

FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
ACT REQUEST

June 27, 1980

FOIA-80-335

rec'd 06/30/80

4327 Alconbury Lane #3
Houston, Texas 77021

J. M. Felton, Director
Division of Rules and Records
Office of Administration
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington D. C.

Dear Mr. Felton,

Enclosed is an FOIA request, which I am filing in accordance with your letter of March 3, 1980, setting a reduced copying charge, and which was in response to FOIA 80-3, 80-3 and 80-47. I most recently received FOIA 80-289.

As in previous requests I have attempted to enclose docket number and NRC accession numbers to assist identification. Most of the are Licensee Event Reports of short length. As before, I have set my reasons for the request and identified the relevant contention for the Allen Creek proceeding.

Thank you very much.

Sincerely,

John F. Doherty
John F. Doherty

8007230246

1. Letter from E. D. Fuller (G. E.) to D. F. Ross (NRC), of 1/13/78. Code described here is cited as identical to "TWIGLE-2".
In my contention #15, I have asserted WIGLE code is inadequate to represent a power excursion neutronics in a one dimensional code. This letter is important, because staff asserts comparisons in the letter demonstrate a one dimensional code is conservative with respect to a three dimensional code.
2. Letter from G.G. Sherwood of General Electric to D. Eisenhut (NRC) of 3/19/79, which gives information on the influence of the Doppler effect on Fuel Rod Bowing. This letter is needed, because my Contention #33 asserts Doppler has been overestimated as a significant check on reactivity during core distorting accidents, and my contention #3 asserts fuel rod bowing is a likely accident result in case of reactivity insertion due to melting of fuel and steam explosions or metal-water reactions when molten fuel strikes coolant. This is the only source from the manufacturer of the Allens Creek reactor to even mention fuel rod bowing and hence is important to show from their own remarks that bowing is a possibility. It also appears the Doppler inadequacy argument of this intervenor will be addressed here.
3. Docket 50-373/374 LaSalle Station, Unit 1 & 2. Section 15.4.1.2 of the FSAR (Am #36 is part of this, 7/78). Staff, in reply to an interrogatory to my Contention #46 referenced this. This material is needed to refute their attempt to show start-ups of the Allens Creek plant at high xenon concentrations and at low or no void conditions do not require prohibition because consequences of continuous withdrawal of high rod worth are shown acceptable in this accident analysis.
4. From the list of documents relating to the 1964-65 re-examination of WASH-740 (NRC document), in Public Document Room, docket number 144-18, on page 12, a memo from C.H. Beck to the Atomic Energy Commission on the draft report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the 1965 restudy of WASH-740, a list of reactors on which stud bolts have broken. This list (should be quite short) is needed to show the extent of stud bolt failure in operating reactors. At the moment the only definite failure evidence I have is from the LaCrosse BWR, which was provided as 80-134/18.
5. Docket 50-249, Dresden-3, B. B. Stephenson (Commonwealth Edison), Letter to James G. Keppler (NRC), Follow Up Report to Abnormal Occurrence Entitled "Correlation of Fuel Failures at Dresden-3 Identified by Wet Shipping Tests to Calculated Violation of GE PCIOMR, June 20, 1975. Reason needed: General Electric has proposed a 1% plastic strain criterion for zirconium clad should serve as the pellet-clad interaction damage limit. However, this report shows pellet-clad interaction of less than 1% has been observed to occur at plastic strains less than 1%. In my contention 8, regarding ATWS, I will need to show that the public is not adequately protected against the several fuel mechanical actions, such as fuel swelling which leads to pellet clad interaction in this accident type.

