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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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 THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION :  
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 ON :  
 :  
 THE ACCIDENT AT THREE MILE ISLAND :  
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 -----X

(Oral deposition of KEVIN J. MOLLOY.)

APPEARANCES:

RUTH DICKER, ESQUIRE  
M. Street, N.W.  
Washington, D. C. 20037

Associate Chief Counsel for  
the President's Commission on  
the Accident at Three Mile  
Island

1912 255

TAKEN AT:

Sheraton Motel  
Room 101  
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

9 a.m.  
Thursday, July 26, 1979

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WITNESS:

DIRECT

Kevin J. Molloy

3

EXHIBITS

Number

Marked

1	Resume of Kevin J. Molloy	3
2	Document entitled "Emergency Plan for Communities Near the Three Mile Island Facility"	18
3	Document entitled "Action and Response Plan for Emergency Personnel and Citizens"	106
4	Document entitled "Three Mile Island Incident Log"	118

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PROCEEDINGS

KEVIN J. MOLLOY,

1 was called as a witness and, having been first duly sworn  
2 by Ms. Dicker, was examined and testified as follows:

DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. DICKER:

7 Q Please state your full name and home address  
8 for the record.

9 A Kevin J. Molloy, R. D. 6, Box 46, Miller Road, 11  
10 Hummelstown, Pennsylvania.

MS. DICKER: Mark this as Exhibit 1, please.

(Exhibit No. 1 marked  
for identification.)

BY MS. DICKER:

15 Q Mr. Molloy, pursuant to our request you had  
16 given me a copy of your resume which I have marked as Exhibit  
17 1 for this deposition.

Is this a current copy of your resume?

19 A Yes. That was typed up approximately a year  
20 ago and I have not had a chance to update it, but basically  
21 it's extremely current.

22 Q Is there anything that you would like to add or  
23 change or update on this resume?

24 A Not right now, no.

25 Q Would you please tell me what your current

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1 position is.

2 A I am the Director of the Office of Emergency  
3 Preparedness and Communications for Dauphin County, Pennsyl-  
4 vania.

5 Q And as Director of this office, what are your  
6 responsibilities?

7 A I have day-to-day responsibilities for overseeing  
8 the County Communications Center, dispatching all the  
9 police, fire and ambulance calls for the county. Also to  
10 assist local political subdivisions when and where requested  
11 as far as emergency planning purposes. Also to assist  
12 institutions such as hospitals and so forth with their  
13 emergency planning. Those are the basic responsibilities.

14 Q Please explain what the interrelationship is  
15 between your office and these local subdivisions you spoke  
16 about.

17 A Basically in the Civil Defense structure you have  
18 several layers. You have the local, by that I mean a local  
19 political subdivision, township or borough or whatever; then  
20 the county, state and federal levels of government. This is  
21 the basic chain of command in the Civil Defense structure.  
22 Information, be it during an emergency or nonemergency,  
23 pertaining to training or certain programs flows up and down  
24 this particular chain of command.

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25 Our major responsibility is to provide, as the local

1 Agency.

2 Q Can you describe these courses.

3 A Well, there have been a multitude of courses.  
4 As an example, sheltering mass care type courses, what you  
5 look for as far as a shelter is concerned, where to put  
6 people. Communications. They have classes on public  
7 information, things of that nature.

8 Q Has there been any training on radiological  
9 incidents?

10 A No. They have radiological monitoring courses  
11 that the state PEMA puts on. But in terms of preparing  
12 for a specific accident, there has been none that I am  
13 aware of.

14 Q You mentioned before that you provide training  
15 for your local communities.

16 What kind of training is provided in that instance?

17 A Once again, basically what we do is, as an  
18 example, if I would attend a course dealing with mass care  
19 and things of that nature, then in turn we would put on a  
20 course for the local Directors. In addition, the state also  
21 puts on courses for the local Directors outlining their  
22 basic responsibilities.

23 For a new Director we will explain to him how to set up  
24 an emergency operation center, get a volunteer staff, set  
25 up a resource manual, things of that nature.

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1 Q Have there ever been any discussion with any  
2 state or federal agency concerning obtaining training  
3 courses in radiological incidences, other than monitoring?

4 A Not really that I recall. I attended a course  
5 that dealt with planning that was sponsored by the NRC and  
6 the state agency and the Federal Emergency Preparedness  
7 Organization.

8 Q Do you remember when that course was given?

9 A This -- okay. This would have been -- well, this  
10 is dated the 9th of January. It would have been that week  
11 of 1976, early January of 1976.

12 Q Can you identify what it is that you are referring  
13 to?

14 A It's an interagency course in radiological  
15 response planning in support of fixed nuclear facilities.  
16 Basically it was a class designed to give you some idea  
17 as to how to set up plans for an emergency at a fixed  
18 facility.

19 MS. DICKER: Off the record.

20 (Discussion off the record.)

21 MS. DICKER: Back on the record.

22 BY MS. DICKER:

23 Q Mr. Molloy, you stated that this is an interagency  
24 certificate.

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25 Can you please tell me which agencies were involved in

1 this course.

2 A Several of the agencies included the Nuclear  
3 Regulatory Commission, the Environmental Protection Agency,  
4 the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, which is the federal  
5 Civil Defense. Energy Research and Development Administration  
6 or the Department of Transportation and Department of Health,  
7 Education and Welfair.

8 Q How did you find out that this course was  
9 available?

10 A Through the state. They advised certain county  
11 Directors across the state that were near nuclear facilities  
12 that the course was available. It was held in Harrisburg.

13 Q Were you the only person from your county who  
14 attended this course?

15 A No. My assistant attended it also.

16 Q Could you please explain to me what the relationship  
17 is between the county Civil Defense organization and the  
18 state Civil Defense organization.

19 A Basically the state is a support agency of the  
20 county level, just like we are a support agency of the local  
21 level. Once again, we go through them to assist us in  
22 obtaining federal funds, filling out project applications,  
23 grants, things of that nature. They also provide training  
24 for my assistant and I.

25 Q Is there any reporting relationship between the

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1 two agencies?

2 A We send in a monthly report, basically just a  
3 very brief outline of some of the activities covered by our  
4 office during the month.

5 Q Prior to March 28, 1979, what was your relationship  
6 with Three Mile Island?

7 A I am not sure what you mean by relationship,  
8 other than to say that I had met with the people of Three  
9 Mile Island. I have worked with them in terms of setting  
10 up the lines of communication in the event a situation  
11 would occur. I have attended several on site drills that  
12 they put on. I have observed several fire drills, as an  
13 example, that they have had held with off-site agencies.

14 Q Were you at all involved in the development of  
15 the Three Mile Island emergency plan?

16 A Not the on-site plan. The county, we had our  
17 own plan which we initially -- it was a five-mile plan  
18 aimed mainly at the emergency personnel in the five-mile  
19 area. That was done about the middle of 1975, I believe.

20 Q Was that plan developed in conjunction with  
21 Three Mile Island personnel?

22 A Basically the way the plan came up is we -- I  
23 set up a meeting back in 1974. I am not sure of the exact  
24 month, but the latter part of the year, at which time I had  
25 representatives from the state police, the state Bureau of

1 Radiological Protection, the utility company, and representa-  
2 tives of local government, including local Civil Defense  
3 types. I had just been on the job several months at that  
4 particular time myself so I was not totally familiar with what  
5 was going on.

6 It was then that I was really made aware of the fact  
7 that there was no plan in existence at all at the county  
8 level. And as a result of that meeting I drew up a plan.  
9 Basically it was a combined -- it was a resource manual  
10 to show what we had available in the area. It also had the  
11 names and phone numbers of people to contact. It set down  
12 the lines of communication in terms of the utility notifying  
13 the state, things of that nature. I outlined major evacuation  
14 routes, shelter facilities in the area, things of that nature.

15 That particular plan was geared strictly toward the people  
16 -- the emergency personnel in the five-mile zone.

17 Q Did you finish your answer?

18 A Well, I was just going to say that I worked on  
19 developing the plan myself. Then what I did I sent draft  
20 copies out to the local city Directors, the state-- by the  
21 state I mean different agencies and so forth.-- and asked for  
22 suggestions, corrections and so forth.

23 Q Which state agencies, for instance, did you send  
24 them to?

25 A Back then it was the State Council of Civil Defence,

1 the state police, Bureau of Radiological Protection; those  
2 are the ones I can think of.

3 Q Did you send a copy to Met-Ed as well, did you say?

4 A Yes. I sent them to all of the agencies that  
5 I thought would be involved, and the local Civil Defense  
6 Directors and so forth.

7 Q What kind of feedback did you get?

8 A I can't remember specifics right now because it  
9 was several years ago. But to the best of my knowledge  
10 it seemed that I didn't get much input, other than the Bureau  
11 of Radiological Protection at that time was working on a  
12 general guideline situation for police and firemen for  
13 radiological accidents, you know, vehicular accidents,  
14 that kind of thing, which they gave to me to try and  
15 incorporate in my plan. But as far as from the local  
16 Directors, I don't recall any particular input. Basically  
17 as far as the utility was concern there really wasn't much  
18 input because they were only involved with the notification  
19 end of the thing.

20 Q Was the development of this plan completely  
21 voluntary or were you requested to develop such a plan by  
22 any federal, state or local agency?

23 A It was -- I would say it was voluntary. I realized  
24 there was a need for it. Nobody said you had to do it.

25 Q Did any agency request that you develop such a



1 plan?

2 A To the best of my knowledge I don't believe there  
3 was anybody that said, "We want you to have a plan."

4 Q Why did you decide on a five-mile evacuation plan  
5 at that time?

6 A At the time the plan was drawn up, once again to  
7 the best of my knowledge it seemed like the state agency was  
8 also starting to get a little bit more heavily involved in  
9 planning. And I believe during the course of conversations  
10 with the state agencies is when a five-mile limit was set up.  
11 I don't remember specifically who set it. It's my understand-  
12 ing now, and I have just found this out recently, that  
13 basically the five-mile limit was set so that there would be  
14 a standardization across the state where any facilities are  
15 located.

16 Q Who decided on the standardization?

17 A It would have been the state agency, which is PEMA.

18 Q Do you think that that is the reason why you  
19 developed this five-mile plan?

20 A Once again, I assume that, you know, the state  
21 agency suggested it to me. I couldn't tell you exactly who  
22 or exactly when, but obviously I got the guidance from some-  
23 body.

24 Q When this plan was completed, was it distributed  
25 to the population at all?

1           A           No. The plan, as I indicated, was geared toward  
2 the emergency personnel. And it was given to the, as an  
3 example, the state police, the local Civil Defense Director  
4 and so forth. It also outlined their responsibility and  
5 things of that nature.

6           Q           Can you explain --

7           A           The line of reasoning at that particular time  
8 was, with a five-mile plan had an incident occurred all  
9 action would have been strictly in county. Okay. Even if  
10 we had moved people they would have been sheltered in county.  
11 Ninety-five percent of the resources we would have used would  
12 have been in county, everything was strictly in county.

13                   It was my own personal feeling at the time, when we  
14 were strictly talking five miles, that that really would  
15 not have been that beneficial to the general public. The  
16 most of them could have cared less about how many fire trucks  
17 we had or how we were going to notify boaters out in the  
18 islands, and things of that nature.

19           Q           Was there any consideration about conducting  
20 drills during which the population would be included?

21           A           You mean a mock evacuation drill?

22           Q           That's right.

23           A           That thought never entered my mind, to conduct one.  
24 It was suggested by one of the artinuclear groups.

25           Q           When?

1           A           I don't remember which year. It was after the  
2 fact of the plan being drawn up, that much I do remember.  
3 We felt there was really nothing to be gained by getting the  
4 population to participate in a drill. No. 1, to get the  
5 most amount of people participating you would have to do it  
6 either at night or on a weekend when people aren't working.  
7 No, 2, we just felt, based on just talking to like my  
8 neighbors, as an exaple, I happen to live down in the five-  
9 mile zone, they are not going to waste their Saturday spend-  
10 ing six hours out of their home so that we could pull this  
11 stuff. There really just didn't seem to be much benefit.

12           Q           So are you saying that you sense, at least as  
13 Director of Civil Defense for the county, that people weren't  
14 too concerned about some kind of incident happening at Three  
15 Mile Island?

16           A           People aren't that concerned about any type of  
17 incident happening in this county, which is, I don't like to  
18 use the term disaster prone, but we have had a multitude in  
19 a wide variety of disasters ranging from massive floods to  
20 tornadoes to airplane crashes, and so forth. The public  
21 is very apathetic when it comes to Civil Defense or Emergency  
22 Preparedness, as we call it now.

23           Q           Had Met-Ed ever done, prior to the 28th of March,  
24 anything to educate the public concerning possibilities of  
25 incidences from Three Mile Island?

1           A           I really don't feel I can answer that.

2           Q           Any that have been offered to your county?

3           A           Well, we have been invited down to the plant, once  
4 again, to participate in the drills and so forth. And the  
5 same with the Met-Ed conducting drills for the local fire  
6 departments, things of that nature. So there has been some  
7 interaction, yes.

8           As far as making us nuclear engineers or physicists  
9 or things of that nature, no, not really.

10          Q           You mentioned that you had gone down to the plant  
11 to participate in certain activities sponsored by TMI, or  
12 conducted by TMI. Were these participatic in their mock  
13 drills?

14          A           Mainly when we went down to the Island it was  
15 to observe as opposed to participate. The participation  
16 would come in, as an example, if they were actually bringing  
17 an off-site agency such as a fire department onto the  
18 Island. When we were invited down, as an example, we were  
19 invited down to tour the facility to give us an idea of  
20 what was down there. And when they conducted their yearly  
21 drills, like the state Director and myself and some of  
22 the other county Directors and so forth would be invited  
23 down, to come observe which procedures they followed, things  
24 of that nature, which was impressive. Although, we didn't  
25 quite know what they were doing, to be quite honest.

1 Q So you just watched what they were doing,  
2 but there was no actual involvement in the drill?

3 A No.

4 Q Was there ever any practice drill in terms of  
5 at least establishing communications?

6 A Yes. There were several drills conducted, and I  
7 can't give right now specific dates or anything of that  
8 nature, but where we would run a telephone-type drill.  
9 In other words, the plant would call the state and the  
10 notification would proceed. It was basically a telephone-  
11 type thing.

12 Q Do you know how often those would occur?

13 A I don't recall of any within the past year, to  
14 the best of my knowledge. However, I would say perhaps in  
15 maybe '75-76, in that area there it seemed like we were  
16 doing them perhaps every two months, or three months. It  
17 sticks in my mind that we had a lot of those particular drills  
18 back then to make sure the system worked.

19 Q Would you know that it was a drill prior to the  
20 fact of it happening?

21 A In some cases I think we were notified in advance  
22 that we are going to be conducting a drill. There were a  
23 couple of times that we were not advised in advance. But  
24 once again, the phone calls always started off with a drill,  
25 so when the real one came I knew it was a real one.



1 Q Do you know whether these drills, either the  
2 drills that you observed at the plant, or communication  
3 drills that we just spoke about, were required by the NRC?

4 A No, I don't honestly know whether they are or not.  
5 I am not totally familiar with NRC rules and regulations.

6 Q Can you describe to me what the chain of communica-  
7 tion would be pursuant to these drills that you carried out.

8 A Well, basically it goes from the Island, the utility  
9 notifies the state agency. By the state agency I mean PEMA,  
10 the Emergency Management Agency. Also the Bureau of Radio-  
11 logical Protection. In addition, the Island also notifies  
12 my office. We are a 24-hour a day operation. That's the  
13 initial notification procedure.

14 Then basically the way it should follow in an event is  
15 information from the island is given to the Bureau of  
16 Radiological Protection and then they will take the informa-  
17 tion, the technical information and so forth, make a decision  
18 concerning either an action has to be taken, evacuate, stay  
19 in the house, don't worry about it; that type thing. They  
20 would give that information to PEMA who would forward it down  
21 to my office, and we would disseminate it to the locals.  
22 That's basically how the system should function. It's  
23 very simple.

24 Initially when we set it up, and I am not sure when  
25 we made the change, but initially it was just the state was

1 to get the call from the Island. But it was a good couple  
2 of years, about two years ago that I asked that it be modified,  
3 that we also get a call initially. And the reason for that  
4 being --

5 Q Who did you ask?

6 A We -- with the state agency and the utility,  
7 we all agreed that, you know, yes, we could change the pro-  
8 cedure. And basically the line of reasoning behind the  
9 request for that change was simply in the event a situation  
10 occurred where the utility right off the bat felt an evacua-  
11 tion was necessary then we would find out about it, you  
12 know, extremely fast rather than waiting for it to come  
13 down through the chain.

14 Q And you suggested this change?

15 A Yes, right.

16 Q And both the utility and the state were receptive  
17 and made the change?

18 A Oh, yes. The change was made. There was no  
19 problem. Everybody was in total agreement that it was a  
20 good thing to do.

21 MS. DICKER: Can I have this marked as Exhibit 2.

22 (Exhibit No. 2 marked  
23 for identification.)

24 BY MS. DICKER:

25 Q Mr. Molloy, I have in front of me marked Exhibit

1 2 for this deposition a document entitled "Dauphin County  
2 Civil Defense, Emergency Plan for Communities Near the  
3 Three Mile Island Facility."

4 Is this the plan that was in fact in effect on March  
5 28, 1979?

6 A No. That had been -- this was the initial plan  
7 that we drew up. Since that time we had updated some of the  
8 information, phone numbers, and a few other things. That  
9 was in 1978. It basically contained a lot of the same  
10 information, but it did show a few other changes. As I  
11 say, a lot of the phone numbers and things of that nature.

12 It's basically the same thing.

13 Q It basically contains the substance of the  
14 material we spoke about earlier, about the plan that you had  
15 in effect?

16 A That's correct.

17 Q Before we leave this particular area, I would  
18 like to just touch on the subject of communication and  
19 coordination between counties surrounding the Three Mile  
20 Island facility, prior to March 28, 1979.

21 For instance, had there been any coordination or any  
22 sharing of information on emergency plans with the surround-  
23 ing counties?

24 A Yes. When -- well, the one part of your question,  
25 as far as sharing the plans, whatever, when I submitted my



1 initial plan to the state, which I understand was the first  
2 in the state at a county level, it was copied and then sent  
3 to all the other counties.

4 In terms of communication we, of course, have always  
5 had telephone communications. We have a teletype system  
6 provided by the state. In addition, as I indicated earlier  
7 we are also the County Communication Center. Lebanon and  
8 York County -- I am sorry. Lancaster and York Counties  
9 also have County Communication Centers. We share one fire  
10 frequency with them. We are on the same fire frequency.

11 Q Which county is this?

12 A This would be Lancaster and York. Those are the  
13 three counties that were initially in the five-mile zone.

14 We share the same fire frequency with them. So in  
15 addition to the telephone and teletype there was also the  
16 instantaneous radio communication with them.

17 Q Had you received copies of their emergency plans  
18 prior to March 28th, 1979?

19 A I had -- I don't recall getting one from York.  
20 Lancaster's I did get a copy of it. A couple of years ago  
21 it was basically the same as mine was.

22 Q Let's go to the events of March 28th, 1979.  
23 How did you first learn that there had been an incident  
24 at Three Mile Island? 1912 273

25 A I received a telephone call at my residence at --

1 once again, the time might not be exact, but I figure it  
2 was somewhere around five minutes after seven, from  
3 Margaret Reilly, who is with the Bureau of Radiological  
4 Protection reference to a -- there was a problem on the  
5 Island involving some high readings. It was an on-site  
6 incident.

7 And I asked if I had to evacuate anybody and was told  
8 no. While I was on the phone with Miss Reilly -- I have  
9 a fire monitor in my residence that's on 24-hours a day --  
10 my communication center was telling me to clear the line,  
11 they wanted to get a hold of me. So as soon as hanging  
12 up with Miss Reilly then I immediately called my communication's  
13 base and they basically told me the same thing that Miss  
14 Reilly had told me.

15 Q Did Miss Reilly indicate that there had been any  
16 off-site readings, for instance?

17 A I don't remember.

18 Q Do you remember if there was any discussion  
19 about evacuation at that point?

20 A I did ask if we had to move anybody.

21 Q What was the response?

22 A No, there was no necessity of moving anybody  
23 at that time. That it was an on-site situation.

24 Q Then what happened?

25 A Okay. As I indicated I talked to my office.

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1 What I did then, I was ready to head for work anyway, so I  
2 went to my office, headed to my office. I left about  
3 quarter after seven, give or take a couple of minutes again.  
4 Enroute to the courthouse my base called me over the radio,  
5 and about that time I was just about coming off the Interstate,  
6 which is a couple of minutes away from the office, they advised  
7 me it was a general site emergency. I just told them that  
8 I would be there momentarily.

9 Q What does a general site emergency mean to you as  
10 Director of Civil Defense for the county?

11 A I didn't know specifically other than I assumed  
12 that the situation had deteriorated somewhat.

13 Immediately upon arriving at my office I called PEMA,  
14 the duty officer. Well, I checked with my dispatchers to  
15 find out did they say we had to evacuate or anything like that,  
16 and they said no. Then I called PEMA, and this was around  
17 seven-thirty, and verified what was transpiring.

18 Q Before we go on, did you say that the information  
19 was that it was a general site emergency?

20 A Yes.

21 Q Was the call from Margaret Reilly from the Bureau  
22 of Radiological Protection and your call back to PEMA pursuant  
23 to the chain of communications that had been established in  
24 the emergency plan?

25 A That's correct. During my conversation with

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1 Miss Reilly -- you have to bear in mind TMI, the Island,  
2 called my base, they also called PEMA. Okay? Part of PEMA's  
3 responsibility is to get a hold of me, which they called  
4 my office.

5 So the system -- the initial notification worked as it  
6 was. When I came in the office, as I say, I checked with  
7 my dispatchers to make sure there was no necessity for move-  
8 ment of people. And then I called PEMA because at that time  
9 I just had -- well, I had no information other than there  
10 was an incident on site. I just wanted to see if any new  
11 information was available. And basically what they had told  
12 me was that there was a problem on the Island; it involved  
13 some readings; we didn't have to move anybody. And after  
14 getting that information then I hung up with them --

15 Q Do you remember who you talked to at PEMA?

16 A No. I am sure that their logs would show  
17 who I talked to.

18 Q Do you recall if you had any problems getting  
19 through to PEMA?

20 A No, none at all.

21 Q Was that the full extent of the information that  
22 they had given you? Was there any more detail about the  
23 status of the plant at that point? 1912 276

24 A I don't think they knew that much either, other  
25 than, you know, there was this situation on the Island, but

1 it did not necessitate any removal of people.

2 It's always been the understanding that if we would  
3 ever get a call from the utility that our main concern is  
4 not the technical aspect of what is going on down there,  
5 but rather is the situation that severe that we must evacuate  
6 people. I have always gone with the feeling that, you know,  
7 we have a Bureau of Radiological Protection, the people at  
8 the sites and so forth are all trained and well educated and  
9 so forth, and therefore they can take all the technical jargon  
10 and so forth and put it in plain English and say to me  
11 either you do or you don't move people, which was basically  
12 -- that's our area of concern.

13 Q Basically you were just there to receive  
14 recommendations for evacuation or other protective actions  
15 for the people of your county?

16 A That's correct.

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17 Q After you spoke with PEMA what did you do?

18 A Okay. Then I started calling the local municipal-  
19 ities involved like Middletown and Lower Swatara and Highspire,  
20 getting a hold of people, just explained to them what I knew.

21 Q What were you telling them, if you can recall?

22 A Just basically there was an incident down at  
23 Three Mile Island, there had been some type of release, that  
24 there was no need for our taking any action at this time.  
25 As soon as I find out more information I will get back to you.



1 very negative image. We were geared towards the Russians  
2 attacking and dropping the bomb and things of that nature  
3 as far as the laws were concerned, although some of us who  
4 had just gotten into the field we tried to get more involved  
5 and so forth. But there was just a -- just a general I  
6 don't care attitude. And everybody assumed that the county  
7 has a plan. And I explained to them that my plan did not  
8 cover the specifics needed during this type of emergency  
9 situation.

10 In other words, we will take Middletown as an example.  
11 Now, my responsibility is -- Middletown takes a look at their  
12 particular community. They decide if we have to evacuate the  
13 community, these are the local roads that we will use to  
14 get them to the major Interstate roads and so forth. How  
15 many extra buses would they need? What other resources would  
16 they need to accomplish this?

17 My responsibility is when they make a request for extra  
18 resources I give it to them. My responsibility is once I  
19 get -- once those people are at that interstate then we take  
20 over to make sure it's coordinated with police units to get  
21 them safely out of the county or out of the danger area.  
22 And once they are out of there to make sure they have shelter  
23 facilities and a place to go.

24 Q Your function basically is coordinator and aid  
25 to these local counties?

1           A           This is correct. In any type of emergency  
2 situation our office is mainly a coordinating agency. And  
3 this was explained time and time again. Ironically in the  
4 late part of '78, perhaps October-November '78, I had a  
5 meeting one evening with -- and invited the local Directors,  
6 Civil Defense Directors and police chiefs and fire chiefs to  
7 my office in the five-mile community. And basically what  
8 we were going to cover was what types of accidents could  
9 happen, in very brief terms, something strictly on site,  
10 that wouldn't bother us, or if we had a release or something  
11 of that nature, not very technical at all, and what their  
12 responsibilities were. In the first place, hardly anybody  
13 showed up as usual.

14           Q           So basically when you called them on the 28th  
15 of March they did not have plans in effect and were not ready  
16 to evacuate people?

17           A           They had no written plans. One really can't say  
18 that they were not ready to evacuate people because we  
19 have had incidents before where people have been evacuated.  
20 But there was no written document as such.

21           Q           Let's continue in the sequence then.

22           A           Approximately at seven-thirty-seven on the morning  
23 of Wednesday, the 28th, I received a call from Dick Dubiel.

24           Q           Who is he?

1912 280

25           A           He worked down at the utility down, down at --

1 Q Was your calling these local communities  
2 pursuant to your emergency plan?

3 A Right. That's the procedure.

4 Q Do these local communities have emergency plans  
5 themselves. do you know?

6 A In most cases, no, they don't.

7 Q Had that ever been discussed with them prior to  
8 March 28, 1979?

9 A Many times.

10 Q Is there any reason why plans weren't developed  
11 by that time?

12 A Well, when you talk plans, we have to expand  
13 it beyond a plan for Three Mile Island. We have to talk  
14 about an emergency plan for any type of situation.

15 Q All right.

16 A It's a local planning -- it starts at the local  
17 level. It does not start in Washington or anywhere else.  
18 It starts in the community. 1912 278

19 Unfortunately, in most cases the local Directors are  
20 volunteers that are -- the state law says every municipality  
21 will have one. The local elected heads of government  
22 appoint one. They don't support him. They don't care  
23 whether he attends training sessions or anything. There is  
24 just a very negative attitude. Back then too when we were  
25 called Civil Defense and so forth, Civil Defense carries a



1 he's an employee of Met-Ed. We received this on our 911  
2 emergency telephone system which happened to be taped phone  
3 lines. I have some lines in my office that are taped, others  
4 that are not. And he initially talked to one of my dispatchers  
5 and my dispatcher got me and I got on the line with him.  
6 He identified himself and he said, and I quote, this is  
7 from the conversation --

8 Q Are you referring to a transcript of the conversa-  
9 tion?

10 A Yes.

11 It says: "Okay, we are in for real."

12 Then I responded: "Okay."

13 Then he said: "What type, we are not exactly sure. We  
14 got the core covered right now. I don't think we got a real  
15 big problem, but we have got some bad radiation readings  
16 that could in fact be erroneous, but we can't rely on that,  
17 okay? What I need is, I need to get Maggie Reilly informed  
18 and back in touch with us as soon as possible. Okay?"

19 I said: "Okay, we will take care of it."

20 End of conversation.

21 Then, of course, I immediately called over to the state  
22 to make sure that the message was given to Miss Reilly.

23 Q Do you have any idea why Dick Dubiel called you  
24 instead of calling Miss Reilly directly? 1912 281

25 A No, not really. I can assume that perhaps he

1     tried and couldn't get through or something.

2           Q       But he didn't state why he was calling you?

3           A       No, no. He was in a hurry to get a hold of her.

4           Q       Had there been any doubt in your mind up to this  
5 point that this was not the real thing, or that this was  
6 still a drill or something of that sort?

7           A       No, no. When I received the first phone call on  
8 that beautiful, bright, sunny day I knew it was not a drill.  
9 Not at five minutes after seven and at home.

10          Q       Then what happened?

11          A       Okay, about seven-forty-three I received a call  
12 from Miss Reilly and I gave her the message to get a hold of  
13 Dick Dubiel.

14          Q       Had you tried to call her before that time?

15          A       I think I passed a request onto PEMA, as I  
16 recall, which would be my normal operation chain of command.

17          Q       In other words, you requested PEMA --

18          A       When she called me back she had already been  
19 in touch with Dick Dubiel. But I didn't know that until  
20 I mentioned it to her. She was calling me basically to  
21 give me -- let me know what was going on down at the plant.  
22 I don't recall her exact conversation. But then I did say  
23 to her: "Did you get a hold of Dick Dubiel?"     1912 282

24                 And she said, Yes, that had been taken care of.

25          Q       Before we go on, I want to get this straight in

1 my mind. Dick Dubiel called you and you called PEMA and  
2 asked PEMA to call Margaret Reilly?

3 A To the best of my knowledge, that's what I  
4 recollect happened.

5 Q You yourself did not attempt to contact Margaret  
6 Reilly at that point?

7 A I don't believe I did, no.

8 Q And your reason for doing that was to keep  
9 within the chain of communication established?

10 A Right. PEMA is my normal chain of command.

11 Q So Margaret Reilly called you and what did she  
12 say at that point?

13 A Once again, I don't remember the exact conversa-  
14 tion, but basically it was just what was going on down at  
15 the Island, that they had an incident, that apparently  
16 there had been some type of release. I don't recall exactly  
17 what type or anything of that nature. And we didn't have  
18 to move people. And that's when I mentioned to her: "Did  
19 you talk to Dick Dubiel?" And she acknowledged that she had  
20 talked to him.

21 Q Up to this point, other than contacting the local  
22 Civil Defense Directors, did you call any of the other  
23 support services that you had and put them on stand-by or  
24 anything like that?

25 A Well, basically since there was no action required

1912 283

1 all we did was we notified the local Civil Defense people.  
2 In one case I knew a couple of them were at work, therefore  
3 I called the local fire chiefs and police chiefs. In addition,  
4 I also called Lancaster and York Counties, which is in my  
5 plan. Once again, it's a kind of a back-up thing. I assumed  
6 that they would be notified by the state. I knew they would  
7 be notified but I also made the call. We also -- I was talk-  
8 ing to a representative from the Red Cross. The Red Cross  
9 handles our shelter, our mass care centers and so forth.

10 Q Is that also pursuant to your plan that we spoke  
11 about?

12 A This would be part of the support services that  
13 I would just automatically notify.

14 In addition, I also called the state police and they  
15 told me that they had been made aware of the situation.

16 Q Basically was the substance of this conversation  
17 just informing them there had been an incident and that  
18 they should be aware of this?

19 A Right. Basically that was all the information I  
20 had and we would get back to them as rapidly as possible if  
21 anything else were needed.

22 Q You keep mentioning that you were told that  
23 there had been some radiological release.

24 Were you given any numbers of any sense about how much  
25 had been released, or anything like that?

1912 284

1           A           There was no numbers mentioned to the best of  
2 my knowledge. Once again, we were never geared toward that  
3 type of situation. I just recalled that it was mentioned that  
4 there was an on-site release. But that there apparently was  
5 no danger to the public and therefore that's why we weren't  
6 taking any evacuation measures. We did not really get  
7 involved with getting any technical information until -- it  
8 would have been after Friday, after, you know, things  
9 started getting a little bit hot and heavier.

10           Q           Would you have been able to interpret numbers  
11 if they had been given to you?

12           A           No. That's not my function. That's why that was  
13 discussed with the state agency, PEMA, Bureau of RAD, Health  
14 and so forth. And that was discussed on several occasions  
15 that we just do not have the expertise.

16           Q           You mean it was discussed on several occasions  
17 during the incident, or prior to the incident?

18           A           No, no. Prior to the incident when we were  
19 initially doing the plan. That they were the experts in  
20 that field. All we wanted to know from them was what action  
21 to take or not to take.

22           Q           So you felt pretty comfortable with relying on  
23 their recommendation?

24           A           Yes. And still do.

25           Q           Does the county have any capacity to do any work.

1912 285



1 monitoring itself?

2 A Right. We have a limited capacity. I have a  
3 staff member who has been with the county -- I have been  
4 there five years -- he has been there longer than I have --  
5 He is a full-time county employee, but he is also the  
6 radiological monitoring officer. And we did have some  
7 equipment available. In addition, the county sponsored  
8 a monitoring course that was paid for in part by the federal  
9 government, part by the local municipality, in Londonderry  
10 Township, which is where the facility is located. We had  
11 approximately 25 local volunteers from Londonderry and  
12 Middletown take the course. It was a monitoring-type course.

13 Q Were you routinely doing some kind of monitoring  
14 before March 28th, 1979, you being the county?

15 A No. No, not at all.

16 Q So this equipment was there simply for this  
17 kind of incident then?

18 A The equipment was there because it was stocked  
19 there when everybody was concerned about a war. The nuclear  
20 facility really had nothing to do with that equipment being  
21 there.

22 Q At this point did you consider using the equipment  
23 to do your own monitoring during the incident?

24 A No. We didn't make any attempt to take any  
25 equipment out at all and start any monitoring. My radiological

1 officer, as I indicated, works at the courthouse full time.  
2 Eventually he did take some of his equipment out and set it  
3 up.

4 Q You mentioned that this equipment was put there  
5 for the purposes of a nuclear war?

6 A Yes.

7 Q Or a wartime activity?

8 A Yes.

9 Q Was this equipment useable, do you know, for this  
10 kind of incident?

11 A In terms of condition and so forth?

12 Q In terms of condition and also capability for  
13 measuring the type of releases that were coming out of the  
14 Island?

15 A I really don't know.

16 Q So am I correct in understanding that this  
17 equipment was not used throughout the incident?

18 A Eventually some of the local municipalities  
19 broke their units out. The units had been given -- this  
20 was way back in the '60's, they were put in different shelters,  
21 some were given to the fire companies and so forth. And  
22 eventually some of the local municipalities did take their  
23 equipment out, those that had received the training, the  
24 monitoring course, and did some monitoring on their own.

25 Q Was this training in monitoring course given so

1 that the county would be prepared to do monitoring for a nu-  
2 clear power plant, or was this a wartime monitoring activity?

3 A It was geared more toward a nuclear incident, not  
4 necessarily wartime, but any type of nuclear incident.

5 And we utilized a project application to get the funds to  
6 put this course on for the locals, and part of the standard  
7 statement that you put in in order to justify getting the  
8 money is that it can be utilized in a nuclear war.

9 Q So that was the main thrust of the purpose of the  
10 course?

11 A For grant purposes, yes.

12 Q Have there ever been any discussion to establish  
13 monitoring, routine monitoring, for environment?

14 A No, not that I ever recall.

15 Q Let's go on with our sequence of events then. We  
16 were talking about notifying York and Lancaster Counties,  
17 the Red Cross, and other port services in the county.

18 Then what happened?

19 A Basically, without getting the specific times,  
20 basically from, we will say eight o'clock in the morning  
21 up until noontime what we had going on was calls, as an  
22 example, from PEMA to my office saying that the situation  
23 had not changed, there was no action required, or my calling  
24 PEMA saying: "What's going on?" Then we would call the  
25 local people and let them know what little we knew at the



1 present time. We did receive a call from Three Mile Island,  
2 from the utility. As a matter of fact we received two,  
3 I think they were both before noon. One dealt with an  
4 aircraft that happened to be circling over the site, and we  
5 did get a call -- I got a call from a Larry Knoll and he  
6 wanted us to call the airport. And he gave us the aircraft's  
7 number and would they get it away. Then a little bit later  
8 on in the day, like I say, I think it was at noon, around  
9 noon, whatever, we got a call concerning some boaters that  
10 were coming up to the Island and would we get them out of  
11 the way.

12 Q Through noon on Wednesday was there any problem  
13 in getting through to PEMA or PEMA getting through to you?

14 A No.

15 Q Were you receiving many phone calls from citizens  
16 of the community concerning the incident?

17 A To the best of my knowledge we did not receive a  
18 large amount of phone calls on Wednesdays. There were some  
19 calls, but I just don't recall a large amount of calls.

20 Q Did anything of significance happen during the  
21 afternoon and evening of Wednesday the 28th?

22 A Once again, during the afternoon some of the  
23 things that -- well, we kept advising the locals of what  
24 little we knew and so forth. I talked with the Lebanon  
25 County Director.

1912 289

1 Q Was this the first time you had talked to him?

2 A Yes.

3 On March -- on the 28th of March the state had planned  
4 a training session up at the central area headquarters  
5 for all of the county Directors.

