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Mr. Boyce H. Grier
Director, Region I
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406

July 11, 1980
MP-1-1562

Reference: Provisional License DPR-21
Docket Number 50-245
Reportable Occurrence RO-80-10/3L

Dear Mr. Grier:

This letter forwards the Licensee Event Report for Reportable Occurrence RO-80-10/3L required to be submitted within 30 days pursuant to the requirements of the Millstone Unit 1 Technical Specifications, Section 6.9.1.9. An additional three copies of the report are enclosed.

Yours truly,

E. J. Mroczka
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

EJM:MB:cp

Attachment: LER RO-80-10/3L

cc: Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, Washington, D.C. (30)
Director, Office of Management Information and Program Control, Washington, D.C. (3)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, c/o Document Management Branch, Washington, D.C. 20555

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ATTACHMENT TO LER 80-10/3L
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY
MILLSTONE NUCLEAR POWER STATION - UNIT 1
PROVISIONAL LICENSE NUMBER DPR-21
DOCKET NUMBER 50-245

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

The integrity of the pipe support for Low Pressure Coolant Injection Subsystem B injection piping at primary containment penetration X-45 became questionable.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the reactor was in cold shutdown; extraction steam piping and main condenser repairs were in progress.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On June 13, 1980, at 0730 hours, while preparing for tension testing of concrete expansion bolts in accordance with IE Bulletin 79-02, one bolt on the X-45 penetration pipe support broke. Investigations concerning the bolt failure were initiated at this time.

DESIGNATION OF APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

After further investigation, it was determined that some of the base plate bolts had been improperly installed during original plant construction.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

The reduction in structural integrity of the pipe support in question due to the bolt failure and subsequent repair activities did not create a condition that had not been previously analyzed. Since the reactor was in the cold shutdown condition, LPCI was not required to be operable; alternate Emergency Core Cooling Systems were available.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The broken bolt and the bolts that were improperly installed were removed and replaced in accordance with the original design drawings. The bolts on the remaining penetration anchors of this design were tested and found satisfactory. The analysis of penetration support base plate design loads is being pursued as previously committed under IE Bulletin 79-02 and 79-14 inspections.