

APPENDIX A

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

Power Authority of the State of New York

Docket No. 50-333

Based on the results of the NRC inspection conducted on September 19-22, 1978, it appears that certain of your activities were not conducted in full compliance with conditions of your NRC Facility License No. DPR-59 as indicated below. Items A and B are Infractions. Item C is a Deficiency.

- A. Technical Specification 6.11 (A) 1 states in part: "In lieu of the 'control device' or 'alarm signal' required by paragraph 20.203(c)(2) of 10 CFR 20, each High Radiation Area (i.e., > 100 mrem/hr) in which the intensity of radiation is 1000 mrem/hr or less shall be barricaded and conspicuously posted as a high radiation area..."

Contrary to the above, on September 19, 1978, the East and West Crescent Rooms which had general area radiation levels of 450 mrem/hr and 250 mrem/hr, respectively, were not barricaded and posted as High Radiation Areas.

- B. Technical Specification 3.5.C.1.a states: "From and after the date that the HPCI System is made or found to be inoperable for any reason, continued reactor operation is permissible only during the succeeding 7 days unless such system is sooner made operable, provided that during such 7 days all active components of the Automatic Depressurization System, the Core Spray System, LPCI System, and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System are operable." Technical Specification 4.5.C.1.a states: "When it is determined that the HPCI subsystem is inoperable the RCIC, the LPCI subsystem, both core spray subsystems, and the ADS subsystem actuation logic shall be demonstrated to be operable immediately. The RCIC system and ADS subsystem logic shall be demonstrated to be operable daily thereafter."

Contrary to the above, on August 6, 1978, when the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system became inoperable due to a failed suction valve, the system was not declared inoperable and the required operability demonstrations of the other core cooling systems were not performed.

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- C. Technical Specification 6.9 (A) 4.1 states in part: "The types of events listed below shall be reported within 24 hours by telephone and confirmed by telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile transmission to the Director of the Regional Office, or his designate no later than the first working day following the event, with a written followup report within two weeks." One of the events listed in Technical Specification 6.9 (A) 4.1 is: "Errors discovered in the transient or accident analyses or in the methods used for such analyses as described in the safety analysis report or in the bases for the technical specifications that have or could have permitted reactor operation in a manner less conservative than assumed in the analyses."

Contrary to the above, on August 19, 1978, a telephone call reporting an event concerning errors discovered in the safety analysis was not confirmed by a telegraph, mailgram, or facsimile transmission.