6 Q What kind of training session?

7 A I have forgotten. It was a quarterly training  
8 seminar. I don't even know what subjects were discussed.  
9 And the Lebanon County Director was one I think that had gone  
10 up to the training center. And then he had come back and we  
11 talked that night. In addition we went to a 24-hour position.  
12 By that, I mean my assistant and I. We decided that we were  
13 going to stay there overnight in case anything happened. It  
14 appears that from the state agency one call I have listed at  
15 2225, at ten-twenty-five at night, from PEMA that it was  
16 cooling better and there were stable conditions. So as late  
17 as Wednesday night it appears that things were getting better,  
18 the incident was calming down and so forth.

19 Q Let's go to Thursday then. You had stayed overnight  
20 at the office?

21 A Yes. I was in the office all night. Once again,  
22 basically we followed the same procedure, checking with PEMA  
23 or PEMA calling us and we would give the information to the  
24 locals, and things of that nature. 1912 290

25 Q Had there been any discussion up to that point,

1 at least through Thursday evening, let's say, concerning  
2 development of evacuation plans with the local communities?

3 A I think I told the locals that they had best  
4 check what they had done thus far.

5 Q Were you getting reports back from the locals  
6 concerning this?

7 A No.

8 Q So you basically didn't know what they were doing  
9 to prepare for a potential evacuation?

10 A No, not really.

11 During -- up until noontime on Thursday, once again we  
12 expanded the police departments, we notified them and things  
13 of that nature, we kept in touch with the local officials and  
14 so forth. We met with the Red Cross people, things of that  
15 nature. So basically Thursday morning it was a normal  
16 routine.

17 On Thursday afternoon I received a call from a local radio  
18 station and they had a doctor there and he was going to go  
19 on the air and advise the evacuation of pregnant women and  
20 preschool children.

21 Q Do you know who this person was?

22 A To the best of my knowledge it was Dr. Sternglass.

23 Q Had you heard of Dr. Sternglass prior to having  
24 this call?

25 A Yes.

1912 291

1 Q What had you heard about Dr. Sternglass?

2 A That he was a very antinuclear type.

3 Q Do you know why the radio station called you?

4 A Well, I am under the impression that they called  
5 me to find out if the situation had deteriorated or something.  
6 I advised the radio station, I said: "Hold on. I will  
7 have someone get in touch with you." I immediately called  
8 the state agency.

9 Q Up to this point you hadn't heard anything about  
10 evacuation of pregnant women and children?

11 A No, not at all.

12 Anyway I called the state agency --

13 Q When you say "state agency," you mean PEMA?

14 A PEMA, right, and advised them of what was trans-  
15 piring, would they get a hold of somebody from DER, Depart-  
16 ment of Health, rather, or Bureau of Radiological Protection  
17 and get that situation straightened out.

18 Q Do you know if they did? Do you know what the  
19 upshot of that was?

20 A It seems to me that it took them a little bit too  
21 long to get back to the radio station. By then the statement  
22 was on the air. And later on that afternoon a doctor, I  
23 don't recall his name right now, but from the Department of  
24 Health, like the Assistant Secretary or something like that,  
25 did go on the air and say, no, you don't have to. 1912 292

1 Q Are you aware of the people in your county react-  
2 ing to Dr. Sternglass' recommendation?

3 A We did get some phone calls on it. Basically what  
4 we would tell the people the only thing we knew is that the  
5 situation at the plant had not deteriorated and so forth.  
6 And if I recall--I didn't take all the phone calls, of course,  
7 my other people did -- I think that a couple of the people  
8 were told: "Call your own doctor and see what his feeling  
9 is in the matter."

10 Q What was the information you were receiving on  
11 Thursday concerning the status of the plant?

12 A Just no change, it's not in cold shutdown yet,  
13 continues to improve.

14 Q So your impression Thursday was that things were  
15 on the road to recovery?

16 A Most definitely, right, that's correct.

17 Q Can you give me an idea of the sense of the  
18 community at that point, or at least throughout Thursday?

19 A I had pretty much stayed in my office. But just  
20 from talking to people in the courthouse there were a lot  
21 of questions, but I don't think there was any, you know,  
22 huge concern that anything bad was going to happen.

23 Q So people --

24 A And that's just based strictly on, you know, once  
25 again the people that I talked to in the courthouse.



1 Q But your sense is that people were pretty calm  
2 and reasonable on Thursday?

3 A Yes, most definitely.

4 Q Do you know whether you received calls from people  
5 who were not living in the area who had a different impression  
6 of what was going on at the plant during the course of  
7 Thursday?

8 A I think it was sometime on Thursday -- it would  
9 have been late in the evening, it sticks in my mind, I know  
10 it definitely happened on Friday, but I think it started on  
11 Thursday a little bit, that we would get a call from a local  
12 resident saying, my cousin from Philadelphia or somewhere  
13 called and said he heard that it was getting better --  
14 excuse me, might be getting worse. I don't recall, once  
15 again I was not the only one answering the telephones, but  
16 I don't recall receiving a phone call from anybody out of  
17 the area. But I recall answering the phone a couple times  
18 where they had somebody out of the area who had heard some-  
19 thing and called them. But it wasn't a major problem on  
20 Thursday night.

21 After Friday is when it really started kicking in.

22 Q We will get to that when we get to Friday.

23 Did anything else of significance happen during the  
24 course of Thursday? 1912 294

25 A No. Again it was just passing forth the little

1 information that we did have. And I had met with Jack  
2 Semanko who works for one of the hospitals and was keeping  
3 him briefed in the situation, and he in turn was briefing  
4 the other hospitals and so forth.

5 Q Do you know whether any of the hospitals in the  
6 area were planning for potential evacuation at that point?

7 A Thursday, to the best of my knowledge I don't  
8 believe so.

9 Q What was your purpose of meeting with Semanko on  
10 Thursday?

11 A I had worked closely with him because he was on  
12 the Emergency Health Services Council of the county, of  
13 Dauphin County, which I am involved. And it was just to  
14 keep him updated on what little we knew at the particular  
15 time. And then, as I say, he notified the other hospitals  
16 to give them what little information we did have.

17 Q So am I correct in understanding that the hospitals  
18 at some point later down the road started to consider evacua-  
19 tion of patients; is that correct?

20 A Oh, yes.

21 Q Is there anything else on Thursday?

22 A On Thursday we had some of our amateur radio  
23 operators and we set up -- made sure the communications were  
24 working between our emergency operating center and the  
25 Civil Defense van. And we talked to -- I talked to some

1 other agencies that had called, as an example, Civil Air  
2 Patrol, we have used them before in emergencies. They wanted  
3 to let us know they were available, and what was going on.

4 Q Can you summarize what your understanding on  
5 Thursday evening was concerning the status of the plant?

6 A It basically is that they were continuing cooling  
7 operations. They were going toward a cold shutdown. The  
8 situation was improving and there was no off-site risks.

9 Q Up to that point had you any problems in communicat-  
10 ing with any state agency or local agency?

11 A No, none at all.

12 Q Had there been any contact with any other state  
13 agency other than PEMA through Thursday?

14 A Well, I had talked to people from the Bureau of  
15 Radiological Protection.

16 Q Had there been any contact with any other federal  
17 agency?

18 A I was never in touch with any federal agencies.

19 Q And no federal agency up to that point contacted  
20 you?

21 A No.

22 Q Did you feel through Thursday that you were  
23 receiving adequate information concerning the status of the  
24 plant and recommendations or advice concerning what your  
25 activities should be?

1912 296

1 A Most definitely, yes.

2 Q Let's go to Friday then.

3 Did you stay over on Thursday evening again?

4 A That's correct, we stayed all night.

5 Q What happened on Friday morning?

6 A About two-thirty that morning we received a call  
7 that there had been a discharge into the river.

8 Q Who did you receive that call from?

9 A From PEMA.

10 Once again, to the best of my knowledge it presented  
11 no problem or anything of that nature.

12 Q Do you know what time this call came in?

13 A Around two-thirty sticks in my mind. That's what  
14 I have logged, but I can't say that that's exactly the time.

15 About six-fifty, 0650, that morning we received a call  
16 -- or I called, I am sorry, I called PEMA, the Emergency  
17 Management Agency, and asked for an update and was told that  
18 the situation was improving at that particular time.

19 We, of course, were calling our locals and letting them  
20 know what was transpiring to the best of our knowledge.

21 Basically the next biggest incident that occurred at  
22 approximately 0834 hours on Friday, I received a call from  
23 Jim Floyd, who is an employee down at Three Mile Island.  
24 I don't know his exact position. And it was with reference  
25 to release into the environment and he wanted PEMA to give

1 him a call.

2 Q Can you recall in more detail exactly what the  
3 message was?

4 A No. It was a very short conversation to the  
5 best of my knowledge. "We had a release. Have PEMA call me."  
6 That might not be an exact quote, but it's darned close.

7 And he was -- seemed to be in a hurry, so I didn't  
8 question him too much.

9 Q And he didn't state why he was calling you as  
10 opposed to calling PEMA directly at that point?

11 A No, not at that time.

12 Q Do you now know why he called you instead of PEMA?

13 A From several of the meetings that I have been to  
14 and reading what testimony has been given thus far, apparently  
15 there were several people down at the site making really  
16 duplicate phone calls. I am under the impression that  
17 when he had called me that somebody else down at the site  
18 was already calling PEMA.

19 Q So they were overlapping their own efforts?

20 A Basically that appears to have happened on several  
21 occasions.

22 Once again, that's from having attended some meetings and  
23 things of that nature.

24 At 0835 I contacted PEMA, Carl Kuehn in reference to the  
25 call I received from TMI.



1 Q Did you have any problems getting through to  
2 PEMA at that point?

3 A No.

4 Q Before we go on, you mentioned that you had  
5 learned that there was some duplication of effort at meetings.  
6 What kind of meetings were you referring to?

7 A Well, this was within the past month or so. As  
8 an example, we had a meeting up at PEMA, I think about three  
9 weeks ago, at which the NRC was there and the county Directors  
10 and a couple of other agencies. And this was just brought  
11 out in the course of talking. When -- as an example, when  
12 I got a call at 0834 and at this particular meeting I heard  
13 the state had already had this, somebody else on the phone,  
14 and it was just brought out that it appeared that there  
15 were several calls coming off the Island pertaining to the  
16 same thing.

17 Q When you called PEMA at 8:34 in the morning, did  
18 they indicate to you that they had already known there was  
19 a release?

20 A No, no.

21 Okay, I had -- my Commissioners came down. After that  
22 call I called upstairs to the County Commissions and I said:  
23 "Come down here."

24 Q When you say "Come down here" you mean --

25 A They are on the second floor and I am down in

1 the basement of the courthouse. And I wanted them down  
2 just to brief them on what had occurred.

3 Q When you talked to this person at PEMA, did you  
4 receive any more information from that person concerning  
5 the release?

6 A Oh, no. Once again he just said: "Okay, we  
7 will take care of it."

8 At 0854 I received a call from Jim Cassidy from PEMA  
9 who indicated that there was an on-site emergency, they had  
10 had a significant increase in readings, no evacuation was  
11 needed. That's basically the gist of the conversation.

12 Q Can you remember any more detail about that  
13 conversation?

14 A No.

15 Q Who is Jim Cassidy, do you know?

16 A He's a staff member over at the Pennsylvania  
17 Emergency Management Agency.

18 What we did then is we started our phone calls all  
19 over again, my secretary and assistant and the volunteers,  
20 whatever, were filling them in on the latest event here.

21 Q Basically what were you telling them?

22 A That there had been an on-site emergency; there  
23 was an increase in the readings, some type of release but  
24 no evacuation was needed. And as I said we notified the  
25 local municipalities and so forth. All right.

1 About 9:25 I received a call from Col. Henderson, who  
2 is the Director of the State Emergency Management Agency, and  
3 he indicated to me, once again this is not a verbatim quote  
4 of things, that there had been a release and that we would be  
5 probably advised to initiate evacuation proceedings. And  
6 that we would -- once again to the best of my knowledge  
7 -- we would be getting an official call in a few minutes.

8 Q Did he say what kind of an evacuation was going  
9 to be coming?

10 A I don't recall. I assumed that we were talking  
11 the five-mile zone. I just assumed that on my own.

12 Q Did it sound to you as if the decision was  
13 already made at that point, that an evacuation was going to  
14 be carried out or --

15 A Yes. This was like a prenotice and be prepared,  
16 it's coming down through..

17 Q So you thought for sure that this evacuation order  
18 would be coming through?

19 A Oh, yes. Immediately what I did, as I put all  
20 of my 10 mile fire companies on stand-by in quarters. We  
21 can set the sirens off from our emergency operation center  
22 and put them on stand-by.

23 Q What do you mean by 10 mile fire companies?

24 A They were within the 10-mile radius of the plant.

25 I had my dispatchers -- we have monitors in the school

1 districts and we had them call in and so forth. And then  
2 I went on WHP radio and just basically said that, once again  
3 I don't remember word for word, and I have tried to get a  
4 hold of a tape which is supposed to have been saved,  
5 but has somehow or other gotten lost, basically as a result  
6 of the incident at Three Mile Island there is a possibility  
7 that we might have to evacuate an area. If we -- or that  
8 we might have to evacuate. If we would have to evacuate  
9 this is what we want to -- want you to take with you, you  
10 know, take your time and people on one side -- we use  
11 Swatara Creek as a guideline. And people on one side of  
12 Swatara Creek were to go to the Hershey area, the others  
13 were to go to the Harrisburg Farm Show area. Those are  
14 basically staging areas. It was just to initially get them  
15 out of the five-mile zone then we would disperse them  
16 to shelters afterwards.

17 Q So your purpose in going on WHP was to put  
18 the people on alert as well?

19 A Right.

20 Q And to inform them of what they should do when the  
21 evacuation comes?

22 A Right.

23 Q Did you put it in terms of a real possibility,  
24 or that it was in fact --

25 A No. I kept saying, and I have verified this

1 with the newsman that I talked to, that I emphasized that  
2 there was no evacuation going on.

3 Q What did you say, as best as you can remember?

4 A I said there was no evacuation going on, however,  
5 if we would have to, this is what -- what I had just said  
6 earlier, and I repeated it a couple times.

7 Q Did you indicate to the public that an evacuation  
8 was likely?

9 A No.

10 Q Did you indicate that it was possible?

11 A Well, I am sure I did by saying as a result of  
12 the incident an evacuation is a possibility. I didn't say  
13 it was likely -- is a possibility, yes.

14 Q How quickly did you get on to WHP?

15 A Fast.

16 Q How did you arrange that so quickly?

17 A I just called the unlisted news number and iden-  
18 tified myself to Jim Moyer.

19 Q Did you have any prior arrangement with this  
20 radio station?

21 A That's our emergency broadcast station, our  
22 primary EBS station. So we would automatically go to them.

23 Q You indicated that there was a tape and that this  
24 tape is lost.

25 A Well, I asked him to tape it. And he indicated



1 to me in later conversation when things had quieted down  
2 that he had taped it. When I called back to try and get  
3 a copy, it apparently had been lost or erased or something  
4 like that.

5 Q So you had never even heard the tape yourself?

6 A No, I haven't.

7 Q What was your reasoning for going on to WHP  
8 and giving this message at this point?

9 A Just to make the people aware that the possibility  
10 did exist and if it did occur, you know, here's what you do  
11 and here is what you take with you. Stay calm, listen to  
12 instructions of the emergency personnel and what you will  
13 hear over the media and so forth.

14 Q Did you ever receive a call back in five minutes  
15 from Col. Henderson?

16 A No, I didn't.

17 Q What happened?

18 A I don't know exactly what transpired. I don't  
19 recall hearing back from the state until around ten o'clock,  
20 I would say, somewhere in that area. I don't have it  
21 logged. But I have been told that we did receive a call  
22 back from the state during that particular time frame. As  
23 I say, basically what we were doing is we were putting our  
24 units in position; we were notifying our local Directors  
25 and things of that nature. We were doing what we would have

1 had an evacuation been required.

2 Q Do you know what the substance of this 9:35  
3 call was, I mean this ten o'clock call was?

4 A I think that's when we were told that an actual  
5 evacuation was not going to take place and that we should  
6 just be on an alert or something like that. It's just  
7 almost completely lost from my mind because everything just  
8 happened so rapidly in that short span of time.

9 In addition, it was at that particular time that we  
10 had the telephone problem.

11 Q Do you want to talk about that?

12 A A lot of people obviously heard this and they  
13 heard the fire sirens going off to put people on stand-by  
14 and there was just a massive amount of phone calls that  
15 overloaded the lines in the area.

16 Q How many lines do you have in the emergency  
17 center?

18 A Well, I have approximately 50 incoming 911 lines.  
19 I have four 7-digit number emergency lines in the COM center.  
20 I have two nonlisted police administrative lines and non-  
21 listed fire administrative lines. I have several direct  
22 hot lines with some of the fire companies. In my office I  
23 have five incoming lines.

24 Q As of Friday morning, were all of these phones  
25 manned?

1912 305

1           A           Yes. Well, not every extension was. My secretary  
2 was there and my assistant and so forth. There wasn't  
3 somebody at every phone, but every phone was manned, every  
4 line could be answered.

5           Q           And you are saying somewhere after your appearance  
6 on WHP people started calling in and questioning what they  
7 should do?

8           A           They were questioning what was going on.

9           Q           What were you telling them?

10          A           Just basically that there was the possibility  
11 that an evacuation could take place. When the system over-  
12 loaded there weren't too many people getting through, so  
13 there weren't too many calls. We maintained communications  
14 with our local people, the police and fire and ambulance  
15 and so forth, through our communications network. So that  
16 communication was not affected by the telephone outage.

17          Q           Was your communications with PEMA, for instance,  
18 affected by this overload of calls?

19          A           We had difficulty getting out on the phones, yes,  
20 right. I don't know exactly how long it lasted for, but  
21 I -- once again because we were extremely busy. I am  
22 under the impression it was maybe 20-25 minutes that there  
23 was this real heavy overload that just completely knocked  
24 out the system, so to speak. 1912 306

25          Q           This happened right after the 9:30 WHP message?

1           A           I would say within a matter of a few minutes.

2           Q           Then this call came in around ten o'clock saying  
3 that no evacuation was going to take place?

4           A           To the best of my knowledge. It came from PEMA.

5 I don't remember who --

6           Q           Did you take the message, do you know? Was it  
7 you or somebody else?

8           A           I personally don't recall taking it. I cannot  
9 answer yes or no, I did or did not take it. We were in the  
10 process of gearing up our machinery and so forth.

11          Q           Had you tried to call PEMA back prior to receiving  
12 this ten o'clock phone call?

13          A           I don't remember.

14          Q           After you received this phone call, what did you  
15 do?

16          A           We got in touch with the locals and just told  
17 them that there was no evacuation called for, that we were  
18 going to keep the units on stand-by and they had better  
19 get their emergency plans drawn up, if they hadn't done so  
20 already.

21          Q           Did it seem to you at this point that the locals  
22 were taking the whole event more seriously than they had  
23 been prior to this?

24          A           After we put everybody on stand-by and the phones  
25 started ringing and so forth, I think they were perhaps

1 taking it a little bit more seriously.

2 Q What was the next significant event on Friday  
3 then?

4 A Around noontime somewhere, that's when the  
5 Governor's office recommended the evacuation of the pregnant  
6 women and preschool children, and -- to stay in -- well,  
7 actually it was a little before noon, sometime before noon,  
8 and they recommended that people within a 10-mile zone  
9 of the plant, as I recall, keep your windows closed, stay  
10 indoors for a while.

11 Q Did that recommendation -- both of those  
12 recommendations come at the same time?

13 A To the best of my knowledge.

14 Q How did you learn of those recommendations?

15 A There was a call from PEMA, and I am not positive,  
16 but I think we also heard it on the radio. But --

17 Q But initially you learned of this through PEMA?

18 A To the best of my knowledge, with -- as I  
19 indicated earlier, with it being four months ago and as  
20 rapidly as things happened, it's sometimes difficult to  
21 remember exactly in detail.

22 Q I understand.

23 A What we also did in that particular timeframe,  
24 which was around noon on Friday, is we opened up a shelter.  
25 Of course, we had been in touch with the Red Cross people and



1 we opened up s shelter at the Hershey Sports Arena. That was  
2 in the 10-mile zone, as a matter of fact, it's a little bit  
3 more than 10 miles from the plant. We felt that that was  
4 a good place to put the people initially.

5 Q And opening up this arena was decided upon once  
6 you had learned of the recommendation to evacuate pregnant  
7 women and children; is that correct?

8 A Yes.

9 Q It had not been considered before?

10 A No, no. Once again we initially planned on just  
11 using that as a staging area. Between, we'll say, ten and  
12 11:30, as an example, the Red Cross representative came  
13 to my office and that's when that decision was made.

14 Q What were you doing about the school children?

15 A Okay. The schools -- the children -- the schools  
16 were closed.

17 Q Why were they closed?

18 A I don't remember. Obviously because of the  
19 incident. Who ordered them closed; I believe it was the  
20 Governor's office.

21 Q Do you know when they were closed?

22 A Around noontime on Friday.

23 Q Is it your understanding that the Governor's  
24 office communicated directly with school superintendents or  
25 school officials to close schools?

1 A No. I don't know the exact procedure.

2 Q You were not involved at all in the closing of  
3 the schools?

4 A No.

5 Q So during this planning of the evacuation of  
6 the pregnant women and children you did not consider getting  
7 the kids out of school or getting the kids to their families  
8 or anything like that? That had already been accomplished  
9 by that point?

10 A That had pretty much taken care of itself. From  
11 what I understand some parents went to the schools and  
12 picked their children up.

13 Q How did you communicate this recommendation to  
14 the people in the county?

15 A The evacuation of the pregnant women and preschool  
16 children?

17 Q And the cover up, staying indoors.

18 A That had already been given to the news media by  
19 the state agency.

20 Q So you didn't do anything to let the public  
21 know about that?

22 A It was on every radio station and so forth, as  
23 far as we were aware. We, of course, passed the information  
24 on to the local Directors and so forth. But most of them,  
25 to the best of my recollection, they had already heard it.

1 Q You didn't send out any sound trucks or anything  
2 like that at this point?

3 A We didn't, no. It's my understanding that some  
4 of the local municipalities did start that type of procedure.  
5 Once again this is where if they had had local plans they would  
6 have been better prepared to handle this situation.

7 Q So other than coordinating with the Red Cross to  
8 set up the Hershey Arena for the evacuees, were you at all  
9 involved in the actual evacuation of pregnant women and  
10 children?

11 A No, no. The only way that we really would have  
12 gotten involved, and once again it had already been on the  
13 media, would have been to supply any extra vehicles or anything  
14 of that nature, that the local Directors might have needed  
15 for those that didn't have transportation.

16 Q Do you have a sense of the reaction of the citizens  
17 at this point, around twelve o'clock, when the recommendations  
18 were made?

19 A Deep concern.

20 Q Were your calls increasing again and lines getting  
21 tied up?

22 A We had a lot of calls, but it was not as bad as  
23 it was for that short period of time that morning. From  
24 we'll say ten o'clock on Friday morning, which is when I  
25 feel the phone problem cleared up, for a week we had pretty

1 much solid calls.

2 Q What were you telling these people when they  
3 called?

4 A It depended on the question. Initially, you  
5 know, we just gave them, once again, what information  
6 we had. But then as the event progressed and days passed  
7 by we got involved in a whole bunch of different questions.

8 Q What were you telling them concerning specifically  
9 about evacuation when they were calling at twelve o'clock  
10 or twelve-thirty or one o'clock?

11 A That there was no evacuation taking place. They  
12 should listen to the news media. If you had to go, or if  
13 you would have to move, this is what we would want you to  
14 take with you, and just keep listening to the news media.

15 Q Can you summarize what the activities were on  
16 Friday afternoon?

17 A Okay. We got a call from PEMA, this one I have  
18 logged, they indicated that the situation at the plant was  
19 relatively stable. They had a puff which was released  
20 earlier in the morning. And once again we called all the  
21 locals and personnel in the 10-mile area and advised them  
22 of this thing.

23 Q What time did this call come in?

24 A I don't have an exact time, but we are talking  
25 after one o'clock, around one o'clock. And we just passed

1 the information that we had on to the locals and so forth.  
2 And advised them that if they hadn't even started getting  
3 their act together that they should.

4 Q Were you offering them any kind of assistance  
5 in the development of these plans at this point?

6 A At this stage of the game, you know, that's not  
7 the time for us to be offering assistance other than to ful-  
8 fill whatever need they happened to have.

9 You know, what we were saying to them was do your resource  
10 inventory. How many buses do you have for transportation?  
11 How many policemen do you have? Things of that nature. We  
12 were giving them assistance and kind of telling them what to  
13 do. But that's really not the proper time to be doing anything.

14 And then basically on Friday afternoon we were reviewing  
15 -- I had some of my staff people in and we were reviewing  
16 what we were going to do if we did have to move the people,  
17 and just phone calls going back and forth. And there were  
18 just so many -- at that time, on Friday morning, really I  
19 guess, is when our log keeping kind of got shot in terms of  
20 any type of accuracy for times and so forth.

21 Q So is it fair to say that on Friday the situation  
22 became a lot more severe and that you were a lot more busy  
23 on Friday in terms of planning for potential evacuation than  
24 before?

25 A It became intense on Friday morning.

1912 313



1 Q And did it remain that way throughout Friday?

2 A That's correct. Once again Friday was just  
3 constantly on the phone answering questions, suggestions to  
4 the locals, working with the Red Cross, things of that nature.

5 Q Was there any discussion through, well, up  
6 through Friday evening concerning extension of the evacuation  
7 plans beyond five miles or beyond 10 miles?

8 A Well, we had been working on 10 miles on Friday.

9 Q Do you remember why you decided to extend it out  
10 to 10 miles?

11 A The state had notified us I think Friday morning,  
12 but I am not exactly positive. And we went to the 20-mile  
13 situation sometime on Saturday.

14 Once again I don't recall exactly the times that were  
15 involved because we were just so darned busy we couldn't  
16 keep a super accurate log.

17 Q Before we get to Saturday, can you give me a sense  
18 of the feeling in the community throughout Friday and what  
19 you were doing to inform the public about what was going on?

20 A On Friday morning, which is really about the best  
21 time for me to give a sense of the community, obviously there  
22 was a great amount of concern due to the large volume of phone  
23 calls, and uncertainty of what was transpiring, what was  
24 going to happen.

25 Friday afternoon things had calmed down a little bit, but

1 I still think there was this heightened interest and concern  
2 as to what was going on down there. When we would get calls  
3 from the local media or any media, basically what we would  
4 do we would keep our comments rather restricted and just  
5 say that in our office this is what we are doing, we are  
6 answering questions or referring to different agencies, we  
7 are working on our plans, things of that nature.

8 If they would ask what was going on down at the Island,  
9 we referred them to either the state or to the Bureau of  
10 Radiological Protection, because I personally felt that  
11 it was better to have all of the statements concerning the  
12 actual problem on the Island coming from one source. I  
13 didn't want 20 Directors or so forth giving their opinion.  
14 This would have just made a mess.

15 Q Do you have any feeling about the media reporting  
16 up to this point and how it affected what you were doing?

17 A As I say, it seems to me on Friday, it would have  
18 been in the afternoon, is when we started getting -- we were  
19 being made aware of the fact that apparently there were some  
20 stories going out that evacuation was going on in fact, and  
21 things of that nature.

22 And so it was on Friday afternoon that this situation  
23 mediawise seemed to deteriorate. What little time we had  
24 really to listen to the radio it appeared the local media  
25 was keeping the thing in the proper perspective. But rather

1912 315

1 it was people from the outside area that were -- we understand  
2 you are evacuating. I got a call from a station in Colorado  
3 on Friday night and they asked me how the evacuation was  
4 going. This presented a real problem. Because what was  
5 happening was this created a problem because we were getting  
6 calls from the local residents who had gotten a call from a  
7 relative either out of state or out of the area and they were  
8 being told how bad things were in our area.

9 And I think I even indicated to the station that I talked  
10 to, and I don't remember which one it was, that, you know,  
11 things aren't that bad here right now. The people are not  
12 running screaming or doing anything like that at all. We  
13 are very calm. You people are more upset than we are.

14 Q So that caused a lot of the phone calls that were  
15 coming in?

16 A Right. We spent a lot of time dispelling rumors  
17 and stories that people had heard.

18 Q Was there any talk about setting up a rumor  
19 control system so that you could dispell these stories?

20 A Not at that time, not a specific rumor control  
21 phone. To a degree we had it going because people were  
22 calling us and we were giving them the best information  
23 that we did have possible. 1912 316

24 Q Throughout Friday were you feeling positive  
25 about the information flow that was going on between state

1 agencies and yourself? Were you receiving adequate informa-  
2 tion?

3 A At that time it appeared we were, yes.

4 Q Up to the point of Friday evening, had there  
5 been any other communication with federal agencies?

6 A To the best of my knowledge, no.

7 Q At any point during this time had you been  
8 informed that anybody from the federal agency would be  
9 coming in to help you develop emergency evacuation plans?

10 A No. The only thing that we had heard about the  
11 federal agencies, and it seems to me it came from a call  
12 from PEMA, was that NRC obviously had people down at the  
13 Island and were getting more there. I don't recall anybody  
14 saying to me that we were going to have extra assistance  
15 coming in.

16 Q Let's go onto Saturday.

17 What was your understanding as of Saturday morning  
18 concerning the status of the plant?

19 A Once again that the situation had stabilized and  
20 that while the plant was not, quote, unquote, normal, it  
21 was not leaking or doing anything of that nature. And  
22 there was no evacuation called for at that time. Keep  
23 your planning efforts going. 1912 317

24 Q Had you been informed of anything about a hydrogen  
25 bubble or hydrogen explosion up to that point?

1           A           Sometime Friday, and I just for the life of me  
2 do not recall the exact time or exactly how I heard about  
3 it, but I think we learned about the bubble on Friday.

4           Q           Do you remember how you learned about it?

5           A           I don't recall getting the phone call. I know  
6 we were listening to -- some people were listening to the  
7 radio and so forth. I don't recall any specifics about the  
8 bubble at all. We were just too darned busy, really.

9           Q           Up to this point, at least up to Saturday morning,  
10 you were concerned only with the 10-mile evacuation plan; is  
11 that correct?

12          A           That's correct. We were geared towards the  
13 five and the 10 really, zooming in on that.

14                      Saturday morning -- once again, of course, we stayed  
15 there overnight -- Saturday morning, early in the morning,  
16 it was after midnight, we received a call concerning the  
17 Frey Village Retirement Center which had 200 -- it was  
18 over 250 residents there, elderly people.

19          Q           What is Frey Village?

20          A           It's a retirement center. As I said, they had  
21 a little over 250 people there, I think.

22                      Anyway, I talked to the administrator of the home,  
23 updated him on the situation as best I knew. He asked if  
24 he should evacuate, and I indicated to him that there was  
25 no official evacuation ordered. It was really up to him, if

1912 318



1 he would rather do it now at a leisurely pace as compared  
2 to under emergency conditions, we would help him as much as  
3 possible.

4 Q Did you recommend any course of action for him to  
5 take at that time?

6 A The only thing that I recommended to him was that  
7 if he felt, you know, it was his decision, that he would  
8 rather be able to move the patients at a little bit more  
9 leisurely pace that we would assist him in whatever manner  
10 possible. Basically the gentleman down there that we  
11 talked to, he had been in touch with other nursing homes  
12 out of the area to find out how much space they had and so  
13 forth.

14 Now he called us and he wanted ambulances and so forth.  
15 And what we told him to do is that we would only supply a  
16 limited number of ambulances because in case an evacuation  
17 actually came through we wanted our own units near home.  
18 I think he had set up some spaces as far away as Scranton  
19 or Wilkes-Barre. And we didn't want our ambulances that far  
20 away. We would give him a few to work with.

21 Q Did you in fact do that?

1912 319

22 A Yes, we did. The move took place throughout  
23 the day on Saturday. It was done at a very easy pace so  
24 as not to upset the residents, the elderly residents, of  
25 the community. Also during that morning, early in the

1 morning, we received a phone call from the administrator  
2 of the Odd Fellows Home, which is also a retirement center,  
3 much smaller. Frey Village incidentally is in Middletown;  
4 Odd Fellows is in Lower Swatara Township. And basically we  
5 worked out the same arrangement with the gentleman from  
6 the Odd Fellows Home. What he did is he had made arrange-  
7 ments with the state hospital. They had an empty wing  
8 up there. So in that particular case we used a lot of local  
9 ambulances and so forth because there you are only talking  
10 a 10-mile trip.

11 Q But this evacuation was still voluntary?

12 A Oh, yes, yes.

13 Q It was not even recommended by anyone; is that  
14 right?

15 A . No, not officially recommended. Once again the  
16 only evacuation throughout the entire incident was the  
17 pregnant women and preschool children in the five-mile zone.

18 Q Were you at all concerned that the process of  
19 evacuating these people from these homes would affect the  
20 surrounding population, that people would react to this  
21 and panic would be created?

1912 320

22 A No. We were not worried about panic. We, and I  
23 mean myself and other people in my office, we have great  
24 faith in the people in our community. We have been involved  
25 in other evacuation situations. And it's not like the

1 people have never been involved in emergency situations. We  
2 were not worried about a panic-type thing. However, we did  
3 notify the news media that this event was taking place  
4 because we were sure the public was going to see it.

5 Q Had there been any discussion, or a continuation  
6 of a discussion with Semanko concerning evacuations of  
7 hospitals throughout Saturday?

8 A Yes. The medical group, the volunteer medical  
9 group which was Jack Semanko and Jim Fisher; Dr. Smith,  
10 J. Stanley Smith; and Joel Grottenthaler, they were giving  
11 themselves and working in on that particular problem. That  
12 was their assignment. And during the day, this is what  
13 they were working on.

14 At that particular time Jim Fisher was in charge of that  
15 group as opposed to Jack Semanko.

16 Q Can you summarize what it was they were planning  
17 to do?

1912 321

18 A What they were doing is they were going to --  
19 they had advised hospitals to discharge as many patients  
20 as they possibly could and so forth, to come up with a  
21 current census of how many patients they could not let out,  
22 in coronary care and intensive care, things of that nature.  
23 They were checking with the Department of Health and other  
24 medical institutions across the state to see which hospitals  
25 could take patients, which hospitals could take certain kind

1 of patients, neonatal patients and so forth, arranging for  
2 special transportation for specific kinds of patients, such  
3 as the neonatals. You bring them out in an incubator and you  
4 had to have a special ambulance and so forth to handle that  
5 situation.

6 Q Had there been any discussion or planning for  
7 limiting admission to hospital at this point?

8 A Oh, yes, right. When the procedure went in for  
9 discharging of the patients, it was also suggested that  
10 emergencies only be admitted. That was discussed initially.

11 Q Were these just discussed, or were these actually  
12 followed through? Were people actually discharged?

13 A Oh, yes, most definitely. I think the population  
14 of the five hospitals when this started was somewhat over  
15 3,000 patients and to the best of my knowledge it got down  
16 to around 1300, in that general vicinity. So there was a  
17 drop in the hospital population, that's correct.

18 Q Were you at all involved in this planning, or was  
19 this --

1912 322

20 A No, no. I had given that assignment to a  
21 specific group. And then basically one of their other  
22 functions was to find out how many patients do they have  
23 left; how many ambulances would they need; what types of  
24 transportation and so forth. Then they would let me know  
25 and I would hand that over to the transportation group and

1 so forth.

2 Q Let's continue in this chronology.

3 What else happened on Saturday of significance?

4 A Okay. We had met with the five-mile Directors  
5 early Saturday morning to verify their needs. At that time  
6 they were supposed to survey their community and so forth.  
7 To verify their needs, to advise them of the staging areas,  
8 that their people would be moved out to and so forth. While  
9 I was meeting with them the rest of my staff members were  
10 working on the 10-mile plan and also getting in touch with  
11 those Directors to bring them back in later, for a meeting  
12 later on that afternoon.

13 Q How many people were working on the 10-mile plan,  
14 do you know?

15 A Around 13 or so.

16 Q Were they all county people?

17 A No. At this stage of the game I had most of  
18 my volunteer group in. Of course, all my paid people were  
19 there, but then we also had our volunteer staff come in.

20 Q I guess my question is: Were there any people  
21 from any other state agencies there or any federal agencies  
22 helping you in the development of this plan?

23 A Right. We had two representatives from Region 2,  
24 showed up very, very late Friday night. They just came  
25 in for a matter of a moment or two, said they were there to



1 observe and then they left and said they would be back first  
2 thing in the morning.

3 And then Friday sometime we also got a state employee  
4 that came in to help.

5 Q And all three of these people came back Saturday  
6 morning to help?

7 A Right, came back Saturday. The two federal  
8 people were from the Region 2 headquarters of DCPA at Olney,  
9 Maryland.

10 Q Had you requested them to come in and help in  
11 the development of this plan?

12 A No, no. As a matter of fact they were sent to --  
13 I believe they were just told to come in and observe what was  
14 transpiring, but we put them to work.

15 Q Did you find they were helpful?

16 A Very, extremely. They were involved in all  
17 facets of the project.

18 Q How about the state person you mentioned?

19 A Once again he came in -- he was from the central  
20 area headquarters which is up in Selinsgrove. And what  
21 the state had done to help the counties out is they drain  
22 the manpower from the central area headquarters and put  
23 them in the different counties and so forth. One of his  
24 main functions was to work on the coordination with host  
25 counties and coordination between the state and the county

1 and so forth.

