76	2.63	3.74	2.12	1.06	.28	.51	746.	388.-77.77	13.	339.		
12139145	-7777.-7777.	16.44	1.15	1475.	53.0	.34	1.24	.64	2.26	3.57	2.31	1.04	.29	.54	746.	388.-77.77	13.	339.		
12140145	-7777.-7777.	17.21	1.14	1435.	53.1	.35	1.18	.89	2.43	3.68	2.62	1.11	.36	.66	746.	388.-77.77	13.	339.		
12141145	-7777.-7777.	17.14	1.14	1447.	53.3	.42	1.27	.86	2.40	4.12	3.10	1.03	.34	.69	739.	378.-77.77	12.	336.		
12142145	-7777.-7777.	17.33	1.15	1367.	53.4	.51	1.12	.86	2.52	4.45	3.54	1.08	.45	1.19	739.	378.-77.77	11.	336.		
12143145	-7777.-7777.	17.33	1.15	1343.	53.5	.59	1.32	.98	2.18	3.97	4.58	1.14	.39	.94	739.	378.-77.77	11.	336.		
12144145	-7777.-7777.	17.58	1.15	1343.	53.6	.72	1.12	1.28	1.84	3.14	4.07	.95	.32	.74	739.	378.-77.77	10.	336.		
12145145	-7777.-7777.	17.59	1.13	1343.	53.7	.79	1.26	1.37	.81	2.30	4.27	.98	.72	.82	733.	389.-77.77	10.	336.		
12146145	-7777.-7777.	17.78	1.14	1245.	53.8	.77	1.32	1.53	1.74	1.85	3.64	1.08	1.08	1.24	733.	359.-77.77	9.	336.		
12147145	-7777.-7777.	17.79	1.14	1197.	53.8	.63	1.29	1.45	1.29	1.78	3.68	1.35	1.05	1.35	733.	359.-77.77	9.	336.		
12148145	-7777.-7777.	17.91	1.14	1197.	53.9	.64	1.16	2.47	.95	1.79	4.02	1.27	.78	.84	733.	359.-77.77	9.	336.		
12149145	-7777.-7777.	16.42	1.10	1112.	53.6	.67	.88	2.26	1.16	.96	4.32	.34	.16	.23	729.	363.-77.77	7.	334.		
12150145	-7777.-7777.	16.54	1.15	1076.	53.8	.67	.92	2.01	1.78	1.67	3.94	.34	.11	.14	728.	357.-77.77	6.	334.		
12151145	-7777.-7777.	18.79	1.17	988.	54.3	.60	.94	2.04	1.72	1.85	2.20	.55	.06	.06	723.	352.-77.77	5.	335.		
12152145	-7777.-7777.	18.48	1.27	916.	54.5	.72	.98	1.36	2.03	2.70	1.67	.84	-77.77	.88	722.	349.-77.77	4.	332.		
12153145	-7777.-7777.	18.49	1.22	840.	54.5	.52	1.04	1.38	1.85	1.96	.95	.54	.18	-77.77	720.	345.-77.77	3.	332.		
12154145	-7777.-7777.	18.98	1.23	797.	54.2	.64	.95	1.27	1.88	1.98	.67	.53	.16	.08	719.	343.-77.77	2.	332.		



12111134	51.1	2	1 1-0,9-777.7	318.9	318.1	327.7	324.2	325.8	326.5	530.6	568.6	539.4	571.3-777.7-777.7	152.4
12112137	51.8	2	1 1-0,5-777.7	318.6	315.4	326.9	325.5	327.9	326.4	539.6	568.6	539.2	571.8-777.7-777.7	155.6
12113134	52.4	2	1 1-0,5-777.7	327.9	314.4	326.9	324.2	327.5	326.3	539.6	568.6	539.4	570.9-777.7-777.7	154.3
12114134	52.4	2	1 1-0,2-777.7	327.4	314.4	326.9	323.1	327.7	326.1	539.9	568.7	539.3	570.7-777.7-777.7	152.4



214710	214711	214712	214713	214714	214715	214716	214717	214718	214719	214720	214721	214722	214723	214724	214725	214726	214727	214728	214729	214730	214731	214732	214733	214734	214735	214736	214737	214738	214739	214740	214741	214742	214743	214744	214745	214746	214747	214748	214749	214750	214751	214752	214753	214754	214755	214756	214757	214758	214759	214760	214761	214762	214763	214764	214765	214766	214767	214768	214769	214770	214771	214772	214773	214774	214775	214776	214777	214778	214779	214780	214781	214782	214783	214784	214785	214786	214787	214788	214789	214790	214791	214792	214793	214794	214795	214796	214797	214798	214799	214800																																																																							
139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150	151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175	176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200	201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225	226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250	251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275	276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300



SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files

C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
R. S. SHEPHERD - Task Engineer  
R. A. GIVERS - Project Manager

FILE: 13-5-322  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 05  
SPR 322 REV. 1  
TITLE LOW PRESS.  
LEVEL FOLLOWING  
REACTOR TRIP  
DATE: 6-25-76

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - FLORIDA \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED. \_\_\_\_\_ L.M. KOLONAY  
\_\_\_\_\_ R. J. Baker - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - Intl. Support \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ P. E. Perrone - OFR \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Donnell - OFR \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 322 which was processed on Contract 620-00 05. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem ~~is~~ is not considered applicable to other contracts 00.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc: G. M. Jacks - Plant Integration  
This SPR has been reviewed IAW NPG-1707-01

Chris C. Lockard  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BARCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER	MET ED	CONTRACT NO.	620-000	SPR NO.	322	REV. NO.	1
VENDOR	BMC	P.O. NO.		TASK NO.	21	GROUP NO.	01
SITE ENGINEER		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE				
S. P. MAINI							

TITLE  
LOW PRESSURIZER LEVEL FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
SEE ATTACHED SHEET

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  
L. M. Kolesny of Engineering informed.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  
Review and implement logic modification such that reactor trip should block calibrating integral RC 9.12, to achieve a slower cooldown rate of RC System and a more acceptable pressurizer level.

This problem should be reviewed for all other sites.

APPROVED BY: *Spanning* 10/4/76  
SUPERVISOR SIGNATURE: *L. M. Kolesny* 10/4/76

RESOLUTION  
SEE COMPLETION REPORT

APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE	DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER	<i>Chris C. Lockard</i>	6-23-76
TASK ENGINEER/NS UNIT MGR	<i>Norm Kolesny</i>	6/23/76
OP. PLANT MGR.	<i>[Signature]</i>	6/24/76
PROJECT MANAGER/SERVICE MGR.	<i>[Signature]</i>	6/23/76

COST CATEGORY  NORM  C  D  G  VENDOR CLAIM

AUTH CHARGE NO.  FIELD CHANGE REQ. FC NO.

SITE COMPLETION REPORT  
FURTHER INVESTIGATION SHOWED THAT OPERATOR PUT FW CONTROL IN MANUAL. THE PROBLEM RESULTED FROM OPERATOR ACTION INSTEAD OF AUTOMATIC CS ACTION.  
RECOMMEND SPR BE CLOSED *(R. Kolesny) BMC 4/2/76*

DEVIATIONS  NONE  SEE SPR/REV NO. \_\_\_\_\_

DATE COMPLETED \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNED BY *[Signature]* DATE 6/23/76

S.O.M. CONST. REP. APPROVAL *[Signature]* DATE 6/23/76

RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE

FINAL DISTRIBUTION  
PROJECT MANAGER  
S.O.M. CONST. REP.  
QA DOC FILE  
CENT. ENGR  
FILE 121.2



ATTACHMENT  
SPR 322 Rev. 1

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

Following a reactor trip the pressurizer level goes as low as 40 inches. SPR 322 Rev. 0 pointed out the main reason that pressurizer level goes as low, because the trapped steam pressure in turbine header decays slowly, resulting in turbine bypass remaining open for time longer than is necessary.

Further examination of the reactor trip data revealed that immediately following the reactor trip the feedwater demand actually reduced to 20% instead of reducing to 5% (cross limit value as neutron power following the trip is zero).

This additional feed to steam generators contributes to the excessive cooling of the RC system and hence lower pressurizer level.

See attached EMCo report on the subject.

PRODUCT SYSTEM FILE NO. 1506	FILE NO. 931	DATE OF FAILURE 0/4/74	FROM N. S. Radd
UNIT NO. 290622	DATE CODE X	EXP. NO. 81239	ACCT. NO. T79
TITLE AND TYPE OF SYSTEM PRODUCT HEATER IMPROVEMENT		FIELD NO. PG Log 552 Middletown, PA 17057	

References: By RA of 9/23/74  
 On 9/4/74 Met. Ed. Plant Superintendent, Jack Herbein stated that "On a Reactor Trip the pressurizer level should not drop as low as it does. (to approximately 40 inches) Analysis of the 8/13/74 Generator breaker trip test reveals the cross limits from neutron power error to feedwater flow control did not perform as expected. The neutron power error cross limit should have reduced the feedwater demand immediately after reactor trip to approximately 5%. The neutron power error cross limit actually reduced the feedwater flow demand to approximately 20%. This additional feed to the steam generators contributed to the excessive rate of cooling of the RC system and the resultant drop in pressurizer level.

The reason for the above undesirable performance is as follows. On a reactor trip the CRD system transfers to manual. When the CRD is in manual the neutron power error is applied to the  $K_{avg}$  calibrating integral.

EFFECT ON SYSTEM (BRIEFLY)  
 Pressurizer level less than 50 inches cuts off heaters  
 RC pressure can not be controlled.

FOR FIELD USE

DAYS SERVICE	0
SERVICE	0
EXPANSIONS	0
MATERIAL	0
SER. NO.	P72-235

ALLOCATION

<input type="checkbox"/> PRODUCT
<input type="checkbox"/> PRODUCT APPLICATION
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SYSTEM
<input type="checkbox"/> SYSTEM APPLICATION
<input type="checkbox"/> WARRANTY
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER

DETECTIVE BY AT RETURNED

NO  
 YES ON \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 RW NO \_\_\_\_\_

FAILURE OCCURRED

<input type="checkbox"/> ON RECEIPT
<input type="checkbox"/> IN SERVICE (WARRANTY)
<input type="checkbox"/> IN SERVICE (NON-WARRANTY)
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2 YEAR TEST TIME IN SERVICE

POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR PROBLEM

00	<input type="checkbox"/> FAULTY MATERIAL
01	<input type="checkbox"/> FAULTY MANUFACTURING
02	<input type="checkbox"/> FAULTY DESIGN
03	<input type="checkbox"/> PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCY
04	<input type="checkbox"/> FAULTY PACKAGING
05	<input type="checkbox"/> COMPONENT FAILURE
06	<input type="checkbox"/> WEAR/OUT
07	<input type="checkbox"/> IMPROPER APPLICATION
08	<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATING ENVIRONMENT
09	<input type="checkbox"/> INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS (DOCUMENTATION)

CUSTOMER ATTITUDE

SATISFIED  
 CONCERNED  
 UNCONCERNED

DATE SOLUTION REQUIRED: 10/15/74 OR  INFO ONLY

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION & CORRECTIVE ACTION (BY FIELD IF APPLICABLE)

*[Handwritten signature and notes]*

OPERATING CONDITIONS

AMBIENT TEMP \_\_\_\_\_ EA  
 ATMOSPHERE:  CLEAN  
 AVERAGE  DIRTY  
 HUMIDITY  HI  LO  AVG.

TIME REQUIRED TO:

REPAIR \_\_\_\_\_ EA  
 TROUBLESHOOT \_\_\_\_\_

FAILURE DETAILS: EA

SMCC PART NO. \_\_\_\_\_

DESCRIBE (CIRCUIT, CAP, TRANSISTOR, ETC.)  
 CIRCUIT SYMBOL (C1, R1, Q1)  
 VFG. OF PART (IF KNOWN)

HOW PART FAILED:

<input type="checkbox"/> SHORT	<input type="checkbox"/> OPEN
<input type="checkbox"/> MECH. DAMAGE	
<input type="checkbox"/> ADJUSTMENT	
<input type="checkbox"/> DIRTY	<input type="checkbox"/> UNKNOWN
<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (DESCRIBE)	

FOR USE ONLY:

PROBLEM TYPE	FAILURE CAUSE CODE	FIN SYSTEM	WARRANTY	ACTION TAKEN BY

COPES

QUALITY ASSURANCE	SIGNATURE _____ DATE _____
WARRANTY REPAIR	
CONTRACT OPER	DATE _____
WARRANTY REPAIR	APPROVAL _____ DATE _____
COORDINATION ENGR.	
COMM. SERVICES	
ORDER CENTER	
COMPONENT ENGR.	

FOLLOW UP ON CORRECTIVE ACTION

CITY	NAME	PART NO.	COMMENTS

DISP. OF RM \_\_\_\_\_

DATE RECD \_\_\_\_\_

DATE RETURNED \_\_\_\_\_

HOURS SPENT SOLUTION

DEPT	MAN	HRS

ATTACHMENT

PROBLEM: (Cont'd)

At this time the neutron error is very large and rapidly causes the calibrating integral to travel to its limit. Reference DWG D556175 and D556175B. When the Tave calibrating integral travels to its limit the effective neutron power error to the cross limit is reduced and therefore results in inadequate reduction in feedwater flow.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

On DWG D556175 T1 (Calibrating Integral Operation), Logic Block should be added between RC D3.2 and RC D4.1. This logic block to read "IS REACTOR TRIPPED? (By Diamond)". If YES, Block calibrating Integral RCP.12. If NO, Proceed to RC D4.1.

DESIRED ACTION:

Please contact B&W to see if they would like to implement this ICS improvement.

APPLIES TO OTHER NSS CONTRACTS: YES

DATE

CLNT. ENGR  
FILE 12M 2

~~5-12-75~~

0 NSS-5 SPR 322 File (Pinner)

On 5-12-75 discussed this with Bob White. Bob feels that this particular problem is part of an ongoing evaluation underway at TMI and to maintain the plant on line after a Turbine Trip. He says he's committed to making a final recommendation for the new NSS which would be issued for NSS-7, 14, 6 etc once TMI completes additional testing later this year.

7/2/75 - EC - 114 At BPCS LEO KOLONAY

2-2-76 322 rev. 0 dead this date. 322 rev. 1 was operated based on previous information -> plant in manual during transient. Don Murray will review rev. 1 and advise us as to whether or not he thinks the SR should be issued. 2-2-76

(2-2-76)

3-16-75 Talk to STAN MANGI to see if we looked into this - WAS THE PLANT IN MANUAL? SHOULD SPR BE CLEARED? (see clipboard)

# SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER	NET ID	CONTRACT NO.	620-070	SPR NO.	322	REV. NO.	
VENDOR	B&W	P.O. NO.		TASK NO.	21	GROUP NO.	01
SITE ENGINEER		REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. CLMP. DATE				
S. P. MAIRKI							

TITLE  
LOW PRESSURIZER LEVEL FOLLOWING REACTOR TRIP

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
SEE ATTACHED SHEET

STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED  
L. M. Kolony of Engineering informed.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL  
Review and implement Logic modification such that reactor trip should block calibrating integral RC 9.12, to achieve a slower cooldown rate of RC System and a more acceptable pressurizer level.  
  
This problem should be reviewed for all other sites.

APPROVED BY: *Spinning*      10/4/74      *[Signature]*      10/4/74

RESOLUTION

APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE	DATE
N.S. SUPPORT ENGINEER	<i>[Signature]</i>	10/4/74
TASK ENGINEER		
PROJECT MANAGER		

COST CATEGORY  NORM  C  D  G  L  VENDOR CLAIM

AUTH CHARGE NO  FIELD CHANGE REQ  FC NO

SITE COMPLETION REPORT

RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE

FINAL DISTRIBUTION  
PROJECT MANAGER  
S O M. CONST. REP  
QA DOC. FILE  
CENT. ENGR  
FILE 120.2

DEVIATIONS  NONE  SEE SPR REV NO. \_\_\_\_\_

DATE COMPLETED \_\_\_\_\_ SIGNED BY \_\_\_\_\_

S O M. CONST. REP. APPROVAL \_\_\_\_\_ DATE \_\_\_\_\_

RESOLUTION

COMPLETION

ATTACHMENT  
SPR 322 Rev. 1

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM:

Following a reactor trip the pressurizer level goes as low as 40 inches. SPR 322 Rev. 0 pointed out the main reason that pressurizer level goes as low, because the trapped steam pressure in turbine header decays slowly, resulting in turbine bypass remaining open for time longer than is necessary.

Further examination of the reactor trip data revealed that immediately following the reactor trip the feedwater demand actually reduced to 20% instead of reducing to 5% (cross limit value as neutron power following the trip is zero).

This additional feed to steam generators contributes to the excessive cooling of the RC system and hence lower pressurizer level.

See attached HMCs report on the subject.



ATTACHMENT

PROBLEM: (Cont'd)

At this time the neutron error is very large and rapidly causes the calibrating integral to travel to its limit. Reference DWG D553732 and D5561758. When the T<sub>ave</sub> calibrating integral travels to its limit the effective neutron power error to the cross limit is reduced and therefore results in inadequate reduction in feedwater flow.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

On DWG D556175 TI (Calibrating Integral Operation), Logic block should be added between RC D3.1 and RC D4.1. This Logic block to read "IS REACTOR TRIPPED? (By Diamond)". If YES, Block calibrating Integral PC9.12; If NO, Proceed to RC D4.1.

DESIRED ACTION:

Please contact B&W to see if they would like to implement this ICS improvement.

APPLIES TO OTHER NBS CONTRACTS: YES



APR 16 1975

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To  
C. A. Cready, Project Management

From  
E. W. Winks, Control Analysis, EXT 2864

*EWW*

408 663.6

Cust.  
Duke Power Company

File No.  
or Ref.

Subj.  
A Feedwater Pump Speed "Kicker" Circuit  
for Oconee Unit #1 (and #2 and #3)

Date

April 16, 1975

This letter is cover and customer and see subject only

The following information on a modified Feedwater Pump Speed Control Circuit, which has been implemented at the TMI-1 Plant, is being forwarded at this time to allow incorporation prior to any additional load rejection tests scheduled for Units 1, 2, or 3. B&W recommends this as a temporary change to your ICS which will be followed up by a field change package.

The purpose of the Pump Speed "Kicker" Circuit is to enable the feedwater flow control system to continue to deliver a high level of flow to each Steam Generator, even though the steam outlet pressure has suddenly increased approximately 150 psi. The modification originated and implemented at TMI-1 improved the overall plant performance by directly increasing feedwater pump speed more rapidly than could be accomplished by the combined action of the feedwater control valve and pump speed controllers in the ICS.

The modification to the present Unit #1 ICS is the following:

Route an additional wire from the turbine header pressure error signal (IC/B on Drawing Unit #1) to two summers which are shown on Drawing D8032313F. The particular summers are FW28.8B(4-1-3) and FW28.8B(6-2-1) and the new signal is to be connected to each summer. In the new line also install a diode and a 100 k ohm resistor in a path to ground. Refer to the attached schematic.

The turbine header pressure control error signal has the following effective range:

- + 10 Volts = 300 psi above setpoint.
  - + 0.5 Volts = 15 psi above setpoint.
- Any signal below 0.5 Volts will be blocked by the diode in the new line.

