



UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

SUPPORTING AMENDMENT NO. 18 TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-5

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY  
OGLETHORPE POWER CORPORATION  
MUNICIPAL ELECTRIC ASSOCIATION OF GEORGIA  
CITY OF DALTON, GEORGIA

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT, UNIT NO. 2

DOCKET NO. 50-366

Introduction

By telecopied letter dated June 2, 1980, Georgia Power Corporation (licensee) requested a temporary change to the Technical Specifications appended to Facility Operating License No. NPF-5 for the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, Unit No. 2. The change involves a temporary waiver of the restriction on startup of the reactor with an inoperable High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System. This request was authorized on June 2, 1980. The licensee confirmed their June 2, 1980, telecopied request with a formal submittal dated June 2, 1980. This Safety Evaluation documents our review.

Background

On June 2, 1980, Hatch 2 tripped on high bearing vibration on the exciter of the main generator. The cause of the trip was identified as either a faulty sensor or a failed bearing. During discussions with the NRC staff, the licensee stated that diagnosis of the exact cause, in order to determine necessary repairs, required that the reactor be restarted in order to produce sufficient steam to roll the main turbine.

At the time of the trip, the HPCI system had been inoperable for two days to repair the motor operator to the system's injection valve. The current Standard Technical Specifications for Hatch 2 authorize continued operation with an inoperable HPCI for up to 14 days to provide for such maintenance and repair activities. However, the specifications do not permit startup with an inoperable HPCI.

The licensee's request for a temporary change involved: (1) authorization for restart with an inoperable HPCI for the purpose of conducting a special test on the main generator; (2) a limit of 10% power during the period of the temporary authorization; and (3) a limitation on the temporary authorization for seven days.

### Evaluation

Specification 3.0.4 of the Hatch 2 Technical Specifications precludes entry into an operational condition with reliance on an action statement; e.g., before startup for power operation, all Emergency Core Cooling Systems should be operational. This specification is necessarily general in nature and does not cover contingencies such as the conduct of special tests for diagnosis of malfunctioning systems.

We have reviewed the licensee's request and determined that a one-time temporary change for the purpose of conducting a special test is acceptable and justified as discussed below.

The temporary change does not alter the duration that the HPCI is out of service since it was declared operational. All other safety systems are operational. These include the Depressurization System, Low Pressure Coolant Injection and Core Spray System. Further, the Reactor Core Isolation Coolant System is also operational. The temporary change includes restrictions on power level and provides for added surveillance on power level. Manual initiation of the HPCI, should it be necessary, is possible from the main control room.

In view of the above, we have determined that startup of the plant and the conduct of the special test is within the envelope of analyzed failures previously considered for continued operation with an inoperable HPCI system. Therefore, the one-time change is acceptable.

### Environmental Considerations

We have determined that this amendment does not authorize a change in effluent types or total amounts nor an increase in power level and will not result in any significant environmental impact. Having made this determination, we have further concluded that this amendment involves an action which is insignificant from the standpoint of environmental impact, and pursuant to 10 CFR Section 51.5(d)(4) that an environmental impact statement, or negative declaration and environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the issuance of this amendment.

### Conclusion

We have concluded, based on the considerations discussed above, that: (1) because the amendment does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of accidents previously considered and does not involve a significant decrease in a safety margin, the amendment does not involve a significant hazards consideration, (2) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, and (3) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations and the issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

Dated: July 2, 1980