



Portland General Electric Company  
Trojan Nuclear Plant  
P.O. Box 439  
Rainier, Oregon 97048  
(503) 556-3713

July 9, 1980  
CPY-618-80

Mr. R. H. Engelken, Director  
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region V  
1990 North California Blvd.  
Walnut Creek, California 94596

Dear Sir:

In accordance with the Trojan Plant Operating License, Appendix A, US NRC Technical Specifications, Paragraphs 3.8.1.2 and 3.8.2.4, attached is Licensee Event Report No. 80-11, concerning a situation where both emergency diesel generators were out of service at the same time during periodic maintenance.

Sincerely,

C. P. Yundt  
General Manager

JCP  
CPY/JCP:na  
Attachments

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REPORTABLE OCCURRENCE

1. Report No.: 80-11
2. a. Report Date: July 9, 1980  
b. Occurrence Date: June 11, 1980
3. Facility: Trojan Nuclear Plant, PO Box 439, Rainier, Oregon 97048
4. Identification of Occurrence:

During scheduled periodic maintenance, both emergency diesel generators were out of service at the same time.

5. Conditions Prior to Occurrence:

The plant was in Mode 5, Cold Shutdown at the time of this occurrence.

6. Description of Occurrence:

The "A" train emergency diesel generator was removed from service for an "A" train outage. The "B" train emergency diesel generator had been verified operable prior to removing the "A" train diesel from service. However, the "B" train battery was on an equalizing charge at the time which removes it from the DC bus. The battery supplies control power and field flashing power. When the "B" train emergency diesel generator had been started to verify operability, control and field flashing power was actually supplied by site AC power, as it normally is. Thus, if there had been a complete loss of offsite power, then the "B" train emergency diesel generator would not have started.

7. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence:

The cause of this occurrence was personnel error. A cross train outage had been allowed to occur and the electrical lineup on the "B" train had not been verified prior to removing the "A" train from service.

8. Analysis of Occurrence:

This event had no effect on either plant or public safety. A loss of offsite power did not occur during the approximately two hours that both trains were out of service and if one had occurred, it would have been very easy to close one circuit breaker to place the "B" train battery back on the bus and start the diesel.

9. Corrective Action:

The immediate corrective action was to stop the equalizing charge and place the "B" train battery on the bus and verify the correct electrical lineup. The permanent corrective action was to reinstruct operations personnel to be alert for cross train outages and to verify the correct electrical lineup as part of verifying the operability of an emergency diesel generator train.