

UNITED STATES
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION
DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS
REGION II - SUITE 916
230 PEACHTREE STREET, NORTHWEST
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

TELEPHONE 404 526-4503

January 3, 1973

J. G. Keppler, Chief, Reactor Test and Operations Branch, Directorate of
Regulatory Operations, Headquarters

ADVANCE INSPECTION INFORMATION - DUKE POWER COMPANY (OCONEE 1), REPORT
NO. 50-269/73-1

The Oconee Nuclear Plant Superintendent, J. E. Smith, telephoned the
Region II inspector, R. F. Warnick, at approximately 8:45 a.m. on
December 30, 1972, and informed him of an oil fire experienced in the
Unit 1 reactor building on and in the immediate area of the 1B2 reactor
coolant pump (RCP-1B2).

The inspector arrived at the reactor site at 3:15 p.m. to personally
observe the area where the fire occurred.

According to entries in the shift supervisors' logbook, the "FIRE"
stat alarm was received in the Unit 1 control room at 0725 on
December 30, 1972. A check of the alarm panel indicated the alarm
originated in the reactor building. Operators visually confirmed
there was a fire on RCP-1B2 and on the 1B2 steam generator outlet "J"
leg. The fire was extinguished with CO₂ from portable bottles.

When the fire alarm was received, the reactor coolant system was at
525°F and 2155 psig for hot functional tests; however, no tests were
in progress. RCP's 1A2 and 1B2 were operating.

The 1B2 AC and DC oil lift pumps were started at 0722 in preparation
for stopping RCP-1B2. At 0724 RCP-1B2 was stopped, and at 0726 the
1B2 oil lift pumps were stopped. The shift supervisors' logbook stated
that these actions were routine and were not taken as a result of the
fire.

The fire was caused by oil from the oil lift pump system falling on
the hot reactor coolant system piping. The oil escaped from a flanged
joint near the oil system pressure relief valve, drained to the
25 gallon capacity lower bearing housing reservoir, overflowed and
fell onto the pump, piping, and floor below.

TRANSMITTED VIA FACSIMILE
1/3/73 - re - 3:30 p.m.

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The inspector was informed that the oil was Texaco Regal B rust and oxygen inhibited (R and O) oil and that the flash point was approximately 425°F.

During the original notifying phone conversation, the inspector was told the oil leaked from a "blown" flange gasket. On January 2, 1972, the inspector was informed that the failed gasket was a "Velomoid" oil resistant material. While at the site, the inspector was told that this was the third gasket failure oil leak to occur on the oil lift system, but the first leak with the reactor coolant system hot.

On January 2, 1972, the plant superintendent informed the inspector that the following corrective actions have been taken:


1. The reactor coolant system was cooled down to reduce the system temperature below the oil flash point, and to permit removal of the "Mirror" insulation for examination and cleanup.
2. The "Mirror" insulation was removed, inspected by a factory representative, and determined to be undamaged.
3. The piping and surfaces beneath the insulation were cleaned.
4. All Velomoid gaskets on the oil lift system were replaced with asbestos gaskets.
5. The RCP oil leakage collection drain lines have been temporarily rerouted to drain into oil barrels.
6. Westinghouse has been contacted to aid in determining a permanent solution to the problem.
7. The spilled oil has been cleaned up.

The inspector was informed on January 2, 1972, that the reactor coolant system was at 400 psig, that hot functional testing conditions were being re-established, approximately 70 hours at hot conditions are needed to complete the hot functional tests, and that approximately three and a half days have been lost because of the fire.

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While at the site the inspector observed small areas of charring on the "Mirror" insulation of the reactor coolant pump and the "J" leg of the steam generator, some charring on an empty cable tray and small diameter piping, and oil on both horizontal and vertical surfaces below the oil lift system. No smoke was visible in the reactor building and only minor fire odors remained eight hours after the fire.

From the information available at the present time, it is possible that this incident has generic significance. This possibility will be reviewed during the next inspection. DPC has not determined at this time whether this is a reportable incident as defined in 10 CFR 50.55(e).


C. E. Murphy, Acting Chief
Facilities Test and Startup
Branch

RO:II:CEM