

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

IN THE MATTER OF:

THREE MILE ISLAND

SPECIAL INQUIRY INTERVIEWS

INTERVIEW OF KENNETH RICHARD LAMISON

Place - Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Date - Thursday, 20 September 1979

Pages 1-45

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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In the Matter of: :
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THREE MILE ISLAND :
SPECIAL INTERVIEWS :
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DEPOSITION OF KENNETH RICHARD LAMISON

Holiday Inn Town
2nd and Chestnut Streets
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

Thursday, 20 September 1979
1:25 p.m.

APPEARANCES:

ROBERT CHIN, ESQ.
MALCOLM L. ERNST
FREDERICK HERR
ROBERT SCHAMBERGER
NRC Special Inquiry Group on TMI
6935 Arlington Road
Bethesda, Maryland

C O N T E N T S

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WITNESS

EXAMINATION

Kenneth Richard Lamison

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EXHIBIT

IDENTIFIED

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3

P R O C E E D I N G S

1 Whereupon,

2 KENNETH RICHARD LAMISON

3 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn,
4 was examined and testified as follows:

5 MR. ERNST: Please be seated. State your full
6 name and position for the record.

7 THE WITNESS: Kenneth Richard Lamison. I'm
8 the Operations Officer for the Pennsylvania Emergency
9 Management Agency.

10 MR. CHIN: Mr. Lamison, I show you what has been
11 marked for identification as Exhibit 1. Is this a copy
12 of the letter that the NRC Special Inquiry Group sent to
13 you regarding your deposition today under oath?

14 THE WITNESS: It is.

15 (Lamison Exhibit No. 1 identified.)

16 MR. CHIN: Have you read this document in full?

17 THE WITNESS: I have.

18 MR. CHIN: Do you understand the information
19 in the letter, including the general nature of our inquiry?

20 THE WITNESS: I do.

21 MR. CHIN: Your right to have counsel if you
22 choose?

23 THE WITNESS: I do.

24 MR. CHIN: And the fact that the information that
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1 you give here today may eventually become public?

2 THE WITNESS: Yes. I understand it.

3 MR. CHIN: Mr. Lamison, are you represented by
4 counsel today?

5 THE WITNESS: I am not.

6 MR. CHIN: I would like to note for the record
7 the witness is not represented by counsel today.

8 Mr. Lamison, do you understand that at any time
9 during this inquiry, this interview, you should feel a need
10 for counsel or would like to have counsel present, please
11 advise and we will adjourn this interview to allow you to
12 make arrangements. Is this procedure all right with you?

13 THE WITNESS: It is.

14 MR. CHIN: Mr. Lamison, did you bring a resume
15 with you today?

16 THE WITNESS: I did not.

17 MR. CHIN: Will you send us one?

18 THE WITNESS: I will forward one to you next
19 week when our other witness is before you.

20 MR. CHIN: I would like to note for the record
21 that Mr. Lamison will send us a resume. Thank you.

22 Mr. Ernst?

23 EXAMINATION

24 BY MR. ERNST:

25 Q The first question, Mr. Lamison, is a rather general

1 one. I wonder if you would describe your assigned duties
2 at PEMA; first, the routine duties and typical day-to-day
3 activities, and secondly, however those duties might have
4 been altered by the Three Mile occurrence?

5 A On a day-to-day basis, I am routinely responsible
6 for the provision of assistance, staff visits, the approving
7 of plans, SOPs, and attendant Annex Es to all county
8 operations. This extends, in some cases, down to local
9 levels, primarily as it concerns the guidance and the
10 direction of planning activities.

11 I am also responsible for the provision of guidance
12 and assistance in the form of training exercises and tests
13 that are conducted at the county and local level. I am
14 also responsible for training exercises and tests conducted
15 at the state level.

16 I supervise the person involved with and assign the
17 responsibility for the provision of assistance and guidance,
18 policy and programming, human needs aspects, communications.
19 I am also responsible for radiological defense activities.

20 Those are, in general terms -- they have very broad
21 connotations as to many of these activities.

22 During emergency operations, as the operations officer,
23 I am responsible for the conduct of the emergency operations
24 center to include the supervision over state agencies in the
25 provision of their response mechanisms furnished to us in

1 meeting requirements which stem from other levels of
2 government that may be participating is whatever the
3 emergency may be.

4 Q With regard to guidance to counties, does
5 that include the preparation or review or whatever of the
6 county emergency plans?

7 A That is correct. I have an individual responsible
8 for that activity under my guidance and supervision, and
9 we receive and review plans that are prepared at the
10 county level to include their SOPs and Annex Es. Under
11 special occasions, we could do this same, or perform this
12 same activity at the local level. It would be sort of a
13 special occasion.

14 You know, the philosophy of our activities stems from
15 the lowest level with the capability to conduct a response,
16 and it escalates to the higher echelons in government
17 based upon need to supplement and resources for supervisory
18 activities. Of course, the emergency dictates then at what
19 level it's conducted.

20 We follow this same concept in our administrative
21 activities or day-to-day operations likewise, so that you
22 might say there's a chain of command or activities from the
23 top to the bottom. Now, this is predicated upon who
24 possesses the resources and authority. This then dictates
25 the system which we have employed.

1 Q So your work with the other state agencies in an
2 emergency situation is resource-dictated, which the resource
3 needs come from the local county into yourself?

4 A That is correct, yes. To be specific in this
5 area, each agency, state agency has two mechanisms to deal
6 on a day-to-day and during-an-emergency basis. Number one,
7 we have an emergency point of contact in every state
8 agency, and he is the person that, on a day-to-day basis,
9 we call to gain an insight to resources or provision to
10 us, information or data that we need to conduct those
11 day-to-day activities.

12 We also have, in each state agency, a response team and
13 it's comprised of an individual or individuals based upon the
14 size of the agency who, when we mobilize our EOC, report
15 to us to perform the responsibilities assigned to that agency.
16 Along with this team is carried the authority to act for
17 the secretary of that particular department. It is this
18 mechanism that I control or exercise supervision over during
19 emergencies, when we have our EOC activated.

