



DOCKET NUMBER
PROPOSED RULE PR-50 (27)
(45 FR 36082)


June 30, 1980
L-80-207

Mr. Samuel J. Chilk
Secretary of the Commission
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Attention: Docketing and Service Branch

Dear Mr. Chilk:

Re: 10 CFR Part 50 Fire Protection Program for
Nuclear Power Plants Operating Prior to
January 1, 1979, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking



On May 27, 1980, the Commission published in the Federal Register (45 FR 36083) a proposed amendment to its regulations to require certain minimum provisions for fire protection in operating nuclear power plants. Florida Power & Light Company (FPL) has reviewed the proposed rule and offers the attached comments for your consideration.

FPL has also participated in review of the proposed rule as part of a utility group under KMC, Inc. and as part of the Edison Electric Institute Fire Protection Committee and supports the comments to be submitted by those organizations.

Very truly yours,

J. A. De Mastri

Robert E. Uhrig
Vice President
Advanced Systems & Technology

REU/TCG/ah

Attachments

cc: Harold F. Reis, Esquire

Acknowledged by card..7/1/80..mdv

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FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT COMPANY
COMMENTS ON PROPOSED FIRE PROTECTION RULE

General Comments

1. FPL recommends that the 30 day comment period be extended to provide sufficient time to review and comment on the proposed regulation and to assess its impact. We fail to see how the 30 day period can be justified on the basis that the public has been afforded an opportunity to comment on Regulatory Guide 1.120. When FPL initially commented on Regulatory Guide 1.120, the methods described in that document were to be used in evaluation of submittals in connection with construction permit applications docketed after February 28, 1977 and did not directly apply to any FPL facilities. In addition, the comments submitted by FPL for revision 1 to Regulatory Guide 1.120 have never been formally resolved by the NRC.
2. The intent of the proposed rule is to specify minimum fire protection requirements in seventeen generic areas where agreement has not been reached between the NRC staff and some licensees. The proposed Appendix R states that it does not rescind any requirements set forth in any Safety Evaluation Report for any nuclear power facility. This implies that licensees must satisfy all new requirements contained in the rule as well as those requirements previously agreed to by the NRC staff and licensees for resolving the same generic issues. In a number of instances where the staff has accepted an alternative method of satisfying a particular requirement, conflicts could exist. The proposed Appendix R should be modified to state that it does not apply to issues resolved by the NRC staff and licensees prior to the effective date of the rule.
3. The value-impact assessment performed by the NRC staff is inadequate with respect to capital and operating costs to be incurred by licensees in meeting the detailed requirements of the proposed rule. Order-of-magnitude cost estimates performed by FPL subsequent to publication of the proposed rule in the Federal Register indicate capital costs up to \$89 million for the three operating FPL units, and additional operating costs up to \$1 million for each facility. This does not reflect outage costs or replacement power costs. FPL does not consider these costs justified based on the marginal incremental benefits for our facilities.
4. The proposed rule is overly prescriptive and does not include the flexibility to permit alternative methods of satisfying basic fire protection requirements. Much of the detail in the rule is more appropriate for a NUREG or Regulatory Guide. The ACRS, in this rulemaking and others, has stated that regulations should specify the basic requirements and allow the licensee to determine the methods of satisfying those requirements.

The following specific comments are listed in the same order as the subject information appears in the Federal Register.

<u>F/R Page No.</u>	<u>Item No.</u>	<u>Comments/Recommended Changes</u>
36086	III. A. Par. 1	Change the fresh water requirement to allow use of salt water during fire emergencies or during fresh water shortage periods (such as, required maintenance of one tank).
36086	III. A. Par. 4	When storage tanks are used for combined service water/fire water uses, provide an alternate means of dedicating fire water supply in lieu of providing vertical standpipes (such as administratively controlling water supply, providing additional high and low level alarms, and/or providing technical specification limiting conditions for operation during periods of low fire water supplies).
36087	III. B.	Change requirement to allow use of standard gate isolation valves.
36087	III. D.	Provide alternatives to the use of standpipes in containment, (such as large portable fire fighting extinguisher units using Dry Chemical, AFFF foam).
36087	III. E.	"Service pressure" should be changed to "operational pressure". In addition, the frequencies for testing fire hose should be in accordance with applicable NFPA Fire Codes.
36087	III. F.	Interpretation of this section could require fire detection in all areas of the plant. The need for automatic fire detection systems should be determined by the plant's fire hazard analysis. In addition, automatic wet pipe sprinkler systems could provide an acceptable alternative to the use of automatic fire detection systems.
36087	III. G.	Delete the information in items 1 and 2. Such information is more appropriate for a NUREG or a Regulatory Guide. Design considerations to meet a specific requirement are the responsibility of the licensee.
		The protection of Safe Shutdown Capability should be addressed by each plant's fire hazard analysis and specific protective features provided as prescribed by that analysis. Table I should be deleted for lack of clarity.