2 Q Was there coordination going on between the five  
3 or six surrounding counties at that point?

4 A Very limited coordination. We were in touch  
5 with them. Basically we were all involved in drawing up  
6 our own plan. We--in looking at a map, you can see where  
7 Three Mile Island is and it was just a common sense-type  
8 thing. For example, Cumberland County would go to the  
9 west, whichever area the counties would go to, Dauphin  
10 County would go to the north and so forth.

11 There was one or two instances where we were going  
12 basically in the same direction as Cumberland County was  
13 going. That's where we got involved with the coordination  
14 of the traffic patterns with PennDOT and things of that  
15 nature.

16 Q So you all coordinated routes for exit to --

17 A Yes. Basically what we did was, there were  
18 not too many problems involved because each county was  
19 going in a different direction, but there were a couple  
20 of instances where questions cropped up and they would be  
21 solved at the state level, coordinated at the state level.

22 Q What is your sense of the meeting with the locals  
23 that you had Saturday morning?

24 A Most of them had been working throughout the  
25 night it appeared. They were quite concerned. They wanted

1 to know exactly what was going on down at the plant.  
2 I, of course, was not in a position to say exactly what  
3 was going on down there, other than the situation was stable  
4 and there were experts down there and they were doing --  
5 monitoring down there and so forth. So we just gave them  
6 what little information that we did have available.

7 Q Did you receive word at any time during Saturday  
8 to extend the evacuation plan to 20 miles?

9 A Right. That was -- I sent one of my staff  
10 members up to the state, Mr. Smith, to pick up some infor-  
11 mation that they had concerning the 5, 10 and 20 mile --  
12 concerning 5-, 10- and 20-mile planning. It was on a single  
13 sheet of paper as I recollect.

14 Q Had you been informed by someone from the state  
15 this was available to you?

16 A Yes. They had called and wanted me to come up,  
17 but I couldn't go up because I had a meeting with my locals,  
18 so I sent Mr. Smith up.

19 Q Can we just clarify for the record, when you say  
20 state, I assume that you mean PEMA; is that correct?

21 A Yes. I am sorry. That's my normal terminology.

22 So anyway, he went up and picked it up and brought it  
23 back.

24 Q Had they at that time told you that they wanted  
25 you to plan for 20-mile evacuation?

1           A           I thought it was later on in the day, but they  
2 are saying that it was earlier. The state agency indicated  
3 it was earlier on Saturday that we were told.

4           Q           Your recollection is that you had picked up  
5 this material and then some time after that point you  
6 learned that you were to extend it out to 20 miles?

7           A           Right, it was specifically mentioned 20 miles.

8           Q           Let's go on with the chronology in terms of what  
9 you actually were doing that day.

10          A           Now, what we also had going on at that particular  
11 time, of my five-mile Director meetings, we had the printer  
12 -- the county has a small printshop -- we had him come in and  
13 had him print up leaflets advising people what to do, also  
14 some passes for emergency workers and things of that nature.

15                 The telephone company had installed some extra phones on  
16 Saturday morning.

17          Q           Had you requested that that be done?

18          A           My assistant had requested it.

19                 In addition, the state also had a hot line put in,  
20 but that request was from them.

21          Q           These were phone lines, just general phone lines  
22 for people to call in and for you to call out?

23          A           With the exception of the hot lines which were  
24 direct phone lines. In other words, we can pick it up  
25 and it just goes to one place.

1 Q Those hot lines were also established on  
2 Saturday?

3 A The one with the state on Saturday and we had  
4 phones installed on Sunday also, some extra phones, including  
5 a rumor control phone, a phone that we called the rumor  
6 control phone. And over the period of Saturday and Sunday  
7 is when the phones were installed. I don't recall specific  
8 times or anything.

9 Q Who were the other hot lines set up with?

10 A WHP and -- which as I mentioned earlier is our  
11 emergency broadcast station, and also WCMB.

12 Q That is another station?

13 A Another radio station, correct.

14 Up until about noontime, once again, we had the planning  
15 going on for the 10- and the five-mile zones, we were finding  
16 out the needs of the local Directors in that area with  
17 respect to National Guard troops for traffic control, things  
18 of that nature. Some other federal people showed up, or  
19 were sent there by the federal agency, there was a film  
20 crew and a camera crew.

21 Q What were they doing?

22 A They were gathering data for historical purposes.  
23 There were some people from, I believe it was the Research  
24 Management Corporation, or something on that line, who were  
25 under contract to DCPA to, I assume, study us to see how we



1 were functioning to see what was going on, something of that  
2 nature.

3 Q What were these people doing there? Were they  
4 just observing?

5 A Initially they were just observing, but eventually  
6 when things calmed down they tried to sit down with us to  
7 find out what was going on and so forth.

8 Q How many people were there doing this?

9 A Well, the film crews and so forth were there for  
10 a very short period of time. That involved maybe two or  
11 three people. As far as from this corporation, I believe  
12 there were about three people there, and that fluctuated.

13 Q How long did they stay there?

14 A They were there for several days. They weren't  
15 in our office at all times. As I say, apparently a group  
16 of them came up and they went to different counties, but they  
17 were there for several days.

18 Q Do you feel that this at all interfered with what  
19 you had to do?

20 A No. We -- like the film crew, I mean they just  
21 went and did their own thing.

22 This research corporation, they really didn't cause us  
23 too many problems. I don't know if I would suggest that that  
24 be done in the future. They could come in a week later or  
25 whatever and get the same type information. But I guess

1 since this was the first time that's why they were there.

2 Q When did you start development of the 20-mile  
3 evacuation plan?

4 A That started during the day on Saturday. Once  
5 again it required finding out what the needs of the various  
6 communities were and finding more host counties.

7 Q What is your recollection of how you became  
8 informed that a 20-mile plan was to go into effect?

9 A That we were to plan for 20 miles? Sometime on  
10 Saturday we got a call. The exact time I don't remember.

11 Q From the state?

12 A Yes, from the state agency. Then we automatically  
13 started planning for that. We, of course, had a lot of  
14 activity going on at that particular time with the hospitals  
15 and the nursing homes that we were working on. We also  
16 had the local municipalities give us a phone number that  
17 would be manned 24 hours a day, and that was given out to  
18 all the news media. That if anybody had any special  
19 transportation problems, either no transportation or a bed-  
20 ridden patient or anything like that, call this local number.  
21 And then what the locals were supposed to be doing was to  
22 keep a good log of this. And it also provided information,  
23 as an example, how many people were definitely ambulatory  
24 patients. That's the only way that they could be transported.  
25 That gave them a good idea of what they had in their

1 municipality.

2 Q How long did it take you to develop this 20-  
3 mile plan?

4 A As I say, we started sometime on Saturday. I  
5 don't know exactly when we had our first workable rough  
6 draft, something that we felt we could have gone with at  
7 0030 hours on Sunday morning. In other words, 12:30 on  
8 Sunday morning.

9 Q Sunday morning?

10 A Sunday morning.

11 So it was approximately in about maybe 14 hours we had  
12 accomplished this.

13 Q Had there been any discussion or thinking about  
14 treatment of victims of the radiological incident, anybody  
15 who had been contaminated or anything like that, for these  
16 first four days?

17 A To the best of my knowledge, no, there wasn't.  
18 We had not heard of any injuries of any type. It just --  
19 our sole goal at that particular time that we were geared  
20 to, and nothing else, was strictly the movement of 200,000-  
21 plus people.

22 Q Can you speak to the nature and the number of  
23 phone calls coming in on Saturday.

24 A Once again we had a large number coming in.  
25 I think about that time is when we started getting calls of

1 the nature of are we going to evacuate tonight, are we  
2 going to evacuate tomorrow? We understand that the -- that  
3 it has melted down, it is going to melt down, just everything  
4 started flying on Saturday.

5 Q How were you responding to those types of phone  
6 calls?

7 A Once again there was no evacuation going on. To  
8 the best of our knowledge the situation down at the plant  
9 had stabilized. If an evacuation is ordered you are only  
10 going to hear it on the media. You will hear either the  
11 Governor or the County Commission give the word. Those  
12 are the only two people you should listen to. Just listen  
13 to the media and your local emergency personnel for  
14 directions on what to do and so forth. Things of that nature.

15 Q What was your feeling through the course of  
16 Saturday concerning the flow of information you were receiving  
17 about the status of the plant and evacuation plans?

18 A On Saturday I guess we received calls throughout  
19 the day really just saying that the situation, you know, was  
20 stable. So the flow of information really wasn't that bad.  
21 Of course, we really didn't have time to think that much  
22 about it because -- as heavily as we were involved in this  
23 planning effort.

24 So then we -- if they called us and said the plant was  
25 stable, that was fine. Okay? It wasn't until, we will say,

1 after Sunday, as an example, when things had calmed down,  
2 that we felt what we had was a pretty good plan, very  
3 workable, et cetera, et cetera and we got -- most of the  
4 pressure had been taken off us, that we were in a position  
5 to start paying a little bit more attention to some of  
6 the rumors that were floating around about what was going on  
7 down at the plant. That's when we got to the point that we  
8 weren't necessarily satisfied with it's stable.

9 Q But up to this point --

10 A Up until Saturday there was no real complaint  
11 on our part concerning the flow of information.

12 Q Would it be fair to say that had you more infor-  
13 mation concerning the status of the plant on Saturday you  
14 would have acted differently throughout this period of time,  
15 or told the people anything differently than what you were  
16 telling them?

17 A Once again the only thing that throughout the  
18 entire event we passed on to the people is strictly what  
19 we were told.

20 Q So you were satisfied with the substance of the  
21 information you were getting?

22 A Right. Up to that point. It was -- now late  
23 Saturday things had calmed down to a degree, to use that  
24 word. The County Commissioner -- we were getting a lot of  
25 calls and it seems to me as though late Saturday towards



1 around the midnight hour is perhaps when we were a little  
2 bit more curious as to specifically what was going on down  
3 at the plant. I think this was because -- I think sometime  
4 on Saturday something cropped up concerning this bubble.  
5 There was still this great debate going back and whether  
6 this bubble was dangerous or not, things of that nature.  
7 And it seems to me as though late on Saturday night when  
8 we had the time is when we started making calls to PEMA  
9 saying we just heard that this bubble is extremely dangerous,  
10 or this, that or the other thing, what's the story.  
11 Well, we don't know, or I think --

12 Q You mean you were receiving information that  
13 there was this bubble and there were dangers, coming from  
14 the media?

15 A No. We were receiving a lot of calls from  
16 people who heard stuff on the radio. Once again a lot of  
17 the times we were just not able to listen to the radio.

18 Also, it seems to me that on Saturday Commissioner  
19 Minnich and I, who is the County Commission Chairman, went  
20 up to the State Capitol Building, which is only a couple  
21 of blocks away and tried to get in to see the Governor to  
22 explain to him what was going on down at our level.

23 Q What were you going to tell him?

24 A We wanted to explain to him that our planning was  
25 going fine and things of that nature, and we wanted to ask

1 him some questions like, you know, give us some concrete  
2 answers, what are chances of an evacuation taking place,  
3 things of that nature. We needed a little more information.  
4 We never did get to see him.

5 And as I say, it seems like on Saturday night we  
6 just started getting a lot more questions that we were unable  
7 to answer. There were more stories floating around on the  
8 news media. I think the Governor had held a press conference  
9 Saturday night sometime.

10 Q Do you remember what he said at this press  
11 conference?

12 A I think -- not really. But there had been a  
13 whole series of things that had occurred and this was when  
14 the Commissioner and I started talking perhaps about our  
15 own evacuation.

16 Q Let's stop there and let me just try to understand  
17 this a little bit better.

18 Are you saying that up to Saturday afternoon or evening  
19 sometime your thoughts were in getting this 20-mile or  
20 10-mile evacuation plan in place?

21 A Right.

22 Q And that you were concentrating solely on that;  
23 is that correct?

24 A Right.

25 Q And that sometime towards Saturday evening when

1 this plan was getting into its final draft stage, you  
2 were better able to concentrate on other things that were going  
3 on; is that correct?

4 A Right.

5 Q And that at that time you started realizing that  
6 perhaps you weren't getting the full information concerning  
7 the status of the plant or the thinking on evacuation;  
8 is that correct?

9 A That's correct.

10 We had several people in my office and at that particular  
11 time there was a discussion that if we didn't get some  
12 better information or if the Governor's office would not  
13 talk to our County Commissioners and so forth, then we  
14 would perhaps do our own evacuation.

15 Q Let's stop there again. I just want to make sure  
16 I understand this.

17 When you came to realize that you were getting inconsistent  
18 information from phone calls and from PEMA and from other  
19 state and federal agencies you attempted to go see the  
20 Governor?

21 A No. We had done that in the afternoon. And that  
22 was strictly so that the Commissioners could let him know  
23 what was going on and they wanted to find out what the  
24 Governor had planned on doing.

25 Q What happened there? What were you told?

1 A We never got to see him. He was too busy.

2 Q What efforts did you make to find out the status  
3 of the plant?

4 A Once again up to that point we were being told  
5 that it was, you know, still stable and so forth.

6 Q Had you been told anything about a bubble by PEMA  
7 up to that point?

8 A I don't recall. I just honestly don't recall  
9 anybody specifically -- there were conversations about  
10 this bubble obviously, but when they took place I don't  
11 really know.

12 (Discussion off the record.)

13 MS. DICKER: Back on the record.

14 THE WITNESS: We had three reports from PEMA  
15 throughout the day on Saturday, which was the 31st, teletype  
16 reports. One was received at 11:50 in the morning, and  
17 without reading through the entire thing I will go to where  
18 it says "Operations," which --

19 BY MS. DICKER:

20 Q Can you identify what you are reading from?

21 A Yes. This is from a teletype that was received  
22 from the state agency, PEMA. It's a situation report.

23 Q Were these situation reports periodically coming  
24 to you?

25 A Right. There was no set time for them. But this

1 one is at 11:50 on Saturday morning, the 31st.

2 It indicated -- the first paragraph dealt with the  
3 weather. The second paragraph "Operations. There is no  
4 change reported in plant status. Planning as described  
5 in the situation report earlier this date is proceeding."  
6 And then radiological information. It just said that the  
7 teams were still out. No radiation levels that are a  
8 health hazard.

9 The next report came in on the 31st. It came in at  
10 2100 hours, which is nine o'clock at night. Once again  
11 a three-part report. The weather and then operations. "The  
12 vent releasing gas to the atmosphere was closed for a short  
13 time and reopened at 1900 hours resulting in a small puff.  
14 Total release was the same as it would have been if the  
15 vent had not been closed."

16 That was the status at the plant.

17 Radiological information, once again they indicated that  
18 the teams were still out and no problem.

19 Now at 2255, which is five minutes of 11, on the night  
20 of the 31st, once again the weather, now the second  
21 paragraph "Operations. NBC broadcasts that the bubble  
22 burst or bubble growing and that mass evacuation occurring  
23 was spurious. Official at Three Mile Island reported bubble  
24 situation to be relatively stable."

25 That's why I say to the best of my recollection it appears



1 that on Saturday evening, it would have been late, that we  
2 started hearing all these unfounded rumors and so forth. And  
3 we were just getting questioned so much, that's when we  
4 decided to see, you know, what is going on down there.

5 Q And you think that Saturday night is the first  
6 official communication you had where a bubble is mentioned?

7 A Yes. That's the first written indication that I  
8 have, provided I haven't lost any teletypes.

9 Q You don't remember any teletypes on Friday, for  
10 instance, mentioning any bubble?

11 A No. The teletypes on Friday, which was the 30th,  
12 we had one dealing with -- they had lifted the advisement  
13 for people to remain indoors within the 10-miles radius, also  
14 that the pregnant women and preschool children be evacuated  
15 and so forth. Other than that at 10:10 on Friday morning  
16 we received a report that covered from the 29th of March,  
17 7 p.m to 7 a.m. on March 30th. And up until seven that  
18 morning it just said they were discharging some water con-  
19 taining xenon -- without reading word for word -- the  
20 state emergency operation center fully operational, the  
21 central area emergency management agency, and its three  
22 critical counties, Dauphin, Lancaster and York remain in  
23 readiness and are constantly furnished situation updates.  
24 Winds and the surface and so forth continue to be monitored.  
25 Periodic radiation reading and activity reports continue to

1 be received from the Department of Environmental Resources.  
2 The NRC reported no readable radiation off site. Reactor  
3 temperatures are sufficiently down for cold shutdown,  
4 however the pressure remains slightly high. Methodically  
5 this system will be placed in a cold shutdown when both  
6 temperature and pressure are satisfactory.

7 Now this covered up until seven o'clock on Friday morning.

8 Then the next written teletype that I have is from 11:50  
9 the following morning. I don't recall seeing any others.

10 Q Is it your recollection that you received no oral  
11 communication on Saturday concerning a bubble or the status  
12 of the bubble?

13 A I don't -- once again I am pretty sure that we must  
14 have learned about it from the media somehow or other.

15 Q Let's take it from this telex that you received  
16 Friday evening -- I mean Saturday evening from PEMA concerning  
17 the NBC report about the bubble bursting.

18 What did you do when you received that information?

19 A Well, prior to that obviously we had heard  
20 about it. And we of course called PEMA and they didn't  
21 know about -- once again to the best of my recollection they  
22 said: "We don't know about the bubble bursting," or we  
23 don't know --

24 Q Did they acknowledge the fact there was a bubble  
25 there?

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1           A           I don't recall specifics. I would assume at  
2 that particular time that the whole world knew that there  
3 was a bubble there. As I say, I think that it was partially  
4 as a result of this particular teletype that we felt that we  
5 wanted more information what was going on down there.

6           Anyway, we had some people in my office, the Commissioner  
7 and I, and a couple of other staff members and a Representa-  
8 tive Piccola and State Senator Gekas. Anyway, they called  
9 the Commissioner -- there was a discussion -- the Commissioner  
10 then said to them we had tried to get in touch with the  
11 Governor's office. And Senator Gekas said: "Well, I will  
12 try it." So he tried calling the Governor's office and he  
13 was told they were too busy. So then he was talking to  
14 somebody from the Lt. Governor's office and he was told  
15 the Lt. Governor was too busy.

16           Q           Was his concern the same as yours at that time,  
17 to find out what was going on?

18           A           Yes. Basically what we were doing was trying to  
19 use his political pull to get a little bit more information.

20           At that point Senator Gekas advised the Lt. Governor's  
21 representative that he was talking with on the phone that if  
22 they did not get in touch with us with a little bit more  
23 information that we would be performing our own evacuation  
24 at, I think it was nine o'clock the next morning.

25           Q           Was that just a way to get some kind of response,

1 or were you seriously considering that evacuation?

2 A At the particular time I would say that it was  
3 probably geared more toward getting a response. But I think  
4 had we not gotten better information that we would have  
5 very seriously considered an evacuation. Because like I  
6 said to Commissioner Minnick it all comes down on our  
7 shoulders. It's not really on the Governor's shoulders  
8 or anyone else. We are the ones that are going to ultimately  
9 have to make a decision.

10 Q Do you remember who you were talking to, or the  
11 Commissioner was talking to in the Lt. Governor's office?

12 A No. Senator Gekas is the one who was in touch.  
13 And I just don't recall specifically who it was. <sup>To whomever</sup>  
14 he happened to be talking indicated that the Lt. Governor  
15 would be back in touch with us. That's basically how  
16 Saturday ended with us waiting to get a call from the Lt.  
17 Governor's office.

18 Q Did you ever receive a call back?

19 A Yes.

20 Q On Saturday?

21 A No, not Saturday.

22 Q Before we go on, I want to continue on that,  
23 but before I forget, I want to ask you whether you felt the  
24 information you were receiving from PEMA was in fact all  
25 the information that PEMA itself had, or --

1           A           Yes. We had called PEMA, once again, throughout  
2 the evening on Saturday, as I recall, and kept indicating  
3 to them that we were getting all these calls, and in some  
4 cases information that -- as a matter of fact like the  
5 bubble, as I say, it's my best recollection that I heard it  
6 from another source. And like I would call PEMA and it  
7 would turn out that story was true there was in fact a  
8 bubble, or something like that.

9           And we indicated to PEMA that we were extremely  
10 dissatisfied, you know, let us know what you know. At that  
11 time they indicated they were letting us know what they knew.

12           Q           Did they indicate to you that they were somewhat  
13 upset with the flow of information that they were receiving  
14 as well?

15           A           Yes. There was a better indication of it the  
16 next day.

17           Q           On Sunday?

18           A           Yes. When we met with Col. Henderson face to  
19 face.

20           Q           Why don't we continue on with that.

21           A           Around Sunday morning at about 0030 hours, which  
22 is half past midnight, our 10- and 20- mile plans were  
23 pretty completed, as I indicated in a, what we thought  
24 was a workable form. We all felt comfortable with it, that  
25 it would work and so forth. So we had our first initial



1 draft done. And as soon as we all agreed that we felt it  
2 was workable then we started immediately on the refinements  
3 of the plan. About two o'clock we received a phone call  
4 at which time --

5 Q Are we talking two o'clock in the morning?

6 A Two o'clock in the morning, I am sorry, 2 a.m.

7 We received a call asking for Senator Gekas. He wasn't  
8 there. One of my dispatchers indicated that. She indicated  
9 that I was there and he asked to talk to me. It was Lt.  
10 Governor Scranton. And he said he understood that we were  
11 seriously considering evacuation. And I said, well, we  
12 certainly were. We felt we were just not getting the proper  
13 information, no one seemed to have the time to bother with us.

14 And he listed reasons why we shouldn't. I don't recall  
15 the specific reasons, but there were several. And I  
16 indicated to him that we had thought about that. But in  
17 spite of that we still felt that we needed better information  
18 so that we ourselves would feel more comfortable because  
19 we were responsible for the people in Dauphin County. Even  
20 though he was we felt we were a little bit more responsible.

21 Q Can you remember if the reasons that he gave  
22 spoke to the status of the plant? 1912 344

23 A Well, No. 1, he didn't want one county starting.  
24 an evacuation, because that would have just started everybody  
25 moving, and things of that nature. I don't specifically

1 recall anything pertaining to the plant itself.

2 Q That is what you were trying to get and that's  
3 why you had called the Lt. Governor?

4 A Yes.

5 Q That's why you had made all these efforts.  
6 I was wondering if he responded to exactly what you were  
7 looking for?

8 A Once again, I think at that particular time, after  
9 I listened to him, I said to him that we had already thought  
10 about all the things he had mentioned, and I said: "Well,  
11 it would be nice if you would be in our office tomorrow  
12 morning to discuss it." And he indicated at that particular  
13 time that he would be in to visit us.

14 Q Meaning Sunday morning; is that correct?

15 A Yes. This is on Sunday morning.

16 (Please go to page 93.)

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1 BY MS. DICKER:

2 Q What happened after you completed your phone con-  
3 versation with the Lieutenant Governor?

4 A Okay, during this particular time frame and up until  
5 the early morning hours up until 7:00 or so forth, what we  
6 were doing is we were still receiving information from the  
7 local directors concerning their needs, and we were giving  
8 them information routes we wanted them to use and so forth.  
9 And it was just a constant refinement of the plans and so  
10 forth.

11 At 8:00 o'clock, give or take a few minutes, we set  
12 up a meeting with all of the locals in the 20 mile area. Up  
13 until that point we had met with the 5, in separate groups.  
14 So this was with all of the local Civil Defense people; all  
15 of the fire chiefs, because we had a fire evacuation plan also;  
16 the police chiefs and then the local government officials.  
17 The meetings were set up at various times throughout the day.  
18 And also, our directors from the upper end of the county,  
19 which would have served as a host area.

20 Shortly after 8:00 o'clock in the morning, Colonel  
21 Henderson arrived at the office.

22 Q Was this unexpected?

23 A Yes. Yeah, that was totally unexpected.

24 Q Let me ask one question here. After you hung up  
25 with the Lieutenant Governor at 2:00 in the morning, did you

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1 stop your efforts to try to find out what the status of the  
2 plans was because you felt he would be telling you this when  
3 he came in?

4 A No, I wouldn't say that we stopped our efforts. As  
5 we continued our calls throughout the night with the state  
6 agency, we would be advised that there was no change or things  
7 of that nature.

8 Q Basically though, you didn't receive any more infor-  
9 mation up to the time that Colonel Henderson came in then  
10 Sunday morning?

11 A Well, we received situation reports at 1:00 o'clock.  
12 It was our first one on the first of April. At 0100 hours we  
13 received a Teletype communication. Once again, it indicated  
14 conditions continued to be relatively stable. That was at  
15 1:00 o'clock.

16 At 3:00 o'clock--

17 Q In the morning?

18 A Yes, I'm sorry. Operations. "The pressure and water  
19 temperature remain stable; work continues."

20 Q Work continues it says?

21 A Yes. I don't know what kind.

22 At 10:45 in the morning, "Situation remains stable  
23 at Three Mile Island facility. Venting of low level radio-  
24 active gases continues."

25 Q Do you recall whether there had been any telephonic

1 communication or oral communication between the time the  
2 Lieutenant Governor called and the time that Colonel Henderson  
3 arrived at the office?

4 A We, as I indicated, we had been in touch with --  
5 during the early morning hours, we had been in touch with the  
6 state agency for several reasons: to let them know what needs  
7 we had and things of that nature. And I'm pretty sure that  
8 during the course of those conversations that we were talking  
9 about what was going on down at the plant. They didn't know  
10 much of anything, really.

11 Q It was still the same kind of thing where they  
12 didn't know any more?

13 A It was a stable situation. I am certain we advised  
14 them that the Lieutenant Governor was coming to visit our  
15 office the next morning.

16 Q What happened when Henderson arrived?

17 A He came in shortly after 8:00 o'clock. The  
18 Commissioner was there and some of my other people were there.  
19 We explained to him and updated him on what we had accomplished  
20 thusfar. We explained to him our problem in terms of informa-  
21 tion flow.

22 Q Do you remember what you said?

23 A I think one reference was made to the bubble. And  
24 the fact that we knew very little about it. And there were  
25 just so many conflicting reports flowing back and forth. And



1 could they find out: what is the story on the bubble? Let  
2 us know so that we're in a position to say it is or it isn't  
3 dangerous according to the experts; that type of thing.

4 He indicated to us, "I know you have a problem. I  
5 have a problem." Colonel Henderson indicated that he was not  
6 getting the information.

7 Once again, we weren't necessarily seeking technical  
8 information. It got to that stage of the game. We just wanted  
9 someone to just flat out come out and say, "This is the situa-  
10 tion down at the plant." Basically, the core is covered,  
11 which at that stage of the game you didn't have to be a  
12 nuclear engineer to know that. There is or there is not a  
13 leak. The bubble is or is not dangerous.

14 And it's my understanding, and I found out much,  
15 much later, that the bubble thing was blown completely out of  
16 proportion. And it was even decided on when they first dis-  
17 covered it shortly thereafter that it wasn't that dangerous.

18 Q At that point, your only information about the  
19 bubble functionally was coming from the media?

20 A Right.

21 Q Was there any discussion as to where the breakdown  
22 of communication was?

23 A Yes. By that time, of course, the NRC and the  
24 Governor's office were in close contact with each other and  
25 they were taking the information. And they were disseminating

1 the information out at these press conferences and so forth.  
2 And we weren't even told when press conferences were being  
3 held by Mr. Denton or the Governor or anybody, really. On  
4 one or two occasions we were told something was going to be  
5 held.

6 Q So basically, it was a gap between the Governor's  
7 office and Colonel Henderson's office?

8 A And PEMA, yes.

9 Q Was Henderson feeling this way, too? Is that what  
10 he was saying to you on --

11 A Yes, he was upset. And other people at the state  
12 agency that I talked to were quite upset because it's not the  
13 way you function during an emergency situation. Information  
14 actually should have gone to PEMA first, down to us. Then  
15 you go hold your press conference. Because then we're in a  
16 position to say to the general public that's calling, "Yes,  
17 we are aware there is a bubble. It's being checked out now  
18 to find out whether it is or it isn't dangerous." But at  
19 least it would give us something to work with.

20 We just kept getting caught short. And in past  
21 emergency situations, the public has learned to call our office  
22 for official information. And it made our office lose some of  
23 its credibility. And you must retain your credibility during  
24 an emergency situation to be effective.

25 Q Were you receiving your information from press

1 conferences and then from the Governor's office? Or maybe  
2 the question should be PEMA. Do you have a sense if PEMA  
3 ever received the information or did they just receive the  
4 information late?

5 A In some cases, it was late. In some cases, they  
6 also heard it on the media. In some cases, when we had a  
7 chance to listen to a press conference, they hadn't had a  
8 chance. And we were telling them what was occurring.

9 Q Did you and Colonel Henderson come to any kind of  
10 agreement or did you have any thoughts on how to remedy the  
11 situation?

12 A He said he'd do his best. And we indicated to him  
13 that we had the Lieutenant Governor coming in to visit us.  
14 And he said that he was aware of it. And we told him that we  
15 were just going to let our feelings be known. I think the  
16 subject of an evacuation was briefly touched on during the  
17 conversation with Colonel Henderson.

18 Q Do you feel that the purpose, the main purpose of  
19 that meeting was to discuss the information flow problem?

20 A I think the reason Colonel Henderson came over was  
21 to see how hostile we were before the Lieutenant Governor  
22 came in. That was our honest feeling.

23 Q Do you think the Lieutenant Governor asked him to  
24 come in and see what was going on?

25 A That was just our own feeling on the matter. We

1 don't know if he did or he didn't. We didn't ask.

2 Q Why don't we continue on with the chronology then.

3 A Also, early Sunday morning we had extra phone lines  
4 installed. All of the personnel had been contacted with  
5 reference to the meetings we had set up, the local government  
6 people and so forth.

7 The nursing homes and the hospitals, I think early  
8 Saturday or excuse me, early Sunday morning indicated that  
9 they might have a problem later on in the day when it came  
10 time for shift change because some of the staff had left the  
11 area.

12 Q Did they indicate how much of the staff had left  
13 the area?

14 A I don't recall. I didn't -- my medical group  
15 handled that particular problem. They just made me aware of  
16 it. So, we got in touch with, as an example, the Red Cross  
17 to see what volunteer nurses and so forth we could count on.  
18 In addition, the State was contacted concerning the problem  
19 of what type of medical help we could get.

20 Q What time did the Lieutenant Governor arrive?

21 A About 10:00 the Lieutenant Governor arrived. He was  
22 accompanied by one of his aides.

23 Q Do you remember who?

24 A I think it was -- I don't remember exact names so  
25 I'd rather not say right now.

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1 Q What happened when he came?

2 A Well, we informed him once again of our accomplish-  
3 ments up until this point in terms of our coming up with the  
4 evacuation plan, things of this nature. We also pointed out  
5 certain problems that would crop up such as the hospitals in  
6 handling neonatal patients and things of that nature.

7 And, of course, having not been involved in this  
8 type of situation before, I think he was just totally shocked  
9 by what was transpiring at our level; how busy we were; how  
10 much work we were doing; how complicated it was. I think it  
11 was an eye opener for him. He was not aware of --

12 Q How complicated and how hard it would be to do this?

13 A Right. Because they had not been down to our level  
14 and in the trenches so as to speak.

15 In addition, we told them that we were extremely  
16 upset about not getting information. We were getting calls  
17 from people and we could not answer their questions. And we  
18 had hoped that there would be a better flow of information.  
19 That the new media should not find out things first. Not  
20 that we were against them finding things out, but we felt that  
21 we as emergency workers should get it better. It was -- it  
22 seemed to be about a three-quarter of an hour meeting at which  
23 time we brought up a lot of different problems.

24 Well, we explained to him about the fact that we  
25 had indications there would be upcoming problems manning



1 hospital staffs later on that day and so forth. And maybe  
2 we might have to make a movement whether they like it or not.  
3 Because we certainly couldn't leave people unattended and so  
4 forth.

5 Q So that the option of evacuation was still very much  
6 open as far as you were concerned?

7 A Yes. The option of evacuation was in existence at  
8 all time. I think one misconception that a lot of people are  
9 under is they feel that the Governor is the only one that can  
10 order an evacuation. An evacuation can be ordered at any  
11 level of government. It's been done in the past by local.  
12 I've done it during specific situations and so forth. So we  
13 always had that evacuation option available to us.

14 Q What kind of representations did the Lieutenant  
15 Governor make concerning improvement on the flow of information?

16 A I can't remember specifics other than he indicated  
17 that he would make every effort to make sure that PEMA got  
18 the word and that it would come down to us. They would try  
19 and let us know as much as possible before these new confer-  
20 ences and so forth.

21 Q Did you feel that something had been accomplished  
22 by your meeting with the Lieutenant Governor?

23 A In terms of information flow, I would say no. But  
24 in terms of at least acquainting him with what was going on  
25 at our level and making him more aware of the huge undertaking

1 that was going on, we felt it put him in a better position.

2 Q Did you feel at that time that having him see the  
3 amount of work and the complications that were involved in  
4 evacuating people that he would be more sensitive to your  
5 needs and that the flow of information would thereby be  
6 improved?

7 A We assumed he would. His visit was good for morale  
8 purposes as it were.

9 Q Did the situation improve after that?

10 A No.

11 Q Did anything change in terms of flow of communication?

12 A To the best of our knowledge, no, it didn't. Once  
13 again, there were press conferences being held down in  
14 Middletown and we were not being told about it. There just  
15 wasn't that huge a change. Or we felt there wasn't.

16 Q So, you're saying that throughout the remainder of  
17 the next day at least that you were still at this disadvantage  
18 in not having information and having to learn this information  
19 through the media?

20 A Right.

21 Q Did anything else of significance happen on Sunday?

22 A Okay. Well, of course, on Sunday we continued our  
23 refinement efforts. We met with National Guard, State Police  
24 and so forth. That went on throughout the day.

25 Around noontime we got a call from PEMA and we were

1 advised that they had to have our needs list. By needs I mean  
2 how many extra buses, ambulances, trains, et cetera, et cetera.  
3 What our requirements were. They needed it by 1:00 o'clock  
4 to be delivered to the President who was visiting Three Mile  
5 Island.

6 Q Was your understanding that these needs would be  
7 supplied by the federal government?

8 A Well, some of the needs come from the state. Some  
9 come from the federal. But we were just under the impression  
10 that it would give the federal people a little bit better idea  
11 as to what was going on, what the needs were going to be for  
12 the entire area.

13 Q Can we sidetrack just for a little bit. You men-  
14 tioned before that the county government has authority to issue  
15 an evacuation order. Is my understanding correct in that if  
16 the -- if an evacuation is called by the state level or  
17 federal level that the costs of the county would be reimbursable;  
18 is that correct? Do you know?

19 A Well, if an evacuation would have been called for --  
20 basically, the only time you get reimbursed is if a declaration  
21 is made, an emergency declaration. If it comes at the federal  
22 level, if the President declares a federal disaster area and  
23 so forth, then there is the chance that you can get reimbursed  
24 for certain expenses incurred during this type of situation.

25 There was no declaration made. In our county, we

1 declared our own localized state of emergency. The other  
2 counties did in the event that the President would go along  
3 with it, which would leave us open to getting reimbursed from  
4 the federal government.

5 Q Was cost at all a factor, do you think, on any level  
6 in the decision not to declare an emergency?

7 A I don't know. At the local and county levels, we  
8 were not worried about cost at all. At no time -- if we  
9 needed extra phones, we got them. At no time was any of the  
10 overtime questioned. And we had thousands of hours of over-  
11 time put in by people. So there was no -- at least at our  
12 level, there was no worry about costs.

13 Q Do you have any feelings about that being a factor  
14 on the state or federal level?

15 A I would say at the state level there was no problem  
16 either because once again they were manned 24 hours a day and  
17 pretty much doing the same thing we were. At the federal  
18 level, I really don't have any idea.

19 Q Has any estimation or analysis been done on the  
20 total cost for your county in responding to the incident?

21 A I think for the county, and once again I just speak  
22 for county government now not the local governments. our  
23 claim that we submitted to the insurance company was somewhere  
24 in the vicinity of \$25,000. That might not be totally accurate  
25 but that's pretty close.

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1 Q I'm sorry for diverting you. Why don't we get back  
2 into the sequence.

3 So, you supplied this list to PEMA.

4 A Right.

5 That afternoon we held meetings with our local  
6 Civil Defense director and the police, the police chiefs, and  
7 the fire chiefs and so forth. We conducted all those meetings.  
8 About that time we had a problem at the fire chiefs' meeting.  
9 We were discussing their function during the actual evacuation  
10 and where they would take their equipment if the evacuation  
11 took place and so forth, and they were getting a little bit  
12 fed up with not getting what they considered good information  
13 from the county. We made them aware of the problem that the  
14 Lieutenant Governor had been in and that we were going to  
15 straighten the situation out.

16 Senator Gekas happened to be at that meeting and he  
17 assisted us in trying to calm everybody down because at one  
18 point it was suggested that the way they would get attention  
19 would be to surround the Capitol with all the fire trucks and  
20 set off the sirens.