14. Docket 50-278 Peach Bottom Station, Unit III. LER 80-001/03L-0. Failure of main steam line monitor. Needed for Doherty Contention #14, which asserts this system is not adequate when running correctly. Needed to find out if MSLRM was inoperative for considerable time before defect discovered on surveillance test.
15. Docket-50-265 Quad Cities Unit II. LER 80-01/03L-0. Relief valves stick shut beyond setting during testing. Needed because Doherty Contention #17 asserts that valves may stick, then open at higher pressure resulting in suppression pool damage. (8002220404)
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16. Docket 50-271 Vermont Yankee. LER 80-004/03L-0. Power supply overheat caused failure of rod pattern information system and rod drift alarm. Needed for Doherty 12, which will try to show the analogous system in Allens Creek endangers the public because of several failures such as these.
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17. "Hydrogen Generation & Pressure Suppression Containments" 7 page doc., 8002140110 by Kastenbergh of ACRS. Needed for Doherty Contention #9, that loads including hydrogen ignition loads cannot be withstood by the standing steel shell, the lower portion of which is the suppression pool in the Mark-III design of Allens Creek.
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18. Portion of Transcript of ECCS/ Reactor Fuels Subcommittee meeting in Washington D. C. of Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards of Feb. 14, 1980 which is devoted to fuels for Water Reactors. This would be General Electric Fuels. This is needed for Doherty Contention #39 on fuel clad swelling and rupture, because it probably makes a direct statement on the adequacy of this fuel vendor's product, and is likely to be Houston Lighting & Power Company's essential case.
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19. Research Information Letter 78, vertical loads in Mark-I containment torus during air venting phase of LOCA. This document of 7 pages appears useful to better understanding the effects of air clearing phase relevant to Doherty Con. #5 that swelling of the suppression pool endangers overhead structures, and that pressure from blowdown to the suppression pool, including such air phases is a hazard (Doherty #17). 8002260236.
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20. Transcript of Feb 13, 1980 meeting of Commission (8002200566) re: turbine missiles. Needed for Doherty Cont. #47 that turbine missiles and effects of lost turbine balance cause a hazard to immediate safe plant operation. (54 pages)
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21. 8002207274 (TOPREP) Calculation of crack growth rate for keyway template in turbine discs. Needed for Doherty #47, because the calculation of crack growth rate will largely determine the importance of this contention.

As part of demonstrating this danger, I need to show the acceptable criteria recommended by the Allens Creek reactor manufacturer is not adequate to ATWS conditions. This report appears from P.8 of Document A-86 of your previous correspondence to indicate that.

6. Docket 50-333, James A Fitzpatrick plant. LER 80-001/03L-0, APRM downscale trip inexact due to drift. Needed to show unreliability of this system for Contention #12, the RCIS which depends on APRM to initiate rod block, which this intervenor says is unreliable (8002040336 and 8002041338).
7. Docket 50-333, James A. Fitzpatrick plant. LER80-012/03L-0 Emergency generator failed due to oil heater failure. Needed to show these units are unreliable despite improvements, in Doherty Contention #10. (8002140712 and 8002140707).
8. Docket 50-333 James A. Fitzpatrick plant. LER80-013/03L-0 On testing, lo-lo-lo level switch failed. Needed to show as in Doherty Contention 41, redundant as to type and function water level indicators should be installed at ACNGS (8002200558)
9. ~~Docket 50-259 Browns Ferry, Unit 1. LER 80-014/03L-0, failure of SCRAM accumulator level switch. This is needed to show as in TexPIRG #32, that the level switches in the SCRAM discharge volume are subject to failure, which the utility is arguing is not so.~~
10. Docket 50-259 Browns Ferry, Unit 1. LER 80-008/03L-0. Crack in coupling bearing support pedestal on HPCI turbine due to water hammer (?). TVA has raised possibility of water hammer damage here, as has this Intervenor in his Contention 44. This LER will be used to show water hammer may damage vital plant systems at ACNGS as alleged.
11. Docket 50-321 Edwin Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1. LER 80-10/03L-0. Failure due to set point drift of a standby liquid control system discharge valve. Relevant to Doherty Contention #8, which asserts there is danger from anticipated transients without SCRAM, for which the standby liquid control system was designed. Furthers Intervenor's position the system is not adequate (8002220419 and forwarding letter(8002220419))
12. Docket 50-220, Nine Mile Point, Unit 1. LER 80-005, /01X-0. Engineering eval of lo-lo set point of reactor water level requires change of 20". Relevant to Doherty Contention #41, that detection of low level in reactor core may be defective in various ways and that redundant indicators are hence required.
13. Docket 50-277 Peach Bottom II. LER 80-004/03L--0. Rod Block Monitor electronic circuit failure. The Rod Block monitor is succeeded in part by the rod control and information system in the Allens Creek plant. This LER is needed to show the electronic portion of the system is subject to failure. (8002290473).