20 Now, the magnitude and the type of the emergency will
21 dictate the number of agencies, by title or type, who are
22 present in our EOC. There are usually some common
23 agencies that appear who have a responsibility to be fulfilled
24 in almost all types of emergencies, such as the Pennsylvania
25 Department of Transportation, Department of Environmental

1 Resources, Department of Military Affairs, and certainly,
2 the state police. We usually start with those agencies
3 and then we expand as the need dictates, as you gain better
4 information as to what are the requirements and just what is
5 the nature of the emergency, and then you expand accordingly.

6 If it's determined through our analyses at the very
7 outset to be extremely important, if it has a very profound
8 impact upon the community, we may start with a full-scale
9 mobilization which is what we did on the 30th of
10 March when we fully mobilized our emergency operations.

11 We didn't retain all agencies on a continuing basis,
12 but as they were needed, we had, throughout, contacts with
13 them. Either the call would come in individually or
14 collectively or whatever the requirement may have dictated.

15 For example, the energy council was there on a
16 continuing basis. The insurance people weren't there at
17 the outset, though we had need to call them in. Now, I
18 have points of contact which we maintain through telephone
19 all the time with these people, so it's not like we're
20 not in contact with them.

21 Q So these people are designated by their
22 department heads or the secretary or whatever --

23 A That's correct.

24 Q -- in order to act for the agency?

25 A It is our philosophy if they do not possess those

1 authorities to act for the agency, the secretary or the
2 head of the agency is to be present to do so, so that
3 we do have rapid response to meet those requirements that
4 are requested of us.

5 Q And you are the de facto or formal chairman of
6 this group?

7 A Yes. Of course, you must remember, I respond
8 and react to those directives and guidance that I get
9 from the director.

10 Q You mentioned a gentleman as being designated
11 to review or whatever the county plans. Would that
12 be Mr. Crowe?

13 A No. The person responsible on a continuing
14 basis is Mr. Blaisdell, who is a new employee with us.

15 MR. CHIN: Will you spell that name, sir?

16 THE WITNESS: B-l-a-i-s-d-e-l-l.

17 Mr. Crowe, during the Three Mile Island incident, and
18 likewise now, is conducting the initial review of all
19 planning activities to assure that the coordination that is
20 essential is being provided to that activity and to those
21 levels of government which are conducting the planning.
22 The final approval of those plans will rest with me.

23 Now, I say that in reacting to the directive from the
24 director and in his name.

1 BY MR. ERNST:

2 Q Organizationally, how are you and Mr. Crowe
3 related?

4 A Well, we're co-equals from that standpoint.
5 Mr. Crowe is the director of our crisis relocation NCP
6 planning, and in the organizational structure, he is an
7 office manager the same as I am classified.

8 In the order of succession, I am the third in order
9 after the deputy.

10 Q Is there a difference in function between what
11 Mr. Crowe is doing compared with Mr. Blaisdell?

12 A We will review those plans from an administrative
13 standpoint in relationship to fulfilling the responsibilities
14 or tasks assigned by the disaster operations plan and
15 also Annex E, which is our detailed instrument, disseminating
16 the responsibilities. And in that light, we will review,
17 coupled with resource requirements, we will review from that
18 standpoint.

19 Mr. Crowe is more concerned, right now, with the
20 coordination of activities to assure that there are no
21 duplication of efforts and that there are no problem areas
22 encountered in the planning effort, because we have several
23 counties involved. We have several counties vying for the
24 same resources so to speak, the use of road networks and
25 this type of thing. These would be issues that he's concerned

1 with. He is also concerned with providing assistance
2 where needed to get this particular aspect of planning
3 completed which is our first priority right now.

4 Q You mentioned communications as one of your
5 responsibilities. Does Mr. Kuehn then work with you?

6 A Yes, he does.

7 MR. CHIN: Could you spell that, please?

8 THE WITNESS: K-u-e-h-n, Mr. Kuehn. He'll
9 be here shortly.

10 BY MR. ERNST:

11 Q You mentioned some responsibility in the area
12 of human needs and radiological. Would you explain that
13 a little bit?

14 A Well, human needs aspects are associated with
15 welfare problems, health problems, mass care activities.
16 This is our own internal link to all those state agencies
17 involved in these types of responsibilities to include
18 other organizations throughout the Commonwealth who
19 have an interest or some association with the human needs
20 aspect, such as aging, the blind, this type.

21 Q Would you describe your specific duties during the
22 -- well, say, the first seven days or so of the TMI
23 accident -- with regard to the coordination of state
24 agency response?

25 A Well, as I indicated before that all the

1 requirements that stem from the echelons of government
2 come into me for fulfillment. And we were prepared to
3 do this.

4 On the 28th, we prepared ourself based upon our under-
5 standing of the problem, really, to conduct a limited
6 operation. Right at the outset, we were led to believe
7 that it was strictly an on-site problem. Therefore,
8 my most important task immediately was to notify all
9 persons with a responsibility or potential fulfillment of
10 responsibilities under those conditions, be prepared in
11 the event of an escalation of whether the problem may lead
12 into something more serious. Of course, it was
13 announced shortly after then that it had escalated,
14 and we immediately started to fulfill those announcement
15 and alerting responsibilities as quickly as possible in
16 the event that we had to conduct an operation, an evacuation.
17 At which time, we would have called together our total
18 response mechanism to fulfill that need.

19 We maintained this profile for a number of days on a
20 prepared basis until the 30th when things became more
21 serious, when we activated our or mobilized -- I should say
22 -- our DOC in its entirety. And again, we were prepared to
23 conduct an operation. However, that never materialized,
24 and we found ourself then going into a full-scale planning
25 activity.

1 This then put our response teams in a different configura-
2 tion, so to speak, and they were fulfilling planning needs
3 and responsibilities. In many cases, they were the catalyst
4 or the link between ourselves and their department to get the
5 proper people to assist in planning or to maintain liaison
6 with the counties who are doing the detail planning.

7 And this is the posture we remained in for a number of
8 days till things looked like they were improving to where
9 we could sort of cut back in some of our staff activity --
10 not in the planning activity, because it was being
11 fulfilled then from the department locations rather than
12 from our EOC.

13 Q You didn't have any function in the area of
14 review or upgrading or whatever of the county plans during
15 that time period?

16 A Well, I wouldn't say I had no responsibility.
17 Yes, this is something that I think we all get involved in
18 in varying degrees. I was not directly responsible for the
19 review, let me put it that way. I was still maintaining
20 an operational posture, but I was responding to the issuance
21 of guidance and things of this nature as a manager.
22 In that respect, I was involved, yes.