The gain for the turbine header pressure error signal on each summer will have to be calculated and set by Duke Power Company. The calculation used at TMI-1 is given below:

1. Assume pump discharge pressure varies with the square of pump speed when suction pressure is constant.
2. For two feedwater pump operation find the pump speed ( $S_1$ ) when the plant is at 100% power.
3. This speed corresponds to a turbine header pressure of 885 psig.
4. For a turbine header pressure of approximately 1050 psi the required pump speed would have to be:  $(S_1) = (S_0) \times \sqrt{1050 \div 885}$ . The increase in pump speed ( $S_1 - S_0$ ) represents a fraction of the total range of feedwater pump speed (2700 rpm to 5400 rpm at TMI-1) and the output voltage of each summer should be adjusted to cause an increase in feedwater pump speed to ( $S_1$ ) when the turbine header pressure error signal corresponding to 1050 psi occurs on each summer.

The following numerical calculation is only an example:

Assume ( $S_0$ ) is 4500 rpm at 100% power. Then ( $S_1$ ) is  $4500 \times 1.089 = 4900$  rpm and ( $S_1 - S_0$ ) = 400 rpm. Assume total speed range of feedwater pumps is 2700 to 5400 rpm or the total increase in pump speed is 2700 rpm. The gain at each summer is that which will cause a pump speed of 4900 rpm when the error in turbine header pressure is 165 psig.

If you have any questions, I would be happy to discuss them with you.

RWW:lr


cc: B. A. Kerrasch  
 A. W. Brown  
 W. Van Brooker  
 R. F. Ryan  
 W. E. Wilson  
 J. T. Janis  
 Y. J. Galan  
 R. S. Rand (BN Co)

Q/A The information contained in this memo has been checked for applicability and completeness.

Signature R. W. Revell

Date 4/14/75

# FEEDWATER PUMP SPEED RICKER<sup>™</sup> MODIFICATION TO THE ICS





PROBLEM:

Steam lines between the instrument connections for Turbine Header pressure and Steam Generator pressure.

Attached please find charts recorded during a generator trip test conducted 8-13-74 which resulted in a reactor trip. From these charts and table 1 it can be noted that while there was flow through the line there was a pressure drop i.e., SG pressure is 30 psi higher than THP, immediately after the trip with no pressure drop due to flow the pressures equalized. For the next 3.5 min. the SG pressure is less than THP. Also note the waves in the SG pressure recorded during the first minute are not present in the THP pressure. These conditions seem to be a good indication that the check valves did close.

The fact that the Turbine Header pressure remains higher for a time holds the Turbine Bypass Valves open longer than necessary. (AFTER The Safety Valves have closed)

It is believed that this area could be improved by having the turbine bypass valves modulate to control Steam Generator pressure when the reactor is tripped instead of turbine header pressure. Getting these valves closed sooner after a trip should keep the Steam generator pressure from dropping so low which would keep the steam generator temperature higher and therefore TAVE. This should then keep the pressurizer level from dropping so low because it would not have to make up as much volume in the RC system.

PROBLEM 2:

On August 13 the generator breaker trip from 100% power transient was tested. The Reactor tripped on high RC pressure four seconds after the generator trip. After analysis of Reactor data it was observed that the system came very close to NOT tripping the reactor. We had previously sustained two turbine trips from 100% power without tripping the reactor. (The reactor did trip on the second turbine trip but not until the reactor had run all the way back to 20% power and this trip was due to operator error.) The most important item to be worked on to prevent reactor trip would be to reduce the maximum steam generator pressure immediately after the generator trip. This might be achieved by lowering the popping pressure on the last two banks of safety valves. In addition, the Emergency Relief Valve control could be modified to utilize the emergency relief valves (atmospheric dump valves) as additional steam relief capability. Presently the RW limits as specified by SW call for immediate reduction of feedwater flow demand to approximately 60% due to the rise in steam generator pressure from 910 psig to 1070 psig on a turbine trip. The elimination or delay of the RW limits in this situation would help to maintain the required feedwater flow which would in turn tend to prevent overheating the primary coolant and to prevent the Reactor tripping on high RC pressure.

PAGE 3

The attached logic and schematic drawings present a suggested way to utilize the atmospheric relief valves to open for overpressure at any time, whether the turbine bypass valves are available or not.

It must be considered that this change will substantially increase the use of these atmospheric relief valves and might increase their maintenance requirements.

DESIRED ACTION:

Contact B&W to see if they would like to implement either of these suggestions.

APPLIES TO OTHER NSS CONTRACTS: YES (ITEM 2)


TABLE 1

Steam Generator pressure and Turbine Header pressure recorded during generator trip test 8/13/74 at TMI Unit 1.







	<u>SG Press.</u>	<u>TH Press.</u>	<u>THP-51 Press.</u>
Before the trip	912 PSI	882 PSI	-30 PSI
peak	1080	1080	0
12 sec.	1068	1074	+6 PSI
24 "	1032	1059	+27
36 "	1008	1046	+38
48 "	984	1035	+54
1 min./60 "	966	1032	+66
12 "	943	1021	+73
24 "	930	1017	+87
36 "	926	1008	+82
48 "	936	1004	+68
2 min./60 "	962	997	+35
12 "	984	994	+10
24 "	986	987	+1
36 "	1002	996	+6
48 "	1008	1005	-3
3 min./60 "	1014	1011	-3
12 "	1032	1020	-12
24 "	1032	1023	-11
36 "	1020	1020	0
48 "	1020	1020	0
4 min./60 "	1020	1020	0








NOTE: CONTACT CLOSED TO TRANSFER TROUBLE CONTROL TO MANUAL (NO TO GUN MANUFACTURE)



THE DRAWING IS THE PROPERTY OF THE MANUFACTURER AND IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED OR TRANSMITTED IN ANY FORM OR BY ANY MEANS, ELECTRONIC OR MECHANICAL, INCLUDING PHOTOCOPYING, RECORDING, OR BY ANY INFORMATION STORAGE AND RETRIEVAL SYSTEM.

(part of) drawing




BARBROCK & WILCOX  
DRAWING NUMBER  
020255

ANALOG CONTROL SYSTEM  
MOTOR DRIVE CONTROL

BARRY WILCOX COMPANY  
WALTER LIND


DRO32724F

1-722880



(PARTIAL CO) D8052724F

6 7 8 5



Part of Dwg  
D553730


Alternative TB control  
using STM Gen. Press,  
Drawn at BAW Research

Alt-exnate Scheme  
 using Steam G. G. 1.  
 Press to  
 Control T B values

STEAM GEN A  
 OUTLET PRESS  
 DWG D554567



STEAM GEN B  
 OUTLET PRESS  
 DWG D554567

Part of  
 DWG  
 D553730




Bypass STM, Gov,  
Pressure to  
Control TB  
Valves

Part of  
DWG D553854




COHERENCE TRIP TEST FROM 100% P

8-13-71











GENERATOR TOP TEST FROM 100% 4

8-13



CONCRETE TOP TEST FIRM 100% 4

8-1



Prod + Trigger  
To F.W. Valve "A"  
9-9-1 input

100% Position

Time

250"

SS. Inlet Valve Level "B"  
9-9-1 input

0% Position

0"

Prod + Trigger  
To F.W. Valve "A"  
9-9-1 input

100% Position

250"

SS. Inlet Valve Level "B"  
9-9-1 input

0% Position

0"

6.10<sup>6</sup> / hr

F.W. Inlet Valve "E"  
9-9-1 input  
(with all levels)

what  
is this  
should  
come back  
up

6.10<sup>6</sup> / hr

9-9-1 input 1

0°

Full Integral  
Total Vol. 10.00  
2.84.00

100% position

0% position

250"

SG Start-up device  
7-4-12

0°

Full Deceleration  
4-1-12  
(with STII limits)

6.81.00

100%  
100%  
100%  
100%  
100%

6.810<sup>6</sup> #/hr

FW Demand  
(with STII limits)

0 #/hr

15.11


28.21

6.20.00

4W  
0 100

25-1  
4

# GENERATOR TRIP TEST FROM 100% 7 8-



-25VDC

12X10<sup>6</sup>Ω

FIV PWR  
FIVE WARD  
10-4-1 IMP 2



100%

Sig. To FIVE WARD


100% PSID  
100% PSID  
100% PSID



FIV WARD  
FIVE WARD  
10-4-1 IMP 2

100 PSID

0 PSID




Differential Press  
10-4-1 IMP 1

100 PSID

0 PSID

Generator Power  
100% PSID



1136

27

GENERATOR TRIP TEST FROM 100% PSID


CONDUCTOR TRIP TEST FOR 100% F



open ——— TIME

2" BYPASS VALVE DOWN  
2-4-11 OUT

CLOSED




1200 PSI

1032 PSI

2" BYPASS VALVE DOWN  
2-4-11 OUT


0 PSI



OPEN

2" BYPASS VALVE DOWN  
2-4-11 OUT

CLOSED






OPEN

2" BYPASS VALVE DOWN  
2-4-11 OUT

OPEN

2" BYPASS VALVE DOWN  
2-4-11 OUT

CLOSED





3

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ For Information  
Central Engineering Files  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance  
B. J. SHEDNERD - Task Engineer  
R. A. GAUVERS - Project Manager

FILE: 1242  
CONTRACT NO: 620-00 05  
SPR 322 REV. 0  
TITLE ICS PERFORMANCE  
FOLLOWING GENERATOR-  
REACTOR TRIP  
DATE: 3-12-76

The attached, cleared SPR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ E. L. Logan - FLORIDA \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ L. C. Rogers - MET. ED. \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ R. J. Baker - TOLEDO \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ B. L. Day - Intl. Support \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ P. E. Perrone - OFR \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ J. L. Donnell - OFR \_\_\_\_\_

R. W. WINKS  
L. M. KOLONAY

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 322 which was processed on Contract 620-00 05. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is/~~is not~~ considered applicable to other contracts 3 → 14

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc: G. M. Jacks - Plant Integration  
This SPR has been reviewed IAW NPG-1707-01

Chris C. Lockard  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER	MST ED	CONTRACT NO. 620-0005	SPR NO. 322	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR	EMCo	P.O. NO.	TASK NO. 21	GROUP NO. 01
SITE ENGINEER	S. P. MAINGI	REQ'D. RESOL. DATE	REQ'D. COMP. DATE	SEQ. NO. 01
TITLE ICS PERFORMANCE FOLLOWING GENERATOR-REACTOR TRIP				
DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM #1 Following a Reactor Trip the pressurizer level goes as low as 40 inches. #2 The Reactor Trips on high RC pressure within few seconds, following a Generator/Turbine trip at 100% power. Per customer these situations are unacceptable. See EMCo. problem report attached.				
STATUS - ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED R. Winks of Control Analysis and L. H. Kolony of Engineering are made aware of the problem.				
FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL #1 Issue field change covering Turbine bypass Valves control signals following the reactor trip should be from OTSG's. #2 To review recommendations in EMCo problem report, specially elimination or relaxation of BTU Limits and lowering settings on last two banks of safety valves.				
DATE OF RESOLUTION		9/27/76	SIGNATURE	
RESOLUTION		1) FC-174 2) Letter, L.C. Rogers to J.G. Herbein dated 5-27-75 (attached)		
RESOLUTION	APPROVED BY	SIGNATURE		DATE
	N S SUPPORT ENGINEER	Miles Vanhulke		2-2-76
	TASK ENGINEER	[Signature]		1-2-76
	OPS manager	[Signature]		2/17/76
PROJECT MANAGER	[Signature]		2/5/76	
COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> G <input type="checkbox"/> L <input type="checkbox"/> VENDOR CLAIM				
AUTH CHARGE NO		<input type="checkbox"/> FIELD CHANGE REQ		FC NO
COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT			<input type="checkbox"/> RECOMMENDED STDS. CHANGE
	SEE ATTACHMENT			FINAL DISTRIBUTION
	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE SPR REV NO. _____			PROJECT MANAGER
DATE COMPLETED 1/19/76		SIGNED BY [Signature]		S.O.M. CONST. REP.
S.O.M. CONST. REP. APPROVAL [Signature]		DATE 1/19/76		QA DOC FILE
				CENT. ENGR
				FILE 1212

SITE COMPLETION REPORT:

1. Field change 174, changing Turbine Bypass Valve Control to CTZ Pressure rather than Turbine heater pressure has been implemented.
2. New relaxed BTU limits have been incorporated.
3. Relief settings on the two main safety valves have been reduced from 1092 PSIG to 1050 PSIG.

All these steps will help run the reactor back to 15% power on a Turbine/Generator Trip, so the SFR is being closed.

P. W. Winko

Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1269, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

May 27, 1975

REM-I-104

Mr. J. G. Herbein  
Metropolitan Edison Company  
Post Office Box 430  
Middletown, PA 17057

Subject: Revised BTU Limits for TMI-1  
Reference: REM-I-62, L. C. Rogers to J. G. Herbein dated May, 1975

Dear Mr. Herbein:

B&W Engineering has recently completed work on the revised curves for the BTU Limit circuit for TMI-1 in preparation for plant operation and testing associated with the proposed turbine trip or load rejection test at rated power. Attachments include these curves and an appropriate table.

An analysis of plant operational characteristics during the January 23, 1975, power runback transient has led to a revision of the curves comprising the BTU Limit circuit. Figure 1 (attached) shows the revised curves which can be incorporated into the ICS at the first opportunity. Comparison with the curves of Figure 2 which are currently in use reveals that the steam pressure limit is significantly expanded, whereas the T hot curve is more limiting at lower temperatures and power levels. The feedwater temperature curve was changed to properly represent the effect of feedwater temperature on feedwater flow and steam superheat. Also, reactor coolant flow has been changed slightly. These revised curves are to be utilized for all plant operation from now on and are not only associated with the proposed plant runback tests.

The revised BTU Limit curves were tested on the B&W Old Forest Road PWR simulator for several major transients and the TMI-1 type plant with the new BTU Limits performed very well. When compared with the old curves, the new limits provided greater operating margin at full power.

The development of the revised curves was accomplished by using the B&W certified steam generator computer code and determining the limits for the four parameters which comprise the BTU Limits to exceed or maintain 35°F superheat. After incorporating the curves into the simulator ICS, the following operational transients were incorporated:

- (a) ramping power up and down with both 3 and 4 RC pumps operating;

5/21/75

(b) tripping / RC pump at 75% power level

(c) tripping the turbine at 100% power level

All of these transients were performed successfully without a reactor trip. In addition, transients in which the feedwater flow had to be limited were performed and the control of the feedwater flow by the new BTU limits was excellent. Sufficient testing of the new BTU Limit curves has occurred and fewer operational problems should develop at TMI-1 since the BTU Limits are less restrictive than the curves presently in use.

The accompanying table presents the specific information which defines each of the four curves in the BTU Limit circuit.

Additional information with regard to lowering the setpoint for pressurizer electromagnetic relief valve, is included and has been reviewed by the Control Analysis Group of Babcock & Wilcox.

The effect of lowering the setpoint of the pressurizer electromagnetic relief valve from 2255 to 2205 psig has been analyzed and will flow an additional 56 lbs of steam to the Quench Tank during a very severe transient.

If you have any further questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours,



L. C. Rogers  
Resident Engineer Manager

LCP/SEM/ear

cc: J. J. Colitz  
J. D. Phinney  
K. F. Schmidt  
D. B. Tuodieski  
~~D. W. Winks~~  
R. S. Paul

TABLE I

Revised BTU Limits for TMI-1

Steam Generator Pressure

Pressure psig	Feedwater Limit - %
Equal to and less than 1000	106
Equal to and more than 1125	50

RC Flow (Temperature compensated - each loop)

Flow Rate $\times 10^6$ lb/hr	Feedwater Limit - %
0	0
80	120

Reactor Outlet Temperature (OTSG Inlet Temperature)

Temperature, F	Feedwater Limit - %
575	0
604	118

Feedwater Temperature

Temperature, F	Feedwater Limit - %
100	60
500	106



T.F.W.

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100




FIG. 2

ICE FLOW (GAL/HR)	T HOT (°F)	P STEAM (PSIG)
10	50	70
20	55	60
30	60	595
40	65	1150
50	70	1400
60	75	1700
70	80	2000
80	85	2300
90	90	2600
100	95	2900



2

SITE PROBLEM REPORT  
TRANSMITTAL FOR ACTION

FEB 26 1976

RECEIVED

TO: <u>L. Roques</u>	For Action	Contract: 620-00 <u>OS</u>
	For Action	SPR Number: <u>322 vno</u>
TO: <u>RW Winks</u>	For Information	Title: <u>ICS Performance</u>
<u>R. Coors</u>	For Information	<u>following Men-Rx</u>
	For Information	<u>trip</u>
	For Information	

Date of Transmittal: 2-17-76 Reply Required By: \_\_\_\_\_

Action Requested: L. Roques is requested to complete  
SPR 322-0 when necessary actions is completed.

Reply and Return This Transmittal to: Mike Vambli  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Reply: SPR was signed off 1/19/76  
and returned to OFR. The again  
closes the SPR now that the original finally  
was returned to the site LOR

This problem is/is not considered as applicable to other contracts: NSS-

(Signed)

- cc: C. C. Plunkett - Contract Administration
- S. H. Klein - NPG Quality Assurance
- B. L. Day - Intl. Support
- E. J. Baker - Toledo
- L. C. Rogers - Met Ed
- E. L. Logan - Florida
- P. E. Ferrone - OFR

SITE PROBLEM  
REPORT TRANSMITTAL

\*\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*\*

JUL 13 1978

To: Change Control For Distribution

S. H. Klein - Quality Assurance

Central Engineering Files

R.W. WINKS - Task Engineer(s)

J.T. JANIS - Project Manager

File: 13-11-330

Contract No.: 620-00 11

SPR: 330

Title: \_\_\_\_\_

RAPID COOLDOWN TRANSIENT

Date: MAY 18, 1978

Status Code: C

( DISTRIBUTION - SEE ATTACHED LIST )

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 330 which was processed on Contract 620-00 11. Future contracts have been reviewed for the potential of a similar problem. This problem is/~~is not~~ considered applicable to other contracts All operating.

REMARKS: \_\_\_\_\_

**COMPLETED**

David H. Curless

NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

10827

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX

CUSTOMER SMUD	ORIGINATOR'S DATE D. CULBERSON 5/16/78	JOC. ID. CONT. NO. 13 - 620-0011	SPR NO. 330	REV. NO. 0
VENDOR BAILEY (BMCO)	P.A. NO.	PART NO./TASK NO. 22	GROUP NO. 001	SEQ. NO. 001
TITLE (MAX 30 CHARACTERS) RAPID COOLDOWN TRANSIENT		PROBLEM CONTACT R. WINKS		

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM: 3/20/78 - Plant operating at 70% power (reduced power level due to one main transformer being out of commission).  
0425 - While attempting to replace a burned out indicating light on turbine header pressure selector switch, the operator dropped the bulb into the switch causing a short. This short resulted in a loss of power to a portion of NNI System and subsequent loss of many ~~trip~~ signals to the control room, computer and ICS. The result was a Reactor trip and rapid cooldown and pressure transient on the primary plant. For details of event, see attached trip report by Bob Winks, March 29, 1978.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED:  
Transient analysis has been performed by B&W Engineering, and SMUD has been given approval to return to power operations. Detailed reports and other correspondence are attached for reference.

