BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

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June 17, 1980

ARTHUR E. LUNDVALL, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT
SUPPLY

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

Attn: Mr. Boyce H. Grier, Director

Subject: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Units Nos. 1 & 2, Dockets Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
IE Bulletin 80-06
ESF Reset Controls

Gentlemen:

As required by the subject Bulletin, we have reviewed the design for all systems serving safety-related functions at the schematic level to determine whether or not, upon reset of an ESF actuation signal, all associated safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode.

The schematic design ensures that all equipment will remain in its emergency mode upon reset of the applicable actuation signal except as discussed below. For each of the categories where the schematic design alone does not prevent mode change, adequate procedures or system design obviate the need for any design modifications.

The ESF actuation system does not automatically reset when the initiating parameters return within bounds; the system does not allow blocking nor overriding the actuation signals, neither manually nor via any process control signal. Procedures following any actuation, specified in Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP) -5, require placing individual hand controls for all equipment in their actuated (i.e., safe) position. These procedures contain detailed checklists which list each handswitch and its required position. When initiating parameters return within bounds, several deliberate operator actions are required before the equipment can change mode: The operator must first manually reset the individual trips, then individually return each handswitch to the non-accident position. These features ensure that the equipment will remain in its emergency mode upon reset of the actuation signal, and no modifications are necessary. Equipment in this category is as follows (all are both units 1 and 2 unless noted):

CV510, CV511	Boric Acid Tank Recirculation Valves
CV512	Makeup Flow Control Valve
MOV501	Volume Control Tank Discharge Valve
CV3840, CV3842	Component Cooling to Waste Evaporator Isolation Valves
CV5210, CV5212	Service Water Heat Exchanger Control Valves
MOV5250, MOV5251	Salt Water to Circulating Water Pump Room Air Cooler Isolation Valves
CV1582, CV1585, CV1590, CV1593	Containment Cooling Unit Discharge Valve
1CV1596, 1CV1597, 1CV1598, 1CV1599	Spent Fuel Pool Cooler Discharge And Supply Valves
CV1600, CV1638, CV1637, CV1639	Service Water to Turbine Building Isolation Valves
CV3828, CV3830	Shutdown Cooling Heat Exchanger Discharge Valves
CV4150, CV4151	Containment Spray Header Isolation Valves
MOV4144, MOV4145	Containment Sump Discharge Valves
MOV659, MOV660	Containment Spray and Safety Injection Pumps Recirculation Valves
SV5285, SV5287	Penetration Room Filter Isolation Dampers

The following equipment is prevented from reset out of the emergency mode upon reset of the actuation signal by administrative procedures:

MOV656	Manual HPSI Header Isolation Valve - This valve is physically locked open in the emergency position at all times.
MOV614, MOV624, MOV634, MOV644	Safety Injection Tank Isolation Valves - The emergency position of each of these valves is open. These valves are opened during normal operation. Power is then removed from the motor operator of each valve to insure the emergency valve position is maintained at all times.

MO231, MO311	Containment Purge Air Supply and Exhaust Fans - The emergency mode of these fans is off. During normal operation, power is removed from the fans to ensure the emergency fan mode is maintained at all times.

The following equipment may change operating mode upon reset of the actuation signal, as described below:

CV5160, CV5162	Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Inlet Valves
CV5163, CV5206, CV5208	Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger Outlet Valves

Each of these valves receives two actuation signals - Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS) and Recirculation Actuation Signal (RAS). The SIAS signal closes these valves to isolate the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger from the Salt Water System. This allows more salt water to flow to the Service Water Heat Exchanger during a Loss of Coolant Accident. Following reset of the SIAS signal, these valves must reopen to supply cooling water to the Component Cooling Water System. A RAS signal also reopens these valves to put the Component Cooling Water Heat Exchanger back in service. Following reset of the RAS signal each of these valves remains open. This operation scheme is intentional, presents no safety problem, and requires no modifications.

A test to verify that the actual installed instrumentation and controls at Calvert Cliffs are consistent with the schematics reviewed will be completed during our next scheduled refueling outage, currently scheduled for Fall 1980 for Unit No. 1 and early 1981 for Unit No. 2.

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY

BY: A. E. Lundvall, Jr.
Vice President, Supply

STATE OF MARYLAND:
: TO WIT:
CITY OF BALTIMORE:

Arthur E. Lundvall, Jr. being duly sworn states that he is Vice President of the Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, a corporation of the State of Maryland; that he executed the foregoing response for the purposes therein set forth; that the statements made in said response are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief; and that he was authorized to execute the response on behalf of said corporation.

WITNESS My Hand and Notarial Seal:

Ruth N. Grier
Notary Public

My Commission Expires: July 1, 1982

cc: Division of Reactor Operations Inspection
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

J. A. Biddison, Esquire
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