23 Q In the event of a declared emergency, which this was
24 not -- suppose TMI had been a declared emergency, which is
25 essentially a multi-county emergency response, who would be

1 in charge for the state, outside of the governor. Clearly,
2 the governor is responsible for everything.

3 A You mean at our level of operation?

4 Q Who is the doer in charge?

5 A Well, the operational aspect of it would be
6 controlled and directed by our director, Colonel Henderson.
7 He is charged with that responsibility, fulfilling the
8 response for the council. The council would charge him
9 with that responsibility.

10 Q It would be a designation at that time?

11 A Well, that is his assigned responsibility; and
12 during the time of an emergency, he automatically fulfills
13 that unless he's given guidance or direction to the contrary,
14 which would be rather hard to conceive.

15 Specific guidance, specific direction would be provided
16 through him by the council, or the lieutenant governor
17 in that case who is the chairman of the council, which he is
18 in constant contact with during periods of emergency.

19 Q At that time, I guess as I understand it, the
20 function of PEMA shifts from a coordinations role to more of a
21 direction and coordination role; is that correct?

22 A Yes, more a management role. We are in the
23 direction business, too, based upon the guidance and those
24 decisions made by the governor. And in those cases, they
25 become directive in nature. Sometimes they are advisory in

1 nature.

2 Our coordination is among state agencies and in conjunction
3 with the counties. We deal with the counties, basically,
4 and not the subdivisions within the county. That is just
5 a little bit voluminous when you start talking about 2600.

6 Q What problems were encountered, major problems,
7 in the coordination of state agencies for the first few
8 days?

9 A Well, we had no problems with state agencies. Our
10 problem rested with the fact that we were unable to
11 inform state agencies precisely what was going on, what
12 were the precise conditions. We knew that they were having
13 problems at the facility. We knew that they were trying
14 to resolve these problems and go back on line. There
15 were indications that in a matter of hours, up to 24 hours,
16 that they would have their problems resolved and be back
17 on line.

18 This was dispelled rather rapidly and definitely, I guess,
19 on Friday morning when things became more serious. But
20 this was the basic problem. We had no problems communicating
21 with them, from that standpoint, or gaining whatever we need
22 from them. The problem was to tell them precisely what
23 we were about to do, it was to be prepared for the worst
24 possible condition. It was under those conditions that we
25 fully mobilized our EOC on Friday morning, the 30th.

1 Q But you really had no problems with either physical
2 communications or communicating whatever you had to communicate
3 to people in an understandable way?

4 A I think we need to clarify a point. We have
5 approximately 121 telephone lines coming into our EOC.
6 Some of those go through our switchboard, and I think our
7 switchboard has a drop of about eight lines. Now, those
8 eight lines, it was practically impossible to communicate
9 in or out on those eight drops, 8150, they were tied up
10 all the time.

11 Our private telephone lines coming in there are not
12 announced at large, and for a considerable period of time
13 until communications became saturated going into the other
14 agencies, we were able to communicate. And during the
15 initial moments of this incident, both on Wednesday, on
16 Friday, we were not hampered. But as time evolved and
17 went on, why, it became extremely complicated. And I
18 would dare say there were probably times when all 121
19 lines were busy and all 121 telephones were going.

20 Now, the more people we have in our EOC, the more
21 saturated the lines become, because we have in our booths,
22 which house our response team, several telephones. And
23 they can receive a call off of our switchboard drops and
24 they likewise have private lines in them that they can use.
25 And they have a line from there back to their office which

1 they can use. So there are a lot of ways that we can
2 communicate out to a period of time, and when we become
3 saturated, why, we're just out of communication. And for
4 a period of time, we were experiencing that, both on
5 Wednesday and on Friday. And as time went by, why, it
6 clarified itself.

7 As more information became available, as more credible
8 information became available, which I say that word in
9 terms of what I surmise the public was considering as
10 credible information, the less calls we were receiving.
11 And as the systems came into being, as an example, right
12 at the outset, we were receiving calls from private and
13 public alike on all aspects of what was going on at
14 Three Mile Island.

15 Well, we consider ourself not the technicians, and there-
16 fore, we shouldn't be answering technical questions as to the
17 facility itself. We will answer the questions associated with
18 our responsibilities which we are the professionals at.

19 Once the systems were established where the point of
20 contact essentially became the governor's office for technical
21 data, that's through his press secretary, and we were
22 associated with our own responsibilities, it started to ease
23 the problem. And that was after the counties and the
24 governor's press secretary set up the rumor control centers.
25 And this started to ease our problem considerably.

1 And the first two days of this incident, we found
2 ourselves actually playing a big part in that role.

3 Q Who is -- well, let's see, I guess as I understand
4 it, there is a desk or a booth or something for each
5 department?

6 A Correct.

7 Q And with a line going back to their departments so
8 they know exactly where they are supposed to go and
9 everything. For example, who represented the Department
10 of Health in the EOC, do you recall?

11 A They had numerous representatives. When we
12 first called the Department of Health, Mr. Welsh
13 accompanied his response team. I'm trying to think of
14 the names of those people that were there.

15 Q It's not that important.

16 A But they had, they came in initially with about
17 a team of three people which is rather a normal response
18 mechanism. And as time went by, they changed some of those
19 personnel. But Mr. Welsh had, just prior to TMI, joined
20 the Department of Health. He was previously with the
21 Department of Environmental Resources. He was sort of
22 their emergency point of contact at the department. He
23 was quite familiar with our activities, so he accompanied
24 his team, as he should, for his own edification. Who were
25 they? What were they doing? This type of thing.

1 Q Was the national guard represented in the EOC?

2 A That's correct.

3 Q Were they there?

4 A Yes, they were there.

5 Q How about the Bureau of Radiation Protection
6 or DER?

7 A DER was present. Their normal response teams
8 were there.

9 Q Do you recall who that was? Were they BRP
10 personnel?

11 A No, they were not. Radiological protection
12 personnel were not there.

13 Q What are the interests of DER, major interests
14 of DER, other than radiological protection, in an incident
15 like this?

16 A Well, water control, hazardous material problems,
17 air pollution, mine subsidences and this type of thing;
18 all of which we are concerned with. And based upon the
19 type of activity, they may be playing a very lead role in
20 it.