21 Q So basically everyone who involved in the response  
22 at the county level were as upset as you were?

23 A At the county and local level we were extremely  
24 dissatisfied with what we weren't hearing. 1912 358

25 Q Did you finalize your emergency evacuation plan on



1 Sunday?

2 A I hate to use the word finalize because even now  
3 it's not finalized. We're constantly undergoing review. But  
4 we had on hand what we felt was a workable plan. We felt we  
5 had pretty much covered all the bases in terms of what our  
6 needs would be, how we would go about conducting an actual  
7 operation if necessary.

8 MS. DICKER: Let me mark this as an exhibit.

9 (Thereupon, a booklet was marked as Exhibit No. 3.)

10 BY MS. DICKER:

11 Q Mr. Molloy, I show you what has been marked as  
12 Exhibit 3 for this deposition entitled "Dauphin County Office  
13 of Emergency Preparedness Action and Response Plan for  
14 Emergency Personnel and Citizens." Is this a copy of the  
15 emergency plan that was developed over the course of your  
16 response to this incident?

17 A Yes.

18 Q Do you feel that by Sunday you -- the plan was in  
19 such shape that you could have evacuated 20 miles pursuant  
20 to this plan and that all the details had been worked out?

21 A Most definitely. We would have accomplished the  
22 10 mile, and actually I think we could have accomplished the  
23 20 mile on Saturday. But obviously, we would have had more  
24 problems than once we got it a little better refined.

25 Q And is this the plan that is still in effect in

1 Dauphin County?

2 A There have been changes since then, but basically,  
3 that's the plan. There has been -- there's a constant refine-  
4 ment going on. This plan does not contain -- when this docu-  
5 ment was put together, some of the local municipalities had  
6 not produced a written plan. Since that time they have. We  
7 made some changes in certain areas, the medical end of the  
8 program and whatever. But that's --

9 Q Has this plan been reviewed by any state agency?

10 A To the best of our knowledge, yes, it has. It  
11 would have been examined by PEMA, the state emergency agency.  
12 They had copies of all of the county's plans that were involved  
13 and went through them.

14 Q Have you gotten any feedback from PEMA on this plan?

15 A We got feedback during the particular incident. We  
16 did not have it printed up into book form until the first  
17 week of April, I think. But we had it in rough draft form.  
18 And PEMA came over during the first week of April and we had  
19 a meeting and showed them what we had going and so forth.

20 Q Has this plan been reviewed by any federal agency?

21 A I don't know.

22 Q Have you distributed it to any federal agency such  
23 as the NRC for instance?

24 A No, I've had only one contact with the NRC.

25 Q What was your understanding of the status of the

1 plant and the situation as of Sunday evening?

2       A       Okay. As of Sunday evening as far as the status of  
3 the plant goes, the situation at the plant to the best of  
4 our knowledge was stable. The bubble, and I have it written  
5 on my log and I don't know where we heard it from, apparently  
6 was getting smaller at that particular time.

7               Looking at my Teletypes and we'll start from --  
8 these are Teletypes from PEMA received in my office on the  
9 first of April. I will start at 5:00 p.m., which is 1700  
10 hours. And once again, it was the same format, weather,  
11 operations and radiological information. "The situation re-  
12 mains stable at Three Mile Island facility. Venting of low  
13 level gas continues during cool down operations." Then it  
14 goes on about the Governor will make a decision about schools  
15 and things of that nature. But as far as things at the plant  
16 went, it was a stable situation at 5:00.

17               At 2100, which was the next report, "Situation at  
18 Three Mile Island remains stable."

19               The next Teletype came out at 2330 and it was --  
20 the Governor had issued the following statement. It was  
21 based on his assessment of the information received about  
22 Three Mile Island. And he said that state offices are to  
23 continue to conduct business. He wanted the pregnant women  
24 and preschool children to stay out of the five mile. We want-  
25 ed schools closed within five miles of the plant until further

1 notice.

2           The next Teletype came in at 2340. Operations.  
3 "No change. Three Mile Island continues to remain stable."

4           Q       Let's go to Monday then. Did anything of signifi-  
5 cance happen on Monday?

6           A       Okay. On Monday, what we had -- the local news-  
7 papers, the Patriot and Evening News -- a very small portion  
8 of the plan actually pertains to the public as far as what  
9 they are supposed to do. And we had that published in the  
10 newspapers. If you live in such a municipality you take  
11 this road and you go where. So that was done on Monday  
12 morning.

13                   In addition, we once again heard that the bubble  
14 was decreasing. We learned that we had approximately 130 to  
15 180 evacuees at the Hershey Arena at that time.

16                   The Lieutenant Governor called and asked if I would  
17 be there and he came over.

18           Q       He had come over both on Sunday and Monday then?

19           A       Yes. He came over on Monday on his own. He called  
20 and asked if I was going to be there and he showed up. And  
21 then he and I -- we met alone in my office, at which time I  
22 indicated to him that there still was this lack of information  
23 flow and so forth. And at that particular time, we understood  
24 that perhaps as early as Tuesday the schools in the 10 mile  
25 zone were going to open. And I explained to him that we were

1 definitely against that because we needed the buses. And if  
2 we didn't get the buses then we would have to go through a  
3 lot of reshuffling. And we felt it was better. So we  
4 discussed several things.

5 Q Do you think that his visit was as a follow through  
6 to the visit the day before?

7 A I really didn't think much of it. I was surprised,  
8 in view of the fact that they had ignored us up till this  
9 point, to see him show up two days in a row.

10 Q Did you talk about the fact that the flow of infor-  
11 mation had not substantially bettered itself?

12 A Right. And at that particular time, I believe I  
13 showed him the reports that we had received, "Three Mile  
14 Island remains stable," and so forth. And yet, you know, the  
15 news media was picking up reports and --

16 Q What did he say to that; do you remember?

17 A I think basically, once again, he left us under the  
18 impression he was going to make an effort to try and improve  
19 the situation. He was explaining -- at one of the meetings,  
20 and I don't know if it was the Sunday or Monday meeting, but  
21 he explained to us that they also had problems in handling  
22 the information and things of that nature. So we tried to  
23 understand the predicament that they found themselves in.

24 Q Had there been any talk up to this point concerning  
25 the length of time it would take to achieve an evacuation?



1           A       On the first meeting on Sunday, we indicated to him  
2 just to show him why we needed information, why we wanted  
3 some type of estimate if at all possible, was there a 50 per-  
4 cent chance of an evacuation or so forth.

5                   We indicated to him that as of Saturday we felt it  
6 would take well over 24 hours to evacuate the hospitals. We  
7 went strictly with the movement of the hospitals because it  
8 would have been the most difficult task.

9           Q       Did he seem surprised by the length of time?

10          A       Yes, extremely. We also were using this as a tool  
11 to impress upon him our need to know rapidly.

12          Q       Was this ever discussed during your Monday meeting  
13 with the Lieutenant Governor?

14          A       On Monday, once again, during the course of the  
15 conversation to the best of my knowledge we did discuss how  
16 long it would take us to move the people out and so forth.  
17 I don't remember specifics. He and I were alone at the  
18 particular time and I just don't remember specifics. We did  
19 discuss the information problem. We discussed the situation  
20 that we had at the hospitals in terms of some staff not show-  
21 ing up. We went into a discussion on the school situation.  
22 He explained to us that part of the reason that they wanted  
23 the schools open was to create a semblance of normalcy, to  
24 get normalcy back in the community. While we understood the  
25 need for that, we also felt that our need for the buses was

1 very legitimate.

2 I also indicated to him at the meeting the night  
3 before that the firemen were extremely upset. And I just  
4 said to him that, "It's about time that you come out and say  
5 either the situation at the plant is getting better or it's  
6 not getting better. What are the percentages as far as an  
7 evacuation is concerned? If it's extremely low, then let's  
8 let the firemen go off duty. They'll still be on call but  
9 we won't have them in the fire houses," and things of that  
10 nature.

11 Q It's my understanding that at some point the Lieu-  
12 tenant Governor estimated that it would take about three hours  
13 to evacuate the 5 mile area surrounding the plant. Were you  
14 aware of this or were you asked to respond to this?

15 A One of the local elected people had mentioned to me,  
16 and it was Representative Reed, R-e-e-d -- to the best of my  
17 knowledge it was him -- about that the Lieutenant Governor was  
18 saying that it could be evacuated in a matter of a few hours  
19 and that he had read it in a Philadelphia newspaper somewhere.  
20 It seems to me as though he told me that, it would have been  
21 before my second meeting with the Lieutenant Governor because  
22 that's why I mentioned to him about, "Hey, it's going to take  
23 longer than two or three hours to move these hospitals out  
24 and so forth." This is why we wanted to know as rapidly as  
25 possible and so forth. And I later received in the mail a

1 photostat of the newspaper. It was the Philadelphia Inquirer,  
2 the Sunday edition, where the Lieutenant Governor was quoted  
3 as saying that the area could be moved out in several hours.

4 Q During the course of either one of these two meetings  
5 with the Lieutenant Governor, do you recall whether he asked  
6 you how long you thought it would take to evacuate a 5 mile  
7 area?

8 A I don't know if we specified a 5 mile area. I think  
9 we were talking about the whole area. And I indicated to him  
10 that in view of the fact that we had had about 40 percent of  
11 the population leave and not counting the hospitals, that we  
12 felt that we could probably get all the other people out that  
13 wanted to leave. Not everybody was going to leave. That we  
14 could probably do it in about 15 hours or so.

15 Q Fifteen?

16 A Yes, 15 or perhaps even less.

17 And I explained to him that I didn't like to get  
18 involved in saying it's going to take X number of hours because  
19 we were -- if an order had ever come down, the movement of  
20 the people would have just kept taking place until they were  
21 moved.

22 Q When you say surrounding areas, do you mean the 20  
23 mile area?

24 A Right. I'm talking strictly my county now, Dauphin  
25 County.

1913 006

1 Q When did it become apparent to you, Mr. Molloy, that  
2 the situation in fact was improving at the plant?

3 A Well, I would say early on that week that we felt  
4 that perhaps as early as Tuesday, in the course of staff dis-  
5 cussions, we felt that it was very unlikely that any evacua-  
6 tion was going to take place.

7 Q How long did the schools stay closed?

8 A The schools were to open on Friday. Other than in  
9 the 5 mile zone.

10 May I correct one point. I indicated earlier that  
11 we had the different telephones installed. And I see by my  
12 log here that the actual rumor control phone apparently was  
13 established on Tuesday. I think I had said Monday. I'm  
14 sorry.

15 Q What was the follow through on the shelter that was  
16 set up in Hershey for the evacuated pregnant women and child-  
17 ren?

18 A During that particular week up until Friday, which  
19 would have been the 6th of April, the population kept de-  
20 creasing.

21 Q The population at the center?

22 A I'm sorry, at the shelter kept decreasing till it  
23 got down to perhaps less than 50 people sometime on Friday.

24 Q What was the maximum number of people there?

25 A I think the Red Cross put it's best estimate at about

1 180 people.

2           Anyway a decision was made -- there was discussion  
3 going on between the Red Cross, I would assume the people at  
4 Herco which is the Hershey Corporation that is in charge of  
5 the facility, and the Governor's office concerning closing  
6 down that particular shelter and moving them to a smaller  
7 facility, which it turned out that decision was made. They  
8 were going to accomplish that. It turned out later on that  
9 they did not open up the second shelter because the population  
10 really dropped down to, I think it was in the vicinity of  
11 like 10 people, and the Red Cross said, "We'll just put them  
12 up in a motel."

13           Q       Do you remember when that decision was made?

14           A       It would have been Friday night into Saturday  
15 morning.

16           Q       Friday, the 6th of April?

17           A       The 6th of April.

18                   During the day on Saturday, I received a phone call  
19 from the Governor's office with a request that I read a press  
20 release concerning the closing of the facility at Hershey.  
21 And that they were going to open up another one.

22           Q       Were you given any reason why you were the one who  
23 was to hold this press release?

24           A       No. As a matter of fact, I said to them that, "Why  
25 don't you let the Red Cross read it? They are the ones that



1 had been offering the shelter and they're the ones that should  
2 receive credit for offering the shelter and so forth." And  
3 it was indicated to me that the Red Cross said that they didn't  
4 want to read it. So, I said, "Well fine, you know, I'll read  
5 it."

6 Q Was there a reason given why the Red Cross didn't  
7 want to read this?

8 A No. This was just one of those little strange  
9 things that occurred.

10 So, shortly after the phone call, they sent over a  
11 press release for me to read. And I gave it to a couple of  
12 the radio stations and so forth, with a few corrections.

13 Q Do you have that press release with you?

14 A Yes, I do.

15 Q Will you read it to us.

16 A At the top it's, "For immediate release. Press  
17 release contact, Kevin Molloy." Incorrect name spelling,  
18 wrong phone number. And I'm quoting from the copy right now  
19 and it just says:

20 "A substantial reduction in the number of temporary  
21 evacuees has prompted the Civil Defense to relocate few re-  
22 maining persons to more accommodating facilities." Quote.

23 "The vast amphitheater of the Hershey Park Arena  
24 is inappropriate for the number of remaining evacuees, said  
25 Kevin Molloy, Civil Defense Director of Dauphin County."

1           Quote, "The number of men, women and children re-  
2           siding in the Hershey Park Arena is small enough that more  
3           private accommodations are available, he said. Hershey Park  
4           Arena has been the relocation center for evacuees from around  
5           the Three Mile Island power plant for the past seven days.  
6           As many as 175 people set up temporary housekeeping on the  
7           floor of the arena. The remaining evacuees will be moved to  
8           the Community Center on Chocolate Avenue in Hershey."

9           That's the end of the press release. I made a  
10          couple of changes to it, but I read it to you as I initially  
11          got it. They had read it to me over the phone prior to bring-  
12          ing it over.

13          Q        So you read that press release on the 6th of April,  
14          right?

15          A        No, that would have been the 7th of April which was  
16          Saturday.

17          Q        When did you close down the emergency center?

18          A        Well, you mean from a 24 hour operation?

19          Q        That's right.

20          A        I believe it was about the 12th of April. What we  
21          started to do was -- a lot of the staff went home. And what  
22          we were doing is my assistant and I -- it was either on the  
23          11th or the 12th -- he would stay one night for 24 hours and  
24          I would stay the other night. It probably was around the week-  
25          end of the 13th that we decided that the situation had calmed

1 down to the point where we could both go home. And, of  
2 course, my dispatchers were left with instructions, if any-  
3 thing happens to give us a call.

4 Q Through the course of your testimony today you've  
5 been referring to what looks to be a log of your activities.  
6 Is that in fact a log of your activities?

7 A It was recreated. Yes, it is. But it was -- once  
8 again, it was based on notes that we had taken. It's based  
9 on the best recollections of the staff members. When things  
10 calmed down, toward the latter part of the first week in  
11 April, I got all the staff together. And it was at that  
12 particular time that I asked everybody to put down their  
13 thoughts and what they did and when they did it. And we tried  
14 to combine everything to create a good solid picture.

15 Q And that is the document that you are referring to?

16 A That's correct.

17 Q Is that the document that you submitted to this  
18 Commission at our request?

19 A Yes, it is.

20 MS. DICKER: May I have this marked as number 4.

21 (Thereupon, a log was marked as Exhibit No. 4.)

22 BY MS. DICKER:

23 Q Mr. Molloy, I show you what we have marked as  
24 Exhibit 4 for this deposition entitled "Three Mile Island  
25 Incident Log." Is this log that I show you the same as the

1 log that you have been referring to during the course of this  
2 deposition?

3 A Yes, it is. It is a partial log. The actual log  
4 that we have went for 14 pages. The people that requested it  
5 from your organization only asked for the first 11 pages that  
6 they felt were pertinent.

7 Q So the parts that I don't have are just a continua-  
8 tion of activities after the --

9 A It would have been after the --

10 Q -- 8th of April?

11 A Yes. That's correct, yes.

12 Q How many days more does your log continue for?

13 A It went up into the -- it's rather sporadic, but  
14 I have one up until the 27th of April.

15 MS. DICKER: Let's go off the record for a minute.

16 (Discussion off the record.)

17 BY MS. DICKER:

18 Q I just want to ask one question about the sentiment  
19 in the community throughout the incident. There was a lot of  
20 news reporting that people were panicking throughout the  
21 incident. You were right there on the scene. Can you give me  
22 an idea of what the sentiment actually was?

23 A Once again, during the critical week and weekend, I  
24 was inside extremely busy. However, in talking to people, I  
25 don't feel that there was the panic. I feel that that word

1 was thrown around too freely, which had a negative effect on  
2 some people. To me the word panic means someone screaming,  
3 yelling, running and so forth. And I think that's pretty much  
4 the book definition. One way that we feel that it can be  
5 shown that the people did not panic is the fact that approxi-  
6 mately 40 percent of the population in the 20 mile zone, and  
7 once again I refer strictly to Dauphin County, left the area  
8 from about noontime on Friday we felt till midnight on Sunday.  
9 Actually they left much faster than that. But we took that  
10 particular time frame.

11           And in view of the fact that we also dispatched  
12 police, fire and ambulance calls, we totaled the number of  
13 vehicular accidents that we had. And we dispatched a total  
14 of 12 accident calls. Once again, from noon Friday till  
15 midnight Sunday, which would have been the 30th through the  
16 1st of April. And we had a total of 12 accidents. And 5 of  
17 those involved injuries in the accidents.

18           Then what we did was we took the same time frame  
19 about a month later. And that would have been from May 4th,  
20 noontime Friday, May 4th, through midnight Sunday, May 6th.  
21 We had a total of 18 accidents that particular weekend. Then  
22 we took a month prior -- well, not quite a month prior to the  
23 incident -- but we went prior to the incident from 12:00 noon  
24 Friday, March 2nd through midnight Sunday, March 9th (sic).  
25 Once again, we had 12 accidents reported.



1           So, in spite of the fact that we had this massive  
 2 movement of people, there was no massive carnage on the high-  
 3 ways or things of that nature. People were frightened; they  
 4 were deeply concerned. I'm sure there were cases of indivi-  
 5 dual panic. However, for the most part there was not this  
 6 panic on the part of the community, the residents of Dauphin  
 7 County.

8           Q       To the extent that there was concern and to the  
 9 extent that there was no panic, do you have any feelings as  
 10 to whether this was a reaction to the press in reporting about  
 11 what was going on?

12          A       I don't think the national media -- and I would con-  
 13 fine my remarks exclusively to the national media, because  
 14 that's where we seemed to be getting some of the problems.  
 15 They just, in some cases, did not handle the situation well.  
 16 As an example, the Teletype I referred to earlier where it  
 17 said, "The NBC reported that the bubble had burst," or whatever.  
 18 I have no idea where they got that information. But when that  
 19 came on, you can imagine the problems that it caused. So,  
 20 the news media, in some cases, was not helpful at all.

21          Q       Can you recall any instance where the news media  
 22 actually interfered with your operations?

1913 014

23          A       Not with my operations, no.

24          Q       There was reporting that looting was going on. And  
 25 I believe the mayor of Middletown issued an order to shoot to

1 kill for looting. Was this a real problem? And what is your  
2 reaction to his shoot to kill order?

3 A We had one instance in Swatara Township where, from  
4 what I can understand, a window was broken in a store and some  
5 kids got in and took some stuff. Other than that, we had no  
6 reports of any major looting or anything of that nature going  
7 on. I think that, in view of the fact that we had a lot of  
8 people leaving, we had a request from some of the local  
9 municipalities for some extra police to prevent looting from  
10 occurring. Somehow or other, somebody found it out and  
11 immediately transformed it into it was going on, that type  
12 situation.

13 As far as the Mayor's shoot to kill order, that was  
14 strictly a local decision. We had nothing to do with that  
15 at all.

16 Q As far as you know, it wasn't based on any real  
17 problem that was going on then?

18 A No. I think it was a psychological thing on the  
19 part of the Mayor.

20 Q What do you mean?

21 A Well, I guess he figured that that would prevent it  
22 from occurring.

23 Q Looking back at the incident 20/20 hindsight, which  
24 I'm sure you and all of your co-workers are now doing, what  
25 kind of changes are being planned or what kind of things would

1 you like to see changed as a result of your experience with the  
2 TMI incident?

3 A Well, I think the incident proves what I have been  
4 saying all along concerning a chain of command. Number one,  
5 it's extremely important. I think it's been shown that every-  
6 body has to stay within the chain of command in order to  
7 function efficiently. My point has been proved there, also.

8 It's had an amazing effect on local emergency  
9 preparedness personnel and local elected heads of government.  
10 They now have quite a bit more interest in making sure they  
11 have a good emergency program to benefit the public.

12 There are going to be changes, I'm sure, in legis-  
13 lation at the state level concerning what our function is  
14 and things of that nature.

15 In our office, we're making some internal office  
16 procedures in terms of having extra clerk-typists there, as  
17 an example. And we have some small internal changes that  
18 we're making.

19 Q Have you made any attempt to follow through on the  
20 main problem that you were experiencing throughout the inci-  
21 dent, which is this communication problem? Have you met with  
22 any people?

23 A We've done several things since the accident. One,  
24 as far as the informational -- the chain of command went --  
25 we had a meeting, well we've had several meetings. But one

1 in particular, we had the NRC -- this was at the state PEMA  
2 headquarters -- we had the NRC, the different counties in-  
3 volved and some other state agencies. And at that particular  
4 time, I indicated how I thought that it had been botched up,  
5 and the chain of command should have been followed and things  
6 of that nature.

7 Q Am I correct in understanding that you think that  
8 the chain broke down between the Governor's office and PEMA's  
9 office?

10 A Yes.

11 Q I just want to make sure I know where the break is.

12 A Yes. The break occurred at the state level some-  
13 where.

14 Q Between agencies at the state level?

15 A In my opinion, it occurred between the Governor's  
16 office and PEMA.

17 Q And do you feel that the Governor's office had  
18 sufficient information that they were being informed about  
19 the status of the plant?

20 A We assumed they were. Someone had to be being told  
21 the information. We know we weren't. We knew the state  
22 agency wasn't. So it had to be going somewhere.

23 In addition to that particular meeting, I have  
24 testified before a state house committee. So as far as the  
25 informational problem, we have been working on that.

1           Now, another thing that we tried to do, as I set  
2 up a meeting -- and I'm not sure of the specific date -- but  
3 I had Doctor Paladino, who is the Dean of Engineering at  
4 Penn State University, come down. He brought a Doctor Green-  
5 lund down with him. And I had Bill Dornsife from the Bureau  
6 of Radiological Protection. And what I did was I sent letters  
7 out to all of the local Civil Defense Directors, all of the  
8 police chiefs and all of the fire chiefs. And the purpose  
9 of the meeting was to, number one, acquaint them with basically  
10 what went on down at the plant, which was what Mr. Dornsife  
11 was going to do. Then Doctor Paladino and Mr. Greenlund were  
12 going to talk a little bit more about radiation and what it  
13 does. It was not a discussion on pro or con nuclear power,  
14 but rather: this is what happened; this is what radiation does  
15 and that type thing.

16           Now, we sent out approximately 120 letters, and we  
17 had 39 people attend.

18           Q       So do you think that indicates that people are still  
19 not sufficiently sensitized to the possibilities of real  
20 problems from not being able to plan ahead and things like  
21 that?

22           A       It indicates that there are some people that still  
23 just don't care, which we run into after any type of emergency  
24 situation. And it's sad.

25           MS. DICKER: I guess that's it. Thank you very much.

END OF DEPOSITION

1913 018



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1979  
My Commission expires:  
February 25, 1983.

Albert W. Marshall  
Notary Public

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of my stenotype notes taken by me during the depositions on the above cause, at the herein indicated time and place.

MOHRBACH & MARSHAL, INC.

By Albert W. Marshall  
Official Reporter

1913 019

## PERRY COUNTY DISASTER PLANS

This plan contains the mechanisms essential to evacuating approximately 9,000 residents of Perry County from the 20 mile radius ring around Three Mile Island.

### EVACUATION PROCEDURES

Staging areas are as follows:

Marysville Boro	-	Municipal building
Penn Township	-	Susquenita High School
Rye Township	-	Bellview Acres
Duncannon Boro	-	On the square

### TRANSPORTATION

West Perry School District will provide busses to evacuate Marysville and Rye Twp.

Rohrer Bus Service and Liddick Bus Service will provide busses to evacuate Penn Twp.

Greenwood School District and Newport School District will provide bus service to evacuate Duncannon Boro.

The fire police will line all routes of evacuation and control traffic flow in conjunction of the Penna. State Police.

All stalled vehicles shall be shoved off the road and the passengers of the stalled vehicles shall be placed in other vehicles and the route of evacuation will be kept open at all cost.

### ROUTES OF EVACUATION

Marysville and Rye Township evacuees shall proceed west on Rt. 850 to Carroll Elementary School. When that facility is full they shall continue on Rt. 850 to the village of Alinda, turn right on Rt. 74 to Greenpark High School.

Landisburg and Shermansdale Fire Companies are charged with the responsibility of keeping Rts 850 & 74 open and traffic flowing.

Penn Township evacuees will use Rts 11 & 15 north to Rt. 274 to New Bloomfield. New Bloomfield Fire Company is charged with the responsibility of keeping Rt. 274 open and traffic flowing

Duncannon Boro evacuees shall use Rt. 849 to Newport. When the Newport facilities are full evacuees shall proceed on Old Rt. 22 to Millerstown. Newport Fire Company is charge with the responsibility of keeping Rt. 849 open to Newport and from Newport to Old Rt. 22.

Millerstown Fire Company has the responsibility for traffic flow on Old Rt. 22 and Rt 17 to Liverpool.

Blain and Ickesburg Fire Companies are responsible for Rt. 17.

After the Blain School is filled with evacuees Rt. 850 north to E. Waterford School system will be used and the Blain Fire Company will have the responsibility to keep that open and traffic flowing.

PART OF 8908290035

## EVACUATION CENTERS

All schools in Perry County with the exception of Susquenita School District (10) will be utilized as the evacuation centers.

The administrative functions as well as food preparation shall be the responsibility of the school administrators and their employees augmented with volunteers.

Greenpark Elementary School is designated as the special care center (those needing special medical attention).

## LOGISTICS

Greenpark High School is designated as the main supply point for Perry County.

Responsible for providing transportation and manpower for supplying and resupplying of evacuation centers are as follows:

- Buffalo Township - Greenwood School District area  
(Millerstown & Liverpool schools)
- Howe Township &  
Oliver Township - Newport centers
- Centre Township - New Bloomfield area centers
- Carroll Township - Carroll Township centers
- Jackson Township - Blain area centers

Contact persons for school bus service evacuations are as follows:

- West Perry - Sam Murray 582-2032  
Jack Glassburn 532-2884
- Greenwood - Dick Wolford 589-7226  
Ted Furry 589-3133
- Newport - John Amsler 567-3641  
Mr. Watt 567-9475
- Susquenita - Mr. Henderson 834-3355  
Mr. Rohrer 834-5465, 692-4281 (car phone)  
Mr. Liddick 834-3383

## GENERAL INFORMATION

Fire police working with State Police are charged with maintaining good order and discipline during the evacuation and in the centers after the evacuation.

West Perry Medical Center and Greenwood Medical Center will provide medical expertise to support the special care center at Greenpark Elementary School.

The Blain Fire Company will provide transportation and manpower to move the package hospital from Loysville to Greenpark Elementary school.

Office space will be provided at Greenpark Elementary School for Mental Health, DER, and anyother special groups or departments that will be required.

The municipalities in the areas to be evacuated are responsible for formulating their own plans to alert the people and to secure their areas after the evacuation.

PERRY COUNTY

AVAILABLE TOW TRUCKS

<u>Location</u>	<u>Name &amp; Address</u>	<u>Phone</u>
4th & Mkt. Newport	Bell's Garage Newport, PA	567-6330
US 11-15 & I-81	Fry's Garage Summerdale, PA	732-1182
PA 850 & PA 34	Jerry's Garage Shermansdale, PA	582-2056
US 22, Clarks Ferry	*Kisner's Garage Duncannon, PA	834-4663
PA 34 & PA 849	Lesh Motors Newport, PA	567-3181
PA 274 & US 11-15	Maguire's Garage Duncannon, PA	834-3111
US 11-15 & PA 17	Matter's Garage Liverpool, PA	444-3701
PA 850 & PA 74	McCowan's Garage Landisburg, PA	789-3956
PA 34 & PA 274	Midway Garage Shermansdale, PA	582-2764
PA 850 & PA 233	Miller's Garage Shermansdale, PA	582-8479
US 22-322 & PA 17	Millerstown Motors Millerstown, PA	589-3112
US 22-322 & PA 34	Morrison's Garage Newport, PA	567-3144
PA 34 & Main Street	Murray's Garage New Bloomfield, PA	582-2123
PA 34 & Main Street	Perry Automotive New Bloomfield, PA	582-2420
PA 34 & LR 21012	Quirk's Automotive Shermansdale, PA	582-8411
PA 274 & PA 74	W & K Ford New Bloomfield, PA	582-2470

Available PA National Guard and PennDOT emergency equipment to be coordinated at the local level on an as-needed basis.

\* This business has two heavy duty and three light duty tow trucks.



COURT HOUSE      Dauphin County      HARRISBURG, PA.

OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS



KEVIN J. MOLLOY

Director

Work: 238-1693

Home: 944-3170

PART OF  
7908290035 :

THREE MILE ISLAND INCIDENT LOG

WEDNESDAY  
3/28/79

- 0709 RECEIVED CALL FROM MS. REILLY, RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, REFERENCE PROBLEM INVOLVING HIGH RADIOACTIVITY AT THREE MILE ISLAND. ON-SITE INCIDENT.
- 0710 BASE RECEIVED CALL FROM THREE MILE ISLAND REFERENCE ABOVE.
- 0713 I CALLED BASE, SAID CLARENCE DELLER FROM PEMA, CALLED ADVISING OF "ON-SITE" PROBLEM.
- 0714 LEFT FOR COURT HOUSE.
- 0725 BASE CALLED OVER RADIO-REQUEST ETA-INCIDENT NOW "GENERAL-SITE" EMERGENCY.
- 0728 IN OFFICE.
- 0730 VERIFY INFORMATION WITH PEMA.
- 0732-0736 NOTIFIED OFFICIALS IN LONDONDERRY, MIDDLETOWN, LOWER SWATARA, HIGHSPIRE, PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, LANCASTER AND YORK COUNTIES AND RED CROSS.
- 0737 CALL FROM DICK DUBIEL - IT IS EMERGENCY, CORE IS COVERED, HIGH READINGS, NOT SURE WHAT WE HAVE, GET MS. REILLY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
- 0743 RECEIVED CALL FROM MS. REILLY REFERENCE ABOVE.
- 0744-0800 <sup>From PCHA</sup> ADDITIONAL CALLS TO PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND LOCALS, MET WITH COMMISSIONER MINNICH.
- 0800-0830 CONTINUED COMMUNICATIONS WITH PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY FOR MORE INFORMATION, RECEIVED SEVERAL CALLS FROM LOCALS.
- 0830-0900 PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY SAY "NO OFF-SITE DANGER-STAND BY" - UPDATE LOCALS - DISPATCHERS ADVISE POLICE DEPARTMENTS - UPDATE CENTRAL AREA HEADQUARTERS - THREE MILE ISLAND CALLS REFERENCE AIRCRAFT - LARRY KNOLL FROM HARRISBURG INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, CALLS TOWER REFERENCE N7229Q CIRCLING TOWERS.
- 0900-1200 CONTINUOUS REQUEST FOR UPDATE, ESTABLISH CONTROL WITH ROYALTON - (BLOCK FOR 441, NOT NEEDED) - THREE MILE ISLAND CALL REFERENCE BOATERS NEAR ISLAND GIVE WORD - NOTIFIED OTHER MUNICIPALITIES.
- 0930 REGION II DCPA WAS ADVISED. (by State)

1138

to the press conf

- 1300 CALLS FROM PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH AND TO ABOVE AGENCIES FOR MORE INFORMATION PASSED AVAILABLE INFORMATION TO LOCALS.
- 1455 PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CALLS, ADVISES "THREE MILE ISLAND STABLE, CONTAINMENT OK - STILL PLOTTING INFORMATION."
- 1500-1900 CALLS CONTINUE BETWEEN COUNTY AND STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES, LOCAL NEWS MEDIA - 24 HOUR OPERATIONS AT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER BY AMATEURS.
- 1915 LATEST REPORT "COOLING CONTINUES - SOME VENTING TO OCCUR, MONITORING CONTINUES, NO OFF-SITE DANGER."
- 2000 CALL FROM GERUSKY REFERENCE SITUATION.
- 2125 NO CHANGE IS WORD FROM NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION AND GOVERNORS OFFICE.
- 2225 PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - COOLING BETTER, STABLE CONDITIONS
- 2230 TALKED WITH LEBANON COUNTY DIRECTOR. DIRECTOR AND ASSISTANT STAY AT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER.

THURSDAY  
3/29/79

- 0530 MOBDES - CMSGT SURNICKI REPORTS TO EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER.
- 0545 CALLED PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - BLAISDALE, REACTOR REMAINS UNDER CONTROL, MORE STABLE THAN YESTERDAY, NOT BACK TO NORMAL, MONITORING CONTINUES BY MET-ED, RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH AND NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION.
- 0620 BRIEFED DENNIS MURRAY, LONDONDERRY.
- 0640 CALLED MIDDLETOWN.
- 0655 BRIEFED - HECKMAN FROM HIGHSPIRE  
MESSICK FROM LOWER SWATARA  
STIPE FROM ROYALTON
- 0705 BRIEFED-RYAN FROM MIDDLETOWN.
- 0755 PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - LAMISON - COOLING ACTIVITY SLOWLY CONTINUING, SECONDARY PUMP BEING USED, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION HAS ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL, NO DANGER TO PUBLIC.
- 0800 BRIEFED COMMISSIONERS.

0800-0830 COMMUNICATIONS CENTER ADVISED 10 MILE ZONE POLICE DEPARTMENTS  
ON SITUATION.

0830 TALKED TO MR. POPPY, LONDONDERRY ELEMENTRY SCHOOL.

0900 CALLS TO PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGMENT AGENCY UPDATE  
ON RESOURCES, ETC.

0910 UPDATE LONDONDERRY TOWNSHIP OFFICE.

0912 UPDATE MIDDLETOWN.

0913 UPDATE ROYALTON.

0915 UPDATE LOWER SWATARA.

0945 CALLED PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REFERENCE  
SITUATION.

0958 TALKED TO MIDDLETOWN - RYAN.

1000 TALKED TO LOWER SWATARA.

1015 MET WITH ~~MR.~~ MIELKE, RED CROSS.

1040 TALKED TO RON DECK, HARRISBURG INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT.

1050 CMSGT SURNICKI COORDINATED WITH CIVIL AIR PATROL.

1104 MET WITH CHIEF SHAFFER WHO WORKS IN COURT HOSUE - (LIBERTY  
FIRE COMPANY- MIDDLETOWN)

1108 CALL FROM SENATOR GEKAS OFFICE WANTS UPDATE.

1125 PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY ADVISED SITUATION  
SAME.

1200 BRABITS COMPLETED COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT CHECK.

1230 TALKED TO MAYOR DOUTRICHS OFFICE.

1245 TALKED TO MR. DELLER- PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY.

1353 TALKED TO MAXWELL LONDONDERRY.

1355 BRIEF COMMISIONER SHEAFFER - SWATARA TOWNSHIP.

1356 MR. HAMBRIGHT - SWATARA TOWNSHIP.

1357 CALL FROM WKBO REFERENCE PREGNANT WOMEN WILL GET BACK.

1358 CALLED PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - REFERNCE ABOVE.

*Press Conf  
7/2/84*

- 1400 MET WITH REV. MIELKE - UPDATE ON SITUATION AND SHELTER DISCUSSION.
- 1401 UPDATE MIDDLETOWN - 6 MONITORING KITS REQUESTED.
- 1405 UPDATE ROYALTON.
- 1530 LAMISON - SITUATION IS IMPROVING.
- 1545 MET WITH JACK SEMANKO, HARRISBURG HOSPITAL, REFERENCE SITUATION, HARRISBURG HOSPITAL WILL HELP.
- 1620 CALL FROM BLOSSER, CUMBERLAND COUNTY.
- 1635 UPDATE CHIEF WILKINS - LOWER SWATARA.
- 1643 DICK LAMISON CALLED FROM PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - UPDATE ON SITUATION.
- 1700 CALLED AND UPDATE - L. HECKMAN - HIGHSPIRE  
D. MURRAY - LONDONDERRY
- 1715 REPRESENTATIVE REED CALLED REFERENCE SITUATION.
- 1800 UPDATE MIDDLETOWN.
- 1812 LAMISON - NO CHANGE - NOT COLD YET, CONTINUES TO IMPROVE, SLOW RATE, OFF SITE RELEASE CONTROLLED.
- 1845 LAMISON REFERENCE FRED FISHER ( HELP FOR MONITORING TEAM )
- 1900 TALKED TO JOHN COOMEY.
- 1900-2100 UPDATE LOCALS, MANY CALLS FROM CITIZENS, MET WITH WASHINGTON POST AND ASSOCIATED PRESS REPORTERS, PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY SAYS ISLAND GETTING BETTER.
- 2115 RYAN, HECKMAN, MURRAY, WILKINS UPDATE ON SITUATION.
- 2155 LOTHROP FROM PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - UPDATE FROM NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION - NO REAL MEASURABLE READINGS OFF SITE - NO HEALTH RISK OFF SITE - NO EMERGENCY BRINGING REACTOR TO COLD SHUT DOWN WILL DO AT APPROPRIATE TIME.
- GENERAL COUNTY 24 HOUR OPERATIONS, LEARNED LT. GOVERNOR VISITED THREE MILE ISLAND, STAFF COORDINATED WITH SCHOOL DISTRICTS DURING THE DAY, AMATEURS ESTABLISHED 24 HOUR COMMUNICATIONS WITH CIVIL DEFENSE VAN AND STATE HEADQUARTERS, LOCALS (5 MILE) ADVISED TO CHECK RESOURCES TELL US NEEDS, COORDINATION WITH CIVIL AIR PATROL KEPT UP MONITORED PRESS CONFERENCES TO GET MORE INFORMATION.