FURTHER ACTION RECOMMENDED BY SITE PERSONNEL: Maneuvering limits should be applied for this plant startup; increase surveillance of LPMS for at least one week; perform an operability check of on-line and redundant NNI instrumentation; establish a procedure for restoring NNI power in event of sustained power loss; operator training on loss of NNI power; surveillance of primary and secondary chemistry daily for at least one week.

RESOLUTION:  
See attachments. Our other customers will be notified of this transient, by Site Instruction, in the hopes of preventing similar occurrences at other sites. This SPR for information only.

PREPARED BY <i>D. Culberson</i>	DATE 5/16/78	APPROVED BY <i>J. L. Smith</i>	DATE 6/5/78
REVIEWED BY <i>R. Winks for H. B. ...</i>	DATE 5/17/78	<i>J. L. Smith</i>	6/2/78

COST CATEGORY <input type="checkbox"/> NORM <input type="checkbox"/> OTHER	FIELD CHANGE REQ <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	F.C.A. NO. 04- NA	SIGNIF. DEFICIENCY <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO
---	---	----------------------	---

COMPLETION	SITE COMPLETION REPORT:	DEVIATIONS: <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SPR REV NO. <input type="checkbox"/>
	INFORMATION ONLY	DATE COMPLETED: 3/24/78
		COMPLETED BY: <i>D. Culberson</i> DATE: 5/16/78
		SHEET 2 OF 27

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To

DISTRIBUTION

From

R.W. WINKS - CONTROL ANALYSIS (EXT. 2864)

805 663-5

Cust.

SMUD

File No.  
or Ref.

NSS 11/T3.4

Subj.

REPORT OF TRIP TO PLANT REGARDING REACTOR TRIP  
OF MARCH 20, 1978

Date

MARCH 29, 1978

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

On Monday, March 21, 1978, SMUD informed B&W of the circumstances of the reactor trip on the day before and requested permission to return to power. An immediate response was initiated and SMUD began to supply B&W plant data recorded during the transient. This reactor and turbine trip transient was more extreme than any others due to cooling the Reactor Coolant System 300 degrees Fahrenheit per hour. With preliminary plant transient data, personnel worked late Monday night in describing the pressures and temperatures of the primary and secondary systems. Late Tuesday afternoon it was decided that B&W would send Mr. Art Brown and the writer to SMUD to assist them in forming a complete description of this transient and validating the data being used in analyses.

We left Lynchburg at 7:15 p.m. and traveled all night to Sacramento, California. We arrived at their plant at 9:30 a.m. and met Mr. Norm Brock, SMUD Instrumentation and Controls supervisor. Art Brown was to delve into the SMUD design of the 24 vdc power distribution system for the nonnuclear instrumentation, and I was to help define the primary and secondary system pressures and temperatures during the entire transient.

We called John Castanes (B&W) from Sacramento at 12 a.m. prior to visiting SMUD to obtain the latest concerns and specific directions. When we arrived at the SMUD plant, we found that SMUD personnel had already determined which NNI channels were valid to the computer, the control room, and to the ICS. Also, Mr. Norm Brock provided us a copy of his notes of the interview with the control room operators following the transient.

I met Mr. Don Blanchley, SMUD, and he provided us a copy of the Post-Trip Review - a record of selected channels for 15 minutes after the reactor trip.

SMUD wanted to know the cause for the instantaneous reduction in Loop A and B feedwater flow. We analyzed the situation and concluded that the single hot leg temperature was below the range

3827

MARCH 29, 1978

for the "BTu Limits" circuit, and it drove the feedwater demand signal to zero. With plant performance data in hand, we left to start work back at the motel (and to rest). We called Bruce Karrasch, Plant Integration, and John Castanes again before 5 p.m. (in Lynchburg).

Art Brown and I visited SMUD all day Thursday and continued in the development of the sequence of events and operations which was consistent with the recorded valid data. The twenty pages of the alarm typer printout was scrutinized to provide any extra data points. Details on auxiliary feedwater and turbine bypass valve system operation were also pursued. Another set of control room operator interview notes was provided to me by Don Blanchley. He also showed me the plant hourly log which contained valid data on primary and secondary pressures and temperatures at precisely 5 and 6 a.m. on the day of the reactor trip (4:26 a.m.). We returned to the motel and I began to write a comprehensive report of the reactor trip transient.

On Friday, March 24, 1978 I arrived at the plant at 8 a.m. and gave my report to Norm Brock and Don Blanchley to review. A copy is included with this report as Attachment #1. Together, we could not resolve why Loop A auxiliary feedwater control valve should have a 100% open demand on it and the Loop B auxiliary feedwater control valve have a 0% open demand (and neither steam generator level was changing). Finally, we hypothesized a set of conditions and decided to go into the control room (plant was at hot shutdown conditions ~ 532 F) and test it.

When the NNI power was lost, both startup level indicators to the ICS became zero volt signals. Also, when the 24 vdc powered buffer amplifiers lost power, they decayed either up or down but not together, so Loop A signal dropped to -10 vdc in about six minutes while Loop B signal increased to +10 vdc and maintained the 0% demand on the Loop B auxiliary feedwater control valve. That caused the "A" steam generator to start filling before "B". The actual filling of the OTSG's was accomplished by the SFAS system using parallel valves which were motor-operated and wide open.

Before leaving SMUD for Lynchburg, I made schematics of the auxiliary feedwater system, the turbine bypass valve control system, and the main feedwater flow control system. I prepared the appropriate sequence of operations of each of the systems, and it is shown as Attachment #2 of this report.

On Friday I learned that SMUD was able to hold the primary system parameters very nearly constant over a 9-minute period following the reactor trip by a wide-open primary system safety relief valve. As RC pressure dropped it reseated, and the additional decrease in RC pressure was due to H.P. injection and cooling by the Loop A steam generator.

4 0 27

DISTRIBUTION

- 3 -

MARCH 29, 1978

Representatives from NRC, San Francisco office, visited SMUD and asked quite a few questions of the operators. They also received a description of the transient from SMUD. By Friday, March 24, 1978 B&W and NRC had reviewed the transient sufficiently to give SMUD permission to return to power. By Monday morning the SMUD plant was operating at its temporary maximum limit of 72%.

*Robert Winks*  
R.W. Winks

RWW/dmb

5827

ATTACHMENT #1

EVALUATION OF REACTOR TRIP  
TRANSIENT AT RANCHO  
SECO ON MARCH 20, 1978

by

Robert Winks, Art Brown  
Babcock & Wilcox Co  
Lynchburg, Virginia

March 24, 1978

## Introduction:

Pg 1

The NSSS designed by B & W allows a specific number of upset transients over the design life of the plant and each customer maintains an accumulative record of each kind of transient experienced by their plant. On March 20, 1978 SMUD subjected the Rancho Seco plant to the most severe reactor trip transient yet experienced at any of the operating B & W plants. The primary and secondary loops were cooled at an excessive rate of 300 degrees Fahrenheit in one hour and the concerns by B & W included the following:

- 1) excessive stresses in the reactor vessel
- 2) excessive stresses in the steam generator tubes
- 3) single phase fluid conditions in the primary loop for adequate reactor core cooling
- 4) proper operation and effect on the RC pumps.

As recorded data could be obtained, both SMUD and B & W personnel evaluated the limited available plant parameter data during the reactor trip transient and resolved the above concerns.

## Summary:

The reactor trip transient was initiated by a dropped, burned out lamp<sup>bulb</sup> causing a short in one of the power supplies for non-nuclear instrumentation. The loss of the particular power supply caused a major portion of the measured plant parameters to indicate improperly. The ~~following~~ plant response following a reactor trip was not the usual transient in that the ICS operation was affected by the erroneous input signals and the Control Room operators had extreme difficulty in determining the status of the plant and operating systems.

2427



From the transient data supplied by SMUD, B&W was able to ascertain that the last two concerns (satisfactory reactor coolant conditions and proper PC pump operation) were not problems by the morning of March 21, 1978. SMUD transmitted more extensive data which permitted estimates to be made for steam generator and reactor vessel pressure and temperature profiles during the reactor trip transient. The B&W Stress Analysis group at Mount Vernon, Indiana, determined that the accidental filling of both steam generators with cold water which excessively cooled down both the primary and secondary loops did not cause any major problem with stresses in the reactor vessel or the steam generators. This conclusion was submitted by B&W to SMUD on March 23, 1978.

The severity of the lamp bulb shorting out a power supply is due to a change made by SMUD to the power distribution system design for the non-nuclear instrumentation. Agreement has been reached between SMUD and B&W for an improved redundant power supply design which can cope with the loss of one power supply without affecting the input signals to the Control Room, the ICS, and the plant computer.

Two B&W personnel arrived on site March 23, 1978 to assist SMUD in determining the sequence of events leading to the reactor trip and the resulting behavior of the plant and ICS, and on the validity of the performance data that was recorded. The objectives were accomplished and an interim report was prepared for SMUD on Friday, March 24, 1978.

## Recommendations:

Pg 3

1. SMUD should modify the present NNI power distribution system design to a more complete redundant design (agreed upon by SMUD and B&W)
2. SMUD should determine a list of necessary plant parameters for shutting down the plant and ensure that it will be valid and available to the Control Room operators under unusual or accident conditions. (With SFAS initiated, operators need to know the changing conditions of the plant.)
3. SMUD should increase the usage of the Post Trip Review feature of the plant computer by obtaining the stored plant parameter data and restarting it manually as required during a particular transient.
4. B&W should review operation and controllability of SFAS when initiated for "operational" type transients rather than accident conditions.

9927

## SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

Pg. 4

The following description is an abbreviated sequence of events leading to and following an automatic trip of the reactor at Rancho Seco on March 20, 1978.

Plant was steady at 70% power level and four RC pumps running.

Operator decided to replace burned out indication light on turbine header pressure selector switch. He dropped small lamp bulb into switch causing a short.

A 24 vdc power supply was current limited and opened two circuit breakers and there was no backup power supply for this portion of the Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System.

Many input signals to the control room, the plant computer, and the ICS indicated either mid scale or zero, or otherwise improperly.

The loop A and B BTU limits developed a zero feedwater limit signal and shut off feedwater flow to both steam generators.

As steam generator levels dropped, the primary side stored more energy and RC pressure increased to the high RC pressure trip setpoint of 2355 psig tripping the reactor. The reactor trip condition tripped the turbine.

Within <sup>100</sup>seconds after tripping the reactor both main feedwater pumps were on a minimum speed of 2200 rpm. Both steam generators were at low level and decreasing, and steam pressure was beginning to decrease.

10 of 27

The auxiliary feedwater pump (steam driven) was automatically started due to low feedwater pump discharge pressure.

Operator noticed that Loop A aux. feedwater control valve had a 100% open demand signal while the Loop B valve had a 0% open demand.

Loop A Steam Generator had higher level than Loop B steam generator (Full range levels were only valid indications)

Finally, operator manipulated to gain control of the Loop A feedwater pump and increased speed up to 3500 rpm.

Due to position of feedwater valves, feedwater only entered into A steam generator. Increasing level indication corresponds to rapid cooldown of EC system. B Generator remained "dry".

When EC pressure decreased below 1600 psig initiating SFAS, the electric motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump was started, the motor-operated aux. feedwater valves opened, and feedwater entered both steam generators.

Both steam generators were filled with cold water before the operator stopped feedwater flow to the two generators.

Power was restored to the faulted NNZ system and the input signals to the control room, computer and ICS were once again normal. SFAS was bypassed by Operator.

Plant Performance data during the reactor trip transient was obtained from the following sources:

- 1) plant computer Post Trip Review - 15 minutes of valid and invalid channels
- 2) Alarm typer printout - operating during period of NNI power outage
- 3) Selected Control Room recorder traces - those known to be valid
- 4) plant computer hourly log printouts - particularly two records during the power outage period
- 5) Estimates of pressure and temperature profiles during transient where insufficient data was available.

Figure 1 shows PC pressure and both a hot leg and cold leg temperature for the interval of time (13 minutes) between reactor trip and initiation of SFAS. Data was obtained from the Post Trip Review printout. At nine minutes increased cooldown of the PC system appears to be a result of the operator adding feed water to the loop A steam generator.

The main concern on PC temperature-induced stresses centered on the 300 F decrease starting at the nine minute mark and continuing until PC temperature reached a low value of about 285 F (or lower) in about one hour.

## ANALYSIS CONTINUED:

Pg 7

Figure 2 describes the Loop B Steam Generator during the initial 15 minutes of the transient. The data was obtained from the Post Trip Review printout and is limited to only the B steam generator. Since this generator was boiled dry longer than the A generator, one could suppose that the curves in Figure 2 are more extreme than occurred in the Loop A steam generator.

Figure 3 shows a comparison of the levels as measured by the full range level instruments on both the A and B steam generators. At nine minutes the operator was successful in adding feedwater into the A steam generator through ~~the main feedwater arteries~~. The status of valves in the Loop B prevented the operator from adding water to the B generator.

Figure 4 displays the primary system pressure and "averaged" pressurizer level indications during the transient before the SFAS was initiated. The primary system was not in trouble during the first 10 minutes of this transient. When the increased cooldown was initiated, then it appears that it was destined to initiate the SFAS.

An Estimate of the change in RC temperature over a 3 hour period is shown in Figure 5. Two data sources were the Post Trip Review and the control room cold leg temperature recorder chart. At 25 minutes after the reactor trip RC temperature was below 520 F and the operator shutdown one RC pump. That is consistent with part of the data obtained from the 5 AM hourly log printout. The actual change in RC pressure temperature is probably less severe than shown as an estimate in Figure 5.

Bc/21

The change in steam pressure and temperature in one of the two steam generators for approximately 90 minutes following the reactor trip is displayed in Figure 6. The Post Trip Review printout was used to describe the two parameters for the initial 15 minutes and the alarm typer printout and the plant computer hourly log printout were used to support the estimated profiles for steam pressure and temperature. This data is similar to that used by the B&W Stress Analysis Group to evaluate the concern for overstressing the tubes in the steam generator. No steam pressure and temperature data exists for the Loop A steam generator and it is possible to conjecture that the higher level indication and the quicker filling rate would lead to less extreme values of steam pressure and temperature for the Loop A steam generator.

Figure 7 exhibits the approximate change in level for both steam generators versus time after the reactor trip. Post trip Review data describes the initial 15 minutes very well. The only data available after that is the alarm typer stating the time each generator becomes full.

5827

# LOOP B RC PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE AFTER REACTOR TRIP AT SMLD ON 3/20/78

NOTE: DATA UPDATED EVERY 1/4 MINUTE





FIG 1



16 027

# LOOP B OTSG PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE AFTER REACTOR TRIP AT SMLJD ON 3/20/78



MINUTES AFTER REACTOR TRIP


FIG. 2



FIG. 1 IN M 10 TO TEST LOG M-10-18 (M-10-18)  
REACTOR TRIP ON 3/20/78

45 0702

18927



RC PRESSURE AND PRESSURIZER LEVEL AFTER REACTOR TRIP AT  
SMLD ON 3/20/78  
FIG. 7

1987

46 0702

REACTOR TRIP - MINUTES

# RC COLD LEG TEMPERATURE AFTER REACTOR TRIP AT SMLD ON 3/20/78




FIG 5

20827

46 0102

ESTIMATED "B" OTSG STEAM PRESSURE AND TEMPERATURE PROFILES AFTER REACTOR TRIP AT SMLD ON 3/20/78



TIME AFTER REACTOR TRIP - MINUTES  
FIG 6

BY: [Illegible]  
DATE: [Illegible]

SCHEMATIC OF MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM AT SMUD




FIG 9

26 027

level




FIG 7

## Suggested Operation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System During the Reactor Trip Transient

1. The turbine driven (and the motor driven) aux. feedwater pumps were started about 2 minutes into the transient when the main feedwater pump discharge pressures were less than 800 psig.
2. The Loop A and B Startup levels were suddenly improper to the ICS but the buffered signal to Each Aux. Feedwater Valve decayed very slowly and neither Aux. Feedwater valve opened. After 6 1/2 minutes the Loop A "Startup level" dropped below the setpoint and the Loop A Aux. Feedwater Valve had a 100% open demand signal. By this time the Loop B signal had increased toward full scale and thus generated a 0% open demand signal.
3. At 13 minutes after the reactor trip the SFAS was initiated by PC pressure dropping below 1100 psig. It opened both Loop A and B motor operated valves, See Figure 8, and water flowed to both Steam Generators.
4. "A" steam generator filled up in 19 minutes but the "B" steam generator filled up in 35 minutes. Reason why is unknown.



## Sequence of Operation of Main Feedwater System During Reactor Trip


1. Upon loss of NNI power supply, selected hot leg temperature signal to ICS dropped to midscale - zero volts or 570 °F. Therefore each loop BTU limits demanded 0% feedwater flow.
2. Main feedwater valves, then startup valves then Block valves went closed.
3. Loop B Block valve stopped midway due to circuit breaker tripping. Valve was then manually closed.
4. At 9 minutes after reactor trip water was supplied to loop A steam generator either by:
  - (a) the Auxiliary feedwater valve opened automatically (pump was running);
  - (b) Operator manually increased Loop A main feedwater pump speed from 2200 rpm to 3500 rpm.
5. All main and auxiliary feedwater valves on Loop B were closed and no water entered the "B" steam generator until the SFAS opened the motor-operated auxiliary feedwater valve at 13 minutes.

## Operation of Turbine Bypass System During Reactor Trip

Facts: Steam flow thru the TB Valves was noticeably shorter than other Reactor trips.

When main circuit breakers are opened each loop TB Valve is controlled by the loop Turbine header pressure.

SMUD steam system schematic:



Loop A T.H. Pressure signal to ICS was Valid.  
 Loop B T.H. Pressure signal to ICS was bad.

SMUD has 25% steam relief capacity to Condensers.

SMUD has 15% steam relief capacity to atmosphere also.

Loop B steam pressure was measured as high as 984 psig by Post Trip Review.

# SCHEMATIC OF AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AT SIND




FIG 8

250827

# SCHEMATIC OF MAIN FEEDWATER SYSTEM AT SMUD





FIG 9

26 of 27

# SCHEMATIC OF TURBINE BYPASS VALVE CONTROL SYSTEM AT SMUD



NOTE: ONLY 2 T.B. VALVES COULD HAVE OPENED BRIEFLY (LOOP A) DURING REACTOR TRIP TRANSIENT

FIG 10

27027

NSS-3  
SPR 533

TITLE Loss of FW Incident

RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SFR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS-\_\_\_\_\_. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SFR on other contracts.  
\_\_\_\_\_

REMARKS

*Action complete. See attached*

ACTION COMPLETE  
ON ALL CONTRACTS

NSS-  
\_\_\_\_\_

1155-03

SAR 533

Loss of FW Inoculant, 5-18-73

Isolated Pressure Switch on Loss of Main  
Fuel Pump - No Emergency Fuel Pump Start

- 1155-11 - No Problem
- 1155-03 - Corrected -
- 1155-07 18-00 - 00397 F07
- 1155-09 10-00 - 00779 05
- 1155-08 18-00 - 00017 C 15
- 1155-05 18-00 - 00751 D02
- 1155-0's NOT FOUND
- 1155-0 18-00 - 00413 C01
- 1155-14 18-00 - 00157 F12 (.62 F11)
- 1155-12 01-001-02-5002 N000
- 1155-3 01-001-02-5005 N000

THE ABOVE IS A LIST OF AE PRINTS THAT WILL RECEIVE  
REVIEW FOR SENSOR LOCATION TO INSURE NON ISOLATION -  
I BELIEVE THAT ALL CONTRACTS IN TESTING AROUND  
THE TIME OF SAR ORIGINION HAVE SITE CHECKED  
AND CORRECTED IF REQUIRED. (CONTRACTS LISTED ABOVE  
) HAVE BEEN REVIEWED (AE P&ID DRW.) AND SWITCH/VALVE  
LOCATIONS ARE FREE OF (CONF) PROBLEM.