21 Q I was thinking specifically of the TMI.

22 A Okay. TMI, actually under that circumstance, it was
23 Radiological Protection Bureau that was playing the key role.

24 Q But they were not --

25 A They were not present in our EOC. It was and is

1 in our plan that under those types of conditions, those
2 types of incidents, that they would be represented. At
3 the outset, again, I think they probably felt like we did,
4 that the nature of the emergency was such, at least initially
5 related, that it was probably at low density, that it would not
6 evolve into something as serious as it did.

7 And in short order, they, like we, became so involved
8 that it was a little difficult to disengage from their
9 environment to move them over to our EOC. However, under
10 our current planning and directives, this situation has
11 changed.

12 Q What types of problems get aired or discussed in the
13 EOC? What comes to mind is, apparently, there was some
14 controversy over the distribution and possible use of
15 potassium iodide which clearly involved the Department of
16 Health. There was some, I guess, taking cows off the
17 pasture and things of that nature which involved other
18 agencies. Were some of these matters at least initially
19 discussed in the EOC, or were decisions made elsewhere?

20 I'm just curious about the function --

21 A Well, a little bit of both, as is normal of
22 staff activities. We became involved at the outset because
23 of the needed transportation upon arrival of the potassium,
24 as to how we were going to get it -- it came in by air from
25 the International Airport -- to wherever we were going to

1 dispose of it, whatever we were going to do with it.

2 So we became involved in that activity, although the
3 overall responsibility for the potassium iodine was with the
4 Department of Health. And we laid on the transportation
5 through general services. We gave them transportation for
6 us and coordinated it with the Department of Health so that
7 it would be picked up at the appropriate time and delivered
8 to the facility where they wished to store it. That was done.

9 The next order of business which came up was its
10 distribution. Before that occurred, the Department of Health,
11 after examining the product they had, wanted to assure that
12 there were instruction for its use and that it was a
13 reliable type of protective agent. Some of it came off the
14 shelf, as I understand it. And I further understand that
15 some of it was on an expedited basis, manufactured and
16 sent into us. And they immediately went into considerations
17 and the development of its distribution as to how it would
18 be handled.

19 We were consulted on this matter. I personally had
20 discussed it with Mr. Welsh and I believe Dr. Washington
21 was there. We were doing this by telephone, and informing
22 them that this was not our responsibility, it was
23 primarily a medication so-to-speak and it was the responsibi-
24 lity of the Department of Health. And they should arrive
25 at the distribution plan.

1 We would assist in any way that we could to help this,
2 and once they had their plan, we would be very happy to
3 review the plan in coordination with them. And then we
4 would see that its distribution requirements were fulfilled.
5 And this was the part that we played in it and the part of the
6 Department of Health who, again, was coordinating with the
7 Bureau of Radiological Protection.

8 Q I take it you offered to do this. Did they actually
9 provide a plan for your review, or were you supposed to
10 participate if it had been distributed?

11 A We would have participated if it would have
12 been distributed. Yes, sir.

13 Q In your view, what is the responsibility of PEMA
14 with respect to the adequacy of county plans?

15 A Well, we're talking about a changing environment
16 by virtue of legislation. Previously, under our old
17 pamphlet law, we really had no assigned responsibility in
18 approving plans. This has been changed by our recent law,
19 Act 323 of '79, which assigns us the responsibility to
20 review and cause changes to be sure that they are appropriate.
21 So in that realm, we now have the responsibility for
22 approving plans.

23 It was sort of an assumed tertiary type thing, really,
24 previously. It was more of an advisory and assurance
25 factor from a federal standpoint to permit other

1 things to be fulfilled, matching funds and things of this
2 nature, which established the requirement for counties to
3 have certain type of documentation.

4 And this was the role we were fulfilling previously.
5 As I say, we've changed that role.

6 Q The current state plan, I understand there are
7 some drafts of it now or updates, but the 1977 state plan
8 is rather general. When you get down to the county level --
9 and perhaps you might want to comment about the state
10 plan itself -- what degree of detail do you think is
11 appropriate for a county plan regarding who does what to
12 whom and when?

13 A Well, I'm sort of a detail guy. I'm a retired
14 army colonel, and I've spent a large portion of my career
15 in the planning business. Therefore, I like to see details
16 so that any person, uninitiated, if you wish, may pick up
17 that plan and be able to fulfill those tasks that are
18 outlined there without wasting an awful lot of time to
19 find out what are they talking about.

20 I think you will find that our revised Annex E is more
21 detailed in the assignment of responsibilities to not only
22 state agencies but to the counties involved, both what we
23 referred to as those counties in the risk area or risk
24 counties and those counties in support of those risk counties.
25 So that there is very little question in their mind as to

1 what we're expecting them to respond to and be capable of
2 doing.

3 Now, if you follow that philosophy, in order for them to
4 fulfill those tasks, their planning effort must outline
5 and cope with each and every task that is given to them.
6 Anything that is assumed by them or deduced from those tasks
7 that has to be fulfilled must be outlined by them. This
8 is the type of detail that should be reflected there.

9 And we're talking about the county level who, again, are
10 responsible for assisting in the development of plans by
11 their political subdivisions who, again, are involved in the
12 fulfillment; which means, in turn, their portion of the
13 planning must be somewhat detailed. And the lower you go,
14 the more detailed it must become. Because, eventually,
15 somebody has to talk about an individual standing on a
16 given street corner which has to be designated to do some-
17 thing. And you have to tell them what to do.

18 So at that level, which is at the local level, they have
19 to be rather precise in what they do.

20 Q I understand there are no local plans per se,
21 written local plans.

22 A Well, I can't answer that question. I can state
23 that I have not seen a plan designed by a local level in
24 support of Annex E or a county plan. But that doesn't say
25 there is no plan.

1 Q What responsibility does PEMA have for assuring
2 that local plans exist?

3 A Well, we're looking for the counties to do that.
4 We've assigned them this responsibility to be fulfilled.
5 I'm sure in the processes of this very important area, we're
6 going to assure ourself that they do have plans. We're
7 not going to approve them at that level, the county is
8 going to do that. We'll approve the county plan. We'll
9 seek assurance that at the local level they have plans.