FRIDAY  
3/30/79

- 0230 CALL FROM PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - REFERENCE DISCHARGE INTO RIVER.
- 0650 CALLED PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - UPDATE - SITUATION IMPROVING.
- 0700-0730 CALLED LOCALS.
- 0800 PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CALLED - STILL PUMPING SOME WATER WITH LOW LEVEL ZENON INTO RIVER - TEMPERATURE IS DOWN.
- 0830 BRIEFED CHEIF SHAFFER - LIBERTY FIRE COMPANY.
- 0834 CALL FROM JIM FLOYD: <sup>THE</sup>(?) - REFERENCE RELEASE INTO ENVIRONMENT HAVE PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY CALL. ←
- 0835 CONTACTED PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY (KUEHN) REFERENCE ABOVE.
- 0840 TALKED TO MIDDLETOWN.
- 0840 COMMISSIONERS MINNICH AND REIDER IN EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER.
- 0854 CALL FROM JIM CASSIDY, PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - ON SITE EMERGENCY - SIGNIFICANT INCREASE IN READINGS (NO EVACUATION NEEDED) ← (was planned - Hershey 7-11-79)
- 0900-0915 UPDATE LOCALS INCLUDING CIVIL DEFENSE, POLICE, FIRE, AMERICAN RED CROSS, CUMBERLAND COUNTY, COMMISSIONER HOFFMAN AT EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTER.
- APPROX. 0925 CALL FROM HENDERSON - HAS BEEN RELEASE - PROBABLY WILL BE ADVISED TO INITIATE EVACUATION - ALL 10 MILE FIRE COMPANY'S ON STANDBY, ALL SCHOOLS TO CALL IN AT 0939. WENT ON WHP WITH INFORMATION (10)
- 0950 CAROL MOLLOY REPORTS TO OFFICE, TOLD HER TO CALL SCHOOLS WITHIN A 5 MILE RADIUS OF THREE MILE ISLAND - KEEP KIDS INSIDE HAVE BUSES READY - CLOSE WINDOWS - LOWER DAUPHIN, MIDDLETOWN, STEELTON-HIGHSPIRE, DERRY AND CENTRAL DAUPHIN ADVISED STAY CALM, STAND-BY, LISTEN TO CIVIL DEFENSE MONITORS.
- 1000-1200 ~~1030 Fire Plan for 90~~
- 1130-1200 BRINDLE, ROGERS, BILL - ARC - REFERENCE HERSHEY SHELTER.
- 1200 MIDDLETOWN AND LONDONDERRY SCHOOLS CLOSED, SEND KIDS HOME - PREGNANT WOMEN AND PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN - 5 MILES-10 MILES KEEP WINDOWS CLOSED.

1300-1500 CALLS FROM PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY -  
READINGS BETTER - STABLE EXCEPT ONE PUFF - CALLS TO AND  
FROM ALL LOCALS IN 10 MILE AREA.

1500-1600 TALKED TO SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE REFERENCE USE OF  
FARM SHOW BUILDING.

GENERAL CALL FROM CHARLES GREEN, PP&E, ALLENTOWN REFERENCE  
BRUNNER PLANT, WILL CLOSE DOWN 2 OF 3 UNITS OVER  
WEEKEND, UNIT 1 TO RUN IF TRIPS NO PROBLEM, CHARGE  
ALL UNITS ON MONDAY.

MANY CALLS FROM CITIZENS REFERENCE INFORMATION ABOUT  
PROBLEM - NATIONAL MEDIA CAUSING SOME PROBLEMS WITH  
EXPLOSION AND EVACUATION STORIES.

LEARNED OF BUBBLE.

SIRENS IN CITY (3 TIMES)

REGION II - PARRISH AND ALDRICH ARRIVE AT EMERGENCY  
OPERATIONS CENTER.

2300 ARC SAYS 160 AT HERSHEY.

2300-2400 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER OPEN ALL NIGHT.

SATURDAY  
3/31/79

- 0001-0600 CALLS FROM AND TO PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY REFERENCE FREY VILLAGE RETIREMENT CENTER AND ODD FELLOWS HOME. DECISION TO MOVE MADE BY ADMINISTRATORS, DAUPHIN COUNTY TO HELP WITH BUSES AND AMBULANCES.
- 0600-0900 EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER STAFF NOW INCLUDES, KEVIN J. MOLLOY, CAROL MOLLOY, JOHN BRABITS, JOYCE BRABITS, JIM PARRISH, HAROLD ARDRICH, BEN TOWSEY, CMSGT SURNICKI, COMMISSIONER MINNICH AND REIDER, O.A. SMITH, JIM FISHER, JACK SEMANKO, MIKE WERTZ, DR. SMITH, JOEL GROTTENTHALER, H. LAHR, CAPT. STACKHOUSE PLUS DISPATCHERS AND LAURIE WESTHAFFER.
- 0900 INITIAL MEETING IN EOC WITH ENTIRE 5 MILE DIRECTORS TO VERIFY NEEDS, ADVISE THEM OF STAGING AREAS (LATER DECIDED MOVE TO HOST COUNTIES TO PREVENT MOVING PEOPLE TWICE) 10 MILE PLANNING PROCEEDING, LOCALS IN THOSE COMMUNITIES CALLED BY PHONE.
- 0900-0930 O.A. SMITH RETURNS FROM MEETING WITH STATE, REFERENCE EVACUATION PLANS FOR 5-10-20 MILES. JIM GRAB REPORTS TO DO SOME PRINTING OF LEAFLETS AND PASSES. HOT LINES INSTALLED BY PHONE COMPANY. *00 20 miles*
- 0930-1200 CONTACT CONTINUES WITH LOCALS AND WITH HOST COUNTIES. EVACUATION ROUTES ARE BEING PLOTTED. WORK ON PRISON AND DETENTION HOME STARTED. DCPA FILM AND PHOTO CREWS AS WELL AS OTHER CONSULTANTS ARRIVE TO GATHER DATA FOR HISTORICAL PURPOSES - PRESS RELEASE WITH LOCAL PHONE NUMBERS ISSUED FOR PEOPLE NEEDING SPECIAL TRANSPORTATION, OR HAVING NO TRANSPORTATION. GREYHOUND SPOKESMEN SAY RIDERSHIP UP 40% - CONTACT WITH LOCALS TO FIND OUT HOW MANY LEFT.
- 1200-1700 CALLS FROM PUBLIC CONTINUE, EFFORTS TO FIND OUT MORE INFORMATION NOT VERY SUCCESSFUL, FISHER, SEMANKO, GROTTENTHALER, DR. SMITH WORK ON HOSPITALS AND NURSING HOMES; TOWSEY AND JOYCE BRABITS CONTACTING HOST COUNTIES; PARRISH, CAROL MOLLOY AND H. LAHR WORKING ON EVACUATION ROUTES, LOCALS ADVISED OF CHANGES AS THEY OCCUR - CAPT. STACKHOUSE COORDINATING WITH LOCALS TO DETERMINE LOCATION OF CHECK POINTS.
- from 20 mile area*  
1700-2400 MEETING AT COURT HOUSE WITH LOCALS TO FIND OUT NEEDS AND ANSWER QUESTIONS ABOUT COORDINATION, ETC. - REP. PICOLLA STOPS AT EOC, SENATOR GEKAS CALLS, GOVERNORS OFFICE ADVISES WE MIGHT EVACUATE 5 MILES OURSELVES DUE TO LACK OF INFORMATION AND CONCERN ABOUT CITIZEN SAFETY - 5 AND 10 MILE EVACUATION PLANS WERE COMPLETED, ~~STATE ADVISES PLAN FOR 20 MILES.~~

*Regitz*

SUNDAY  
4/1/79

- 0030 10-20 MILE EVACUATION PLAN COMPLETED - REFINEMENTS TO CONTINUE - REVIEWED BY EOC STAFF.
- 0100-0200 CALL FROM LT. GOVERNOR - WILL STOP IN OFFICE TO DISCUSS SITUATION.
- 0200-0700 CALLS TO AND FROM STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES.
- 0700 CONT. REFINEMENT OF 10 AND 20 MILES BEGAN.
- 0800 DECISION MADE TO MEET WITH LOCALS IN 20 MILE AREA - UPCOUNTY DIRECTORS, FIRE CHIEFS, POLICE CHIEFS, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS THROUGHOUT THE DAY.
- 0805 COLONEL HENDERSON ARRIVES, LISTENS TO OUR PROBLEMS REFERENCE INFORMATION, SAYS HE IS AWARE OF IT AND IS TRYING TO STRAIGHTEN MESS OUT.
- 0805-1000 EXTRA PHONE LINES INSTALLED, ALL PERSONNEL CONTACTED REFERENCE MEETINGS, EFFORTS CONTINUE TO ASCERTAIN LOCAL REQUIREMENTS, MEETING WITH HOSPITAL AND NURSING HOME SET UP, STAFF PROBLEM CROPPING UP FOR 3-11 SHIFTS - PRESS RELEASE FOR THOSE NEEDING TRANSPORTATION STILL BEING BROADCAST.
- 1000 LT. GOVERNOR SCRANTON ARRIVES, ADVISE HIM OF OUR ACCOMPLISHMENTS THIS FAR AND PROBLEMS WE ARE RUNNING INTO, ASK HIM TO STRAIGHTEN OUR FLOW OF INFORMATION, ASSURE HIM WE WILL FOLLOW (AS BEST AS POSSIBLE) DECISION OF GOVERNOR REFERENCE EVACUATION-MEETING LASTS ABOUT 45 MINUTES.
- 1100-1200 MEETING WITH NATIONAL GUARD, PENNDOT, PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE, ETC. TO WORK ON TRAFFIC PROBLEMS, EOC STAFF STILL CONFIRMING HOST COUNTY INFORMATION (SPECIFICS ON SHELTER, ETC.) WORK ON REFINING PLAN CONTINUES.
- 1200-1300 PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY SAYS MUST HAVE "NEEDS" LIST FOR THE PRESIDENT BY 1300 - TASK ACCOMPLISHED-LACKING SOME LOCAL INFORMATION - BISHOP DAILEY AND MSGE. KEELER, HARRISBURG ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE, BRIEF THEM AND RECIEVE ASSURANCES OF WHATEVER HELP THEY CAN GIVE.
- 1300-2000 MEETINGS HELD WITH LOCAL CIVIL DEFENSE TO DISCUSS REQUIREMENTS AND SHELTERS AVAILABLE, MR. ZIMMERMAN ASSISTS AT POLICE MEETING, CAPT. STACKHOUSE FIRMS UP GUARD COMMITMENT, FIRE CHIEFS UPDATED EVACUATION PLAN FOR EQUIPMENT EXPLAINED DISSASTISFACTION WITH LACK OF ACTION, SENATOR GEKAS HELPS OUT AT MEETING - GEKAS CALLS GOVERNORS OFFICE TO EXPLAIN COUNTY SITUATION - COMMISSIONERS MEET WITH LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS - MEETING HELD WITH MEDICAL PERSONNEL, STAFFING PROBLEM DEALT WITH - HOSPITALS KEEP POPULATION LOW - CONTINUE CALLS BETWEEN LOCALS AND STATE - CURFEWS ESTABLISHED IN LOWER PAXSTON, LOWER SWATARA, SWATARA, ROYALTON, HIGHSPIRE, HUMMELSTOWN, STEELTON - BUBBLE GETTING

SMALLER - MADE REQUEST FOR DIRECTION AND CONTROL INFORMATION WITH COUNTY AND LOCALS SUBMITTED TO FDAA, DISSAPPROVED BY FDAA, DCPA SAYS IS APPROPRIATE BASED ON AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS.

2000-2400 ASK PATRIOT NEWS TO MAKE SOME CHANGES IN THEIR STORY ON EVACUATION PLAN, VERY COOPERATIVE, NO PROBLEM - CONSTANT REVIEW OF LOCAL SITUATION SUCH AS NEEDS, COORDINATION OF PALN, POPULATION THAT LEFT AREA (ABOUT 45% IN 20 MILE AREA) - CONTINUED CONTACT WITH HOST COUNTY DIRECTORS.

MONDAY  
4/2/79

SPECIFIC TIMES  
NOT AVAILABLE

PATRIOT AND EVENING NEWS - PUBLISHED 5-10-20 MILE PLANS - BUBBLE DECREASING.

APPROXIMATELY 130-180 EVACUEES AT HERSHEY ARENA.

LT. GOVERNOR SCRANTON VISITED EOC - MET WITH MR. MOLLOY DISCUSSED THREE MILE ISLAND SITUATION ON SITE - FIREMANS PROBLEM - INFORMATION PROBLEM AND MEDICAL STAFF AND SCHOOL PROBLEM.

SCHOOLS REMAIN CLOSED.

EOC STAFF UPDATES INTERNAL STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES- ALTERNATE EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER SITE INFORMATION FIRMED UP (OPERATIONAL FOR A WHILE ON SUNDAY) - CHECK WITH CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ON BUSINERS AND INDUSTRY ABSENTEEISM INFORMATION.

TALKED ONCE AGAIN WITH MR. SI COHEN, DIRECTOR OF B'NAI BRITH COMMUNITY SERVICES, WASHINGTON D.C. REFERENCE HOUSING FOR EVACUEES.

32 PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE FROM TROOP A SENT INTO 5 MILE AREA TO ASSIST LOCALS - MAYOR REID REPORTED TO HAVE ISSUED "SHOOT ANY LOOTER ORDERS." ABOUT 6500 STATE EMPLOYEES ABSENT (NORMAL 2,500)

AMTRAK AND US POSTAL WILL HELP.



TUESDAY  
4/3/79

SOME DAUPHIN COUNTY RESIDENTS SHOWED UP AT RECEPTION AREA'S DURING THE NIGHT - TTY SENT TO MOST COUNTIES, MOLLOY ADVISES MEDIA, HOST AREAS FOR EVACUATION ONLY.

6 AFFECTED COUNTIES MEET WITH STATE HEADQUARTERS.

ROGER PERKINS, DCPA, REGION I, ARRIVED ON SCENE.

MOST OF SCHOOLS REMAIN CLOSED, SERIOUS DISCUSSION OF WHAT TO DO IF SCHOOLS OPEN AND BUSES NOT AVAILABLE.

RUMOR CONTROL PHONE ESTABLISHED OVER 250 CALLS FIRST 8 HOURS.

WEDNESDAY  
4/4/79

SCHOOLS IN OTHER THAN 5 MILE RADIUS TO OPEN.

COMMISSIONERS PASS EMERGENCY DECLARATION RESOLUTION AND ALSO EXTENDED FOR 7 DAYS.

ALL CURFEWS LIFTED - SCHOOLS IN 5 MILE REMAIN CLOSED - PREGNANT WOMEN AND PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN STAY OUT OF 5 MILE AREA.

SIREN SOUNDS IN CITY.

THURSDAY  
4/5/79

RECEIVED 1976 POPULATION FIGURES, ESTIMATED FROM COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION - WILL START FINAL PRINTING OF PLAN.

FINAL ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH B'NAI BRITH FOR HOUSING IN 17 COMMUNITIES.

JOHN BEX, REGION II AT EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER.

MEDICAL MEETING WITH AIR GUARD, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ETC.

CAPT. STACKHOUSE LEFT FOR MILTON.

FRIDAY  
4/6/79

SOME 100 EVACUEES REMAIN AT HERSHEY.

87 ODD FELLOWS HOME RESIDENTS STILL AT HARRISBURG STATE HOSPITAL,  
40 RETURNED WEDNESDAY AND THURSDAY.

DAUPHIN CONSOLIDATED WATER COMPANY SAYS TESTS SHOW WATER IS "SAFE."

AT 1500 HOURS, RED CROSS REPORTS 48 EVACUEES AT HERSHEY.

MEETING WITH CROW CASSIDY OF PEMA, AND GREGG BEATTY, REGION II, REFERENCE  
PLAN - BEATTY ASSIGNED TO YORK COUNTY OFFICE OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS.

APPROXIMATELY 2/3 OF 60 RESIDENTS OF HOMELAND NURSING HOME, HARRISBURG  
RETURNED HOME.

AMERICAN HARDWARE SUPPLY COMPANY MOVED ITS WEEK LONG CONVENTION TO  
MEMPHIS (ESTIMATED LOSS \$100,000)

SATURDAY  
4/7/79

MR. MOLLOY ISSUE'S PRESS RELEASE PER GOVERNORS REQUEST ADVISING  
CLOSING OF HERSHEY EVACUATION CENTER.

BUBBLE SIZE DECREASING, WORK CONTINUES ON PRINTING OF PLAN, REVIEW  
AND CORRECTION AND ADDITION OF ITEMS CONTINUES

SUNDAY  
4/8/79

16 RESIDENTS OF HOMELAND NURSING HOME RETURNED.

ANTI-NUCLEAR RALLY AT CAPITOL.

RADEF ANNEX UPDATE.

PANG HELICOPTER REPRESENTATIVE, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND COUNTY  
STAFF MEET TO DISCUSS AIR EVACUATION.

MONDAY  
4/9/79

GOVERNOR THORNBURGH LIFTED BAN ON SCHOOL CLOSINGS IN 5 MILE RADIUS. ALSO, STATED IT IS SAFE FOR PREGNANT WOMEN AND PRE-SCHOOL CHILDREN TO RETURN TO 5 MILE RADIUS.

127 RESIDENTS OF THE ODD FELLOWS HOME OF PENNSYLVANIA, LOCATED IN LOWER SWATARA TOWNSHIP, ARE TO LEAVE THEIR TEMPORARY QUARTERS IN THE HARRISBURG STATE HOSPITAL TODAY.

FRANK VOGEL, DCPA NATIONAL OFFICE, VISITED DAUPHIN COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER - MET BRABITS.

TUESDAY  
4/10/79

0850 CALL FROM STEVE TINDALL - FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT.

0910 CALL FROM COMMISSIONER MYERS - REFERENCE CIVILIAN WHO HELPED.

0912 MEETING WITH JIM PARRISH AND HAROLD ALDRICH.

0935 TEST RUN WHP HOT LIME.

1030 CALL FROM MR. COOLEY, ALLSTATE AERIAL SURVEY - REFERENCE MAPS.

1130 CALL FROM ESCORT OF FRENCH ELEC. REPRESENTATIVE - REFERENCE COPY OF 5 MILE PLAN.

1250 TALKED WITH MR. MURRAY REFERENCE TOWNSHIP MEETING.

1305 CALL FROM ROLLING STONE MAGAZINE.

1400 CALL FROM PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - CHUCK CROW - HOW LONG NEEDED TO MOVE IF SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AND MANPOWER ON HAND IN 10 HOURS? AT LEAST 12 HOURS (STAFF OK)

WEDNESDAY  
4/11/79

0810 CALL FROM PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY - LAMISON - REFERENCE RELEASE OF DCPA AND PEMA PERSONNEL.

0830 MET WITH COMMISSIONER MINNICH.

0840 CALL FROM BOB FORSYTH REFERENCE RITTER HOUSE, WATER ST. - .9MR INSIDE

0850 HARRISBURG EXPLOSIVES SPRING GARDEN DRIVE, LOWER PAXTON - STOLEN

0915 MEETING AT PEMA HEADQUARTERS AT 1200.

0920 MINNICH, COSTANZA, REFERENCE GAS, GRUNDONS EXON 770 EISHENHOWER BLVD. 564-7406.

0935 BEN CALLED PEMA REFERENCE ABOVE.

0937 MEETING TO BE HELD WITH EXXON REFERENCE ABOVE (LAMISON CALLED JACK)

6.25  
3:40pm

~~Basic problems~~

Kuapp

NRC - Stella - get milk & changed  
all monthly, TLD's normal  
4-8 ml/stel mo

roof vent  
not close to  
relief valve  
lifting

June 18 4 farms D H J N

0.09 NE

0.65 H - Scull

0.19 West J

0.12 W SE

4 of 12

June 6-22 D & L farm North NE

0.07 D

0.01 L

<6 ROI

Two more today

PP21 of

7908290<sup>35</sup> 1

1.9 mm /  $\mu\text{m}$

x 20 (10000)  $\times 1940 \times 5 \times 10^{-9}$

$$1.9 \text{ mm} \times \frac{20 (10000)}{\text{mm}} \times 1940 \times \frac{5 \times 10^{-9}}{\text{cm}}$$

$$2.736 \times 10^8 \times 10^{-9}$$

.273

$$\frac{1.41 \times 10^{-2} \text{ uC/cm}}{5 \times 10^{-4}}$$

3 600



max (burst) from Hudson to Coueswau 3/30/79  
at 71500  
is planned release 130,000 gal  
etc

How to improve, without expending more

someone with a military background to coordinate efforts

can damage our influence than thought. Later  
~~the~~ very high % of total fissure gases have  
been released

top of our core was steaming. ...  
thermocouple was now reading below saturation  
near water reaction. ... bubble at top of  
the vessel - one element still hot could be  
bleeding.

containing gas ...

between 11:00 ...

1-70 ... (X)

Station ... 444-4144

20 mile ... of coast comes to a halt

0.1 curie/yr

issue of ... small

issue of ... large release rates

EXACT

[Redacted area]

Exit	Location (Mileage)	Time	Time
Exit 16	Goldboro (W. 1)	0.02	0145
	Goldboro	0.02	0155
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.01	0201
	York Haven	0.01	0205
	Manchester	0.02	0211
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	0.02	0217
	Exit 12 Rte 53	0.02	0224
	Exit 13 Rte 53	0.01	0228
	Exit 14 Rte 53	0.02	0231
	Exit 16 Rte 53	0.02	0242
	Goldboro	0.02	0255
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.02	0300
	York Haven	0.03	0307
	Manchester	0.01	0308
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	0.03	0314
	Exit 12 Rte 53	0.04	0320
	Exit 13 Rte 53	0.02	0325
	Exit 14 Rte 53	0.03	0327
	Exit 16 Rte 53	0.02	0337
	Goldboro	0.02	0348
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.02	0354
	York Haven	0.01	0402
	Manchester	0.02	0409
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	0.01	0415
	Exit 12 Rte 53	0.02	0420
	Exit 13 Rte 53	0.02	0425
	Exit 14 Rte 53	0.03	0428
	Exit 16 Rte 53	0.02	0510
	Goldboro	0.01	0520
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.04	0527
	York Haven	0.06	0532
	Manchester	0.02	0537
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	0.02	0548
	Exit 12 Rte 53	0.01	0550
	Exit 13 Rte 53	0.02	0555
	Exit 14 Rte 53	0.01	0557

cutting  
tree

1-16-84

1-16-84

1-16-84

1-16-84

1-16-84

1-16-84

1-16-84

1-16-84

1-16-84  
80  
To  
Fulton  
Blvd.

30-miles  
Round  
Trip

Base  
Record  
1-16-84

Exit	Location (Mile)	Time
Exit 16	Goldboro	1942
Exit 16	Goldboro	1955
Exit 16	Goldboro	2000
Exit 16	Goldboro	2005
Exit 16	Goldboro	2010
Exit 16	Goldboro	2015
Exit 16	Goldboro	2024
Exit 16	Goldboro	2029
Exit 16	Goldboro	2032
Exit 16	Goldboro	2035
Exit 16	Goldboro	2100
Exit 16	Goldboro	2109
Exit 16	Goldboro	2113
Exit 16	Goldboro	2120
Exit 16	Goldboro	2128
Exit 16	Goldboro	2135
Exit 16	Goldboro	2141
Exit 16	Goldboro	2145
Exit 16	Goldboro	2152
Exit 16	Goldboro	2211
Exit 16	Goldboro	2217
Exit 16	Goldboro	2222
Exit 16	Goldboro	2227
Exit 16	Goldboro	2234
Exit 16	Goldboro	2243
Exit 16	Goldboro	2248
Exit 16	Goldboro	2300
Exit 16	Goldboro	2308
Exit 16	Goldboro	2320
Exit 16	Goldboro	2338
Exit 16	Goldboro	2340
Exit 16	Goldboro	2347
Exit 16	Goldboro	2355
Exit 16	Goldboro	0002
Exit 16	Goldboro	0009
Exit 16	Goldboro	0018

You can get  
gas in ex-  
cess at Ex.  
18 at  
Shell Sta.

Stop in at  
Goldboro F.  
Have CRT turn  
at circle for  
coffee if you  
want.

Date	Location	Time	Notes
4-1-79	Exit 10 Rt 53	8:05 AM	
	Goldboro	8:18	
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	8:22	TRANSIENT
	York Haven	8:25	1.04 TO .01
	Manchester	8:35	had wind
	Emigville (Exit 11 Rt 53)	8:40	SCINTILLATES
	Exit 12 Rt 53	8:47	
	Exit 13 Rt 53	8:50	
	Exit 14 Rt 53	8:53	
	Exit 16 Rt 53	8:50	
	Goldboro	9:05	
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	9:10	
	York Haven	9:13	
	Manchester	9:17	
	Emigville (Exit 11 Rt 53)	9:20	
	Exit 12 Rt 53	9:27	
	Exit 13 Rt 53	9:37	
	Exit 14 Rt 53	9:39	
	Exit 16 Rt 53	9:40	
	Goldboro	9:51	
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	10:01	0.1
	York Haven	10:12	10:10 between 202/382 and York
	Manchester	10:18	THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OBSERVATION. COLLISION TOWER SW WIND OUT OF THE SW
	Emigville (Exit 11 Rt 53)	10:30	
	Exit 12 Rt 53	10:40	
	Exit 13 Rt 53	10:45	was covered by EXIT 12 and 13
	Exit 14 Rt 53	10:47	
4-1-79	Exit 16 Rt 53	10:50 AM	
	Goldboro		
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Emigville (Exit 11 Rt 53)		
	Exit 13 Rt 53		
	Exit 14 Rt 53		

NOTES  
 BKG is 2.1  
 TRANSIENT  
 1.04 TO .01  
 had wind  
 SCINTILLATES

0.1  
 10:10 between 202/382 and York  
 THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OBSERVATION. COLLISION TOWER SW WIND OUT OF THE SW  
 was covered by EXIT 12 and 13

215 375 8077 - YORK  
 797-4316

Call BEMA I on Walkie Talkie  
 They can patch you through  
 To response teams etc.

	Cute mi	G.M. Time
	38	
Middletown 41 Bridge	106 mi	
E Shore Turnpike entrance	0.04 mi/hr	
W Shore Turnpike entrance	> 0.02 "	
EXIT 16 Jct. Cr. + St. York Rd.	0.3 "	1300
S. of Redland Acres	0.7 "	1306
Goldsboro downtown	1.5 "	1315
Leaving Goldsboro heading south	.4 "	
Junct. 295 + 262	0.1 "	1325
York Haven	0.06 "	1327
Manchester	0.05 "	1331
Frysville	0.02	1341
83N EX 12	0.05	1350
83N Exit 13	0.25	1354
83N Exit 14	0.2	1356
83N EX 15	0.35	1358
83N EX 15-16	0.5	1359
83N Ex 16	.35	1359
83N EX 17	0.2	1401
Turnpike West Shore	0.15	1412
0.5	1412	
?	1412	
0.5	1419	
0.2	1419	
11.25	1422	
44.5	1422	
0.1	1424	



	G.M	Time
Gas Center (passing)	0.14	1426
≡ point TMI	0.04	1428
Falmouth	0.02	1430
E-Town	< 0.02	1455
N 283 (Middleton) <sup>white</sup> <sub>ball</sub>	0.15	1520
Turnpike junction	0.3	1520
N 283 past junction	0.3	1520
June 235 to Hwy	0.25	1520
East Mill	0.20	1520

Time	Activity	Duration	Notes
7:56 AM	Exit 14	0:01	
8:06	Exit 14	0:01	
8:11	Exit 14	0:01	
8:14	Exit 14	0:01	
8:20	Exit 14	0:01	
8:25	Exit 14	0:01	
8:31	Exit 14	0:01	
8:31	Exit 14	0:01	
9:30	Exit 14	0:01	
9:47	Exit 14	0:01	
9:53	Exit 14	0:01	
9:56	Exit 14	0:01	
10:05	Exit 14	0:01	
10:05	Exit 14	0:01	
10:06	Exit 14	0:01	
10:16	Exit 14	0:01	
10:18	Exit 14	0:01	
10:22	Exit 14	0:01	
10:32	Exit 14	0:01	
10:37	Exit 14	0:01	
10:46	Exit 14	0:01	
10:50	Exit 14	0:01	
10:57	Exit 14	0:01	
11:01	Exit 14	0:01	
11:05	Exit 14	0:01	
12:31 PM	Exit 14	0:01	
12:47	Exit 14	0:01	
12:51	Exit 14	0:01	
12:54	Exit 14	0:01	
1:01	Exit 14	0:01	
1:11	Exit 14	0:01	
1:15	Exit 14	0:01	
1:17	Exit 14	0:01	

30 min  
 1300g  
 1/2  
 500g  
 1

7:56 AM 3/31/79

Exit	Description	mi/hr	Time
3/31/79	Exit 10 (Rte 23)	0.02	1:40
	Caliburno	0.01	1:49
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.01	1:52
	York Haven	0.01	1:57
	Manchester	0.01	2:01
	Linnville (Exit 11 Rte 23)	0.02	2:07
	Exit 12 Rte 23	0.01	2:12
	Exit 13 Rte 23	0.01	2:17
	Exit 14 Rte 23	0.01	2:18
	Exit 16 Rte 23	0.01	3:00
	Caliburno	0.02	3:07
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.02	3:13
	York Haven	0.01	3:15
	Manchester	0.02	3:19
	Linnville (Exit 11 Rte 23)	0.02	3:26
	Exit 12 Rte 23	0.01	3:31
	Exit 13 Rte 23	0.01	3:38
	Exit 14 Rte 23	0.02	3:40
	Exit 16 Rte 23	0.02	3:45
	Caliburno	0.02	3:52
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.01	4:31
	York Haven	0.01	4:33
	Manchester	0.01	4:41
	Linnville (Exit 11 Rte 23)	0.02	4:45
	Exit 12 Rte 23	0.01	4:51
	Exit 13 Rte 23	0.01	4:52
	Exit 14 Rte 23	0.02	4:57
	Exit 16 Rte 23	0.01	5:30
	Caliburno	0.01	5:43
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.01	5:48
	York Haven	0.01	5:52
	Manchester	0.02	6:00
	Linnville (Exit 11 Rte 23)	0.02	6:03
	Exit 12 Rte 23	0.02	6:10
	Exit 13 Rte 23	0.01	6:14
	Exit 14 Rte 23	0.01	6:16

Am 3-31-79

pm

3/2/79

1. D  
Missouri  
Office  
783-8150

Date	Location	Time	Time
3/2/79	Exit 10 Rte 53	1359	
	Caldwells	1315	
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		
	York Haven	1321	
	Manchester	1331	
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	1341	
	Exit 12 Rte 53	1350	
	Exit 13 Rte 53	1354	
	Exit 14 Rte 53	1356	
2/30/79	Exit 16 Rte 53	1950	
	Caldwells	2003	
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	2007	
	York Haven	2010	
	Manchester	2018	
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	2020	
	Exit 12 Rte 53	2029	
	Exit 13 Rte 53	2034	
	Exit 14 Rte 53	2038	
	Exit 16 Rte 53	2111	
	Caldwells	2117	
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	2121	
	York Haven	2128	
	Manchester	2135	
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	2140	
	Exit 12 Rte 53	2145	
	Exit 13 Rte 53	2153	
	Exit 14 Rte 53	2157	
	Exit 16 Rte 53	2239	
	Caldwells	2252	
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	2258	
	York Haven	2301	
	Manchester	2308	
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)	2315	
	Exit 12 Rte 53	2322	
	Exit 13 Rte 53	2337	
	Exit 14 Rte 53	2341	

CO called 1  
TMT called 19

CO called 2130

TMT 2300

CO  
called 2355  
TMT 0104

Date	Location (W. 1)	Relay	Time
	Exit 16 Rte 83	.01	0340
	Goldsbere	.01	0355
8/1	Rte 202 + 352 junction	.01	0013
	York Haven	.01	0016
	Manchester	.01	0023
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	.01	0027
	Exit 12 Rte 83	.01	0035
	Exit 13 Rte 83	.01	0040
	Exit 14 Rte 83	.01	0040
	Exit 16 Rte 83	.01	0111
	Goldsbere	.01	0122
	Rte 202 + 352 junction	.01	0129
	York Haven	.01	0132
	Manchester	.01	0131
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	.01	0143
	Exit 12 Rte 83	.01	0151
	Exit 13 Rte 83	.01	0155
	Exit 14 Rte 83	.01	0157
	Exit 16 Rte 83	.01	0237
	Goldsbere	.01	0245
	Rte 202 + 352 junction	.01	0256
	York Haven	.01	0254
	Manchester	.01	0306
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	.01	0310
	Exit 12 Rte 83	.01	0319
	Exit 13 Rte 83	.01	0327
	Exit 14 Rte 83	.01	0326
	Exit 16 Rte 83	.01	0401
	Goldsbere	.01	0413
	Rte 202 + 352 junction	.01	0420
	York Haven	.01	0423
	Manchester	.01	0424
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	.01	0434
	Exit 13 Rte 83	.01	0442
	Exit 13 Rte 83	.01	0447
	Exit 14 Rte 83	.01	0447

CD 0309

CD 0309  
VRC

Called CD 051



Loc.	Time
Exit 7 Rt 83	0651
Goldboro	0732
Rte 262 + 352 junction	0738
York Haven	0741
Manchester	0748
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	0751
Exit 12 Rte 83	0758
Exit 13 Rte 83	0802
Exit 14 Rte 83	0804
Exit 16 Rte 83	0806
Goldboro	0806
Rte 262 + 352 junction	0811
York Haven	0814
Manchester	0820
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	0825
Exit 12 Rte 83	0831
Exit 13 Rte 83	0835
Exit 14 Rte 83	0837
Exit 16 Rte 83	0850
Goldboro	0948
Rte 262 + 352 junction	0957
York Haven	0956
Manchester	1000
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	1006
Exit 12 Rte 83	1010
Exit 13 Rte 83	1016
Exit 14 Rte 83	1018
Exit 16 Rte 83	1022
Goldboro	1032
Rte 262 + 352 junction	1037
York Haven	1039
Manchester	1046
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)	1050
Exit 12 Rte 83	1057
Exit 13 Rte 83	1101
Exit 14 Rte 83	1103

CD 0650

Mass Care Centers - Northern HS - Dillsbury  
 Central HS - North York  
 Hershey Sports Arena

length & depth of plume  
 how far extend & how wide →

Pa State Police - Areas of out are  
 being monitored

West	East
1. <del>York</del> Dillsbury	Middletown <sup>airport</sup>
2. <del>York</del> Rte 262 + 382 junction	Talbot
W. Haven	Pandora
Manchester	Mount Airy
Emigsville (EXIT)	Mount Joy
Exit 12	E. Town
Exit 13	283 (West Exit)
Exit 14	283 (East Exit)

at headquarters  
 Lt A. M. I.  
 783-8150  
 Emergency Management  
 Jim Farley  
 Dick Jamison  
 Ken [unclear]

Loc	Time
Exit 10 Rte 33	0651
Goldsboro	0730
Rte 262 + 382 junction	0750
York Haven	0741
Manchester	0748
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 33)	0751
Exit 12 Rte 33	0758
Exit 13 Rte 33	0802
Exit 14 Rte 33	0804
Exit 16 Rte 33	0856
Goldsboro	0906
Rte 262 + 382 junction	0811
York Haven	0814
Manchester	0820
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 33)	0825
Exit 12 Rte 33	0831
Exit 13 Rte 33	0835
Exit 14 Rte 33	0837
Exit 16 Rte 33	0950
Goldsboro	0948
Rte 262 + 382 junction	0953
York Haven	0956
Manchester	1000
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 33)	1006
Exit 12 Rte 33	1010
Exit 13 Rte 33	1016
Exit 14 Rte 33	1018
Exit 16 Rte 33	1022
Goldsboro	1032
Rte 262 + 382 junction	1037
York Haven	1039
Manchester	1046
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 33)	1050
Exit 12 Rte 33	1057
Exit 13 Rte 33	1100
Exit 14 Rte 33	1103

