

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT

CONTROL BLOCK: | | | | | | | | (1) (PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE ALL REQUIRED INFORMATION)

01 | P | A | T | M | I | 2 | 2 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | 0 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 | 4 | | | 5
7 8 9 14 15 25 26 57 58

CON'T
01 | REPORT SOURCE | 6 | 0 | 5 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 2 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 9 | 8 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 6 | 3 | 0 | 8 | 0 | 9
7 8 60 61 98 89 74 75 90

EVENT DESCRIPTION AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES (10)

02 | On May 29, 1980 at 1100 hours while in the Recovery Mode of Operations (decay heat
03 | removal-cold shutdown core) the pressure transducer being used to monitor RCS pres-
04 | sure was isolated from the RCS (by closing valve SNS-V26) without the Control
05 | Room's knowledge. The transducer isolation occurred during the performance of a
06 | Special Operating Procedure (SOP) used to functionally test the new Temporary Sample
07 | System. This event was a violation of T.S. 3.3.3.6 and is reportable under T.S.
09 | 6.9.1.9. This event had no effect on health and safety of the public.

09 | SYSTEM CODE | CAUSE CODE | CAUSE SUBCODE | COMPONENT CODE | COMP. SUBCODE | VALVE SUBCODE
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 18 19 20
C | J | D | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z | Z
11 12 13 18 19 20
17 | LER/RO REPORT NUMBER | EVENT YEAR | SEQUENTIAL REPORT NO. | OCCURRENCE CODE | REPORT TYPE | REVISION NO.
7 8 9 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
X | 18 | G | 19 | 8 | 0 | | 0 | 2 | 4 | | / | 0 | 3 | L | | 0
33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 47

CAUSE DESCRIPTION AND CORRECTIVE ACTIONS (27)
10 | This event was the result of the SOP being deficient by not maintaining valve SNS-
11 | V26 open during the test. The valve was reopened within the action period of the
12 | T.S. 3.3.3.6. Both the SOP (now void) and the System Operating Procedure were re-
13 | vised to preclude reoccurrence and that the Control Room be notified before any
14 | evolution affecting the RCS pressure indication is conducted, including closing SNS-V26.

15 | FACILITY STATUS | % POWER | OTHER STATUS (30) | METHOD OF DISCOVERY | DISCOVERY DESCRIPTION (32)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47
X | 28 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 29 | Recovery Mode | A | 31 | Operating Observation

16 | ACTIVITY CONTENT | AMOUNT OF ACTIVITY (35) | LOCATION OF RELEASE (36)
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47
Z | 33 | Z | 34 | N/A | N/A

17 | PERSONNEL EXPOSURES
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47
0 | 37 | Z | 38 | N/A

18 | PERSONNEL INJURIES
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47
Z | Z | Z | 40 | N/A

19 | LOSS OF OR DAMAGE TO FACILITY
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47
Z | 42 | N/A

20 | PUBLICITY
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 44 45 46 47
Z | 44 | N/A

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT
NARRATIVE REPORT
TMI-II

LER 80-024/03L-0
EVENT DATE - May 29, 1980

I. EXPLANATION OF OCCURRENCE

On May 29, 1980, at 1100 hours, while in the Recovery Mode of Operations (decay heat removal-cold shutdown core), the pressure transducer being used to monitor RCS pressure was isolated from the RCS (by closing valve SNS-V26) without the Control Room's knowledge. The transducer isolation occurred during the performance of a Special Operating Procedure (SOP) used to functionally test the new Temporary Sample System. This event was a violation of Section 3.3.3.6 and is considered reportable under Section 6.9.1.9 of the Interim Recovery Tech. Specs. This event had no effect on the health and safety of the public.

II. CAUSE OF THE OCCURRENCE

This event was the result of the SOP being deficient by not maintaining valve SNS-V26 open during the test.

III. CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE OCCURRENCE

At the time of the occurrence, the Unit II facility was in a long term cold shutdown state. The reactor decay heat was being removed via natural circulation to the A steam generator which is operating in a 'steaming' mode. Throughout the event, there was no Loss of Natural Circulation Heat Removal in the RCS system.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN OR TO BE TAKEN

IMMEDIATE

Valve SNS-V26 was opened restoring the pressure indication to service within the action period of Tech. Spec. 3.3.3.6.

LONG TERM

The SOP (now void) and the System Operating Procedure (now in effect) were revised to preclude reoccurrence and that the Control Room be notified before any evolution affecting the RCS pressure indication is conducted, including closing SNS-V26.

V. COMPONENT FAILURE DATA

N/A