10 Now, there is another aspect to this, I think, that will
11 lend a little credence to what I just had to say. In
12 our training in the future, we're requiring, through our
13 revised Annex E, for counties to participate in the training
14 exercise at least annually, for the purpose of evaluating
15 and taking an in-depth view of their plan, taking a look
16 at their organization, taking a look at their systems to
17 be sure that they can meet all of those requirements.

18 And a part of that directive and direction is that the
19 local levels will participate, and that will give us an
20 opportunity to review and to view and to comment and direct,
21 if necessary, what changes have to be done to improve the
22 situation.

23 Q How do you really accomplish that with unfunded
24 local coordinators that have their own livelihood to watch
25 out for?

1 A With great difficulty; it is extremely difficult.
2 I think the communities contiguous to our nuclear fixed
3 facilities as well as some of the other hazards which impact
4 upon our communities significantly and frequently sense
5 their responsibilities and they are doing more in these
6 areas to be prepared to respond.

7 Regardless of the level of government, the elected
8 officials have the responsibility for life and the protection
9 of property. And I have never seen anything which ties
10 that to the availability of revenues. So it's a
11 constitutional responsibility.

12 More and more, we see these people fulfilling that
13 responsibility and increasing their capabilities to respond.
14 We will continue to have problems in that area. We recognize,
15 probably as well as anybody else, we would like to see
16 a subsidy so-to-speak, at least a grant or some approval
17 of monies for these things. Hopefully, we could gain more
18 from the federal government, but we may have to do this
19 ourself. Right now we do not have monies for this. They
20 are not in our programs.

21 Q Typically, I guess, though, your locals are
22 members of the, maybe, police force or fire department or
23 something like that so there is a governmental arrangement?

24 A That's right. They are tied to other things,
25 there's no question about it. In some cases, the township

1 supervisors are the emergency management coordinators;
2 it may be a policeman or it may be some other walk of life
3 altogether. Many of them are dual-hatted.

4 Q There were dedicated lines installed during
5 the weekend of the accident to six affected counties. And
6 as I understand it, some three weeks or so later, these
7 dedicated lines were removed. Would you explain why there is
8 no longer a need for dedicated lines?

9 A Well, as a state of normalcy evolved, we had a
10 better or an assured capability that we could, by normal
11 land line, communicate, have contact to these counties to
12 conduct our business. The requirement for the conduct
13 of business diminished as we returned to the state of normalcy.
14 We were doing much of it by liaison, but we are billed on
15 a monthly basis for communications. We were operating in
16 an environment, at least as far as I was concerned, without
17 additional appropriations, which meant that whatever we did
18 become involved with, up to a point in time, unless it was
19 a declared emergency, we were going to have to pay out of
20 our existing operating budget. And it is a little austere,
21 to say the least.

22 On that basis, when Mr. Kuehn came to me, why, I agreed
23 that I thought we should take them out. We could, at that
24 particular time, provided that the jacks and the lines
25 internally were there, it would be a matter of activating

1 which would only take us a few minutes to do because we
2 were retaining instruments that were in the EOC, and it
3 was just a matter of plugging us in. The Bell Telephone
4 has representatives right there -- as a matter of fact,
5 within 50 feet of me or more -- in their own office at
6 the end of the hall, so it's just a matter of calling those
7 people.

8 Q So there is still a dedicated line from a jack?

9 A Well, internally it is there. Now, they have to
10 activate it, of course, to make it hot.

11 Q But what does Bell have to do to activate it?

12 A I can't answer that question. I don't know whether
13 it's to tie into our board or whether there is some place
14 in the building they have to do something or not, but it only
15 takes a few minutes to do it, whatever it is, not an
16 extensive period of time. And we could activate it.

17 But there was just no longer a need for that type of direct
18 communications. I think by the 30th of April was when we
19 disconnected our hot lines.

20 Q What are you currently doing to convince the locals
21 that they should have a plan? I guess people are more
22 interested right now, but is there a program established,
23 not right now, maybe some milestones, or something that's
24 been disseminated to the local level so that you can
25 maintain the momentum?

1 A Well, we have placed this planning effort in
2 priority based upon geographical location and our analysis
3 of need for the planning effort.

4 For example, we had -- and we knew this based upon our
5 review and our constant working efforts during TMI that
6 those counties contiguous to Three Mile Island had plans
7 that were detailed plans that, in our mind, again, would
8 work out to 20 miles. So knowing that, we felt we better
9 start taking a look and working with some of the other
10 facilities in the development of their plans.

11 We knew also that we had five-mile plans for Peachbottom
12 and that they were about to be upgraded and reviewed. And
13 so we started with Beaver Valley which is a little more
14 complicated because it has other states involved in this
15 planning effort, like Ohio and West Virginia. Therefore,
16 it's just a little more complicated than dealing with your
17 own people.

18 So this was our first priority. Now, this doesn't say
19 that there was no effort going on elsewhere, because there
20 was. For example, there are revised plans right now for
21 Peachbottom. This was going on concurrently. There is
22 effort being conducted for Berwick, which is not on line
23 yet, but Luzerne and Columbia County are working on plans.
24 Our eastern area director, under whose jurisdiction you will
25 find Berwick, Luzerne County, is in contact with that planning

1 effort in assisting. And we have attended several meetings
2 with those people.

3 We're also talking about and we have some limited effort
4 from our standpoint going into Limrick. Of course, that's
5 not going to come on line for several years. But these
6 efforts are ongoing. We're concentrating, number one, 1
7 Beaver; number two, on Peachbottom; number three, on TMI.
8 We have to take TMI 20 miles and revise those into the
9 ten-mile criteria which we're working with right now.

10 And this is where our effort is going.

11 Now, within that, the counties are working with their
12 municipalities in developing plans in support, one step
13 at a time. You get the county plan working, at the same
14 time there is some activity down in the local level, and it
15 becomes accelerated when all the factors are known.

16 I am not personally involved in the detailed planning
17 aspect of this, as I indicated before. It's under the
18 charge of Mr. Crowe, and we have made available the state
19 resources to permit this planning to go on with assistance.
20 Now, I say knowledgeable as to what's going on all the time,
21 because I do have to participate in the conferences and
22 things of this nature. And on occasion, I head the conference,
23 wherever it may be, so I am knowledgeable as to what they
24 are doing.

25 Q Have lines been installed, inactive lines but ones

1 that you could plug into, as you said, to the surrounding
2 counties around the other nuclear facilities?

