U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION I

50-289/79-17 Report No. 50-320/79-19 50-289 Docket No. 50-320 DPR-50 License No. DPR-73 Priority	Category	C
Licensee: Metropolitan Edison Company		
P. O. Box 542		
Reading, Pennsylvania 19603		
Facility Name: Three Mile Island Units 1 and 2		
Inspection At:Middletown, Pennsylvania		
Inspection Conducted: July 17-19, 1979		
Inspectors: P. Koltay, Reactor Inspector		08/30/79 date
S. K. Chaudhary, Reactor Inspector		9/26/79 date
Approved by: U. E. Linffor S. D. Elmt. S. D. Ebneter Chief, Engineering Support Section No. 2, RC&ES Branch		date 09/26/79 date

Inspection Summary:

Inspection on July 17-19, 1979 (Combined Report Nos. 50-289/79-17 and 50-320/79-19)

Areas Inspected: Unannounced followup inspection of the fire prevention/protection program including new installations, existing installations, surveillance test requirements, houseke ping, administrative controls and plant fire brigade training. The inspection all included a follow-up on outstanding items in the area of fire protection, and to investigation of a Unit 2 control room panel electrical fire. The inspection in lived 22 inspection-hours onsite by one NRC regional based inspector.

Results: No item of noncompliance were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Metropolitan Edison Company

*Mr. T. O'Conner, Senior Technical Analyst
*Mr. W. Potts, Superintendent - Technical Support

* denotes those present at the exit interview

2. New Installations

The inspector examined the modifications in progress in the areas of the auxiliary diesel generators and the contaminated waste storage building.

a. Auxiliary Diesel Generator

The inspector examined the work in progress to protect the auxiliary diesel generators and associated diesel oil storage tanks, located outside the circulating water pump house. The installation of a dike segregating the two tanks from each other and from the adjacent areas has been 95% completed.

The licensee informed the inspector that an automatic sprinkler system designed to protect the auxiliary diesel generators may not be installed, pending a study by the licensee's contractor. The lack of automatic suppression for the diesels may result in a loss of one or both units due to fire inside the diesel generator housing. Since the diesel generators are not redundant units the fire may result in the loss of function of vital equipment in the plant.

This item is considered to be unresolved pending the development and evaluation of a study for the need of automatic suppression inside the diesel generator enclosures. This item will be followed up by an NRC inspector during a subsequent inspection (79-19-01).

b. Contaminated Waste Storage Building

The licensee informed the inspector that a sheet metal on wood construction building, located in the southeast section of the site has been designated as the contaminated waste storage building. Combustible, contaminated solid waste in metal drums is being stored inside the building. At the time of the inspection, several hundred wood pallets and approximately 20 empty wood crates were stored within fifty feet of the building. The temporary hose connection, the only means of fire protection for the building, was also exposed by the wood crates.

The licensee agreed to move the exposing materials at least fifty feet from the building and the hose station. The licensee is also planning to install a hydrant in the area fed through a new 12 inch main connected to the underground main surrounding Unit 2 cooling towers.

Corrective action has been taken by the licensee several days after the conclusion of the inspection, by moving all combustible materials to a distance of at least fifty feet from the building and hose station. This was verified by an NRC inspector on site at the time the work was completed. The installation of the permanent fire protection has not been started.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

Existing Installations

The inspector toured the facility and examined interior and exterior fire protection systems and equipment in Unit 1 and accessible areas in Unit 2.

a. Fire Doors

The inspector noted that several fire doors, separating the cable spreading room and the switchgear room from adjacent areas in the Unit 1 Control Building at elevations 322 feet and 328 feet, periodically failed to close and latch. The licensee indicated that the doors are oversized and their periodic failure to close completely is due to one or more of the following: (1) undersized door closers; (2) slight door frame misalignment; and (3) air pressure differential between adjacent areas.

The licensee will conduct an investigation to determine the course for proper corrective action.

This item is considered to be an unresolved item. The doors will be re-examined by an NRC inspector during a subsequent inspection (79-17-01).

b. Cable Spreading Room

The inspector noted that two 55 gallon drums of partially combustible waste were kept inside the cable spreading room, near the access doors. The licensee stated that the two drums will be removed and combustible waste will not be allowed to accumulate in the cable spreading room. The licensee will conduct periodic inspections of the area.

c. Fire Extinguisher Inspections

The inspector conducted a random verification of records of the monthly inspection of fire extinguishers on both sites. The inspector found that the monthly inspection was lacking in several plant areas. This was brought to the attention of the licensee.

The licensee agreed to inspect all extinguishers at the site by the end of the month of July, 1979.

No items of noncompliance were identified.

4. Fire Brigade Training

The inspector witnessed the "hands-on equipment" segment of the plant fire brigade training school. The training involved the use of dry chemical portable hand extinguishers, the use of small and large hose streams on outdoor fires. It was noted by the inspector that while the fire fighting equipment and training facilities are adequate, participation in the use of equipment was lacking by approximately one-third of the class. The lack of participation by the students regarding the use of fire hoses was brought to the attention of the licensee. The licensee has agreed to take corrective action.

This item is considered to be unresolved pending NRC verification of the licensee's corrective action (79-17-03).

Follow-up on Unresolved Items

(Closed) Unresolved Item (320/79-15-06): Accumulation of combustible materials. The inspector verified that combustible materials at elevation 305 of the Unit 2 auxiliary building, exposing the radwaste electrical panel have been removed. The area is inspected regularly by the licensee.

6. Investigation of Control Room Electrical Panel Fire

Fire occurred in the Unit 2 control room panel WDG-R-1480 - radiation monitor module on July 12, 1979 at 0740 hours. The licensee stated that at the time of the fire the module was partially pulled out for servicing. The fire involved a single printed circuit board. It appears that the fire was initiated by an accidental short circuit between circuit boards. Control room operators noticed smoke and flame coming out of the module. An operator, using a single carbon dioxide extinguisher extinguished the fire at 0741 hours.

Smoke detectors in the control room did not activate. This can be attributed to the quick action of the control room operators.