400 Chestnut Street Tower II

July 28, 1980

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attention: Mr. A. Schwencer, Chief
Light Water Reactors Branch No. 2
Division of Licensing
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Mr. Schwencer:

In the Matter of the Application of) Docket Nos. 50-327
Tennessee Valley Authority) 50-328

Reference: Letter from L. M. Mills to L. S. Rubenstein dated February 14, 1980

Supplement 1 to the Safety Evaluation Report (SSER) for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (NUREG-0011) listed several items to be corrected as a result of the main control room design review (SSER section IV). In a telephone conference on February 14, 1980, TVA agreed to correct the "short-term" items before initial criticality, and a schedule for completion of the "long-term" items was also established. TVA also agreed to correct one "long-term" item (Lack of Labeling and Marking of Systems) before full power operation. TVA committed to investigate the feasibility of correcting the remaining "long-term" items at the first refueling outage. Since that time, TVA has corrected the "short-term" items and two of the "long-term" items. A discussion of each item is included as an enclosure.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager
Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure (10)

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ENCLOSURE

Control Room Review Items

1. Inadequate Control Room Communication

NRC Concern: Difficulty for operators to communicate orally over the length of the Control Room and while wearing protective equipment.

TVA Response: TVA has installed communication equipment at the current jack locations in the Control Room.

2. Inadequate Protection for Inadvertent Switching

NRC Concern: There was a potential for Control Room employees to unknowingly change switch position on certain bench-board and vertical panels.

TVA Response: A railing has been installed on panels 1M1 through 1M6 to prevent accidental contact. On vertical panels 1M7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 15, and 18 and vertical panels 0M12, 0M26, and 0M27, warning tape has been placed at the base to warn employees against approaching the panels unless performing a required task.

3. Procedures

NRC Concern:

a. Procedures should be maintained in a specific location for quick access.

b. An index should be provided for quick reference of procedures.

c. Cross-referencing should not be made in the immediate action section of the procedures. However, referencing could be included in subsequent actions.

TVA Response: TVA has made those changes necessary to ensure compliance with the NRC recommendations.

4. Lack of Alarm Priority

NRC Concern: There did not appear to be any means for the operator to distinguish those alarms requiring high priority from less pressing alarms.

TVA Response: Safety-related alarms which require high priority response have been color coded with a contrasting color.

5. Demarcation of Unit 1, Unit 2, and Common

NRC Concern: In those areas where panels contain unit 1, unit 2, and common plant monitors, it is difficult to distinguish the separation from a distance.

TVA Response: In those areas where demarcation is difficult, individual unit designation have been indicated by color coding and specific numbering (i.e., 0-common, 1-unit 1, 2-unit 2) visible from a significant distance.

6. Annunciators

NRC Concern: Poor contrast of panels with background which make it difficult to read the monitors.

TVA Response: TVA has provided black borders (bezels) around the panels to increase the contrast.

7. Environment

NRC Concern:

a. The light intensity in the Control Room appears to be too high making reading of required monitors difficult.

b. The ambient noise (white noise) in the Control Room may be a significant barrier to oral communication.

TVA Response:

a. Some light fixtures have been removed to reduce the ambient light level.

b. Carpeting has been installed to reduce ambient noise levels.

8. Limitations in Status Monitoring Panel

NRC Concern: Indication that a system is not available is currently provided by an extinguished light. If the bulb is blown, the system may still be available.

TVA Response: The procedures have been modified to require that the operator use the test button to ensure that a system is not available and not just a burned out bulb.

Long-Term Items

1. Incomplete Procedures

NRC Concern: Emergency procedures were not written and structured well.

TVA Response: TVA has revised the emergency procedures for Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. NRC staff members conducted a thorough review and walkthrough of these procedures during the week of July 21, 1980. No problems were identified with the revised procedures.

2. Inadequate Operator Interface with Plant Process Computer

NRC Concern: Trending capability of selected parameters is not available.

TVA Response: TVA will upgrade plant computer display capability as part of the overall TMI information systems upgrade (i.e., technical support center, etc.). This capability will be available by the first refueling outage.

3. Lack of Labeling or Markings on Control and Display Panels

NRC Concern: No consistent means for labeling or marking of components on control or display panels exists.

TVA Response: TVA has identified and highlighted the important component or system panels.

4. Lack of Correlation between Annunciator Panels and Associated Controls

NRC Concern: The locations of annunciator panels, control panels, and to a lesser degree, acknowledge stations were not well correlated.

TVA Response: TVA will continue to evaluate the feasibility of regrouping alarms during the first refueling outage.