

UNITED STATES

ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION

DIVITION OF COMPLIANCE
REGION 1: - SUITE 818
230 PEACHTREE STREET, NORTHWEST

ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

TELEPHONE: 526-4537

June 3, 1971

50-269

Duke Power Company
Attn: Mr. A. C. Thies, Vice President
Production and Operation
Power Building
422 South Church Street
"marlotte, North Carolina 28201

Gentlemen:

letter relates to the discussion Mr. R. E. Oller of the Division of impliance, Region III office held with Mr. W. C. Buskey of the Babcock and Wilcox Company and Mr. C. A. Robinson of your staff at the conclusion of the pressure vessel inspection conducted on April 1, 1971, regarding the construction activities authorized by AEC Construction Permit No. CPPR-35 for the Oconee No. 3 facility.

As noted during the discussion, apparent deficiencies were identified involving items not in conformance with a statement in the Final Safety Analysis Report. The items are as follows:

The Final Safety Analysis Report, Volume 1, Section 4.1.3, "Codes and Classifications," paragraph 4.1.3.1, "Vessels," states part, "The design, fabrication, inspection and testing of the reactor version and closure head, . . is in accordance with the ASME Boiler and Press of the sessel Code, Section III, for Class A vessels."

 Paragraph IX-226(A), ASME Section III, requires that the manufacturer shall maintain a system of material control adequate to assure identity of all material used and that it is acceptable to the applicable specification, prior to the start of manufacturing operations.

Contrary to this requirement, errors and omissions were found in the specimen heat treatment data reported by the forging supplier, Klockner-Verke, A.G., for the reactor vessel, closure head flanges and lower torus ring. There was no indication that the heat treatment data had been reviewed for acceptability by B&W, Mt. Vernon, personnel.

2. Paragraph IX-333(B), ASME Section III, sets out the requirements for the location of penetrameters when the density of a radiograph film, across a weld, varies more than minus 15 or plus 30 percent. The film density for the welds joining the recirculation nozule to the shell were found to range from a low of 2.0 to a high of 4.0 across the winth of the weld. Additional penetrameters were not used as required by the code.

The above nonconformances indicate that BeW's QA program, as implemented, is apparently inadequate to assume a mereude to code requirements, and to verify that materials and components, in mished by their subsuppliers, conform to all projects to the purchase documents.

Please provide us, within 30 days, with your comments concerning these items and any steps which have been or will be taken to correct them, and to minimize recurrences. Your reply should emphasize, in particular, any changes that have been or will be made to your quality assurance program.

you any communicate directly with this office.

CO:II:FJL/VLB

John G. Davis Director

J. B. Henderson, CO:HQ (4)

A. Giambusso, CO:HQ

L. Kornblith, Jr., CO:HQ

R. H. Engelken, CO:HQ

F. J. Long, Ch:II

V. L. Brownlee, CO:II

R. E. Ollar, CO:III