3 A I'm not sure whether they are into Beaver or not
4 at this time, this point in time, but they will be.
5 Of course, we have a direct line out to TMI through NAWAS
6 which has always been into TMI.

7 Q I was thinking of the surrounding counties more?

8 A The other counties are not. Now, this is a
9 situation that involves the counties themselves with the
10 facility to get the direct lines into those counties, but
11 from our EOC, I don't think it is essential that we have
12 direct lines into all those counties.

13 Q You would not perform the same function for the
14 other facilities that you would have performed for
15 TMI?

16 A Let me put it this way: If we have to go to
17 Beaver, we're going to be located out in that part of
18 the state, geographically located. And part of our planning
19 exercise is to select what we will call an advance CP
20 location, which will be some place in the vicinity of the
21 ten-mile radius from that facility. And there we will have
22 an advance segment of our staff. There will be an advance
23 segment of radiological protection. There will probably
24 be other elements. Maybe some of the federal elements will
25 be located there. I'm thinking primarily of those with the

1 monitoring capability or requirement. EPA, DOE, NRC
2 elements in there. We will probably function in support of
3 this activity from our western area headquarters which is
4 located in Indiana. Therefore, we want the tie to go from
5 the facility to that advance CP. We have communications
6 from our location here to Beaver County.

7 We can get in there with teletype. We have other
8 communications which we could activate to give us voice
9 communications in that area, too. This is probably the
10 way we would treat it.

11 I would surmise that TMI is going to be treated a little
12 differently, and more similar to the way we operated during
13 the recent event. And it is based upon the geographical
14 location as to how we're going to treat these activities.
15 We will have a direct line from the facility into radiological
16 protection. There will be a direct line from radiological
17 protection into our CP. And we will still, regardless of
18 where we're functioning from, our EOC in Harrisburg will be
19 our backup and support and it will be active.

20 Q On the morning, Friday morning, March 30th, someone
21 in PEMA apparently called Carl Abraham in Region 1,
22 Region 1 Public Information Officer, concerning the 1200 mr
23 per hour reading and requested advice from the regional
24 office regarding evacuation. Do you know who made that
25 phone call?

1 A No, I have no recollection of such a call. I
2 wouldn't know who in PEMA would be making that call.

3 Q Apparently, also on that morning, there were two
4 phone calls from Met Ed to PEMA about the 1200 mr. Apparently,
5 one was from Floyd to Mr. Kuehn; and then one was from
6 somebody to Mr. Cassidy. You wouldn't happen to know who
7 that somebody from TMI was on the other end of the line?

8 A No, I don't. You know, I was aware of both of
9 those calls simultaneously, because in front of my office
10 are the two primary desks of my office assistants. And I
11 just happened to be standing out there when those calls came
12 in. And I had firsthand knowledge of those calls at that
13 point in time.

14 That's rather unusual that something occurs that way,
15 especially from the same office. I don't know who that other
16 person was.

17 Q Again on March 30th, there was a meeting, apparently
18 in the governor's office, shortly before noon before he
19 made a noon press release in which he was issuing the advisory,
20 I guess, on pregnant women and children and also making some
21 statements about the take-cover order that had been made
22 earlier that morning. Were you at the governor's office
23 or was Mr. Williamson?

24 A Mr. Williamson was at the governor's office.

25 Q I just wanted to make sure it was not you.

1 A No.

2 Q I'm curious if you might have anything else for
3 the record regarding your activities or PEMA's or your
4 observations of what might make things better, that might
5 help our inquiry. There's an awful lot on the record.

6 A I can imagine so. I think that we have learned
7 a considerable number of lessons from this incident, and I
8 would say that most lessons that we have acknowledged that
9 we are doing something about, at least within our capabilities.
10 We're talking to others of those things that need to be
11 done beyond our capabilities such as need for legislation
12 and this type of thing.

13 We have changed some of our training requirements to assure
14 ourself of an effective state staff in recognition that
15 personalities change rather frequently. Therefore, you
16 just don't have time in this type of an incident to train
17 people. You must be able to respond instantaneously,
18 probably more so than under that normal, what we call a
19 normal and natural disaster or emergency-type thing, which
20 is more aligned to the normal day-to-day activity and
21 provision of resources.

22 We're taking a hard look at communications. We have had
23 this requirement for some time so that we have a communications
24 system of both voice and hard copy which is not tied to
25 land line services, so that we have continuous communications
and we do not have to call for outside help to provide this

1 for us. That takes time.

2 We're looking at the local -- in this case I'm using
3 local as county -- that level, to improve expertise through
4 accelerated and improved training. There is a change in
5 our law; our recent law now requires training of local
6 levels to be conducted by the county level of government.
7 We offer the guidance and the help to permit this to occur.
8 We will continue to do that.

9 We hope to stress and emphasize the need for more
10 competency among our leaders so to speak, more dedication,
11 more understanding of needs and requirements and the
12 ability to analyze hazards and their impact and how to
13 deal with them.

14 We need at least an identified structure within our
15 emergency management organizations who can be brought to
16 bear to do planning, be brought to bear to respond. Again,
17 the recognition that with the limitations and constraints
18 of funding, you can't have a standby staff, one that reacts
19 periodically.

20 These are the things that we're looking at, and the things
21 that we are doing to improve our capabilities along with
22 our first priority which is this planning. And it's a
23 total spectrum of planning to include the review and approval
24 of it. These hopefully are going to be the things to
25 permit us to do better and handle this type of situation

1 better.

2 I would be the first to say that we were prepared to
3 handle it within limitations before. We were prepared to
4 evacuate out to five miles, and we could have done it
5 extremely well with short notification.

6 Q In your judgment, how long do you think that
7 might have taken?

8 A Well, I think we have to consider the time frame
9 that we're speaking of. Now, on Wednesday morning when
10 I received a call from the shift leader who told me that
11 it appeared that there was an off-site release moving
12 at about 30 degrees, if I remember, would put whatever it
13 was in the direction of Goldsboro and Brunner Island. And
14 I presented this to radiological protection who in short
15 order came back and said, you know, we think it's only in
16 the neighborhood of 10 mr, but it would be advisable to
17 probably prepare the mechanism in the event you have to
18 conduct an evacuation.