CD 0650

Dist	Location (Mile - 1)	Reading	Time
	Exit 16 Rt 53	0.01	1257
	Goldsboro	0.01	1247
	Rte 202 + 53 junction	0.01	1251
	York Haven	0.01	1254
	Manchester	0.01	1300
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rt 53)	0.01	1304
	Exit 12 Rt 53	0.01	1311
	Exit 13 Rt 53	0.01	1315
	Exit 14 Rt 53	0.02	1317
	Exit 16 Rt 53	0.02	1330
	Goldsboro	0.01	1349
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.01	1355
	York Haven	0.01	1357
	Manchester	0.01	1401
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rt 53)	0.01	1407
	Exit 12 Rt 53	0.01	1412
	Exit 13 Rt 53	0.01	1417
	Exit 14 Rt 53	0.01	1418
	Exit 16 Rt 53	0.01	1500
	Goldsboro	0.02	1509
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.02	1513
	York Haven	0.01	1515
	Manchester	0.02	1519
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rt 53)	0.02	1526
	Exit 12 Rt 53	0.01	1531
	Exit 13 Rt 53	0.01	1538
	Exit 14 Rt 53	0.02	1540
	Exit 16 Rt 53	0.02	1545
	Goldsboro	0.02	1628
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	0.01	1631
	York Haven	0.01	1633
	Manchester	0.01	1641
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rt 53)	0.01	1645
	Exit 12 Rt 53	0.01	1651
	Exit 13 Rt 53	0.01	1655
	Exit 14 Rt 53	0.02	1657

Time	Location	Time	Time
2:17	Exit 16 Rte 3	0.01	1730
	Caldobere	0.01	1745
	Rte 262 + 382 junction	0.01	1748
	York Haven	0.01	1752
	Manchester	0.02	1800
	Linsville (Exit 11 Rte 3)	0.02	1803
	Exit 12 Rte 3	0.02	1810
	Exit 13 Rte 3	0.01	1814
	Exit 14 Rte 3	0.01	1816
	Exit 16 Rte 3	0.01	1822
	Caldobere	0.01	1825
	Rte 262 + 382 junction	0.01	1830
	York Haven	0.01	1835
	Manchester	0.02	1840
	Linsville (Exit 11 Rte 3)	0.02	1845
	Exit 12 Rte 3	0.02	1850
	Exit 13 Rte 3	0.01	1855
	Exit 14 Rte 3	0.01	1900
	Exit 16 Rte 3	0.01	1905
	Caldobere	0.01	1910
	Rte 262 + 382 junction	0.01	1915
	York Haven	0.01	1920
	Manchester	0.02	1925
	Linsville (Exit 11 Rte 3)	0.02	1930
	Exit 12 Rte 3	0.02	1935
	Exit 13 Rte 3	0.01	1940
	Exit 14 Rte 3	0.01	1945
	Exit 16 Rte 3	0.01	1950
	Caldobere	0.01	1955
	Rte 262 + 382 junction	0.01	2000
	York Haven	0.01	2005
	Manchester	0.02	2010
	Linsville (Exit 11 Rte 3)	0.02	2015
	Exit 12 Rte 3	0.02	2020
	Exit 13 Rte 3	0.01	2025
	Exit 14 Rte 3	0.01	2030



Date	Location (W. 1)	Rte.	Time
2/17	Exit 16 Rte 3	1	2:31.8
	Goldboro	2	2:35.6
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	1	2:41.2
	York Haven		2:44.6
	Manchester		2:47.1
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rte 3)		
2/17	Exit 12 Rte 3		2:50.0
	Exit 13 Rte 3		2:52.7
	Exit 14 Rte 3		2:55.1
	Exit 16 Rte 3		2:57.5
	Goldboro		3:01.5
	Rte 202 + 382 junction	1	3:06.1
	York Haven	1	3:10.5
	Manchester	2	3:14.0
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rte 3)	2	3:17.7
	Exit 12 Rte 3	3	3:22.4
	Exit 13 Rte 3	1	3:25.5
	Exit 14 Rte 3	2	3:28.1
	Exit 16 Rte 3	2	3:30.5
	Goldboro		3:34.5
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		3:38.5
	York Haven		3:42.5
	Manchester		3:46.5
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rte 3)		3:50.5
	Exit 12 Rte 3		3:54.5
	Exit 13 Rte 3		3:58.5
	Exit 14 Rte 3		4:02.5
	Exit 16 Rte 3		4:06.5
	Goldboro		4:10.5
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		4:14.5
	York Haven		4:18.5
	Manchester		4:22.5
	Lempville (Exit 11 Rte 3)		4:26.5
	Exit 12 Rte 3		4:30.5
	Exit 13 Rte 3		4:34.5
	Exit 14 Rte 3		4:38.5

501105

Time	Location	Notes
10:44	Exit 16 Rt. 33	Left lane
10:10	Exit 13 Rt. 33	Left lane
10:01	Exit 14 Rt. 33	Left lane
10:01	Exit 13 Rt. 33	Left lane
10:40	Exit 13 Rt. 33	Left lane
10:01	Exit 13 Rt. 33	Left lane
10:18	Manchester	
10:12	York Haven	
10:08	Rte 232 + 352 Junction	
9:57	Goldboro	
9:41	Exit 12 Rt. 33	
9:31	Exit 14 Rt. 33	
9:31	Exit 13 Rt. 33	
9:27	Exit 12 Rt. 33	
9:22	Manchester (Exit 11 Rt. 33)	
9:17	Manchester	
9:13	York Haven	
9:10	Rte 232 + 352 Junction	
9:05	Goldboro	
8:50	Exit 16 Rt. 33	
8:51	Exit 14 Rt. 33	
8:51	Exit 13 Rt. 33	
8:51	Exit 14 Rt. 33	
8:51	Manchester (Exit 11 Rt. 33)	
8:51	Manchester	
8:35	York Haven	
8:35	Rte 232 + 352 Junction	
8:18	Goldboro	
8:05	Exit 12 Rt. 33	
8:05	Exit 14 Rt. 33	
8:05	Exit 13 Rt. 33	
8:05	Exit 14 Rt. 33	
8:05	Manchester (Exit 11 Rt. 33)	
8:05	Manchester	
8:05	York Haven	
8:05	Rte 232 + 352 Junction	
8:05	Goldboro	
8:05	Exit 16 Rt. 33	
8:05	Exit 14 Rt. 33	
8:05	Exit 13 Rt. 33	
8:05	Exit 14 Rt. 33	
8:05	Manchester (Exit 11 Rt. 33)	
8:05	Manchester	
8:05	York Haven	
8:05	Rte 232 + 352 Junction	
8:05	Goldboro	
8:05	Exit 16 Rt. 33	

6942



W 577

100

100

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100

100

Location (W 577)	Reading	Time
Exit 10 Rte 83		
Goldsboro		
Rte 262 + 382 junction		
York Haven		
Manchester		
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)		
Exit 12 Rte 83		
Exit 13 Rte 83		
Exit 14 Rte 83		
Exit 16 Rte 83		
Goldsboro		
Rte 262 + 382 junction		
York Haven		
Manchester		
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)		
Exit 12 Rte 83		
Exit 13 Rte 83		
Exit 14 Rte 83		
Exit 16 Rte 83		
Goldsboro		
Rte 262 + 382 junction		
York Haven		
Manchester		
Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 83)		
Exit 12 Rte 83		
Exit 13 Rte 83		
Exit 14 Rte 83		

Date	Location (Unit)	Reading	Time
	Exit 16 Rt 83		
	Goldsboro		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Eringville (Exit 11 Rt 83)		
	Exit 12 Rt 83		
	Exit 13 Rt 83		
	Exit 14 Rt 83		
	Exit 16 Rt 83		
	Goldsboro		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Eringville (Exit 11 Rt 83)		
	Exit 12 Rt 83		
	Exit 13 Rt 83		
	Exit 14 Rt 83		
	Exit 16 Rt 83		
	Goldsboro		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Eringville (Exit 11 Rt 83)		
	Exit 12 Rt 83		
	Exit 13 Rt 83		
	Exit 14 Rt 83		
	Exit 16 Rt 83		
	Goldsboro		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Eringville (Exit 11 Rt 83)		
	Exit 12 Rt 83		
	Exit 13 Rt 83		
	Exit 14 Rt 83		

Date	Location (W. 1)	Reading	Time
	Exit 16 Rte 53		
	Croftsbere		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)		
	Exit 12 Rte 53		
	Exit 13 Rte 53		
	Exit 14 Rte 53		
	Exit 16 Rte 53		
	Croftsbere		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)		
	Exit 12 Rte 53		
	Exit 13 Rte 53		
	Exit 14 Rte 53		
	Exit 16 Rte 53		
	Croftsbere		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)		
	Exit 12 Rte 53		
	Exit 13 Rte 53		
	Exit 14 Rte 53		
	Exit 16 Rte 53		
	Croftsbere		
	Rte 262 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Emigsville (Exit 11 Rte 53)		
	Exit 12 Rte 53		
	Exit 13 Rte 53		
	Exit 14 Rte 53		



Line	Description	Reading	Time
	Leeds (W. 1)		
	Exit to R 33		
	Gravelly		
	Rte 202 38 4 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Langsville (Exit R 33)		
	Exit to R 33		
	Exit to R 33		
	Exit to R 33		
	Gravelly		
	Rte 202 38 4 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Langsville (Exit R 33)		
	Exit to R 33		
	Exit to R 33		
	Exit to R 33		
	Gravelly		
	Rte 202 38 4 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Langsville (Exit R 33)		
	Exit to R 33		
	Exit to R 33		
	Exit to R 33		

Date	Location	No. of	Time
	Exit 10 (Rte 83)		
	Could here		
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Longville (Exit 11 Rte 83)		
	Exit 12 Rte 83		
	Exit 13 Rte 83		
	Exit 14 Rte 83		
	Exit 15 Rte 83		
	Could here		
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Longville (Exit 11 Rte 83)		
	Exit 12 Rte 83		
	Exit 13 Rte 83		
	Exit 14 Rte 83		
	Exit 15 Rte 83		
	Could here		
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Longville (Exit 11 Rte 83)		
	Exit 12 Rte 83		
	Exit 13 Rte 83		
	Exit 14 Rte 83		
	Exit 15 Rte 83		
	Could here		
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Longville (Exit 11 Rte 83)		
	Exit 12 Rte 83		
	Exit 13 Rte 83		
	Exit 14 Rte 83		
	Exit 15 Rte 83		

	No. by	Time
Jan 11 (Wed) Exit 10 Rte 83 Credit here		
Rte 302 + 382 junction York Haven Manchester		
Longville (Exit 11 Rte 83) Exit 10 Rte 83 Exit 13 Rte 83 Exit 14 Rte 83		
Exit 11 Rte 83 Credit here Rte 302 + 382 junction York Haven Manchester		
Longville (Exit 11 Rte 83) Exit 10 Rte 83 Exit 13 Rte 83 Exit 14 Rte 83		
Exit 11 Rte 83 Credit here Rte 302 + 382 junction York Haven Manchester		
Longville (Exit 11 Rte 83) Exit 10 Rte 83 Exit 13 Rte 83 Exit 14 Rte 83		

No.	Description	Mileage	Time
	Exit 10 (W. 1)		
	Exit 10 (Rt 83)		
	Conditboro		
	Rte 202 + 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Manchester		
	Lanesville (Exit 11 Rt 83)		
	Exit 12 Rt 83		
	Exit 13 Rt 83		
	Exit 14 Rt 83		
	Exit 15 Rt 83		
	Exit 16 Rt 83		
	Exit 17 Rt 83		
	Exit 18 Rt 83		
	Exit 19 Rt 83		
	Exit 20 Rt 83		
	Exit 21 Rt 83		
	Exit 22 Rt 83		
	Exit 23 Rt 83		
	Exit 24 Rt 83		
	Exit 25 Rt 83		
	Exit 26 Rt 83		
	Exit 27 Rt 83		
	Exit 28 Rt 83		
	Exit 29 Rt 83		
	Exit 30 Rt 83		
	Exit 31 Rt 83		
	Exit 32 Rt 83		
	Exit 33 Rt 83		
	Exit 34 Rt 83		
	Exit 35 Rt 83		
	Exit 36 Rt 83		
	Exit 37 Rt 83		
	Exit 38 Rt 83		
	Exit 39 Rt 83		
	Exit 40 Rt 83		
	Exit 41 Rt 83		
	Exit 42 Rt 83		
	Exit 43 Rt 83		
	Exit 44 Rt 83		
	Exit 45 Rt 83		
	Exit 46 Rt 83		
	Exit 47 Rt 83		
	Exit 48 Rt 83		
	Exit 49 Rt 83		
	Exit 50 Rt 83		





Year	Location	No. of	Time
	Exit 10 (Rt 23)		
	Condit Lane		
	Rte 23 & 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Blanchester		
	Lanesville (Exit 11 Rt 23)		
	Exit 12 Rt 23		
	Exit 13 Rt 23		
	Exit 14 Rt 23		
	Exit 15 Rt 23		
	Exit 16 Rt 23		
	Condit Lane		
	Rte 23 & 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Blanchester		
	Lanesville (Exit 11 Rt 23)		
	Exit 12 Rt 23		
	Exit 13 Rt 23		
	Exit 14 Rt 23		
	Exit 15 Rt 23		
	Exit 16 Rt 23		
	Condit Lane		
	also on road pond on		
	York Haven		
	Blanchester		
	Lanesville (Exit 11 Rt 23)		
	Exit 12 Rt 23		
	Exit 13 Rt 23		
	Exit 14 Rt 23		
	Exit 15 Rt 23		
	Exit 16 Rt 23		
	Condit Lane		
	Rte 23 & 382 junction		
	York Haven		
	Blanchester		
	Lanesville (Exit 11 Rt 23)		
	Exit 12 Rt 23		
	Exit 13 Rt 23		
	Exit 14 Rt 23		
	Exit 15 Rt 23		
	Exit 16 Rt 23		

	Miles	Time	
Exit 10 - Rt 83			
Goldboro			
Rt 242 junction			
York Haven			
Blanchester			
Lintonville (Exit 11 Rt 83)			
Exit 12 - Rt 83			
Exit 13 - Rt 83			
Exit 14 - Rt 83			
Goldboro			
Rt 242 + 282 junction			
York Haven			
Blanchester			
Lintonville (Exit 14 Rt 83)			
Exit 15 - Rt 83			
Exit 16 - Rt 83			
Exit 17 - Rt 83			
Exit 18 - Rt 83			
Exit 19 - Rt 83			
Exit 20 - Rt 83			
Exit 21 - Rt 83			
Exit 22 - Rt 83			
Exit 23 - Rt 83			
Exit 24 - Rt 83			
Exit 25 - Rt 83			
Exit 26 - Rt 83			
Exit 27 - Rt 83			
Exit 28 - Rt 83			
Exit 29 - Rt 83			
Exit 30 - Rt 83			
Exit 31 - Rt 83			
Exit 32 - Rt 83			
Exit 33 - Rt 83			
Exit 34 - Rt 83			
Exit 35 - Rt 83			
Exit 36 - Rt 83			
Exit 37 - Rt 83			
Exit 38 - Rt 83			
Exit 39 - Rt 83			
Exit 40 - Rt 83			
Exit 41 - Rt 83			
Exit 42 - Rt 83			
Exit 43 - Rt 83			
Exit 44 - Rt 83			
Exit 45 - Rt 83			
Exit 46 - Rt 83			
Exit 47 - Rt 83			
Exit 48 - Rt 83			
Exit 49 - Rt 83			
Exit 50 - Rt 83			



West  
Cut  
Cut 16. Follow from  
to 10.31 (English) 10.31  
Cut.





UNLESS SPECIFIED, READINGS TAKEN IN CAR WITH WINDOWS OPEN

	284417 THYACET SLINT	LABORING HP10 G.M.
2:30 pm EVAN PRESS	2000 cpm	
FRONT AND MARKET ST	4000	
EXIT 25	20000	
RT 322 E 1/4 mi before mall	48000	0.07 m/4
283 EXIT	60000	0.1
283 1 mi FROM TURNPIKE	100000	0.25
TURNPIKE	100000	0.30
283 WHITE BARN	150000	0.25
283 AIRPORT EXIT	100000	0.20
RT 230 EXIT off AIRPORT EXTENSION	375000	0.8
RT 230 ODDFELLOWS HOME	200000	0.4
MIDDLETOWN - MAIN + UNION	20000	0.04
- MAIN + EMMAS	80000	0.17
UNION + RT 441	200000	0.50
KIWANIS PARK RT 441 12:45	500000	1.0
MAIN GATE AT 3 mi IL.	8000	0.02
RED HILL PARK STAND (1/4 mi further south)	1500	0.02
SOIL SURFACE		0.02
3 mi IL. SOUTH ENTRANCE	2000	0.02
OBSERVATION AREA	35000	0.02
TRI COUNTY BOAT CLUB (beginning of increase)	8000	0.04
NIH-KEL FARM (1/2 mi N. of Boat Club)	250000	0.6
KIWANIS CLUB PARK	150000	0.4
<del>ODDFELLOWS HOME</del>	300000	0.8
ODDFELLOWS HOME	250000	0.4
OLD ENTRANCE TO AIRPORT	35000	0.09

OUTSIDE CAR

283 HUMMELSTOWN EXIT	20 000	0.01
1 mi SOUTH OF HUMMELSTOWN EXIT	4 000	0.02
283 WHITE BARN 13:40	72500	0.12
283/83 PANY EXIT 1	5500	0.02
EXIT 28	15000	0.06
UNION DEPOSIT RD EXIT 29	12500	0.05
CENTRAL DAUPHIN HIGH SCH. EXIT	40000	0.10
UNION DEPOSIT/CONNAY RD	55000	0.14
UNION DEPOSIT/NYAS Rd.	40000	0.10
MILROY RD/DERRY ST	55000	0.13
1 mi West of MILROY on DERRY	80000	0.16
49th + Derry (Weiss Supermarket)	2000	0.02
83/Derry	2000	0.02
83/EXIT 29 Union Deposit 14:05	2000	0.02
BETWEEN EXIT 29-30	4000	0.04
83/EXIT 30 COLONIAL PARK	2500	0.02
WALANT/PROGRESS	2000	0.02

READINGS OUTSIDE OF CAR WERE TWICE AS HIGH

READINGS ON G.M. SAME AT GROUND SURFACE AS 4' ABOVE  
(INDICATES GAMMA FIELD) PROBABLY K85 immersion

NO DETECTABLE SURFACE DEPOSITION

$1.1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ Ci} \times 1.1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ Ci} \times 1.1 \times 10^{-4} \text{ Ci} = 1.33 \times 10^{-12} \text{ Ci}^3$

<u>Place</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Time</u>
Kerrville Park	0.03	5:59
Nelson Grocery	0.04	5:59
East & Main Street	0.02	6:00
Tri County Bank	0.04	6:01
North Entrance	0.05	6:01
<del>...</del>	0.01	6:12
<u>South Entrance</u>		
1/2 W of South Entrance	0.6	6:13
Red Hill farm	7.4	6:14
South entrance	5.06	6:15
1/2 mi from South	2.02	6:16
1/2 mi " "	0.2	6:17

151.75

Gen Products

AM 1911

READINGS  
13-8 unless NOTED

3-29-79

READINGS TAKEN INSIDE  
CAR UNLESS NOTED -  
DOUBLE FOR OUTSIDE.

IGNORE RTH READINGS AFTER  
MAXIMUM, OPEN AIR CHAMBER  
BECAME CONTAMINATED.

	Hbg	SCINT	GM	RTH
0900		4000 cpm	20.02 m <sup>2</sup> /h	
	I 283 / DEWITT ST	10000	0.02	
	TNPHE XCHANGE	20000	0.02	
	283 WHITE BARN	100000	0.10	
	OLMISTEAD PLAZA	100000	0.07	
	W. MAIN / WILSON MIDDLTON	350000	0.20	
	UNION / EMAUS	700000	0.45	
	PT. 441 BRIDGE <sup>SOUTH OF</sup> MIDDLTON SQUARE	OFF SCALE	0.50	
	441 KWANIS PARK		0.30	
	DAVIS SCRAP YARD	200000	0.14	
	1/2 mi South of MIDDLTON	200000	0.10	
	OBSERVATION CENTER		2.0	
725	SOUTH ENTRANCE TRI		2.5	
	1 1/2 mi. South of OBSERV.		0.5	
	2 1/2 mi . . . . .		0.15	
	3 1/2 . . . . .	100000	0.06	
	1 mi North of 241	200000	0.12	
	2 . . . . .		0.50	
	2 1/2 . . . . .		1.0 inside	4.5 out
			1.8 OUT	
	South ENTRANCE TRI		h5	
	1 mi SOUTH OF OBSERV. CENTER		5 inside	10 out
			10 outside	
38	1/2 mi South of OBS. CENTER			14 out
140	OBSERVATION CENTER			17 out
750	- - - - -			6.0
955	- - - - -			3.5

2)

IGNORE RTT  
AS CONTAMINATED  
MAY ↓ 10:00 AM

		<u>GM</u>	<u>RTT</u>
10:00	OBS. Center TMI	0.7 BY outside 0.4 Y	3.5 BY out 2.0 Y side
10:15		1.0 BY out 0.5 Y	4.0 BY 2.5 Y
10:30		NO CHANGE	
10:45		0.7 BY outside 0.5 Y	3.0 2.2
11:00		NO CHANGE	
11:10		0.6 <sup>BY</sup> /0.4 <sup>Y</sup> outside	3.5/2.0
11:20		0.6/0.5	3.0/2.1
11:45		1.2/0.6	
11:50		1.5/0.9	
12:00		1.6/0.8	
210	MIDDLETOWN	0.06 BY outside	
240	OLMSTED PLAZA	0.04 . . . . .	
	283/AIRPORT EXT.	0.08 . . . . .	
	283/WHITE BAR	0.04 . . . . .	
245	TMPX MIDDLE OF RIVER	0.04 . . . . .	
	W. SHORE TAPPE	10.02 . . . . .	
	FISHING CREEK/OLD ROAD	0.3 . . . . .	
	RED LAND ACRES	0.7 . . . . .	
	GOLDSBORO DOWNTOWN	1.5 . . . . .	
	GOLDSBORO SOUTH	0.5 . . . . .	
	CLY	0.07 . . . . .	
	MANCHESTER	0.03 . . . . .	
	EMIGSVILLE	0.02 . . . . .	
345	IRB N/out 10	0.05 . . . . .	
	EXIT #4	0.2 . . . . .	



3)

GAI

	I 83 N / EXIT 15	0.35 BY outside
		0.5
	EXIT 16	0.35
	EXIT 17	0.20
405	TRUNK WEST SHAW	0.15
	OVER RIVER	0.50
	TRUNK EAST SHAW	0.30
	EISENHOWER / FRONT	0.50
	AIRPORT	0.20
420	MIDDLETON UNION / CAUS	0.25
	RT 441 BRIDGE south end of MIDDLETON	1.2
	NORTH ENTRANCE TMI	0.10
	OBSERV. CENTER	0.14
	SOUTH BATE TMI	0.04
	FALMOUTH	0.02
	441 / 241	2.02 B46
	MARRIETTA	B46
	ELIZABETH TOWN	B46
283	UNION / VINE	0.06
283	WHITE BARN	0.15
283	TRUNK JUNCTION	0.30
283 N	SWATARA CRUI	0.30
283 / 835	tbody exit	0.25
	EAST MALL	0.25
40	283 / 17th ST	0.2

OPEN LINE - TMI 3479

	<u>BY</u>	<u>Y</u>	
0813 -			
0818 - O instead	.1	.10746	} 2:00 hrs.
W4-1	.2	.08734	
W#11	.15	.050725	
DO	.15	.0748	
FW#11	.2	.058	
GE 7	.3	.0807	

### Instrumentation

- 30-9:05
- 3 protective clothing kits , 1 box from air sampler
  - 3 general instrument kits , 1 portable & spic
  - 5 walkie talkies , 1 of Curle air meters
  - 2 binoculars + 9 cartridges
  - 3 high range meter
  - 1 snoscope
  - 2 data collection kits
  - 4 rope lengths
  - 1 fidler
  - 1 smear counter
  - 1 extension cord
  - 1 teledetector , 1 battery to A.C. Converter
- 9:05 - Call to Tony G  
equipment to 535 via station wagon
- 10:10 - NRC measured  $1.1 \mu R/h$  @ site boundary
- 10:15 - Leigh Phillips Juice Cm: bubble in case!
- 10:30 - Make-shift iodine sampler put together  
by Casey, Miltnerberger.
- 11:30 - Left 535 to site station.
- 12:00 - ✓ and loaded equipment
- ~12:10 - takeoff.

5-21-79 Joe Brennan re 4/22/79  
0825 Bismarck  
0840 Seely Holwell  
Hoover cows; thyroid & lungs  
& kidney

855 Dr. Washington  
Mr. Frank DeFior,  
Marlboro Road of Sd.  
45 North Main St  
Marlboro MA 07746  
201-780-1300  
re Hershey UK.

Paparella  
1-11 H<sub>2</sub>O & milk  
grass on H<sub>2</sub>O we  
Sergon milk

1045 Dr. Clark, UMD - ~~Sumner~~  
Syracuse - ~~U.S. Army~~ ~~U.S. Army~~ ~~U.S. Army~~  
Advisors 757-6029

1404 Denis Beause - no radioactivity except K-40  
detected on kidney, spleen, & liver of  
Hoover cows - Held for 1 hour

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{137}{131} \frac{2105}{317} &= 0.6 \times 10^2 \\ &= 60 \end{aligned}$$

SP.

1.5 ± 0.5 pCi/l 5/12  
Columbia

5/5, 6, 7, 9 pascen Swallow  
0.5 - 0.6 pCi/l

one time per month, get 100 mCi  
therapy



Primary - as of 5/18  
J-15 & C-37 should be comparable  
Sr 90 1/10 lower

5/5 2-34/60

Papariello 210 pm 5/18

5/16/79  
NRC FROM  
Costa

*Bill Ditt*

LONG TERM SURVEILLANCE PLAN  
THREE MILE ISLAND NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR

Introduction

The long term surveillance plan for Unit 2 of the Three Mile Island (TMI) reactor facility is expected to be operational for one year or more and is designed to document the environmental radiation exposure to the area surrounding TMI. The EPA network of air samplers, gamma rate recorders, and thermo-luminescent dosimeters will be concentrated within a radius of approximately seven miles of TMI. Milk, processed food, and water sampling, as well as vegetation and soil surveys will be conducted at varying distances from TMI, as appropriate. The surveillance system is designed to provide an alert mechanism and to initiate protective action to reduce significant long term exposure of the population to environmental radiological contaminants. It is not designed to prevent all exposure of the population to very low levels of radioactivity.

These surveillance activities represent a coordinated effort of the responsible state and federal agencies (i.e. EPA, HEW, NRC, and the DER of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania). In addition, the licensee's responsibility for environmental monitoring will continue.

Definition of the Problem

The removal of radioactive material, decontamination and repair of Unit 2 reactor facility at TMI can be expected to be a lengthy procedure. During this process, it is inevitable that small amounts of radioactivity will be released to the environment. In addition, it is possible that larger, unplanned releases may occur at any time but in particular at certain points in the cleanup process (e.g., initial re-entry to the containment building).

Plans will be developed to increase surveillance during these pre-designated periods which will probably involve five to ten additional personnel for short periods of time. The routine surveillance program must, however, allow for protective action to be taken in the event of a significant unplanned release. Close coordination must be maintained with NRC in order to permit increased frequency of sampling within the established plan. In this situation, air samplers, gamma rate recorders, and outfall water monitoring will provide the environmental indicators for increased surveillance of milk and other food items, and for any necessary action to protect public drinking water supplies. From a practical standpoint, protection of those drinking water supplies which utilize the Susquehanna River should be of primary concern. With anything short of a catastrophic release of radioactivity, it is unlikely that other drinking water supplies will be affected to the point of requiring any form of protective action.

Any significant unplanned release should be viewed as a single contaminating event with criteria applied which are appropriate to a single environmental insult and not those for continuous release of radioactivity to the environment.

### Surveillance Plan

The EPA surveillance plan presented here is designed to provide the maximum information with the minimum adequate resources. Measurement of airborne radioactivity, both particulate and gaseous, provides data for estimating inhalation doses as well as serving as early indicators of the potential contamination of crops and pasture land. Routine surveillance of food and milk can therefore be reduced in frequency of sample collection by use of air monitoring data. A network of 18 continuous air samplers (list of locations and collection schedule attached), employing both pre-filter and charcoal cartridges, has been established at distances ranging from 0.5 miles to 7 miles radius of TMI. These units sample at approximately 10 cfm and samples will be collected from each station and analyzed three times per week unless conditions dictate more frequent collection. All samples will be analyzed by gamma spectroscopy, using GeLi detector with a lower limit of detection of approximately 80 pCi (0.1 pCi/m<sup>3</sup> for 48 hour sample) for <sup>131</sup>I.

Each air sampling location will also have a gamma rate recorder for measuring and recording external exposure. Recorder charts will be read on the same schedule as the air sample collection and will be removed weekly for review and retention at the EMSL-LV.

Thermo-luminescent dosimeters (TLD) will be placed at each air sampling location and will be collected monthly for read out at EMSL-LV. Background and control badges for estimating in-transit exposure will be included in each group of dosimeters. In addition, TLDs will be maintained at 0.25 mile intervals at the closest locations to TMI along the Susquehanna River. These locations range from 0.5 miles to 2 miles along the east side of the river and from 1.5 to 3 miles along the west side of the river, and on the islands located 0.5 to 1.5 miles west of TMI. These dosimeters will also be changed on a monthly basis and read at EMSL-LV.

Milk sampling by the EPA will be minimal, with probably no more than six locations routinely sampled. Sample collection will be weekly unless otherwise indicated by air surveillance data. Samples will be analyzed at the Harrisburg laboratory with an estimated lower limit of detection of \_\_\_\_\_. This detection level will provide a screening mechanism more than sufficient to provide guidance for protective action. It is not intended to provide the limit of detectability necessary to assess continuous (70 year) exposure. Additional milk samples will be collected and analyzed by other agencies (see attachment \_\_\_\_\_).

Cleanup and disposal of radioactive waste water from the containment building will represent a major problem. Continuous monitoring of the radiological outfall to the Susquehanna is desirable as an alert mechanism to avoid serious contamination of water supplies down-river. A system which continuously draws water from the outfall and provides a graphic presentation of the count rate (or concentration) in a holding reservoir is being employed at present. Several problems have been encountered such as silting of the sampling orifice, gain shifts resulting

from temperature changes and malfunction of the recorder. Attempts are being made to solve these problems. The final system should have a sensitivity of less than 200 pCi/l for the concentration of the liquid in the reservoir. At a sampling rate of 0.25 liters per minute, discharge concentrations at a level of 300 pCi/l should be detectable (as a qualitative increase, not necessarily a quantifiable concentration) in 10 to 15 minutes. Graphic display will be available at some continuously occupied location. This will be provided by hardware hook up via telephone line to the DER offices in the Fulton Bank Building.

#### Contingency Plan

In the event of a large, unplanned release of radioactivity, additional data will need to be collected in order to assess the need for protective action. Such sampling can be effective only in reducing exposure through milk or food crops. It cannot be expected to reduce inhalation or whole body exposure because of the time required for sample analysis. Radioiodine concentrations in excess of 10 pCi/m<sup>3</sup> in air should dictate more frequent sampling from established milk sampling locations in order to document the degree of milk contamination. It is not anticipated that protective action would be considered at this level. At a level of 100 pCi/m<sup>3</sup> the number of sampling locations should be increased in the down-wind direction, with particular emphasis on defining the azimuth limits of the plume. Gamma surveys by mobile monitoring teams should be initiated particularly if dairy cows are on pasture. Responsibility for initiating protective actions at levels less than the limits established by PEA will rest with the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. Recommendations, however, should be made by EPA to consider diversion of whole milk to cheese or powdered milk processing, or into other products for which market availability can be delayed when data indicate that raw milk concentrations of <sup>131</sup>I will exceed 1000 pCi/l. (Consumption of milk in which the peak concentration is 1000 pCi/l will result in a thyroid dose of .)

Releases of contaminated water above the licensee's permitted level for discharge to the Susquehanna River should not occur. However, some form of continuous monitoring of the outfall, or in-plant discharge, with preset alarm levels to indicate concentrations above permitted discharge levels should be employed. (Alarm should also indicate zero level, indicative of system failure.) The short reaction time available to protect public drinking water supplies would suggest that intake to the Brunner Island water supply should be shut down immediately upon high level indication as the most prudent course of action. Water supplies further down river have greater, though still limited, time for notification. The extreme seasonal variability of the river flow significantly affects the dilution capability of the Susquehanna. Fortunately, at low flow (low dilution) there is increased time required for water from TMI to reach drinking water intakes at Wrightsville and Columbia (also serving Lancaster). Sufficient time would be available to collect

a sample from the outfall and screen it in the laboratory. The NRC mobile laboratory on TMI can be made available for this rapid screening. Dilution estimates can be made and decisions reached as to the most appropriate action. It is doubtful that any on-line system can deliver truly quantitative data for the total outfall, so that the use of qualitative information to dictate sample collection is recommended. At low flow dilution factors as low as approximately 25 may prevail. Under such circumstances concentrations of 1000 pCi/l of total radioactivity should be allowable for short periods of time. (The time needed to shut down the discharge after laboratory analysis would probably be on the order of two hours or less from initial indication of high levels of activity.) Under this situation, concentrations of approximately 40 pCi/l would fall in line with interim guidance to the state.

(Although this proposed guidance for drinking water may appear to be inconsistent with that given above for milk, the relative ease of taking protective action to prevent contamination of drinking water, and the lack of economic impact would suggest that the lower concentrations in drinking water be observed in line with the objective of reducing exposure to the greatest possible extent.)

Increased air sampling will serve primarily as a indicator of potential contamination of milk and food crops. Contingency plans should, therefore, call for the deployment of additional samplers in the plume trajectory. Supplemental stations should be established from the nearest point to TMI out to a distance of perhaps 20 miles downwind within a sector  $\pm 45$  degrees of the predicted centerline. Ten air samplers will be kept available for this purpose. The significance of noble gases in the reactor inventory is decreasing with time, however, two samplers will be retained at TMI for special sampling. All equipment for noble gas analysis is stored in the Harrisburg laboratory, but a chemist would have to be sent from Las Vegas to perform the analyses.



TMI BRIEFING MEETING  
MAY 10, 1979

A TMI Briefing Meeting was held on May 10, 1979 in the 11th Floor Conference Room in the Fulton Bank Building. Mr. Louis Bercheni and Mr. Ernie Giovannitti were Chairmen for portions of the meeting. Messrs. Bercheni, Sheaffer, Giovannitti, Fleisher and Donnelly, all of DER, were in attendance at the meeting.

Highlights of the meeting are as follows:

1. REVIEW AND UPDATE OF DER-EPA-USGS COOPERATIVE WATER QUALITY PROGRAM -- The stream, water supply, and waste discharge sampling program was revised to reflect up-to-date conditions. A separate TMI Status Report covers this up-to-date information.
2. ANALYSES OF STREAM SAMPLES -- DER-EPA-USGS TMI reports are not clear concerning the specific radionuclides analyses being made and the laboratories making the analyses. Karl Sheaffer will investigate and have these items clarified.
3. DISTRIBUTION OF WATER SUPPLY ANALYSES -- The radiological information that Tom Merski sent to the City of Lancaster with his April 3, 1979 letter is not clear. Bob Donnelly will contact Tom Merski to have this item clarified.

DER also plans to send radiological information to the City of Lancaster and possibly other people. DER's letter should be reviewed by the TMI group before it is sent to Mr. Middendorf for his approval. EPA and DER staff need to work more closely together to be sure that EPA and DER letters have compatible radiological information.

4. DER CONTINUOUS MONITORING UNIT AT MET ED -- The electrical supply problem was corrected. The strip chart is not operating satisfactorily. The radiological communications system is expected to be installed by May 18. The output from this unit will be in the Ready Room on the 12th Floor of the Fulton Bank Building. Ken Walizer's beeper system will include provisions to alert him when excessive radionuclides are discharged. We also need a back-up beeper alert system.
5. DER-MET ED MEETING -- Lou Bercheni and Ernie Giovannitti plan to meet with Syd Porter of Met Ed next week concerning proposed radiological discharges. The quantity and quality of wastes being discharged, method of treatment, batch or continuous discharges, sampling program and other related items will be discussed.
6. MR. LYON'S MAY 1, 1979 LETTER TO MET ED -- Mr. Lyon's letter to Syd Porter of Met Ed was discussed. Officials of Met Ed had called Lou Bercheni about Mr. Lyon's letter since they wanted certain items in the letter clarified.
7. NEXT MEETING -- Scheduled for 11:00 a.m. on May 18, 1979 in the 11th Floor Conference Room of the Fulton Bank Building.

5/15/79  
1:00 meet  
continued

If, after warming, sampling and analysis  
the sample exceeds an MPC  
call NRC, call downstream, call EPA  
info and advice.  
analyze by SCAP to 300 C/L/73P  
save sample for further possible  
analyses.

2 PA will be keyed into the NAD

Terminate sewage sampling  
don't want data provided  
NRC sign off.

