



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA ST., N.W., SUITE 3100
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30303

MAY 8 1980

In Reply Refer To:

RII:JPO

50-302

Florida Power Corporation
Attn: J. A. Hancock, Director
Nuclear Operations
P. O. Box 14042, Mail Stop C-4
St. Petersburg, Florida 33733

Gentlemen:

The enclosed Information Notice provides early notification of an event that may have safety significance. Accordingly, you should review the Information Notice for possible applicability to your facility.

No specific action or response is requested at this time; however, contingent upon the results of further staff evaluation, a Bulletin or Circular recommending or requesting specific licensee actions may be issued. If you have questions regarding this matter, please contact me.

Sincerely,

James P. O'Reilly
Director

Enclosures:

1. IE Information Notice
No. 80-20
2. List of Recently Issued
IE Information Notices

8007240202

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Florida Power Corporation

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cc w/encl:
D. C. Poole
Nuclear Plant Manager
Post Office Box 1240
Crystal River, Florida 32629

UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

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8002280671

May 8, 1980

IE Information Notice 80-20

LOSS OF DECAY HEAT REMOVAL CAPABILITY AT DAVIS-BESSE UNIT 1 WHILE IN A
REFUELING MODE

Description of Circumstances:

On April 19, 1980, decay heat removal capability was lost at Davis-Besse Unit 1 for approximately two and one-half hours. At the time of the event, the unit was in a refueling mode (e.g., RCS temperature was 90F; decay heat was being removed by Decay Heat Loop No. 2; the vessel head was detensioned with bolts in place; the reactor coolant level was slightly below the vessel head flanges; and the manway covers on top of the once through steam generators were removed). (See Enclosure A, Status of Davis-Besse 1 Prior to Loss of Power to Busses E-2 and F-2 for additional details regarding this event.)

Since the plant was in a refueling mode, many systems or components were out of service for maintenance or testing purposes. In addition, other systems and components were deactivated to preclude their inadvertent actuation while in a refueling mode. Systems and components that were not in service or deactivated included:

Containment Spray System;
High Pressure Injection System;
Source Range Channel 2;
Decay Heat Loop No. 1;
Station Battery 1P and 1N;
Emergency Diesel-Generator No. 1;
4.16 KV Essential Switchgear Bus C1; and
13.8 KV Switchgear Bus A (this bus was energized but not aligned).

In brief, the event was due to the tripping of a non-safeguards feeder breaker in 13.8 KV Switchgear Bus 3. Because of the extensive maintenance and testing activities being conducted at the time, Channels 1 and 3 of the Reactor Protection System (RPS) and Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) were being energized from only one source, the source emanating from the tripped breaker. Since the SFAS logic used at Davis-Besse is a two-out-of-four input scheme in which the loss (or actuation) of any two input signals results in the actuation of all four output channels (i.e., Channels 1 and 3, and Channels 2 and 4), the loss of power to Channels 1 and 3 bistables also resulted in actuation of SFAS Channels 2 and 4. The actuation of SFAS Channels 2 and 4, the operating of SFAS
Decay Heat Loop No. 2, the operating of SFAS

Since the initiating event was a loss of power to the following systems:
Level 1 - High Pressure Injection;
Level 2 - High Pressure Injection;
Level 3 - Low Pressure Injection

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