19 And I called Mr. Lothrop -- I had Mr. Lothrop call to
20 York County, and he was seated beside me. And I just happened
21 to have two phones on my desk and he was using one and I
22 was using the other. And there was no hesitation on the
23 part of people. When they were told, we think this is
24 what you should do and you should notify your municipalities
25 involved to alert their structure and sort of standby; don't

1 do anything, but sort of get the wheels in motion in case
2 we have to conduct an evacuation. And there was no
3 hesitancy on the part of other people to respond to that
4 type of thing.

5 This, or course, had been the second or third call they had
6 received that morning. They had been alerted to the problem;
7 and to reassure that everybody understood, because
8 some people were on the way to work, we repeated those
9 calls. And then this is the third call to some of the
10 counties.

11 And likewise, when I went back to withdraw that sort of a
12 status, put things back to normal, again there was the
13 response to it. And we discussed this on numerous
14 occasions, but that's a long way around to getting to answer
15 your question.

16 A lot of things had happened within this geographical
17 area. A lot of people had moved out, so we're talking
18 about a reduced population over what we had planned for.
19 And instead of talking about relocating maybe 26,000 people,
20 we were talking maybe 10,000, 13,000, 15,000.

21 Q That's on Friday?

22 A That was on Friday. We could have responded,
23 and I would say somewhere between two and a half to three
24 hours, we could have probably evacuated that within a five-
25 mile radius. That's all I'm talking about, because we had no

1 special care or special treatment that had to be given to
2 people in that area. The population is certainly not very
3 dense.

4 Q How about Wednesday morning, at 7:35 a.m.?

5 A Well, first of all, it is my opinion that if
6 there is a release of radioactivity, I question whether we're
7 going to conduct an evacuation. We will probably issue
8 take-cover type of thing. On a precautionary basis, leadtime
9 sufficient so that you can effectively and efficiently get
10 people out, that's something else. Unless we know precisely
11 where our problem lies, I don't see hastily telling everybody
12 to go outdoors. That's probably the worst possible condition
13 that we could present.

14 Q Well, let me try again. Suppose that at 8:00
15 BRP had called down and said, We understand the problem.
16 We've talked to NRC and the word is, Get out?

17 A You're talking about something hastily. If there
18 had been no uncontrolled release of material, on Wednesday
19 morning, we probably could have made it in somewhere around
20 three, maybe three and a half hours, in that time frame.

21 MR. EPNST: Any questions?

22 MR. CHIN: I have two quick ones.

23 You mentioned earlier on Friday morning, the EOC
24 received two calls simultaneously, and that you had firsthand
25 knowledge of those calls. What do you mean by that?

1 THE WITNESS: Well, I was standing between these
2 two desks, and they are buttressed right against each other.
3 And I overheard the conversation from both of them, you know;
4 I wasn't putting it all together, but I overheard what they
5 were talking about and realized in short order that there was
6 a very sensitive problem going on.

7 The details come in to Mr. Cassidy and not necessarily
8 to Mr. Kuehn. Mr. Kuehn was apprised by Mr. Floyd that
9 there was a particular problem and that he was seeking some
10 help from radiological protection and that they were preparing
11 to possibly get some excess or unnecessary people off-site
12 there.

13 The details came in to Mr. Cassidy, and it said, you know,
14 we have something like 1200 mr 600 feet above the stack,
15 so much at the fence.

16 MR. CHIN: Did Mr. Cassidy tell you this, or
17 you just overheard this conversation?

18 THE WITNESS: Well, I overheard some of it, but
19 then he told me. I asked him, I said, you know, What was
20 the information you had? So he told me what it was. And
21 concurrent with that, he was writing it down. He was taking
22 notes as it was going on.

23 I called Maggie Reilly and told her of the report we
24 had received, and she inferred to me that she had had this
25 same type of information. And that's understandable, because

1 it probably was coming in directly from the plant to them.

2 MR. CHIN: And subsequently, did Mr. Kuehn brief
3 you on Mr. Floyd's call?

4 THE WITNESS: Yes, he did.

5 MR. CHIN: And did you sense that there was some
6 difference between those two calls as to the urgency of the
7 crisis at Three Mile Island?

8 THE WITNESS: Well, probably by the story that
9 Mr. Kuehn told me that there was considerable excitement
10 in the voice of Mr. Floyd. I do not recall Mr. Cassidy
11 relating any excitement on the part of the individual
12 except that a determination to get the information through.
13 Piecing them both together, you could sense very readily
14 that there was an extreme emergency occurring that we
15 should look at very, very carefully and immediately.

16 And Mr. Kuehn cited the extreme excitement on
17 the part of Mr. Floyd.

18 MR. CHIN: Did you sense that there was
19 something strange about getting two calls on the same
20 subject matter that morning?

21 THE WITNESS: Not necessarily, no.

22 MR. CHIN: Had that happened before?

23 THE WITNESS: Not to my knowledge, no, not from
24 Three Mile Island.

25 MR. CHIN: Did you act on each, on any one of these

1 calls? Did you recommend to Mr. Henderson that we should
2 take this matter seriously?

3 THE WITNESS: I don't know whether I used those
4 precise words, but I did tell him that there was an
5 emergency at the plant and these were the conditions that
6 had been reported. I also informed him again of the
7 conversation that Mr. Kuehn had with me, about the report
8 he had received and his observations so to speak of that
9 call.

10 It was only a matter of maybe ten, fifteen minutes until
11 Maggie Reilly called me back and said that the release had
12 been contained, had been stopped.

13 MR. CHIN: All right. Another question: I
14 would like for you to describe as an example for us how
15 the EOC functioned on the stay-indoor advisory?

16 THE WITNESS: How it functioned?

17 MR. CHIN: Who notified you of this advisory and
18 what steps you would take to disseminate that information.

19 THE WITNESS: I received my report of this
20 information from Colonel Henderson that the governor had
21 issued a statement earlier in the morning as an advisory for
22 people to stay indoors until noon. Now, we disseminated that
23 information to all the counties within a ten-mile radius.
24 I recall that was out to ten miles. And which is normal,
25 to put this advisory out to all concerned.

1 MR. CHIN: And that was the sole act taken by
2 EOC on this particular advisory?

3 THE WITNESS: Well, we had notified all the agencies
4 also, because the agencies, by that time, were in our
5 EOC. Now, it was my understanding then and it still is that
6 the governor issued this as a press release and was not
7 solely relying on us to disseminate the information. Although,
8 it was our responsibility to do that, to be sure that
9 all of our organizations are aware of what guidance has
10 come out.