Meet @ TMS @ 200 w. Lou & Ernie

5/18/74

Belgium 11 am 11th flr  
Continue stream sampling as is  
3 Determinations <sup>2000 mg/l or less</sup>  
CI weekly

Effluent sample 001  
as gross, H<sub>3</sub> & r Scan

Pressure cap on Ganges installed to  
prevent under pressure  
leakage

NRC still working for plan for  
mgmt of containment stuff

### Warning

1. a) Walyer → NRC  
or Met Ed } verification  
b) Met Ed / NRC → State

2. a) Daily - gross - r Scan  
b) Analysis - r Scan

### Historical

1. a) Daily (700) collection @ 001.  
Bryner J, Vanoster  
b) Weekly collection @ CI, grab (BRG)

2. Analysis - SPA r 3 samples  
DER α, β, H<sub>3</sub> for 001 and CI

Sample will be 2000 mg/l or less  
to field dealer, Amports

7/1/60

217-620-3031

5/8/59

930

McLaughlin - DOE mon @ TMI  
Operation for bank ground &  
variations

1. Periodic field spectral @  
30-40 sites
  2. Set 6 sites and every few m's  
& vegetation
- ≡ A few TD's @ 4 sites

Monday 5/8/59 @ 10:00 AM

(1) of 29 technicians

Dues

Could Ocas pick up Pan Straps  
Continue to write up sheets  
Calculations on H<sub>2</sub>O's

- Hold off on networks till we've effort  
for windows

7:00 PM

5-16  
1:00pm

Pete Slack  
C.F. Costa EPA  
Carl  
Ann. Home EPA

Containment H<sub>2</sub>O

Carl - Stream Data - none since 4-12  
not rec'd from EPA -  
remedies discussed

Tom Mewski

Crass & β - 21-2 pCi/l  
H3 - 300  
+ Scan - 10 pCi/l 1/31

Pete Slack

Oct fall } "IW samples"  
} 45 / day from island 4

Brumby J.

City Island (noobles)

Kanawater

plus discharge - EPA  
to Vegas.

Messie - composite grab Messie sample  
every 15 min - collected daily  
EPA - 3rd & 4th analyses

Briefing 1100 Cuckoo 11th floor  
H<sub>2</sub>O



5-10-79  
12:00

Domestic

Small release = 0.05-0.06 m<sup>3</sup>/hr  
(went - drawing a bubble  
and raising the level of the  
manometer - gas only.)

draining  
pressurizer

Release over @ 1:17

5/14  
130

Ceramics

Sample analysis

gross analysis

H-3

gamma scan

Item 1120

per 1000 lb

5/14

10:05 Joyce Friedman, dt Gov's Office  
EPA will coordinate data gathering  
DER will disseminate to the public  
weekly



Mark Knouse - dt Gov's Office  
copy of 0396 + Kelly Snellings  
letter



Samson  
Samson

11:50 Mary Moore re H.P.S.  
Meet @ Storffers May 21 Rt 363  
Valley Forge  
6-730 Arr Comm  
Janis W.H.R.  
renewal  
1:25 PM  
+ Ann 11/81

17:50 Berclini -  
Go South for Ernie G.  
Middenday  
sample @ 3 downstream locs  
where USOS, atropis  
Hampden, Holtwood, Coxo.  
twice a day  
born + ... + CI  
C... ..

342-2305

2:11  
2:10

Morgan

Mr. Fouché (Jude Lett)

11610

6-8-1  
1941

Mike Sullivan 2:20  
1:11

~~1 Ball  
436-1014  
412~~

~~...  
— post office  
...  
from TAZ incident,~~

DATE: 5/8/79

MEMO TO: Files

FROM: Allan E. Smith  
TMI

SUBJECT: Modifications to TMI Sampling Frequency

Concentrations of fission product radionuclides have been below detection limits at all network stations for six days (05/01 to 05/07). Unless activities at TMI would indicate otherwise, samples from all stations will be collected only three times per week effective 05/08/79. The collection schedule will be:

Monday, Wednesday, Friday -- Stations: 003; 004; 005; 009; 010; 011; 013; 014; 035; and 036.

Tuesday, Thursday, Saturday -- Stations: 001; 016; 017; 020; 021; 023; 031 and 034.

Noble gas sampling will be discontinued effective 05/10/79. The analytical apparatus and liquid scintillation counter will be stored at the Third and Reilly Lab. Two noble gas samplers will be retained at TMI; the other two will be returned to Las Vegas.

Milk sample collection will follow the same schedule as the air samples for the present. A meeting will be held Thursday or Friday, 5/11 or 5/12, with the DER of Pennsylvania, HEW, EPA, and NRC if available to attempt to define the roles of the respective agencies in regard to sampling, particularly milk sampling.

Limited results on side by side air sampling using the old and new ( $\text{CH}_2\text{I}$  efficient) charcoal cartridges suggest no difference in I collection efficiency under present conditions. Because of the higher cost (almost a factor of two) of the newer cartridges, we will revert to use of the old type. The duplicate sampling at station 036 will continue, however, to alert the network operation should conditions suggest that the new, treated cartridge is preferable.



TMI

Dose rates in containment @ 2100hr on May 4, 1979


Xe-133 9.89  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$   
 Kr-85 6.28 E-1  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$   
 Xe-133m 6.88 E-2  
 I-131 2.78 E-3

--- 1.11  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$   
 2.00  $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$

Nuclides	$\beta$ -skin dose (Rad/hr)	$\gamma$ air dose (R/hr)	Whole body (Rem/hr)
Xe-133	345	388	332
Kr-85	96.0	1.23	1.15
Xe-133m	7.80	2.57	1.97
totals	449 Rad/hr	402 Rad/hr	335 rem/hr

based on Reg Guide 1.109

C. Jones



05-11-79  
② Trailer 205  
0830-1200

①

2 PA AC Smith  
18 air samplers Alex Smith  
partic & cartridge (plain)  
& monitoring

TLD 312

TLD's on residents

TLD's @ 1/4 mile intervals  
along road in 2000 acre  
30 day cycle

TLD's on roads

Air samplers along

road Mon W F

west T T S

Milk 4 farms - farms same  
freq as air samples  
N, NW, East, S

3 NG samples 1, 5 & 10 Stn #5  
(terminated 5-10-79)

NRC Cores

Coal farm

Miller

Kramer

Ilwaco

Swain

TLD's, 1 permanent air

Mrs. Harrison

1 permanent air

monitoring


stands

100 m out all the  
time.

= D. J. Ricker

air, raw milk processors keep  
food.

TLD's - 200 - 1000



George Smith

NRC wants to get out of business in  
unrestricted zone.

Will keep TLD's  
will avoid cheating, loans  
will keep lab here  
will be a time bomb

FDA

Processed food  
TLD's

NRC

TLD's may be reduced frequency  
metaxwli = 2 types - 2 CaSO<sub>4</sub>, 2 LiB<sub>2</sub>O<sub>5</sub>  
122 nmo  
10 each  
2 bags per locn  
CaSO<sub>4</sub> 312 per str

Criteria for...  
external monitors

...  
1 to 5 of...

EPA

cutback milk & may be water

Utility

31 TLD's Technology & PWD  
10 common locations between  
center

Some read quarterly, some weekly  
some every 3 days —

Work monthly & quarterly (2)

1 Set for T.S.

1 Set more frequently

H<sub>2</sub>O daily, some comparing

with other

They were ... gate

was or 2 ...

EPA

Monitor to be handovered by 5-18  
to Fulton — Calc for each cell 13  
probably ... 150

Account of discharge  
downstream from the pit

[Pit 11 = ... non-pit]

May 8

ORAN K. HENDERSON, DIR., PEMA

CHARLES A. CROWE, PEMA

MICHEL S. PAWLOWSKI, DCPA REGION 2

MARY ANN DURNELL, DCPA REGION 2

MARGARET A. REILLY, DEIR/RAD PROTECTION

JAMES A. WERLING, DLC. B.V. Supt

JOHN J. MARACEK, DLC. BVPS

Joseph M. ... <sup>Civil Defense</sup> <sup>Beaver County</sup>

William G. OTT, D.L.Co. public INFO Dept.

Frank M. Skleder, DLCo. " "

Drexel H. Williams DLCo. BVPS Results Coordinator

PAUL Y. WHITE, WESTERN AREA, PEMA

George T. Veltson, Beaver County Commissioner

DAU DONATELLA, CHIEF CLERK - CIVIL DEF. DIR.

Nancy ... DLCo



(1)

0538-14

787-3953, 8, 9

Metw Co Comm 0900 BLO @ Hse  
Comm Bethan agreed to  
see part, cooperate, etc.  
Commets, Planning, each to  
participate.

Dotson

"First ..."

Donp & ...

Crow

Co Support organization interaction  
interstate, - interstate orchestrate,  
Public info

Donatella

Co activities, recognition of ...  
obj, of pln.

Co Comm staff (10) will assist in  
renewal.

Li how will Shepard @ plan develop?

Henderson - Co Responsibility,

Interstate relationships

Henderson - Next line State

Directors & ... of Columbus  
(i Director)

Henderson - leaving copies of ...

050879

- 1) Don't go to mt. Johnson at = 0  
smaller settlement - Tomi in sector
- 2) work on the detectors with  
~~the~~ D'Orange.

2) Terrain effect

Get Neutzelman to talk to Casidoller  
re radio net.  
Kover is going forward -  
got to coordinate

AL Po Catio

estimate to 20 mi<sup>2</sup>

high level within 1000000

initiation, case

PIT Airport

TM interest - benefits of planning

Kothrop - look to 6 weeks for good draft (first  
10 days for organization)

Donatella - get to Coran to appoint committee  
- in a day or two

From Joyce Freeman, LT 6045  
5/11/75

\* Updated list for other plant sites  
for Fed wish list - reasonable ~~monitoring~~  
also other things we may like to see  
going on at TMI

- EPA is willing to release all info to us if we want
- Call to tell when we will be available to meet with Udall's Subcommittee 5/16

Meet w/ Jones re recovery 0900 5/16

252 Walt Knapp  
Walt St. Journal Pub. for Senate Comm  
Re: Z.P.

205 Jim Martin  
Committee - Gov Affairs Sub Comm  
Sen. Enr: Pub Works Comm  
~~Herb Allen~~

Rebron  
445 ZPR's 6pm tomorrow  
Availability of dose estimates  
4 est 16-55300  
355 K will be anyway  
maybe 1 or 2, maybe 1 health eff  
ZPR - Cleanup phase food sampling

5/10/79

~~Stally~~

Ernie Cis - re H<sub>2</sub>O Sampling

220 Tom

Internal exposure - FDA

Grodsky quote: Quote from 1965

HPI. Ref. mid - assessment

- assumes no containment - D<sub>3</sub> and  
- fusion gases

322 Joe Vancouver EPA

202-755-0367 returned his call

Walter Linger & Debbie Brown 315-430

Henderson Rap 330-500

3/10/79

9:18 am Joe Marli 412-274-6300 x189

March 2000 @ Westwick  
3 eng - teleoperator  
no curtain  
fire in new road area.

Don Marsden - will visit next Fri  
Candu 5:18 am

Karen Carter ↔ Matt Grant  
how to get DOE pay for appraisal

SSES - Environmental  
Conventions Board 12-79  
Safety stuff 9-80  
Wants to see Conventions  
on environmental

WKBO Mine Puntok 11-1215

Mr Joache - Seltzer

1240

Sed Porter

1) did on daily purg of DW

was under 1000 B, V, P -

w Sr ala T.S. ? monthly for Sr S

2) if find Sr 90 before demen -  
will look for it after the resin

- getting re request for collector  
and analyst name

Gause

Holly Milk Co. N. Holly Springs.  
Conn. refuses to receive

condensed milk from the

area 1 sample raw

1 sample condensed (shem)

Det. Dr Ingraham [BIA]

what about & around TMI

WKBO Mike Pintok appointment

2:15 pm Potential problem - send <sup>3</sup> filters to  
Batelle - truck - not placarded  
paperwork not done  
40 min contact, packages OK

vet Sd.  
Ben  
Ketchum  
940-7621  
x251

Knowledge from Sel - PSP look also  
Truck in wheel. did paper work -  
? Carrier - Tru State  
van type -



1/19/71

005

130

Lt Gov Mayor of Lancaster  
Mayor Wohlsen 397-3501

\* Talk to Vito Amunni or Woody Catehau  
re temporary use of the 11355  
zone

> Copman visit yesterday  
Sawg Alliance & press

Send Mayor copy of dump plan

- 1) we will advise mayor of  
threat as a matter of public  
interest
- 2) we will give him a copy of the  
plan as a memorandum it  
when we get it.

1240 Sid Porter



5/9/74

Rudford 412-621-2009  
Bore & Petle - 100 to 1000

Part II

Confirmed risk estimates of Bore  
the somewhat higher

Minority report - low LET  
no risk at low dose

Incidence rather than deaths  
testifying to Glenn

1-5 cases 30,000 within 5 mi

0.1 Rem level

Less 7500 cases

These 1000 to 2000 analyses  
give low risk, no incident sample  
of 5/4/74

suggested to do Sr analyses  
to WPC as 30% of waste  
system. Do a few to establish  
presence or no of Sr at a low level  
Compare waste samples to  
confirm ~~the~~ level < 30% of

Domise WPC 1000 gals of procedure  
a risk, will get it for review  
& comment.



4/28/79

8:45

Sally Murray calling, inquiring re above update  
on Plant Status

10:00

Betty called again nothing new at TMI

10:50

Carl from concerned citizen - He was ill  
and wanted to know how much radiation  
would cause radiation sickness. He  
was re-scanned at the body counter in  
radiation - /

12:10

Sign out 12:10

4/1/79

0800

Contacted Sec Pennell to inform him  
that 250 pcfm<sup>2</sup> on grass -  
remediated by APC was, at  
present, great consequences.

5/3/79

.02 uCi/sec release - highest reading

10:00

Down to - procedure to reduce pressure to  
500 psi. next several months - go solid  
in release system at all elevations -  
at every place  
no env. consequences.

10:45

Bob Holmes Legislative Staff.

11:20

Down to 10 at Courthouse in  
at all elevations - at every place

1/27

4:00pm Call from Bill Densifi - natural recirc  
- looks good - going to press conference  
Asked to check T+E trailer for radiation  
readings. Called trailer - talked to Steve -  
plume readings .1 mR/hr - no iodine  
in ARMS sample.

4:10 Called P&M to inform them

4:45 Called Trailer - Steve Smith - no iodine detected in  
plume

4:51 Called C.D. to inform them

Bill Eichholz

April 29, 1979

- 9:20 Pump trip today - use maybe  
NRC to central room - will keep  
it low - advised. NRC will announce!  
If no circulation you have days -  
could reactivate pump.  
Want to do it now because of increasing  
indicator failures and unreliability  
Will call for ARMS flight
- 10:06 NRC Trailer - lost level indicator ~~pressurizer~~  
may ~~to~~ trip earlier.
- 11:00 am NRC 301-492-8111 - Frank Young  
called - activate emergency center  
in Bethesda.

Contacted Lt. Gov + PEMA

145 330° 10-15 mph Start going  
solid on 3" SG. ARMS sees some  
disturbance. Pan! react on the monitor  
Lumping gas from 1" of "2" SG.

209 0 - X on ground - NRC  
ARMS - spur in car All X



CALL MEMORANDUM

TO: \_\_\_\_\_

NAME OF CALLER: \_\_\_\_\_

AGENCY: \_\_\_\_\_ TELEPHONE NO: \_\_\_\_\_

TELEPHONE	RETURNED YOUR CALL	WILL CALL AGAIN	PLEASE CALL	HAS THE APPOINTMENT	OTHER

MESSAGE: *EPA letter*

782-5887

TAKE BY: \_\_\_\_\_ DATE: \_\_\_\_\_ TIME: \_\_\_\_\_

DESK MEMORANDUM

TO: *Mary*

DATE SENT: \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: \_\_\_\_\_

DATE NEEDED: \_\_\_\_\_

PLEASE CALL	APPROVAL	SEE ME
RETURNED YOUR CALL	AS REQUESTED	COMMENT
INFORMATION	PREPARE REPLY/REPORT	NOTE AND FILE
RECEIVED BY: _____	DATE: _____	TIME: _____

ROUTE	INITIAL	DATE	ROUTE	INITIAL	DATE

MESSAGE: \_\_\_\_\_

*Meeting (with  
Suffolk County (C.D.)  
officials @ 1 PM in  
C.D. offices on May 5  
be there!*

4.26.79

309  
pm

Teel Spec release rate (inst) =  $0.3 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{sec}$   
 $\approx 8 \times 10^{-9}$  @ vent  
latest  $1.2 \times 10^{-8}$

Dial: Gussow

air 1.31:

3.0 to 4.14 -  $240 \pm 210 \text{ fCi}/\text{m}^3$

4.0 to 4.12 -  $\approx 10 \text{ fCi}/\text{m}^3$

4.0 to 4.19 -  $10 \pm 7 \text{ fCi}/\text{m}^3$

348

tom

→ New spec, air monitor, (CUMM)

1-27

8.29

$3 \times 10^{-8} \mu\text{Ci}/\text{cc}$  condenser monitor 6:00pm  
now  $< 6 \times 10^{-9}$  last night  
possibility of going to cold shutdown today.

4-25-79

8:41 Derwent in S. Dakota - over 6000  
feet deep, very deep in some places  
Some up to 100, some up to 150

9:26 Derwent about alpha

9:30-11:15 Interview to Scott McLeod - UPI  
Walt Knapp

3:57pm Pt. of the ... 2000 ... 131  
Pt. of the ... NW  
Linn farm Linn farm  
near 0.27 p & l (1/2) SSW } 0.06  
NW } 01  
NE } 05  
4:10Z

2-10 (whof) so total  
to the end  
3.26 best result

Woodcut of NW<sup>on</sup> 3.26  
? time valley or runoff  
2 farms way far always  
in during fallout.

1/26

7:30 311° high fuel 225° water temp

1.2 ...

4/20 10:00 AM

Donsite - Iodine levels dropping with replacement of filters - now ~~down to~~ down to  $6.5 \times 10^{-8}$   $\mu\text{Ci/l}$  at vent stack

12:30 SEWAGE ~~IS~~ <sup>WILL</sup> BE SENT OFF SITE.

(2) LOADS FROM MAIN HOLDING TANK  $\leftarrow$  MDL  
3:50 connection  $\rightarrow$  ~~MAINTAINED TANK HOLDING TANK~~  $\leftarrow$  MDL

13:50 2 MORE LOADS FROM THE MAIN HOLDING TANK ALSO  $\leftarrow$  MDL WILL BE SENT OFF SITE

14:22 UNIT 1 circulation water <sup>flow</sup> 20000 gallons released to river  $\leftarrow$  MDA

15:10 at 14:45 2 sewage trucks CARRYING LOAD FROM THE MAIN HOLDING TANK LEFT SITE

15:50 2 MORE TANK TRUCKS SEWAGE LEFT SITE  
(1) MAIN TANK (2) WET WELL

4/24 0723 TMI called - two shipments of sewage to be made today

4/25 0800 Donsite called meathome last evening to inform me that the furline had tripped and that reactor temperatures should increase.

0800 Temp now at  $220^{\circ}$   
I-31 release  $1 \times 10^{-8}$   
finished train in fuel handling building

✓  
Saw [unclear] [unclear]

JTL last

2 - Jordan [unclear] [unclear]  
[unclear] [unclear] [unclear]

last: 4-19 between 4:30 & 1 pm  
@ Scotdale

1st: [unclear] & [unclear] PSP

[unclear] [unclear]

Andy Hill

Ind. [unclear] 3-28 [unclear]

4-6 Not Ed  
10-0 [unclear] over BRG  
4-8 [unclear] EITD

Co. [unclear]

11 [unclear] [unclear]  
13 [unclear]  
9 [unclear]

Sta. [unclear]

12

14 [unclear]

10 [unclear]

✓

U.S.A.

1051 ? Via lower

1024 Mot ED

1127 RR C

1011 M - 1111 - 1111

706 - 1111

Shaker - 1111

1051 - 1111



4/19/79

TMI Incident Log

1140 PENTA (Lamson) reported that rumors are flying that the bubble is back — Reassured him that this was not true

1150 WPD reported that there is to be ~~a meet~~ a briefing for representative of 25-30 foreign countries on 4/20 (Fri-AM) — NRC has selected Dick Lamson (ILAM) to represent Pa. — more from DER/BRP

1230 - Advised WPD to attend briefing re BRP representative

140 Paparella confirmed ~~numbers~~ that levels in milk were below MDA - we will pick up to confirm.

120/79 Tears in HEPA filters - to be removed before  
7:13 no activity above MDA - channel is placed in  
one can sample  
no activity above MDA  
below ~~198~~ 198

1126 Bob Bow  $3.4 \times 10^{-7}$  u/c vent stack

7-19

7:42

Two air samples 4 hour samples  
10-2 < 110 pCi/m<sup>3</sup>  
2-3am < 31 pCi/m<sup>3</sup>  
one grass sample  
550 pCi/m<sup>2</sup>

Found 3 people on fire island - one guy  
whole body counted ~~low counts~~ in Middletown  
finding nothing

7:53

Contacted CD to inform them of nighttime  
activities.

$$\frac{\text{pCi/l}}{\text{pCi/m}^3} = 600 \text{ (HPD)}$$

8:20- Steak Count  $\approx 2 \times 10^{-7} \Rightarrow 6-8 \times 10^{-8} \mu\text{Ci/cc}$   
 $4 \times 10^4$  cartridge pin cartridge  $\approx 25000$  4/19/76

7:43

our cartridge  
from 10-18/79  $3.7 \times 10^{-12} \mu\text{Ci/cc}$   
11,448 Cpt Davis

1135

at Piquette  
allied to  
inform that  
files may be  
inspected -  
3kg count sheet  
compared with  
sample counts  
Lubell says ordered

Results of ~~Milk samples analyzed~~  
by NRC / Per WPD

BELOW MPD

Date	Farm	$\mu\text{Ci/l}$
4/17	Alwase	59.4
4/19	Becker	41.6
4/17	Fisher	69.3

APRICOL Coolant water inventory - high numbers <sup>amounts</sup> <sub>% of max</sub>

I-131	$8.5 \times 10^3$ sec/ml	16
I-133	none	
Cs 134	$8.2 \times 10^1$	9.1
Cs 136	$1.2 \times 10^2$	12
Cs 137	$3.4 \times 10^2$	13
Sr 89	$6 \times 10^2$	} fraction of core in coolant .009
Sr 90	$5 \times 10^1$	
Ru 106	none	
Ba 140	$2.8 \times 10^2$	
La 140	$1.6 \times 10^2$	
<sup>140</sup> Pr } <sup>141</sup> Pr }	$1.8 \times 10^2$	
Ce 144	$1 \times 10^2$	
Ba 136m	$9 \times 10^1$	
Strontium	$< 1 \times 10^{-3}$	
Uranium	$< 10$ ppb	
Pu	$< \text{MDA}$	
Tritium	1.2	

4-18 Not transuranics detected

7:09 Minor release of iodine - ~~3-4m~~ <sup>3-4m</sup>  $200 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^3$  at observation center -

Sample immediately before 50  $\mu\text{Ci}$

Diesel generator start for routine surveillance

4:20 - 5:27  $50 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^3$

Meteorological - found plume 20  $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{hr}$   
Xenon - plume mile +  $\frac{1}{2}$   
South east of the plant

116.79

3:50

Warm Castle Baltimore Sun

1-17-79

Last 5 NRC I-131 samples

< 30 pCi/M<sup>3</sup>

check conc.  $1-2 \times 10^{-7}$  uCi/cc.

1:57

Call from Denton - in line turned corner

sprayed floor again

20 filters put back in

vented ~~the~~ makeup tank to

stack samples  $10^{-7}$  uCi/cc.

Denton leaving

Stall ~~to~~ to take day shift

C. Kelly to take night shift

Requested that he cover Lt. Henderson

Henderson

1200

NRC estimates that between 0.5 & 1.0 Ci I<sup>131</sup> was released during charcoal filter problem.

2000

Exhaust monitor reading  $7 \times 10^{-7}$  uCi/l  
Containment Hy 1.36%

Primary coolant @ 250

Thermocouples unchanged highest 370°

Change all charcoal filters ~~in~~ in 1 train

LAT 195+ primary water - done at CRNL  
APRIL 10 to Sanku, CRNL, + Belle.

4.16.79

1500

Howard DeLeon ORNL will be  
around on Friday to talk re TMI episode  
0900 on Fri 4.20.79

510

Scott MacCloud UPI

315

Re Advisory Committee: Karin Carter -  
in light of suspensions - public must be allowed  
to attend but not necessarily allowed to <sup>make oral</sup> presentate  
if you will allow remarks from  
non members.

tight agenda - detailed

announce early re opportunity for oral  
comments, may submit

not rule making or policy making body  
(early statement)

lots of oo's/agenda

125

Terry Linn ABC news re milk case  
weekend.

1535

Government report on Waste Gas  
Boiler - will maybe keep ~ 345

TMI INCIDENT LOG

4-16-77

925

Karen Porter re testimonies San Hart  
4-23 hearings. Give on down

10:46

Mr. Hansen Alcoholic A.L. wants data  
from early with event to settle  
complaints. Tried to get from EPA  
in 7-1-1972. It was not  
possible to get data from EPA  
(Hansen 4/11/77) (Hansen)

10:55

1059

Unpublished EPA

Review - Town of (Preston)  
took readings since 3-29 in tower  
to be reason' get data from us.

11:10

Bill Adams - San Hills office

12:15

Jim Hicks will send W.B. can 7-7  
4 us + card - will go there directly.

231

George Isbenny



f-16 cont

DOE had previously counted as  $2 \times 10^{-9}$   
or 1/10th of the previous value

2419 Jim Keppier - NRC contacted

2430 Called C.D. to ~~inform~~ inform

2437 Wind speed 10.2 direction  $295^{\circ}$   
8.1  $290^{\circ}$

0507 NRC - Dale Davidson ~~at 10:07~~

0207 off 0507

$9.47 \times 10^{-11}$   $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$

Cartridge results <sup>15</sup> 5.25 am to 8:09 am  
STACK SAMPLE RESULTS

$2.7 \times 10^{-7}$  at vent  
compares with monitor reading of

$3. \times 10^{-7}$   
15  
5:06 pm cart  $3.83 \times 10^{-7}$   $\mu\text{Ci/cc}$  exhaust  
1002-2140  $2.13 \times 10^{-7}$   
compared with  $1.4 \times 10^{-8}$

levels began to increase when they  
started to ~~take~~ take out filter  
2300 on 15th

0535 Licensee  $7.4 \times 10^{-11}$  RMC - SAI  
 $9.4 \times 10^{-11}$  NRC

0546 2030 Sample  
NRC  $2.41 \times 10^{-10}$  charcoal silica  
RMC  $2.91 \times 10^{-10}$  charcoal  $2.27 \times 10^{-10}$   
DOE  $2. \times 10^{-9}$   $2.2 \times 10^{-10}$   
 $2 \times 10^{-9}$

TMI accident log

7-15 cont.

Jim of Middletown mayor's problem & possibility of a press conference called by Commissioners re complaint that they are not being informed.

7-16  
7:40

Called C.D. - Conroy to fill him in on problem.

2005 Rec'd call from Denton's replacement, Mr. Regier (944-0791) who wanted to be informed by DOE when they had more data.

2037

Jim Sage called - sample 2 x 10<sup>-9</sup>  $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^3$  2243 mid-time they believe that similar concentration would be seen for 10 miles - less than 1/2 mile in width - will call me at home on next sample

2051

Call CD to inform them - went home

2200

Reliance - contacted - 17.4  $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^3$  wait for next sample

2:25

Checked meteorologist  
7.1 mph 288° 45.6°

3:40

Vegetation - .5 and .7 nCi/m<sup>2</sup>  
DOE called (80 pCi/liter) calculate

4:00

DOE - Jim Sage 5.3 x 10<sup>-9</sup>  $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{cc}$  @ 02:27  
NRC 'cf' Jim 2.4 x 10<sup>-10</sup> for sample that

TMI Incident Log

1-15 cont -

Conroy kept getting calls from Malloy, who was called by Middletown (10). Apparently, someone was monitoring NRC radios in Middletown, called Herkey communications to inquire as to what was going on. They called Middletown C.D. Middletown C.D. called Malloy at home. Everyone read at not being informed.

2100 Came into office. called NRC trainee to get more info - concentrations at 1624 were  $1 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{M}^3$  at NRC site and  $1 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{M}^3$  at 1700. NRC aircraft could find nothing

2115 Called Melne to inform him of levels and that Middletown was mad.

2200 Reid call from Jim Sope WOF - 1 hour sample .6 mi E of plant showed  $2 \times 10^{-4}$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{cc}$  or  $5000 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{M}^3$ . 6-7

2230 Called Melne back to inform him of activities.

2240 Called Reilly to inform her

2300 Reid call from WOF to verify second sample at same location was  $2 \times 10^{-4}$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{cc}$ . Apparently very narrow plume. Wind at  $315^\circ$  at 15 knots when sample was taken.

330 Reid call from Lenton who was called by Cretchlow. He stated reading from plant per steel  $1.4 \times 10^{-3}$   $\mu\text{Ci}/\text{cc}$  at exhaust. Informed



# TMI Incident log

7:47

7:45 Reestablished contact w TMI - My late arrival (due own) due to loss of control of Fulton building access card. Got page of discharge data from TMI via telefax machine. Machine screwed up thereafter - can't get it to unclump paper. Two other pages of data due to be sent. Two tanks of sewage from main holding tank on way to digester (telex from Lev)

7:50 Called F&E trailer. McCabe ~~nothing~~? - nothing w.w. Coldroom continues T @ 250° from 280° @ start

7:55 Checked in again with PFMA (Oeller). Blandell had called earlier for update (2050)

7:15 Call from NBC news (Crosby, interview of 4:13) re ~~re~~ contamination, Lebanon balance and dairy products shipped to market. Told him about USDA shutdown of plants without evidence over first week of the incident and sent him to FDA regional coordinator for clarification.

7:40 talked to Dornise @ F&E trailer

11:11 Sewage - 1 man, 1 train, trailer - Lev to digester

## TRC Incident Log

7/13/79

- 1630 Notified FEMA, NRC and TMI that we were on duty
- 1635 Took TRC survey data - ~~high~~ nothing significant
- 1700 Took NCC FATS data for Idaho nothing significant
- 1803 Bleeding off steam in secondary system to reduce temp to  $230^{\circ}$   
@  $4^{\circ}/hr$  temp now  $280^{\circ}$
- 1833 Discharging industrial waste at 1/3 NCC. NCC notification



9/13/74

The Incident Log

1620

Notified FEMA, NRC and TMI that we were on duty

1635

Took the security data - ~~kept~~ nothing  
supplement

1645

Took the FATS data for Indene nothing  
supplement

Checking off steam in secondary  
system to reduce temp to 230°  
4°/hr temp now 280°

Industrial waste out 1/3  
NRC notification

MI Incident Log

4/12/79

1715

Dr Johnson call to inform us that the WRA & GNL groups were to issue a statement to the effect that the exposure to pregnant women as a result of the incident were minimal, & there would be no need for abortions.

1835

Notified Operations Officer @ FEMA that DEB/BRP office would be closed from 1900 4/12 to 0700 4/13

1840

Notified Don Butzel that as of now the Fulton Bldg main entrance was open. He said someone goofed & he would take care of it.

1845

Notified NRC trailer at MI that DEB/BRP office would be closed from 1900 4/12 to 0700 4/13.

1850

Bruce Smith called concerning WBC for U.S. residents — told him WRC wants to conclude operations @ 1900 4/18/79. Suggested to him to have U.S. people call (in mass) which might persuade NRC to stay in operation for a longer time.

1111 Incident Log

11/12/79

1915 Damage  
 121-0 - 1000  
 121-1 - 1000  
 Bottom - 570000m  
 1) - 1000  
 121-2 - 1000  
 121-3 - 1000  
 121-4 - 1000  
 121-5 - 1000  
 121-6 - 1000  
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 121-95 - 1000  
 121-96 - 1000  
 121-97 - 1000  
 121-98 - 1000  
 121-99 - 1000  
 121-100 - 1000

Post Part Sample  
 ORNL Sample  
 taken 11.11.79

1900 Notified MRI (Unit #1 control room)  
 that open line would be shut  
 down from 1900 1/12/79 till 0700  
 1/13/79. In case of emergency, call  
 PLMAG 783-8150 / MAR-

1/11/79

5:45 Going down in pressure again - to degas + get back up.

600

1:50 in Stuart from Gorman (Oregon) office re Marshall Perrets remarks at Trojan

1730 Status of Whole-Body Counting:  
a) Telephone: 944-7467  
b) Pop. being tested: < 3-mile radius  
c) Will remain in operation thru 4/16.  
d) Hours: 24-hr/day  
e) Results back on 120 people all negative.  
f) People are cancelling or no shows openings available on Sat, Sun, & Mon.

2300 Sgt Porter called & requested assistance in counting a liquid sample on our Lq Scint. Counter. (Their's is malfunctioning & cannot be repaired till tomorrow morning). Charlie High estimated it would be 0100 4/12/79 to complete. I gave him an OK for CT. Sgt was 95%  
↗

certain the sample contained No I<sup>131</sup>  
Charlie will pipette in an area w/  
(from 8 ventilators)



## TMI Accident Log

1/8/79

1530

TMI reported that there would be no swage dumps tonight — good for the rest of the weekend

1745

NRC @ TMI (Jim Gilson) informed BRF that the general public may obtain copies of PNO's by contacting the NRC Region I office, King of Prussia (Earl Abraham)

1805

Downsife reported that NRC would probably recommend to Gov. Thornburgh that he lift the evacuation for-  
payment waiver & pu school kids.

1/9/79

1645

Downsife reported that levels of 10 m/hr were currently present at the Observation Center due to venting from the Aux Bldg. This is being caused by a leak in the header. Met Ed w. searching for the leak to correct same.

1730

Downsife relayed a verbal request from NRC for permission to check every 3rd sample of the Industrial Waste dump. It's preventing them from getting more important things done. Phil is meeting with Pete Newman to see if we can obtain OK from Lyon or to override Lyon.



## MCI Incident File

4/7/79

1845

Rad Lab counting raw sewage sample obtained by SWR down to a sensitivity of 300 pCi/L - / MARK

2330

Analysis of raw sewage (2 samples from 2 trucks) showed MDA for I<sup>131</sup>. (See IW/Sewage data file.) Walt Lyon, etc. must get a copy of this data — GET IT TYPED ON SUN? / MON

2345

Results of Industrial Waste analyses by Met Ed being telecopied to BRP. Lyon, Boardman, etc. should get copies (See IW/Sewage data file.)

1/8/79

Remcon @ 7:05 am

100	4-6-79	IWFS	$4.93 \times 10^{-6}$	μCi/ml of I-131
100	4-6-79	IWFS	$1.87 \times 10^{-6}$	
100	4-7-79	IWFS	$2.58 \times 10^{-6}$	
100	4-7-79	IWTS	$3.0 \times 10^{-5}$	
106	4-7-79	IWTS	$1.92 \times 10^{-5}$	
100	4-7-79	IWTS	$1.91 \times 10^{-5}$	
100	4-7-79	IWTS	$2.41 \times 10^{-5}$	

140

Dornsife reported that Sodium Thiosulfate has reduced I-131 release levels to .1 Ci/day GAS?

11/11/79 Incident Log

4/7/79

200	4-6-79	IWTS	$4.17 \times 10^6$ u.c./ml I-131
400	4-6-79	IWTS	$2.34 \times 10^6$ u.c./ml I-131
700	4-6-79	IWFS	$6.92 \times 10^5$ u.c./ml I-131
100	4-6-79	IWFS	$3.25 \times 10^5$ u.c./ml I-131

transferred  
to data  
file  
18:00  
4/7/79

550 After release of iodine, up back to containment  
1/7/79 Release resumed at 0.2 m/sph from 0.2 m/sph  
→ 0.1 m/sph return to 0.2 m/sph. Secured in ~1 min.

41 Stopped venting, waste decay tanks to contain  
temporarily to get idea of source term  
are, putting sodium thiosulfate in.  
Repairing another filter train - two or  
3 days to get installed

30 lbs pressure now in waste decay  
tanks down now 90

11:12 DOE reducing helicopter surveillance  
to 2 flights/day - will be on standby  
for release event flights.

11:15 Call from Bill to discuss request to meet with  
Henderson + Gorman, and Adam, etc.

11:40 Reported to PEDIA Operations Officer that  
TMC could not contact Fulton Bldg from  
TMC on "walkie talkie" - batteries need  
to be replaced. % recharged?

4/7/74

- 30 pm Reactor coolant pump tripped. - ~~second~~  
second pump on - ~~the~~ TMS will try to  
determine ~~how~~ why reactor pump tripped  
& if it can be turned on again - may have  
to use another system to shut down  
reactor
- 1000 pm Told NRC & co. in TWR sample results  
every 1 hour - not every time they  
get sample
- 1600 Circuit breaker opened on 1st coolant  
pump which caused the pump trip.  
Reset circuit breaker so that 1st  
pump is now on "standby". Investigating  
reason why circuit breaker opened.
- 1700 Hubel reported that there <sup>would be</sup> only one  
always disposal over weekend. / MAR
- 1855 DOE hot line will be down from  
over 1800, 4/7/74. For an emergency  
contact: Ted Schenck @ Vella Lee  
(774-1100, Rm 213)
- 1900 VRC (Wash) (L. G. Glette) requested  
copy of the young Mt. Ed. permission  
to discharge industrial waste. I  
couldn't locate one. No response  
from Mike Melina or Critchlow.  
Follow up SIT 4/7/74, J  
Jon

4/6/79 continued

TMI Incident Log

0550 Vented waste gas to monitor containment building system checked out with no leaks being found <sup>any</sup> will be out to continue checking.