F. J. [Signature]

1-15-75

SPR CROSS-CONTRACT IMPLEMENTATION

ORIGINATING CONTRACT NSS <sup>3</sup>~~533~~ SPR 3 533

TITLE: LOSS OF FEED WATER INCIDENT  
FOR IMPLEMENTATION ON NSS ALL

TASK ENGINEER

IMPLEMENT RESOLUTION:  YES  NO

IF YES, PRIORITY:  DIRECTLY AFFECTS SYSTEM AND PLANT RELIABILITY  
 IMPROVES SYSTEM PERFORMANCE  
 COULD POSSIBLY AFFECT SYSTEM AND PLANT RELIABILITY

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF RESOLUTION:

CHECK SECONDARY PLANT PAID FOR LOCATION OF TAP, RELOCATE IF NECESSARY

IF NO, REASON FOR NOT IMPLEMENTING:

*must see*

ART McBRIDE → TASK ENGINEER'S SIGNATURE

PROJECT MANAGER

IMPLEMENT:  YES  NO

ESTIMATED DATE FOR IMPLEMENTATION \_\_\_\_\_

IF NO, REASON FOR NOT IMPLEMENTING:

\_\_\_\_\_  
PROJECT MANAGER'S SIGNATURE



TITLE Loss of Feed Water Flow incident  
RELATED SPRs \_\_\_\_\_

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS- 04 -> 14. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS

This is a generic problem.  
Upon loss of both Fd. pumps with  
isolation valves shut there should  
be a turbine trip.

NSS-3- Has trip now

Letter sent to all P.M's to inform  
cust. of this potential problem by  
B.A. Karasch. (He reports all cust. have  
been notified).

NSS- 4&9 \_\_\_\_\_  
has trip.

Generically closed  
JLB

NSS-

546

Per J.D. Phinney Met Ed & Jersey  
Central has turbine trip

NSS-

7 - Informed Clyde Barksdale  
Letter has not been sent yet.  
Eric handling A P + L report

NSS-

8 - Letters have been sent to cust.  
Taken care of by Fred A. East says problem  
not applicable  
Fred, Alark ENR NOV 1974

NSS-

11 - Per Roger Maggi cust. has  
been notified.

NSS-

12 & 13 E. Coggi - will resume procedures  
via letter, see Wilho on same problem  
from A P + L.

NSS-

14 - Letter has been sent to cust.

Refer to each index for status

NSS 3

SPR 533

SPR APPLICABILITY REVIEW

FEB 14 1974

TO: BA Karasche

FROM: D.L. Allison

Please review the attached SPR for applicability to other contracts. This is a general review and is intended to eliminate sending commitments to every task engineer in determining applicability.

Task Engineer's Comments:

Beuce, Please return SPR, and include in reply why not or why applicable.

The SPR is applicable to all contracts. Recommendation has already been made to initiate Turbine trip and Emergency feed on a positive signal indicating loss of main feedwater. Recent letter to RL Pittman on SPR 158 (NSS-4) also re-emphasizes the need to check out Emergency feed system.

Task Engineer: Bef.

Return to: D.L. Allison

H. Worsham

Return to ESN

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

File NSS- 3  
12M2-SPT- 533

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To \_\_\_\_\_ for Action

CONTRACT 620-00 - 03

SPR 533

TITLE LOSS OF FW INCIDENT

DATE 6-1-73

To R.J. Maxwell - S.O.H. (2) For Information

- J. Kaclin
- J. Kennedy
- J. Plimley
- K. Subrke

Date Reply to be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: DUKE has moved the pressure sensing location upstream (Feed Pump discharge) to preclude any possibility of the check valve interfering with pressure decay. The 1" bypass valve has also been opened.

- cc: G. E. Kulyrych  
 E. G. Ward  
 J. M. Olds  
 R. T. Schorer  
 N. S. Embrey  
 J. McFarland  
 C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
 Central Engineering Files  
 E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

H. Worsham  
J. D. Carlton  
G. QUALE

R. Pittman  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

MANOUR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
 COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
 CHARGE No. \_\_\_\_\_  
 APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
 Project Manager

OWNER: Duke Power Company CONTRACT NO. 1001-3 SPR NO. 533 SPR REV NO. 0

ADDR: P.O. NO. COMP. NO. 22 GROUP NO. 02 SEQ. NO. 01

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_ PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DWG NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SITE ENGINEER: E.R. Phinney / J.D. Phinney EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE: 1 MAIN 30 SPACES Loss of FW Incident (5/16/73)

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

See attachment.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

1. Conducted test to establish why the Emergency FW pump did not start.
2. Opened bypass around FW pump discharge valves.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL

Evaluate system transient. (Reactimeter tape sent to Lynchburg.)

RECOMMENDED ACTION

1. Provide positive means of sensing loss of FW pumps to initiate Emergency FW flow and main turbine trip. (CUSTOMER)
2. Evaluate the SP4 failure and correct. (CUSTOMER)
3. ADVISE OTHER CONTRACTS OF THIS PROBLEM (N.S)

TITLE	PERSONAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DEPARTMENT	REGION
ORIGINATOR	<i>[Signature]</i>	5/18/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Space	
SITE OPER. MGR.	<i>[Signature]</i>	5/16/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
NS SUPPORT ENGR.	<i>[Signature]</i>	5/31/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Space	
			<input type="checkbox"/> PSAB/FSAB	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Side Change	
PROJECT MANAGER			Field Change Ref. <input type="checkbox"/>	
			Field Change No. _____	
COST CATEGORY: <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/> <input type="checkbox"/>		AUTO CHANGE NO. _____ DATE COMPLETED _____ BY: _____	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN. <b>DUKE</b>	
SITE OPS MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER S. SUPPORT ENGR. COGNIZANT ENGR. CONTRACT ADMIN. NPG CA FILE 12M2 <b>N53</b> <b>SPR 533</b>		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____	CON. ACTIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____	

LOSS OF FW INCIDENT (5/16/73)

Description of Problem

At approximately 1940 hrs. the "A" main FW pump tripped due to loss of suction pressure. Sequence of events as follows:

1. Loss of all condensate booster pumps (operator error).
2. Main FW pump trip.
3. Loss of OTSG water inventory.
4. RCS temperature and pressure high.
5. Electroratic relief valve lifted.
6. Reactor trip on high pressure.
7. Main turbine trip.
8. Emergency FW pump started manually (auto start command not received).


Two automatic actions did not occur. The Emergency FW pump did not start on loss of FW pumps and the main turbine did not trip on loss of FW pumps. The device to initiate these actions is a pressure sensor on the main FW header downstream of the FW pump discharge valves and upstream of the FW line RB penetration check valves. The FW pump discharge valve automatically closed on FW pump trip and isolated the section of FW header that the pressure sensor is located in. The header remained above the 600 psig setpoint which, if reached, would have started the emergency FW pump (Main turbine trip setpoint is 700 psig.) A 1" bypass around the FW pump discharge valves is provided, but the bypass valve was closed.

Analysis of this incident is complicated by the failure of the Sequence of Events Monitor to log real time correctly. At the time of the FW pump trip, an error of +30 minutes occurred.

Attached are system parameter curves produced from reactor data.

JDP/attachment.

FIGURE 1 LOOP (BI) PARAMETER AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 3 MINUTES BEFORE READING TRIP




550 700 0  
550 750 1  
570 800 4  
580 850 2  
590 900 5  
600 950 7

TIME (MINUTES)

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1000  
1000

FIGURE 2 LOOP (A) PARAMETERS AS A FUNCTION OF TIME & MINUTE ERROR RATE TRIP



1000  
1000



TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To E. J. McConnell For Information FILE: 12M2  
J. D. CARLTON Contract 620-00 - 03  
G. E. Kulynych - Sr. Project Manager SFR 533  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin. TITLE LOSS OF  
Central Eng'neering Files FW INCIDENT  
E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance DATE 8/27/73

The attached, cleared SFR is submitted for your information.

TO:  J. N. Kaelin-Arkansas \_\_\_\_\_  
 J. P. Kennedy-SMUD \_\_\_\_\_  
 K. E. Suhrke \_\_\_\_\_  
 ~~H. J. Worehan~~ \_\_\_\_\_  
 J. D. Phinney-Met Ed \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 533 which has been processed on Contract 620-00 - 03. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: OTHER sites are advised of this problem at Ocoee via transmittal of the SFR

cc: G. QUALE

R. L. Pittman  
 NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENG'NEER



LOSS OF FW INCIDENT (5/16/73)

Description of Problem

At approximately 15:0 hrs. the "A" main FW pump tripped due to loss of suction pressure. Sequence of events as follows:

1. Loss of all condensate booster pumps (operator error).
2. Main FW pump trip.
3. Loss of OTSG water inventory.
4. RCS temperature and pressure high.
5. Electromatic relief valve lifted.
6. Reactor trip on high pressure.
7. Main turbine trip.
8. Emergency FW pump started manually (auto start command not received).

Two automatic actions did not occur. The Emergency FW pump did not start on loss of FW pumps and the main turbine did not trip on loss of FW pumps. The device to initiate these actions is a pressure sensor on the main FW header downstream of the FW pump discharge valve and upstream of the FW line RB penetration check valves. The FW pump discharge valve automatically closed on FW pump trip and isolated the section of FW header that the pressure sensor is located in. The header remained above the 800 psig setpoint which, if reached, would have started the emergency FW pump (Main turbine trip setpoint is 700 psig.) A 1" bypass around the FW pump discharge valves is provided, but the bypass valve was closed.

Analysis of this incident is complicated by the failure of the Sequence of Events Monitor to log real time correctly. At the time of the FW pump trip, an error of +30 minutes occurred.

Attached are system parameter curves produced from reactivometer data.

JDP/attachment.

NO. 3115 P. DIVISION FOR INSTRUMENTS MADE BY THE DIVISION OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

FIGURE (1) LOOP (B) PARAMETER AS A FUNCTION OF TIME 3 MINUTES BEFORE REACTOR TRIP





FIGURE 2. LOOP (A) PARAMETERS AS A FUNCTION OF  
 TIME 3 MINUTES BEFORE REACTOR TRIP



File NSS- 3  
12M2-SPR- 533

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To \_\_\_\_\_ For Action

CONTRACT 620-00 -03

SPR 533

TITLE LOSS OF

To R.J. McCowell - S.O. #1 (2) For Information

FW INCIDENT

J. Kaelin

DATE 6-1-73

J. Kennedy

J. Phinley

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer  
\_\_\_\_\_

K. Subrke

Action Requested: DUKE has moved the pressure sensing location upstream (Feed Pump discharge) to preclude any possibility of the check valve interfering with pressure decay. The 1" bypass valve has also been opened.

- cc: G. E. Kulynych
- E. G. Ward
- G. M. Olds
- R. T. Schomer
- N. S. Embrey
- J. McFarland
- C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

R. F. Pittman  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

H. Worsham  
J. D. Carlton  
G. QUALE

MAN-HOUR LIMITS _____
COST LIMITS _____
CHARGE No. _____
APPROVED: _____ Project Manager

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER Duke Power Company CONTRACT NO. NSS-3 SPR NO. 533 SPR REV. NO. 0

VENDOR \_\_\_\_\_ P.O. NO. \_\_\_\_\_ COMP. NO. 22 GROUP NO. 02 SEQ. NO. 01

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_ PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_  
 DWG NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SITE ENGINEER ERM. Michael / J.D. Phinney EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) Loss of FW Incident (5/16/73)

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

See attachment.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLLJING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.

1. Conducted a test to establish why the Emergency FW pump did not start.
2. Opened bypass around FW pump discharge valves.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL

Evaluate system transient. (Reactimeter tape sent to Lynchburg.)

RECOMMENDED ACTION

1. Provide positive means of sensing loss of FW pumps to initiate Emergency FW flow and main turbine trip. (Customer)
2. Evaluate the SEM failure and correct. (CUSTOMER)
3. Advise OTHER CONTRACTS OF THIS PROBLEM (N.S.)

APPROVALS		TITLE	APPROVE SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
	ORIGINATOR		<i>[Signature]</i>	5/18/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
	SITE CONSTR. REP.		<i>[Signature]</i>	5/18/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs.	
	SITE OPER. MGR.		<i>[Signature]</i>	5/18/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
	NS SUPPORT ENGR.		<i>[Signature]</i>	5/31/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
	PROJECT MANAGER				<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs.	
					<input type="checkbox"/> PSAB/FSAB	
					<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Sids. Change	
					Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
					Field Change No. _____	
DISTRIBUTION		Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> Mech <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> I	Av's Charge No. _____	Date Completed _____	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV _____	
SITE OPS MANAGER		RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN. <u>DUKE</u>		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED		
PROJECT MANAGER						
N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.						
COGNIZANT ENGR.						
CONTRACT ADMIN.						
NPG QA						
FILE 12M.2 <u>NSS 3</u>						
<u>SPRS 33</u>						

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NUCLEAR SERVICE

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.

2. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.

Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:

1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.
2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.

3. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.

Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.

If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, (b) Indicate "Not Required" in space provided for project manager's approval, and (c) Distribute as indicated in step 4 below.

If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are to be incurred, approve SPR and forward to project manager for approval (step 4).

If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-03; obtain field change No. from project manager, and indicate field change No. on SPR.

4. PROJECT MANAGER - Approve SPR and Return to Nuclear Service Support Engineer.

5. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - Distribute in Accordance With Procedure No. NPG-0402-04; Initial Action Taken Box (on Support Engineer's File Copy) When Documents Affected Have Been Corrected.

6. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.

Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-04. Return completed SPR to nuclear service support engineer.

Initiated by BAW CONSTRUCTION COMPANY

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.

2. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer. Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.

Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:

1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.
2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.

3. PROJECT MANAGER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.

Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.

If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, and (b) Distribute in accordance with procedure No. WPG-0402-05.

If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are to be incurred, obtain abnormal cost charge No. from contract administration; approve and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0-02-05.

If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-03; assign field change No., have approved and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.

4. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.

Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05. Return completed SPR to the project manager.



LOSS OF FW INCIDENT (5/16/73)

Description of Problem

At approximately 1540 hrs. the "A" main FW pump tripped due to loss of suction pressure. Sequence of events as follows:

1. Loss of all condensate booster pumps (operator error).
2. Main FW pump trip.
3. Loss of OTSG water inventory.
4. RCS temperature and pressure high.
5. Electromatic relief valve lifted.
6. Reactor trip on high pressure.
7. Main turbine trip.
8. Emergency FW pump started manually (auto start command not received).


Two automatic actions did not occur. The Emergency FW pump did not start on loss of FW pumps and the main turbine did not trip on loss of FW pumps. The device to initiate these actions is a pressure sensor on the main FW header downstream of the FW pump discharge valves and upstream of the FW line RB penetration check valves. The FW pump discharge valve automatically closed on FW pump trip and isolated the section of FW header that the pressure sensor is located in. The header remained above the 600 psig setpoint, which, if reached, would have started the emergency FW pump (Main turbine trip setpoint is 700 psig.) A 1" bypass around the FW pump discharge valves is provided, but the bypass valve was closed.

Analysis of this incident is complicated by the failure of the Sequence of Events Monitor to log real time correctly. At the time of the FW pump trip, an error of ~30 minutes occurred.

Attached are system parameter curves produced from reactimeter data.

DP/attachment.

FIGURE (C) LOOP (B) PARAMETER AS A FUNCTION



UNREPRODUCED  
 PRINTED IN U.S.A.



THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

J. H. JOHNSTON, DISTRICT SALES MANAGER	
From	<i>John Williamson - Fox</i> J. T. JANIS, SERVICE MANAGER
Cust.	SMUD
Subj.	MASTER SERVICES CONTRACT ADDITION
File No. or Ref.	
Date	MAY 25, 1978

NDS 663 3

This letter is copy one customer and one subject one

Attached is a proposed letter for establishment of Master Services Contract Task 68 for your signature and transmittal to SMUD. If you have any questions or require additional information, please advise.

JTJ/hh  
Attachment

- cc: GG Anderson
- R. Berchin
- RP Breeding
- JM Burnett
- HS Muir
- BA Karrasch
- CM Olds
- JD Phinney
- DG Culberson - SPR-330 file

3-11-330

May 25, 1978

Mr. J. J. Mattimoe  
Assistant General Manager & Chief Engineer  
Sacramento Municipal Utility District  
6201 S. Street  
Sacramento, California

Subject: Master Services Contract  
SMUD Contract 6367, B&W No. 595-7072  
Task 68 - Analysis of March 20, 1978 Reactor Trip  
and Rapid Cooldown Transient

Reference: 1. B&W letter, JT Janis to RJ Rodriguez, dated March 23, 1978  
2. B&W letter, JT Janis to RP Oubre', dated April 5, 1978

Dear Mr. Mattimoe:

As a result of the March 20, 1978 Loss of MNI Power Incident and subsequent rapid cooldown transient, B&W was requested to perform an evaluation of the effects of the transient on the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). The following Task Proposal has been prepared to cover the analysis work performed to date and to obtain your approval for additional analyses to address NRC concerns and determine the long term effect on the life of RCP casings. This task is proposed under the terms and conditions of the subject Master Services Contract.

Task 68 - Analysis of the March 20, 1978 Reactor Trip and Rapid Cooldown Transient

Task 68-01 - Evaluation of Transient

Scope

- a. The Company will perform an evaluation of the effects of the transient conditions on the major components of the RCS and the nuclear fuel assemblies on an expedited basis and provide SMUD with a letter reporting its recommendations. This evaluation will be performed based on transient data provided by SMUD.
- b. The Company will perform a detailed QA review of the calculations and analyses performed, including verification of validity of the input data used. A detailed report will be provided along with any additional

Estimated Cost

Charges will be on a time and material basis at the appropriate Master Services Contract rates in effect at the time work is performed. Item (a) above is completed and item (b) is in the report preparation stage. Through April, 526 MH and 0.5 computer hours have been expended and it is estimated an additional 200 MH will be required to complete the task. Travel and living expenses will be billed at cost.

Schedule

Item (a) has been completed (Reference 1). Item (b) report should be ready for transmittal about July 1, 1978.

Task 68-02 - Follow-on Fracture Mechanics AnalysisScope

In task 68-01 (a) above, a quick and conservative fracture mechanics analysis of the reactor vessel beltline region and outlet nozzle region was performed. This was an ASME Section III type analysis using a postulated flaw size of 1/4 the vessel thickness. The factors-of-safety calculated for the beltline region and outlet nozzle region are 1.8 and 1.2 respectively.

Since the NRC staff expressed an interest in analysis of factors-of-safety for smaller flaw sizes, B&W proposes to perform additional fracture mechanics analysis for the reactor coolant pressure boundary areas most susceptible to flaw growth. These areas are the reactor vessel beltline region, reactor vessel outlet and inlet nozzle regions, and the lower head of the OTSG just below the tube sheet to shell junction. The analysis will be performed for a series of flaw sizes ranging from the minimum reportable flaw size defined by Section XI to a flaw depth of about 0.5 a/w. The final output of the analysis will be a plot of factors-of-safety versus flaw sizes and plots of factors-of-safety versus time during the transient for several flaw sizes. The application of these curves would be that once the desirable factors-of-safety are established, SMUD would need only to demonstrate that it's NDT technique would have detected the associated flaw size during the baseline inspection.