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36087	III. H.	<p>Change to read "...the minimum size of the fire brigade shall be at least five members on each shift or a lesser number as determined on a plant specific basis....." Delete equipment requirements. Such detailed information is more appropriate for a NUREG or a Regulatory Guide.</p> <p>The NRC staff has established the minimum onsite fire brigade shift size as five fully trained fire fighters. To support this position the NRC has not considered the degree of dependency upon the availability of support personnel professional offsite fire fighting units. NUREG-0050 p. 27 states that "onsite personnel should have sufficient training and practice to handle all small fires, and to contain larger fires until the offsite units arrive". However, Branch Technical Position 9.5-1 states "The plant should be self sufficient with respect to fire fighting activities and rely on public response only for supplemental or back up capability".</p> <p>FPL feels that the above statement is a definite contrast from the original NRC staff finding that offsite fire fighting units play a definite role in supporting the nuclear plant personnel. Therefore, FPL feels that a three man fire brigade with offsite support is more than adequate to extinguish small realistic type fires for the required 30 minutes. Since offsite response times are from 10 to 20 minutes at Turkey Point and St. Lucie, FPL feels that we have satisfied the NRC's original concern for offsite response.</p> <p>In developing the five-man fire brigade scenario for nuclear power plants, the NRC staff has postulated the following sequence of events:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">A) Assume a fire starts.B) Assume fire is not extinguished in its incipient stage (failure of existing fire detection systems and for fire suppression systems).C) Assume additional fire extinguisher hose lines and spare breathing apparatus and ladders must be obtained.D) Assume heavy smoke conditions require portable smoke ejectors.E) Assume energized equipment must be denergized and would require use of protective water shielding.

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		F) Assume a second hose line for backup.
		G) Assume flammable liquid fire requires portable foam equipment.
		H) Assume fire in confined space and its exact locations cannot readily be determined.
		I) Assume a fire brigade member becomes trapped or incapacitated in any way.
		J) Assume offsite people must be broken into teams having a fire brigade member assigned as leader.
		K) Assume inclement weather prevents offsite assistance from responding in 30 minutes.
		FPL agrees that for the most severe or unusual situation, a combination of these assumptions could be postulated, but to assume that all can occur simultaneously is totally unrealistic.
		In fact, the staff's assumptions on this subject goes well beyond the single failure criteria established in 10 CFR Part 50.
		Finally, based upon postulated realistic type fires and the highly trained well equipped offsite fire departments located near Turkey Point Units 3 & 4 and St. Lucie Unit 1, FPL feels that a three-man fire brigade is more than adequate to provide onsite manual fire suppression and provides justification for less than five men on a plant specific basis.
36087 & 36088	III. I.	Sections 1 through 4 should be deleted. Such detailed information is more appropriate for a NUREG or Regulatory Guide.
36088	III. J.	Delete the 8 hour requirement for battery supply. The minimum hour requirement should be plant specific and justified in the fire hazard analysis.
36088 & 36089	III. K.	Delete sections 1 through 12. The information included in these sections is over-specific and is more appropriate for a NUREG or Regulatory Guide.
36089	III. L.	Alternate shutdown capability is discussed in each plant's fire hazard analysis and is further governed by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria 19. Therefore, this section should not be addressed

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		in a fire protection rule, only referenced as a fire protection consideration.
36089	III. M. Par. 2	This section should only recommend the design criteria and not specify the design itself.
36089	III. M. Par. 3	This paragraph should recognize that many barriers are constructed for reasons other than fire protection and may have a rating in excess of the required fire loading for that fire area and door. The fire resistance rating of doors, frames, etc. should be determined by the fire hazards analysis.
36089	III. M. Par. 4	Delete the word "door" in fire <u>door</u> damper. In addition, consideration should be given to nuclear safety criteria when requiring fire dampers in safety related duct systems.
36089	III. M.	This section should permit the use of acceptable alternatives for fire barriers such as water curtains.
36089	III. N.	Refer to FPL letter L-79-271 dated September 25, 1979, comments on Draft Regulatory Guide, Fire Stop Testing Task RS-809-5.
36089	III. O.	This section should only address fire doors located in areas containing safe shutdown system equipment.
36090	III. O. Section 4	This section should provide for mechanical actuation as an acceptable alternative.
36090	III. P.	The safe shutdown earthquake design bases is addressed in 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria and does not belong in this document.
36090	III. Q.	Associated Circuits should be deleted from this document on fire protection, since the subject is addressed in each utility's license and is covered by 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix A General Design Criteria 24.