0615 Sergeant A called from TMI saying that a sample from the 4/6/79, CS10 to CS20, Waste Storage Tank release had been taken and will be reanalyzed to confirm its concentrations. We will again be notified of the results.

0630 Sample taken from TMI - analysis of waste storage tank release CS10 to CS20,  $4.1 \times 10^{-5}$  pCi/cc, i.e., consistent with initial data. Release of tank contents was resumed at 0615. \* See 4/6/79(0515) per data to Lyons for comparison.

0700 NRC called from H. A. Walker at Observation Tower. While transferring gas to containment building there was apparently a small leak. A reading of 0.35 mCi/hr was noted for 3H5 mounted to the trailer.

~~4/7/79~~  
0950 IWF's 4/2/79 16:00  $4.6 \times 10^{-6}$  pCi/l I  
TMI 16:00 1.5 pCi/l

1000 NRC approved removal of less than MDA permitted to go to High Bay

200 Drury reported that ~~per~~ anticipated iodine release rate of 1/1000 Ci/day peaking in the next 24 hours

TMI Incident Log

4/5/79

2145

Met-ed. notified BPP that two trucks with site sewage had left for the Highpure Sewage Treatment Plant. A sample of the sewage was taken at 1325 (analyzed ~~2115~~<sup>1425</sup>) with the following results:

T<sub>100</sub> - 2.10 x 10<sup>6</sup> u./ml

T<sub>1000</sub> - 2.10 x 10<sup>6</sup> u./ml

The incident was reported by Tom Minkley, HT Supervisor # Don Miller, NRC. Met-Ed said this info would be telecopied to BPP. \* Big Gorge, BWA, was notified. \* (See Misc. data file.)

2230

Walt Lyon called to inform that Met-Ed was in violation of their agreement with BWA in that they <sup>(you)</sup> must monitor sewage prior to disposal at the sewage plant. Big Gorge left at 2:20 to go to the sewage treatment plant.

4/6/79

0100

From NRC trailer - TMI began to receive industrial waste under MPC.

0415  
no call

Started disposing waste Storage Tank  
contacts # C310. 6045 Gal confirmed. <sup>Telecopy to Lyons; -> Discharge 0210-00</sup>

0448

TMI called Guy to transfer the waste you took to the <sup>transfer</sup> ~~water~~ of the external ~~in~~ as required. Estimate time 04:00

11111. Incident Log

1/5/79

0620

BRT advised FEMA Operations Officer, that there has been no change in the level of  $I^{131}$  in milk.

0720

NRC advised that Mel-Ed has not begun to dump industrial waste water into the river.

1830

Bill Dornisik reports that there are now 2 back-up systems available for the pressurizer level measurement. One is hooked up and the other is on stand-by. They are working on system to vent make-up tanks and decay tanks. They need to "tie up" the  $I$  in the Aux. Bldg. Feels that Mel-Ed has brought in some good technical people to help out with the ~~work~~ planning and work from ~~here~~ now on. They are busy writing procedures for NRC review.

230

Dornisik - Sewerage Holding Tank 3 different samples and pump <sup>house</sup> well no detectable  $I^{131} < 3 \times 10^{-2} \mu\text{Ci/l}$   
 $< 4.5 \times 10^{-2} \mu\text{Ci/l}$  - UTILIT would like to transfer effluent to sewerage plant

510

IWFS (Exhaustion <sup>1110</sup> reactor system) 4/5/79 04:00  $< 2 \times 10^{-6} \mu\text{Ci/ml } I$   
 IWFS ( " " Treatment " ) " "  $2.66 \times 10^{-5} \mu\text{Ci/ml } I$

100

Mail Lyon wants average sample results

<del>200</del>	<del>4-5-79</del>	<del>IWFS</del>	<del><math>4.7 \times 10^{-5} \mu\text{Ci/ml } I^{131}</math></del>
<del>200</del>	<del>4-5-79</del>	<del>IWFS</del>	<del><math>2.7 \times 10^{-5} \mu\text{Ci/ml } I^{131}</math></del>
<del>300</del>	<del>4-5-79</del>	<del>IWFS</del>	<del><math>3.9 \times 10^{-6} \mu\text{Ci/ml } I^{131}</math></del>
<del>400</del>	<del>4-5-79</del>	<del>IWFS</del>	<del><math>5.7 \times 10^{-6} \mu\text{Ci/ml } I^{131}</math></del>



TMI Incident Log

TMI Incident Log

4/4/79

0710

John Lubman (NRC) provided BRP with the results of their samples of the waste water to be dumped at rate of 1000 4/4/79 (See water data file) (Opposed to SWQ)

0815

Bill Downsife at plant. W.Q. people from DER will be meeting at 10 am. Effort at TMI is getting back-up system in to replace the level gage lost on the pressurizer.

1005

NRC was notified by Mot Ed that Governor had put a stop to decay tank sampling because of release of gases during sampling. Sec. Jones cleared with Sec. Withburn that sampling is allowed and NRC was notified.

1145

- Agreed at meeting with Fed agencies, DER & Health, Health will start getting copies of DOE summaries of data and Health was ~~sent~~ invited over to 5th floor at any time.

1200

- Bill Downsife reported that water quality meeting went well and agreement reached on sampling, etc. Company ~~to~~ has already or will be starting a discharge within a few minutes.

1345

Carl ~~Siefert~~ (NRC) advised that waste water dump to river has not begun.

Also reported corrected data concerning gas in piping containment (see water data file)

1/23/77

1900 - Called Al Lyon & Ted Closter to convene to discuss  
Water Supply action. Do we need to shut them down?

19:35 Called NRC - They really don't sample - get company  
data. We need to get some better handle on the  
Wastewater situation.

~~Comment~~

19:51 Kately's sample = 10 MPE - notify;  
sample give > 20 MPE stop and consult  
(see letter 9:20-6674 re lot spoiled)  
from 10/20/76 river.

10000 sample @ Browns: Uwerly.

11:58

Water condition in shell Co. (DB)

12/79  
11:53

Water samples collected - down to 2 beds,  
to get up water.

2:50

Sample being taken from waste water  
tanks - results will be relayed to BRF

2:50

Shy @ Red Lab - call with procedure.

1/3/79

0:50

Kately advised (Rosa lab) phoned that  
results of recent water samples will be  
telegraphed to Hwy on Wed (4/1/79) morning  
will call on 1/10/79

4/2/79

905 - Particulate filter - ERAMS Station - Evan Press Bldg.  
Filter on since 8:30 4/1/79 - Didn't see any I<sub>131</sub>  
on Gamma Scan N15 level. (Rad Lab-DEE)

1356 - Recombiner being purged -

1345 - Requested Dept of Agriculture to give more exact locations  
of farms where milk samples are being collected. They will  
have good data on that on Tuesday Morning. When it is  
telephoned in - Give it to Joel Lubeau - NRC.

13:45 - Recombiner shut down because of <sup>apparent</sup> leaks. Readings  
went from 9 to 20 m<sup>3</sup>/hr on West side of plant FALSE  
REPORT

11th 14:30  
Aschombe - Mchs. Split - 3/30/79 - I<sub>131</sub> <10 pCi/l

Need to call Mr. Ayta - <sup>234-5021-Ext. 911</sup> <sup>Holiday Jan Term</sup> Told him about  
How far out are the 37 samples. very low levels.

~~Don Waters - W/upt 8:46~~

Conley - <sup>4:45</sup> PM 4/2/79 <10 pCi/l I<sub>131</sub>

INFO FROM NRC - TRI  
6:55 Recombiner really never leaked - May have been a  
false reading with the telegrapher. - Never really shut down  
OPERATION SATISFACTORY  
Recombiner - operational up to temp. at 4:15 pm.

	Bubble Size		↓ Diff ↑ Shift Need Gauge Apprent
3:15	Bubble size -	0740 = 47 ft <sup>3</sup>	
11 am	briefing - 50 ft <sup>3</sup>	12:30 pm - 208 ft <sup>3</sup>	
		1:30 pm - 194.5 ft <sup>3</sup>	
		3:15 pm - 173.5 ft <sup>3</sup>	

all readings are ± 250 ft<sup>3</sup>

<sup>booklets</sup> Trend on bubble - Continuous downward. No good  
numbers because of gauge reading method error.

18:10 - Downside - Bubble is practically gone. - Things are pretty good.  
Present cooling method is working - Keep it going

18:35 - Info from NRC that radioactive materials other than  
noble gases are in Waste water discharges. NRC to shut  
it down w/ haste.

040279

1336

TMI

Valves open to Hydrogen re-combiner.

Now purging with nitrogen, after which they will go operational.

/Burt Savage

13:45 - Recombiner shut down because of apparent leak.

↑  
**FALSE REPORT**

AT 4:15 pm - Operating Satisfactorily

at 5:10 pm - Bulbs still continuing to grow smaller.

4/2/79

LAB CALLED - 3/22 - 4/2 period - 15,600 cu. ft.  
3 mile Island - Cumulate, <sup>cartridge 3rd line</sup> sampler  
2.4 x 10<sup>-12</sup> microcuries/l I<sub>131</sub>

10:00 Large tanks are on Interstate 81 and making a fuel  
in ~~New England~~ <sup>New England</sup> - 11:00 am - Let Dornick know

11:15 Wind Data 11 mph - 110° (from Alton Shaddell) <sup>temp.</sup>

11:20 - DR. DENTON at news briefing - Reactor is being cooled - Has  
<sup>name</sup> <sup>initial</sup> <sup>in</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>area</sup> <sup>of</sup> <sup>the</sup> <sup>reactor</sup> <sup>building</sup> <sup>dropped</sup> - 800 cu. ft. to 50 cu. ft. on gas bubble.

Milne - On-ground rdgs.

Maggie - EPA reviewing 3 mile island custody to  
confirm results.

Richard Tellman - House Interstate <sup>& Foreign</sup> Commerce Committee - Congressional Hearings -  
202-225-5365 = Tom Gerusky =

Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations  
Chairman Est. Eckhardt.

1-703-765-5392 Advise health effects  
Lester Brown - 202-543-1246

Rayburn Bldg. - Wed. A.M. 10:10 oc

~~Tom Gerusky~~ - 12:07 - Informed them we would ~~not~~ be there - <sup>closed at 11:15</sup> <sup>see above</sup>

15 SWEENEY - A.G. Office - Referred to Blayney - Question on legal responsibility

2:10 - DOE says on-ground data will not be available until  
early afternoon.

DR. EISENGER 301-383-2740 Lead - Md. Dept. of Health  
Wants to strip people of clothes - Would like technical data.

15<sup>2</sup> EPA confirmed the Rad Lab analysis of the cartridge  
samples from TMI (see above)

4-2-79

1030 - Bill Potts - Unit 2 TMI

Plan to start using Hydrogen recombiner between

1030 and 1100.

Procedures and plans approved  
by NRC - with Technical  
inputs from manufacturers  
and Federal officials standing  
by.

/ Rutzavage



4/2/79

: Check Bill Dornsite's Automobile situation & needs -

Cliff Jones called 9:05 am <sup>Manfred</sup>  
Jim Coulter - <sup>Manfred</sup> has arranged for low level waste disposal  
→ 301-269-3041 <sup>change the number</sup> to South Carolina site  
367-6018  
0518 CALL BILL DORNIFE. & RELAY INFORMATION  
Done

MITSKAS - FDA -

ilk Sample No. - 79169918 - I131 - 36 pc/l Cs137 - 27 pc/l  
Las Vegas. results will be coming in at 7:00 pm. <sup>with - Anshom... of effluen</sup>  
When - 4/1

DR. LIANAMAN - 533-7436 } Maggie will contact  
Figures he would like to work with us

ill stuffs \* Robert Coult - 215-853-1689  
Jumper in repairing steam generators - available  
if needed. - Survey, Va. power plant until he is done.

~~Robert Shores - R.S. Welding Battalion -~~

<sup>note</sup> <sup>to him</sup> <sup>Volunteer</sup> Robert Shores - R.S. Welding Battalion - CO<sub>2</sub> or Argon can be used to replace  
explosion - replace <sup>gas</sup> with inert gas.

Randy Alitch - Asked that Dr. WARD attend 10:00 mtg. in Gov's office.  
He will attend.

Sec Jones - Pgh. Press article - Contact Granlund - 8-475-3459  
Not permitted to make statements. Press Room 33-1116  
Nancy Daugherty - No problem. GRANLUND WILL CALL -  
Refer all calls to Gov's Press office.

Rad Lat

Paul Nolt From M. Jy 3/31 & 4/1 210, I131 <sup>pc/l</sup> (Split with <sup>...</sup>)

<sup>045</sup> Called Dr. GRANLUND - Will refer all news media calls to Gov's  
Press number.

7-1-71 R.H. 5 to 6.

0030 Collected brown flies to have  
at least 4000 of them. 1st Peak at 2nd Peak  
Peak at 3rd Peak. 4th Peak at 5th Peak  
of 1000.

0148 C.D. Weather 0000 -  
57° RH 92% wind calm  
Bar 30.04 + steady

0241 water winds C.D. weather  
RH 92% 50°  
Bar 30.04 + steady

0341 C.D. weather 0000  
Cloudy rain later this afternoon  
to bedtime tonight & tomorrow  
partly cloudy  
56° RH 84% wind W @ 3  
Bar 30.04 + steady

0544 from Mill - a structure at 550  
at 100 ft above lake 10 miles

0607 C.D. weather 0000 - 57° RH  
Bar 30.04 + steady

0700 from the...  
to the...  
at the...  
T.M.I

3/31/79

(9)

214:46 Charles S. Sinks  
Chief Carpenter Sops Harbor  
717-284-4776

2230 Boardman called re security  
at TMI - called Vernisif at  
home - he handled it

2300 with analysis results on debris  
to be published

2345 Re Richard White called - if there  
is brom in cooling water it would  
prevent explosion - also does not  
mean unit 1 alone - cooling could  
be done & unit one would go  
out at 3000 in 90 - would  
be done

2350 Creative William - Tuckton -  
734-1535 - per  
per [unclear]

4/1/79

2001 White - report fuel could ignite  
in tank in 100 report -  
also - into the bullet & go  
for a report on release

20025 Richard M. Kease  
FBI Phila - transferred  
to [unclear]

3/31/79

2000 hrs to enter Dept. of Energy, 4/11/79

Dept. of Energy, 4/11/79

to 4/11/79

to 4/11/79

From 30.04 to steady

Isolated vent for 15 minutes

8

7 pm - Reestablished vent at 7 pm - a little puff - nothing alarming - total amount of Xe emitted is the same as if vent had worked continuously during the isolation

~~7:09 pm~~

7:25 pm - Dick Cummings - NRC - Bethesda, Md wanted info on sampling results today. Referred him to Jim Hoge at Capital City Airport 717/774-1535.

7:52 pm Gensby wanted update

8:09 pm Walk sample results - 5 more farms on east & west shore - no detectable activity

Knowledge start

8:50 PM See Jones called - communication set up with NRC - had Hilne call him

9:55 NRC wants more data

9:03 Jones - OK to give data to NRC  
confirmed by Gensby

9:15 Rabbit, Hilde - sample a waste going to jet

9:31 called C.D. Sleath & gave data

9:16 Had C.D. Sleath call Hilde

3/31 PM

6:25 Weather from west wind

at 6:11 PM.

Surface			
320	at	10	
1000	at	220	at 10
2000	at	270	at 5
3000	at	330	at 21
4000	at	320	at 20
5000			
6000			

6:30 - Downfifts - vent was closed on tank for a while - it will produce a little bump in the next half hour - Don't be alarmed. Dose rate wise it will not be anything additional.

6:37 - Relayed Downfifts message to Jim Sago, DOE @ Cap. City A.P.

6:52 Andy Hull - analyzed 700 samples to date  
 100 samples from today - No 131  
 includes new air sampling that rejects everything but 131.  
 Distraction in diving around - nothing new -  
 all there all night.  
 and our number range

Current analysis  
 dry  
 and  
 water  
 S. S. S. S.  
 Cap. City



2/31 pm

McCannell  
737-8019  
Toney 737-9982

weather

3pm weather

Surface	240° @ 10 mph
1000'	250° @ 16
2000'	260° @ 19
3000'	260° @ 16
4000'	260° @ 16
5000'	260° @ 19
6000'	280° @ 27
7000'	280° @ 36

weather 4pm wind is WNW @ mph

5:30 Rad lab - 1ST milk sample

Conley farm  
R.D. 1 Yocumtown Rd.  
Ebers, Pa.

< 28 PC/Lt.  
No detectable activity

5:51 weather @ 5:30 pm. Hby

surface 310° - 4 knots  
Weather (3-8193) low a lot of group sites  
\* of people that can be accommodated, directions, etc.

5:56 Downside reported in - nothing new

6:19 Car 80 (West Shore) coming in for end of shift.

3/31 pm

Road Chem Lab  
757-4514

Weather  $\pm$  1:40 pm

winds at Coy City Airport

290° 12 mph

Middleton

300° 12 mph

2:05 Low level sounding @ 1:15 pm

Surface 2511

2000' 2614

3000' 2511

Feb <sup>Day</sup> Ted Haley - Wades State

Chairman Energy Comm

How could he get ahead of H. Ed Denton

3:00 West Shore car call - At edge of river at  
Oldsboro directly across from TAM1 -  
reading 0.02 m/lr.

3:10 Tom Essig - NRC - TAM1 - wants results  
on milk samples - will wait til tomorrow  
morning to call after our lab has run the samples

3 o'clock - wind drifted from W to N W  
speed picked up to 12 mph

3:15 - from dist lab - water samples  
city of IIRa samples collected near 21/274  
1.0 indication of ... dist system  
< 27 and < 24 p/ltr.

3/30  
collected yesterday - lane. 6 9-10 & 12 pm - no xe I 131 < 22 p/lr  
calls - 3/31 7-4-6 & am - No xe, I 131 < 25 p/lr

3/31 pm

4

1:25 - 11:15

Weather forecast from Carlyle Wetland

Winds from SW - inc to 10 mph  
Should be 10-20 mph by afternoon  
Showers south of Hwy mainly NE @ 35 mph  
Expected in York area in 3 hours (2:15)  
Wind forecasts 7 am - Sunday 4/1

Surface	0905
2000'	0905
3000'	2605
5000'	2609
10000'	2625

C 9-90° from East  
26-200° from East/West

7 am Monday 4/2

Surface	1920
2000'	2020
3000'	2125
5000'	2235
10000'	2450

1:50. <sup>1/2</sup> While samples have arrived in lab (10 per East & 10 per West)  
Will start analysis at 2:30 pm.

1:54. Wetland in Bill Shadden

US Fish Office  
4411 - 4104 ext 286  
914-4067 or 41068 (Hudd Center)

365 Cont  
367-051



who at 3 mile Island should get the 1000  
Howard Scott can take down - must be given to a specific individual  
Keep other 1000 in lab - (Send several 100 to Gov office accounts the)

DO NOT SEND KI TO TMI  
2:13 - See Jones  
Germany will handle this thru the post office

ST. PAUL CALIFORNIA POST - HOG. 234-4051



3/31  
AM

11:45 Weathered in CD office to receive North car sampling data  
routinely, use names to deliver it

11:55 2 water samples from Lancaster  
Hog City not yet here  
Philip FFA eqip. arrived at 10:40 - being unloaded  
getting eqip in E. over pass - arrive at 1 pm.  
Raman yesterday water sample - showed small reduced SR peak  
Thank the xx - background

12 noon Meteorologist <sup>on duty in basement</sup> 7-7853 - Dennis Lohman  
consistent SW winds for a while

12:45 Mr. Essig NRC - TMI - work up data on our sampling  
Wants results of milk samples - sensitivity of our  
measurements - method of analysis, paper, etc.

1 pm - Weekend - try want milk sample results

1:06 pm City of Hog Water samples are in (3 samples)  
1:14 pm collected at open reservoir  
Sensitivity for I<sup>131</sup> less than 24 picocurie/liter  
NO other peaks of anything

no detectable activity

Serious - Col Roy Lonsbury - DCF Capital City Airport  
want to meet with someone in CD & DCF on Fri. morning  
Col Lonsbury should meet with him + Dahl or someone  
5 pm in CD headquarters (DEF office)  
Tell him what we are doing & put him in  
touch with Mr. Denton - must coordinate with him  
do we clear with Denton - <sup>act</sup>

70 - East shore  
80 - West shore  
11 AM

10 am Denton will brief & Bernise will update Gov's office early 2 hours

10:35 - Lyon will leave Fred Marozza call Lancaster Director of Public Works re safety of water supply.

10:40 - Dossing called  
Core condition  
water content samples  
6% of core fraction 1'3" in content  
- Killo Pond - Stratum - No remain  
indicates core cracking - no melting damage

10:57 relayed Dossing's info to Genwhg

FDA memo to  
Call 757-5375  
753-8190  
35193 - Westland  
- CD busdepot  
Main\*

11:00 West Shore core breaking for lunch - will restart after lunch.

11:00 - Dossing reports call of 11:45 samples at 12 noon - 1 p.m.

Milk sample results phone to - what kind  
Lulu Krauss 3-1913 - Def Ag.

CC to  
9/18/13

Water & Milk sample - type up on sheet of paper  
hand deliver to Gov. office Jay Waldman, Chief of Clerk  
to Genwhg on \* to Dave Hill

Harwood Scott (A) [unclear]  
can use no number  
7/11 AM

Don Fitzgerald - EPA  
feel liaison - can be present  
~~BTH meeting room~~  
can act as liaison to all fed agencies  
send to Capital City Airport.

WQM questions - use emergency  
numbers to be provided by Niddi -

783-1116 - Gov. Info. number  
refer all calls re  
Co. Civil Defense of people trying to locate  
Waters, etc.

9.15 AM  
City of Hbg concerned about duckholes  
being contaminated - Ernie told him to sample &  
deliver to us.  
Will also collect water samples from river &  
analyze to answer constituent questions  
} takes hours  
to find down  
can only do  
soon quickly

10.17 Weller info to be fed in to here from DER meteorologist

Bob Lab. Evans  
Doris Brumm 74314  
78-3-1116  
in line ~~3776~~ - Howard gl water sample result  
at 10:30



3.31.79

Re: New York

modifications  
up to 100 ft - well  
depth 200 ft - damage is  
possible moving - radiolytic gases  
are present - by 100 ft or  
by opening pressure to be plus  
E 100 ft

Some fuel - cost - most - 280°  
Rocks fully inserted

Will make the move during daylight  
hours with precautions

Phone numbers:

Vince or Sage  
6 Feyn Cars

774-1535  
2856

Trump Martin 234-4051

1:45 Jack Glavin

1:50 Dr. S. Pison  
with Bill

1:55 - Pigeon race over -  
this may - should it be  
cancelled.

3/20/19  
0000

1205

Caul  
Shy's Landing

AP Little hi

Trying to find perspective  
at an unusual angle  
west

0450. Hot. Newton, 100, 100, 100  
100. Many hard results (TSM) on  
"mud" and "mud" (B.S.) / out  
"mud" (S) on "mud" (S) / out  
"mud" (S) on "mud" (S) / out

General Instructions

Mobile sampling team East Shore Car - West Shore Car  
Record rainfall in data sheets as they call them  
in on the next radio phone.  
Bring data to POC up in CD headquarters. 7-817.

Check I. to bring plans in from NM1. Have  
check payment and get data

Bundle of notes and milk samples from rad lab.  
Record data

Phone milk data to Mike Kraus (Def Ayr) @ 3-11

Compile notes and milk data - have it typed  
in brief form and have Prand delivered  
to Mr. Governor, Mr. Waldman or Mr. Seif  
Also deliver a copy to Mrs. Hitchcock / Mrs. Milne  
in the Press office

I deliver a copy to Sec. State office.

Calls from news media - refer all calls to  
783-1116  
do not give any info to news media.

Calls from NRC, Washington office - do not  
give info.

Calls from NRC, Three Hat Island - give  
any info we have.

Notes  
Do not give any info to media for POC use  
generally that's all

CD to check on ...

If 5 a.m. flight to State College cannot  
leave (weather, etc.) samples will  
be delivered to 5th floor Fuller Bldg to  
be held for pick up by 6 a.m. or  
so. They will then be flown up later  
or driven to State College after 11 a.m.

If there are any more developments  
I will let you know.

0.000  
7/77

A. The Group (514)

1. by usual show: X<sup>100</sup> & X<sup>150</sup> peaks;

(the rest sample have X peaks)

2. Mark ... (Great Army farm)

the day ... (length 5h & ...)

3. ...

4. ...

5. ...

B. ...

... by two beams (one on the east)

... the west shore, using

the ... — SET DATA

... RESULT:

774-2456  
774 2476

... (four days 7/11 1977)

...

...

...

...

... group (A1) with

... of ...

... group ...

...

...

...

...



D. Site status

1. To the best of my knowledge, no  
shutdown status is over the weekend  
thus the situation should remain  
status quo
2. X<sup>123</sup> & X<sup>124</sup> being vented to atm.
3. Survey results by Met-Ed are  
being relayed to BRP over open  
line.

E. Waste water

1. Waste water is treated with X<sup>122</sup>  
and is being dumped into river. BRP  
is monitoring the situation and  
will report back to BRP  
as soon as possible.



talked to Louis and DAG-PIO Kesho

Talked to Redford (ARC)  
Nancy Gerts (329 NIS®)

Talked with rep. from Newmarket  
about the new group draws.

$$-1 \times 10^5 \text{ gal} \times 10 \frac{\mu\text{Ci}}{\text{gal}} \times \frac{10^3 \text{ gal}}{1} = 3.785 \frac{\text{L}}{\text{gal}}$$

$$15 \times 10^4 \mu\text{Ci} = 0.15 \text{ Ci}$$

Some notes

turbulence out of fuel line...  
well prop recycled out

Space A. catalytic overflows from  
fuel waste

Not designed as nuclear WDG  
coll. in polystyrene  
beaker


to 1 MBq source

leak from condensation semi  
 $10^{-3}$  to  $10^{-4} \frac{\mu\text{Ci}}{\text{L}}$

~~to 1 MBq source~~

to 1 MBq source  
to 1 MBq source  
to 1 MBq source

to 1 MBq source



The Department of Environmental Protection said that the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant has discharged into the Susquehanna River 200,000 gallons of waste water that has become slightly contaminated with xenon, ~~which is a short-lived radioactive gas.~~

~~Because of the nature of the discharge, it will not result in pollution of the river. And the discharge will result in the level~~

Because of the nature of the discharge, it will not result in pollution of the river. The xenon is dissolved in the waste water. Once it reaches the river, it will dissipate ~~into the air in only a few minutes.~~ into the air in only a few minutes.

James Sniezek, division director for health safety programs for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 's laboratory at Bethesda, Md. advised DER he expects there will be no detectable levels of xenon in the river after about five minutes.

Because ~~the~~ xenon is a gas, it will bubble out of the river water when agitated through the pumping process.

Every gallon of contaminated waste <sup>water</sup> that is discharged will be diluted by 275 gallons of river water.

~~XXXXXXXXXX~~

Sniezek also ~~advised~~ the ~~department~~ department that the dissipation of the xenon from the water will ~~not~~ result in discharges ~~of~~ of xenon into the air that will be well within federal ~~standards~~ <sup>limits</sup>.

~~He said, for example, that under proposed regulations for new nuclear power plants, xenon discharges~~

~~he said that the proposed xenon discharge is only one percent of the~~ ~~discharges that will be permitted by nuclear power plants.~~

He said <sup>concentration in the</sup> the discharge is only one percent of the proposed ~~discharge~~ federal discharge standard for new nuclear power plants. ~~with~~ There is no existing ~~discharge standard.~~

The 60,000 gallons ~~of~~ of waste water have accumulated in the ~~plant's~~ ~~turbine~~ turbine building. The water, not normally radioactive, comes from showers, the laundry, wash basins and leakage from steam lines.

Federal ~~officials~~ officials told the department the water became contaminated because <sup>radioactive gases</sup> of the ~~gas~~ gas entered into the plant as a result of the accident.

It is apparently a matter of priority to  
the state and federal officials advised the department that  
the discharge was approved and the water would be dumped

C-10  
3/3

Under normal operating conditions, the water is discharged to the river, however, discharges have been held since the incident Wednesday morning.

The officials said that unless the discharge resumed, the holding tanks would fill up and undiluted waste water would run directly into the river through a storm drain.

Plant and federal officials said they also needed the holding tanks to store other radioactive waste water.

The plant initially began discharging the waste water at about 2:30 p.m. But the discharge was suspended at 6:30 p.m. for further review by state and federal officials.

The department w

DER wanted more assurances that the water contained nothing more

DER wanted more assurances that xenon was the only radioactive element in the discharge. Tests at the DOE's Bethesda lab confirmed that xenon was present in one form at  $1 \times 10^{-4}$  curies per liter and another form at  $1 \times 10^{-5}$  curies per liter.

The Department has already notified municipalities downstream of the power plant of the discharge but said there is no cause for concern.

4/11/78  
NY





2.29.71

1037 ...  
 1038 ...  
 1039 ...  
 1040 ...

1040 Wound of deviation 1040 this mass from North  
approximately 2 mi per hr

1019 T. ... 2.5 mi per hr

1030 ... 1 mi per hr

1038 - 9 E 6 1.5 mi per hr

Ground survey  
Stable just west end  
of old meadow  
Plot from west bank to  
east end of meadow

Went to change  
combs 1930 to 230  
10-15 ft

Trail down  
Stable etc. (L. & B.)  
Gullies with (L. & B.)  
(L. & B.)

Went down  
L. & B. 1930 to 230  
3-30-79  
3-30-79



329-79 1:25

Herb Hakim -

pilot sent home (motel)

back @ 7:30

ready to fly @ 0800

Went to ~~the~~ any bldg off @ 1:25

nam start @ 11:30

774-3022


787-8031

Stalin:

? I come in and build. air

FTS 593-8150 PE MA FAX

Milk ID's



Gehe Se Geh #1 = 0.131  
lines @ ~~0.47~~ 0.509 & 1.46

Gehe Grass at lawn - no D  
0.013, .054, 0.250, 0.478

↓  
Gilder Matt - ~~0.29~~ no D 131



BEM/T

Colie pie maile  
submarin

88

<u>Colie Pie</u>	<u>GM</u>	<u>Time</u>
3 m/hr	0.6 m/hr	1130
3 m/hr	1.2 m/hr	

<u>Colie Pie</u>	<u>G. M.</u>		
	88	8	
3 m/hr.	1.2 m/hr.	.6 m/hr	1145
	1.5 "	.9 "	1150



Neal Gordon  
 DEK Environmental  
 planning

background 002 1103

10/15/88 10:10 -/hr

10/15/88 10:15 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:20 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:25 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:30 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:35 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:40 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:45 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:50 -/hr  
 10/15/88 10:55 -/hr  
 10/15/88 11:00 -/hr

1325

1325 Wrightsville - Xe traces  
 Columbus - Xe traces

100 ft

1330 EVAMS - 5hr reading 0.68 r/h<sup>3</sup> yesterday,  
 2.20 pCi/m<sup>3</sup> today  
 1440 KILLS Xe 140 L. 169 Ra 222   
 1-10)

22/11

11/11 211  
211 291

11/11 21

11/11 21  
11/11 21

11/11  
11/11

11/11 21  
11/11 21

11/11  
11/11

944  
955  
927

610  
010

"  
"  
"  
"  
"  
"

03

7 11/11 1 5  
1 11/11

11/11 1116  
11/11 1024  
3.5 m/hr 1035  
3.1 m/hr 1045  
3.5 m/hr 1105  
3.0 m/hr 1115

1 m/hr  
3 m/hr  
1.5 m/hr

1 m/hr 1.8 outside  
1.8 3.6 outside  
1.4 m 1.6 m

11/11  
11/11 0.136  
1 m/hr  
6 m/hr 0.79  
5 m/hr 0.951  
1.5 m/hr 0.153  
2.5 m/hr 0.957  
2.5 m/hr 1000  
2.5 m/hr 1006  
1 m/hr 1011

3/30/79

Traveling on Route 441

From observation center to Bainbridge

9:34	10 BG .4 G	9:50 - 1.5 BG .8 G
9:37	8 BG 4.5 G	10:00 - 2.0 BG 1.0 G at Bainbridge
9:42	8 BG 4.5 G	
9:45	5.5 BG 2.5 G	
9:48	12 BG .40 G	
9:50	10 BG 9.0 G	
9:52	2.5 BG	
9:56	1.5 BG .7 G	



TAKEN  
11:38

Date: ??

Hour

READING

LOCATION

2330

10 MR  
Gamma

GE-9  
(on site)

2335

1 MR

GE-8

11:50

2350

3 MR

Homestead  
Plaza



<u>Hour.</u>	<u>Reading</u>	<u>Location</u>
2315	6 MR	S on 441 RTR. MILE E FROM HOST
2315	less than 1 MR	North Gate (ON site)
2315	" " " "	Host (HBG)
2300	3 MR	Longview Area
238	13 MR	Kyriskal School
235	3 MR	Fulling Mill Road - Eisenhav.
325	50 MR (closed) 36.5 using multi-factor	2.0 FT before GE-10

11:03 Am.

Falling Mill Road  
Kunkel School  
East of Eisenhower Blvd

13 MR

AP  
Across Susquehanna from  
Homestead -

12 MR

Longview Acres  
N of Kunkel School - 3 miles

3 MR

Sending out another team in  
ABOVE AREA

TAKEN

Hour

Reading

Location

9:10 (TAKEN)

20,000 R

top of DOME

2:15

5.2 x 10<sup>-7</sup>

Behind  
warehouse

9:20 (TAKEN)

<sup>WUCKO</sup>  
~~WUCKO~~ curve,  
2 1/2 hrs 1  
Rem chid dose  
(on site)

TAREK  
8:12

TABLE UPDATE

<u>HOUR</u>	<u>READING</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
2010	Team A - Inch in opt. MR 26	Inside warehouse
2010	Team A - closed MR 14	Inside warehouse SF corner - 0/1/2

4 00 *Leakwater pump malfunction*

< 0.0 men at Gold

less than MDA

<  $6.3 \times 10^{-10}$  uc/

reduced vacuum pump release thru  
S.G. A.

primary to secondary

6000 R/hr

100 m/hr



Reactor coolant pump running

bubble out of loop

cooling down with vacuum

shifting bubble to 785 lbs.

---

.1923 less than 1 m.p.h.

Reactor 0500 20 m.p.h.

from 0° @ 5

30 m.p.h.

0500



TAKEN  
7:25 PM

DAN

TRII UPDATE

<u>Hour</u>		<u>LOCATION</u>
1923	Con 1 MR	South Unit I Cooling tower
1920	5 MR	GE 9
1920	20 MR	GE 7 - GE 10 (Between)

TAKEN  
7:49

RL II INST

1943 (hrs)	25 MR	with closed	Behind warehouse
	92 "	" open	

1914 (NRC) 2 MR. per hr

HISG Int'l  
between  
terminal &  
highway

Table 5  
 Deposition Rate

$1200 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^2$   $G\beta = 100 \mu\text{Ci/hr}$  (7 days post t)  
 $\times 0.7$  (Ratio of total activity, 7 days post)

$210 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^2$   $I = 0.44$  (only on the  
 post t)  $\times 0.1$   
 Vegetation factor (Hall)

$42.0 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^2$  (Positive gross)  
 $\times 0.1$  (gross/initial factor (unitless))

$\xrightarrow{\text{Title}}$   $4.2 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^2 = 500$  related to initial (Ft)

Art to Ground

$3000 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^2$   $G\beta$   
 $\times 0.1$

$\approx 200 \mu\text{Ci}/\text{m}^2$

$\times 0.05 = 10.0$

$\times 0.1 = 1.0$

$\approx 0.10$



INFO  
GIVEN  
AT 7:10 PM

STAN | DATA


Hour

LOCATION



1917	12 MR	between GE 1 - GE 10
1917	10 MR	GE 10
1915	less .05 MR	Boat Club
1916	" 1 MR	GE 1
1915	" " "	North Gate



**IMAGE EVALUATION  
TEST TARGET (MT-3)**



**MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART**







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... ..

... ..

\* ... .. work with DOL

... .. from DCE



---

... ..  
... ..  
... ..

70


24/63

1000 + 30

~~1000~~

20

10



... 3/23/79  
... ~ 0900 3/23/79

100 ppm B

1 lb Pb per

fine part < 1 micron/lb

visitation of test site

primary

B 56 bottled up

evacuate gas then

people going to Goldboro - to monitor

shut down

HP analysis

primary to secondary bank

failed fresh - Temp lost HC installation

600 R/h

may have had bubble in primary

Top of ...

0730  
not ...

state energy of  
slower ...  
...  
...  
...

... 1000 ...

... tumbled down

... to ...

... direction

... ground ...

...  
...  
...  
...  
...

...