Estimated Cost

Charges will be on a time and materials basis at the appropriate Master Service Contract rates in effect at the time work is performed. It is estimated that approximately 310 MH will be required to complete this task. Travel and living expenses, if any, will be billed at cost.

Schedule

It is estimated that the span time to complete this analysis will be eight (8) weeks from date of task authorization.

Task 68-03 - Effect of Transient on Accumulated Usage Factor of Reactor Coolant PumpScope

The effect of the large temperature and pressure transients on the pump casing and cover is best evaluated by the responsible engineer who performed the stress analysis on these pumps. It is believed that these transients could have caused some cyclic type stresses which will increase the lifetime usage factor slightly. B&W will contract with the engineering firm who performed the original stress analysis to perform this additional fatigue evaluation.

Estimated Cost

The cost quotation received from the engineering firm is \$8,000. This cost will be billed under the Procurement terms of the Master Services Contract.

Schedule

It is estimated that the span time to complete this analysis will be six (6) weeks.

Work on Task 68-01 was initiated on the verbal authorization of Mr. R. P. Oubre'. Work on Tasks 68-02 and 68-03 will be initiated upon authorization of this task letter.

This proposal is valid until June 30, 1978 except that the Company shall have the right to withdraw or amend this proposal at any time before formal acceptance by the purchaser and subsequent acceptance in writing by an authorized representative of the Company.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me or Joel Janis in Lynchburg. You may authorize this task by signing in the space provided below and returning the copy to us.

Very truly yours,

J. H. Johnston

4401013/nh

cc: RP Oubre'      RJ Rodriguez  
    DG Raasch

APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

FRACTURE MECHANICS EVALUATION OF THE REACTOR VESSEL OF THE SMUD UNIT AT PARCHO  
SECO FOR THE UNRESTRICTED RELEASE BY 371073

A fracture mechanics analysis of the reactor vessel has been performed using the conservative approach outlined in the ASME Code, Section III, Appendix G. Specific details of the analytical approach are documented in BNL Topical Report BNL-10046A, Rev. 1.

Analyses were performed on the two most critical areas of the reactor vessel - the beltline region and the outlet nozzle region. At the lowest temperature during the transient the material is still in the upper shelf region (ductile behavior). Due to the low level of radiation, degradation to beltline region materials is not significant enough to produce a shift in the transition reference temperature. Consequently, the beltline region materials are also at the upper shelf toughness region.

Factors-of-safety for the beltline region and outlet nozzles have been calculated as follows:

$$F. \text{ of } S. = \frac{K_{IR}}{K_{Im} + K_{It}}$$

where  $K_{IR}$  is the reference stress intensity factor

$K_{Im}$  is the stress intensity factor due to pressure

$K_{It}$  is the stress intensity factor due to the thermal gradient through the thickness

The factor-of-safety for the beltline region is 1.8.  
The factor-of-safety for the outlet nozzles is 1.2.

Detailed calculations are provided on sheet 3 of 3.

It should be recognized that this is a very conservative analysis. A postulated flaw size of 1/4" is assumed for the beltline region and the 3.0" nozzle corner flaw is assumed for the outlet nozzle. The material fracture toughness (reference stress intensity value) used is 200 ksi/in. Finally, the calculation of the stresses associated with the transient is conservative.

*Charles E. Harris*

Charles E. Harris, PE  
March 23, 1978

*Henrik S. Palme*

Henrik S. Palme  
March 23, 1978



CALCULATIONS:BASIC RELATIONSHIP  $2K_{im} + K_{it} \leq K_{is}$ BELTLINE REGION

$$(2K_{im} + K_{it})_{max} = 174.366 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}} \quad (\text{M13CCAH})^{**}$$

LQ91 3/23/78

$$K_{im} = P M_m \frac{r_i^2 + r_o^2}{r_o^2 - r_i^2}$$

(BAW-10046A, Rev. 3)  
Removing the F.O.S. of 2time = 40 mins.  
temp  $t_{it} = 468^\circ\text{F}$ 

$$P = 2100 \text{ Psi}$$

$$r_i = 85.5 \text{ in.}$$

$$r_o = 97.0 \text{ in.}$$

$$M_m = 2.9 \quad (\text{ASME Code Appendix G, Fig. G-2214.1})$$

$$K_{im} = 64.45 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}}$$

$$K_{it} = 174.366 - 2(64.45) = 45.47 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}}$$

$$F. \text{ of } S. = \frac{200 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}}}{64.45 + 45.47} = 1.82$$

$$F. \text{ of } S. = 1.82$$

NOZZLE REGION

$$(2K_{im} + K_{it})_{max} = 247.286 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}} \quad (\text{M14CCAH})^{**}$$

LQ91 3/23/78

time = 75 mins  
temp  $t_{it} = 392^\circ\text{F}$ 

$$K_{im} = P F (\%m) \frac{r_i^2 + r_o^2}{r_o^2 - r_i^2} \sqrt{t_{it}}$$

(BAW-10046A, Rev. 3)  
Removing F.O.S. of 2

Computer runs M13CCAH and M14CCAH are based on a computer code developed to perform the BAW-10046A, Rev. 1 calculations. It should be noted that the thermal stress intensities are calculated based on a uniform

$$P = 2100 \text{ Psi}$$

$$r_i = 84.1875 \text{ in.}$$

$$r_o = 96.3125 \text{ in.}$$

$$F(\%m) = 1.74 \quad (\text{WRC Bulletin 175, Fig. AG-1})$$

$$a = 3.0 \text{ in.} \quad (\text{Appendix G, Section III, ASME Code})$$

$$K_{im} = 83.9 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}}$$

$$K_{it} = 247.286 - 2(83.9) = 79.49 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}}$$


$$F. \text{ of } S. = \frac{200 \text{ Ksi}\sqrt{\text{in}}}{83.9 + 79.49} = 1.22$$

$$F. \text{ of } S. = 1.22$$

Charles E. Harris, Jr.  
March 23, 1978

through the vessel thickness that may not be the same as for this vessel.

FIGURE 1  
SMUD RAPID COOLDOWN  
DC TEMPERATURE





0425

cc. WA Karrassen  
JM Burnett  
CW Bruny/MW  
JR Burris

THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY POWER GENERATION GROUP	
TO J. T. JANIS, NUCLEAR SERVICE, NPGD	
From P. A. SHERBURNE/L. H. BOHN, STEAM GENERATOR UNIT	BOS 001 5
Cust. SMUD	File No. or Ref.
Subj. SMUD RAPID COOLDOWN--EFFECTS ON OTSG INTEGRITY	Date MARCH 23, 1975

1.0 RECOMMENDATION

Our preliminary assessment of the potential damage to the SMUD steam generator during the 3/20/78 rapid cooldown transient is complete. Based on that assessment, we feel that the steam generators have not been adversely affected and that the SMUD plant can return to power operation with the following qualifications:

- (1) Plant operation should be limited to 75% power pending (a) confirmation of transient data supplied by SMUD to date, (b) QA of shell temperature calculations made by B&W, and (c) review and approval of OTSG tube load calculations made by C. W. Bruny (MW).
- (2) Confirmation from SMUD that the Loose Parts Monitoring System is operational, especially in the area of the upper tubesheet.

In addition, SMUD should be informed of B&W's intention to perform an inspection of the steam generators during the next outage.

2.0 DISCUSSION

Figures 1-3 give the histories of RC cold leg temperature, steam pressure, and OTSG water level as reconstructed from data supplied by SMUD. The major concern with the steam generators during this transient is whether the tubes have plastically deformed due to the large axial tensile loads imposed on them. If this is the case, the tube load following return to power operation will be more compressive and tube natural frequencies will be lowered. The consequence of lesser tube frequencies is reduced safety margin for fluid elastic vibration (Connors' mechanism) of the peripheral tubes (upper span).

MARCH 23, 1978

To assess whether or not the tube yield strength was exceeded during this transient, an estimate of average shell temperature vs. time was made. A plot of the average shell temperature as calculated is shown in Figure 4. From this calculation, the maximum tube-to-shell temperature differential ( $\Delta T$ ) is 170°F at 0515 hours. (Note that average tube temperature is equal to RC cold leg temperature.) This information was transmitted verbally to C. W. Bruny at Mt. Vernon who subsequently determined that 170°F tube-to-shell  $\Delta T$  does not result in a tube stress greater than yield. Based on this information and on our judgement that the calculated average shell temperature is conservative, we concluded that the tube stress did not exceed yield and that the tubes were not plastically deformed. Due to the preliminary nature of this assessment, however, we advised that plant operation be restricted to 75% power pending QA of the calculations.

Additional effort is required by Mt. Vernon personnel to assess the effect of the rapid cooldown on the OTSG cumulative usage factor. This effect will be determined and forwarded when complete.

### 3.0 CLOSURE

It is our understanding that the above concerns and restrictions were verbally transmitted to SMCD by B. A. Karrasch on Wednesday afternoon, March 23, 1978.

*OK for L.H. Bohn*


PAS/LHB/ef

50-1-57

FIGURE 2

SMUD RAPID COOLDOWN 3/20/58

DC TEMPERATURE




COOL DOWN TO 100°F

Fig 2/1/79

FIGURE 2

SMUD RAPID COOLING... 3/20/78

STEAM PRESSURE



STEAM PRESSURE

TIME OF FILM

3/20/78

STEAM PRESSURE, PSI

FIGURE 3

SHED RAPID COMPLETION 1/20/78

STEAM WATER LEVEL



0.850 — TIME OF TEST

0.750

0.650

0.550

0.450

0.400 — TIME FOLLOWING LOSS OF MAIN STEAM SUPPLY, MINUTES


1/20/78

WATER LEVEL ~ 2



FIGURE 4

SHUD RAPID COOLDOWN (2/20/78)  
SHELL TEMPERATURE



ENG 3/22/78

Bill Barrett

3/20

8:15

x

## RCS Chemistry

AFTER TRANS

$$I_{131} \quad 3.88 \times 10^{-2}$$

$$I_{135} \quad 4.52 \times 10^{-2}$$

$$I_{135} \quad 2.32 \times 10^{-2}$$

$$\text{gross } \beta \quad 3.16 \times 10^{-1}$$

I  $\sim 10 \times$  NORMALgross  $\beta$  last week was  $\sim 2.2 \times 10^{-1}$ gross  $\alpha$  in progress. have in am

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS IN PLOG.

5 PAGES

- 1 3 pages - memory trip notes  
 4th RC Pressure Trade  
 5th RCS TEMP

John McLaughlin  
 H (916) 944-2936

9:00

30 min

Region 5 - Bill Johnson

NEW Review &amp; Recommendation

Five items

No NCS APRIL 2000

Bill Gammell  
Don Blatchley

A-Cad Log

PRT work up

04:29:30	582.8
04:30:00	587.9
04:30:30	590.9
04:31:30	593.1
04:32:30	594.9
04:35:30	595.1
04:34:30	594.9
04:35:30	590.4
04:36:30	571.7
04:37:30	572.1
04:38:30	566.6
04:39:30	558.6
40:30	528.3

Experience <sup>PRT</sup> ~~Shift~~  
of 2155

04:26:45	585.2
	588.2
	586.1
	586.6
	587.1
	587.1
	587.6
	587.6
	588.1
	588.1
	588.8
04:29:30	588.8

PRT Hi Temp 04:25:59 210° on  
disc. d.  
RV-1B

NR 2115, 2119, 2114, 2115  
WR 2103, 2107, 2028

04:28:29 2017 High Press. Temp.  
Electronic

PRT data

8:01 pumped down  
8:15 Seemed  
10:44 Press. = 118 psi  
Added deion. water, down to 20 psi  
Incr. P to 2155, PRT press. increased  
1900-2000 lbs.

D inverter stop  
J inverter  
circuit breakers  
open upon  
trip of one  
power supply -

GROSS  $\alpha$ 

$$1.11 \times 10^{-8} \text{ mCi/ml} \pm 7.43 \times 10^{-9}$$

Gamma Scan

Np 239 - 106.1 KEV

ACTIVITY  $9.7 \times 10^{-5}$  mCi/ml2 $\sigma$  Limit  $\pm 3.01 \times 10^{-5}$ 

$$\text{GROSS } \alpha \quad 1.11 \times 10^{-8} \text{ mCi/ml} \pm 7.43 \times 10^{-9}$$

10 → 2000<sup>11</sup> 532 ONE CODE REELEX LEVAGE

82.9 inches in PZR LOWEST LEVEL

1995<sup>15</sup> 15 MIN  
2000<sup>20</sup> 20 MIN

HOW MEASURING PZR LEVEL

TOP AT 0925

SECURED 4X ZCP EARLY (1)

SAFE / PROTECTIVE MEASUREMENT 4 X

150  
11

5:14 ← 5:22 HPI

↓ 10

0445 13 → 557 1586

0448 14 → 546.3 1510

PLANS 0445 15 → 535 1475

AT 0445

FULL RANGE 15 0156

0448 28

0445 156

04 25:59

04 28:29







	3	4	5	6	7	8	A	B	HOE	HOE	A cont	S Cold	C Cold	D cont
4:19:45	-4.05	-4.06	72.5	71.3	71.6	71.9	599.7	599.1			564.9	566.1	564.7	567.5

S/Cold  
 A cont

A4

AC

04:20:55	- 4.05- 4.05	73.5	72.0	72.4	72.7	577.3	577.2	577.0	577.4	575.0	577.7	577.0	577.0
04:21:00	- 4.05- 4.05	73.1	71.5	71.9	72.4	577.2	577.1	577.0	577.3	575.0	577.6	577.0	577.0
04:21:05	- 4.05- 4.05	72.7	71.0	71.4	71.9	577.2	577.2	577.2	577.3	575.1	577.6	577.0	577.0
04:21:10	- 4.05- 4.05	73.1	71.3	71.7	72.5	577.7	577.1	577.0	577.3	575.1	577.6	577.0	577.0
04:21:15	- 4.05- 4.05	73.1	71.3	71.5	72.5	577.7	577.1	577.0	577.3	575.1	577.6	577.0	577.0
04:21:20	- 4.05- 4.05	72.2	71.0	71.5	71.5	577.3	577.3	577.0	577.3	575.0	577.6	577.0	577.0
04:21:25	- 4.05- 4.05	72.4	71.4	71.2	72.0	577.3	577.7	577.0	577.2	575.3	577.1	577.0	577.0
04:21:30	- 4.05- 4.05	73.5	72.0	72.0	72.0	577.3	577.2	577.0	577.3	575.3	577.1	577.0	577.0
04:21:35	- 4.05- 4.05	72.4	71.3	71.5	71.5	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.3	575.0	577.1	577.0	577.0
04:21:40	- 4.05- 4.05	72.5	71.7	71.5	71.9	577.0	577.1	577.0	577.2	575.4	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:21:45	- 4.05- 4.05	73.6	71.0	71.7	72.0	577.0	577.2	577.0	577.1	575.4	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:21:50	- 4.05- 4.05	72.5	71.7	71.2	71.3	577.3	577.2	577.0	577.1	575.4	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:21:55	- 4.05- 4.05	72.5	71.7	71.2	71.3	577.3	577.2	577.0	577.1	575.4	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:22:00	- 4.05- 4.05	73.7	71.0	71.7	71.9	577.3	577.2	577.0	577.1	575.4	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:22:05	- 4.05- 4.05	72.8	71.0	71.9	71.9	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:22:10	- 4.05- 4.05	72.1	71.1	71.4	71.6	577.9	577.4	577.0	577.3	575.3	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:22:15	- 4.05- 4.05	73.5	72.0	72.0	72.7	577.3	577.4	577.0	577.3	575.3	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:22:20	- 4.05- 4.05	73.0	71.6	71.2	71.7	577.3	577.3	577.0	577.3	575.3	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:22:25	- 4.05- 4.05	72.2	71.0	71.3	71.5	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.5	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:22:30	- 4.05- 4.05	73.3	72.0	72.4	72.7	577.7	577.3	577.0	577.0	575.5	577.0	577.0	577.0

04:23:15	- 4.05- 4.70	63.7	63.1	62.6	63.1	577.4	577.0	577.0	577.1	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:20	- 4.05- 4.70	1.4	1.0	1.7	1.0	577.7	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:25	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.4	1.3	1.5	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:30	- 4.05- 4.70	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:35	- 4.05- 4.70	1.4	1.3	1.1	1.1	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:40	- 4.05- 4.70	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.2	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:45	- 4.05- 4.70	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.1	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:50	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:23:55	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:00	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:05	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:10	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:15	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:20	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:25	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:30	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:35	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:40	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:45	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:50	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:24:55	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0
04:25:00	- 4.05- 4.70	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	577.0	575.0	577.0	577.0	577.0

G100 - AVE PER LEVEL

T009 - P22 TEMP

● 23 - A 205 FLOW

G122 - B " "

T067 - A FW TEMP

T208 - B FW TEMP

L035 - A OTSG LVL

L036 - B " "


G12 - IMBALANCE

04:24:00 - 179.4 - 648.2 - 69.24 - 68.96 - 437.0 - 431.8 - 170.6 - 176.7 -

●



RCS 1/10  
5575



W. V. C.



THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY

POWER GENERATION GROUP

To Distribution List D

From G. M. Olds - Manager, Nuclear Service Department  
 J. C. Deddens - Manager, Engineering Department

BOS 667 5

Cust.

File No.  
or Ref.

Subj. SMUD NNI Incident Recovery Team

Date March 21, 1978

This letter is copy to customer and the subject only.

The Rancho-Seco plant suffered a loss of the NNI System for approximately an hour on 3/20/78. A severe plant transient resulted.

A task force is appointed via this memo to reconstruct the event and to investigate any significant effects on the NSS equipment involved. The task force is expected to derive B&W recommendations to the customer based on their findings. In addition, they will assist SMUD in gaining NRC concurrence with returning the plant to service.

The task force will be headed by B. A. Karrasch, who will work through J. T. Janis with the SMUD organization. Bruce will be assisted by J. J. Kelly.

The Licensing representative will be C. S. Banwarth.

J. M. Burnett will coordinate Component Engineering participation. P. A. Sherburne and J. R. Durris have started OTSG calculations.

J. A. Castanes will coordinate all activities of the Control and Instrumentation Section.

R. W. Winks and A. W. Brown are proceeding to the plant to assist with the investigation.

Others may be added to the task force as the work proceeds.

Top priority should be assigned to these activities in order to return the plant to service as soon as possible.

GMO:JCD:NFB

cc: J. H. MacMillan  
 D. W. Montgomery  
 R. H. Lall  
 J. C. Deddens  
 J. H. Taylor  
 J. D. Phinney  
 R. J. ...

