TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

400 Chestnut Street Tower II

TIC 50-259 560 THE

20 JUL 10 All: 30 July 7, 1980 ٠,

Mr. James P. O'Reilly, Director Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region II - Suite 3100 101 Marietta Street Atlanta, Georgia 30303

Dear Mr. O'Reilly:

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OFFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN 80-10 - RII:JPO 50-259, -260, -296 - BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

In response to your letter dated May 6, 1980, which transmitted OIE Bulletin 80-10, we are enclosing the results of our investigations for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant. If you have any questions, please call Jim Domer at FTS 857-2014.

Very truly yours,

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

L. M. Mills, Manager Nuclear Regulation and Safety

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

RESPONSE TO OIE BULLETIN 80-10 BROWNS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT

We have reviewed the subject OIE Bulletin and the results of our investigations for the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant are as follows.

ITEM 1

Review your facility design and operation to identify systems that are considered as nonradioactive (or described as nonradioactive in the FSAR), but could possibly become radioactive through interfaces with radioactive systems, i.e., a nonradioactive system that could become contaminated due to leakage, valving errors or other operating conditions in radioactive systems. In particular, special consideration should be given to the following systems: auxiliary boiler system, demineralized water system, isolation condenser system, PWR secondary water cleanup system, instrument air system, and the sanitary waste system.

RESPONSE TO ITEM 1

We have reviewed the Browns Ferry design for possible interfaces between nonradioactive and radioactive systems, which could cause the nonradioactive system to become contaminated. These interfaces were previously reviewed in response to IE Circular 77-14. The systems identified were potable water, demineralized water, and the auxiliary boiler system. The latter interface exists via connections between the boilers and the pressure suppression chamber (torus) chromate control system, which is not used.

ITEM 2

Establish a routine sampling/analysis or monitoring program for these systems in order to promptly identify any contaminating events which could lead to unmonitored, uncontrolled liquid or gaseous releases to the environment, inlcuding releases to onsite leaching fields or retention ponds.

RESPONSE TO ITEM 2

A routine sampling and analysis program for the above-mentioned systems has been established.

RESPONSE TO ITEMS 3 AND 4

3

TVA will comply with the requirements outlined in items 3 and 4, if any of these systems should become contaminated.