(7-77)

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01	LICENSEE CODE		LICENSE NUMBER		LICENSE TYPE		CAT	
	O H D B S 1	(2)	Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø Ø	(3)	4 1 1 1 1	(4)		(5)

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01	REPORT SOURCE		DOCKET NUMBER		EVENT DATE		REPORT DATE	
	L	(6)	Ø 5 Ø - Ø 3 4 6	(7)	Ø 6 1 4 8 Ø	(8)	Ø 7 1 1 8 Ø	(9)

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 (NP-33-80-59) On 6/14/80 at 1243 hours during the restoration of containment pressure
03 inputs to Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) cabinets, the station experienced an
04 SFAS actuation. The actuation caused decay heat suction to switch from the Borated
05 Water Storage Tank to the emergency sump. A loss of suction occurred and the pump
06 was stopped. This caused a loss of decay heat flow and violation of T.S. 3.9.8.
07 There was no danger to the public or station personnel. Flow was restore [illegible] two
08 minutes and no increase in core temperature was noted.

09	SYSTEM CODE	CAUSE CODE	CAUSE SUBCODE	COMPONENT CODE	COMP. SUBCODE	VALVE SUBCODE
	C F (11)	D (12)	Z (13)	Z Z Z Z Z Z (14)	Z (15)	Z (16)

(17) LER/RO REPORT NUMBER	EVENT YEAR		SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO.		OCCURRENCE CODE	REPORT TYPE		REVISION NO.
	8 Ø	—	Ø 4 9	/	Ø 3	L	—	Ø

ACTION TAKEN	FUTURE ACTION	EFFECT ON PLANT	SHUTDOWN METHOD	HOURS (22)	ATTACHMENT SUBMITTED	NPRD-4 FORM SUB.	PRIME COMP. SUPPLIER	COMPONENT MANUFACTURER
X (18)	G (19)	Z (20)	Z (21)	Ø Ø Ø Ø	Y (23)	N (24)	Z (25)	Z 9 9 9 (26)

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)

10 The cause was a deficient procedure in that ST 5061.01 Appendix F did not require the
11 mechanic to go to test trip bypass while restoring a channel or to reset the channel
12 after completion of restoration. At 1252 hours Decay Heat Pump 1-1 was started and
13 flow re-established. A modification to ST 5061.01 will be added to provide these
14 instructions.

15	FACILITY STATUS	% POWER	OTHER STATUS (30)	METHOD OF DISCOVERY	DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
	H (28)	Ø Ø Ø (29)	NA	B (31)	Conclusion of Surveillance Test

16	ACTIVITY RELEASED	CONTENT OF RELEASE	AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35)	LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
	Z (33)	Z (34)	NA	NA

PERSONNEL EXPOSURES

17	NUMBER	TYPE	DESCRIPTION (39)
	Ø Ø Ø (37)	Z (38)	NA

PERSONNEL INJURIES

18	NUMBER	DESCRIPTION (41)
	Ø Ø Ø (40)	NA

LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY (43)

19	TYPE	DESCRIPTION
	Z (42)	NA

PUBLICITY

20	ISSUED	DESCRIPTION (45)	NRC USE ONLY
	N (44)	NA	

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NAME OF PREPARER Tom Isley PHONE: 419-259-5000, Ext. 230

8007170450

GPO 917-926

TOLEDO EDISON COMPANY
DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION UNIT ONE
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION FOR LER NP-33-80-59

DATE OF EVENT: June 14, 1980

FACILITY: Davis-Besse Unit 1

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE: Inadvertent actuation of Safety Features Actuation System (SFAS) during restoration of containment pressure inputs

Conditions Prior to Occurrence: The unit was in Mode 6, with Power (MWT) = 0 and Load (Gross MWE) = 0.

Description of Occurrence: On June 14, 1980 at 1243 hours, during the restoration of containment pressure inputs to SFAS cabinets, the station experienced an SFAS actuation of levels 1, 2, and 3. Level 1 caused some containment isolation. Level 2 caused more isolation and alignment of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems. Level 3 caused decay heat pump 1-1, which was in service, to switch suction from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) hotleg to the Borated Water Storage Tank (BWST). This caused about 16,000 gallons of borated water to be added to the RCS and raised the level in the refueling canal. At 1248 hours, the BWST level dropped to 4.5 feet which caused a Level 5 actuation. This switches decay heat suction from the BWST to the emergency sump. DH7A and DH7B went closed isolating the BWST. This caused a loss of suction to the decay heat pump. At 1250 hours, the pump was stopped to prevent damage. This caused a loss of decay heat flow and violation of Technical Specification 3.9.8, which requires at least one decay heat loop to be in operation in Mode 6. The action statement requires a suspension of all operations involving an increase in the reactor decay heat load or a reduction in boron concentration of the RCS. The conditions were met. At 1252 hours, the suction for the decay heat pump was restored, the pump placed in service, and the flow was verified at 3000 gpm.

Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence: An I&C mechanic was in the process of restoring the containment pressure inputs to SFAS at the conclusion of the Integrated Leak Rate Test, ST 5061.01, Appendix F. When the mechanic touched the leads for Channel 3 to the terminals, a voltage transient caused a high containment pressure trip of that channel. He then went to Channel 4 and when the leads were attached, a high containment pressure trip was received in that channel. This meant the two out of four requirement for Levels 1, 2, and 3 trip of SFAS was received. ST 5061.01 Appendix F did not require the mechanic to go to test trip bypass while restoring a channel or to reset the channel after completion of restoration which would have prevented the trip of SFAS.

Analysis of Occurrence: There was no danger to the health and safety of the public or to station personnel. No core alterations were in progress and flow was restored within two minutes after it was lost. No increase in core temperature was noted.

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Corrective Action: At 1252 hours on June 14, 1980, suction from the RCS to the decay heat pump 1-1 was re-established, the pump put in service, and flow verified at 3000 gpm. At 1332 hours, the NRC was notified via the red phone. At 1345 hours, the recovery from the safety actuation was complete with the RCS at 92°F and 3000 gpm flow.

A modification, T-4774, has been added to ST 5061.01 to provide instructions on restoring containment pressure inputs to SFAS.

Failure Data: There have been no previous similar reportable occurrences in which decay heat flow was lost due to a procedural inadequacy.

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