J. T. Janis  
 C. S. Banwarth  
 J. M. Burnett  
 P. A. Sherburne  
 J. R. Durris  
 J. A. Castanes

D. H. Roy

K. E. Sunko

*[Handwritten signature and initials]*

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260, Lynchburg, Va. 24505

Telephone: (804) 384 5111

March 23, 1978

Mr. R. J. Rodriguez  
Manager, Nuclear Operations  
Sacramento Municipal Utility District  
6201 S. Street  
Sacramento, California

Subject: Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station - Unit No. 1  
Evaluation of NSS Cooldown Transient

Dear Mr. Rodriguez:

B&W has reviewed the data provided by SMUD regarding the March 20, 1978 reactor trip and resulting cooldown transient, and have performed the following evaluations:

1. Evaluation of RCP seal performance data prior, during and subsequent to the transient.
2. Evaluation of transient conditions with respect to RCP's and CRDM's.
3. Evaluation of transient conditions with respect to fuel assemblies.
4. Evaluation of transient conditions with respect to RV, RC piping, pressurizer, and OISS's.

As a result of these evaluations, B&W concurs with SMUD's intent to return Rancho Seco to power operation at a power level at or below 75% full power with the following recommendations:

1. The following maneuvering limits be applied for this plant startup:
  - a. The maximum rate of power increase below 20% full power shall be 10% per hour.
  - b. The maximum rate of power increase between 20% and 40% full power shall be 30% per hour.
  - c. Above 40% full power, escalation shall be limited to 3% per hour.
2. Increased surveillance of the loose parts monitoring system for at least a one week period.




3. Performance of an operability check of on-line and redundant NMI instrumentation.
4. Establishment of a procedure for restoring NMI power in the event of a power loss and a commitment to establish by April 7, 1978 operator instructions for immediate action to limit NSS transient if NMI power cannot be immediately restored.
5. Surveillance of primary and secondary radiochemistry on a minimum of a daily basis for at least one week following startup.

B&W NPOD's concurrence with operation of Rancho Seco above 75% full power is contingent upon our QA evaluation of data input provided by SMC and analyses performed by B&W Engineering, and you will be informed of completion of these activities and our concurrence in a timely manner.

In addition, B&W is performing an evaluation to determine the effects of the transient conditions on the Reactor Coolant System accumulative usage factor and will advise you of those results. As a further measure of verification of OTSG tube integrity, B&W requests additional inspection of the OTSG tubes during your next refueling outage. Those inspection recommendations will be forwarded to SMC along with B&W's proposed refueling inspection plan prior to the outage.

If you have any questions or require additional information, please advise.

Very truly yours,

  
Joel T. Janis  
Service Manager

JTJ/ah

cc: JJ Mattinoe  
DG Raasch  
RP Oubre'  
JH Johnston

bcc: RM Ball  
R. Berchin  
JA Castanes  
JC Daddens  
EA Karasch  
ER Kane  
JH MacMillan  
GM Olds  
JD Phinney

AL Dunlap  
JH Taylor

Record Center NSS-11 11.2

SMUD

SACRAMENTO MUNICIPAL UTILITY DISTRICT 6901 S Street Box 15122 Sacramento California 95815 (916) 486-2741

RFO 78-28

March 28, 1978

Mr. Joel Janis  
Whitbeck & Wilcox  
P. O. Box 1150  
Lynchburg, Virginia 24505



Dear Joel:

For discussion with you on Monday, March 27, you requested a chronology of our rise to power over the past weekend. Listed below is that chronology showing the rate of change of power level for the three rises in power.

Criticality @ 1607	3/24/78
0-20% 82/hr	3/24/78
20-42.5% 65/hr	3/24/78
Turbine/Reactor Trip at 2230	3/24/78

Criticality @ 0112	3/25/78
0-20% 66/hr	3/25/78
20-40% 260/hr	3/25/78
40-55% 35/hr	3/25/78
55-61% essentially 02/hr	
over a 20-hour period	
extending into 3/26/78	

Reactor reduced to 10 <sup>-8</sup>	
intermediate range amps	3/26/78
0-20% 105/hr	3/26/78
20-50% 172/hr	3/27/78
50-55% 37/hr	3/27/78
55-72% 122/hr	3/27/78

You will note that on the rise to power from 55 to 72% on Monday, March 27, the rate of change was at 122 per hour. This exceeded the recommended rate of change given to SMUD in your letter of March 23, 1978. I request your review this rate of change and respond to SMUD on any effect which it may have had. I would appreciate your response as soon as possible.

Respectfully,

*R.P. Oubre*  
R.P. Oubre

ENCLOSURE

TO

Gen. Meyer

FROM

DeMar

SUBJECT

SMUD SIR

FILE NO. OR REF.

DATE

3.21.78

## BACKGROUND

FOLLOWING A TRIP THE REACTOR COOLANT TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE DECREASED. GEN. MEYER HAS DEMANDS THE CHANGE IN TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE AND ITS EFFECTS ON FUEL ROD CLADDING STRESS APPEAR INSIGNIFICANT AND CAN BE TREATED IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO TOLEDO DEPRESSURIZATION. THERE IS A HIGH PROBABILITY THE SOME FUEL ASSEMBLIES LIFTED SINCE 4 PUMPS WERE OPERATING AS A TEMPERATURE DROPPED TO 400 F. FOR A PERIOD UP TO 10-12 MINUTES. THIS IS NOT A SERIOUS PROBLEM (SEE COMMENTS ACTION LIST RESOLUTION). HOWEVER, AS A CAUTIOUS PRECAUTION, STARTUP SHOULD BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH NMPA'S ASSUMING THAT FUEL HAS BEEN HEATED, I.E. 39% MODER ABOVE 75% POWER WITH FUEL MODER POWER AT POWER LEVELS CUT OFF.

COOLANT PRESSURE SHOULD BE MONITORED CAREFULLY AND PARTICULAR ATTENTION SHOULD BE PAID TO LOOSE PARTS WITHIN THE SYSTEM.

MECHANICAL MANEUVERING RECOMMENDATIONS

RANCHO SECO

CONTRACT SMDD

REVISION 0

DATE JUNE 3, 1977

The following are the recommended maneuvering limits for SMDD, Cycle 2:

1. The maximum rate of power increase below 20% full power shall be 10% per hour.
2. Above 20% power, normal operating procedures (Tech. Spec Limits) will apply unless the reactor has operated at less than 20% power for more than 48 hours.
3. If the power level has been below 20% full power for greater than forty-eight (48) hours, the maximum rate of power increase above 20% full power shall be 30% per hour with a five (5) hour hold at 20% full power below the power level cutoff and a five (5) hour hold at the power level cutoff. These holds can run concurrently with holds required by the Technical Specification.
4. During the initial power escalation at cycle startup or immediately following a control rod interchange, the initial escalation above the 40-75% full power shall be limited to 3% per hour, with a five (5) hour hold at the power level cutoff. This hold can run concurrently with Technical Specification holds where applicable.
5. With the exception of item 4 above, no restrictions are placed on required physics startup tests.

*V. B. J. ...*  
FUEL ENGINEERING SECTION MANAGER

THE B. B. COCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To	C. M. Olds, Manager, Nuclear Service	
From	E. A. Karrassi, Manager, Plant Integration	BOS 603.3
Cust.	177 - All	File No. or Ref.
Subj.	SMUD Cooldown Incident	Date March 29, 1978

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only.

On March 20, 1978, SMUD experienced a loss of power to a substantial portion of the non-nuclear instrumentation (see details - Attachment 3). Although the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) functioned properly, SMUD still experienced the most severe thermal transient on any B&W plant to date. The subsequent investigation pointed out that additional guidance to our operating customers in the area of limiting potential events of this nature is warranted. Accordingly, the Engineering Department recommends that our operating plant customers be informed of this incident, and suggestions be made on how to minimize the plant thermal transient for loss of NNI and other similar events. Attachment 1, a sequence of events, and Attachment 2, a series of descriptive curves, are provided to assist you in preparation of a customer letter.

In addition, the following recommendations should be made to assure proper operator action for events of this nature:

1. Operators should be trained to recognize a loss of power to all or a majority of their NNI (indicators fail to mid-range, automatic or manual transfer to alternate instrument strings brings no response, etc.). The loss of power is emphasized here rather than the failure of any one instrument or control signal. These minor events are adequately covered in our present simulator course.
2. Given that the operator can determine that he has lost power to all or most of the NNI, he should know the location of the power supplies and power supply breakers and have a procedure available to regain power.
3. If the fault cannot be cleared (e.g., the breakers to the power supplies reopen), he should have a list of alternate instrumentation available to him. Some possibilities are:
  - a) ESFAS panels
  - b) RPS panels
  - c) ECI
  - d) SRCI

- e) Remote shutdown panels
- f) Local gages
- g) Plant Computer

Note that each plant will be different in detail, but the list should be developed in advance and the operators thoroughly trained in its usage.

4. The above instrumentation sources should also be keyed to certain critical variables to help the operator select his priorities during the emergency condition. It is recognized that no procedure can cover all the possible combinations of non-nuclear instrumentation failures, however, if the operator knows he has an instrument problem (as opposed to a LOCA or steam line break, for example), he can limit the transient by controlling only a few variables. These are:

- a) Pressurizer level (via HPI or normal makeup pumps)
- b) RCS pressure (via pressurizer heaters, spray, E/M relief valve)
- c) Steam generator level (via feed flow, feedwater valves)
- d) Steam generator pressure (via turbine bypass system)

The pressurizer level and RCS pressure assure that the Reactor Coolant System is filled and the steam generator level and pressure assure adequate decay heat removal.

In our opinion, the preferred solution is to install safety grade steam generator level instrumentation, start auxiliary feedwater on a low level steam generator signal, and control steam generator level automatically, as is required on our IDOTEG plants. This may not be a practical retrofit solution for the operating plants, however, this solution should be suggested as a possible way to assure minimal lost capacity days due to equipment failure. Plant Integration will be happy to assist you in the preparation of the customer letter.

*B. Karrasch*

BAK:jl

cc: J. C. Deddens	J. A. Castanes
D. H. Roy	P. A. Sherburne
R. M. Ball	J. R. Burris
T. M. Schuler	R. W. Moore
G. W. Pryor	R. W. Wicks
L. J. Stanek	J. T. Janis
K. E. Suhrke	A. W. Brown
J. S. Tulenko	B. J. Shepherd
J. W. ...	...
L. ...	C. L. ...
J. J. Kelly	H. S. Palme
J. D. Phinney	J. M. Burnette
D. F. Hallman	G. A. Meyer

Attachments

ATTACHMENT III

The operator was in the process of changing a light bulb in a turbine header pressure transfer switch when he dropped the bulb into the switch and shorted the switch to ground. A protective fuse in the circuit had no chance to blow before the power supply monitor circuit sensed the short on the bus and opened the breakers to the "Y" and "Z" power supplies. This resulted in the loss of approximately half the MMI signals ("X" power supply remained energized) and the ability to transfer from "bad" to "good" signals. It should be pointed out that the utility changed the original BW design in the area of the power supplies. If the original BW design were installed, the incident would have resulted in the loss of the ability to transfer (select) signals only. No active signal would have lost power.

SEQUENCE OF EVENTS - 04:25(AM) to 05:34(AM)

<u>TIME</u>	<u>EVENT</u>
4:25:35	- Lost NRI power supply cabinets 5,6, & 7 (E&W Channel "Y")
	- This caused a loss of T <sub>1</sub> signals to the ICS. BIU limits ran back feedwater, resulting in a loss of feedwater (actual Rx power was 72%).
4:25:46	- Reactor trip on high pressure, turbine trip on interlock.
	- Pressurizer code relief setting was known to be low (=2225 psig). The electromagnetic relief was isolated due to previous leakage problems. The data indicates primary pressure went =2400 psig =>code relief valve lifted.
4:26:17	- Operator starts HPI pump "B" to maintain ppr. level.
4:28:23	- Operator stops HPI pump "A".
4:30	- OTSG "B" goes dry. Data indicates that "A" OTSG probably also went dry.
4:34:25	- RC pressure =1900 PSI (low pressure trip set-point).
4:34	- Operator increases speed of a MFP and feeds "A" OTSG. This starts RCS on pressure and temperature decrease.
4:37:16	- SFAS actuation at 1600 psig. This starts HPI, LPI and initiates aux. feed. Aux. FW valves are opened to full open position. The system makes no automatic attempt to control steam generator water level.
4:40	- RC pressure at 1475 psig. It starts to recover from this point due to HPI. T <sub>ave</sub> = 528°F.
4:43:56	- "A" HPI pump secured.
4:46:09	- LPI secured.
4:49:54	- "A" HPI initiated. From this point on, the operator started and stopped HPI pumps as necessary to maintain pressurized level.




TIMEEVENT

- 4:51:25 - Secured RCP-D ( $T_{ave} = 435^{\circ}\text{F}$ )  
This reduced #RCP's to three
- 4:47:27 - OTSG "A" water level - 599.7"  
Speculate that  $\approx 2$  ft of tubes are not flooded  
(at top) due to steam line arrangement.
- 5:00:00 - Hourly computer log printout  
Steam temp  $380^{\circ}\text{F}$  (OTSG "B")  
Steam pressure 171 psig (OTSG "B")  
Assuming  $T_{ave} = T_{sat} \Rightarrow T_{ave} = 380^{\circ}\text{F}$
- 5:13:47 - Power restored to KNI cabinets 5, 6, & 7  
 $T_{ave} = 285^{\circ}\text{F}$   
RCS Pressure  $\approx 2000$  psig  
Both OTSG full level ranges pegged high  
Operator begins to reduce RC pressure using  
pzs. spray.  
Operator stops aux. FW pump.

ATTACHMENT 2, SH 1-3

46 1470


16-2 IN X 10 IN TO 1/2 INCHES P.A. X 10 DEETS  
 1000 PSI X 1000 PSI X 1000 PSI





46 1470

10 x 10 TO 1/4" x 1/4" x 1/4" x 1/4" ALL PIPES TO BE 1/4" x 1/4" x 1/4" x 1/4"



TITLE RCV-7 Shaft Sealed  
RELATED SPRs SPR (4LT) 446, 461

This SPR has been reviewed by Task Engineering Groups and is applicable to  
NSS-\_\_\_\_\_. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS RC Bumbley  
03, 04, 05, 9, 12, 13,

This problem will be closed out on generic  
basis because 1) it has been assigned to the Top Generic  
Problem list 2) There are other SPRs associated  
with the problem of this valve (SPR 570) and  
3) There is nothing on this particular problem  
NSS- (Sealed shaft) that can be done or has been  
seen elsewhere on this valve. The problem has  
been ~~not~~ properly identified ~~as~~ to engineering  
and Nuclear Services dissatisfaction with  
the rotating stem valve as a spray valve has  
been expressed.

RFP 12/26/74

NSS-

TRANSMITTAL SLIP  
FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To R. J. McConnell (2) For Information  
R. G. Buckley - NSE  
G. E. Kallmych - Sr. Project Manager  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.  
Central Engineering Files  
E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

FILE: 1342  
Contract 620-00 - 03  
SFR 546  
TITLE RC-VI Shaft  
Scored  
DATE 2-19-74

The attached, cleared SFR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. N. Kaelin-Arkansas \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ J. P. Kennedy-SMD \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ K. E. Suhrke \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ J. J. Wershan \_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_ J. D. Phinney-Wet Ed \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. \_\_\_\_\_ which has been processed on Contract 620-00 \_\_\_\_\_. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: No maintenance report written  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_

cc:

R. J. Pittman  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To W.C. BUTT - NSE For Action

→ R.J. McConnell - S.D.M.  
L. Allen - A.P.M.

cc J. Kaelin - ARK For Information

J. Kennedy - SMUD  
J. Phinney - Met Ed  
K. Subnke  
H.J. Worsham

CONTRACT 620-00 - 03

SPR 546

TITLE RC-VI Shaft  
Scored

DATE 7-18-73

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: Upon receipt of the DUKE main-  
tenance report, the feasibility of exchanging  
the present bonnet with a new bonnet  
(possibly from Unit III) will be determined.  
W.C. BUTT is investigating other  
types of valves which are suitable for  
spray valves i.e. (Copes Vulcan, non rotating  
stem, bellows). Site is requested to fwd  
DUKE maintenance report when its available.

- cc: G. E. Kulynych
- E. G. Ward
- G. M. Oids
- R. T. Schomer
- N. S. Embrey
- J. McFarland
- C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

R.G. BURLEY  
O. Pottgruber

R. L. Pittman  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

MANHOUR LIMITS	_____
COST LIMITS	_____
CHARGE No.	_____
APPROVED:	<u>R. Allen</u> Project Manager

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER DUKE POWER Co CONTRACT NO. 620-0003 SPR NO. 546 SPR REV. NO. 0

VENDOR RICKWELL P.O. NO. 021480 COMP. NO. 28 GROUP NO. 41 SEQ. NO. \_\_\_\_\_

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_  
Dwg NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_

PRIORITY  
1

SITE ENGINEER E.L. LOGAN EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) RC-V1

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM REFERENCE: SPR'S 444, 447 & 446.  
VALVE OPERATION ERRATIC ON 7/6/73. SHAFT FOUND TO BE GALLED. SHAFT DRESSED-UP IN PLACE WITH EMERY CLOTH AND VALVE RE-PAKED ON 7/7/73. DURING CHECKOUT ON 7/8/73 THE KEY HOLDING THE GEAR ON THE MOTOR SHAFT WAS FOUND TO BE SHEARED. THE KEY & GEAR WERE REPLACED. OPERATION AT HOT CONDITIONS ON 7/9/73 AM WAS SATISFACTORY. NO PACKING LEAKS.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
VALVE REPAIRED BY DUKE MAINTENANCE AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. DUKE PREPARING FULL REPORT. WILL TRY TO OBTAIN COPY FOR B&W.

~~OTHER~~ ACTION ~~RECOMMENDED~~ BY ~~OTHER~~ SITE PERSONNEL -  
Recommended  
Consider replacing lantern ring w/packing. Box in yoke for leakage collection

RECOMMENDED ACTION  
Duke now write report (other SPRs) cover the valve :: closing this SPR

TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
ORIGINATOR	<u>E.L. Logan</u>	<u>7/9/73</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
SITE CONSTR. REP.			<input type="checkbox"/> Proc Specs	
SITE OPER. MGR.	<u>John J. Connell</u>	<u>7/10/73</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr Books	
NS SUPPORT ENGR.	<u>R. L. Putman</u>	<u>7/13/73</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Tech Specs	
			<input type="checkbox"/> P&ID/PI&B	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended	
			<input type="checkbox"/> Side Change	
			Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
			Field Change No. _____	
			<u>John J. Connell</u> <u>7/29/74</u>	

DISTRIBUTION SITE OPS MANAGER PROJECT MANAGER N.S. SUPPORT ENGR. COGNIZANT ENGR. CONTRACT ADMIN. NPG QA FILE 12M2455-3 SPR 546	Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> Norm <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> I	Auth. Charge No. _____ Date Completed _____ By: _____
	RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN. _____	DEVIATIONS <input type="checkbox"/> NONE <input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____
	OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED _____	



THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

File  
SPR546

*J.P. Ittner*  
RUP  
SPR -

to  
R. R. Beach

from  
E. L. Logan *ELL*

subject  
Duke Power

subject  
MORE ON 1 RC-4 (RC-V2) and 1 RC-1 (RC-V1)

805 683-5

File No.  
or Ref.

Date  
12/18/73

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only

Limit Switch LS-9 was added to the 1 RC-V2 circuit on 12/12/73. (See Fig. 1) The switch was set to stop valve travel at 4 turns of the handwheel from the full closed position. This appears to have solved the opening problem as this valve was opened on 12/16/73 at full temperature and pressure. Now the valve cannot be closed. Two attempts were made on 12/17/73 and both times the overloads tripped. The 15 ft # motor is evidently not strong enough to start the valve toward the closed position.