11 MR. CHIN: Would the same apply to his advisory
12 on pregnant women and preschool children?

13 THE WITNESS: That information was received by
14 Colonel Henderson, and I cannot tell you who made the call to
15 him. We disseminated that information also.

16 MR. CHIN: In the same manner as the other?

17 THE WITNESS: Yes.

18 MR. CHIN: And that was all that EOC needed to do?

19 THE WITNESS: That's correct.

20 Now, there were a lot of other things that went on along
21 with that, because that meant that those counties that were
22 involved had to open mass care centers and facilities to
23 take care of these people, which they did. And there
24 were some requirements that evolved from that activity.
25 As an example, the mass care center that was activated at the

1 Hershey Sports Arena, under the control of Dauphin County,
2 there was a requirement for cots which were delivered there.
3 When we closed it, we picked those back up.

4 MR. CHIN: That's all I have.

5 THE WITNESS: When I say that's all we have to do,
6 at that particular time, for dissemination, and all of
7 the agencies were notified because the agencies were in the
8 EOC. Now, when we have the response teams there, we
9 announce these things to the response teams and rely on them
10 to get it back to their departments. Now, it was effective
11 that way because the office of administration called me,
12 who has the responsibility, among state agencies, for
13 notifying all state agencies of these types of things.
14 And in the midst of all these things going on, the office
15 of administration called me and said, This is the advisory.
16 I said, Thank you.

17 And off the record, I might state --

18 MR. CHIN: Off the record.

19 (Discussion off the record.)

20 THE WITNESS: It was effective, as you can see,
21 in short order.

22 A lot of other things happened just about that same time
23 after the announcement of that advisory, the warning system
24 was activated, the siren was activated. There certainly
25 was no intent for that to be activated, but it was caused,

1 as best as we can relate, through a surge of power or
2 workmen that were working on lines, this type of thing.
3 But those things sort of coincide with everything else that
4 was going on; that caused a little havoc for awhile.

5 Many, many calls, that was a problem.

6 MR. ERNST: I have a couple of incidental questions.

7 BY MR. ERNST:

8 Q How old a man is Mr. Cassidy? What is his
9 background and experience?

10 A Well, I would say Mr. Cassidy is in his early
11 30s. He was with our western area headquarters for several
12 years, and we moved him into Harrisburg when that position
13 became open which was a promotion to the extent that it
14 brought him back to where his wife's family is located;
15 for personal reasons, it was more convenient for him.

16 He's a hard-working, dedicated individual, and he's
17 intelligent, capable of writing and understanding. He's
18 one of our planners.

19 Q Does he have military experience?

20 A I would say, based upon his age, he probably
21 has maybe short-term military experience. I don't
22 know specifically what it is. But I would assume so.

23 Q What was the emotional state of Mr. Cassidy when
24 relaying the information to you?
25

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1 A He's a very calm, cool, and collected individual.
2 I've never seen him otherwise. He doesn't get excited; he's
3 a very mature individual, really, for his age.

4 Q What was Mr. Kuehn's state?

5 MR. CHIN: I think we ought to go off the record.

6 (Discussion off the record.)

7 MR. ERNST: In conclusion, let me say this
8 is an ongoing investigation; and although I have completed
9 the questions that I have for you today, there is a
10 possibility there may be a need to ask further questions.
11 We will make every effort to avoid doing so.

12 For that reason, instead of closing this particular
13 deposition, I will just recess it.

14 We wish to thank you for your time and the information
15 you have provided to us. I'm sure it will be helpful.

16 THE WITNESS: Very good.

17 MR. ERNST: Thank you very much.

18 (Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the taking of the
19 deposition was concluded.)
20

21
22 _____
Kenneth Richard Lamison

23

24

25



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

September 4, 1979

In Reply Refer to:
NIFTM 790904-10

Mr. Kenneth R. Lamison
Operations Officer
Pa. Emergency Management Agency
Room B-151, Transportation & Safety Bldg.
P. O. Box 3321
Harrisburg, Pa. 17105

Dear Mr. Lamison:

I am writing to confirm that your deposition under oath in connection with the accident at Three Mile Island is scheduled for September 20, 1979 at 1:30 p.m., in a meeting room at the Holiday Inn Town motel, 2nd and Chestnut Streets, Harrisburg, Pa. Please bring with you a copy of your resume and any documents in your possession or control regarding TMI-2, the accident or precursor events which you have reason to believe may not be in official NRC files, including any diary or personal working file.

The deposition will be conducted by members of the NRC's Special Inquiry Group on Three Mile Island. This Group is being directed independently of the NRC by the law firm of Rogovin, Stern and Huge. It includes both NRC personnel who have been detailed to the Special Inquiry Staff, and outside staff and attorneys. Through a delegation of authority from the NRC under Section 161(c) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Special Inquiry Group has a broad mandate to inquire into the causes of the accident at Three Mile Island, to identify major problem areas and to make recommendations for change. At the conclusion of its investigation, the Group will issue a detailed public report setting forth its findings and recommendations.

Unless you have been served with a subpoena, your participation in the deposition is voluntary and there will be no effect on you if you decline to answer some or all of the questions asked you. However, the Special Inquiry has been given the power to subpoena witnesses to appear and testify under oath, or to appear and produce documents, or both, at any designated place. Any person deposed may have an attorney present or any other person he wishes accompany him at the deposition as his representative.


You should realize that while we will try to respect any requests for confidentiality in connection with the publication of our report, we can make no guarantees. Names of witnesses and the information they provide may eventually become public, inasmuch as the entire record of the Special Inquiry Group's investigation will be made available to the NRC for whatever uses it may deem

appropriate. In time, this information may be made available to the public voluntarily, or become available to the public through the Freedom of Information Act. Moreover, other departments and agencies of government may request access to this information pursuant to the Privacy Act of 1974. The information may also be made available in whole or in part to committees or subcommittees of the U.S. Congress.

If you have testified previously with respect to the Three Mile Island accident, it would be useful if you could review any transcripts of your previous statement(s) prior to the deposition.

Thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Mitchell Rogovin".

Mitchell Rogovin, Director
NRC/TMI Special Inquiry Group