LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

	CONTROL BLOCK: (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)
0 1	A L B R F 1 2 0 0 - 0 0 0 0 - 0 0 3 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 57 CAT 58
CON'T	REPORT L 6 0 15 10 10 10 12 15 9 7 10 16 12 14 18 10 3 0 7 1 8 8 0 9 EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
077	During an outage, control valve fast closure pressure switch PS-47-144 was miswired
013	when personnel failed to follow proper procedures for working on CSSC equipment.
0 4	Two consecutive shutdowns resulted. During the second shutdown all RPS scram group
016	1 and 2 rods initially inserted and stopped prior to completion of the scram stroke
0 6	(T.S.3.3.c). There have been no previous occurrences. There was no effect on
0]	the public health or safety.
7 B	SYSTEM CAUSE CAUSE COMP VALVE
0 9 7 8	CODE SUBCODE S
	17) REPORT NUMBER 21 27 23 24 26 27 28 29 10 31 10 31
	ACTION FUTURE ON PLANT SHUTDOWN HOURS (22) ATTACHMENT SURMITTED FORM SUB SUPPLIER SU
110	Pressure switch model TC 9622-3 was rewired incorrectly during maintenance as a
	result of the failure to follow administrative controls for work on CSSC. The rewiring
	error was corrected. The problem will be discussed with plant personnel involved to
	prevent recurrence.
(III)	
	FACILITY STATUS G G G B O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O
	PERSONNEL EXPOSURES AND INFO PACTIVITY 35 NA LOCATION OF RELEASE 36 NA PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
الم الم	O O O O O O O NA PERSONNEL INJURIES NA
	VUMILE A DESCRIPTION (41) NA NA
<u>II</u>	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (13) 1 VEE DESCRIPTION NA 1 10
21	PUBLICITY 15TUED DESCRIPTION 45 News paper, radio and TV
	8007230531

LER SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

BFRO-50- 259 / 8050 Toohnical Specification Involved	2.2
BFRO-50-259 / 8050 Technical Specification Involved	3.3.0
Reported Under Technical Specification 6.7.2.b(3)	
Date of Occurrence 6/24/80 Time of Occurrence 1731	Unit1
Identification and Description of Occurrence:	
Refer to detailed report attached.	
Conditions Price to Comment	
Conditions Prior to Occurrence:	
Unit 1 @ 0 MWe	
Unit 2 @ 70% MWe Unit 3 @ 99% MWe	
onic 5 g 55% rwe	
Action specified in the Technical Specification Surveillance due to inoperable equipment. Describe. Refer to detailed report attached.	Requirements met
Apparent Cause of Occurrence:	
Refer to detailed report attached.	
Analysis of Occurrence:	
There was no danger to the public health or safety, no dama equipment, and no release of activity.	ge to the plant or
Corrective Action:	
Switch was rewired correctly.	
Failure Data:	

Period - Lifetime; Responsibility - Administrative Supervisor

*Revision:

*Retention:

ATTACHMENT TO LER BFRO-50-259-80050

Turbine control fluid leaks at PS-47-144 on the #2 control valve resulted in a forced Unit 1 outage. Plant personnel used only mechanical control drawings to identify the switch function and improperly identified the switch as non-CSSC. Personnel worked at the control valve under poor lighting conditions and without the control normally required for CSSC maintenance (independent verification of functional test). This resulted in PS-47-144 being rewired incorrectly when normally unused switch #2 was inadvertently wired into the circuit switch number 1. The resulting wiring scheme consisted of the normally open and normally closed contacts of uncalibrated switch #2 being wired in parallel and then connected in series with the contacts of calibrated switch #1. This wiring scheme permitted the reactor protection system to fulfill its control valve fast closure scram function but introduced a brief electrical disruption to the parameter sensor relay each time switch #2 actuated.

Unit shutdowns resulted during each of the next two consecutive startup sequences during performance of turbine control valve fast closure S.I. 4.1.A-12.

On the first occasion during reopening of an adjacent control valve, brief electrical disruptions initiated by control fluid pressure fluctuations at PS-47-144 resulted in the de-energization of both channel B1 scram actuators. The A channel 1/2 scram due to closing of the adjacent control valve had not yet been reset and insertion of all control rods resulted.

On the second occasion during reopening of an adjacent control valve, a brief electrical disruption initiated by control fluid pressure fluctuations at PS-47-144 resulted in the de-energization of only one of the paralleled pair of B1 channel scram actuators. The A channel 1/2 scraw due to closing of the adjacent control valve had not yet been reset and initial insertion of only RPS scram group 2 and 3 rods resulted. Prior to full insert stroke all rods stopped immediately after RPS channel A was reset by the operator.

Reactor protection system time delay to reset circuitry was not initiated because the brief electrical disruption de-energized only one of the paralleled pair of Bl channel scram actuators. Reactor protection system design is such that both Bl scram actuators would have to de-energize before initiating the ten second time delay to reset circuitry.