As you know Duke replaced the yoke bushing on 1 RC-1 ( 1 RC-V1 ) on 11/23/73 (SPR # 570). The replacement bushing was not the correct one as Rockwell had shipped the wrong replacement part to Duke. Duke had planned to replace this bushing during the December outage. The valve became inoperable on 12/16/73. The valve indicates open when commanded open, but system conditions indicate the valve stays closed. If the bushing is stripped as before, it seems the valve would be hung open rather than closed. This problem will have to be investigated during the next Unit I shutdown. Duke has closed 1 RC-3 ( 1 RC-V ) to preclude an open failure of 1 RC-1 causing a plant shutdown as occurred on 11/20/73.

The Unit I pressurizer valve line-up is as follows:


- Spray Valve (RC-1) - Closed and Inoperable
- Spray Block (RC-3) - Closed
- Electromatic Relief (RC-66)- Operable
- Elec. Block (RC-4) - Open and Inoperable

Since 12/15/73 we have been able to obtain comparative RCS and pressurizer boron concentrations. This is in response to SPR-557 and E. A. Karrasch's memo of 11/19/73. Figures 2 and 3 are plots of these values for both Units I and II. The Unit I continuous vent (.1 to .4 gpm) was secured on 12/17/73. Before the system is cooled down, we will investigate for leaking valves, etc. Unit II is indicative of normal operation since a conscious effort has been made to maintain RCS boron concentration constant with only the spray valve bypass flow into the pressurizer.

ELL/bh

- cc: J. P. Ittner ✓ R. G. Burnley  
E. V. Straub E. L. Logan  
C. A. Creacy W. C. Butt  
R. L. Pittman B. Karrasch  
R. J. McConnell

NOTE: LS-9 ADDED 12/13/75 TO STOP  
TRAVEL BEFORE FULLY "TOGGLED CLOSED"  
POSITION.



10/24/75 CONF/11/10/75

11/24/75 CONF/11/10/75  
(11/24/75)

FIGURE 1

LOGAN

OCONEE  
UNIT I BORON

--- RCS  
--- PRZE

① STARTED VARIING PWR LEVEL BETWEEN 220" & 270" @ 0850 12/1/73




FIGURE Z

12/1/73

OCONEE  
UNIT II BORON

— RCS  
- - - PREC




FIGURE 3

LOGAN

# LIMITORQUE CORPORATION

AFFILIATED WITH PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORPORATION

181 South Gulph Road, King of Prussia, Pa. 19406

Telephone (215) 265-3000

Telex-84-6321



*K. FITZMAN*  
Reply to:  
2614 Old Pineville Road  
Charlotte, North Carolina 28210  
Phone: (704) 527-4614

January 2, 1974

# COPY

Babcock & Wilcox  
c/o Duke Power Company  
Oconee Nuclear Station  
P. O. Box 1175  
Seneca, South Carolina 29673

Attention: Mr. Roy Mc Connel

Subject: Pressurizer Spray Valve, Tag RCVI,  
Located at Duke Power Co., Oconee Nuclear Station  
Rockwell Size 2½", Figure 3628M  
Limitorque SMB-2-40, per Mfg. No. 342869D  
Rockwell P.O. 36-29014, Dwg. B-441804

Gentlemen:

The purpose of this letter is to confirm our 'phone conversation of December 31 and to enumerate the immediate and long term actions taken to eliminate the problem encountered at the above valve application.

The immediate action to be taken is:

- A. Continue to utilize the present SMB-2 operator with alterations to the Bellville washers (torque spring package) and motor.
- B. Rewind the motor from 3600 RPM to 1800 RPM.
- C. Change from the present 13-spring washer set (.189" thick -.0787" dish) to a 9-spring washer set (.1378" thick -.0984" dish)
- D. Set the torque switch on both sides, (both scales), at 1½ so the operator will torque out at 93'⁄₄ at the stem nut.

The immediate action recommendations arose from the need to quickly eliminate the problem within a 3 day span and were based on an actual operating pressure differential of 50 psi where the maximum differential to be encountered would be 200 psi.

(continued)

cc: Mr. Joe Davis, Duke Power Co., Seneca, S.C.  
Mr. Bob Burnley, Babcock & Wilcox, Lynchburg, Va.  
Mr. Ed Logan, Babcock & Wilcox, Seneca, S.C.  
Mr. Tom Stoecker, Rockwell, Raleigh, N.C.  
Mr. Jim Morris, Rockwell, Raleigh, N.C.

The effect of the above modifications will be observable within the next few days and will probably be taken into account by Jim Morris of Rockwell and Bob Burnley of your company in their present long range decision. I say long range since I understand they are contemplating going to a smaller motor and operator on this and a second valve. The time required to manufacture new operators and coordinating their installation at the next downage necessarily make it a long range action.

This immediate action of 12-28 through 12-31 has in essence relied on decreasing the valve stem speed and making the torque cut-out feature more sensitive. With it's success, Jim and Bob may want to consider decreasing the speed on any other similar problem applications by altering gear ratios and altering torque spring packages, and keeping the present operators.

On the part of Limitorque Corporation, our next step is to get in touch with Rockwell and be of service to Jim Morris in his evaluation and action on this valve and operator application.

Very truly yours,

LIMITORQUE CORPORATION

George Cusack  
District Manager

GC:fa

GEORGE  
UNIT II POISON  
 --- RCS  
 --- PRE




FIGURE 3

LOGAN

# Babcock & Wilcox

Power Generation Group

P.O. Box 1260 Lynchburg, Va 24506

Telephone: (804) 384-5111

December 28, 1973

SOM 641

Duke Power Company  
Cconee Nuclear Station  
P. O. Box 1175  
Seneca, South Carolina 29678

Subject: RC-V1 (Spray Valve) Interim "Fix"

Attention: Mr. J. Ed Smith

Dear Mr. Smith:

RC-V1 has experienced a high failure rate. This is apparently due to the forces exerted on it by the high speed operator (SMB-2-40), provided to achieve the desired RCS transient response.

B. & W. has ordered SMB-0-1; operators to replace the current RC-V1 operators on all three units, however; the promised delivery on these units is 25 weeks. The smaller operators are permitted by re-evaluation of the required transient response and should improve the performance of RC-V1.

As an interim means of extending the life of the spray valve, B. & W. recommends modifying the existing operator to reduce its power or exchanging it with a lower powered operator.

RC-V5 (spray line block valve) is identical to the spray valve but has a smaller operator (SMB-00) as it has no transient response requirements.

Exchanging these operators has been reviewed by B. & W. and would provide an increased reliability for the spray valve at the cost of decreased transient response. An operation with no spray flow has been reviewed by the Station Review Committee and found to be permissible, operation with a slow spray valve should also be acceptable.

RC-V5 is very seldom operated and use of the larger operator should not greatly affect its life. The proper operator would be re-installed when the replacement RC-V1 operators became available.

Please note that there is a difference in the motor voltage between the two operators, and the control circuits would also require modification.

We will be glad to review any alternate means of decreasing the power of the RC-V1, which you may find available.

Yours truly,

*R. J. McConnell*  
R. J. McConnell

Site Operations Manager

RJM/bh

cc: R. R. Beach, The Babcock & Wilcox Company / Established 1867  
G. E. Kulynych and J. P. Ittner



B. Pittman

Dear Mr. [Name]:  
I have your letter of [Date] regarding [Subject].  
I am sorry that I cannot give you a more definite answer at this time.  
The matter is still under consideration and I will be in touch with you again as soon as a final decision has been reached.  
Very truly yours,  
B. Pittman

cc: Mr. H. Barwick  
Mr. Pittman

F. [Name], Sr. Buyer

Do not type below this line

Date 1-17-73

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To W.C. BUTT - NS. For Action

CONTRACT 620-00 - 03

R.J. McConnell - S.P.M.

SFR 546

L. Allen - A.P.M.

TITLE RC-VI Shaft  
Scored

To J. Kaelin - ARK For Information

DATE 7-18-73

J. Kennedy - S.M.V.D

J. Phinney - Met Ed

K. Subrka

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

H.J. Woesham

Action Requested: Upon receipt of the DUKE Main-  
tenance report, the feasibility of exchanging  
the present bonnet with a new bonnet  
(possibly from Unit II) will be determined.

W.C. BUTT IS investigating other  
types of valves which are suitable for  
spray valves i.e. (Coper Vulcan, New rotating  
stem, bellows). Site is requested to fwd  
DUKE's maintenance report when its available.

R. L. Pittman  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

- cc: G. E. Kulynych
- E. G. Ward
- G. M. Olds
- R. T. Schoner
- N. S. Embrey
- J. McFarland
- C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin.
- Central Engineering Files
- E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

R.G. BURNLEY  
O. Pittsgruber

MAN-OUR LIMITS	_____
COST LIMITS	_____
CHARGE No.	_____
APPROVED:	<u>R. Allen</u> Project Manager

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

BABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER Duke Power Co CONTRACT NO. 620-0003 SPR NO. 546 SPR REV. NO. 0

VENDOR Wickwell P.D. NO. 081480 COMP. NO. 28 GROUP NO. 41 SEQ NO.

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_ PRIORITY  
 Dwg NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SITE ENGINEER E. L. Logan EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP. DATE \_\_\_\_\_

TITLE / MAX. 30 SPACES) RC-V1

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM REFERENCE: SPRs 444, 447 & 496.  
VALVE OPERATION ERRATIC ON 7/6/73. SHAFT FOUND TO BE GALLED. SHAFT DRESSED UP IN PLACE WITH EMERY CLOTH AND VALVE RE-DACKED ON 7/7/73. DURING CHECKOUT ON 7/8/73 THE KEY HOLDING THE GEAR ON THE MOTOR SHAFT WAS FOUND TO BE SHEARED. THE KEY & GEAR WERE REPLACED. OPERATION AT HOT CONDITIONS ON 7/9/73 AM WAS SATISFACTORY. NO PACKING LEAKS.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
VALVE REPAIRED BY DUKE MAINTENANCE AND RETURNED TO SERVICE. DUKE PREPARING FULL REPORT. WILL TRY TO OBTAIN COPY FOR B&W.

~~RECOMMENDED~~ ACTION ~~RECOMMENDED~~ BY ~~RECOMMENDED~~ SITE PERSONNEL -  
Recommendations  
Consider replacing lantern ring w/packing. Box in yoke for leakage collection.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

APPROVALS		TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	COMMITMENTS AFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
	ORIGINATOR		<u>E. L. Logan</u>	<u>7/9/73</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
	SITE CONSTR. REP.				<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
	SITE OPER. MGR.		<u>Raymond Connell</u>	<u>7/10/73</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
	MS SUPPORT ENGR.		<u>R. L. Pittman</u>	<u>7/13/73</u>	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
	PROJECT MANAGER				<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
					<input type="checkbox"/> PSAB/TSAB	
					<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Side Change	
					<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
					<input type="checkbox"/> Field Change No. _____	
DISTRIBUTION		Category <input type="checkbox"/> Norm <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> I	Auth. Charge No.	Date Completed _____		
SITE OPS MANAGER		RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.		By: _____		
PROJECT MANAGER		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED		DEVIATIONS		
N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.				<input type="checkbox"/> NONE		
COGNIZANT ENGR.				<input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV. _____		
CONTRACT ADMIN.						
NPG QA						
FILE 12M2455-3						
SPR 546						

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PDS-21091 - SITE PROBLEM REPORT

Initiated by NE Nuclear Service

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.  
 Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, (b) Indicate "Not Required" in space provided for project manager's approval, and (c) Distribute as indicated in step 4 below.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal nuclear service expenditures) are to be incurred, approve SPR and forward to project manager for approval (step 4).  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-07; obtain field change No. from project manager, and indicate field change No. on SPR.
4. PROJECT MANAGER - Approve SPR and Return to Nuclear Service Support Engineer.
5. NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER - Distribute in Accordance With Procedure No. NPG-0402-04; Initial Action Issues Box (on Support Engineer's File Copy) when Documents Affected Have Been Corrected.
6. SITE OPERATIONS MANAGER - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.  
 Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-04. Return completed SPR to nuclear service support engineer.

Initiated by EAW Construction Company

1. ORIGINATOR - FILL IN: Customer; Contract No.; Vendor; PO No.; Component No.; Group No.; Sequence No.; Drawing No.; Title; Description of Problem; Status; Further Action Required by Other Than Site Personnel; Recommended Action; Approval Signature; Date.
2. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - FILL IN: SPR No. and Rev. No.; Priority; Site Engineer; Early Start Date; Required Completion Date; Approval Signature; Date.  
 Note: Assign priority No. 1 or 2 defined as follows:  
 1. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to avoid delay in project completion.  
 2. Implementation must be complete by required completion date to obtain maximum project effectiveness.
3. PROJECT MANAGER - FILL IN: Primary Documents; Documents Affected; Cost Category; Authorized Charge No.; Responsibility Assignment; Other Contracts Affected.  
 Verify or establish proposed resolution working with appropriate engineering units, purchasing, and others as required.  
 If field change is not required and additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are not to be incurred, take the following steps: (a) Approve SPR, and (b) Distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is not required but additional costs (over and above normal construction Co. expenditures) are to be incurred, obtain abnormal cost charge No. from contract administration; approve and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.  
 If field change is required, see procedure No. NPG-0402-07; assign field change No., have approved and distribute in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05.
4. SENIOR CONSTR. CO. SITE REPRESENTATIVE - Implement Resolution; Upon Completion, Fill in Actual Start Date, Date Completed, and By.  
 Note: If necessary to deviate from the approved SPR, note deviation on approved SPR and obtain revised SPR in accordance with procedure No. NPG-0402-05. Return completed SPR to the project manager.

TITLE BSS Pzr Level Indication  
RELATED S-ns \_\_\_\_\_

This W/N has been reviewed by Test Engineering Group and is applicable to  
NCD- None. The following  
is the status and/or resolution of this SPR on other contracts.

REMARKS B.MCO responsible for applicability.  
11/20/73 - Per G.J. Gibbs this problem is  
N.A. to other contracts. Computers on  
other contracts have pt for Temp &  
pressure. GA

NCD- \_\_\_\_\_

NCD- \_\_\_\_\_

**ACTION COMPLETE  
ON ALL CONTRACTS**

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

\*\*\* CLEARED \*\*\*

To H.A. BAKER For Information FILE: 1242  
G.J. GIBBS Contract 620-00 08  
 \_\_\_\_\_ SFR 456  
 \_\_\_\_\_ TITLE B55 PZR LEVEL  
C. C. Plunkett - Contract Admin. INDICATION  
Central Engineering Files \_\_\_\_\_  
E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance DATE 2/19/74

The attached, cleared SFR is submitted for your information.

TO: \_\_\_\_\_ J. D. Phinney \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ J. P. Kennedy \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ R. J. McConnell \_\_\_\_\_  
 \_\_\_\_\_ D.L. ALLISON \_\_\_\_\_

Attached is one copy of Site Problem Report No. 456 which has been processed on Contract 620-00 08. Your contract or contracts may have the potential for a similar problem. The Site Problem Report is being forwarded for your information and use to prevent problems from recurring on following contracts. A more complete file on the problem is available in the Nuclear Service area.

REMARKS: NO ACTION TAKEN ON ARE. ENG. SHOULD CONSIDER CORRECTION ON NEW CONTRACTS.

cc:

J.P. Steeles  
NUCLEAR SERVICE SUPPORT ENGINEER

**CLEARED**

**SITE PROBLEM REPORT**

BABCOCK & WILCOX-NPS

CUSTOMER Arkansas Power & Light CONTRACT NO. 0008 SPR NO. 456 SPR REV NO - 0  
 VENDOR B&W P.O. NO. 908210 COMP. NO. 25 GROUP NO. 01 SEQ NO. 01

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_  
 DWG NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_  
 QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_ PRIORITY 1

SITE ENGINEER F. R. Faist EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP DATE 2/20/73

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) 855 PWR LEVEL INDICATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM  
 See Attachment.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
 Problem discussed with J. Albert with regards to 1801. However problem is in 855 software and G. Gibbs was contacted with regard to software problem. E. Davis contacted.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
 B & W and B&W to provide recommended modifications to 855 software in order to comply with customers request.

RECOMMENDED ACTION SEE ATTACHED LETTER H.A. BAKER TO T.D. STABLES 1/16/73  
 Attached copy of SPR reads as follows: A TEMP. COMPENSATED DIRECT READING RC PRESSURIZER LEVEL EXISTS AS POINT 1808 IN THE COMPUTER NOW. POINTS 0417, 0418, & 0419 ARE READ OUTS OF ΔP SENSORS. IF THE POINT DESCRIPTION (1808) IS MISLEADING, IT CAN BE CHANGED LATER BY ARKANSAS.

APPROVALS		TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	REVISIONS REQUESTED	ACTION TAKEN
	ORIGINATOR		<i>F. R. Faist</i>	1/1/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
	SITE CONSTR. REP.				<input type="checkbox"/> Print Specs	
	SITE OPER. MGR.		<i>J. K. Kuhn</i>	2/1/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Inst. Books	
	AS SUPPORT ENGR.		<i>T. D. Stables</i>	10/5/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
	PROJECT MANAGER		<i>H. A. Baker</i>	11-1-73	<input type="checkbox"/> Tech Specs	
	DISTRIBUTION				<input type="checkbox"/> PS&D/SS&D	
	SITE OPS MANAGER				<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Size Change	
	PROJECT MANAGER				Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>	
	N. S. SUPPORT ENGR.				Field Change No. _____	
	COGNIZANT ENGR.					
	CONTRACT ADMIN.					
	NPG QA					
	FILE 12M2 _____					
RESPONSIBILITY ASSGN.		Cost	Av'ty Charge No.	Date Completed	By: <i>F. R. Faist</i>	
		Category <input type="checkbox"/> Major <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> O <input type="checkbox"/> L		2/14/73		
OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED		DEVIATIONS				
<i>This problem should be corrected for all future contracts.</i>		<input type="checkbox"/> NONE				
		<input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV _____				
				Closed under protest! 2/14/73 <i>J. K. Kuhn</i>		

SFR# 4/56

Description of Problem

Reference 1) B&W Dwg. #280347780 sheet 1 of 3, RC Control Loop RC 1 and 2.

The reference dwgs. indicates that the three pressurizer level transmitters RC1-LT1, LT2 and LT3 each provide a pressurizer level input to the computer. The computer is presently programmed to read transmitter output which is a  $\Delta P$  signal (wet leg on the PIR level transmitters). Consequently, upon calling for pressurizer level, Point ID's 0417, 0418 and 0419, the computer output is that of level transmitter  $\Delta P$  (inches) not pressurizer water level! AP&L has informed B&W site personnel that this is extremely confusing to operations and that the present situation is totally unacceptable.

Recommended Action

Since uncompensated pressurizer level can be in great error, it was recommended by B&W site personnel and AP&L personnel that the computer output for pressurizer level inputs, Pt. ID. NO. 0417, 0418, 0419 be temperature, pressure compensated pressurizer level.

Again, AP&L is extremely displeased with the present arrangement and expects to see a modification.

