

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT

REGION V

Report No. 50-344/80-12

Docket No. 50-344 License No. NPF-1 Safeguards Group _____

Licensee: Portland General Electric Company
121 S. W. Salmon Street
Portland, Oregon 97204

Facility Name: Trojan

Inspection at: Rainier, Oregon

Inspection conducted: May 14-16, 1980

Inspectors: *P. H. Johnson* 7/2/80
P. H. Johnson, Reactor Inspector Date Signed

Date Signed

Approved By: *D. M. Sternberg* 7/2/80
D. M. Sternberg, Chief, Reactor Project Section 1, Date Signed
Reactor Operations and Nuclear Support Branch

Summary:

Inspection on May 14-16, 1980 (Report No. 50-344/80-12)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of response to IE Bulletins and Circulars and followup on previous inspection items; also included independent inspection effort. The inspection involved 15 inspector hours onsite by one NRC inspector.

Results: No deviations or items of noncompliance were identified.

DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

- P. Yundt, General Manager
- *W. Orser, Engineering Supervisor
- *R. Schmitt, Chief Nuclear Plant Engineer
- *A. Olmstead, Maintenance Supervisor
- *J. Reid, Quality Assurance Supervisor
- G. Zimmerman, Licensing Section Supervisor (Phone Contact)

The inspector also interviewed other licensee employees during the course of the inspection. These included licensed operators and plant staff engineers.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview.

2. IE Bulletin/Circular Followup

The inspector followed up on licensee actions related to recent IE Bulletins and Circulars. The Bulletins and Circulars had been forwarded to and reviewed by cognizant members of the licensee's organization. Inspection findings relating to the bulletins and circulars reviewed during the inspection are as follows:

IE Bulletin 79-18, Audibility Problems Encountered on Evacuation of High-Noise Areas (Open): A licensee representative stated that (1) a light modulation system will be installed in containment during the current outage (to indicate evacuation); (2) an audible paging system and evacuation alarm will be provided elsewhere; and (3) a contractor is currently performing a study on a new system. The existing system had been found incapable of supporting the additional speakers needed to provide proper audibility. The representative stated that one to two years would be required to design, obtain, and install the new system, and that a supplemental letter to the Director of IE Region V would outline the licensee's plans (the letter, subsequently transmitted on June 17, 1980, estimated that "an additional year" would be required for installation and testing).

IE Bulletin 80-04, Analysis of Main Steam Line Break with Continued Feedwater Addition (Closed): The licensee's response dated April 30, 1980, concluded that previous analyses were conservative. Consequently, no corrective actions were identified. This concludes IE review of the licensee's response; technical aspects of the licensee's safety analysis (response to items 1 and 2 of IEB 80-04) will be evaluated by NRR.

IE Circular 79-05, Moisture Leakage in Stranded Wire Conductors (Open): A licensee representative and an internal memorandum indicated that the licensee's review related to this circular will be conducted in conjunction with evaluations required by IE Bulletin 79-01B. Inspection followup and closeout of this circular by IE will similarly be combined with review of IEB 79-01B actions.

IE Circular 79-22, Stroke Time for Power Operated Relief Valves (Open): Procedures PICT 17-1 and PICT 17-2 included a step which verifies that each PORV opens. These procedures are completed before placing the PORV's in service for solid-plant pressure protection. A licensee representative stated that a measurement of stroke time (from control panel indications) would be added to the two procedures.

IE Circular 80-01, G.E. Induction Disc Relays (Closed): A memorandum to the General Manager reported that 130 relays at Trojan were within the GE criteria requiring cleaning. Of the 130 approximately 31 were class 1E. Cleaning of the relays was to be completed prior to plant startup.

IE Circular 80-02, Plant Staff Work Hours (Open): An Administrative Order was in preparation.

3. Other Followup Items

- a. Dropped Rodlets (Closed): Another Westinghouse reactor facility recently reported the discovery that individual "rodlets" had broken loose from a number of rod cluster control assemblies (RCCA's). Licensee representatives stated that information related to this problem had been presented by Westinghouse during a briefing at Trojan on November 8, 1979. According to Westinghouse personnel present at the briefing, the problem is not considered applicable to Trojan, since their RCCA's were manufactured in a different lot. Of the 53 RCCA's at Trojan, 14 were relocated to new fuel assemblies during the present refueling outage. No dropped rodlets were observed in this sample, based on the fact that spider assemblies were installed without interference into the fuel assemblies from which the RCCA's were removed. A licensee representative also stated that procedure PET 1-1 had been revised to monitor for dropped rodlets during operation. This procedure will be performed every 31 effective full power days.
- b. Administrative Controls on Defeat of Safety Activation Signals during Containment Purging (Open): Instances were observed at other facilities wherein containment isolation signals were defeated during purging. In examining this question at Trojan, the inspector observed that the high radioactivity containment ventilation isolation setpoint on Plant Effluent Radiation Monitor (PERM) No. 1 is readily adjustable on the front of the panel (this is not inconsistent with technical specifications requirements, which establish a setpoint limit of ≤ 2 times background). The inspector verified from schematic diagrams that, even if the PERM setpoint were raised to a very high value, it could not defeat other containment isolation functions. However, the ease with which the setpoint can be raised appeared to be inconsistent with the licensee's letters to NRR dated January 3, 1979, and June 16, 1980. These letters stated that, "Capability for manual override of the high radiation signal of the containment purge valves does not exist," and, "there is no easy manner in which the containment purge

valves could be overridden to permit purging when a high radiation level exists in the containment." The inspector noted that the setpoint could easily be raised to permit purging with high activity levels present in containment. A licensee representative stated in a telephone conversation subsequent to the inspection that a letter correcting the statements would be forwarded to NRR. (80-12-01)

4. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives (denoted in Paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on May 16, 1980. The scope and findings of the inspection were discussed.

The inspector discussed containment ventilation isolation setpoints with a licensee representative on June 26, 1980. The representative stated that a letter would be sent to NRR to correct certain information in previous transmittals (paragraph 3.b).