-6-

-	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
/0/1/	CONTROL BLOCK $/////(1)$ (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION) /V/A/N/A/S/1/(2) $/0/0/-/0/0/0/0/-/0/0/(3)$ $/4/1/1/1/1(4)$ $///(5)$
/0/1/	$\frac{\text{REPORT}}{\text{SOURCE} / L/ (6)} \frac{/0/5/0/C/0/3/3/8/}{(7)} (7) \frac{/0/6/1/9/8/0/}{(8)} (8) \frac{/0/7/1/6/8/0/}{(9)}$
	DOCKET NUMBER EVENT DATE REPORT DATE EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)
/0/2/	/ On June 19, 1930, with the unit in Mode 1, the Post Accident Hydrogen Analyzer /
/0/3/	/ was declared inoperable and out of service after performing periodic surveil- /
/0/4/	/ lance testing. The health and safety of the general public were not affected /
/0/5/	/since the unit 2 hydrogen analyzer was available for sampling unit 1 contain/
/0/6/	/ ment hydrogen content and the unit 1 analyzer was returned to service well /
10/-1	/within the allowable 30 day period. This is contrary to T.S. 3.6.4.1 and _/
/0/8/	/ reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b. /
	CODE CODE SUBCODE COMPONENT CODE SUBCODE SUBCODE
/0/9/	/S/E/(11)/D/(12)/Z/(13)/V/A/L/V/E/X/(14)/D/(15)/H/(16)
(17	SEQUENTIALOCCURRENCEREPORTREVISIONLER/ROEVENT YEARREPORT NO.CODETYPENO.) REPORT
	NUMBER /8/0/ /-/ /0/5/8/ /// /0/3/ /L/ /-/ /0/
ACT TAK	IONFUTUREEFFECTSHUTDOWNATTACHMENTNPRD-4PRIMECOMPONENTENACTIONON PLANTMETHODHOURSSUBMITTEDFORMSUB.SUPPLIERMANUFACTURER
<u>/E/</u>	(18) $\underline{/G/}$ (19) $\underline{/Z/}$ (20) $\underline{/Z/}$ (21) $\underline{/0/0/0/}$ (22) $\underline{/Y/}$ (23) $\underline{/N/}$ (24) $\underline{/A/}$ (25) $\underline{/1/2/0/8/}$ (26)
C.	AUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
/1/0/	/ The H2 Analyzer T/C bridge failed to energize due to low back pressure in the /
/1/1/	/ sample lines. Pressure regulator valve BPR-1 was adjusted to provide suffi- /
/1/2/	/ cient back pressure causing pressure switch PS-1 to close thereby energizing /
/1/3/	/_ the bridge circuit. /
/1/4/	1
1	FACILITY METHOD OF
/1/5/	$\frac{F}{(28)} \frac{10/7/9}{(29)} \frac{10}{NA} \frac{10}{(30)} \frac{10}{B} \frac{10}{(31)} \frac{10}{(30)} \frac{10}{B} \frac{10}{(31)} \frac{10}{(30)} \frac{10}{B} \frac{10}{(31)} \frac{10}{(30)} $
/1/6/	ACTIVITY CONTENT RELEASED OF RELEASE AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) LOCATION OF RELEASE (36) <u>/Z/ (33) /Z/ (34) / NA / / NA / / NA / / / NA / / / NA / / / /</u>
/1/7/	NUMBER TYPE DESCRIPTION (39) /0/0/0/ (37) /Z/ (38) / NA / PERSONNEL IN URLES / /
/1/8/	NUMBER DESCRIPTION (41) /0/0/0/ (40) / NA
	LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43) TYPE DESCRIPTION (43)
/1/9/	<u>/Z/ (42) / NA</u> PUBLICITY /
/2/0/	ISSUED DESCRIPTION (45) NRC USE ONLY /N/ (44) / NA / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / /
	NAME OF PREPARER W. R. CARTWRIGHT PHONE (703) 894-5151
. 80	007220580

Virginia Electric and Power Company North Anna Power Station Docket No. 50-338 Report No. 80-058/03L-0 Attachment to LER 80-058/03L-0

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Description of Event

On June 19, 1980, with the unit in mode 1, the hydrogen analyzer thermal conductance (T/C) bridge failed to energize during the performance of the quarterly surveillance test and the analyzer was declared inoperable and out of service. The health and safety of the general public were not affected since the unit 2 hydrogen and yzer was available for sampling unit 1 containment hydrogen content and the unit 1 analyzer was returned to service well within the allowable 30 day period. This is contrary to T.S. 3.6.4.1 and reportable pursuant to T.S. 6.9.1.9.b.

Probable Consequence Occurrence

The consequences of this event were minimized since the unit 2 hydrogen analyzer was available to determine hydrogen content of the unit 1 containment atmosphere, if required. As a result the health and safety of the general public were not affected.

Cause of Event

The hydrogen analyzer failed to energize due to low back pressure in the sampling lines. The T/C bridge circuit failed to energize because the pressure switch sensing back pressure remained open. The regulator valve downstream of the sensing elements was found out of adjustment and not providing sufficient pressure to close the pressure switch.

Immediate Corrective Action

The back pressure regulator valve BPR-1, was adjusted to its proper setting of 3.0 psig which caused the pressure switch, PS-1, to close and energize the T/C Bridge Circuit. The periodic surveillance test was completed and all acceptance criteria were met.

Scheduled Corrective Action

The periodic surveillance test shall be revised to include correct setting of the back pressure regulator value to ensure adequate sample line back pressure.

Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence

No further actions are required.

Generic Implication

There are no generic implications.