FRE/sp




THE BABCOCK & WILCOX COMPANY  
POWER GENERATION GROUP

To	T. D. Stables - Nuclear Services	
From	H. A. Baker - Associate Project Manager - 2158	BDS 653-5
Cust.	Arkansas Power & Light Co.	File No. or Ref. NSS-8/8A25
Subj.	SPR 456	Date January 14, 1971

This letter to cover one customer and one subject only

We agree that the representation of pressurizer level transmitter inputs to computer in terms of uncompensated delta P is confusing. However, the operator has available an average compensated pressurizer level readout as Point 1808 on the computer. In addition he has available a readout of the compensated pressurizer level signal selected for control on REL-1R.

The attached correspondence indicates that this is a situation of long standing and are included for your information. Since the cost of the suggested changes to make the operators life a little easier is very high, we would like to leave the status as is and intend to make no changes.

  
H. A. Baker

HAB/pmf  
CC: w/att  
J. N. Kaelin  
J. Boehmann

SITE PROBLEM REPORT

ABCOCK & WILCOX-NPG

CUSTOMER Arkansas Power & Light CONTRACT NO. 0008 SPR NO. 456 SPR REV NO - 0

VENDOR ENCo. P.O. NO. 805217 COMP. NO. 25 GROUP NO. 01 SEQ. NO. 01

PRIMARY DOCUMENTS: SPEC NOS. \_\_\_\_\_ PRIORITY \_\_\_\_\_  
DWG NO. \_\_\_\_\_ EQUIP CODE/LEVEL/DATE \_\_\_\_\_ /  
QA LEVEL \_\_\_\_\_ QA SPEC NO. \_\_\_\_\_

SITE ENGINEER F. R. Faust EARLY START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ ACTUAL START DATE \_\_\_\_\_ REQ'D COMP. DATE 9/11/73

TITLE (MAX. 30 SPACES) 855 PZR LEVEL INDICATION

DESCRIPTION OF PROBLEM

See Attachment.

STATUS-ACTION TO DATE INCLUDING PERSONS CONTACTED, COMMITMENTS MADE, ETC.  
Problem discussed with J. Albert with regards to NNI. However problem is in 855 software and G. Gibbs was contacted with regard to software problem. E. Davis contacted.

FURTHER ACTION REQUIRED BY OTHER THAN SITE PERSONNEL  
B & W and ENCo. to provide recommended modifications to 855 software in order to comply with customers request.

RECOMMENDED ACTION

*A. They compensated direct reading RC pressure level point exist in the computer room. Point 0417 049, 049 are now out of AP concern. If the point description is including it can be handled later by Arkansas.*

*B. Bill*

APPROVALS		TITLE	APPROVAL SIGNATURE	DATE	DOCUMENTS EFFECTED	ACTION TAKEN
APPROVALS	ORIGINATOR		<i>F. R. Faust</i>	9/11/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Drawings	
	SITE CONSTR. REP.				<input type="checkbox"/> Proc. Specs	
	SITE OPER. MGR.		<i>J. K. Kabin</i>	9/11/73	<input type="checkbox"/> Instr. Books	
	N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.				<input type="checkbox"/> Operating Procedures	
	PROJECT MANAGER				<input type="checkbox"/> Tech. Specs	
DISTRIBUTION		Cost Category <input type="checkbox"/> Maint <input type="checkbox"/> C <input type="checkbox"/> D <input type="checkbox"/> P <input type="checkbox"/> A		Auth. Charge No.		<input type="checkbox"/> Recommended Site Change
SITE OPS MANAGER		RESPONSIBILITY ASSIGN.		Date Completed _____		Field Change Req. <input type="checkbox"/>
PROJECT MANAGER		OTHER CONTRACTS AFFECTED		By: _____		Field Change No. _____
N.S. SUPPORT ENGR.				DEVIATIONS		
COGNIZANT ENGR.				<input type="checkbox"/> NONE		
CONTRACT ADMIN.				<input type="checkbox"/> SEE REV _____		
NPG QA						
FILE 12M2 _____						

## INTER OFFICE MEMO

TO:	J. J. Bodmann	Office or Dept.	NFO	Symbol or Mail Station No.	3B7	
FROM:	M. W. Boesch	Office or Dept.	Software Engineering	Symbol or Mail Station No.	208	
PROJECT:	APL-Nuclear Unit #1	Engineer or Contractor		Drawings, Reports, etc. or S.O. No.	1601L	
REASON FOR MEMO TO COVER ONE SUBJECT ONLY:	Problem Report #303T-E10 (A172)				Date	November 26, 1973

**Reference:**

- (1) R. L. Healer to M. N. Zaharna dated 6/8/73 discussing the RC Pressurizer Level Temperature Compensation Calculation.
- (2) Spec Sheet representing S.O. 1601L125
- (3) CS-3-90 Computer Spec for NSS-8 dated January 4, 1971

In the revised submittal of PR #303T-E10, Bailey Meter CMO is requested to touch base with B&W to get proceedings in motion to change the subject computer points to temperature compensated pressurizer level. I believe what the Bailey PSS means is that the APL personnel are requesting that all three computer differential pressure inputs should have calculated results rather than being averaged into one calculated result.

In the CS-3-90 dated January 4, 1971, Bailey is requested to supply 3 computer inputs representing un compensated level readings (Sec.7.9, Page BA.6). At a later date, Bailey was instructed to represent all uncompensated inputs as differential pressure inputs as opposed to uncompensated levels (Reference (1) above, Page 2, Item 1).

Also, in the CS-3-90 dated January 4, 1971, Bailey is requested to supply only one RC Pressurizer Level Computed Result (Sec. 7.9, Page BA.27, Line 906). This Computed Result is currently an average of the three differential pressure inputs after temperature compensation. Thus, Bailey is according to spec and any change to existing program logic could only come as a result of B&W direction.

MWB:ll

M. W. Boesch

Distribution:

MWBoesch (4)

*MWB*

PROBLEM REPORT

ISSUE NO. 303T-E10

DATE 8/15/73  
BY S. J. H. / 10/12

WORK CENTER E. C. C. 1055  
MATERIAL NO. 22951-786  
MATERIAL NAME - F. L. 1055  
BUSSEVILLE, AR

REF. NO. OF POWER ELEMENT NUCLEAR HI  
REF. NO. 0917-0919  
COMPUTER PRESSURIZER LEVELS

308212

To avoid a potential loss of accuracy Ref. Nos 0917-0919 have been changed from pressure level to pressure level sp.

As requested by the NPO - with complete daily point information listing is shown in attached sheets. Forward immediately to writer, pressurizer station retention (LOW=160<sup>2</sup> PSI, HI=220<sup>2</sup> PSI) in diff. pressure; no work at these conditions.

CONTINUED ON SEPARATE SHEET  
SIGNATURE: J. Collins

DATE SOLUTION REQUIRED: 8/30/73 OR INFO ONLY

FOR FIELD USE  
DAYS SERVICE 0  
SERVICE \$ 0  
EXPENSES \$ 0  
MATERIAL \$ 0  
S. I. O. NO. 57272

ALLOCATION  
 PRODUCT  
 PRODUCT APPLICATION  
 SYSTEM  
 SYSTEM APPLICATION  
 WARRANTY  
 OTHER

NO  
 YES ON \_\_\_\_\_ DAY  
RM NO.

IN WARRANTY  
 ON RECEIPT  
 IN SERVICE  
EST. TIME IN SERVICE

POSSIBLE CAUSE FOR PROBLEM  
 FAULTY MATERIAL  
 FAULTY MANUFACTURING  
 FAULTY DESIGN  
 PERFORMANCE DEFICIENCY  
 FAULTY PACKAGING  
 COMPONENT FAILURE  
 WEAR/TEAR  
 IMPROPER APPLICATION  
 OPERATING ENVIRONMENT  
 INSUFFICIENT INSTRUCTIONS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION & CORRECTIVE ACTION (SEE FIELD IF APPLICABLE)

→ PRESS: 2155-PSI -> electrovalves  
TEMP: 5-11  
ALERT FROM G.M.  
PRESS. THIS EQUATION - 37.375

INVESTIGATOR: J. Collins  
ACTION: \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
EXPECTED RESULT DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
FINAL DISPOSITION SIGNATURE: \_\_\_\_\_  
ENGINEERING: \_\_\_\_\_  
RELIABILITY: \_\_\_\_\_  
QC/QA: \_\_\_\_\_  
MFG. FOREMAN: \_\_\_\_\_

DISPOSITION OF RM #  
DATE RECEIVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE RETURNED: \_\_\_\_\_  
CLASSIFICATION (RELIABILITY)  
 MFG & QC  
 RELIABILITY  
 DESIGN  
 STANDARDS  
 APPLICATION  
 PACKAGING  
 FIELD  
 OTHER

NPSL has requested B&W to change subject computer points to temp. compensated pressure level. Please touch base with B&W to get proceedings in motion. Done 10/3/73

PROBLEM ANSWER  FINAL SOLUTION

ACCOUNT ALLOCATION  
COST CENTER  
ASSIGNING MATERIALS  
APPROVAL INITIALS

RESULTS

RECEIVED  
OCT 05 1973

ASSIGNED TO: \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVAL: \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE	NAME	PAR. NO.	COMMENTS

RM NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE RCVD. \_\_\_\_\_  
REPAIR NO. \_\_\_\_\_  
REPAIRED BY \_\_\_\_\_  
DEPT. \_\_\_\_\_  
DATE \_\_\_\_\_

MWB  
10-17-73

**INTER-OFFICE MEMO**

TO	Office or Dept.	Symbol or Modification No.	
M. N. Zaharna	Software Engineering	A2-13	
FROM	Office or Dept.	Symbol or Modification No.	
R. L. Healer ✓	Software Engineering Applications	A2-13	A2-13 R.L. Healer
EMPLOYER'S CUSTOMER'S PROJECT	Employer or Contractor		
Teledo Edison Company Davis Besse Unit #1	B&W/Bechtel		1220H
SUBJECT (This should cover one subject only)			Date
Reactor Coolant Pressurizer Level Temperature Compensation			6/8/73

BACKGROUND

Although this memo specifically references the Toledo Edison Co. Job, ENCo Job 1220H, the problem and solution presented here actually are applicable to all current and previous Nuclear Steam Supply 855/50 or 855/25 computer applications. Specifically these jobs are as follows:

1. Metropolitan Edison Company, ENCo. Job No. 150L
2. Arkansas Power & Light Company, ENCo. Job No. 1601L
3. Florida Power Corporation, ENCo. Job No. 430L
4. Sacramento Municipal Utility District, ENCo. Job No. 1602L
5. Jersey Central Power & Light Company, ENCo. Job No. 1595L
6. Toledo Edison Company, ENCo. Job No. 1220H

There was considerable uncertainty on the exact requirements for the reactor coolant pressurizer level temperature compensation calculation with regard to necessary accuracy and relationships of the various associated process variables. As a result, various memos were interchanged between Bailey Meter Company and the Babcock & Wilcox Company on this subject. Please reference the attached copies of the following memos for the background on this information interchange as follows:

1. R. L. Healer to J. C. McCreary on February 9, 1973.
2. R. L. Healer/M. N. Zaharna to J. R. Schmidt on March 2, 1973.
3. J. E. Jones to J. C. McCreary on March 23, 1973.
4. R. K. Jahn to J. E. Jones on April 18, 1973.
5. J. C. McCreary to J. E. Jones on February 15, 1973.
6. E. S. Naufal to J. C. McCreary on January 2, 1973.

Despite this proliferation of correspondence many uncertainties still existed about this calculation. In an attempt to secure a final resolution of all outstanding questions on the subject, a meeting was set up between Bailey Meter Company and Babcock & Wilcox Company on May 17, 1973 with R. L. Healer representing BMCo. and B. J. Pentzist representing B&W. R. K. Jahn also attended some portions of the meeting briefly.

#### MEETING OBJECTIVES

1. Resolve the proper representation of the uncompensated input values and the "bad" alarms associated with them.
2. Resolve the proper relationship of the reactor coolant pressurizer level water reference leg temperature variations with respect to the reactor coolant pressurizer temperature variations themselves.
3. Establish the necessary accuracy for this computation throughout its range.

#### RESULTS

1. It was agreed that a reasonable representation for the uncompensated input was in terms of differential pressure only. It was noted by Bailey Meter Company that representing inputs as uncompensated level versus representing them in terms of differential pressure made them no more or less likely to be reported as "bad" alarms. This discussion was in reference to a question that was raised in the March 23, 1973 memo sent by J. E. Jones of BM to J. C. McCreary of Bailey Meter. It was, therefore, agreed BMCo. would represent all uncompensated inputs on the various jobs as differential pressure inputs as opposed to uncompensated levels. It was also agreed that 32-character descriptors associated with these inputs should have the abbreviation "DP" added to them. The result of this agreement was that the uncompensated inputs would range from either 400-0 or 320-0 inches nominally.
2. It was agreed that a sixth-order surface fit for this calculation was more desirable than a seventh-order surface fit for various reasons, amongst them the facts that the BMCo. In-house facility can not go beyond sixth-order and ripples are more likely to occur in a seventh-order surface fit than they are in a sixth-order surface fit. Keeping the desirability of a sixth-order surface fit in mind it was agreed that BMCo. would attempt to implement a sixth-order surface fit with the following accuracy requirements:

Plus or minus 1/2% of range in the normal operating reactor coolant pressurizer temperature range of 600 to 670 °F, and maximum allowable error of plus or minus 3/4% for the balance of the reactor coolant pressurizer temperature range.

It was agreed that BMCo. would attempt the implementation

advise B&W of the results.

3. There was considerable discussion about the exact relationship of the water reference leg temperature to the temperature in the pressurizer itself, and R. K. Jahn of B&W, and J. D. Carlton of B&W participated in some of the discussion. The conclusions that were reached were that the variations in the water reference leg temperature had very little effect upon the final computed value of the temperature compensated reactor coolant pressurizer level, and, if a constant temperature were assumed for the water reference leg it could affect the output by only about 1/2 of 1%. Since, however, B&W has already implemented some work with a varying water reference leg temperature it was agreed that no significant work could be saved by changing to a constant water reference leg temperature. In addition to the preceding, if a constant water reference leg temperature were assumed, it would have to have a different value from job to job, and hence would also not allow any saving of work to B&W. B&W also noted that the introduction of a 1/2 of 1% error into the calculations was close to the maximum allowable tolerance that they felt necessary for this computation. B&W did agree, however, that this relationship was basically an empirical one and it was very unlikely that the variation relationship would be different from job to job. Reviewing the specified variation as indicated on various previous and current jobs it was agreed between B&W and B&W that the variations specified for TECO undoubtedly presented the smoothest and most probable variation, and therefore B&W agreed to recommend to their engineering department that this particular relationship be used on all future jobs. It was further agreed that as long as the relationship specified for the various jobs was the same as Toledo's or SMUD's, or that used on the Metropolitan Edison Co. Job, that no attempts would be made to change or deviate from that specified. If however, any different relationship was specified it was agreed that B&W would advise B&W of that fact and a mutually agreeable relationship would be set up to minimize additional work from job to job.

(The last two items listed under results are also listed in a hand written, signed, and dated agreement which is attached to this memo.)

RLH:maj  
Attachments

*Richard L. Healer*  
Richard L. Healer

Distribution:

J. R. Schmalz A3-41 D. L. Pepp A3-41 J. C. McCreary A3-41 J. E. Furr  
R. K. Jahn A3-41 J. J. Lodmann A3-41 M. W. Boesch A2-13 E. J. Star  
J. G. Steinerunner A2-13 W. T. Gregor A2-13 P. A. Weintz A2-13  
R. L. Healer A2-13

B&W  
For: Arkansas Power & Light  
Nuclear Sta.

SPECIFICATION SHEET

3

Type BY3X-10X-A (325.42 to 7.33" H<sub>2</sub>O)  
Level Transmitter

A

Service: Pressurizer Level  
Ser. # 716169-71  
X: Environmental Qualif. Constr. with  
Amplifier Pt. #6625480A1  
B/M663274B  
Dwgs. D6625482, D6625483, D6625484

A

Finish Plasite Per Spec. N2323-B on  
all Aluminum and Steel Parts

X-Clean Per Spec. N2326-2A; Also Calibrate  
and Hydrostatic Test (at 2155 PSI)  
to Spec. N2321-1D

Calibration for 60 PSI H<sub>2</sub>O over 68F H<sub>2</sub>O  
and 68F Wet Leg with Conn. at Eleva-  
tions 0 and 327.375 In:

Level In.	Diff. "68F H <sub>2</sub> O	Output V DC
320	7.33	+10
240	86.85	+ 5
160	166.38	0
80	245.90	-5
0	325.42	-10

A  
A

3(AW) Tags Per Spec. A16958A  
620-0008 620-0008 620-0008  
RC1-LT1 RC1-LT2 RC1-LT3  
LT-1000 LT-1001 LT-1002

Certificate of Compliance Required with  
Calibration Report to Include Pg. 4 of  
Spec. N2321-1D in O/A Package with Item  
Identification (Per Form E1810 to O/A  
Attn: C.E. Miller, W1-24 Attached)

FINAL INSPECTION REQUIRED

MAP/MS/MP/MT

FOR EXPLANATION OF BAILEY NOMENCLATURE, REFER TO THE APPROPRIATE INSTRUCTION SECTIONS.





December 5, 1973

The Babcock & Wilcox Co.  
P.O. Box 1260  
Lynchburg, Virginia 24505

J.J. Bodmann  
E. Clauss  
M.N. Zaharna  
LYN  
SF  
STL

3B7  
Jobsite  
208

Attention: Mr. H.A. Baker

Subject: Arkansas Power & Light Company  
Arkansas Nuclear One  
B&W Order No.: 80821Z  
B&W Contract No.: NSS-8  
B&W Job No.: 1601L


Reference: FPR 303TE10 (attached)  
Software Problem Letters dated 7/30/73 and 10/23/73  
J.J. Bodmann to H.A. Baker

Gentlemen:

Attached is FPR 303TE10 which requires B&W action to resolve.

We have received your letter of 11/12/73 on Plant Computer Status and we are pleased by your response. FPR 303TE10 and the problems covered by the above referenced letters fall into the same category of outstanding software problems which your 11/12/73 letter addresses. We offer our full assistance to bring these matters to quick resolution.

Sincerely,  
BAILEY METER COMPANY



J.J. Bodmann, Project Manager  
Nuclear Project Office

JJB/jd1

1LH w/o enc.: G.M. Olds  
1LH w/o enc.: G.V. Carroll  
2LH w/2 enc.: G.D. Quale

TRANSMITTAL SLIP

FIELD OPERATIONS SITE PROBLEM REPORT

To J.N. KAELIN For Action

CONTRACT 620-00 DB

SPR 456

TITLE 855 PZR

To H.A. BAKER For Information

LEVEL INDICATION

G.I. GIBBS

DATE 1/17/74

Date Reply to Be Submitted To  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

Action Requested: Project Management has responded by saying that the cost of fix vs. end result does not make a change feasible.

J.D. Phinney  
RS McConnell  
cc: D.L. ALLISON  
JP Kennedy

J.D. Phinney  
Nuclear Service Support Engineer

C. C. Flunkett - Contract Admin.  
Central Engineering Files  
E. V. DeCarli - Quality Assurance

MAN-HOUR LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
COST LIMITS \_\_\_\_\_  
CHARGE No. \_\_\_\_\_  
APPROVED: \_\_\_\_\_  
Project Manager